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gao_GAO-11-137 | gao_GAO-11-137_0 | Most Responding Officials Were Satisfied with OPM’s Assistance, Guidance, and Information Sharing on Work/Life Programs
OPM’s Office of Work/Life/Wellness Provides Assistance, Guidance, and Information to Assist Federal Agencies in Addressing Work/Life Programs and Issues
OPM officials describe OPM’s Office of Work/Life/Wellness as a source of assistance, guidance, and information that agencies may use to develop their own work/life programs. As shown in figure 1, of the 33 agency officials who responded to our survey, 24 indicated that OPM’s assistance, guidance, and information sharing greatly helped or helped somewhat in implementing work/life programs. Another six agency officials indicated that OPM’s assistance, guidance, and information sharing helped in some cases and hindered in others. We also have previously recommended that OPM disseminate federal agencies’ leading practices in human capital programs to help agencies recruit and retain their workforces. We also surveyed agency officials about the effects of their work/life programs on employee recruitment and retention. However, while OPM has developed a health and wellness pilot program based on discussions with private sector representatives, it has not yet shared information about private sector work/life programs with federal agencies. ive “shared work/life campus”
Although OPM used information from the private sector to develop the WellnessWorks program with the goal of implementing it across the federal government, OPM has not shared with federal departments and agencies information about other health and wellness programs, or other work/life programs implemented in the private sector. Managers at four of the seven companies we spoke to indicated that the work/life programs instituted by their companies had had a great or very great effect on recruitment, retention, and productivity. While OPM has limited its collection and evaluation of federal work/life programs to only a few, some federal agencies are independently tracking and collecting work/life program usage data on a wider range of programs such as alternative work schedules and employee assistance programs. Sharing data among agencies on the effect of work/life programs on agency-intended goals could be helpful for agency decision making in a budget-constrained environment. OPM officials said that they did not track or maintain an inventory of these evaluations nor review these evaluations. OPM’s Office of Work/Life/Wellness has met with private sector company representatives to examine private sector health and wellness programs and the leading practices used to implement those programs, however the office does not systematically collect information on other private sector work/life programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Director of OPM, working with the CHCO Council, identify the resources, steps, and timetable necessary to complete the following three actions: (1) track on a more systematic basis information already being collected by individual federal agencies on their work/life programs, such as program usage data and evaluations; (2) evaluate the results of work/life program surveys conducted by leading private sector organizations, as stated in OPM’s 2010-2015 strategic plan, that could help federal agencies as they implement their work/life programs; and (3) provide the information from both the public and private sectors, including other comprehensive evaluations produced by academic institutions, state entities, and other organizations, to agency officials—through available avenues such as the CHCO Council and federal executive boards—that could help them address work/life program issues and determine if the work/life programs are meeting their agencies’ goals. Our requesters asked us to determine the extent to which (1) OPM provides assistance and guidance to federal agencies for establishing and enhancing work/life programs; (2) OPM or the federal agencies track, evaluate, or refine work/life (3) OPM has identified leading practices in the private sectors for the implementation of work/life programs and shared this information with federal agencies. Office of Personnel Management: Key Lessons Learned to Date for Strengthening Capacity to Lead and Implement Human Capital Reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
To improve its ability to recruit and retain federal employees, agencies have implemented a wide range of work/life programs, such as flexible work schedules, child care, and employee assistance programs. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) plays a key role in guiding federal human capital initiatives, including the implementation of work/life programs. As requested, GAO determined the extent to which: (1) OPM provides assistance and guidance to federal agencies for establishing and enhancing work/life programs; (2) OPM or the federal agencies track, evaluate, or modify work/life programs; and (3) OPM has identified leading practices in the private sector for the implementation of work/life programs and shared this information with federal agencies. To do this, GAO reviewed OPM policy and guidance; surveyed 40 federal officials--20 Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) and 20 work/life managers; and interviewed officials from seven private sector companies recognized for the quality of their work/life programs.
What GAO Found
OPM's Office of Work/Life/Wellness is available to federal agencies to provide assistance, guidance, and information as agencies develop and implement work/life programs. For example, OPM has established formal working groups, sponsored training for agency officials, promulgated regulations to implement work/life programs, and provided informal guidance to agencies that address issues related to these programs. Of the 33 agency officials who responded to GAO's survey, 24 indicated that OPM's assistance, guidance, and information sharing greatly helped or helped somewhat in implementing work/life programs. Another six agency officials indicated that OPM's assistance, guidance, and information sharing helped in some cases and hindered in others. OPM tracks and collects information on a few work/life programs across the federal government, including health and wellness programs which it recently began tracking in response to a White House initiative. Some federal agencies independently provide OPM with evaluations on other work/life programs. However, when asked, OPM officials said that they did not track or maintain an inventory of these evaluations nor review these evaluations due to the lack of time and available resources. Tracking, analyzing, and sharing information among federal agencies on the effect of work/life programs on agency-intended goals could be helpful for individual agency decision making in a budget-constrained environment. To follow up on the White House health and wellness initiative, OPM held several meetings and conferences with representatives from private sector companies to discuss their health and wellness programs and the effect of these programs on recruitment and retention. Although OPM has developed a health and wellness pilot program based on some of the information obtained from these meetings and conferences, OPM has not systematically shared with federal agencies other information about the private sector's health and wellness programs or other work/life programs. GAO also interviewed officials from seven private sector companies recognized for the quality of their work/life programs to identify leading practices in implementing private sector work/life programs. Private sector officials from four of the seven companies that GAO interviewed indicated that their programs have been effective in increasing employee job satisfaction, resulting in improved recruitment, retention, and workforce productivity. Systematically collecting and disseminating information on the implementation and evaluation of private sector work/life programs could help federal agencies compare their work/life programs with leading practices in the private sector.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPM assist agencies in implementing their work/life programs by more systematically tracking and evaluating data on the implementation and evaluation of work/life programs and sharing this information with federal agencies. OPM agreed with GAO's recommendations and suggested technical changes which GAO has incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_AIMD-96-50 | gao_AIMD-96-50_0 | In contrast to our 1989 general management review of OMB, this review focused on a specific reorganization initiative. Overall, the RMOs were assigned about 26 percent more staff than the former budget program areas had, although OMB’s total fiscal year 1994 staffing allocation (556 full-time equivalents) was unchanged. The RMOs were also given responsibility for overseeing agencies’ implementation of governmentwide management policies—a responsibility that had formerly been assigned to OMB’s management offices (the statutory offices and the General Management Division). As a result of OMB 2000, OMB replaced its budget examiner positions with program examiner positions and reassigned staff from the budget program areas, the General Management and Special Studies Divisions, and the statutory offices to fill those positions in the RMOs. Some recent statutory management initiatives have, in fact, provided a new set of tools that may aid the integration of management issues in the budget process. Accordingly, as part of its planned broader assessment of its role in formulating and implementing management policies for the government, OMB should consider the lessons learned from OMB 2000. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to describe (1) changes in OMB’s organizational structure, responsibilities, and staffing as a result of OMB 2000; (2) changes to OMB’s three statutory offices; (3) changes in the attention OMB gave to management issues in the budget formulation process before and after OMB 2000; and (4) how OMB planned to evaluate OMB 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the changes that have occurred at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as a result of OMB 2000, focusing on the: (1) changes in OMB organizational structure, responsibilities, staffing, and OMB statutory offices; and (2) attention OMB gave to management issues in the budget formulation process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) OMB 2000 created a new organizational structure for OMB by reorganizing and replacing former budget program areas with resource management offices (RMO) staffed by employees reassigned to new program examiner positions; (2) OMB shifted specific oversight responsibilities of the statutory offices to RMO, while responsibilities for governmentwide management policies remained in the statutory offices; (3) OMB total staffing allocation remained the same, despite RMO having about 26 percent more staff than previously budgeted; (4) the implementation of OMB 2000 resulted in greater attention to agency management issues in the budget process; (5) while some OMB staff were concerned about their ability to perform their expanded responsibilities, OMB staff generally had a positive view of OMB 2000; and (6) although OMB initially planned to evaluate OMB 2000 as a distinct management initiative, it plans a broader assessment of its overall effectiveness in formulating and implementing management policies for the government. |
gao_GAO-04-770T | gao_GAO-04-770T_0 | Significant External and Internal Demands Will Challenge FAA’s Current and Evolving Operations
FAA faces significant demands that will challenge its ability to operate both in the current environment and in what it expects to encounter in the coming decade. With the industry still attempting to recover from the most tumultuous period in its history, FAA’s funding is constrained by lowered Airports and Airways Trust Fund receipts and increased pressure on the contribution from the General Fund. To meet its current and future operational challenges, FAA is facing demands for greater efficiency and accountability. The U.S. Commercial Aviation Industry Is Still Recovering From Unprecedented Financial Chaos
Since 2001, the U.S. airline industry has confronted financial losses of previously unseen proportions. As a result, the total amount of transportation taxes that were remitted to the Trust Fund declined by $2.0 billion (19.6 percent) between fiscal years 1999 and 2003 (in 2002 dollars). Clearly, a major challenge for FAA both now and into the future will be cost-cutting and cost control. Operating costs represent over half of FAA’s budget. FAA’s most recent forecasts project significant increases in overall system activity by 2015. Despite Personnel and Acquisition Reforms, Systematic Management Issues Continue to Impede ATC Modernization
Over the years, systematic management issues, including inadequate management controls and human capital issues have contributed to the cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that FAA has consistently experienced in acquiring its major ATC modernization systems. ATC Projects Continue to Experience Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems
FAA established its current acquisition management system (AMS) in 1996 following acquisition reform. The ongoing challenges facing air traffic control modernization efforts led Congress and the administration to create a new oversight and management structure through the new Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in order to bring the benefits of performance management to ATC modernization. The ATO was designed to bring a performance management approach to ATC modernization efforts. FAA’s Future Success Hinges on Several Critical Success Factors
To successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century, FAA must fundamentally transform its people, processes, technology, and environment to build a high-performing organization. Specifically, the key characteristics and capabilities of high-performing organizations fall into four themes as follows: A clear, well-articulated, and compelling mission. Strategic use of partnerships. Focus on needs of clients and customers. However, over the years, FAA’s efforts to meet client and customer needs have not always been successful, and some have had a long lasting negative impact. Strategic management of people. While FAA has taken some promising steps through its new ATO to restructure itself in a manner consistent with high-performing organizations, the agency still faces significant and longstanding systemic management challenges. Our work for more than two decades has shown that even modest organizational, operational, and technological changes at FAA can be difficult and time consuming, all of which underscores the difficult road ahead for FAA and its new ATO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last two decades, FAA has experienced difficulties meeting the demands of the aviation industry while also attempting to operate efficiently and effectively. Now, as air traffic returns to pre- 9/11 levels, concerns have again arisen as to how prepared FAA may be to meet increasing demands for capacity, safety, and efficiency. FAA's air traffic control (ATC) modernization efforts are designed to enhance the national airspace system through the acquisition of a vast network of radar, navigation, and communication systems. Nine years have passed since Congress provided FAA with personnel and acquisition reforms. However, projects continue to experience cost, schedule and performance problems. FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is its most current reform effort. Expectations are that the ATO will bring a performance management approach to ATC modernization. This statement focuses on three main questions: (1) What are some of the major challenges and demands that confront FAA? (2) What is the status of FAA's implementation of reforms and/or procedural relief that Congress provided? and (3) What are some of the critical success factors that will enable FAA to become a highperforming organization?
What GAO Found
A forecasted increase in air traffic coupled with budgetary constraints will challenge FAA's ability to meet current and evolving operational needs. The commercial aviation industry is still recovering from financial losses exceeding $20 billion over the past 3 years. Many airlines cut their operating expenses, but FAA's budget continued to rise. However, transportation tax receipts into the Airport and Airways Trust Fund, from which FAA draws the majority of its budget, have fallen by $2.0 billion (nearly 20 percent) since 1999 (in constant 2002 dollars). Cost-cutting and cost-control will need to be watchwords for FAA from this point forward. FAA has implemented many of the reforms authorized by Congress 9 years ago, but achieved mixed results. Despite personnel and acquisition reforms the agency contended were critical to modernizing the nation's air traffic control (ATC) system, systemic management issues continue to contribute to the cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. FAA's most current reform effort, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) -- a new performance-based organization mandated by AIR-21 that is operating the ATC system is just now being put in place. To meet its new challenges, FAA must fundamentally transform itself into a high-performing organization. The key characteristics and capabilities of high-performing organizations fall into four themes: (1) a clear, well articulated, and compelling mission; (2) strategic use of partnerships; (3) focus on the needs of clients and customers; and (4) strategic management of people. FAA has taken some promising steps through its new ATO to restructure itself like high-performing organizations, but still faces significant and longstanding systemic management challenges. Even modest organizational and operational changes at FAA can be difficult and time consuming. |
gao_GAO-09-903T | gao_GAO-09-903T_0 | Within the 10-month period immediately following 9/11, the number of air marshals grew significantly. FAMS deploys thousands of federal air marshals to a significant number of daily domestic and international flights. At times, air marshals may have ground-based assignments. FAMS’s Operational Approach to Achieving Its Core Mission Is Based on Risk-Related Factors
FAMS’s operational approach (concept of operations) for achieving its core mission is based on assessments of risk-related factors, since it is not feasible for federal air marshals to cover all of the approximately 29,000 domestic and international flights operated daily by U.S. commercial passenger air carriers. FAMS seeks to maximize coverage of high-risk flights by establishing coverage goals for 10 targeted critical flight categories. An Independent Assessment Concluded That FAMS’s Approach for Achieving Its Core Mission Was Reasonable; Recommendations for Enhancing the Approach Are Being Implemented
After evaluating FAMS’s operational approach for providing an onboard security presence on high-risk flights, the Homeland Security Institute, a federally funded research and development center, reported in July 2006 that the approach was reasonable. We reviewed the institute’s evaluation methodology and generally found it to be reasonable. Although the institute’s July 2006 report concluded that FAMS’s operational approach was reasonable and valid, the report also noted that certain types of flights were covered less often than others. For example, the institute recommended that FAMS increase randomness or unpredictability in selecting flights and otherwise diversify the coverage of flights. Our January 2009 report noted that FAMS had implemented or had ongoing efforts to implement the institute’s recommendations. FAMS Has Taken Positive Actions to Address Issues Affecting Its Workforce and to Help Ensure Continued Progress
To better understand and address operational and quality-of-life issues affecting the FAMS workforce, the agency’s previous Director—who served in that capacity from March 2006 to June 2008—established various processes and initiatives. The previous Director also established listening sessions that provided a forum for employees to communicate directly with senior management and an internal Web site for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to management. These efforts have produced some positive results. For example, as noted in our January 2009 report, FAMS amended its policy for airport check-in and flight boarding procedures (effective May 15, 2008) to better ensure the anonymity of air marshals in mission status. In addition, FAMS modified its mission scheduling processes and implemented a voluntary lateral transfer program to address certain issues regarding air marshals’ quality of life—and has plans to further address health issues associated with varying work schedules and frequent flying. In our January 2009 report, we also noted that FAMS plans to conduct a workforce satisfaction survey of all employees every 2 years, building upon an initial survey conducted in fiscal year 2007, to help identify issues affecting the ability of its workforce to carry out its mission. Thus, to increase the usefulness of the agency’s biennial workforce satisfaction surveys, we recommended that the FAMS Director take steps to ensure that the surveys are well designed and that additional efforts are considered for obtaining the highest possible response rates. FAMS, to its credit, has established a number of processes and initiatives to address various operational and quality-of-life issues that affect the ability of air marshals and other FAMS personnel to perform their aviation security mission. The current FAMS Director has expressed a commitment to continue relevant processes and initiatives for identifying and addressing workforce concerns, maintaining open lines of communications, and sustaining progress. How does FAMS foster career sustainability for federal air marshals given that maintaining an effective operational tempo is not necessarily compatible with supporting a better work-life balance? These types of questions warrant ongoing consideration by FAMS management and continued oversight by congressional stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
By deploying armed air marshals onboard selected flights, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), a component of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), plays a key role in helping to protect approximately 29,000 domestic and international flights operated daily by U.S. air carriers. This testimony discusses (1) FAMS's operational approach or "concept of operations" for covering flights, (2) an independent evaluation of the operational approach, and (3) FAMS's processes and initiatives for addressing workforce-related issues. Also, this testimony provides a list of possible oversight issues related to FAMS. This testimony is based on GAO's January 2009 report (GAO-09-273), with selected updates in July 2009. For its 2009 report, GAO analyzed policies and procedures regarding FAMS's operational approach and a July 2006 classified assessment of that approach. Also, GAO analyzed employee working group reports and related FAMS's initiatives for addressing workforce-related issues, and interviewed FAMS headquarters officials and 67 air marshals (selected to reflect a range in levels of experience).
What GAO Found
Because the number of air marshals is less than the number of daily flights, FAMS's operational approach is to assign air marshals to selected flights it deems high risk--such as the nonstop, long-distance flights targeted on September 11, 2001. In assigning air marshals, FAMS seeks to maximize coverage of flights in 10 targeted high-risk categories, which are based on consideration of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. In July 2006, the Homeland Security Institute, a federally funded research and development center, independently assessed FAMS's operational approach and found it to be reasonable. However, the institute noted that certain types of flights were covered less often than others. The institute recommended that FAMS increase randomness or unpredictability in selecting flights and otherwise diversify the coverage of flights within the various risk categories. In its January 2009 report, GAO noted that the Homeland Security Institute's evaluation methodology was reasonable and that FAMS had taken actions (or had ongoing efforts) to implement the institute's recommendations. To address workforce-related issues, FAMS's previous Director, who served until June 2008, established a number of processes and initiatives, such as working groups, listening sessions, and an internal Web site for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to management. These efforts have produced some positive results. For example, FAMS revised its policy for airport check-in and aircraft boarding procedures to help protect the anonymity of air marshals in mission status, and FAMS modified its mission scheduling processes and implemented a voluntary lateral transfer program to address certain quality-of-life issues. The air marshals GAO interviewed expressed satisfaction with FAMS's efforts to address workforce-related issues. The current FAMS Director has expressed a commitment to continue applicable processes and initiatives. Also, FAMS has plans to conduct a workforce satisfaction survey of all employees every 2 years, building upon an initial survey conducted in fiscal year 2007. GAO's review found that the potential usefulness of future surveys could be enhanced by ensuring that the survey questions and the answer options are clearly structured and unambiguous and that additional efforts are considered for obtaining the highest possible response rates. To its credit, FAMS has made progress in addressing various operational and quality-of-life issues that affect the ability of air marshals to perform their aviation security mission. However, sustaining progress will require ongoing consideration by FAMS management--and continued oversight by congressional stakeholders--of key questions, such as how to foster career sustainability for air marshals given that maintaining an effective operational tempo can at times be incompatible with supporting a work-life balance. |
gao_GAO-08-301 | gao_GAO-08-301_0 | Accordingly, we addressed the following questions: (1) What is FEMA’s process for developing and refining its cost estimates for any given disaster? (2) From 2000 through 2006, how close have cost estimates been to the actual costs for noncatastrophic natural disasters? (3) Given the findings from the first two questions and our relevant past work, what steps has FEMA taken to learn from past experience and improve its management of disaster-related resources and what other opportunities exist? We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. FEMA Uses Various Methods to Develop and Refine Cost Estimates Depending on Program Requirements
Once a major disaster has been declared, FEMA staff deployed to the joint field office, along with state and local officials and other relevant parties (e.g., private nonprofit organizations, other federal agencies, etc. Cost estimates for mission assignments are developed jointly by FEMA staff and the performing agencies. FEMA officials told us that by 3 months after a declaration the overall estimate of costs related to any given noncatastrophic natural disaster is usually reasonable, that is, within 10 percent of actual costs. These results, however, cannot be generalized to disaster declarations for which all financial decisions have not been made since we were only able to compare estimates to actual costs for about one-quarter of the noncatastrophic natural disasters declared from 2000 through 2006. First, the coding of incident type did not always match the description of the disaster. FEMA Has Taken Steps to Learn from Past Disasters and Improve Its Management of Disaster-Related Resources but Further Opportunities Exist
FEMA officials identified several ways in which FEMA takes past experience into account and uses historical data to inform its cost estimation processes for any given disaster. FEMA could review the effect its own processes have on fluctuations in its disaster cost estimates and take actions to better mitigate these factors. For example, in predicting costs for the Individual Assistance program, the usefulness of a national average should be examined. FEMA’s opportunities to learn from past experience, especially from its disaster cost data, could be hampered by some costs that are no longer distributed to individual disaster declarations. FEMA has also taken steps to improve its management of disaster-related resources, such as “leaning forward,” professionalizing and expanding the responsibilities of its disaster comptroller cadre, and developing a model to predict costs for category 3 or higher hurricanes prior to and during landfall. For example, to improve data reliability FEMA could develop standard operating procedures and training for staff entering and maintaining disaster estimate data in the DFSR database. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better mitigate the effect of factors both beyond and within FEMA’s control to improve the information provided to decision makers; to better inform future estimates, including the ability to incorporate past experience in those estimates; and to improve the management of FEMA’s disaster-related resources, the Secretary of Homeland Security should instruct FEMA’s Administrator to take the following nine actions: Conduct sensitivity analyses to determine the marginal effects of key cost drivers to provide a range for the uncertainty created by factors beyond FEMA’s control. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public Law No. 110-28 directed GAO to review how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) develops its disaster cost estimates. Accordingly, GAO addressed the following questions: (1) What is FEMA's process for developing and refining its cost estimates for any given disaster? (2) From 2000 through 2006, how close have cost estimates been to the actual costs for noncatastrophic (i.e., federal costs under $500 million) natural disasters? (3) What steps has FEMA taken to learn from past experience and improve its management of disaster-related resources and what other opportunities exist? To accomplish this, GAO reviewed relevant FEMA documents and interviewed key officials. GAO also obtained and analyzed disaster cost data and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review.
What GAO Found
After a disaster is declared, FEMA staff deployed to a joint field office work with state and local government officials and other relevant parties to develop and refine cost estimates. The overall estimate comprises individual estimates for FEMA's assistance programs plus any related tasks assigned to other federal agencies (mission assignments) and FEMA administrative costs. The methods used to develop these estimates differ depending on program requirements including, in some cases, historical knowledge. FEMA officials told GAO that cost estimates are updated on a continuing basis. Decision makers need accurate information to make informed choices and learn from past experience. FEMA officials stated that by 3 months after a declaration estimates are usually within 10 percent of actual costs--which they defined as reasonable. GAO's analysis showed that decision makers did not have cost information within this 10 percent band until 6 months after the disaster declaration. These results cannot be generalized since this comparison could only be made for the 83 (24 percent) noncatastrophic natural disaster declarations for which final financial decisions had been made. Disaster coding issues also hamper FEMA's ability to learn from past experience. For example, in several instances the code for the incident type and the description of the disaster declaration did not match. Officials described several ways in which FEMA has learned from past disasters and improved its management of disaster-related resources. For example, FEMA uses a national average to predict costs for expected applicants for Individual Assistance. FEMA has also taken several actions to professionalize and expand the responsibilities of its disaster comptrollers. Nonetheless, FEMA could further learn from past experience by conducting sensitivity analyses to identify the marginal effect various factors have on causing fluctuations in its estimates. FEMA could improve its management of disaster-related resources by developing standard procedures for staff involved in entering and updating cost estimate data in its database. |
gao_GAO-03-679 | gao_GAO-03-679_0 | Background
Over the last decade, telework has emerged as a management tool in the federal government. The statutory framework for telework includes provisions that require agencies to take certain actions related to telework, provide agencies with tools for supporting telework, and provide both GSA and OPM with lead roles in the implementation of telework in the federal government. Therefore, these agencies have not established a delineation of their respective roles. After we discussed the issues created by the lack of coordination between GSA and OPM with both agencies, a GSA official indicated that GSA and OPM expressed a new commitment to coordination, especially with regard to the governmentwide telework Web site. Such a commitment reflects a promising start for better assisting federal agencies in improved implementation of their telework programs. However, the key to success will be sustained efforts by both agencies to work together in assisting agencies and providing consistent and straightforward guidance, services, and resources on the governmentwide telework initiative. Selected Federal Agencies Are Not Fully Implementing Key Telework Practices
We identified 25 key practices in telework-related literature and other sources as those that federal agencies should implement in developing their individual telework programs. While all four agencies we reviewed have taken at least some steps to implement most of the key practices, we found that only 7 of the 25 key practices had been fully implemented by all four agencies. Although some telework-related resources from GSA and OPM, including GSA’s telework implementation manual and OPM’s recently released telework guide for managers, supervisors, and telework coordinators, already provide federal agencies with information on how to implement several of the key practices we identified, agencies may need additional guidance, guidelines, and/or individualized technical support to fully implement these practices. Although GSA and OPM are lead agencies for the governmentwide telework initiative, they have not fully coordinated their efforts in leading the governmentwide telework initiative and have had difficulty in resolving their conflicting views on telework-related matters. Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to characterize the federal laws and their requirements that currently apply to telecommuting within the federal agencies in the executive branch; determine what the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) are doing, as lead agencies, to coordinate and promote telecommuting in the federal government; determine what selected federal agencies are doing to implement key practices in developing telecommuting programs; and identify additional governmentwide actions that could be taken to encourage federal agencies to increase telecommuting participation. Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
GAO Responses to Comments from VA
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Telework--work done at a location other than a traditional office--has gained widespread attention over the past decade as a human capital flexibility offering various potential benefits to employers, employees, and society. Using such flexibilities as management tools can help the federal government address its human capital challenges. GAO did this study in response to a congressional request to assess the federal government's progress in implementing telework programs and to determine what else can be done to give federal employees the ability to telework under appropriate circumstances.
What GAO Found
The statutory framework for federal telework requires agencies to take certain actions related to telework, provides agencies with tools for supporting telework, and provides both the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the General Services Administration (GSA) with lead roles and shared responsibilities for the federal telework initiative. Both agencies offer services and resources to support and encourage telework in the federal government. However, these agencies have not fully coordinated their telework efforts and have had difficulty in resolving their conflicting views on telework-related matters. As a consequence, agencies have not received consistent, inclusive, unambiguous support and guidance related to telework. After we discussed the issues created by the lack of coordination between GSA and OPM with both agencies, a GSA official then indicated that GSA and OPM expressed a new commitment to coordination. Such a commitment reflects a promising start for better assisting federal agencies in improved implementation of their telework programs. However, the key to success will be sustained efforts by both agencies to work together in assisting agencies and providing consistent and straightforward guidance, services, and resources on the governmentwide telework initiative. GAO identified 25 key practices in telework-related literature and guidelines as those that federal agencies should implement in developing telework programs and grouped these practices under seven categories. While the four selected executive agencies we reviewed--the Department of Education (Education), GSA, OPM, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)--have taken at least some steps to implement most of the key practices, only 7 of the 25 key practices, such as establishing a cross-functional project team and establishing an agencywide telework policy, had been fully implemented by all four agencies. Although some telework-related resources from GSA and OPM provide federal agencies with information on how to implement several of the key practices we identified, agencies may need additional guidance, guidelines, and/or individualized technical support to fully implement these practices. |
gao_GAO-05-857T | gao_GAO-05-857T_0 | When considering the risk of mortgages, a substantial amount of research GAO reviewed indicates that the LTV ratio and the borrower’s credit score are among the most important factors when estimating the risk level associated with individual mortgages. Generally, mortgages with higher LTV ratios (smaller down payments) and lower credit scores are riskier than mortgages with lower LTV ratios and higher credit scores. Several Practices Mortgage Institutions Use in Designing and Implementing Low and No Down Payment Products Could Be Instructive for FHA in Managing Risk of a No Down Payment Product
According to representatives of mortgage institutions we interviewed, they use a number of similar practices in designing and implementing new products. Some of these practices could be helpful to FHA in its design and implementation of a zero down payment product, as well as other new products. Although FHA has less flexibility in imposing additional credit enhancements it does have the authority to seek co-insurance, which it is not currently using. FHA makes adjustments to underwriting criteria and to its premiums, but told us that it is unlikely to use a credit score threshold for a new zero down payment product. FHA officials with whom we spoke question the circumstances in which they can limit the availability of a program and told us they do not have the resources to manage programs with limited availability. Mortgage institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mitigate the risk of low and no down payment products by requiring additional credit enhancements such as higher mortgage insurance coverage. For example, mortgage institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sometimes introduce stricter underwriting standards as part of the development of new low and no down payment products (or products about which they do not fully understand the risks). Mortgage institutions may also limit servicing on the loans to servicers with particular product expertise, regardless of who originates the loans. The administration’s proposal for a zero down product included increased premiums to help compensate for an increase in the cost of the FHA program which would permit FHA to potentially offset additional costs stemming from a new product that entails greater risk or not well understood risk. Yet, when FHA makes new products widely available or makes significant changes to existing products with less-understood risks, these products or actions also can introduce significant risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist Congress in considering legislation to authorize the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to carry out a pilot program to insure zero down payment mortgages, this testimony provides information about practices mortgage institutions use in designing and implementing low and no down payment products. It also contains information about how these practices could be instructive for FHA in managing risks associated with a zero down payment product--a product for which the risks are not well understood. This testimony is primarily based on GAO's February 2005 report, Mortgage Financing: Actions Needed to Help FHA Manage Risks from New Mortgage Loan Products, (GAO-05-194).
What GAO Found
In recent years, many mortgage institutions have become increasingly active in supporting low and even no down payment mortgage products. In considering the risks of these new products, a substantial amount of research GAO reviewed indicates that loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and credit score are among the most important factors when estimating the risk level associated with individual mortgages. GAO's analysis of the performance of low and no down payment mortgages supported by FHA and others corroborates key findings in the literature. Generally, mortgages with higher LTV ratios (smaller down payments) and lower credit scores are riskier than mortgages with lower LTV ratios and higher credit scores. Some practices of other mortgage institutions offer a framework that could help FHA manage the risks associated with introducing new products or making significant changes to existing products. Mortgage institutions sometimes require additional credit enhancements, such as higher insurance coverage, and stricter underwriting, such as credit score thresholds, when introducing a new low or no down payment product. FHA is authorized to require an additional credit enhancement, but does not currently use this authority. FHA has used stricter underwriting criteria, but told us it is unlikely they would use a credit score threshold for a new zero down payment product. Mortgage institutions may also impose limits on the volume of the new products they will permit and on who can sell and service these products. FHA officials question the circumstances in which they can limit volumes for their products and believe they do not have sufficient resources to manage a product with limited volumes, but the potential costs of making widely available a product with risk that is not well understood could exceed the cost of initially implementing such a product on a limited basis. |
gao_GAO-16-810 | gao_GAO-16-810_0 | VA’s Procurement Policy Framework Is Outdated and Fragmented, and Acquisition Responsibilities Are Not Always Clear
Our analysis of VA’s contracting regulations and policies, which VA contracting officers must follow, found a framework that is disjointed and difficult to use. Several sources of VA policy address SDVOSB contracting. Workload Is a Challenge for Some Members of VA’s Acquisition Workforce
We found indications that managing workload is a challenge for some of VA’s acquisition workforce, which includes contracting officers and CORs. However, this initiative has not been fully implemented. Without taking more proactive steps to understand and address obstacles to implementing the directive, VHA cannot ensure that all of its medical centers are taking advantage of this potential improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of its procurement efforts. VA Can Improve Its Processes for Medical Supply Purchasing, Identifying Cost Savings Opportunities, and Documenting Contracts
VA can improve the functioning of key procurement processes. Medical supplies are one area where strategic sourcing efforts have lagged. More Than a Third of the Selected Contract Files Lacked Key Documents, and Internal Compliance Reviews Did Not Always Identify These Issues
VA contract files we reviewed were often missing key documents, increasing the risk that key processes and regulations were not followed. As evidenced by missing documentation in our review of selected contract files, existing compliance reviews are not identifying all contract file shortcomings. Conclusions
To fulfill its mission to serve veterans, VA’s discretionary budget was $75 billion in fiscal year 2016, more than a quarter of which was spent on essential goods and services, such as medical services and supplies, provided by contractors. Given the volume of those procurements, which add up to about $20 billion a year, VA must have clear policies and effective oversight in place to ensure that veterans’ needs are being met and that VA is taking full advantage of discounted pricing. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following 10 recommendations to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. 1. 2. In order to ensure that VA’s procurement data is complete and accurate, the Office of Acquisitions and Logistics should develop policies and procedures to ensure that obligations made through prime vendor orders—such as medical-surgical orders—are consistently captured in eCMS. 3. 4. To improve the efficiency of the procurement process, VHA should assess why its April 2014 directive to implement contract liaisons at all medical centers has been inconsistently implemented and take appropriate steps to increase use of these liaison positions, if warranted. However, the department did not send the formal, written response in time for us to include it in this report, although it had over 30 days to respond. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the extent to which Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) data systems accurately reflect VA procurement spending for fiscal years 2013 through 2015, we obtained data on VA contract spending from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 from VA’s Electronic Contract Management System (eCMS). To assess VA procurement policies and lines of authority, we obtained and analyzed VA policy documents, including procurement regulations, policy and guidance, as well as organizational charts and related documentation. We interviewed Office of Procurement Policy officials regarding current and planned policies. We selected six contracting offices to visit, based on those with the largest total contract obligations in fiscal years 2013 through 2015 in eCMS, as well as their organizational structure (in order to select a mix of VHA contracting offices with greater and lesser degrees of centralization) and the types of requirements they procure (in order to select national contracting offices):
NCO 8, St. Petersburg, Florida;
NCO 22, Long Beach, California;
NCO 23, Minneapolis, Minnesota;
National Acquisition Center (NAC), Hines, Illinois;
Strategic Acquisition Center (SAC), Frederick, MD; and
SAC, Fredericksburg, VA.
For the three VHA NCO contracting offices we selected, we also met with officials from their corresponding VISNs, including leadership, CORs, and logistics officials. To assess the extent to which VA’s contracting workforce is positioned to carry out its responsibilities, we obtained and analyzed data on VA employees in the GS-1102 contracting job series from two sources, both of which we found sufficiently reliable for purposes of reporting summary data:
Personnel data from the Office of Human Resources and
FAC-C certification data from OAL’s eCERT system. To assess the extent to which opportunities exist to improve VA’s key procurement functions and to save money, we selected a non- generalizable sample of 37 contracts across five locations—NCO 8, NCO 22, NCO 23, NAC, and the SAC location in Frederick, Maryland. | Why GAO Did This Study
The VA spent about $20 billion in fiscal year 2015 for procurement of a wide range of goods and services that are essential to meeting its mission to serve veterans. A 2015 independent review commissioned by VA found that the procurement acquisition function was unduly complex and inefficient.
GAO was asked to look at how VA manages procurement. This report assesses 1) the extent to which VA data systems accurately reflect procurement spending, 2) VA procurement policies and lines of authority, 3) the extent to which VA's acquisition workforce is positioned to carry out its responsibilities, and 4) the extent to which opportunities exist to improve VA's key procurement functions and save money. GAO analyzed VA policies and procedures and reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 37 contract actions for fiscal years 2013 through 2015, selected based on their dollar value, extent of competition, and use of small business set-asides. GAO interviewed relevant officials and visited six contracting offices.
What GAO Found
GAO found opportunities for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its multi-billion dollar annual procurement spending in several areas including data systems, procurement policies and oversight, acquisition workforce, and contract management.
Shortcomings in VA's recording of procurement data limit its visibility into the full extent of its spending. A recent policy directing that medical-surgical supply orders be captured in VA's procurement system is a step in the right direction, but proper implementation is at risk because procedures are not in place to ensure all obligations are recorded.
VA's procurement policy framework is outdated and fragmented. As a result, contracting officers are unclear where to turn for current guidance. VA has been revising its overarching procurement regulation since 2011 but completion is not expected until 2018. Meanwhile, contracting officers must consult two versions of this regulation, as well as other policy related documents. Clear policies are key to ensuring VA conducts procurements effectively on behalf of veterans. The figure below depicts the various sources of regulations, policy, and guidance.
Sources of Veterans Affairs (VA) Procurement Policy as of June 2016
Managing workload is a challenge for VA's contracting officers and their representatives in customer offices. A 2014 directive created contract liaisons at medical centers in part to address this issue, but medical centers have not consistently implemented this initiative, and VA officials have not identified the reasons for uneven implementation.
VA can improve its procurement processes and achieve cost savings by complying with applicable policy and regulation to obtain available discounts when procuring medical supplies; leveraging its buying power through strategic sourcing; ensuring key documents are included in the contract file, as GAO found that more than a third of the 37 contract files lacked key documents; and ensuring that compliance reviews identify all contract file shortcomings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 10 recommendations, including that VA develop procedures to ensure all obligations are recorded in the procurement system, update and clarify its policy framework, assess and address inconsistent implementation of the contract liaison initiative, review strategic sourcing efforts, and improve contract reviews. VA stated that it agreed with all of GAO's recommendations; however, VA did not provide its written response in time for publication in this report. |
gao_GAO-09-554 | gao_GAO-09-554_0 | To develop a better understanding of the effects of human-induced climate change and identify options for adaptation and mitigation, two United Nations organizations established IPCC in 1988 to assess scientific, technical, and socio-economic information on the effects of climate change. Aviation Emissions Represent a Small but Growing Share of All Emissions
IPCC estimates that aviation emissions currently account for about 2 percent of global human-generated carbon dioxide emissions and about 3 percent of the radiative forcing of all global human-generated emissions (including carbon dioxide) that contribute to climate change. Other assumptions include improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency and air traffic management and increases in airport and runway capacity. IPCC used the medium economic growth rate scenario to estimate aviation’s contribution to overall emissions in 2050. Assumptions about Other Factors Could Affect IPCC’s Forecasts
In developing its forecasts, IPCC made assumptions about factors other than economic growth that also affected its for experts we interviewed, and FAA have noted: ecast results, as IPCC itself, IPCC assumed that advances in aircraft technology and the introduction new aircraft would increase fuel efficiency by 40 percent to 50 percent from 1997 through 2050. However, if significant reductions are made in overall emissions from other sources and aviation emission levels continue to grow, aviation’s contribution could grow. Experts Believe Future Technological and Operational Improvements Are Likely to Help Reduce Emissions from Commercial Aircraft, but Likely Not by Enough to Fully Offset Estimated Market Growth
According to experts we interviewed, a number of different technological and operational improvements related to engines, aircraft design, operations, next-generation air traffic management, and fuel sources are either available now or are anticipated in the future to help reduce carbon dioxide emissions from aircraft. The development and adoption of low-emissions technologies is likely to be dependent upon fuel prices or any government policies that price aircraft emissions. Experts Believe That Although Many Technologies Are Expected to Help Reduce Emissions Growth in the Future, They Involve Trade-offs
Aircraft Engine Improvements
Improvements to aircraft engines have played a primary role in increasing fuel efficiency and reducing engine emission rates; experts we interviewed expect them to do so in the future—one study estimates that 57 percent of improvements in aircraft energy intensity between 1959 and 1995 were due to improvements in engine efficiency. Many new aircraft can be purchased with winglets, and existing aircraft also can be retrofitted with them. As a result, according to some experts we interviewed, there may be little additional improvement in reducing emissions by reducing on-board weight. A large number of industry and government participants, including airlines, fuel producers, and manufacturers, are currently conducting research and development on alternative fuels for aircraft. He used IPCC’s midrange forecast of emissions to 2050 as a baseline for future traffic and found that even assuming the introduction of these technologies, global emissions in 2050 would continue to exceed 2000 emissions levels. Governments Can Use a Variety of Policy Options to Help Reduce Commercial Aircraft Emissions, but the Costs and Benefits of Each Vary
Governments have a number of policy options—including policies that set a price on emissions, market-based measures like a cap-and-trade program or a tax, regulatory standards, and funding for research and development—they could use to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions from commercial aviation and other sectors of the economy. However, given the relatively small current and forecasted percentage of global emissions generated by the aviation sector, actions taken to reduce aviation emissions alone, and not emissions from other sectors, could be costly and have little potential impact on reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the government would establish a market under which the regulated sources could buy and sell allowances with one another. In addition, according to IPCC, because technology standards may require emissions to be reduced in specified ways, they may not provide the flexibility to encourage industry to search for other options for reducing emissions. Government-Sponsored Research and Development Can Help Encourage the Development and Adoption of Low- Emissions Technologies, but May Be Costly to Governments
Government-sponsored research into low-fuel consumption and low- emissions technologies can help foster the development of such technologies, particularly in combination with a tax or a cap-and-trade program. EPA provided technical comments via email that were incorporated as appropriate and also provided a written response. Emissions standards, for example, generally give regulated sources fewer incentives to reduce emissions beyond what is required for compliance. Emissions will be calculated for the entire flight. To specifically address technological and operational options to reduce commercial aviation’s contribution to greenhouse gases and other emissions that can have an impact on the climate, we contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to identify and recruit experts in aviation and environmental issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aircraft emit greenhouse gases and other emissions, contributing to increasing concentrations of such gases in the atmosphere. Many scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)--a United Nations organization that assesses scientific, technical, and economic information on climate change--believe these gases may negatively affect the earth's climate. Given forecasts of growth in aviation emissions, some governments are taking steps to reduce emissions. In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed (1) estimates of aviation's current and future contribution to greenhouse gas and other emissions that may affect climate change; (2) existing and potential technological and operational improvements that can reduce aircraft emissions; and (3) policy options for governments to help address commercial aircraft emissions. GAO conducted a literature review; interviewed representatives of government agencies, industry and environmental organizations, airlines, and manufacturers, and interviewed and surveyed 18 experts in economics and aviation on improvements for reducing emissions from aircraft. GAO is not making recommendations. Relevant agencies provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate and EPA said emissions standards can have a positive benefit to cost ratio and be an important part of policy options to control emissions.
What GAO Found
According to IPCC, aviation currently accounts for about 2 percent of human-generated global carbon dioxide emissions, the most significant greenhouse gas--and about 3 percent of the potential warming effect of global emissions that can affect the earth's climate, including carbon dioxide. IPCC's medium-range estimate forecasts that by 2050 the global aviation industry, including aircraft emissions, will emit about 3 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and about 5 percent of the potential warming effect of all global human-generated emissions. Gross domestic product growth is the primary driver in IPCC's forecasts. IPCC also made other assumptions about future aircraft fuel efficiency, improvements in air traffic management, and airport and runway capacity. IPCC's 2050 forecasts for aviation's contribution to global emissions assumed that emissions from other sectors will continue to grow. If other sectors make progress in reducing emissions and aviation emissions continue to grow, aviation's relative contribution may be greater than IPCC estimated; on the other hand, if other sectors do not make progress, aviation's relative contribution may be smaller than estimated. While airlines currently rely on a range of improvements, such as fuel-efficient engines, to reduce emissions, some of which may have limited potential to generate future reductions, experts we surveyed expect a number of additional technological, operational, and alternative fuel improvements to help reduce aircraft emissions in the future. However, according to experts we interviewed, some technologies, such as advanced airframes, have potential, but may be years away from being available, and developing and adopting them is likely to be costly. In addition, according to some experts we interviewed, incentives for industry to research and adopt low-emissions technologies will be dependent to some extent on the level and stability of fuel prices. Finally, given expected growth of commercial aviation as forecasted by IPCC, even if many of these improvements are adopted, it appears unlikely they would greatly reduce emissions by 2050. A number of policy options to address aircraft emissions are available to governments and can be part of broader policies to address emissions from many sources including aircraft. Market-based measures can establish a price for emissions and provide incentives to airlines and consumers to reduce emissions. These measures can be preferable to other options because they would generally be more economically efficient. Such measures include a cap-and-trade program, in which government places a limit on emissions from regulated sources, provides them with allowances for emissions, and establishes a market for them to trade emissions allowances with one another, and a tax on emissions. Governments can establish emissions standards for aircraft or engines. In addition, government could increase government research and development to encourage development of low-emissions improvements. |
gao_GAO-13-743 | gao_GAO-13-743_0 | Physical inspections are one of the main tools NRC uses to oversee licensee performance. NRC assesses its reviews of performance indicators and all findings that result from its physical inspections to determine what actions, if any, to take in response to signs of declining performance, including violations of NRC requirements. NRC Relies on Staff’s Professional Judgment in Implementing Its Processes for Overseeing the Safety of Commercial Nuclear Reactors
NRC relies on its staff’s professional judgment in implementing its processes, which are largely prescribed in guidance, for overseeing the safety of commercial nuclear power reactors. NRC Allocates Specific Oversight Roles and Responsibilities among Regional Officials, Resident Inspectors, Headquarters Officials, and the Nuclear Power Industry
To implement its oversight, NRC allocates specific roles and responsibilities to regional officials, resident inspectors, headquarters officials, and the nuclear power industry. NRC assigns resident inspectors to each nuclear power plant to conduct baseline inspections. NRC also builds into its processes incentives for licensees to identify concerns about reactor safety, discuss those concerns with NRC, and identify actions to correct them. NRC Oversight Relies on Its Staff’s Professional Judgment in Applying Regulations and Guidance
NRC’s oversight processes are based in regulation, and its specific processes for identifying and assessing findings and violations are largely prescribed in guidance, but rely on several key points where NRC staff must exercise their professional judgment, such as determining (1) whether an issue of concern constitutes a finding or violation, (2) a finding’s risk significance or a violation’s severity, and (3) whether findings or violations have cross-cutting aspects, among other things. Differences Exist across NRC Regions in Identifying and Resolving Findings, and NRC Has Taken Some Steps to Address Them
NRC is aware of differences across regions in identifying and resolving the findings that result from its oversight processes and has taken some steps to address them. During the same period, Region II—the region with the greatest number of reactors and plants—recorded the fewest number of nonescalated findings. Differences in inspection hours. NRC Officials and Industry Representatives Have Raised Concerns about Differences in the Number of Findings Identified across NRC Regions
NRC officials and industry representatives have raised concerns that differences in the number of findings NRC regions identify may be due, in part, to differences in how NRC staff identify and resolve findings. Number of Escalated Findings Had Fewer Differences across NRC Regions
The number of escalated findings had fewer differences across regional offices. According to NRC officials, the initiative was intended to explore how the different regional offices identify and assess inspection findings. Thus even with taking these steps to examine the consistency of its oversight processes, agency officials told us that NRC has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the differences in the number of nonescalated findings identified across regions. Under federal standards for internal control, managers at the functional or activity level are to compare actual performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization and analyze significant differences. Without conducting such an analysis, NRC (1) does not know whether its regional offices or individual inspectors are applying regulations and guidance consistently in handling findings; or (2) cannot identify other factors that may have led to the differences. NRC Uses Numerous Methods to Develop Lessons Learned for Improving Oversight, but Challenges Remain in Accessing This Information
NRC has both formal and informal methods for developing lessons learned to improve its oversight. Formal methods include agencywide programs and annual assessments. Informal methods include reaching out to peer groups and technical experts throughout the agency and accessing various agency databases. Although NRC guidance directs inspectors to use information in agency databases on past experiences to plan and conduct future inspection activities, inspectors face challenges accessing this information, which may limit their ability to use it. NRC has also undertaken special initiatives, such as the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force, to develop lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan that it could apply in its oversight of U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors. Without better search tools, inspectors could overly rely on information available through informal channels. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe how the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) implements its processes for overseeing the safety of commercial nuclear power reactors; (2) evaluate the extent to which NRC consistently identifies and resolves findings through these processes; and (3) describe NRC’s methods for developing lessons learned to improve its oversight and challenges, if any, NRC faces in doing so. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2011 disaster at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant demonstrated that unexpected nuclear accidents with extreme consequences can occur and, thus, heightened concerns about NRC's ability to oversee the safety of U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors. NRC oversees safety through multiple processes, such as physically inspecting reactors and also responding to signs of declining performance (i.e., findings) or violations of its requirements.
GAO was asked to review NRC's oversight of the U.S. nuclear power industry. This report examines (1) how NRC implements its processes for overseeing the safety of commercial nuclear power reactors; (2) the extent to which NRC consistently identifies and resolves findings through these processes; and (3) NRC's methods for developing lessons learned to improve its oversight and challenges, if any, NRC faces in doing so. GAO reviewed NRC policies and guidance; visited five nuclear power plants located in multiple NRC regions; analyzed NRC data on findings, violations, licensee performance, and inspection hours; interviewed NRC officials and industry representatives; and observed demonstrations of NRC's database search tools.
What GAO Found
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relies on its staff's professional judgment in implementing its processes for overseeing the safety of U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors. In implementing this oversight, NRC allocates specific roles and responsibilities to resident inspectors assigned to each plant, regional officials at one of four regional offices responsible for most oversight activities, headquarters officials, and the nuclear power industry. NRC also builds into its processes incentives for plant managers to identify concerns about reactor safety, report those concerns to NRC, and take prompt actions to correct them. NRC's processes for identifying and assessing findings and violations are based on prescribed agency procedures and include several points where NRC staff must exercise their professional judgment, such as determining whether issues of concern identified during physical inspections constitute findings or violations and the risk significance of any findings or the severity of any violations, among other things.
NRC is aware of differences across regional offices in identifying and resolving findings that result from physical inspections. GAO's analysis of NRC's data indicated that the number of escalated findings had fewer differences across regions than nonescalated findings, which are lower-risk findings and less severe violations. According to NRC officials, several factors, such as the hours spent on inspections, may explain the differences in nonescalated findings. However, GAO found that the regional office with the fewest reactors and the fewest inspection hours had the most nonescalated findings. NRC officials and industry representatives have raised concerns that the differences may also be due to differences in how NRC staff identify and resolve findings. NRC has taken some steps to examine the consistency of its oversight. For example, in 2009, the four regional offices implemented an initiative to explore how the regional offices identify and assess inspection findings. However, NRC has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the differences in the number of nonescalated findings across regions. Under federal standards for internal control, managers are to compare actual performance with planned or expected results throughout the organization and analyze significant differences. Without such an analysis, NRC does not know whether its regional offices are applying regulations and guidance consistently.
NRC has both formal and informal methods for developing lessons learned to improve its oversight. Formal methods include agencywide programs, annual and biennial assessments, and special initiatives. Informal methods include reaching out to peers and technical experts across the agency and accessing various agency databases. Although NRC guidance directs inspectors to use information in agency databases on past experiences to plan and conduct inspection activities, inspectors face challenges accessing this information, which may limit their ability to use it. For example, several NRC inspectors reported contacting other inspectors informally because NRC's database search tools contain limited instructions and do not ensure thorough results. Without better search tools, inspectors may overly rely on information available through informal channels.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that NRC analyze the causes of differences in identifying and resolving findings across regional offices and address these differences, and that it improve its database search tools. NRC agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GGD-99-176 | gao_GGD-99-176_0 | Plans Were Inconsistent and Incomplete
The refund plan and the paper submissions plan were inconsistent and incomplete in two key areas of IRS’ guidance. These areas were performance goals and mitigating actions. These weaknesses raise questions about whether these two plans provide sufficient assurance that IRS has taken all the necessary steps to reduce the impact of a potential Year 2000 failure. IRS officials agreed to make changes to these two plans to improve their consistency and completeness in these areas. Although this business contingency plan includes a specific performance goal as required by IRS’ guidance, that goal is inconsistent with the recommended contingency actions. The inconsistency between the performance goal and the business contingency plan procedures raises questions about the goal that IRS is trying to achieve with its contingency plan. With respect to mitigating actions, this plan did not include dates for completing them before a potential Year 2000 failure. Moreover, the plan did not specify which individuals were to be responsible for completing the mitigating actions. Although IRS’ guidance does not require that the plan identify specific individuals, without identifying responsible individuals and dates for completing the mitigating actions, IRS has little assurance that these actions will be completed before a potential Year 2000 failure. The paper submissions plan focuses on the contingency actions to be implemented in the event that SCAMPS experiences a Year 2000 system failure. Although IRS’ guidance calls for plans to contain a performance goal, the paper submissions plan did not include one. Also, we told IRS officials that we had questions about the viability of one of the plan’s mitigating actions. Actions Are Under Way to Help Ensure Consistency and Completeness of All Plans
In addition to agreeing to make changes to the two plans, IRS officials said that actions are under way to help ensure that other business contingency plans are consistent and complete. If properly implemented in a timely fashion, these actions should provide IRS with a higher level of assurance that its business contingency plans will help reduce the impact in the event of a Year 2000–related system failure. 1, 1999); and (3) Internal Revenue Service Century Date Change Business Continuity and Contingency Plan, (Version 1.0, Nov. 24, 1998); interviewed officials from the Century Date Change Project Office; interviewed members of the submission processing contingency plan working group, the executive that was responsible for the two plans we reviewed, the Business Year 2000 Executive, and other BSRO staff; toured the Atlanta Service Center to learn more about how tax returns are processed through IRS’ information systems; and reviewed 6 of the 10 sections of the two business contingency plans to determine whether they were consistent with IRS’ guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed two Internal Revenue Service (IRS) year 2000 business continuity and contingency plans for their consistency and completeness on the basis of IRS' guidance for such plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) two IRS business continuity and contingency plans--one for processing paper tax returns that result in a refund (refund plan) and the other for receiving paper submissions (paper submissions plan)--were inconsistent and incomplete in two key areas included in IRS' guidance: (a) performance goals; and (b) mitigating actions; (2) these weaknesses raise questions about whether these two plans provide sufficient assurance that IRS has taken all the necessary steps to reduce the impact of a potential year 2000 failure; (3) IRS' guidance requires that plans specify a desirable performance goal; (4) the performance goal for the refund plan was inconsistent with the plan's contingency actions; (5) this inconsistency raises questions about the goal that IRS is trying to achieve with the refund plan; (6) the paper submissions plan did not include a performance goal; (7) without appropriate performance goals, IRS has little assurance that the contingency actions specified in the plan are appropriate for reducing the impact of a potential year 2000 failure; (8) in addition, neither plan specified the completion dates for the mitigating actions, which IRS' guidance defines as the steps that are to be completed in advance of a potential year 2000-related failure, to help reduce its impact; (9) moreover, neither plan specified which individuals were to be responsible for completing the mitigating actions; (10) IRS' guidance requires that the plans include mitigating actions and completion dates, but does not require that responsible individuals be identified for completing mitigating actions; (11) however, without assigning actions to specific individuals and identifying completion dates, IRS has little assurance that these actions will be completed before a potential year 2000 failure; (12) in June 1999, GAO informed IRS officials of its concerns regarding these two plans; (13) GAO also told them that its concerns raise questions about the extent to which other plans may have similar weaknesses; (14) in response to GAO's concerns, IRS officials agreed to make changes to improve the completeness and consistency of these two plans; (15) they also said they have designated an individual that is to determine the extent to which other plans may have similar weaknesses and revise the plans as needed; and (16) in addition, IRS assigned one of its year 2000 contractors to set up a mechanism by which IRS could track the implementation of business continuity and contingency plan actions. |
gao_GAO-06-200 | gao_GAO-06-200_0 | Several Factors Have Contributed to the Increase in Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions
Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased over two-thirds from calendar year 2000 to calendar year 2004. JIATF-South and other cognizant agency officials pointed to a number of factors that contributed to the increases, such as better intelligence on cocaine movements that allow JIATF-South to target specific cocaine shipments; the introduction of armed helicopters increasing the capability to interdict cocaine shipments on go-fast boats; and increased cooperation from nations in the region, which has led to more efficient use of resources. Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions Have Increased
Cocaine seizures and disruptions have increased about 68 percent since calendar year 2000. Availability of Assets Provided for Interdiction Operations Have Varied Since Fiscal Year 2000
Overall, since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and allied assets provided for detecting and disrupting drug trafficking activities in the transit zone has varied. On-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and flight hours peaked in fiscal year 2002, but both have declined since then, primarily because Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense assets in recent years were mostly offset by additional ship days and aircraft hours provided by the Coast Guard, CBP, and allied nations. Nevertheless, according to JIATF-South, it cannot detect many of the known maritime cocaine movements reported in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because it cannot get ships or aircraft to the suspected movement in time. JIATF-South officials attribute the recent declines primarily to the reduced availability of U.S. Navy P-3 maritime patrol aircraft because of structural problems. Challenges in Maintaining Interdiction Operations
While the United States has increased the number of seizures and disruptions in the transit zone since 2000, the Coast Guard, CBP, and Defense face several challenges in maintaining the current level of assets provided for transit zone interdiction operations. In addition, the readiness rates of older Coast Guard ships, which support interdiction operations in the transit zone, have declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar system on its long- range surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. Agencies’ Performance Measures Vary and Data for Assessing Performance Are Problematic
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving their goals, and to communicate their results to the Congress. The Coast Guard’s performance measures related to the transit zone set specific goals to reduce the flow of cocaine. Data for Assessing Transit Zone Interdiction Operations and Drug Use in the United States Are Problematic
Data for assessing U.S. interdiction operations in the transit zone and relating the results to the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy’s priority of disrupting the illicit drug market and to its overall goal of reducing drug usage in the United States are problematic. As a result of the disparity between the estimated cocaine supply and demand, the interagency group stated that a precise estimate of cocaine flow was not possible for 2004, and that “a range of possible amounts was more intellectually and analytically honest.” The group estimated that between 325 and 675 metric tons of cocaine flowed towards the United States in 2004, but such a wide range is not useful for assessing transit zone interdiction efforts. ONDCP Has Not Fully Addressed Prior Recommendations for Improving Drug Data Collection and Analysis
In a 2001 report prepared for ONDCP, the National Research Council concluded that the United States had neither the data systems nor the research infrastructure needed to assess the effectiveness of drug control enforcement policies. Homeland Security did not state when it will complete this effort. According to ONDCP officials, they have not been completed. Scope and Methodology
Overall, to examine the status of U.S. interdiction assets and progress made in disrupting drug trafficking in the transit zone, we focused on U.S. (1) efforts to interdict cocaine because nearly all the cocaine entering the United States comes from South America and (2) operations in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because the United States has positioned most of its interdiction assets in these areas. We discussed these matters with cognizant law enforcement and military authorities at Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and headquarters in Washington, D.C. We also discussed operational challenges with Coast Guard officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where the Coast Guard stations armed helicopters used in interdiction operations; CBP officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where CPB stations P-3 maritime patrol aircraft used in interdiction operations; DEA officials in Miami, Florida, and Nassau, Bahamas, who manage an ongoing drug interdiction program in the waters around the Bahamas called “Operation Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos;”
JIATF-South officials in Key West, Florida, including the Commander; representatives from the Coast Guard, CBP, Defense, and other U.S. agencies; as well as the liaison officers from France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; and Justice officials with the U.S. Attorney’s offices in Tampa and Sarasota, Florida, directly involved in the Panama Express operation. | Why GAO Did This Study
One of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy's priorities is to disrupt the illicit drug market. To this end, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security provide ships and aircraft to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, shipped from South America through the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean--an area known as the transit zone. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) oversees the U.S. anti-drug strategy. The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) directs most transit zone operations. We examined U.S. efforts to interdict maritime movements of cocaine. We analyzed the (1) changes in cocaine seizures and disruptions since calendar year 2000, (2) trends in interdiction assets provided since fiscal year 2000, (3) challenges to maintaining transit zone interdiction operations, and (4) performance measures the agencies use to assess their progress.
What GAO Found
Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased about 68 percent since calendar year 2000--from 117 metric tons in 2000 to 196 metric tons in 2004. About two-thirds of the disruptions were in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean where the United States has most of its interdiction assets. JIATF-South and other cognizant officials attribute the increase to improved interagency cooperation and intelligence, the introduction of armed helicopters to stop go-fast boats, and increased cooperation from nations in the region. Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of assets--ships and aircraft--to disrupt drug trafficking in the transit zone have varied. On-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and flight hours peaked in 2002, but both have generally declined since then, primarily because the Department of Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense assets have been largely offset by the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and certain allied nations. Nevertheless, in recent years, JIATF-South has detected less than one-third of the "known and actionable" maritime illicit drug movements in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean. Yet, once detected, over 80 percent of the drug movements were disrupted. Various factors pose challenges to maintaining the current level of transit zone interdiction operations. The reduced availability of the U.S. Navy's P-3 maritime patrol aircraft due to structural problems will degrade the U.S. capability to detect suspect maritime movements, readiness rates of older Coast Guard ships have declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar system on the Coast Guard's long-range surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. Coast Guard and CBP officials also noted that they may not be able to sustain their level of assets in light of budget constraints and other homeland security priorities that may arise. These officials expressed concern that the long-term implications of likely declines in transit zone assets have not been addressed. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving their goals. The Coast Guard's measures relate to reducing cocaine flow through the transit zone, CBP's planned measures are not specific to the transit zone, and Defense's planned measures focus on the number of disruptions of cocaine movements. But data that would help in assessing transit zone interdiction operations are problematic. For instance, in its assessment for 2004, ONDCP reported that between 325 metric tons and 675 metric tons of cocaine may be moving towards the United States. Such a wide range is not useful for assessing transit zone interdiction operations. In addition, data on U.S. drug usage are difficult to obtain and often cannot be generalized to the United States. In a 2001 report for ONDCP, the National Research Council made similar observations and recommended ways to improve the collection and analysis of illicit drug data, but ONDCP has not fully addressed them. |
gao_GAO-14-364T | gao_GAO-14-364T_0 | Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Financial Risks from Extreme Weather Events by Increasing the Nation’s Resilience
Among other impacts, climate change could threaten coastal areas with rising sea levels, alter agricultural productivity, and increase the intensity and frequency of severe weather events such as floods, drought, and hurricanes that have cost the nation tens of billions of dollars in damages over the past decade. Given these challenges and the nation’s fiscal condition, in February 2013, we added Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks to our list of high-risk areas. Climate-related impacts will result in increased fiscal exposures for the federal government from many areas, including, but not limited to its role as (1) the insurer of property and crops vulnerable to climate impacts, (2) the provider of aid in response to disasters, (3) the owner or operator of extensive infrastructure such as defense facilities and federal property vulnerable to climate impacts, and (4) the provider of data and technical assistance to state and local governments responsible for managing the impacts of climate change on their activities. Federal Government as Insurer of Property and Crops
The financial risks from two important federal insurance programs—the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) administered by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)—create a significant fiscal exposure. In 2012, the NFIP had property coverage of over $1.2 trillion and the FCIC had crop coverage of almost $120 billion. As of December 2013, FEMA’s debt from flood insurance payments totaled about $24 billion—up from $17.8 billion before Superstorm Sandy—and FEMA had not repaid any principal on the loan since 2010. Further, the federal government’s crop insurance costs have increased in recent years for a variety of reasons, more than doubling from $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $7.6 billion in fiscal year 2012. In March 2007, we reported that both of these programs’ exposure to weather-related losses had grown substantially, and that FEMA and USDA had done little to develop the information necessary to understand their long-term exposure resulting from climate change. We are currently examining how these programs account for climate change in their activities. topography, coastal erosion areas, changing lake levels, future changes in sea levels, and intensity of hurricanes in updating its flood maps. The federal government does not fully budget for these costs, thus creating a large fiscal exposure. We reported, in September 2012, that disaster declarations have increased over recent decades to a record of 98 in fiscal year 2011 compared with 65 in 2004. Over that period, FEMA obligated over $80 billion in federal assistance for disasters. Federal Government as Property Owner and Operator
The federal government owns and operates hundreds of thousands of buildings and facilities that a changing climate could affect. For example, in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense (DOD) recognized the risk to its facilities posed by climate change, noting that the department must assess potential impacts and adapt as required. We plan to report later this year on DOD’s management of climate change risks at over 500,000 defense facilities. Federal Government as Provider of Technical Assistance to State and Local Governments
The federal government invests billions of dollars annually in infrastructure projects that state and local governments prioritize and supervise. According to a 2010 Congressional Budget Office report, total public spending on transportation and water infrastructure exceeds $300 billion annually, with roughly 25 percent of this amount coming from the federal government and the rest coming from state and local governments. This work—within the framework of the February 2013 high- risk designation—may identify other steps the federal government could take to limit its fiscal exposure and make our communities more resilient to extreme weather events. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the United States Global Change Research Program, the costs and impacts of weather disasters resulting from floods, drought, and other events are expected to increase in significance as previously “rare” events become more common and intense. These impacts pose financial risks to the federal government. While it is not possible to link any individual weather event to climate change, these events provide insight into the potential climate-related vulnerabilities the United States faces.
GAO focuses particular attention on government operations it identifies as posing a “high risk” to the American taxpayer and, in February 2013, added to its High Risk List the area Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks . GAO's past work identified a variety of fiscal exposures—responsibilities, programs, and activities that may either legally commit the federal government to future spending or create the expectation for future spending in response to extreme weather events. This testimony is based on reports GAO issued from March 2007 to November 2013 that address these issues.
GAO is not making new recommendations but made numerous recommendations in prior reports on these topics, which are in varying states of implementation by the Executive Office of the President and relevant federal agencies.
What GAO Found
The federal government has opportunities to limit its exposure and increase the nation's resilience to extreme weather events. Since 1980, the U.S. has experienced 151 weather disasters with damages exceeding 1 billion dollars each. This testimony focuses on 4 areas where the government could limit its fiscal exposure.
Property and crop insurance . The financial risks from two federal insurance programs—the National Flood Insurance Program administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC)—create a significant fiscal exposure. In 2012, the NFIP had property coverage of over $1.2 trillion and the FCIC had crop coverage of almost $120 billion. As of December 2013, FEMA's debt from flood insurance payments totaled about $24 billion. For various reasons, FCIC's costs more than doubled from $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $7.6 billion in fiscal year 2012. In 2007, GAO found that the agencies responsible for these programs needed to develop information on their long-term exposure to climate change. The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 requires FEMA to use information on future changes in sea levels and other factors in updating flood maps used to set insurance rates. Private insurers are also studying how to include climate change in rate setting. GAO is currently examining the extent to which private and federal insurance programs address risks from climate change.
Disaster aid . The federal government does not fully budget for recovery activities after major disasters, thus creating a large fiscal exposure. GAO reported in 2012 that disaster declarations have increased to a record 98 in fiscal year 2011 compared with 65 in 2004. Over that period, FEMA obligated over $80 billion for disaster aid. GAO's past work recommended that FEMA address the federal fiscal exposure from disaster assistance.
Owner and operator of infrastructure . The federal government owns and operates hundreds of thousands of facilities that a changing climate could affect. For example, in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense (DOD) recognized the risk to its facilities posed by climate change, noting that the department must assess the potential impacts and adapt. GAO plans to report later this year on DOD's management of climate change risks at over 500,000 defense facilities.
Provider of technical assistance to state and local governments . The federal government invests billions of dollars annually in infrastructure projects that state and local governments prioritize, such as roads and bridges. Total public spending on transportation and water infrastructure exceeds $300 billion annually, with about 25 percent coming from the federal government and the rest from state and local governments. GAO's April 2013 report on infrastructure adaptation concluded that the federal government could help state and local efforts to increase their resilience by (1) improving access to and use of available climate-related information, (2) providing officials with improved access to local assistance, and (3) helping officials consider climate change in their planning processes. |
gao_GAO-01-617 | gao_GAO-01-617_0 | As of March 31, 2001, federal regulatory and enforcement agencies had not taken any enforcement actions or prosecuted any cases under this law. Federal agencies have taken initial regulatory steps to ensure that financial institutions establish appropriate safeguards designed to protect customer information. However, they supported the legislation because it explicitly makes fraudulent access to financial information a crime. Others Suggested Few Legislative or Administrative Changes for Consideration
As stated previously, more time and experience are needed to assess the efficacy and adequacy of the remedies contained in Subtitle B regarding fraudulent access to financial information. As discussed earlier, we did not evaluate how practical these suggestions were since we found no consensus on these issues. FTC staff and some state officials suggested that states be allowed to take enforcement actions for violations of Subtitle B provisions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the efficacy and adequacy of the remedies provided by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) in addressing attempts to obtain financial information by false pretenses, we interviewed officials from the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. | What GAO Found
This report provides information on (1) the efficacy and adequacy of remedies provided by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 in addressing attempts to obtain financial information by false pretenses and (2) suggestions for additional legislation or regulatory action to address threats to the privacy of financial information, from financial institutions. As of March 2001, federal regulatory and enforcement agencies had not taken any enforcement actions or prosecuted any cases under Subtitle B. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice are still in the process of taking steps to ensure that the financial institutions that they regulate have reasonable controls to protect against fraudulent access to financial information. Although all of the federal regulators and privacy experts whom GAO contacted agreed that more time and experience are needed to determine if Subtitle B remedies adequately address fraudulent access to financial information, FTC staff and privacy experts suggested legislative changes to Subtitle B. GAO did not evaluate the potential impact or practicality of these suggestions because it found no consensus on these ideas. |
gao_GAO-10-13 | gao_GAO-10-13_0 | DHS has delivered US-VISIT entry, and evaluated exit, capabilities in a series of increments. DHS reports that enumeration is being used by DHS’s U.S. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS develop a plan for delivering a comprehensive exit capability that included, among other things, key milestones and performance measures. Processing. To this end, the US-VISIT program office has established integrated project management plans, and has adopted an integrated approach to interacting with and involving project stakeholders, both of which are important ingredients to project success. However, US-VISIT has not developed and employed an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be accomplished to deliver the Comprehensive Exit solution. Rather, it is relying on several separate and distinct schedules to manage individual aspects of the project. Moreover, not all of these individual schedules are reliable because they have not been derived in accordance with relevant schedule estimating guidance. Without a Comprehensive Exit integrated master schedule that is derived in accordance with relevant guidance, the program office cannot reliably commit to when and how the work needed to deliver the Comprehensive Exit solution will be performed, and it cannot adequately manage and measure its progress in executing the work needed to deliver it. Both the Air Exit Pilots schedule and the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot schedule only fully meet one of the nine key schedule estimating practices, and either partially, minimally, or do not meet the remaining eight. In contrast, the prime contractor’s schedule is largely reliable, as it fully or substantially meets all nine practices. Conclusions
To DHS’s credit, it has completed or has under way five of six components that fall under the auspices of its US-VISIT Comprehensive Exit project, the status of which range from preplanning to transitioning to operations and maintenance, and it is managing some aspects of these various project components in an integrated manner. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the status of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to deliver a comprehensive exit solution for the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program and (2) the extent to which DHS is applying an integrated approach to managing its comprehensive exit solution. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program stores and processes biometric and biographic information to, among other things, control and monitor the entry and exit of foreign visitors. Currently, an entry capability is operating at almost 300 U.S. ports of entry, but an exit capability is not. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has previously reported on limitations in DHS's efforts to plan and execute its efforts to deliver US-VISIT exit, and made recommendations to improve these areas. GAO was asked to determine (1) the status of DHS's efforts to deliver a comprehensive exit solution and (2) to what extent DHS is applying an integrated approach to managing its comprehensive exit solution. To accomplish this, GAO assessed US-VISIT exit project plans, schedules, and other management documentation against relevant criteria, and it observed exit pilots.
What GAO Found
DHS has established a Comprehensive Exit project within its US-VISIT program that consists of six components that are at varying stages of completion. To DHS's credit, the US-VISIT program office has established integrated project management plans for, and has adopted an integrated approach to, interacting with and involving stakeholders in its Comprehensive Exit project. However, it has not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needs to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution. Rather, it is relying on several separate and distinct schedules to manage individual components and the US-VISIT prime contractor's work that supports these components. Moreover, neither of the two component schedules that GAO reviewed are reliable because they have not been derived in accordance with relevant guidance. Specifically, both the Air Exit Pilots schedule and the Temporary Worker Visa Exit Pilot schedule only fully meet one of nine key schedule estimating practices, and either partially, minimally, or do not meet the remaining eight. In contrast, the prime contractor's schedule is largely reliable, as it fully or substantially meets all nine practices. Without a master schedule for the Comprehensive Exit project that is integrated and derived in accordance with relevant guidance, DHS cannot reliably commit to when and how the work will be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution to its almost 300 ports of entry, and it cannot adequately monitor and manage its progress toward this end. |
gao_GAO-01-781 | gao_GAO-01-781_0 | The Park Service identified 53 priority construction projects, and the Congress identified an additional 27 projects as priority projects. Variation in Project Costs Depends on Project Type, Functions Included, and Size
Visitor center project costs vary depending on whether the projects require new construction or renovation of existing visitor centers, the number and type of functions included in the visitor center building, and the size of the building. The Park Service estimates that $48 million, or 9 percent, of the total funding for the 80 visitor center projects will be fee demonstration funds. We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior; the Director of the National Park Service; and other interested parties. The projects are grouped by whether or not they involve new construction or renovation of an existing building, and by the status of the project construction. Appendix III: Funding Sources and Total Costs of Park Service Visitor Center Projects
The following table provides details on the funding sources for the 80 visitor center projects that the Park Service has completed, has under construction, or is planning. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Our objectives were to discuss overall project costs and functions. We noted that the Park Service buildings are expected to have a long lifespan because the Park Service policy is to renovate and reuse buildings before they are replaced. | Why GAO Did This Study
Visitor centers at the national parks are among the most important facilities run by the National Park Service. As existing visitor centers age and new parks are created, renovated or new facilities are needed. This report discusses (1) the number, the status, and the reasons for Park Service visitor center projects; (2) whether the projects involve new construction or the renovation of existing buildings; (3) whether these projects were designated priorities by the Park Service or by Congress; (4) the costs and functions of the projects; and (5) the funding sources for the projects.
What GAO Found
GAO found that from 1996 through 2005, the Park Service has completed or planned 80 projects to renovate or build new visitor centers. The renovations and new construction are intended to replace aging facilities and exhibits, to provide more space, and to handle rising numbers of visitors. Of the 80 projects, 53 were a priority of the Park Service and 27 were a priority of Congress. The Park Service estimates that the total cost of the 80 projects will be $542 million. The visitor center projects are funded primarily by the Park Service's appropriated funds. Other funding sources include private partnerships and fee demonstrations. |
gao_GAO-13-266 | gao_GAO-13-266_0 | Consumers may be charged two types of fees. Finally, the acquiring fee is paid by the ATM owner to the EFT networks for use of the networks to conduct the ATM transaction. Financial institutions operate ATMs as a convenience to their own account holders, who generally do not pay fees to use these ATMs. Financial Institutions Operate ATMs Primarily for Their Own Account Holders, Often with No Fees
According to industry estimates, there are approximately 420,000 ATMs currently operating in the United States, and financial institutions operate just under half of those machines, either in their own facilities or at off-site locations, such as shopping centers, drug stores, and grocery stores. Most independent ATM operators charge a surcharge fee to consumers for the convenience of accessing their account from a machine outside their bank’s ATM network. ATM Surcharge Fees Assessed by Financial Institutions Have Increased, While Foreign Fees Remained Constant
Our analysis shows that the prevalence and amount of ATM surcharge fees levied by financial institutions have generally increased since 2007, while foreign fees have generally remained constant in prevalence and amount, as seen in figure 2. Of those institutions that charged a surcharge fee, the estimated average ATM surcharge fee increased from $1.75 in 2007 to $2.10 in 2012. Surcharge fees charged by financial institutions in our sample ranged from $0.28 to $5.52 in 2007, and the range was $0.45 to $5.00 in 2012. In 2012, the estimated average surcharge fee for larger financial institutions was approximately $0.24 higher than the estimated average surcharge fee for smaller financial institutions, and banks’ estimated average surcharge fees were also $0.17 higher than the estimated average surcharge fees charged by credit unions. However, we analyzed data from Informa Research Services on the fees charged by a judgmentally selected sample of 100 ATMs run by independent ATM operators in 2012. The surcharge fee ranged from $1.50 to $3.00. However, some independent ATMs may have surcharge fees that are higher or lower than those in our sample. However, data obtained by mystery shoppers from a sample of 100 judgmentally selected independent ATMs in the top 10 metropolitan statistical areas, show that most of these ATMs charged a surcharge fee to the mystery shopper, but some transactions were conducted surcharge free. Consumers Have Many Ways to Obtain Cash without Incurring Fees
To obtain cash without incurring fees, consumers can generally withdraw cash at a bank branch during banking hours or use ATMs in their bank’s network. Additionally, some financial institutions participate in surcharge-free networks that allow their customers free access to ATMs outside their bank’s network of ATMs. In this way, a financial institution can expand the number and location of ATMs available to its customers. Infrastructure and processing. None of the data we collected on costs are generalizable to either the financial institution or independent ATM operator populations at-large, although some costs, such as hardware and software investments, were mentioned as key drivers by many of the operators included in our work. Our analysis of the data collected from a sample of 30 institutions from three financial institution types—large bank, medium bank, and credit union—revealed some key differences in the biggest cost drivers for these ATM operators. Increasing Costs and Declining Revenues Are Prompting Some Changes in ATM Operations
Most operators included in our study—financial institutions and independent firms—reported that overall ATM costs have increased over the past 5 years and they expect that they will continue to do so. In contrast, 6 operators reported that revenues remained about the same, and 4 reported a slight increase during that same period. Specifically, the objectives of this report are to discuss (1) the business models for ATM operators— financial institution and independent firms—and how they set ATM fees, (2) the amounts of fees that consumers incur to conduct ATM transactions and how these fees changed over time, and (3) the reported costs of ATM operations for financial institution and independent ATM operators and how costs and revenues are expected to change. To discuss the operations and costs for ATM operators, in addition to the interviews discussed above, we surveyed a nonprobability sample of financial institutions and independent firms that operate ATMs to collect information on
ATM operations and business models,
ATM transaction levels for calendar year 2011,
ATM costs for calendar year 2011 in 12 specific cost categories, overall ATM cost and revenue trends for the past 5 years and in the future, and factors ATM operators consider when setting ATM fees. To report on the amounts of fees that consumers pay to conduct transactions at financial institution ATMs, and how these fees changed over time, we purchased and analyzed data on surcharge and foreign ATM fees charged by banks and credit unions from 2007 through 2012 from Moebs $ervices, Inc. (Moebs), a market research firm that specializes in the financial services industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1960s, consumers have increasingly used ATMs to easily access their accounts and conduct transactions such as cash withdrawals. Consumers may incur fees to use ATMs, such as a surcharge fee, which is paid to the ATM operator for transactions conducted at ATMs outside their financial institutions network. In 2008, GAO reported that ATM surcharge fees had increased since 2000. GAO was asked to review issues related to continued increases in these fees.
This report discusses (1) the business models for ATM operators and how they set ATM fees, (2) the amounts of fees that consumers incur to conduct ATM transactions and how these fees have changed over time, and (3) the reported costs of ATM operations for ATM operators and how the costs and revenues are expected to change.
For this work, GAO surveyed a nongeneralizable sample of 30 financial institutions and 4 independent ATM operators to collect information on their ATM operations and costs in calendar year 2011. In addition, GAO analyzed two types of ATM fees data obtained from firms specializing in the financial services industry: (1) data on fees charged by financial institutions from 2007 to 2012 that are generalizable to all financial institutions in the United States, and (2) nongeneralizable data on fees charged by independent ATM operators that were procured by mystery shoppers at 100 judgmentally selected independent ATMs in 2012. GAO also interviewed industry representatives and federal regulators to understand ATM operations and requirements.
What GAO Found
Automated teller machine (ATM) operators include financial institutions--banks and credit unions--as well as independent firms. Industry representatives GAO spoke with estimate there are approximately 420,000 ATMs in the United States. They estimate that financial institutions operate and set the fees for about half of the market, and independent operators work together with merchants to operate the remainder and to determine the fees incurred by consumers. ATM operators have differing business models that affect the way they set ATM fees for consumers. Financial institutions operate ATMs as a convenience to their own account holders, who generally do not pay fees to use these ATMs, while non-account-holding customers do. At independent ATMs, most consumers incur a surcharge fee, although there are some exceptions, such as when the ATM is part of a surcharge-free ATM network.
GAO estimates that the prevalence and amount of ATM surcharge fees charged by financial institutions have increased since 2007, and that the estimated average surcharge fee for financial institutions that charged a fee increased from $1.75 in 2007 to $2.10 in 2012, in 2012 dollars. In 2012, surcharge fees charged by financial institutions ranged from $0.45 to $5.00. GAO's analysis of a nongeneralizable sample of 100 ATMs run by independent operators found that the average surcharge fee was $2.24 and ranged from $1.50 to $3.00 in 2012. However, some independent ATMs may have surcharge fees that are higher or lower than those in GAO's sample. In contrast, GAO estimates that the foreign fee--the fee assessed by financial institutions for using an ATM outside the institution's network--generally stayed constant in dollar amount over this period. Consumers have many ways to obtain cash without incurring fees, such as using ATMs within their financial institution's network. Additionally, some financial institutions participate in surcharge-free networks that allow their customers free access to ATMs outside their institution's ATM network. These networks can greatly expand the number and location of ATMs available to consumers free of charge.
GAO's analysis of the ATM cost data reported by a nongeneralizable sample of financial institutions it surveyed revealed some differences in the biggest cost drivers for ATM operations. For example, large banks' reported costs for hardware and software investments were higher as a percentage of their reported total ATM costs than for the midsize banks and credit unions. Key cost drivers reported by the nongeneralizable sample of independent ATM operators varied, but commonly reported costs were rent, infrastructure, and transaction processing. In addition, most of the surveyed ATM operators reported that overall per-ATM costs have increased over the past 5 years, while per-ATM revenues have declined. Many of the operators GAO contacted believe that ATM operation costs will continue to rise in the future and that revenues will be flat or decline. |
gao_GAO-02-360 | gao_GAO-02-360_0 | Several EOP staff said they believed that what they observed during the transition, such as broken furniture and excessive trash left behind, was done intentionally. Some former Clinton administration staff acknowledged that they had observed a few keyboards with missing “W” keys and some prank signs at the end of the administration. However, the former Clinton administration staff we interviewed also said that (1) the amount of trash that was observed during the transition was what could be expected when staff move out of their offices after 8 years; (2) they did not take the items that were discovered missing; (3) some furniture was broken, but not intentionally, before the transition and little money was spent on repairs and upkeep during the administration; and (4) many of the reported observations were not of vandalism. Appendix III discusses steps to help prevent damage to government property during future presidential transitions. Conclusions
Damage, theft, vandalism, and pranks occurred in the White House complex during the 2001 presidential transition. 2. 3. The GAO reports that “EOP staff . 1. 4. | What GAO Found
Damage, theft, vandalism, and pranks occurred in the White House complex during the 2001 presidential transition. Several Executive Office of the President (EOP) staff claim that they observed (1) messy offices containing excessive trash or personal items, (2) numerous prank signs containing derogatory and offensive statements about the president, (3) government property that was damaged, and (4) missing items. Further, EOP staff believed that what they observed during the transition was done intentionally. Some former Clinton administration staff acknowledged that they observed some damaged items and prank signs. However, the former Clinton administration staff said that (1) the amount of trash found during the transition was what could be expected; (2) they did not take the missing items; (3) some furniture was unintentionally broken before the transition, and little money was spent on repairs and upkeep during the administration; and (4) many of the reported observations were not of vandalism. This report makes several recommendations regarding the prevention and documentation of vandalism during future presidential transitions. |
gao_GAO-09-518 | gao_GAO-09-518_0 | DOD Has Not Effectively Managed and Overseen the Acquisition and Deployment of DRRS
DOD has not effectively managed and overseen the acquisition and deployment of DRRS in accordance with a number of key program management disciplines that are recognized in DOD acquisition policies and guidance, along with other relevant guidance, and are fundamental to delivering a system that performs as intended on time and within budget. In particular, DRRS requirements have not been effectively developed and managed, and DRRS testing has not been adequately performed and managed. Further, DRRS has not been guided by a reliable schedule of the work needed to be performed and the key activities and events that need to occur. These program management weaknesses can be attributed in part to long-standing limitations in program office staffing and oversight. Specifically, key users have only recently become fully engaged in developing requirements, and requirements have been experiencing considerable change and are not yet stable. Until April 2009, DRRS was not subject to any of DOD’s established mechanisms and processes for overseeing information technology systems. This absence of effective oversight has contributed to a void in program accountability and limited prospects for program success. Some DRRS Features Are Operational but Are Not Fully Consistent with Legislative Requirements and DOD Guidance
DOD has implemented DRRS features that allow users to report certain mission capabilities that were not reported under the legacy system, but these features are not fully consistent with legislative requirements and DOD guidance; and DOD has not yet implemented other envisioned features of the system. In addition, DRRS has not fully addressed the challenges with metrics that were identified prior to 1999 when Congress required DOD to establish a new readiness reporting system. Users have also noted that DRRS lacks some of the current and historical data and connectivity with DOD’s planning systems necessary to manage and deploy forces. DOD Is Providing Congress with DRRS Capability Data from the Combatant Commands, but Services Have Not Consistently Reported Capability Data
The geographic combatant commands are capturing enhanced capability data in DRRS, and DOD’s quarterly readiness reports to Congress currently contain this information, as well as information that is drawn from DOD’s legacy readiness reporting system, GSORTS. However, the military services have not consistently used the enhanced capability reporting features of DRRS. Because DRRS does not yet fully interface with legacy systems to allow single reporting of readiness data, the Army and Navy developed additional system interfaces and are reporting in DRRS. While some Marine Corps units are reporting their capabilities in DRRS, the Marine Corps had not yet directed its units to report in the system as of May 2009. However, after investing about 7 years and about $96.5 million in developing and implementing DRRS, the system’s schedule has been extended, requirements are not stable, and the system still does not meet congressional and DOD requirements for a comprehensive readiness reporting system to assess readiness and help decision makers manage forces needed to conduct combat and contingency operations around the world. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address the risks facing DOD in its acquisition and deployment of DRRS, and to increase the chances of DRRS meeting the needs of the DOD readiness community and Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the Chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to reconsider the committee’s recent approval of DRRS planned investment for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and convene the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to review the program’s past performance and the DIO’s capability to manage and deliver DRRS going forward. We did not evaluate the department’s overall ability to assess the readiness of its forces or the extent that data contained in any of its readiness reporting systems, including DRRS and the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS), reflect capabilities, deficiencies, vulnerabilities, or performance issues. Specifically, (1) the test events for already acquired, as well as currently deployed and operating, DRRS releases and subreleases were not based on well-defined plans, and test events have not been fully executed in accordance with plans or executed in a verifiable manner, or both; (2) the results of executed test events have not been captured and used to ensure that problems discovered were disclosed to decision makers and ultimately corrected; and (3) the DIO has not established an effective test management structure to include, for example, a clear assignment of test management roles and responsibilities, or a reliable schedule of planned test events. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) reports data about the operational readiness of its forces. In 1999, Congress directed DOD to create a comprehensive readiness system with timely, objective, and accurate data. In response, DOD started to develop the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). After 7 years, DOD has incrementally fielded some capabilities, and, through fiscal year 2008, reported obligating about $96.5 million. GAO was asked to review the program including the extent that DOD has (1) effectively managed and overseen DRRS acquisition and deployment and (2) implemented features of DRRS consistent with legislative requirements and DOD guidance. GAO compared DRRS acquisition disciplines, such as requirements development, test management, and DRRS oversight activities, to DOD and related guidance, and reviewed the system's current and intended capabilities relative to legislative requirements and DOD guidance. We did not evaluate DOD's overall ability to assess force readiness or the extent that readiness data reflects capabilities, vulnerabilities, or performance issues.
What GAO Found
DOD has not effectively managed and overseen the DRRS acquisition and deployment, in large part because of the absence of rigorous and disciplined acquisition management controls and an effective governance and accountability structure for the program. In particular, system requirements have not been effectively developed and managed. For example, user participation and input in the requirements development process was, until recently, limited, and requirements have been experiencing considerable change, are not yet stable, and have not been effectively controlled. In addition, system testing has not been adequately performed and managed. For example, test events for already acquired system increments, as well as currently deployed and operating increments, were not based on well-defined plans or structures, and test events have not been executed in accordance with plans or in a verifiable manner. Moreover, DRRS has not been guided by a reliable schedule of work to be performed and key activities to occur. These program management weaknesses can, in part, be attributed to long-standing limitations in program office staffing and program oversight and accountability. Despite being a DOD-wide program, until April, 2009 DRRS was not accountable to a DOD-wide oversight body, and it was not subject to DOD's established mechanisms and processes for overseeing business systems. Collectively, these acquisition management weaknesses have contributed to a program that has fallen well short of expectations, and is unlikely to meet future expectations. DOD has implemented DRRS features that allow users to report certain mission capabilities that were not reported under the legacy system, but these features are not fully consistent with legislative requirements and DOD guidance; and DOD has not yet implemented other features. The geographic combatant commands are currently reporting their capabilities to execute most of their operations and major war plans in DRRS, and DOD is reporting this additional information to Congress. However, because DRRS does not yet fully interface with legacy systems to allow single reporting of readiness data, the military services have not consistently used DRRS's enhanced capability reporting features. For example, as of May 2009, the Army and Navy had developed interfaces for reporting in DRRS, while the Marine Corps required units to only report in their legacy system. Recently, the Marine Corps also began developing an interface and has done limited reporting in DRRS. In addition, DRRS has not fully addressed the challenges with metrics that led Congress to require a new readiness reporting system. DRRS metrics are less objective and precise, and no more timely than the legacy system metrics. Users have also noted that DRRS lacks some of the current and historical data and connectivity with DOD's planning systems necessary to manage and deploy forces. Until these limitations are fully addressed, DRRS will not have the full complement of features necessary to meet legislative and DOD requirements, and users will need to rely on legacy reporting systems to support mission-critical decisions. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-214 | gao_T-HEHS-98-214_0 | Since August 1997, about three-quarters of the mandates with a July 1998 deadline have been implemented. HCFA’s recent publication of the Medicare+Choice and SNF PPS regulations are examples of the progress HCFA has made in implementing key mandates. BBA-mandated changes. Adequate Information Critical to Success of Medicare+Choice
BBA establishes a new Medicare+Choice program, which will significantly expand the health care options that can be marketed to Medicare beneficiaries beginning in the fall of 1998. Recognizing that consumer information is an essential component of a competitive market, BBA mandated a national information campaign with the objective of promoting informed plan choice. campaign” that includes comparative data on the available health plan choices. Reliable Plan Performance Data Essential to Quality-Based Competition
Comparative data on quality and performance are a key component of the information campaign mandated by BBA and an essential underpinning of quality-based competition. immature health plan information systems and ambiguities in the HEDIS measurement specifications. The large range in disenrollment rates among HMOs suggests that this single variable could be a powerful tool in alerting beneficiaries about potentially significant differences among plans and the need to seek additional information before making a plan choice. The campaign is to be financed primarily from user fees—that is, an assessment on participating health plans. Ultimately, the design of this and other aspects of the information campaign should be driven less by cost and more by how effective they are in meeting beneficiary needs and contributing to the intended transformation of the Medicare program. Anticipated Savings at Risk With New SNF Payment System
On July 1, 1998, HCFA began phasing in a Medicare PPS for SNFs, as directed by BBA. Although HCFA met the deadline for issuing the implementing regulations for the new SNF per diem payment system, features of the system and inadequate data used to establish rates could compromise the anticipated savings. Even if additional audits were to uncover significant inappropriate costs, HCFA maintains that it has no authority to adjust the base rates after the July 1, 1998, implementation of the new payment system. Thus, more people could be eligible and Medicare could be responsible for longer stays unless HCFA is clear that Medicare coverage criteria have not been changed. In contrast, when Texas implemented a similar reimbursement system for Medicaid, the state instituted on-site reviews to monitor the accuracy of patient assessments and to determine the need for training assessors. At the time it is processing the bill, the claims contractor will not have access to data that would allow confirmation that the patient’s classification matches the assessment. HCFA could take short-term steps to correct deficiencies in the new SNF PPS. BBA Provisions Delayed by Year 2000 Computer Renovations
Collection of non-inpatient encounter data from plans SHMO: Plan for integration of part C and SHMO Medicare subvention: Project for military retirees Reporting and verification of provider identification numbers (employer identification numbers and Social Security numbers)
Maintaining savings from temporary reductions in capital payments for PPS hospitals SNF consolidated billing for part B services Payment update for hospice services Update to conversion factor 1/1/99Implementation of resource-based practice expense RVUs Implementation of resource-based malpractice RVUs Prospective payment fee schedule for ambulance services Application of $1,500 annual limit to outpatient rehabilitation therapy services (continued)
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) implementation of Medicare provisions contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), focusing on: (1) an overview of how HCFA's implementation has progressed since GAO's earlier testimony; (2) the efforts to inform Medicare beneficiaries about the expanded health plan choices available to them in 1999, commonly referred to as the information campaign; and (3) the prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNF), which began a 3-year phase-in in June 1998.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HCFA is making progress in meeting the legislatively established implementation schedules; (2) since the passage of BBA in August 1997, almost three-fourths of the mandates with a July 1998 deadline have been implemented; (3) however, HCFA officials have acknowledged that many remaining BBA mandates will not be implemented on time; (4) HCFA maintains that these delays will have a minimal impact on anticipated Medicare program savings; (5) given the concurrent competition for limited resources and the differing importance and complexity of the many BBA mandates, the success or failure of HCFA's implementation efforts should not be judged solely on meeting deadlines; (6) rather, any assessment should consider whether the agency is meeting congressional objectives while taking a reasoned management approach to identifying critical BBA tasks, keeping them on track, and integrating them with other agency priorities; (7) complying with the BBA mandate to conduct an information campaign that provides beneficiaries with the tools to make informed health plan choices poses significant challenges for HCFA and participating health plans; (8) in implementing the Medicare plus Choice program, HCFA must now assemble the necessary comparative information about these options and find an effective means to disseminate it to beneficiaries; (9) a parallel goal of the information campaign is to give beneficiaries information about the quality and performance of participating health plans to promote quality-based competition among plans; (10) HCFA has accelerated its goals for obtaining standardized information from plans, and GAO believes health plan disenrollment rates provide an acceptable short-term substitute measure of plan performance; (11) the campaign is to be financed primarily from user fees; (12) HCFA has met the July 1, 1998, implementation date for phasing in a new payment system for SNFs; (13) GAO is concerned, however, that payment system design flaws and inadequate underlying data used to establish payment rates may compromise the system's ability to meet the twin objectives of slowing spending growth while promoting the delivery of appropriate beneficiary care; (14) in the short term, the new payment system could be improved if HCFA clearly stated that SNFs are responsible for insuring that the claims they submit are for beneficiaries who meet Medicare coverage criteria; and (15) in the longer term, further research to improve the patient grouping methodology and new methods to monitor the accuracy of patient assessments could substantially improve the performance of the new payment system. |
gao_GAO-03-685 | gao_GAO-03-685_0 | Government Auditing Standards, effective in January 2003, call for auditors to “be free, both in fact and appearance from personal, external, and organizational impairments to independence.” These standards also require that auditors “avoid situations that could lead reasonable third parties with knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances to conclude that the auditor is not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment . . ..” Given that their independence and impartiality is so critical, inspectors general need to be sensitive to how their actions might be perceived and interpreted by their staffs, the administration, Congress, and the public. Some employees questioned the Inspector General’s judgment in regard to her possession of a firearm in the office, as well as law enforcement credentials. Evaluation of OIG Productivity
The OIG conducts a variety of activities that aim to improve program operations, identify and recover overpayments, and investigate and sanction those who violate statutes and regulations governing HHS programs. Second, it is difficult to compare performance from one year to the next because the results in one period are heavily dependent on work in the pipeline that was initiated in prior years. Many of the OIG’s productivity measures remain comparable to prior years or showed increases, but we found that several other key indicators of performance have declined since the Inspector General took office. Also, the number of convictions resulting from the OIG’s investigative referrals has steadily increased over the last 6 years. The OIG Chief Counsel explained that, in 2002, the Department of Education became responsible for processing most of the exclusions of health care providers who had defaulted on the repayment of their federally funded student loans. For example, we noted reductions in the number of settlements and recovery amounts that result from the OIG’s False Claims Act referrals to DOJ. As shown in table 4, the number of these cases had a marked decline since fiscal year 2000. OEI management decided to combine the results of both projects into a single report. Measure of Employee Morale
Based on our survey and extensive interviews, we found in the aggregate that employee views about the organization, management, and their personal job satisfaction remained positive and relatively unchanged between 2002 and 2003. Our survey revealed a substantial deterioration in OEI employees’ views of the organization, management, and their personal job satisfaction. Our results also showed that 54 percent of OCIG employees lack trust and confidence in their organization. The decline in the views of OCIG staff can, in part, be attributed to changes implemented by the Inspector General, and the atmosphere of anxiety and distrust that her actions created. We also provided them with a copy of our draft report. In written comments on a draft of this report, the Inspector General disagreed with some of our findings and characterizations of certain events. The Office of the Secretary did not provide comments. In reference to our discussion about the OIG’s productivity, the Inspector General stated that the OIG had achieved substantial accomplishments under her leadership and direction and cited the savings attributable to its work in fiscal year 2002. For example, senior managers were considerably more disturbed than all other employees about OIG leadership. Further, headquarters employees expressed less satisfaction with the organization and leadership than their counterparts in the field. We continue to believe that the Inspector General’s decision to intervene at the request of senior officials in the Florida governor’s office and her subsequent instructions to her staff to delay the audit created a perception that her independence was compromised. The Inspector General noted that most of the individuals who left the OIG following her changes were in new positions that were “at least equal to or better than” the ones they occupied at the OIG and that she always promoted from within the organization. In our draft report, we also discussed the OIG’s budgetary difficulties. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To conduct our review, we focused on three key areas—the leadership exhibited by the current Inspector General, Janet Rehnquist, the productivity of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) in recent years, and employee morale. Analysis of OIG Performance Measures
To determine whether the OIG has experienced any changes in productivity since the current Inspector General took office in August 2001, we reviewed OIG publications, such as its semi-annual reports, to determine how savings, recommendations, and other performance indicators changed since fiscal year 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Janet Rehnquist became the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in August 2001. GAO was asked to conduct a review of the Inspector General's organization and assess her leadership, independence, and judgment in carrying out the mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG). GAO examined indicators of the OIG's productivity and compared them to the organization's past performance. GAO also determined whether employee morale has been sustained by surveying all OIG employees and comparing the results to those obtained through an identical survey administered in 2002. On March 4, 2003, the Inspector General resigned her office effective June 1, 2003. However, in this report we refer to Ms. Rehnquist as the Inspector General.
What GAO Found
The credibility of inspectors general is largely premised on their ability to act objectively and impartially--both in substance and in perception. Some of the HHS Inspector General's actions--including her decision to delay a politically sensitive audit--created the perception that she lacked appropriate independence in certain situations. The Inspector General exhibited serious lapses in judgment that further troubled many OIG staff. For example, she inappropriately obtained a firearm that she briefly possessed at her workplace and OIG credentials that identified her as a law enforcement officer. The Inspector General also initiated a variety of personnel changes in a manner that resulted in the resignation or retirement of a significant portion of senior management, disillusioned a number of higher level OIG officials and other employees, and fostered an atmosphere of anxiety and distrust. Ultimately, the collective effect of these actions compromised her ability to serve as an effective leader of HHS's Office of Inspector General. Examining productivity trends is difficult because the work of the OIG often involves multiyear efforts and the results recorded for a single year are heavily dependent on work initiated in prior years. Similarly, savings achieved in any one year can be attributable to the culmination of efforts made over several years. Given these constraints, GAO noted that productivity at the OIG over the last 3 years increased in some areas and declined in others. Overall savings attributable to the OIG's efforts--as reported in its semiannual reports to the Congress--increased from $15.6 billion in fiscal year 2000 to $21.8 billion in fiscal year 2002. The number of individuals convicted for violating HHS program statutes and regulations--another key indicator of the OIG's performance--also increased. On the other hand, declines were noted in the number of settlements with providers who submitted false claims to the government and the OIG's education and outreach activities. GAO's survey results showed that employees' overall views of the organization, management, and their personal job satisfaction generally remained positive and relatively unchanged between 2002 and 2003. However, field office staff and those in lower level positions were considerably more positive in their views of the organization than their counterparts in headquarters and at the highest levels of management. Two units in particular--the OIG's Office of Counsel and the Office of Evaluation and Inspections--also had marked declines in morale. Both reported significantly lower levels of trust and confidence in the organization and less job satisfaction, compared to 1 year earlier. The Inspector General generally disagreed with some of our findings. In our response, we address why these findings raise concerns about the management of the OIG. We also provided our draft report to the Office of the HHS Secretary, but did not receive comments. |
gao_GAO-03-946 | gao_GAO-03-946_0 | Background
USAID is the lead U.S. agency for administering humanitarian and economic assistance to about 160 countries. USAID’s Changing Workforce Affects Ability to Deliver Foreign Assistance
USAID has changed from an agency of U.S. direct-hires that largely provided direct, hands-on implementation of development projects to one that manages and oversees the activities of contractors and grantees. In addition, 37 positions remain vacant, and opportunities for training and mentoring staff are limited, sometimes forcing the placement of staff who may lack essential skills and experience. USAID also lacks a “surge” capacity to help it deal with emerging crises and changing strategic priorities. As a result, several human capital vulnerabilities have surfaced but have not been systematically addressed. Involvement of Agency Leaders, Employees, and Stakeholders in Strategic Workforce Planning Is Limited
USAID’s senior management is developing a human capital strategy to respond to the President’s Management Agenda, but it has not identified how it will significantly involve employees and other stakeholders in developing and communicating the workforce strategies that result from its efforts. However, USAID has not developed a workforce plan for its civil service staff—a factor noted by OMB in its Presidential Management Agenda “scorecard” of USAID’s human capital management efforts. USAID also has not yet developed workforce plans for its personal services contractors, who make up the majority of its workforce, although USAID plans to do so in response to a recommendation by its Inspector General. Since 1992, the number of U.S. direct-hire staff has decreased by 37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs has almost doubled. With fewer and less experienced U.S. direct-hire staff managing increasing levels of foreign assistance in more countries, along with expected increases in program funds for Afghanistan and Iraq, significant funding increases for the global initiative to fight human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency, and potential USAID involvement in the Millennium Challenge Account, USAID’s ability to provide oversight over its foreign assistance activities and pursue U.S. foreign policy objectives is becoming increasingly difficult. Because USAID has not adopted a strategic approach to workforce planning and management, it cannot ensure that it has addressed these challenges appropriately and identified the right skill mix and competencies needed to carry out its development assistance programs. link workforce planning to the agency’s mission. hired and what should be contracted. Agency’s program budget increased, but its workforce decreased for 10 years. USAID has significant barriers to workforce planning. Develop and implement a comprehensive changing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) oversees humanitarian and economic assistance--an integral part of the U.S. global security strategy--to more than 160 countries. GAO recommended in 1993 that USAID develop a comprehensive workforce plan; however, human capital management continues to be a high-risk area for the agency. GAO was asked to examine how changes in USAID's workforce over the past 10 years have affected the agency's ability to deliver foreign aid and to assess its progress in implementing a strategic workforce planning system.
What GAO Found
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff directly implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees. Since 1992, the number of USAID U.S. direct-hire staff declined by 37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID programs almost doubled and, over the last 2 years, program funding increased more than 50 percent. As a result of these and other changes in its workforce and its mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced foreign service officers and inadequate training and mentoring have sometimes led to the deployment of staff who lack essential skills and experience. The agency also lacks a "surge capacity" to respond to evolving foreign policy priorities and emerging crises. With fewer and less experienced staff managing more programs in more countries, USAID's ability to oversee the delivery of foreign assistance is becoming increasingly difficult. USAID has taken steps toward developing a workforce planning and human capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve its mission in response to the President's Management Agenda, but it needs to do more. For example, USAID has begun its workforce analysis but it has not yet conducted a comprehensive assessment of the skills and competencies of its current workforce and has not yet included its civil service and contracted employees in its workforce planning efforts. Because USAID has not adopted a strategic approach to workforce planning, it cannot ensure that it has addressed its workforce challenges appropriately and identified the right skill mix to carry out its assistance programs. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-76 | gao_T-HEHS-97-76_0 | Several State Statutory and Policy Changes Require Permanency Hearings Sooner
The prolonged stays of children in foster care have prompted 26 states to enact laws or policies to shorten to less than the federally allowed 18 months the time between entering foster care and the first permanency hearing. At the end of that time, a permanent placement decision must be made. According to officials in Ohio’s Office of Child Care and Family Services, the requirement for earlier permanency hearings was made to expedite the permanent placement process and reduce the time children spend in foster care. States Make Changes in Permanency Process With Some Promising Results for Foster Children
Although the states we reviewed did not systematically evaluate the impacts of their initiatives, they have implemented a variety of operational and procedural changes to expedite and improve the permanency process. Key Factors Essential for Meeting Goals of Initiatives
States increased their chances of successfully developing and implementing initiatives when certain key factors were a part of the process. When contemplating changes, state officials had to take into consideration the intricacies of the foster care process, the inherent difficulty that caseworkers and court officials face when deciding whether a child should be returned home, and the need, in some cases, for caseworkers and judges to recognize that termination of parental rights should be pursued. These included (1) long-term involvement of officials in leadership positions; (2) involvement of key stakeholders in developing consensus and obtaining buy-in about the problem and its solution; and (3) the availability of resources to plan, implement, and sustain the project. As these initiatives become a part of the complex child welfare system, however, they can also create unintended consequences. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) state efforts to reduce the time frames within which hearings must be held to determine permanent placements for foster children; (2) state initiatives designed to expedite permanent placements for foster children and the effectiveness of these initiatives; and (3) key factors that facilitate changes in this part of the child welfare system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) signaling the importance of permanent placement to the well-being of children, 26 states have established more stringent requirements on the timing of the first permanency hearing than has federal law, which requires a hearing within 18 months; (2) in addition, the states it reviewed undertook operational and procedural initiatives to expedite the permanent placement process as well as make well-informed permanent placement decisions; (3) although most of these states did not systematically evaluate their initiatives, they reported that many of the initiatives have contributed to reducing the time spent in foster care or decreasing the total number of foster placements made for a child; (4) state officials reported that the key factors in successfully implementing these initiatives were the long-term involvement of key officials, an extended commitment of resources, and the need for a change in perspective of case workers and judges in order to recognize that, in some cases, termination of parental rights is the best solution for the child's future. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-87 | gao_T-HEHS-99-87_0 | This growth has slowed somewhat in the past 2 years. Our recent work has examined two aspects of the Medicare+Choice program—payments and consumer information initiatives. BBA provisions dealing with payments to Medicare+Choice plans acknowledge that Medicare’s prior managed care payment method for health maintenance organizations (HMO) and other risk plans failed to save the government money and created wide disparities in payment rates across counties. Other provisions addressing consumer information needs are designed to raise beneficiary participation in Medicare+Choice and promote more effective quality-based competition among plans. HCFA had to develop and report on the new risk adjuster by March 1 of this year and is required to put the method in place by January 2000. while some plans are dropping out of the program, others are interested in signing new contracts. Medicare+Choice Information Campaign
Context for BBA’s information campaign provisions: Capitalizing on changes in the delivery of health care, BBA’s introduction of new health plan options is intended to create a market in which different types of health plans compete to enroll and serve Medicare beneficiaries. The BBA also required HCFA to provide beneficiaries with a list of available participating plans and a comparison of these plans’ benefits. comparisons difficult for beneficiaries. Mandated PPSs will alter how reimbursements are made to SNFs, HHAs, hospital outpatient departments, and rehabilitation facilities. Our work on SNF and home health benefits shows the importance of the design and implementation details of PPSs to achieving expected BBA savings and ensuring that Medicare beneficiaries have access to appropriate services. administrative overhead. The BBA called for phasing in a PPS for SNF care beginning after July 1, 1998, to bring program spending under control. Even if additional audits were to uncover significant inappropriate costs, HCFA maintains that it has no authority to adjust the base rates after the implementation of the new system. HCFA has no plans to undertake as extensive a monitoring effort. However, without adequate vigilance, inaccurate, inappropriate, and even fraudulent assessments could compromise the benefits of the PPS. To control spending while ensuring the appropriate provision of services, the BBA mandated important changes in the payment method and provider requirements for home health services. Design, implementation, and impact issues: Under the interim payment system, which took effect October 1, 1997, HHAs are paid their costs subject to the lower of two limits. The first limit builds on the existing aggregate per-visit cost limits but makes them more stringent. The closures could be a market correction for overexpansion in light of the BBA’s signal that Medicare would not support the double-digit increases in spending of the previous few years. We have attempted to monitor the impact of the interim payment system on access for this Committee as well as for the House Committees on Commerce and Ways and Means. Conclusions
The brief experience with some of the major Medicare provisions of the BBA demonstrates the challenges to implementing meaningful reform. At the same time, various provider groups have increasingly come to the Congress for relief. We believe that any significant alterations to key BBA provisions should be based on thorough analysis or sufficient experience to fully understand their effects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the implementation and impact of the Medicare provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), focusing on: (1) the Medicare Choice program, particularly the payment method and consumer information efforts; and (2) prospective payment systems (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNF) and home health agencies (HHA) in Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) changes of the magnitude of those in the BBA require significant efforts to implement well and are subject to continual scrutiny; (2) GAO recently reported that the efforts of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to put the BBA provisions in place have been extensive and noteworthy, and the agency has made substantial progress in implementing the majority of the Medicare-related BBA mandates; (3) at the same time, it has encountered obstacles; (4) intense pressure to resolve year 2000 computer compliance issues has slowed HCFA's efforts; (5) in undertaking certain major initiatives, the agency has had to cope with inadequate experience and insufficient information; (6) thus, achieving the objectives of the BBA will require HCFA to refine and build on its initial efforts; (7) reforms of the payment methods for Medicare Choice plans are under way; (8) the withdrawal of some managed care plans has raised questions about how to maintain desired access for beneficiaries while implementing needed changes to plan payments and participation requirements; (9) HCFA has also initiated an information campaign to provide beneficiaries with new tools to make informed health plan choices and create stronger, quality-based competition; (10) some aspects of the campaign have only been piloted and certain problems did develop; refining these efforts to make them more useful and effective for beneficiaries is now critical; (11) the BBA's mandate to replace cost-based reimbursement methods with PPS constitutes another major program reform; (12) the phase-in of the PPS for SNFs began on schedule on July 1, 1998; (13) design flaws and inadequate underlying data used to establish the payment rates may compromise the system's ability to meet the twin objectives of slowing spending growth while promoting appropriate beneficiary care; (14) GAO has not found evidence that the closures or the interim payment system has significantly affected beneficiary access to home health care; (15) GAO's monitoring of potential access problems is continuing as more data on any effects of the interim system become available; (16) the impact of BBA's significant transformations of Medicare could generate pressure to undo many of the act's provisions; (17) in this environment, Congress will face difficult decisions that could pit particular interests against a more global interest in preserving Medicare for the long term; and (18) GAO believes that it would be a mistake to significantly modify BBA's provisions without thorough analysis or giving them a fair trial over a reasonable period of time. |
gao_GAO-07-1038T | gao_GAO-07-1038T_0 | Results of Investigation
In October and November 2006, using fictitious names, our investigators created two bogus companies—one in an agreement state and one in a non-agreement state. The license applications stated that our company intended to purchase machines with sealed radioactive sources. It took a total of 4 weeks to obtain the license. We altered the license so that it appeared our bogus company could purchase an unrestricted quantity of sealed source materials rather than the small amounts of Americium-241 and Cesium-137 listed on the original license. Next, we contacted two U.S. suppliers of the machines specified in our license. Although we had no legitimate use for the machines, our investigators received, within days of obtaining a license from NRC, price quotes and terms of payment that would have allowed us to purchase numerous machines containing sealed radioactive source materials. It could possibly—although it is unlikely—be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks.” Importantly, with patience and the proper financial resources, we could have accumulated, from other suppliers, substantially more radioactive source material than what the two suppliers initially agreed to ship to us—potentially enough to reach category 2. According to IAEA, category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, “could cause permanent injury to a person for a short time (minutes to hours), and it could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded material for a period of hours to days.”
Application to the Agreement State
Ten days after mailing their application form to the agreement state’s department of environment, our investigators received a call from a department license examiner. The license examiner stated that the application was deficient in some areas and said that she would send us a letter outlining what additional information the state required before approving the license. The official told us that as a matter of long-standing state policy, license examiners in this state conduct site visits and interview company management (especially radiation safety officers) before granting new licenses for radioactive materials. An NRC official indicated that NRC would take immediate action to address the weaknesses we identified. After this meeting, we learned that NRC suspended its licensing program for specific licenses until it could determine what corrective actions were necessary to resolve the weaknesses. On June 12, 2007, NRC issued supplemental interim guidance with additional screening criteria. These criteria are intended to help a license examiner determine whether a site visit or face-to-face meeting with new license applicants is required. Once we received our license, the ease with which we were able to alter the license and obtain price quotes and commitments to ship from suppliers of radioactive materials is also cause for concern. Accordingly, we are making the following three recommendations to the Chairman of the NRC: First, to avoid inadvertently allowing a malevolent individual or group to obtain a license for radioactive materials, NRC should develop improved guidance for examining NRC license applications. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates domestic medical, industrial, and research uses of sealed radioactive sources. Organizations or individuals attempting to purchase a sealed source must apply for a license and gain the approval of either NRC or an "agreement state." To become an agreement state, a state must demonstrate to NRC that its regulatory program is compatible with NRC regulations and is effective in protecting public health and safety. NRC then transfers portions of its authority to the agreement state. In 2003, GAO reported that weaknesses in NRC's licensing program could allow terrorists to obtain radioactive materials. NRC took some steps to respond to the GAO report, including issuing guidance to license examiners. To determine whether NRC actions to address GAO recommendations were sufficient, the Subcommittee asked GAO to test the licensing program using covert investigative methods.
What GAO Found
By using the name of a bogus business that existed only on paper, GAO investigators were able to obtain a genuine radioactive materials license from NRC. Aside from traveling to a non-agreement state to pick up and send mail, GAO investigators did not need to leave their office in Washington, D.C., to obtain the license from NRC. Further, other than obtaining radiation safety officer training, investigators gathered all the information they needed for the license from the NRC Web site. After obtaining a license from NRC, GAO investigators altered the license so it appeared that the bogus company could purchase an unrestricted quantity of radioactive sealed sources rather than the maximum listed on the approved license. GAO then sought to purchase, from two U.S. suppliers, machines containing sealed radioactive material. Letters of intent to purchase, which included the altered NRC license as an attachment, were accepted by the two suppliers. These suppliers gave GAO price quotes and commitments to ship the machines containing radioactive materials. The amount of radioactive material we could have acquired from these two suppliers was sufficient to reach the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) definition of category 3. According to IAEA, category 3 sources are dangerous if not safely managed or securely protected. Importantly, with patience and the proper financial resources, we could have accumulated substantially more radioactive source material. GAO also attempted to obtain a license from an agreement state, but withdrew the application after state license examiners indicated they would visit the bogus company office before granting the license. An official with the licensing program told GAO that conducting a site visit is a standard required procedure before radioactive materials license applications are approved in that state. As a result of this investigation, NRC suspended its licensing program until it could determine what corrective actions were necessary to resolve the weaknesses GAO identified. On June 12, 2007, NRC issued supplemental interim guidance with additional screening criteria. These criteria are intended to help a license examiner determine whether a site visit or face-to-face meeting with new license applicants is required. |
gao_GAO-16-220 | gao_GAO-16-220_0 | In addition to honey bees, certain managed bees and wild, native bees also provide valuable pollination services. From 2006 to 2014, beekeepers who responded to the Bee Informed Partnership’s nongeneralizable national survey of managed honey bee colony losses reported that an average of about 29 percent of their bee colonies died each winter. Selected USDA Agencies Conduct Monitoring, Research and Outreach, and Conservation to Protect Bees, but Limitations Exist within Those Efforts
Five selected USDA agencies conduct monitoring, research and outreach, and conservation to protect bees, but limitations within those efforts hamper the agencies’ ability to protect bee health. USDA Agencies Increased Honey Bee Colony Monitoring in 2015 but Have Not Worked with Federal Partners to Coordinate a Native Bee Monitoring Plan
USDA agencies have taken some actions to increase monitoring of honey bees, other managed bees, and wild, native bees, but USDA, which co- chairs the White House Pollinator Health Task Force with EPA, has not worked with its partners on the task force to coordinate a native bee monitoring plan. Some officials said that USDA has not coordinated with other task force agencies to develop a wild, native bee monitoring plan because they were developing the broader task force strategy. By developing a mechanism, such as a monitoring plan for wild, native bees that would (1) establish roles and responsibilities of lead and support agencies and their shared outcomes and goals and (2) obtain input from relevant stakeholders, there is better assurance that a coordinated federal effort to monitor bee populations will be effective. USDA Bee Research and Outreach Have Focused Primarily on Honey Bee Health, but Limitations in Its Research Information System Hinder Efforts to Track Research Projects
USDA has conducted and funded research and outreach, primarily by ARS and NIFA, on the health of different categories of bees, including honey bees and, to a lesser extent, other managed and wild, native bees, but CRIS, which tracks USDA-funded research and outreach, does not currently facilitate tracking or searching of projects by bee category. This evaluation concluded, among other things, that NRCS field offices were eager to support pollinators, but agency staff needed additional expertise to advise landowners how to implement effective conservation practices. NRCS officials said an evaluation of field office efforts to restore or enhance bee habitat could help identify where expertise gaps occur. Among other steps, in 2013, EPA revised the label requirements for certain pesticides and in 2015, proposed revisions for certain additional pesticides that are acutely toxic in an effort to reduce bees’ exposure. Since at least 2009, EPA has encouraged beekeepers and others to report bee kill incidents potentially associated with pesticides, but agency officials and others point to challenges to accurate reporting and data collection on these incidents. EPA Has Encouraged State and Tribal Governments to Voluntarily Develop Plans to Protect Managed Bees from Pesticides
In response to a directive from the June 2014 presidential memorandum on pollinators, EPA has encouraged state and tribal environmental, agricultural, and wildlife agencies to voluntarily develop managed pollinator protection plans (protection plans) that focus on improved communication between farmers and beekeepers regarding the use of pesticides and the proximity of managed bees. EPA’s June 2014 Guidance Does Not Call for the Agency to Assess the Risks That Pesticide Mixtures May Pose to Bees
EPA’s June 2014 risk assessment guidance calls for the agency to assess the risks that individual pesticides may pose to bees but not for the assessment of the risks from combinations of pesticide products or combinations of pesticide products with other chemicals. Senior EPA officials told us in October 2015 that they agreed that tank mixtures of registered pesticides pose potential risks to bees. However, according to stakeholders we interviewed, sources for data on commonly used or recommended mixtures are available. By identifying the pesticide mixtures that farmers and pesticide applicators most commonly use on agricultural crops, EPA would have greater assurance that it could assess those mixtures to determine whether they pose greater risks than the sum of the risks posed by the individual pesticides. By increasing the evaluation of its habitat conservation efforts to include identifying gaps in expertise and technical assistance, USDA could better ensure the effectiveness of its efforts to restore and enhance bee habitat plantings across the nation. The task force’s research action plan calls for EPA to develop tools for assessing risks to a variety of bee species, including nonhoney bee species, such as other managed or wild, native bees. However, EPA does not have data on commonly used mixtures and does not know how it would identify them. To improve the effectiveness of federal efforts to monitor wild, native bee populations, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture, as a co- chair of the White House Pollinator Health Task Force, coordinate with other Task Force agencies that have monitoring responsibilities to develop a mechanism, such as a federal monitoring plan, that would (1) establish roles and responsibilities of lead and support agencies, (2) establish shared outcomes and goals, and (3) obtain input from relevant stakeholders, such as states. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the bee-related monitoring, research and information dissemination, and conservation efforts of selected U.S Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies and (2) the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) efforts to protect bees through its regulation of pesticides. | Why GAO Did This Study
Honey bees and other managed and wild, native bees provide valuable pollination services to agriculture worth billions of dollars to farmers. Government and university researchers have documented declines in some populations of bee species, with an average of about 29 percent of honey bee colonies dying each winter since 2006. A June 2014 presidential memorandum on pollinators established the White House Pollinator Health Task Force, comprising more than a dozen federal agencies, including USDA and EPA.
GAO was asked to review efforts to protect bee health. This report examines (1) selected USDA agencies' bee-related monitoring, research and outreach, as well as conservation efforts, and (2) EPA's efforts to protect bees through its regulation of pesticides. GAO reviewed the White House Task Force's national strategy and research action plan, analyzed data on USDA research funding for fiscal years 2008 through 2015, reviewed EPA's guidance for assessing pesticides' risks to bees, and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders from various groups including beekeepers and pesticide manufacturing companies.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conducts monitoring, research and outreach, and conservation that help protect bees, but limitations in those efforts hamper the department's ability to protect bee health. For example, USDA has increased monitoring of honey bee colonies managed by beekeepers to better estimate losses nationwide but does not have a mechanism in place to coordinate the monitoring of wild, native bees that the White House Pollinator Health Task Force's May 2015 strategy directs USDA and other federal agencies to conduct. Wild, native bees, which also pollinate crops, are not managed by beekeepers and are not as well studied. USDA officials said they had not coordinated with other agencies to develop a plan for monitoring wild, native bees because they were focused on other priorities. Previous GAO work has identified key practices that can enhance collaboration among agencies, such as clearly defining roles and responsibilities. By developing a mechanism, such as a monitoring plan for wild, native bees that establishes agencies' roles and responsibilities, there is better assurance that federal efforts to monitor bee populations will be coordinated and effective. Senior USDA officials agreed that increased collaboration would improve federal monitoring efforts.
USDA also conducts and funds research and outreach on the health of different categories of bee species, including honey bees and, to a lesser extent, other managed bees and wild, native bees. Consistent with the task force strategy and the 2008 Farm Bill, USDA has increased its conservation efforts on private lands to restore and enhance habitat for bees but has conducted limited evaluations of the effectiveness of those efforts. For example, a USDA-contracted 2014 evaluation found that agency staff needed additional expertise on how to implement effective habitat conservation practices, but USDA has not defined those needs through additional evaluation. By evaluating gaps in expertise, USDA could better ensure the effectiveness of its efforts to restore and enhance bee habitat plantings across the nation. USDA officials said that increased evaluation would be helpful in identifying where gaps in expertise occur.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken steps to protect honey bees and other bees from risks posed by pesticides, including revising the label requirements for certain pesticides, encouraging beekeepers and others to report bee deaths potentially associated with pesticides, and urging state and tribal governments to voluntarily develop plans to work with farmers and beekeepers to protect bees. EPA also issued guidance in 2014 that expanded the agency's approach to assessing the risk that new and existing pesticides pose to bees. The task force strategy also calls for EPA to develop tools to assess the risks posed by mixtures of pesticide products. EPA officials agreed that such mixtures may pose risks to bees but said that EPA does not have data on commonly used mixtures and does not know how it would identify them. According to stakeholders GAO interviewed, sources for data on commonly used or recommended mixtures are available and could be collected from farmers, pesticide manufacturers, and others. By identifying the pesticide mixtures that farmers most commonly use on crops, EPA would have greater assurance that it could assess those mixtures to determine whether they pose greater risks than the sum of the risks posed by individual pesticides.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that USDA coordinate with other agencies to develop a plan to monitor wild, native bees, and evaluate gaps in staff expertise in conservation practices, and that EPA identify the most common mixtures of pesticides used on crops. USDA and EPA generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-96-90 | gao_RCED-96-90_0 | Sources and Amounts of Special Account Funds Throughout the Park Service
Park Service headquarters officials identified eight special accounts and provided us financial data for these accounts. The total value of these accounts was about $45 million in fiscal year 1994. Of the eight accounts, five are authorized to recover the costs of particular in-park activities. The other three accounts are not designed to recover costs, but provide park units with cash and noncash benefits to be used for a variety of purposes within the parks. In fiscal year 1994, according to data provided by the Park Service, the cost-recovery accounts totaled $6.5 million; the noncost-recovery accounts were valued at $38.5 million. Information on Funds in Special Accounts at 27 Park Units
To provide a perspective on the amount of special account funds available at individual park units, we gathered information on a judgmental sample of 27 park units that included 20 of the largest parks in the national park system. These park units did not receive any income from leasing historic properties or have any damaged resources that were subject to reimbursement. These cost-recovery accounts were for living history demonstrations, special-use permits, and mess operations. Noncost-Recovery Accounts—Donations, Cooperating Associations, and Concessioners
In fiscal year 1994, the National Park Service valued the amount of funds in noncost-recovery accounts at $38.5 million. We found that the expenditures from the concessioners’ special accounts at these park units were made for authorized purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the National Park Service's (NPS) special account funds, focusing on: (1) the sources and amounts of these funds; and (2) whether the expenditures of these funds are consistent with intended purposes.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the value of the eight NPS accounts reviewed totalled $45 million; (2) five of these accounts recovered the costs associated with in-park activities and the other three provided cash and noncash benefits; (3) in 1994, cost-recovery accounts totalled $6.5 million and non-cost-recovery accounts totalled $38.5 million; (4) cost-recovery accounts are funded through living history demonstrations, reimbursements from mess operations, historical property leases, payments for park damages, and special-use fees for funding; (5) non-cost-recovery accounts receive funding from various donations and cooperating associations that operate bookstores on park premises; (6) the associations provide a variety of in-park services related to park themes and construct facilities that support concession services; (7) significant discrepancies exist between NPS and individual park financial data on the amount of funds in special accounts established by concessioners; (8) the actual amount of money in the special fund accounts is several million dollars higher than reported by NPS; (9) NPS attributes some of these discrepancies to inaccurate tracking of concessioners' accounts; and (10) all but one of the expenditures from the special fund accounts were for authorized purposes. |
gao_GAO-12-239T | gao_GAO-12-239T_0 | S&T Could Take Additional Steps to Ensure that DHS T&E Requirements Are Met; Officials Cited Challenges to Overseeing T&E across DHS
S&T Oversight of DHS Testing and Evaluation
In June 2011, we reported that S&T met some of its oversight requirements for T&E of acquisition programs we reviewed, but additional steps were needed to ensure that all requirements were met.Specifically, since DHS issued the T&E directive in May 2009, S&T reviewed or approved T&E documents and plans for programs undergoing testing, and conducted independent assessments for the programs that completed operational testing during this time period. S&T officials told us that they also provided input and reviewed other T&E documentation, such as components’ documents describing the programs’ performance requirements, as required by the T&E directive. DHS senior level officials considered S&T’s T&E assessments and input in deciding whether programs were ready to proceed to the next acquisition phase. However, S&T did not consistently document its review and approval of components’ test agents—a government entity or independent contractor carrying out independent operational testing for a major acquisition—or document its review of other component acquisition documents, such as those establishing programs’ operational requirements, as required by the T&E directive. Challenges in Coordinating and Overseeing T&E across DHS
We also reported in June 2011 that S&T and DHS component officials stated that they face challenges in overseeing T&E across DHS components which fell into 4 categories: (1) ensuring that a program’s operational requirements—the key performance requirements that must be met for a program to achieve its intended goals—can be effectively tested; (2) working with DHS component program staff who have limited T&E expertise and experience; (3) using existing T&E directives and guidance to oversee complex information technology acquisitions; and (4) ensuring that components allow sufficient time for T&E while remaining within program cost and schedule estimates. In addition, as part of S&T’s recent reorganization, the agency has developed a new division specifically geared toward assisting components in developing requirements that can be tested, among other things. S&T Recently Reorganized and Our Prior R&D Work Could Inform How S&T Moves Forward
Since 2009, S&T has undertaken a series of efforts related to its organizational structure. S&T underwent a new strategic planning process, developed new strategic goals, and conducted a reorganization intended to better achieve its strategic goals. These efforts were implemented after a 2009 National Academy of Public Administration study found that S&T’s organizational structure posed communication challenges across the agency and that the agency lacked a cohesive strategic plan and mechanisms to assess performance in a systematic way, among other things. In August 2010, S&T reorganized to align its structure with its top strategic goals, allow for easier interaction among senior leadership, and reduce the number of personnel directly reporting to the Under Secretary of S&T. Moreover, according to testimony by the Undersecretary of S&T in March 2011, to ensure that individual R&D projects are meeting their goals, S&T has committed to an annual review of its portfolio of basic and applied R&D and all proposed “new start” projects. We are currently reviewing DHS and S&T’s processes for prioritizing, coordinating, and measuring the results of its R&D efforts for the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and we will report on this issue next year. Our prior work related to R&D at other federal agencies could provide insight for S&T as it moves forward with new structures and processes operating within potential fiscal constraints. During the 1990s, we issued a series of reports on federal efforts to restructure R&D in the wake of changing priorities and efforts to balance the federal budget. Since our assessment of R&D efforts at DHS is currently under way, we have not determined the extent to which these key findings from our prior work are applicable to DHS’s R&D efforts or the extent to which DHS already has similar efforts under way. We reported that restructuring research, development, testing and evaluation to meet current and future needs required interagency agreements and cross- agency efforts, in addition to ongoing individual efforts. Our work on DOE National Laboratories provides additional insights related to oversight of R&D efforts that could be useful for DHS S&T. Specifically, we reported in July 2011 that EPA has yet to fully address the findings of numerous past studies that have examined EPA’s science activities. Related GAO Products
Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and Development of New Technologies. DHS Science and Technology: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Test and Evaluation Requirements Are Met. Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP. 2011. Homeland Security: Improvements in Managing Research and Development Could Help Reduce Inefficiencies and Costs, GAO-11-464T. 1, 2011. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our prior work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Research and Development (R&D) efforts. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and, within it, established S&T with the responsibility for conducting national research, development, test and evaluation (T&E) of technology and systems for, among other things, detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks. Since its creation in 2003, DHS, through both S&T and its components, has spent billions of dollars researching and developing technologies used to support a wide range of missions including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers and baggage for explosives, among others. S&T has a wide-ranging mission, which includes conducting basic and applied research of technologies, and overseeing the testing and evaluation of component acquisitions and technologies to ensure that they meet DHS acquisition requirements before implementation in the field. In recent years, we have reported that DHS has experienced challenges in managing its multibillion-dollar technology development and acquisition efforts, including implementing technologies that did not meet intended requirements and were not appropriately tested and evaluated. These problems highlight the important role that S&T plays in overseeing DHS testing and evaluation. S&T has reorganized to better achieve its goals and provide better assistance to DHS components in developing technologies. In addition to the challenge of implementing its varied mission, S&T is also managing a decline in available R&D resources. S&T's fiscal year 2011 appropriation decreased 20 percent from fiscal year 2010 and, while its fiscal year 2012 appropriation has not yet been enacted, both the House and Senate marks for the agency are lower than what was appropriated in fiscal year 2011. As a result, S&T has had to adjust resources and re-prioritize its efforts. In the past, we have reported on issues related to the transformation and reorganization of R&D efforts in the federal government, particularly related to shifting of priorities and managing a reduction in resources. In addition, we identified DHS R&D as an area for potential costs savings in our March 2011 report regarding opportunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue. Specifically, we reported that DHS could take further actions to improve its management of R&D and reduce costs by ensuring that testing efforts are completed before making acquisition decisions and cost-benefit analyses are conducted to reduce R&D inefficiencies and costs. The testimony today focuses on the key findings from our prior work related to S&T's test and evaluation efforts, S&T's recent reorganization efforts, and key findings from our past work related to federal R&D. Specifically, this statement will address: (1) the extent to which S&T oversees T&E of major DHS acquisitions and what challenges, if any, S&T officials report facing in overseeing T&E across DHS; and (2) S&T's recent reorganization efforts and how key findings from our prior work on R&D in the federal government can inform how S&T moves forward. This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from March 1995 to July 2011 related to DHS's efforts to manage, test, and deploy various technology programs; transformation of federal R&D; and selected updates conducted from July 2011 to the present related to S&T's reorganization efforts..
What GAO Found
In June 2011, we reported that S&T met some of its oversight requirements for T&E of acquisition programs we reviewed, but additional steps were needed to ensure that all requirements were met. Specifically, since DHS issued the T&E directive in May 2009, S&T reviewed or approved T&E documents and plans for programs undergoing testing, and conducted independent assessments for the programs that completed operational testing during this time period. S&T officials told us that they also provided input and reviewed other T&E documentation, such as components' documents describing the programs' performance requirements, as required by the T&E directive. DHS senior level officials considered S&T's T&E assessments and input in deciding whether programs were ready to proceed to the next acquisition phase. However, S&T did not consistently document its review and approval of components' test agents--a government entity or independent contractor carrying out independent operational testing for a major acquisition--or document its review of other component acquisition documents, such as those establishing programs' operational requirements, as required by the T&E directive. We also reported in June 2011 that S&T and DHS component officials stated that they face challenges in overseeing T&E across DHS components which fell into 4 categories: (1) ensuring that a program's operational requirements--the key performance requirements that must be met for a program to achieve its intended goals--can be effectively tested; (2) working with DHS component program staff who have limited T&E expertise and experience; (3) using existing T&E directives and guidance to oversee complex information technology acquisitions; and (4) ensuring that components allow sufficient time for T&E while remaining within program cost and schedule estimates. Since 2009, S&T has undertaken a series of efforts related to its organizational structure. S&T underwent a new strategic planning process, developed new strategic goals, and conducted a reorganization intended to better achieve its strategic goals. These efforts were implemented after a 2009 National Academy of Public Administration study found that S&T's organizational structure posed communication challenges across the agency and that the agency lacked a cohesive strategic plan and mechanisms to assess performance in a systematic way, among other things. In August 2010, S&T reorganized to align its structure with its top strategic goals, allow for easier interaction among senior leadership, and reduce the number of personnel directly reporting to the Under Secretary of S&T. |
gao_NSIAD-96-150 | gao_NSIAD-96-150_0 | Management Weaknesses at the Federal Level Have Hampered Progress
The Army is slow to achieve the desired results in Alabama because CSEPP’s (1) management roles and responsibilities are fragmented and unclear, (2) planning guidance is imprecise and incomplete, (3) officials at the federal level are too involved in the management of certain local projects, (4) budget process lacks teamwork, and (5) financial controls are ineffective. These weaknesses have resulted in time-consuming negotiations and delays in implementing projects critical to emergency preparedness. In 1994, we reported that communities near the stockpile sites lacked critical items to respond to a chemical emergency, including operational communications systems, alert and notification devices, decontamination equipment, complete automated information systems, and personal protective equipment. State and Local Actions Have Delayed Projects
Although the progress of CSEPP in Alabama has been hampered by management weaknesses at the federal level, some state and local actions have contributed to the delay in implementing projects critical to emergency preparedness. For example, Alabama EMA spent more than 2 years trying to contract for a demographics survey, which will serve as the basis for determining the requirements for the tone alert radios and developing critical planning documents. In addition, Calhoun County EMA has been reluctant to initiate CSEPP projects until federal officials agree to the county’s requirements. Calhoun County EMA Opposes the Environmental Permit for Anniston’s Disposal Facility
Because of 12 major deficiencies it has identified in the program, Calhoun County EMA opposes the Army’s environmental permit application to construct Anniston’s disposal facility until it receives a written commitment from the Army to support the county’s emergency preparedness requirements or provide acceptable alternatives. In our draft report, we concluded that the lack of progress of Alabama’s CSEPP was primarily the result of management weaknesses at the federal level and that state and local actions also slowed the program. To assess the funding and progress of Alabama’s and Calhoun County’s emergency preparedness programs, we examined a variety of federal, state, and county planning and funding documents and reconciled data among the Army, FEMA, state, and counties. However, the survey had not started as of May 28, 1996. The letter was received on May 28, 1996. GAO Comments
1. It is important to note that the problems experienced in Alabama’s CSEPP are likely to continue until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements among federal, state, and local officials on specific requirements for projects. 2. 3. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. However, communities near Anniston Army Depot are not fully prepared to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency, and Alabama and six counties have not been able to spend $30.5 million, 66.4 percent of the $46 million allocated to enhance their emergency preparedness. 13. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) for Alabama and Calhoun County, Alabama, focusing on: (1) the status and funding of CSEPP in these areas; (2) the impact of federal, state, and local management on Alabama's program; and (3) Calhoun County's opposition to the chemical stockpile disposal facility that the Army plans to build at the Anniston Army Depot.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) eight years after CSEPP's inception, Alabama communities near Anniston are not fully prepared to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency because they lack critical items; (2) Alabama and six counties have not spent $30.5 million, 66.4 percent of the $46 million allocated to enhance emergency preparedness; (3) the unexpended funds are associated primarily with four projects for which federal, state, and local officials have not agreed on specific requirements: (a) a CSEPP 800-megahertz emergency communications system; (b) equipment and supplies to protect people in public buildings; (c) indoor alert and notification devices for public buildings and homes; and (d) personal protective equipment for emergency workers; (4) citing these four projects and eight other areas as major emergency preparedness deficiencies, Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) opposes a state environmental permit for the construction of the disposal facility until it receives a written commitment from the Army to support the county's emergency preparedness requirements or provide acceptable alternatives; (5) the lack of progress in Alabama's CSEPP is the result of management weaknesses at the federal level and inadequate action by state and local agencies; (6) management weaknesses at the federal level are fragmented and unclear roles and responsibilities, incomplete and imprecise planning guidance, extensive involvement in the implementation of certain local projects, lack of team work in the budget process, and ineffective financial controls; (7) these weaknesses have resulted in time-consuming negotiations and delays in implementing projects critical to emergency preparedness; (8) Alabama EMA spent more than 2 years trying to contract for a demographics survey, which will serve as the basis for determining the requirements for the tone alert radios and developing critical planning documents; (9) the survey has not started as of May 28, 1996; (10) Calhoun County EMA has been reluctant to initiate CSEPP projects until federal officials agree to the county's requirements; (11) the situation in Alabama may not be unique; since 1994, GAO has reported that CSEPP is not working the way it was intended; (12) GAO's work has shown that although some progress has been made, communities near the eight chemical weapons storage sites in the United States are not fully prepared to respond to a chemical emergency, financial management is weak, and costs are growing; (13) the problems experienced in Alabama's CSEPP are likely to continue until an effective approach is developed for reaching timely agreements among federal, state, and local officials on specific requirements for projects; and (14) developing this approach should rest with the Army. |
gao_GAO-08-765T | gao_GAO-08-765T_0 | In 2000, federal procurement law established a performance- based approach as the preferred acquisition method for services. The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires all performance-based service acquisitions to include a performance work statement that describes outcome-oriented requirements in terms of results required rather than the methods of performance of the work; measurable performance standards describing how to measure contractor performance in terms of quality, timeliness, and quantity; and the method of assessing contract performance against performance standards, commonly accomplished through the use of a quality assurance surveillance plan. Requirements and Standards Definition Influence Program Outcomes
Our work has found that performance-based acquisitions must be appropriately planned and structured to minimize the risk of the government receiving services that are over cost estimates, delivered late, and of unacceptable quality. Prior GAO and DHS Inspector General reviews of complex DHS investments using a performance-based approach point to a number of shortcomings. The DHS Inspector General has also indicated numerous opportunities for DHS to make better use of sound practices, such as well-defined requirements. While all eight contracts for these investments had outcome- oriented requirements, the requirements were not always well-defined. Further, contracts for half of the investments did not have a complete set of measurable performance standards. Complex investments with contracts that did not have well-defined requirements or complete measurable performance standards at the time of contract award or start of work experienced either cost overruns, schedule delays, or did not otherwise meet performance expectations. Unreliable Data and Lack of Management Review Constrain Oversight
In managing its service acquisitions, including those that are performance- based, DHS has faced oversight challenges, including a lack of reliable data and systematic management reviews. Reliable data are essential to overseeing and assessing the implementation of contracting approaches, acquisition outcomes, and making informed management decisions. Moreover, the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO), who has responsibility for departmentwide procurement oversight, has begun some initial review of performance-based service acquisitions, but has not conducted systematic management assessments of this acquisition method. Our analysis of information provided by contracting representatives at the Coast Guard, CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and TSA showed that about 51 percent of the 138 contracts we identified in FPDS- NG as performance-based had none of the required performance-based elements: a performance work statement, measurable performance standards, and a method of assessing contractor performance against performance standards. Conclusion and Recommendations
Consistent with federal procurement policy, DHS has emphasized a performance-based approach to improve service acquisition outcomes. The report we are releasing today recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security take several actions to increase DHS’s ability to achieve improved outcomes for its service acquisitions, including those that are performance-based. These actions include routinely assessing requirements for complex investments to ensure that they are well-defined and developing consistently measurable standards linked to those requirements; systematically evaluating outcomes of major investments and relevant contracting methods; and improving the quality of FPDS-NG data to facilitate identifying and assessing the use of various contracting methods. DHS generally concurred with our recommendations, noting some departmental initiatives under way to improve acquisition management. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has relied on service acquisitions to meet its expansive mission. In fiscal year 2006, DHS spent $12.7 billion to procure services. To improve service acquisition outcomes, federal procurement policy establishes a preference for a performance-based approach, which focuses on developing measurable outcomes rather than prescribing how contractors should perform services. This testimony focuses on how contract outcomes are influenced by how well DHS components have defined and developed contract requirements and performance standards, as well as the need for improved assessment and oversight to ensure better acquisition outcomes. GAO's statement is based on its report being released today, which reviewed judgmentally selected contracts for eight major investments at three DHS components--the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)-- totaling $1.53 billion in fiscal years 2005 and 2006; prior GAO and DHS Inspector General reviews; management documents and plans; and related data, including 138 additional contracts, primarily for basic services from the Coast Guard, CBP, TSA, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
What GAO Found
Over the past several years, GAO has found that appropriate planning, structuring, and monitoring of agency service acquisitions, including those that are performance-based, can help minimize the risk of cost overruns, delayed delivery, and unacceptably quality. Several prior GAO and DHS Inspector General reviews of major DHS investments using a performance-based approach point to such shortcomings. While all of the contracts GAO reviewed at the Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA had outcome-oriented requirements, contracts for four of the eight investments did not have well-defined requirements, or a complete set of measurable performance standards, or both at the time of contract award or start of work. These service contracts experienced cost overruns, schedule delays, or did not otherwise meet performance expectations. In contrast, contracts for the other four investments had well-defined requirements linked to measurable performance standards and met the standards for contracts that had begun work. In managing its service acquisitions, including those that are performance-based, DHS has faced oversight challenges that have limited its visibility over service acquisitions and its ability to make informed acquisition management decisions. Notably, the department lacks reliable data on performance-based service acquisitions. About half of the 138 contracts identified by DHS as performance-based had none of the elements DHS requires for such contracts: a performance work statement, measurable performance standards, or a quality assurance surveillance plan. Such inaccurate data limit DHS's ability to perform management assessments of these acquisitions. In addition, the Chief Procurement Officer, who is responsible for departmentwide procurement oversight, has not conducted management assessments of performance-based service acquisitions. To help DHS improve outcomes for its service acquisitions, including those that are performance-based, GAO recommended that DHS routinely assess requirements for complex investments to ensure that they are well-defined, and develop consistently measurable performance standards linked to those requirements. GAO also recommended that DHS systematically evaluate the outcomes of major investments and relevant contracting methods and improve the quality of data to facilitate identifying and assessing the use of various contracting methods. DHS generally concurred with GAO's recommendations, noting some departmental initiatives to improve acquisition management. |
gao_GAO-03-426 | gao_GAO-03-426_0 | According to DOE, more than 50,000 tons of the spent fuel have accumulated at 72 sites in 33 states, many located near urban areas in the Midwest and the East. Likelihood of Widespread Harm from Terrorist Attacks or Severe Accidents Involving Spent Fuel Is Low
Studies conducted by NRC and DOE have consistently found that the likelihood of widespread harm to human health from a terrorist attack or a severe accident involving spent fuel is very low. Some studies involving spent fuel stored in pools of water found that widespread harm is possible under severe but unlikely accident conditions. To respond to increased security concerns stemming from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, NRC is further studying the safety and security of spent fuel in transit and in wet or dry storage, including the potential effects of more extreme attack scenarios such as deliberate aircraft crashes. As part of an ongoing process to assess its safety measures, NRC has a number of ongoing and planned studies. Shipping Fuel from Shutdown Reactor Sites First
DOE could potentially enhance the overall security of spent fuel by first shipping fuel currently stored at shutdown nuclear reactor sites. Regardless of the potential transportation-related security benefits, DOE’s contracts with spent fuel owners limit its ability to ship the oldest fuel first. It is not clear whether this will be a common preference. Currently, no rail line extends to Yucca Mountain. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that all reasonable options to further enhance the security and safety of spent fuel in storage at nuclear power plants and in transit are explored, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy assess the potential benefits and costs of (1) minimizing the total number of shipments of spent fuel by consolidating shipments where possible, (2) shipping spent fuel in an order that further minimizes risk, and (3) emphasizing the use of trains dedicated to hauling spent fuel. To determine the potential health effects of a terrorist attack or a severe accident involving commercial spent nuclear fuel, we examined a variety of federally sponsored studies, primarily conducted or sponsored by DOE and NRC. To identify options for DOE to enhance the security of spent fuel as it develops its plans to ship the fuel to Yucca Mountain, we reviewed documents analyzing DOE’s plans and preferred alternatives, including the environmental impact statement and many of its supporting documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Spent nuclear fuel, the used fuel periodically removed from nuclear power reactors, is one of the most hazardous materials made by man. Nuclear power companies currently store 50,000 tons of spent fuel at 72 sites in 33 states. That amount will increase through 2010, when the Department of Energy (DOE) expects to open a permanent repository for this fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Concerns have been raised since September 11, 2001, that terrorists might target spent fuel. GAO was asked to (1) review federally sponsored studies that assessed the potential health effects of a terrorist attack or a severe accident on spent fuel, either in transit or in storage, and (2) identify options for DOE to further enhance the security of spent fuel during shipping to Yucca Mountain.
What GAO Found
The likelihood of widespread harm from a terrorist attack or a severe accident involving commercial spent nuclear fuel is low, according to studies conducted by DOE and NRC. Largely because spent fuel is hard to disperse and is stored in protective containers, these studies found that most terrorist or accident scenarios would cause little or no release of spent fuel, with little harm to human health. Some assessments found widespread harm is possible under certain severe but extremely unlikely conditions involving spent fuel stored in storage pools. As part of its ongoing research program and to respond to increased security concerns, NRC has ongoing and planned studies of the safety and security of spent fuel, including the potential effects of more extreme attack scenarios, including deliberate aircraft crashes. While NRC and DOE have found that spent fuel may be relatively safe and secure, DOE could potentially enhance the security of this fuel through options such as minimizing the number of shipments and picking up fuel in an order that would reduce risk, such as moving older less dangerous fuel first. These options could reduce the risk during transport and at some locations where the fuel is currently stored. However, contractual agreements between DOE and owners of spent fuel may limit DOE's ability to choose among these options. In addition, it is not clear that the benefits of these measures would justify the potential costs, including a possible renegotiation of the contracts between DOE and the spent fuel owners. |
gao_GAO-08-970 | gao_GAO-08-970_0 | Background
FDA is responsible for overseeing the safety and effectiveness of human drugs marketed in the United States, whether they are manufactured in foreign or domestic establishments. See figure 1 for a description of this process. 2). FDA’s Drug Registration Database Contains Inaccuracies and Planned Changes Will Not Ensure the Availability of Accurate Information on Foreign Establishments
DRLS provides FDA with some information that the agency uses to select establishments for inspection, but contains inaccuracies and does not provide a complete count of establishments subject to inspection. FDA officials told us that the agency does not routinely verify the information provided by establishments to ensure that it is accurate. To create a list of foreign establishments subject to inspection, the agency relies on information from databases that were not designed for that purpose and contain divergent estimates—about 3,000 and 6,760 from DRLS and OASIS, respectively. FDA Inspects Relatively Few Foreign Establishments to Assess the Manufacture of Drugs Currently Marketed in the United States
FDA inspects few foreign establishments, relative to domestic establishments, each year to assess the manufacture of drugs currently marketed in the United States. The percentage of such foreign establishments that have been inspected cannot be calculated with certainty because FDA does not know how many foreign establishments manufacture drugs for the U.S. market and are thus actually subject to inspection. Comparing this average number of inspections with FDA’s count of 3,249 foreign establishments that it used to prioritize its fiscal year 2007 surveillance inspections suggests that the agency inspects about 8 percent of foreign establishments in a given year. At this rate it would take FDA more than 13 years to inspect this group of establishments once, assuming that no additional establishments are subject to inspection. They told us that the agency inspects these domestic establishments about once every 2.7 years. From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, the number of foreign establishment inspections FDA conducted varied from year to year, but increased overall from 220 in fiscal year 2002 to 332 in fiscal year 2007. While FDA has recently made progress in conducting more foreign inspections, it still inspects relatively few such establishments. FDA Selects Few Foreign Establishments to Inspect the Manufacturing of Drugs Currently Marketed in the United States, in Contrast to Its Inspections of Domestic Establishments
FDA selected few foreign establishments for inspection in order to examine the manufacturing of drugs currently marketed in the United States. FDA’s Identification of Serious Deficiencies Has Led Establishments to Take Corrective Actions, but Subsequent Inspections Were Not Always Timely
Though FDA oversight resulted in foreign establishments taking actions to address serious deficiencies identified during inspections, FDA’s subsequent inspections of these establishments were not always timely. Although FDA verified these corrective actions during subsequent inspections, FDA inspections to determine establishments’ continued compliance were not always timely and identified additional deficiencies. Determining the number of inspections during which FDA identified serious deficiencies is hindered by inconsistencies in databases used by FDA to track inspections. FDA Issued Warning Letters to Establishments, Most of which Had Previous Deficiencies
FDA issued warning letters to establishments at which it identified serious deficiencies. 4.) For 3 establishments, FDA had previously determined the adequacy of their corrective actions by reviewing information provided by the establishment. Therefore, it is important that FDA inspect foreign and domestic establishments with similar characteristics at comparable frequencies. Ensure that information on the classification of inspections with serious deficiencies is accurate in all FDA databases. To examine the extent to which FDA has accurate data on the number of foreign manufacturing establishments subject to inspection, we obtained information from FDA databases on establishments whose drugs have been imported into the United States. Food and Drug Administration: Improvements Needed in the Foreign Drug Inspection Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), oversees the safety and effectiveness of human drugs marketed in the United States, including those manufactured in foreign establishments. FDA inspects foreign establishments in order to ensure that the quality of drugs is not jeopardized by poor manufacturing processes. This report examines (1) the extent to which FDA has accurate data on the number of foreign establishments subject to inspection, (2) the frequency of foreign inspections, and (3) oversight by FDA to ensure that foreign establishments correct serious problems identified during inspections. GAO analyzed information from FDA databases, reviewed inspection reports which identified serious deficiencies, and interviewed FDA officials.
What GAO Found
FDA databases contain inaccurate information on foreign establishments subject to inspection. FDA uses information from a database of establishments registered to market drugs in the United States and a database of establishments that shipped drugs to the United States to compile a list of establishments subject to inspection, but these databases contain divergent estimates--about 3,000 and 6,800, respectively. FDA's registration database contains information about establishments not subject to FDA inspection. Although annual reregistration is required, FDA does not deactivate in its database establishments that do not fulfill this requirement. The agency also does not routinely verify that a registered establishment manufactures a drug for the U.S. market. The accuracy of this information is important in FDA's identification of foreign establishments subject to inspection. FDA inspects relatively few foreign establishments each year to assess the manufacturing of drugs currently marketed in the United States. FDA inspected 1,479 foreign drug manufacturing establishments from fiscal years 2002 through 2007.Because FDA does not know the number of establishments subject to inspection, the percentage of those inspected cannot be calculated with certainty. However, using a list FDA developed to prioritize foreign establishments for inspection in fiscal year 2007, GAO estimated that FDA may inspect about 8 percent of foreign establishments in a given year. At this rate, it would take the agency more than 13 years to inspect these establishments once. In contrast, FDA estimates that it inspects domestic establishments about once every 2.7 years. Unlike domestic establishments, foreign establishments were generally only inspected if they were named in an application for a new drug. While FDA made progress in fiscal year 2007 in conducting more foreign inspections, GAO estimated it still inspected less than 11 percent of such establishments. As FDA plans additional inspections, it is important that it ensure that foreign and domestic establishments with similar characteristics are inspected at a similar frequency. FDA's identification of serious deficiencies has led foreign establishments to take corrective actions, but inspections to determine continued compliance are not always timely. FDA identified deficiencies during most foreign inspections, but determining how the agency classified the results of a specific inspection is hindered by inconsistencies in its databases, particularly on the classification of inspections with serious deficiencies. From fiscal years 2002 through 2007, FDA issued 15 warning letters to foreign establishments at which it identified serious deficiencies. FDA generally determined the adequacy of actions taken in response to these letters by reviewing information provided by the establishments. FDA's subsequent inspections to determine establishments' continued compliance were not always timely. Of establishments named in the 15 warning letters, FDA subsequently inspected 4 establishments 2 to 5 years later, generally because these establishments were named in a new drug application. At 3 of these 4 inspections, FDA verified that corrective actions had been taken but identified additional deficiencies. |
gao_HEHS-97-57 | gao_HEHS-97-57_0 | Centers opting for FTCA coverage may decide to purchase a supplemental or “gap” policy to cover events not covered by FTCA. Claimants may also file suit if HHS fails to respond to their claims within 6 months of receipt. For example, a policy with coverage limits of $1 million/$3 million will pay up to $1 million for each claim and no more than $3 million for all claims annually. More Centers Plan to Use FTCA Coverage to Reduce Their Costs
While most eligible centers did not rely on FTCA coverage during the demonstration period, centers now seem to be taking greater advantage of the opportunity to reduce their costs. During the demonstration period, all centers were required to apply for FTCA coverage but did not necessarily cancel their private comprehensive malpractice insurance. As of March 21, 1997, 452 of 716 eligible centers have applied for FTCA coverage. HRSA has told centers to cancel private comprehensive malpractice insurance when they come under FTCA but remains uncertain, as it was in the demonstration period, about which FTCA-covered centers have actually terminated that insurance and are thus not paying for duplicate coverage. Centers were also given greater assurance that the federal government would cover their claims. Of the approximately 716 centers currently eligible for this coverage, 264 of the eligible centers, or 37 percent of them, have not applied for it. Few FTCA Health Center Claims Resolved to Date
Few of the 138 FTCA claims filed against health centers since the beginning of FTCA coverage have been resolved. Although the number of FTCA claims filed against centers has increased since the demonstration period began in 1993, only five settlements have been made and all have been relatively small. HRSA Recommends Capping Payments Made on Behalf of FTCA-Covered Centers to Limit Federal Liability
HRSA has drafted a legislative proposal limiting the federal government’s liability for FTCA claims filed against migrant and community health centers. Although HRSA collected data from centers regarding their insurance costs and savings under FTCA, we found that these data were not reliable for determining whether centers canceled their private comprehensive malpractice insurance and reduced their costs. For 22 of the 32 claims involving FTCA-covered centers that have resulted in federal lawsuits, HHS had not responded to the claimants or contacted them to discuss a settlement during the 6-month period. Although the law extending FTCA coverage to centers does not direct HRSA to provide risk management, HRSA officials acknowledge both the need to minimize the federal government’s potential liability and provide risk management services to centers. The growth in FTCA coverage offers both the challenge of a greater federal liability to manage and a new opportunity to help community and migrant health centers improve the quality of their care. We are sending copies of this report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and interested congressional committees. However, we did not independently verify the status of these claims. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the implementation of Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) coverage for community health centers, focusing on the: (1) health centers' use of FTCA coverage; (2) status of claims filed against FTCA-covered centers through March 21, 1997; and (3) Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) management of FTCA for community and migrant health centers, and its efforts to reduce claims through risk management programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the permanent authorization of FTCA coverage, the greater availability of supplemental policies to cover incidents not covered under FTCA, and the reports of some centers already realizing substantial savings have contributed to the willingness of many centers to now obtain FTCA coverage; (2) although the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) required centers to apply for FTCA coverage during the demonstration period, centers were not compelled to cancel their private comprehensive malpractice insurance; (3) although HRSA does not have complete data on center participation during the 3-year demonstration period, it appears that most centers retained their private comprehensive malpractice insurance during this time; (4) because these centers were covered by both FTCA and their private policies, they did not reduce their insurance costs; (5) of the 716 centers eligible for FTCA coverage, 452 have elected this coverage and are now required to cancel their private comprehensive malpractice insurance; (6) despite this level of participation, a significant number of centers have not reapplied for FTCA coverage since its recent extension; (7) as of March 21, 1997, 264 of the 716 centers eligible for FTCA coverage, or 37 percent, had not applied for it; (8) since the demonstration period began in 1993, there have been 138 claims filed against FTCA-covered centers alleging damages of more than $414 million; (9) however, the actual amount of the federal government's liability for these claims is unclear; (10) as of March 21, 1997, only five claims have been settled, with total payments of $355,250; (11) at the recommendation of HHS' Office of Inspector General, HRSA developed a legislative proposal that, if enacted, would limit the federal government's liability to $1 million for claims filed against FTCA-covered centers; (12) by extending FTCA coverage to centers, the federal government has assumed potential liabilities that need oversight and careful management; (13) HHS could improve its administration of FTCA coverage for community and migrant health centers by strengthening data collection efforts and claims management practices; (14) HHS has 6 months in which to either deny a claim or make a settlement offer before a claimant may file suit in federal court; (15) for 22 of the 32 claims that have resulted in federal lawsuits, HHS had not attempted to respond to the claimants during this 6-month period; and (16) risk management services can help centers minimize liability by reducing their financial exposure to claims. |
gao_GAO-13-761 | gao_GAO-13-761_0 | However, many organizations have since replaced these types of identification cards with those that do not contain SSNs. the numbers in magnetic stripes on the cards. The HICN is maintained and referenced throughout CMS’s IT environment. In addition, use of shared services promotes standardization and interoperation of data and can reduce stove piping. However, while each of the studies addressed, at a high level, the impact of various approaches on CMS’s IT environment, they were not intended to identify a specific technical solution for removing SSNs from cards. As a result, they identified two approaches: (1) replacing the SSN-based HICN with a new identifier that does not include the SSN, referred to as the Medicare Beneficiary Identifier; and (2) truncating the first five digits of the SSN for display on Medicare cards. They conducted high-level assessments of the types of changes that would need to be made to those systems, including the level of complexity of the changes, the number of hours of work at each life-cycle phase, and the potential to leverage related efforts. While the data and information collected during the 2013 study could be leveraged to support a future IT project to address SSN removal, according to officials with CMS’s Office of Information Services, the agency’s Chief Information Officer has not received direction from CMS’s leadership to submit a proposal for an IT project that would lead to the identification, development, and implementation of a technical solution. CMS Has Initiated Actions Intended to Address Modernization Goals That Could Facilitate SSN Removal but Has Not Made Specific Plans for Leveraging Efforts
CMS has efforts under way to modernize its IT systems, a number of which could be leveraged to facilitate the removal of SSNs from Medicare cards. For example, one of the agency’s modernization goals is to establish IT functionality that can be used to support multiple business needs of organizations and facilitate data sharing among the agency and its stakeholders. For example, the IT infrastructure that was established to implement the service could support the implementation of a crosswalk service needed by multiple systems to translate a new identifier to the HICN (and vice versa). As a result, the agency could save unnecessary costs and efforts associated with duplicative programming changes to the four affected systems. While these projects could offer opportunities for leveraging ongoing modernization initiatives to facilitate SSN removal, CMS officials stated that because the agency has not yet established a business case and IT project for removing SSNs from Medicare cards, they have not included shared services or other IT initiatives in their modernization activities and related plans to specifically support changes needed as a result of SSN removal. Until CMS establishes an IT project for SSN removal that could be incorporated into ongoing agencywide modernization initiatives, it may miss opportunities to leverage other ongoing system development activities that could facilitate efforts to design, develop, and implement an IT solution in a timely and cost-effective manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better position the agency to efficiently and cost-effectively identify, design, develop, and implement an IT solution that addresses the removal of SSNs from Medicare beneficiaries’ health insurance cards, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following two actions: direct the initiation of an IT project for identifying, developing, and implementing changes that would have to be made to CMS’s affected systems, including designating a business owner and establishing a business case, issuing a project charter, and conducting project selection and architectural reviews of proposed approaches for the removal of SSNs from Medicare beneficiaries’ cards; and incorporate such a project into plans for ongoing enterprisewide IT modernization initiatives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) assess the actions the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has been taking to identify and implement information technology (IT) solutions for removing Social Security numbers (SSN) from Medicare beneficiaries’ cards, and (2) determine whether CMS’s ongoing information technology modernization initiative could offer opportunities to facilitate efforts to remove the SSN from the cards. We assessed the data from these documents, referred to as “workbooks,” to determine the steps agency officials took that could be used to identify a technical solution for the two approaches– one to introduce a new identifier that does not include the SSN and another to mask the first five digits of the SSN in the existing SSN-based identifier, the Health Insurance Claim Number (HICN). Appendix II: GAO’s Assessment of Three CMS Systems and the Types of Potential Changes Needed to Support SSN Removal
We selected three systems for assessment to better understand the types of changes that would have to be made to process beneficiary data based on the introduction of a new identifier, or Medicare Beneficiary Identifier (MBI), to replace SSNs as data entered into the systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The health insurance claims number on Medicare beneficiaries' cards includes as one component the beneficiary's (or other eligible person's, such as a spouse's) SSN. This introduces risks to beneficiaries' personal information, as the number may be obtained and used to commit identity theft. Many organizations have replaced SSNs on these types of cards with alternative identifiers. However, the introduction of such a new data element into IT environments can require changes to systems that process and share data. Moreover, previous assessments of CMS's IT environment have found that it consists of many aging, "stove-piped" systems that cannot easily share data or be enhanced; thus the agency has ongoing efforts to modernize its environment.
As requested, GAO studied CMS's efforts related to the removal of SSNs from Medicare cards. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess actions CMS has taken to identify and implement IT solutions for removing SSNs from Medicare cards and (2) determine whether CMS's ongoing IT modernization initiatives could facilitate SSN removal efforts. To do this, GAO reviewed agency documentation and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)--which is the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for administering Medicare--has not taken needed steps, such as designating a business owner and establishing a business case for an information technology (IT) project, that would result in selecting and implementing a technical solution for removing Social Security numbers (SSN) from Medicare cards. However, the agency has collected information and data as part of its most recent study of SSN removal that could contribute to the identification and development of an IT solution. These include information relevant to examining alternative approaches, identifying costs and risks, and assessing the impact of different approaches on the agency's existing IT systems. For example, the agency identified two approaches for removing the SSN: (1) replacing it with a new identifier, referred to as the Medicare Beneficiary Identifier, and (2) masking the first five digits of the SSN for display on Medicare cards. CMS system and business owners also conducted high-level assessments of the types of changes that would need to be made to systems identified in the agency's IT inventory. For example, system owners estimated the level of complexity of the changes, the number of hours of work at each life-cycle phase, business and technical risks, and the potential to leverage related efforts. CMS noted in its most recent study that replacing the SSN with a new identifier could reduce the risk of identity theft from a lost or stolen card, and actions taken thus far could inform a future IT project to address SSN removal. However, according to CMS officials, agency leadership has not directed them to initiate such a project. Until such a project is undertaken, the agency will not be positioned to identify or implement a solution to support the removal of SSNs from beneficiaries' cards.
CMS has efforts under way to modernize its IT systems, some of which could be leveraged to facilitate the removal of SSNs from Medicare cards. Specifically, one of CMS's high-level modernization goals is to establish an architecture to support "shared services"--IT functions that can be used by multiple organizations and facilitate data sharing. According to agency officials, a service established to automate and manage certain aspects of CMS programs could be used to support a "crosswalk" function that would translate the existing claims number to the new beneficiary identifier (and vice versa). This would enable internal systems to receive information containing the new identifier and continue to process data based on the existing number. Another project was intended to consolidate eligibility determination services from four systems, which could reduce the extent of modifications that would have to be made to each of the systems. However, because the agency has not initiated a project for removing SSNs from identification cards, officials have not considered including shared services or other IT initiatives in their modernization activities and related plans to specifically support changes needed as a result of SSN removal. As a result, CMS may miss opportunities to incorporate such a project into ongoing agencywide modernization initiatives that could facilitate efforts to design, develop, and implement an IT solution for SSN removal in a timely and cost-effective manner.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS initiate an IT project to develop a solution for SSN removal and incorporate such a project into plans for ongoing IT modernization initiatives. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations, if certain constraints were addressed. However, GAO maintains that its recommendations are warranted as originally stated. |
gao_GAO-02-475 | gao_GAO-02-475_0 | Background
The military services face the challenge of dealing with a large backlog of facilities maintenance and repair and insufficient funding devoted to sustainment, restoration and modernization. Even after the four rounds of base realignment and closures, the Department estimates that 20 to 25 percent of its infrastructure is not needed to meet current mission requirements. Other important initiatives include, but are not limited to, housing and utility privatization, competitive sourcing of non-inherently governmental functions, demolition, and leasing of real property and facilities. 2667 for traditional leases, but the services have made limited efforts to use the expanded leasing authority, which was expected to result in larger and more complex projects. Factors Affecting the Services’ Current and Future Use of the Expanded Leasing Authority
The services have identified a number of factors that have limited the use of the expanded leasing authority and that could adversely affect the program in the future. | What GAO Found
The military services face significant challenges in addressing facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization needs with limited funds. These challenges are magnified by the 20 to 25 percent of the Department of Defense's (DOD) real property that it views as not being needed to meet current mission requirements, but that adds to costs. To reduce these costs and acquire additional resources to maintain its facilities, DOD has developed a multi-part strategy involving base realignment and closure, housing and utility privatization, competitive sourcing of non-inherently governmental functions, and demolition of facilities that are no longer needed. Although the services continue to use the leasing authority provided for traditional type of leases, they have made limited efforts to use the expanded leasing authority enacted by Congress in fiscal year 2001. The services have identified a number of impediments that have limited the use of the expanded leasing authority and that could adversely affect the program in the future. |
gao_NSIAD-98-67 | gao_NSIAD-98-67_0 | However, because first flight did not occur as scheduled, the beginning of the flight test program was delayed. This team plans to complete its assessment by the end of February 1998. Air Force Estimates of F-22 Performance
As of January 1998, the Air Force estimated that, at the end of the EMD program, the F-22’s performance will meet or exceed the goals for all 10 established parameters. Conclusion
The Air Force’s estimate to complete F-22 EMD is $18.884 billion, $55 million less than the EMD cost limitation that will be adjusted to $18.939 billion. However, issues have emerged concerning production and delivery of wings and fuselages for the EMD aircraft, and test schedules have consequently been delayed. The Air Force is further assessing the impact of these issues on EMD cost, the schedule upon which test data is produced, and the schedule upon which the EMD program is to be completed. The Air Force is estimating that the F-22 will meet or exceed its performance goals. However, less flight test data have been accumulated through January 1998 than were expected because the flight test program was delayed and flight tests have been suspended to accomplish planned ground tests and minor structural additions to the test aircraft airframe. Delayed tests reduce the amount of actual F-22 performance information that will be available to support Air Force plans to begin production in fiscal year 1999. 5, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Air Force's F-22 engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force's estimate to complete F-22 EMD is $18.884 billion, $55 million less than the EMD cost limitation that will be adjusted to $18.939 billion; (2) however, the F-22 EMD program is not meeting schedule goals established in response to the Joint Estimating Team review; (3) the first flight of the F-22 was about 3 months late, issues have emerged concerning production and delivery of wings and fuselages for the EMD aircraft, and test schedules have consequently been delayed; (4) Lockheed Martin has indicated that negotiated costs should not be exceeded because of these issues; (5) the Air Force, however, is further assessing the impact of these issues on EMD cost, the schedule upon which test data is produced, and the schedule upon which the EMD program is to be completed; (6) the Air Force expects to complete this assessment at the end of February 1998; (7) the Air Force is estimating that the F-22 will meet or exceed its performance goals; (8) however, less flight test data have been accumulated through January 1998 than were expected because the beginning of the flight test program was delayed from May 1997 to September 1997 and flight tests have been suspended to accomplish planned ground tests and minor structural additions to the airframe; (9) flight testing will not resume until April 1998; and (10) delayed tests reduce the amount of actual F-22 performance information that will be available to support Air Force plans to begin production in fiscal year 1999. |
gao_GAO-12-696 | gao_GAO-12-696_0 | The Assistant Administrator of the Office of Environmental Information serves as the Chief Information Officer for EPA. Control Weaknesses Threaten Information and Systems Supporting EPA’s Mission
Although EPA has taken steps to safeguard the information and systems that support its mission, security control weaknesses pervade its systems and networks, thereby jeopardizing the agency’s ability to sufficiently protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and systems. As a result, EPA has limited assurance that its information and information systems are being adequately protected against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disruption, or loss. Agencies accomplish this objective by designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. Although EPA has established an access control methodology based on least privilege and need-to-know principles, it did not always limit user access rights and permissions to only those necessary to perform official duties. EPA did not always effectively encrypt certain sensitive information. For example, EPA did not always encrypt private keys stored on certain servers and had used a weak password encryption feature on network devices. We have not yet verified this information. EPA Did Not Effectively Implement Other Controls
In addition to access controls, other important controls should be in place to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an agency’s information. Despite these efforts, EPA had not always implemented configuration management controls. EPA has conducted the appropriate background investigations for all 14 employees and contractors reviewed. EPA Has Not Fully Documented and Implemented Components of Its Information Security Program
A key reason for the weaknesses in controls over EPA’s information and information systems is that it has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls were effectively established and maintained. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, and information security training for personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support operations and assets of the agency. However, until EPA fully implements these controls, it will have limited assurance that its information and information systems are being adequately protected against unauthorized access, disclosure, modification, and loss. Update system security plans to reflect current policies and procedures. In a separate report with limited distribution, we are also making 94 detailed recommendations to correct weaknesses in access controls and in other information security controls. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In providing written comments on a draft of this report (reprinted in app. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had effectively implemented appropriate information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support its mission. Using the requirements identified by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which establishes key elements for an effective agencywide information security program, and associated NIST guidelines and EPA requirements, we evaluated EPA systems and networks by analyzing EPA policies, procedures, practices, and standards to determine their effectiveness in providing guidance to personnel responsible for securing information and information systems; analyzed security plans for six systems to determine if those plans had been documented and updated according to federal guidance; examined the security awareness training process for employees and contractors to determine whether they had received training according to federal requirements; examined training records for personnel who have significant responsibilities to determine whether they had received training commensurate with those responsibilities; analyzed EPA’s procedures and results for testing and evaluating security controls to determine whether management, operational, and technical controls for six systems had been sufficiently tested at least annually and based on risk; reviewed EPA’s implementation of continuous monitoring and use of automated tools to determine the extent to which it uses these tools to manage IT assets and monitor the security configurations and vulnerabilities for its IT assets; evaluated EPA’s process to correct weaknesses and determine whether remedial action plans complied with federal guidance; and examined contingency plans for six systems to determine whether those plans had been developed and tested. | Why GAO Did This Study
EPA is responsible for protecting human health and the environment by implementing and enforcing the laws and regulations intended to improve the quality of the nations air, water, and lands. The agencys policies and programs affect virtually all segments of the economy, society, and government. In addition, it relies extensively on networked computer systems to collect a wealth of environmental data and to disseminate much of this information while also protecting other forms of sensitive or confidential information.
Because of the importance of the security of EPAs information systems, GAO was asked to determine whether the agency has effectively implemented appropriate information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support its mission. To do this, GAO tested security controls over EPAs key networks and systems; reviewed policies, plans, and reports; and interviewed officials at EPA headquarters and two field offices.
What GAO Found
Although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken steps to safeguard the information and systems that support its mission, security control weaknesses pervaded its systems and networks, thereby jeopardizing the agencys ability to sufficiently protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and systems. The agency did not fully implement access controls, which are designed to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. Specifically, the agency did not always (1) enforce strong policies for identifying and authenticating users by, for example, requiring the use of complex (i.e., not easily guessed) passwords; (2) limit users access to systems to what was required for them to perform their official duties; (3) ensure that sensitive information, such as passwords for system administration, was encrypted so as not to be easily readable by unauthorized individuals; (4) keep logs of network activity or monitor key parts of its networks for possible security incidents; and (5) control physical access to its systems and information, such as controlling visitor access to computing equipment. In addition to weaknesses in access controls, EPA had mixed results in implementing other security controls. For example, EPA conducted appropriate background investigations for employees and contractors to ensure sufficient clearance requirements had been met before permitting access to information and information systems. However,
EPA had not always securely configured network devices and updated operating system and database software with patches to protect against known vulnerabilities.
EPA had not always ensured equipment used for sanitization and disposal of media was tested to verify correct performance.
An underlying reason for the control weaknesses is that EPA has not fully implemented a comprehensive information security program. Although EPA has established a framework for its security program, the agency has not yet fully implemented all elements of its program. Specifically, it did not always finalize policies and procedures to guide staff in effectively implementing controls; ensure that all personnel were given relevant security training to understand their roles and responsibilities; update system security plans to reflect current agency security control requirements; assess management, operational, and technical controls for agency systems at least annually and based on risk; and implement a corrective action process to track and manage all weaknesses when remedial actions were necessary. Sustained management oversight and monitoring are necessary for EPA to implement these key information security practices and controls. Until EPA fully implements a comprehensive security program, it will have limited assurance that its information and information systems are adequately protected against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disruption, or loss.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 12 recommendations to the Administrator of EPA to fully implement elements of EPAs comprehensive information security program. In commenting on a draft of this report, EPAs Assistant Administrator generally agreed with GAOs recommendations. Two of GAOs recommendations were revised to incorporate EPAs comments. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is also making 94 recommendations to EPA to enhance access and other information security controls over its systems. |
gao_GAO-09-192 | gao_GAO-09-192_0 | According to the statement, State/F’s mission, on behalf of the Secretary of State and the DFA, is to provide leadership, coordination, and strategic direction within the U.S. government and with external stakeholders to enhance foreign assistance effectiveness and integrate foreign assistance planning and resource management across State and USAID; lead strategic, operational, and performance planning of U.S. foreign assistance with a focus on aligning resources with policy priorities; develop and defend foreign assistance budget requests and allocate State and USAID foreign assistance funding to meet urgent needs and new opportunities and to ensure long-term sustainable investments; and promote good stewardship of foreign assistance funds by strengthening oversight, accountability, and transparency. State/F Developed Consolidated State-USAID Foreign Assistance Planning and Budgeting Processes
State/F developed a program configuration, known as the Standardized Program Structure and Definitions (standardized program structure), to provide a consistent way to categorize and account for State-USAID foreign assistance. State/F also began developing annual operational plans, performance plans and performance report based on the standardized program structure, to strengthen the link between foreign assistance funding, activities, and results. Moreover, State/F implemented a consolidated budget process for State and USAID foreign assistance programs, beginning with the fiscal year 2008 budget request. State/F’s operational plan guidance requires State and USAID staff to describe how the programs of all other U.S. government agencies in the country are helping address, at the program area level, the goals in State/F’s foreign assistance framework. State/F Lacks Implementation Time Frames for Comprehensive Foreign Assistance Reforms and Developing a Foreign Assistance Strategy and Country- Specific Strategies
Although State/F has established time frames for certain key elements of foreign assistance reform, it has not established time frames for developing and implementing a comprehensive, integrated U.S. foreign assistance strategy covering all agencies involved in delivering U.S. foreign assistance, or for developing guidance for foreign assistance delivered through other U.S. government entities. In addition, because it has not completed the pilot phase for the 5-year CAS, State/F has not yet developed time frames for fully implementing the CAS. As a result, senior management may lack the holistic overview of foreign assistance resources needed to make informed decisions about trade-offs among various priorities. First, the CAS may not adequately replace USAID’s country strategies, as State/F initially planned. State/F Faces Challenges in Workforce Management Issues
Although State/F has taken some steps to establish a workforce and organizational structure, including beginning to define the roles and responsibilities of its employees, our work and an October 2008 State/F internal management review found that State/F faces key challenges in managing its workforce. For example, the State/F internal management review found that (1) State/F had not yet clearly defined the roles of some of its employees and organizational units and (2) State/F had not ensured that its employees have the skills and competencies needed to manage foreign assistance programs. During our work, some State and USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and in the field echoed these concerns. In addition, State/F has not developed a long-term workforce management plan to periodically reassess its workforce capacity to carry out assigned responsibilities, such as supporting and managing the consolidated budget, planning, and reporting processes for State and USAID foreign assistance programs. If the administration decides to continue foreign assistance reform efforts consistent with the State/F reforms announced in January 2006, we recommend that the Secretary direct the DFA to establish a time frame for fully implementing all aspects of these reforms as well as benchmarks and goals to measure progress and define success; establish a time frame for developing and implementing multiyear, country-specific, foreign assistance strategies in all countries where U.S. departments, agencies, or organizations provide assistance; ensure that State/F’s communication strategy encourages substantive, timely, two-way information exchanges between State/F and USAID and State employees; consider an operational plan structure that clearly portrays and accurately captures the functions and activities of regional programs and activities; and develop a long-term workforce management plan to periodically assess State/F’s workforce capacity to manage foreign assistance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to (1) examine key actions that the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (State/F) has taken to reform foreign assistance by consolidating the foreign assistance operations of the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and (2) identify any key challenges that affect State/F’s implementation of these reforms. USAID missions in three of the six countries— Kenya, Peru, and Ukraine—are also responsible for managing regional programs or programs in neighboring countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2006, to better align foreign assistance programs with U.S. foreign policy goals, the Secretary of State appointed the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to serve concurrently as Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) and gave the DFA authority over all Department of State and USAID foreign assistance funding and programs. The Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (State/F) was given responsibility for reforming foreign assistance by, among other things, consolidating State and USAID foreign assistance processes. GAO was asked to (1) examine State/F's key efforts to consolidate State and USAID foreign assistance processes and (2) identify any key challenges that affect State/F's reform of foreign assistance. GAO evaluated budget, planning, and other documents and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C.; Ethiopia; Haiti; Jordan; Kenya; Peru; and Ukraine.
What GAO Found
Since June 2006, in its efforts to consolidate State and USAID foreign assistance processes, State/F has implemented certain key practices that are characteristic of successful organizational transformations--for example, developing a mission statement and involving employees. In addition, State/F has taken several steps to consolidate State and USAID planning and budgeting processes--for example, instituting common program definitions for the use of foreign assistance funds to collect, track, and report on data related to program funding and results. State/F also began developing annual operational plans, based on the common program definitions, to serve as annual expenditure plans, performance plans, and performance reports for State and USAID foreign assistance projects worldwide and to provide descriptive information about other U.S. government agencies' foreign assistance programs. Moreover, State/F initiated a pilot program for developing a 5-year country assistance strategy (CAS) intended to provide a comprehensive view of all U.S. foreign assistance activities in every country in which U.S. resources are targeted. Further, beginning with fiscal year 2008, State/F implemented a joint State-USAID foreign assistance budget process to bring needed coherence of program activities and accountability for resources. Finally, State/F established an integrated State-USAID workforce to direct the consolidation of State and USAID foreign assistance operations. Despite this progress, State/F faces challenges that could constrain its efforts to reform foreign assistance. For example, State/F lacks time frames for developing a comprehensive U.S. foreign assistance strategy--one of its assigned responsibilities--and fully implementing the 5-year CAS. As a result, State/F has limited capacity to demonstrate progress in these key reform efforts. State/F also lacks a clear, consistent strategy for communicating with USAID and State employees about its efforts, leading to confusion among staff and hindering management-staff relations; although State/F has devised an initial plan to address this challenge, it has not yet carried out this plan. In addition, State/F's operational plans do not adequately describe some of USAID's regional foreign assistance activities, and consequently senior management may lack a holistic overview of foreign assistance resources needed to make informed trade-offs among various priorities. Further, the goals and measures in State/F's country operational plans sometimes do not align with those of other agencies providing foreign assistance in the country, limiting State/F's assurance that all U.S. foreign assistance funds in the country are strategically tied to broader U.S. foreign policy goals in the country. Finally, both a 2008 State/F internal review and GAO found that State/F had not yet clearly defined the roles of some of its employees and organizational units and had not matched all employees' skills with their positions. State/F has taken initial steps in response to the internal report's findings, including defining the roles and responsibilities of various executive and managerial positions and organizational units, but has not yet done so for all State/F staff, and has not developed a long-term workforce management plan to address workforce planning challenges. |
gao_GAO-03-872T | gao_GAO-03-872T_0 | Student Aid Programs
Ensuring access to postsecondary education while reducing vulnerability of student financial aid programs to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement is one of the key management challenges Education faces. Both Education and Congress have made changes to address management challenges in the student financial aid programs. In 2001, Education established a Management Improvement Team (MIT) of senior managers to formulate strategies to address key management problems throughout the department. These are (1) financial aid system integration issues, (2) fraud and error in student aid application and disbursement processes, (3) defaulted student loans, and (4) human capital management. Significant progress towards this goal was made earlier this year when Education received an unqualified—or “clean”—opinion on its financial statements. While this is an important milestone for the department, significant management weaknesses remain that must be addressed for Education to meet its goal in this area. These weaknesses included (1) the absence of a fully integrated financial management system, (2) deficiencies in financial management practices that require extensive analysis of accounts to resolve errors through manual adjustments, (3) the lack of a rigorous review of interim financial data for timely identification and correction of errors, (4) the inability to accumulate, analyze, and present reliable financial information in the form of financial statements, (5) the dependence on a variety of stopgap measures to prepare financial statements, (6) the insufficiency of compensating controls, such as top-level reviews to address and try to compensate for systemic control weaknesses, and (7) the lack of a review to identify and quantify improper payments. Education has taken actions over the last several years to improve its financial management and to address the weaknesses identified. While Education has made progress in addressing many of its weaknesses, in fiscal year 2002, the auditor again reported that significant financial management issues continued to impair the department’s ability to accumulate, analyze, and present reliable financial information. Until these issues are fully resolved, Education’s ability to produce timely, accurate, and useful financial information for its managers and stakeholders will be greatly impeded. Education also told us that it recognizes that reviewing and improving internal controls is an ongoing task and that it intends to remain vigilant in this area. Education also needs to address identified computer security weaknesses in its financial management and other information systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its 2003 performance and accountability report on the Department of Education, GAO identified challenges in, among other areas, student financial aid programs and financial management. The information GAO presents in this testimony is intended to assist Congress in assessing Education's progress in addressing and overcoming these challenges. GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony, but past reports have made specific recommendations aimed at addressing some of these major management challenges.
What GAO Found
Education has taken steps to address its continuing challenges of reducing vulnerabilities in its student aid programs and improving its financial management, such as establishing a senior management team to address management problems, including financial management, throughout the agency. And, while Education has made significant progress, weaknesses remain that will require the continued commitment and vigilance of Education's management to resolve. Education needs to reduce vulnerability of student aid programs to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Education has made considerable changes to address the ongoing challenges in administering its student aid programs. However, Education needs to continue to address systems integration issues, reduce fraud and error in student aid application and disbursement processes, collect on student loan defaults, and improve its human capital management. Education also needs to improve financial management. Education has implemented many actions to address its financial management weaknesses. Significant progress was made earlier this year when Education received an unqualified--or "clean"--opinion on its financial statements for fiscal year 2002. While this is an important milestone for the department, internal control and systems weaknesses remain that impede Education's ability to produce timely, accurate, and useful financial information for its managers and stakeholders. |
gao_GAO-02-751 | gao_GAO-02-751_0 | Tax Provisions
In recent years Congress has enacted eight higher education tax provisions that are specifically designed to help individuals and families save for, repay, or meet the current costs of higher education, and accomplish this by permitting tax filers to use their qualified educational expenses to reduce their federal income tax liability (see table 1). Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits Provide Benefits for a Substantial Portion of Undergraduate Students
In the 1999-2000 academic year, more than 4 in 10 undergraduate students received a higher education tax credit, according to our estimate. Figure 6 compares the estimated HOPE credit to the total tuition and fees charged to dependent students, and to the net tuition and fees they paid. For Title IV Recipients, Higher Education Tax Credits Equaled a Varying Share of Their Aid
Approximately 14 percent of undergraduate students received both title IV aid and a higher education tax credit in 1999-2000; for these students, the HOPE and Lifetime Learning tax credits equaled a varying share of the face value of the title IV aid they received. Available Policy and Instructions Provide Clear Guidance about the Impact of Several, but Not All, Tax Provisions on Eligibility for Title IV Aid
Available policy and instructions provide clear guidance about the impact of several higher education tax provisions on eligibility for title IV aid, but in a few instances they do not. Education has not established a policy on how the income that students and parents report as part of the expected family contribution is affected by the tax-free earnings of state savings plans, prepaid tuition plans, and Coverdell accounts. For many of the higher education tax provisions that we reviewed, the HEA or Education’s guidance make clear how their use affects aid eligibility. After January 2002, in accordance with the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, the earnings of these plans were no longer subject to federal taxation. Little Information Is Available to Congress on the Relative Effectiveness of Title IV Grants, Loans, and Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits
Little information is available to Congress on the relative effectiveness of title IV grants and loans and the HOPE and Lifetime Learning tax credits in promoting postsecondary attendance, choice, and completion, or their impact on college costs. Treasury has studied the impact of some tax provisions, but has not yet done so for the HOPE or Lifetime Learning tax credits. Some of these studies explicitly estimated the effects of federal aid programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA), as first adopted in 1965, authorizes federal grant and loan programs, providing a total of $53 billion in assistance to 8.1 million students in fiscal year 1999. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 allowed eligible taxpayers to reduce their tax liability by receiving up to $1,500 HOPE or $1,000 Lifetime Learning tax credit for tuition and course-related fees paid. The 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act created a new tax deduction for tuition expenses and expanded many existing higher education tax provisions. The federal investment in providing student assistance through the tax code has risen sharply from $.0056 billion in 1996 to $7.6 billion in 2002--more than 80 percent of which is comprised of HOPE and Lifetime Learning tax expenditures. GAO reviewed title IV aid programs and higher education tax provisions designed to assist students and families, to help Congress prepare for the reauthorization of HEA.
What GAO Found
GAO found that, in the 1999-2000 academic year, the Lifetime Learning and HOPE tax credits provided an estimated 4 in 10 undergraduate students with benefits that equaled a varying share of tuition and fees charged and title IV aid received. Some students did not receive the credits on the basis of their income; while others received the credits, but obtained less than the credits' maximum value because their educational expenses were too small to make full use of the credits. Available policy and instructions provide clear guidance about the impact that several, but not all, tax provisions have on title IV aid eligibility. For several higher education tax provisions, the HEA or Education's policies and instructions make clear how the use of tax provisions affects aid eligibility. For some tax provisions, however, Education has not established a policy on how their use affects aid eligibility, or it has established a policy but not communicated it clearly to aid applicants. Little information is available to Congress on the relative effectiveness of title IV grants, loans, and the HOPE and Lifetime Learning tax credits in promoting postsecondary attendance, choice, and completion or on the impact of these programs on college costs. This is due, in part, to the data and methodological challenges intrinsic to conducting studies examining their effects. Moreover, Education has conducted few evaluations of the title IV aid programs, and Treasury has not yet examined the effects of higher education tax credits. |
gao_NSIAD-96-159 | gao_NSIAD-96-159_0 | DOT Has Not Developed Statutorily Required Data Base on Intermodal Investments
Title V of ISTEA established within DOT an Office of Intermodalism and required that the Director of this office, through the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), develop, maintain, and make publicly available a data base that includes “information on public and private investment in intermodal transportation facilities and services.” To date, the data base on investment in intermodal facilities and services has not been developed, and comprehensive data on investment in public and private investment in intermodal transportation facilities and services do not exist. We found that only 10 states used ISTEA funds for intermodal freight projects. A total of 23 projects obligated $35.6 million from two ISTEA funding categories. As of December 31, 1995, $68.4 million, or 36 percent, had been obligated by the states for these projects. Intermodal Freight Transportation Planning
In our review of how several local and regional areas are attempting to address intermodal freight transportation needs, we found that MPOs have been given considerable responsibility for a wide range of transportation concerns. Impediments to Improving Intermodal Transportation
In visits to several local and regional areas that handle a large volume of freight, officials emphasized two impediments that hinder intermodal freight transportation planning. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information for this report, we (1) reviewed ISTEA and its legislative history; (2) interviewed DOT headquarters and regional officials; (3) interviewed state, local, and private sector officials; (4) interviewed representatives of major transportation organizations; (5) reviewed DOT data from fiscal years 1992 to 1995 showing the funding status of ISTEA-authorized priority intermodal projects; and (6) reviewed volumes of DOT data highlighting projects funded with the two categories of ISTEA money that DOT officials believed states would most likely use to fund intermodal freight projects. More detailed information on how states used ISTEA funds for intermodal freight transportation is presented in appendix I. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act Funds Used for Intermodal Freight Transportation
Based on our review of Department of Transportation (DOT) data and interviews with public and private sector officials, we attempted to identify intermodal freight projects financed with the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) funds not specifically targeted for priority projects (see table I.1). Status of Priority Intermodal Projects Authorized in ISTEA Legislation
Section 1108 of ISTEA authorized funds to various states for “priority intermodal projects,” commonly referred to as “demonstration” projects.For projects specifically related to improving intermodal freight transportation, ISTEA authorized $191.8 million for 20 projects in 9 states. Table I.2 contains a breakout of the total number of priority intermodal freight projects in each state, the total contract authority for the projects, and the amount of funds obligated, as of December 31, 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed intermodal freight transportation issues, focusing on: (1) the Department of Transportation's (DOT) efforts to track how states use Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) funds to facilitate intermodal transportation; (2) the nature and extent of ISTEA funds used by states for intermodal freight projects; (3) how some local and regional areas that handle large volumes of freight have considered intermodal freight transportation issues as part of their planning processes; (4) impediments some areas face in improving intermodal freight transportation; and (5) trends in intermodal freight transportation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOT has not developed the statutorily required database on public and private intermodal transportation investments, or tracked how states use ISTEA funds for such projects; (2) DOT says that its limited role in allocating funds, states' inconsistent identification of projects, and intermodal projects' multiple financing sources make establishing the database difficult; (3) as of September 1995, 10 states had obligated about $35.6 million in ISTEA funds for 23 intermodal-freight-related projects; (4) as of December 1995, 9 states had obligated $68.4 million, or 36 percent of the $191.8 million in ISTEA funds authorized, for 20 priority intermodal freight projects; (5) the total amount of funds obligated for intermodal freight projects through the first four ISTEA fiscal years equals less than 1 percent of ISTEA funds apportioned to the states for highways and other nontransit infrastructure projects during the same period; (6) metropolitan planning organizations have to balance intermodal freight issues with a wide range of other transportation needs; (7) public transportation planners lack experience and planning tools for intermodal transportation, but states are slowly developing such expertise and tools; (8) local and regional planners are addressing problems specific to their areas; and (9) impediments to improving intermodal freight transportation include obtaining necessary proprietary information on freight movements and coordinating public and private-sector planning, but public-private partnerships may help overcome such impediments. |
gao_GAO-06-19 | gao_GAO-06-19_0 | While actual terrorist operations require only comparatively modest funding, international terrorist groups need significant amounts of money to organize, recruit, train, and equip new adherents and to otherwise support their activities. U.S. Efforts to Combat Terrorist Financing Abroad Include a Number of Interdependent Activities
U.S. government agencies participate in a number of interdependent efforts to address the transnational challenges posed by terrorist financing, including terrorist designations, intelligence and law enforcement, international standard setting, and training and technical assistance. The effort does not have key stakeholder buy-in on roles and practices, a strategic alignment of resources with needs, or a process to measure and improve performance. U.S. Effort Does Not Strategically Align Resources with Need
The U.S. government does not strategically align its resources with its mission to deliver counter-terrorism financing training and technical assistance. Treasury Faces Two Accountability Issues Related to Its Terrorist Asset Blocking Efforts
Treasury faces two accountability issues related to its terrorist asset blocking efforts. First, Treasury’s OFAC reports on the nature and extent of terrorists’ U.S. assets do not provide Congress the ability to assess OFAC’s achievements. Second, Treasury lacks meaningful performance measures to assess its terrorist designation and asset blocking efforts. OFAC officials said they have initiated efforts to develop an OFAC-specific strategic plan and performance measures. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Chairman of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Charles E. Grassley; Senator Richard J. Durbin; and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Senator Susan M. Collins, asked us to (1) provide an overview of U.S. government efforts to combat terrorist financing abroad and (2) examine U.S. government efforts to coordinate the delivery of training and technical assistance to vulnerable countries. In addition, they requested that we examine specific accountability issues the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) faces in its efforts to block terrorists’ assets held under U.S. jurisdiction. We assessed documentation and interviewed officials from: the Department of Homeland Security (Immigration and Customs the Department of Justice (Criminal Division’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Counter Terrorism Section, and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training; Federal Bureau of Investigation); the Department of State (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, Bureau of International Organizations, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, U.S. Agency for International Development; three U.S. embassies abroad) the Department of the Treasury (Office of Technical Assistance, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division); the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF); International financial institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB); and Inter- American Development Bank; the United Nations (UN), including the Counter Terrorism Committee and relevant UN Security Council resolutions sanctions committees and monitoring mechanisms; and the Organization of American States. Our report concludes that the U.S. government lacks an integrated strategy to coordinate the delivery of training and technical assistance because key stakeholders do not agree on roles and practices, there is not a clear presentation of what funding is available for counter-terrorism financing training and technical assistance, and a system has not been established to measure performance and incorporate this information into its planning efforts. The report, as mandated, was intended to provide only a snapshot view in time of terrorist assets held in the United States by terrorist countries and organizations.’” “Substitute with the following language: ‘OFAC officials have advised that OFAC’s new performance measures are expected to be completed by December 1, 2005, and its new strategic plan is expected to be completed by January 1, 2006.’” “In the second paragraph, the following language: “We also recommend that the Secretary of Treasury provide more complete information on the nature and extent of asset blocking in the United States in its Terrorist Assets Report to Congress and establish milestones for developing meaningful performance measures on terrorist designations and asset blocking activities…..” Should be replaced with the following language: . | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist groups need significant amounts of money to organize, recruit, train, and equip adherents. U.S. disruption of terrorist financing can raise the costs and risks and impede their success. This report (1) provides an overview of U.S. government efforts to combat terrorist financing abroad and (2) examines U.S. government efforts to coordinate training and technical assistance. We also examined specific accountability issues the Department of the Treasury faces in its efforts to block terrorists' assets held under U.S. jurisdiction.
What GAO Found
U.S. efforts to combat terrorist financing abroad include a number of interdependent activities--terrorist designations, intelligence and law enforcement, standard setting, and training and technical assistance. First, the U.S. government designates terrorists and blocks their assets and financial transactions and supports similar efforts of other countries. Second, intelligence and law enforcement efforts include operations, investigations, and exchanging information and evidence with foreign counterparts. Third, U.S. agencies work through the United Nations and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering to help set international standards to counter terrorist financing. Fourth, the U.S. government provides training and technical assistance directly to vulnerable countries and works with its allies to leverage resources. The U.S. government lacks an integrated strategy to coordinate the delivery of counter-terrorism financing training and technical assistance to countries vulnerable to terrorist financing. Specifically, the effort does not have key stakeholder acceptance of roles and procedures, a strategic alignment of resources with needs, or a process to measure performance. First, the Department of Treasury does not accept the Department of State leadership or the State-led Terrorist Financing Working Group's (TFWG) procedures for the delivery of training and technical assistance abroad. While supportive of the Department of State's role as coordinator of TFWG efforts, the Department of Justice officials confirmed that roles and procedures were a matter of disagreement. Second, the U.S. government does not have a clear presentation and objective assessment of its resources and has not strategically aligned them with its needs for counter-terrorist financing training and technical assistance. Third, the U.S. government, including TFWG, lacks a system for measuring performance and incorporating results into its planning efforts. The Treasury faces two accountability issues related to its terrorist asset blocking efforts. First, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reports on the nature and extent of terrorists' U.S. assets do not provide Congress the ability to assess OFAC's achievements. Second, Treasury lacks meaningful performance measures to assess its terrorist designation and asset blocking efforts. OFAC is in the process of developing more meaningful performance measures aided by its early efforts to develop an OFAC-specific strategic plan. Officials stated that OFAC's new performance measures will be completed by December 1, 2005, and its strategic plan will be completed by January 1, 2006; however, they did not provide us with documentation of milestones or completion dates. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-95 | gao_T-HEHS-98-95_0 | Restoring Social Security’s long-term solvency will require some combination of increased revenues and reduced expenditures. Relative Emphasis Between Income Adequacy and Individual Equity
Helping ensure adequate retirement income has been a fundamental goal of Social Security. Virtually all reform proposals also pay some attention to “income adequacy,” but some place a different emphasis on it relative to the goal of “individual equity,” which seeks to ensure that benefits bear some relationship to contributions. Some proponents of reform believe that increasing the role of individual retirement savings could improve individual equity without diminishing income adequacy. 1.) 2.) Who Bears Risk and Responsibility? The balance between income adequacy and individual equity also influences how much risk and responsibility are borne by individuals and the government. Workers face a variety of risks regarding their retirement income security. No matter what shape Social Security reform takes, restoring long-term solvency will require some combination of benefit reductions and revenue increases. Revenue increases might take the form of increases in the payroll tax rate, expanding coverage to include the relatively few workers who are still not covered under Social Security, or allowing the trust funds to be invested in potentially higher-yielding securities such as stocks. Reforms that increase the role of individual retirement savings would also involve Social Security benefit reductions or revenue increases, which might take slightly different forms. Pay-as-You-Go or Advance Funding? Reform proposals have also raised the issue of increasing the degree to which the nation sets aside funds to pay for future Social Security benefits. Advance funding could reduce payroll tax rates in the long term and improve intergenerational equity but would involve significant transition costs. In a pure pay-as-you-go arrangement, virtually all revenues come from payroll taxes since trust funds are kept to a relatively small contingency reserve that earns relatively little interest compared with the interest that a fully funded system would earn. In contrast, defined benefit employer pensions are generally fully advance funded. Saving and Investing for Productivity Growth
Ideally, Social Security reforms would help address the fundamental economic implications of the demographic trends that underlie Social Security’s financing problems. Economic growth, and more specifically growth in labor productivity, could help ease the strains of providing for a larger elderly population. Increased investment in physical and human capital should generally increase productivity and economic growth, but investment depends on national saving, which has been at historically low levels. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the goals of the social security program and the difficult choices that restoring its long-term solvency will require, focusing on: (1) balancing income adequacy and individual equity; (2) determining who bears risks and responsibilities; (3) choosing among various benefit reductions and revenue increases; (4) using pay-as-you-go or advance funding; and (5) deciding how much to save and invest in the nation's productive capacity.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) helping ensure adequate retirement income has been a fundamental goal of social security; (2) virtually all reform proposals also pay some attention to income adequacy, but some place a different emphasis on it relative to the goal of individual equity, which seeks to ensure that benefits bear some relationship to contributions; (3) some proponents of reform believe that increasing the role of individual retirement savings could improve individual equity without diminishing income adequacy; (4) the balance between income adequacy and individual equity also influences how much risk and responsibility are borne by individuals and the government; (5) workers face a variety of risks regarding their retirement income security; (6) no matter what shape social security reform takes, restoring long-term solvency will require some combination of benefit reductions and revenue increases; (7) revenue increases might take the form of increases in payroll tax rate, expanding coverage to include the relatively few workers who are still not covered under social security, or allowing the trust funds to be invested in potentially higher-yielding securities such as stocks; (8) reforms that increase the role of individual retirement savings would also involve social security benefit reductions or revenue increases, which might take slightly different forms; (9) reform proposals have also raised the issue of increasing the degree to which the nation sets aside funds to pay for future social security benefits; (10) advanced funding could reduce payroll tax rates in the long term and improve intergenerational equity but would involve significant transition costs; (11) in a pure pay-as-you-go arrangement, virtually all revenues come from payroll taxes since trust funds are kept to a relatively small contingency reserve that earns relatively little interest compared with the interest that a fully funded system would earn; (12) in contrast, defined benefit employer pensions are generally fully advance funded; (13) ideally, social security reforms would help address the fundamental economic implications of the demographic trends that underlie social security's financing problems; (14) economic growth, and more specifically growth in labor productivity, could help ease the strains of providing for a larger elderly population; and (15) increased investment in physical and human capital should generally increase productivity and economic growth, but investment depends on national saving, which has been at historically low levels. |
gao_GAO-05-294 | gao_GAO-05-294_0 | Furthermore, because of leeway in the actuarial methodology and assumptions sponsors may use to measure plan assets and liabilities, underfunding may actually have been more severe and widespread than reported at the end of the period. Because of flexible funding rules permitting the use of accounting credits other than cash contributions to satisfy minimum funding obligations, on average 62.5 of the 100 largest plans each year received no cash contributions from their sponsors, including 41 percent of plans that were less than 100 percent funded. In 2001 there were signs of increased underfunding, and by 2002, more than half of the largest plans were less than 100 percent funded, with 23 plans less than 90 percent funded. 3). Very Few Sponsors of Underfunded Large Plans Paid an AFC from 1995 to 2002
From 1995 to 2002, an average of only 2.9 of the 100 largest DB plans each year were assessed an additional funding charge, the funding mechanism designed to prevent severe plan underfunding, even though on average 10 percent of plans each year reported funding levels below 90 percent. Further, during this period, 2 of these 6 plans that owed an AFC were terminated, each with assets far below promised benefits and each without having had to make a cash contribution in the 3 years prior to termination. Sponsors that owed an AFC had mixed success at improving their plans’ financial conditions in subsequent years, and most of these plans remained significantly underfunded. Just over 30 percent of the time a plan was assessed an AFC, the funding rules allowed the sponsor to forgo a cash contribution altogether that year. Again, terminated plans provide a stark illustration of weaknesses in the rules’ ability to ensure sufficient funding. Large Plans’ Sponsors’ Credit Ratings Appear Related to Certain Funding Behavior and Represent Risk to PBGC
The recent funding experiences of large plans, especially those plans that are sponsored by financially weak firms, illustrate the limited effectiveness of certain current funding rules and represent a potentially large implicit financial risk to PBGC. From 1995 to 2002, on average, 9 percent of the largest 100 plans had a sponsor with a speculative grade credit rating, suggesting financial weakness and poor creditworthiness. As a group, speculative grade-rated sponsors had lower average funding levels, and were more likely to incur an AFC than other sponsors. To the extent that this depresses cash contributions, such plans may have a higher chance of underfunding, thus creating additional financial risk to PBGC. PBGC’s best estimate of the total underfunding of plans sponsored by companies with credit ratings below investment grade and classified by PBGC as reasonably possible to terminate was an estimated $96 billion as of September 30, 2004 (see fig. Further, the very small number of sponsors of underfunded plans that pay the AFC indicates that the rule needs to be strengthened if it is to serve as the primary mechanism for shoring up assets in underfunded plans. Thus, while our sample data set represents only a small portion of the total plans in the single-employer program, it constitutes a significant proportion of the liabilities of the DB system and the financial risk to PBGC while allowing for more manageable analysis. Defined benefit (DB) pension plan—a pension plan that promises a guaranteed benefit, generally based on an employee’s salary and years of service. Related GAO Products
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Structural Problems Limit Agency's Ability to Protect Itself from Risk, GAO-05-360T. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pension funding rules are intended to ensure that plans have sufficient assets to pay promised benefits to plan participants. However, recent terminations of large underfunded plans, along with continued widespread underfunding, suggest weaknesses in these rules that may threaten retirement incomes of these plans' participants, as well as the future viability of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) single-employer insurance program. We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority, and it is intended to assist the Congress in improving the financial stability of the defined benefit (DB) system and PBGC. We have addressed this report to each congressional committee of jurisdiction to help in their deliberations. This report examines: (1) the recent funding and contribution experience of the nation's largest private DB plans; (2) the funding and contribution experience of large underfunded plans, and the role of the additional funding charge (AFC); and (3) the implications of large plans' recent funding experiences for PBGC, in terms of risk to the agency's ability to insure benefits.
What GAO Found
Each year from 1995 to 2002, while most of the largest DB pension plans had assets that exceeded their current liabilities, 39 percent of plans on average were less than 100 percent funded. By 2002, almost one-fourth of the 100 largest plans were less than 90 percent funded. Further, because of leeway in the actuarial methodology and assumptions sponsors may use to measure plan assets and liabilities, underfunding may actually have been more severe and widespread than reported. Additionally, 62.5 percent of sponsors of the largest plans each year on average made no cash contribution because the rules allow sponsors to satisfy minimum funding requirements through plan accounting credits that substitute for cash contributions. From 1995 to 2002, only 6 unique plans in our sample were subject to an additional funding charge (AFC), the primary funding mechanism to address underfunding, a total of 23 times. By the time a firm was subject to an AFC, its plan was likely significantly underfunded, and such plans remained poorly funded. By using other funding credits, just over 30 percent of the time sponsors of these plans were able to forgo cash contributions in the years their plans were assessed an AFC. Two very large and significantly underfunded plans terminated without their sponsors owing a cash contribution in the 3 years prior to termination, illustrating further weaknesses in the AFC. To the extent that financially weak firms sponsor underfunded plans, weaknesses in funding rules create a potentially large financial risk to PBGC and thus retirement security generally. From 1995 to 2002, on average each year, 9 of the largest 100 plans had a sponsor with a speculative grade credit rating, suggesting financial weakness and poor creditworthiness. Plans of speculative grade-rated sponsors had lower average funding levels and were more likely to incur an AFC than other plans. As of September 30, 2004, PBGC estimated that plans of financially weak companies with a "reasonably possible" chance of termination had plans with an estimated $96 billion in underfunding. |
gao_RCED-96-41 | gao_RCED-96-41_0 | The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection began testing multimedia pollution prevention inspections in 1989 and in 1993 adopted the approach statewide. All three states plan to evaluate the environmental outcomes of integrating environmental management. On the basis of their experiences thus far, officials in Massachusetts and New York generally consider the integrated approaches in their states to be successful, while New Jersey officials believe that it is too early to predict the success of that state’s permitting test. New York Uses a Facility-Management Approach
New York is pursuing integrated environmental management by coordinating its medium-specific activities. New Jersey Is Testing Facilitywide Permits
New Jersey is testing the use of a single, integrated permit for industrial facilities, an approach that departs from the existing practice of issuing permits to industrial facilities on a medium-specific basis. These officials generally believed that their state’s integrated approach was beneficial to the environment while increasing regulatory efficiencies and reducing costs to industry. 1). Obtaining funds for Massachusetts also required EPA’s approval as well as congressional authorization to reprogram funds from other activities. Recent EPA Initiatives Address State Multimedia Activities
A grant program EPA recently proposed may provide states with easier access to multimedia funding and promote the reporting of their integrated facilities management activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the environmental management approaches used in Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey; (2) state and industry experiences with these integrated management approaches; and (3) the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) role in state efforts to reduce pollution.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Massachusetts has adopted a single, integrated inspection approach to assess facilities' compliance with environmental statutes; (2) New York is using a facility-management strategy to coordinate medium-specific environmental programs; (3) New Jersey is testing the use of single, integrated permits for industrial facilities, rather than issuing separate permits for pollution releases; (4) although Massachusetts and New York intend to implement their integrated approaches statewide, New Jersey believes that it is too early to evaluate the success of its pilot program; (5) state industry officials believe these integrated management approaches are beneficial to the environment, achieve regulatory efficiencies, and reduce costs; and (6) EPA has proposed a new grant program that will help states gain easier access to funding for multimedia programs, as well as ease the reporting of multimedia activities. |
gao_GAO-02-444 | gao_GAO-02-444_0 | Background
In July 2000, P.L. IRS Disclosed Data Filed by Section 527 Organizations, but the Data Are Not Readily Accessible to Support Public Users
According to IRS officials, IRS has disclosed on its Section 527 Web site all data reported on Forms 8871 and 8872. However, this Web site falls short of disclosing data to the public in an accessible manner because the site is difficult to use and lacks electronically searchable and downloadable data. IRS Provides Limited Oversight to Ensure that Section 527 Organizations Meet Filing Requirements
IRS’s oversight of Section 527 organizations’ compliance with the law’s filing and reporting requirements has been very limited and has included checks on whether some of the reported data is correct and little proactive effort to determine whether all filings are timely and all organizations that should file have done so. 106-230’s requirements. These organizations are to annually file Forms 990 to list their activities, income, and expenses— including those for political activities. 106-230 and on publicly disclosing the data. IRS Planning for New Responsibilities Not Adhering to Accepted Principles
IRS has not developed a strategic plan to carry out its Section 527 responsibilities. For example, this IRS plan focuses on activities, such as audits, for all types of tax-exempt organizations. 106-230, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue develop results-oriented plans, including timeframes and resources needed, for improving the usability of the disclosure Web site after consulting with the full range of users of the data; overseeing whether Section 527 organizations fulfill their filing requirements; and increasing the availability of electronic data on Section 527 organizations to improve the public accessibility of disclosed data as well as to support IRS’s oversight efforts. Such organizations have sponsored advertisements that support or oppose a candidate’s position on an issue without expressly advocating the election or defeat of that candidate. IRS officials said that P.L. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tax-exempt organizations seeking to influence political elections--called Section 527 organizations--are estimated to spend millions of dollars annually in federal elections. These organizations use unregulated "soft money" for issue advocacy, such as sponsoring an advertisement that supports or opposes a candidate's position on an issue. Although all states require these groups to publicly release data on their finances and activities, no central source for such data exists. In July 2000, Congress passed legislation requiring Section 527 organizations to provide data on their purposes, officers, contributors, and expenses to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for public disclosure.
What GAO Found
IRS has established a website for this purpose, but GAO found that the website is difficult to use, and most of the disclosed data are not electronically searchable and downloadable--which can inhibit timely analysis of the relationship between political organizations and the influence of soft money on federal campaigns. IRS has done little to oversee Section 527 organizations' compliance with the law's filing and reporting requirements. As a result, IRS can provide four assurances that the data it disclosed on its website are timely, complete, and correct. IRS officials said that oversight has been limited because of (1) competing demands for resources, (2) the focus on educating Section 527 organizations and on publicly disclosing the data, and (3) having the lack of electronic data on Section 527 organizations. IRS has not developed a strategic plan to ensure that the law's requirements are met. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-134 | gao_T-HEHS-96-134_0 | Last year, VA proposed ways to expand its statutory authority and veterans’ eligibility for VA health care. Several bills have been introduced that, if enacted, should authorize VA hospitals to establish contract access points and provide more primary care services to veterans in the same manner as the new access points are now doing. Over the longer term, VA hospitals may incur unexpected, significant cost increases to provide care to veterans who would otherwise not have used VA’s facilities. To date, most directors have concluded that it was more cost-effective to contract for care in the target locations than operate new access points themselves. About half of the veterans who have used VA health care in the past, and a larger portion of the new users, said that it matters little whether they receive care in a VA-operated facility. Veterans will also generally benefit financially by enrolling in new VA access points. Creating New Access Points Can Address Long-Standing Equity Concerns
Inequities in veterans’ access to VA care have been a long-standing concern. Establishing new access points gives VA the opportunity to reduce some of these veterans’ travel distances. In addition, VA has not developed a plan to ensure that hospitals establish access points in an affordable manner. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) plan to improve veterans' access to primary health care.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) by creating new access points, VA may be able to cost-effectively improve users' access to health care and reduce the inequities in veterans' access caused by geographic inaccessibility; (2) creating new access points may increase costs dramatically, since VA failure to adhere to statutory eligibility limitations has resulted in an increase in the amount of services provided and members receiving benefits; (3) the lack of a VA facility in a particular area does not necessarily justify the establishment of a new primary care access point in that area; (4) VA hospitals need to find ways to finance new access points through reorganization of resources rather than with additional funds; (5) in some underserved areas, it has been more cost-effective to contract for health care services rather than establishing a new VA access point; and (6) new access points could cause financial difficulties for VA, because these new facilities will make VA funded care more accessible to veterans who would otherwise not have used VA facilities. |
gao_GAO-17-506 | gao_GAO-17-506_0 | In Fiscal Years 2013– 2015, DODIG Generally Did Not Meet Statutory and Internal Goals for Civilian and Contractor Reprisal Cases, but Timeliness Improved
DODIG generally did not meet its statutory and internal timeliness goals for the DOD civilian and contractor whistleblower reprisal investigations that it closed in fiscal years 2013 through 2015, but improved timeliness for some categories of cases, as well as its intake process and oversight reviews during that time. However, the average length of all closed investigations improved by about 20 percent (99 days), decreasing from 505 days in fiscal year 2013 to 406 days in fiscal year 2015. By assessing the feasibility of collecting more detailed workload data, such as the labor hours associated with each case, and including such data in future personnel requirements assessments, DODIG would be better positioned to evaluate the effectiveness of process changes it has implemented, assess its personnel requirements, and allocate personnel in the most efficient manner in order to accomplish its mission. DODIG Has Several Processes to Help Ensure the Independence and Thoroughness of Reprisal Cases, but Some Weaknesses Exist
DODIG has established several processes to help ensure the independence and thoroughness of the civilian and contractor reprisal cases it handles, including a training program, a staff recusal process to help safeguard independence, and an internal controls process to help ensure the accuracy of case-file information. However, a lack of documentation on recusals and conflicts of interest may limit its ability to fully evaluate threats to its independence, and its practice of declining cases is not fully consistent with its complaint-intake process. 3. 4. Examples of documents or data that were missing or not uploaded— Conversely, our review of case files for cases closed in fiscal year 2015 found that some other key documentation or data that are needed to demonstrate compliance with or execution of the investigative, quality- assurance, or internal controls processes were either missing or were not uploaded to DODIG’s case-file system in a timely manner. DODIG Has Conducted Oversight of DCIPS Employee Cases Provided by Some of the Defense Intelligence Components but Has Not Fully Addressed Oversight Requirements
DODIG has conducted oversight of investigations involving DCIPS employees that were conducted by the some of the defense intelligence component IGs, which consist of the IGs of the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency. However, DODIG and the defense intelligence components have not fully addressed requirements related to DODIG’s review of all DCIPS employee allegations, determinations, and investigations handled by the component IGs. DODIG’s Timeliness Performance Measures Demonstrate Key Attributes of Successful Measures, but It Lacks Measures to Assess the Quality of Investigations and Oversight Reviews
In April 2017, DODIG developed six performance measures to assess the timeliness of its investigations and oversight reviews for fiscal year 2017 that demonstrate many, but not all, key attributes of successful performance measures. However, DODIG does not have performance measures to assess the quality of its investigations and oversight reviews for fiscal year 2017 and beyond. DODIG also does not have key workload data that would enable it to more fully assess its personnel requirements in support of its planned steps to improve timeliness. Without a process for doing so, DODIG and the defense intelligence components are unable to fulfill their prescribed roles related to the oversight of component determinations and investigations. (Recommendation 2)
The DOD Inspector General should implement a process to document employee recusals and impairments to independence and incorporate such information into an aggregate-level evaluation of threats to DODIG’s independence. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DODIG) has met and taken steps to achieve key timeliness goals for civilian and contractor whistleblower reprisal investigations, we obtained data on all Department of Defense (DOD) civilian and contractor employee whistleblower reprisal cases closed by DODIG and appropriated-fund DOD civilian employee cases closed by the Office of Special Counsel from October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2015, and on all DODIG civilian and contractor employee cases open as of September 2016. We assessed the timeliness of closed Office of Special Counsel cases involving DOD appropriated-fund civilians against the statutory 240-day goal for completing these investigations. To determine the extent to which DODIG has developed performance measures to assess the timeliness and quality of its investigations, we reviewed documentation including quarterly briefing materials, annual reports, and internal control processes and checklists, and interviewed DODIG officials, to identify timeliness and quality performance measures for investigations and oversight reviews that have been variably used by DODIG since fiscal year 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding the federal government against waste, fraud, and abuse. However, whistleblowers also risk reprisal, such as demotion, reassignment, and firing.
GAO was asked to review DODIG's reprisal investigations program for DOD civilians and contractors. This report examines the extent to which DODIG has (1) met and taken steps to achieve key timeliness goals for civilian and contractor reprisal investigations, (2) established processes to ensure that civilian and contractor reprisal cases are handled independently and thoroughly, (3) conducted oversight of civilian reprisal cases handled by the defense intelligence components, and (4) developed performance measures to assess the timeliness and quality of its investigations. GAO analyzed DODIG data for cases closed from fiscal years 2013 through 2015, reviewed a generalizable random sample of 178 cases closed in 2015, which included all fully investigated cases, and interviewed cognizant officials and investigators.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DODIG) did not meet statutory or internal timeliness goals for more than 83 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) civilian and contractor employee whistleblower reprisal investigations it closed in fiscal years 2013 through 2015. DODIG has taken steps to improve timeliness and has reduced the average length of its investigations, intake process, and oversight reviews. Although the average length of all closed investigations improved by about 20 percent over the 3 fiscal years, it was significantly longer than the established timeliness goals. For example, DODIG's timeliness goal is 240 days for DOD appropriated-fund and non-appropriated-fund civilians, but in fiscal year 2015 the average length of these investigations was 608 and 402 days, respectively. Similarly, the statutory timeliness goal for DOD contractors and subcontractors is 180 days, and in fiscal year 2015 the average length for those investigations was 285 days. To continue to improve timeliness, DODIG requested funds to increase its personnel, but it has yet to determine the feasibility of collecting key workload data such as labor hours that would enable it to strengthen its assessment of personnel requirements and allocate personnel in the most efficient manner.
DODIG has established processes to help ensure the independence and thoroughness of the DOD civilian and contractor cases it handles, including a quality-assurance process and an internal controls process. However, a lack of documentation may limit its ability to fully evaluate threats to its independence, and it does not always follow its complaint intake process. GAO's review of case files closed by DODIG in fiscal year 2015 found that some key documentation or data needed to demonstrate compliance with these processes were missing or were not uploaded to DODIG's case-management system in a timely manner. GAO found, and DODIG officials acknowledged, that DODIG's internal controls checklist for assessing case-file completeness does not capture all key documentation and investigative events, thus limiting DODIG's ability to ensure the completeness and accuracy of case-file documentation and data.
DODIG has conducted oversight of reprisal cases provided by some of the defense intelligence component inspectors general—such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. However, DODIG and the components have not fully addressed requirements related to DODIG's oversight of component cases, and there is not a process to do so. As a result, DODIG and the components are unable to completely fulfill their prescribed roles related to the oversight of component cases.
In April 2017, DODIG developed performance measures to assess the timeliness of its investigations and oversight reviews for fiscal year 2017 that demonstrate many, but not all, attributes of successful performance measures. However, DODIG has not established performance measures to assess the quality of its investigations and oversight reviews for fiscal year 2017 and beyond. By developing performance measures that fully reflect these key attributes, DODIG will be better positioned to assess the timeliness and quality of its investigations and oversight reviews and determine whether initiatives are on track to achieve desired outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven recommendations, including that DODIG assess the feasibility of collecting key workload data, document threats to independence and incorporate such information into an evaluation of independence threats, strengthen its internal controls checklist, develop a process to oversee all defense intelligence component cases, and develop performance measures to assess its quality and timeliness. DODIG concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-553 | gao_GAO-16-553_0 | For example, oil and gas resources can be nominated for lease by operators, the tribe, or an individual Indian mineral owner. However, other offices within Interior also have a role in the development and accounting of Indian energy resources in regard to CAs. Interior Has Taken Actions to Streamline the Review and Approval Process, but Three Weaknesses Will Effect Its Ability to Assess the Results of Its Actions
In the summer of 2015, BIA and BLM issued guidance in an effort to streamline the CA review and approval process and address the backlog of Indian CAs awaiting review and approval. Interior Will Not Be Able to Fully Assess the Results of Its Recent Actions to Streamline the CA Process without Required Time Frames and a Systematic Tracking Mechanism
BIA and BLM developed the revised guidance with the intent to expedite the review and approval of CAs and ensure the more timely payment of royalties to Indian mineral owners, but Interior has established few time frames for the BIA and BLM offices that perform tasks during the review and approval process and BIA has no mechanism in place to track Indian CAs. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should define objectives to include what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for achievement. In addition, according to the revised guidance, it is BIA’s responsibility to monitor the review and approval times for Indian CAs; however, BIA currently has no systematic mechanism in place to track an Indian CA through the review and approval process and the revised guidance did not establish such a mechanism. An interagency plan created in May 2014 in response to Executive Order 13604 notes that the ability to track and monitor the review of permits and applications is a best practice to improve the federal review process. However, Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government states that management should compare actual performance to expected results and analyze significant differences. Specifically, as Interior has not established required time frames by which an Indian CA should be reviewed and approved, BIA will be limited in its ability to hold offices accountable to ensure that Indian CAs are reviewed and approved in a timely manner. Finally, because Interior does not have a plan to assess the results of its revised guidance on the Indian CA process, the agency will be unable to determine whether it has achieved its policy objectives, such as decreasing the time needed to review and approve Indian CAs, designed to result in the more timely disbursement of royalties to Indian mineral owners. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and, as appropriate, the Director of the Bureau of Land Management to take the following three actions:
Establish required time frames for the review and approval of Indian CAs to ensure a more timely CA process. Develop a systematic mechanism for tracking Indian CAs through the review and approval process to determine, among other things, whether the revised CA process meets newly established time frames. | Why GAO Did This Study
The development of Indian-owned oil and gas resources is one of the largest revenue generators in Indian country, and individual Indian mineral owners may rely on royalty payments from such development to pay for living expenses. Various offices within Interior are responsible for management and oversight of oil and gas development on Indian lands. In some cases, Indian-owned resources cannot be developed independently. In those cases, BLM reviews a revenue-sharing agreement known as a CA, and BIA approves it. Prior GAO reports identified an extensive backlog of Indian CAs awaiting review and approval, leading to significant delays in the payments of royalties to Indian mineral owners.
GAO was asked to review Interior's review and approval process for Indian CAs. This report examines Interior's recent guidance intended to streamline the review and approval process for Indian CAs and the effect this guidance may have on the timeliness of the process. GAO analyzed agency procedures and guidance and interviewed Interior officials responsible for managing the CA review and approval process.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior (Interior) recently issued guidance intended to streamline the review process and reduce the approval times of oil and gas revenue-sharing agreements—called a communitization agreement (CA)—that include Indian resources. Under the revised guidance, for example, oil and gas operators are to provide simplified, less detailed information in their CA applications. In addition, the revised guidance eliminates some duplication in the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) and the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) review processes.
It is too early to determine the effect the revised guidance will have on the CA process, but Interior will be limited in its ability to assess the results of its actions for three reasons:
Interior has established few time frames for the BIA and BLM offices that perform key tasks during the review and approval process. None of these time frames apply to BIA, which is ultimately responsible for approving an Indian CA. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should define objectives to include, among other things, time frames for achievement. Without time frames, BIA will be limited in its ability to hold offices accountable to ensure a more timely review process.
BIA has no systematic way to track an Indian CA through the review process. A 2014 interagency plan to improve the federal permitting review process stated that the ability to track review times is a best practice to improve the federal review process. Without a systematic tracking mechanism, BIA will be unable to fulfill its monitoring role to ensure that documents move through the review process expeditiously.
Interior's revised guidance does not include a plan to evaluate whether its efforts to streamline the process result in the more timely review of Indian CAs, and BIA officials told GAO that they have no plans for such an assessment. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should compare actual performance to expected results and analyze significant differences. Without conducting such an assessment, Interior will not know if the revised guidance has resulted in the more timely payments of royalties to Indian mineral owners.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Interior establish required time frames for the review and approval of Indian CAs, develop a systematic mechanism to track these CAs through the review process, and assess its actions to improve the timeliness of the process. Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations and described the actions it plans to take in response. |
gao_GAO-13-88 | gao_GAO-13-88_0 | Some OSHA standards require that certain products used in the workplace, such as a variety of electrical equipment, be safety-tested and approved by OSHA-accredited laboratories. OSHA makes three types of accreditation decisions, which are generally valid for 5 years: 1. Scope of Staff Responsibilities and Unclear Application Procedures Lengthen the Accreditation Process
Application Processing and Approval Times Are Lengthy Compared to OSHA’s Desired Time Frames and Other Benchmarks
None of the accreditation applications approved in the last 5 years were processed and approved within the time frames that OSHA officials consider desirable, and the time frames for some applications were significantly longer. For all 13 applications processed during the 5-year period we reviewed, it took much longer to process and approve the application than the desirable time frames, and in some cases, years longer (see table 2). Of the 29 applications pending approval as of June 2012, 12 had been pending for between 5 and 10 years. Imbalance between Program Staffing Levels and Scope of Responsibilities Led to Long Time Frames and Delayed Approval of Applications
The way the NRTL program is designed requires its four staff members to balance many wide-ranging responsibilities and can lead to delays in approving accreditation applications. The program is structured so that these staff members are responsible for the following:
All aspects of approving accreditation applications. Oversight activities for existing labs. Responding to requests from other federal agencies. This suggests that a given application may be set aside for significant amounts of time while OSHA personnel attend to their other responsibilities. Applicants found the guidance particularly confusing because OSHA’s requirements for the content and level of detail labs must provide in their accreditation applications differ in important ways from those of many other organizations that accredit safety labs by using current international standards for accreditation. The lab ultimately had to revise its application to meet OSHA’s requirements, extending both the amount of time lab staff spent preparing the application and the time OSHA officials spent reviewing it. While OSHA’s application requirements may differ from international standards in order to meet the agency’s safety mission, OSHA has not compared its requirements to current international standards to identify differences and assess their costs and benefits in order to ensure that the time devoted to assessing applicants against additional requirements is well-spent. However, subsequently, the agency has not formally reviewed the NRTL procedures against the current versions of international standards on accreditation or recently assessed the risks, costs, and benefits of having procedures that deviate from these standards. Strategies for Improving Timeliness Exist, but OSHA has Taken Limited Steps to Implement Them
While a range of promising strategies for improving timeliness exist, including some that might help address resource constraints, mitigate confusion over application procedures, and improve efficiency, OSHA has taken limited steps to implement such strategies in its accreditation process. Based on our review of various sources, including GAO reports, we identified three promising strategies for improving timeliness: (1) aligning program design with program mission and resources; (2) providing clear guidance and timely communication to program stakeholders; and (3) developing performance measures and using data to track progress in meeting them to identify inefficiencies. other agencies such as NIST.thought that OSHA should reevaluate its approach to accreditation. OSHA’s current structure and workload have made it difficult to provide clear guidance and timely communication to applicants. It remains unclear, however, whether planned hiring efforts will adequately address timeliness issues or how OSHA plans to reinstitute its performance measures. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the timeliness of the NRTL accreditation process, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to: Review the NRTL program’s structure and accreditation application procedures to identify and implement any alternatives that better align program design with resource levels and improve program timeliness while remaining consistent with the agency’s mission. Labor agreed with our recommendations and described its plans to implement them, citing a commitment to use the most efficient and effective strategies in the NRTL program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This study’s objective was to answer the following questions about the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL) program: (1) How long does it take to make accreditation decisions and what are the key factors that affect timeliness? and (2) To what extent has OSHA adopted commonly used strategies for improving timeliness? To address these research questions, we used a variety of methods including: analysis of OSHA’s data on recently processed accreditation applications; reviews of relevant federal laws, regulations, and OSHA publications on the NRTL program; interviews with key program stakeholders including OSHA officials, eight NRTL program applicants, and other public and private organizations, including non-profits, that accredit safety labs for other programs or purposes; a review and synthesis of findings from various sources, including GAO reports, international standards, guidance on accreditation, and materials from other federal agencies to identify promising strategies for improving the timeliness of accreditation decisions; and interviews with officials from selected federal agencies about their accreditation processes and practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
American workers interact with many types of products that could pose risks to their safety. The NRTL program, administered by OSHA, works to support employers and workers by establishing a process for safety-testing certain equipment and other products for use in the U.S. workplace. Under this program, which is supported by user fees, OSHA accredits third-party labs as NRTLs, which then determine whether certain types of products meet safety standards. Because the availability of NRTLs is essential to ensuring that employers have timely access to products that meet safety standards, GAO was asked to examine (1) how long it takes to make accreditation decisions and the key factors that affect timeliness, and (2) the extent to which OSHA has adopted commonly used strategies for improving timeliness. GAO reviewed relevant documents and data from OSHA; interviewed OSHA officials, other NRTL stakeholders, and officials from four federal agencies that administer accreditation programs for other purposes; and reviewed information on strategies for improving timeliness from past GAO reports and other sources.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's (Labor) Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) process for accrediting Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTL) is lengthy due to the scope of staff members' responsibilities and unclear application procedures for accreditation. Among the 13 recently approved applications, OSHA took between 1 and 5 years to make accreditation decisions. All of these applications took much longer to approve than OSHA's desired time frames, and in some cases, years longer. In addition, 12 of the 29 applications that were awaiting final decisions by OSHA as of June 2012 had been under review longer than the 5-year period for which the accreditation decision would be valid. This lengthy process has potentially negative economic consequences for laboratories and requires OSHA staff to divert their time from other oversight activities. Two key factors led to the long time frames:
Imbalance between staffing levels and scope of responsibilities : The way that OSHA has designed the NRTL program requires its four staff members to balance many wide-ranging responsibilities. These responsibilities include: reviewing all aspects of accreditation, auditing existing laboratories, and responding to information requests from other federal agencies. Consequently, accreditation applications were sometimes set aside for significant amounts of time while OSHA personnel attended to their other responsibilities.
Unclear application requirements : OSHA's requirements for the content and level of detail to be provided in accreditation applications--such as detailed information to assess independence--differ in important ways from international standards used for accrediting safety labs. Lack of clarity in guidance about these and other requirements create confusion among applicants and extend both the amount of time applicants spend preparing the applications and the time OSHA officials spend reviewing them. OSHA said its additional requirements are important to the agency's mission, but it has not formally compared them to current international standards or recently assessed the risks, costs, and benefits of any procedures that deviate from international standards.
While OSHA plans to take some steps to improve timeliness, it has not taken advantage of a range of promising strategies, including some that might address its resource constraints and improve efficiency. GAO identified three key strategies for improving timeliness: (1) aligning program design with program mission and resources; (2) providing clear guidance and timely communication to stakeholders; and (3) developing performance measures and using data to identify inefficiencies. GAO found that OSHA has not evaluated the NRTL accreditation process to assess whether its current structure is the most efficient for processing and approving applications in a timely manner and meeting the program's goals. Consequently, OSHA's processes may be slower than necessary and planned hiring may not adequately address timeliness issues. Since the NRTL program was created in 1988, several new approaches to accreditation have been developed. For example, some federal agencies have collaborated with outside entities to complete select tasks in the accreditation process while continuing to make key oversight decisions in-house. The NRTL staff's current workload has made it difficult for them to implement other timeliness strategies, such as providing timely communication to stakeholders. In addition, OSHA recently stopped using its NRTL performance measures because officials believed that meeting them was impractical.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Labor review its current structure and procedures for accrediting NRTLs and implement alternatives that would maintain effectiveness while improving timeliness. Labor agreed with the recommendations and described its plans to address them. |
gao_GAO-12-290 | gao_GAO-12-290_0 | CORs serve as the eyes and ears for the contracting officer and act as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the unit receiving support or services. DOD Took Steps to Enhance Existing Training Program, but Existing Training Does Not Fully Prepare CORs for Contract Management and Oversight Duties
Although DOD requires CORs to receive training and took some actions to enhance training programs, CORs we met with in Afghanistan do not always receive adequate training to prepare them for their contract management and oversight duties. DOD requires that CORs be qualified by training and experience commensurate with the responsibilities to be delegated to them. Additionally, not all of the required training for CORs was conducted, and some other oversight personnel were not being trained. Other CORs, contracting officials, and commanders described similar situations in which services were either not provided as anticipated or were not provided at all. For example, DOD contracting personnel told us about a dining facility in Afghanistan that was built without a kitchen because it was not included in the original statement of work, resulting in DOD having to generate a separate statement of work for the kitchen. CORs Do Not Always Have the Subject Area-Related Technical Expertise Needed to Oversee Some Contracts
CORs did not always have the subject area-related technical expertise or access to subject matter experts with those skills to manage and oversee contracts in Afghanistan, especially those contracts of a highly technical and complex nature. However, according to CORs and contracting personnel we interviewed in Afghanistan, CORs did not have the subject area-related technical expertise necessary to monitor contract performance for the contracts they were assigned to oversee. Contracting officials told us that guard towers at a forward operating base were poorly constructed and unsafe to occupy. The COR’s inadequate subject area-related technical expertise or access to subject matter experts prevented the early identification of defective welding on the staircase that rendered it unsuitable to use to climb up the guard tower. Number of CORs Is Not Sufficient to Adequately Oversee the Contracts in Afghanistan
DOD does not have a sufficient number of CORs to oversee the numerous contracts in Afghanistan and, according to some government officials, there are not enough CORs in theatre to conduct adequate oversight. The CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command requires the nomination of CORs for all service contracts worth over $2,500 with significant technical requirements that require on-going advice and surveillance from technical or requirements personnel, unless exempted by the contracting officer. Further, we found that CORs do not always have the time needed to complete their oversight responsibilities. While available data do not enable us to determine the precise number of contracts that require CORs, in fiscal year 2011, DOD completed over 35,000 contracting actions on over 24,600 contracts and orders that were executed primarily in Afghanistan.CORs we interviewed in Afghanistan, some CORs are responsible for providing oversight to multiple contracts in addition to performing their primary military duty. For example, one COR we interviewed was assigned to more than a dozen construction projects. According to the COR, it was impossible to be at each construction site during key phases of the project, such as for the concrete pouring of building footings, wiring installation, or plumbing. Consequently, according to contracting officials, construction on these multiple projects was completed without sufficient government oversight and problems were not always identified until the building was completed. In addition, in some cases units did not assign enough CORs to provide oversight. Conclusions
DOD and the services have taken some steps, such as developing a new CORs training course with a focus on contingency operations to improve oversight of contracts in contingency operations, such as in Afghanistan; other more general efforts, such as the COR certification program for services’ acquisitions, may also lead to improvement. The current mechanism for training CORs that also perform duties related to the requirements determination process and to the development of requirements documentation continues to have weaknesses because DOD has not yet developed training standards to ensure that these personnel fully understand Joint Operational Area specific issues such as the Afghan First program, the Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance, and the details on the preparation of statements of work and documents required by the contract review boards. Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to develop standards regarding the number of contracts that a COR can manage and oversee based on the technical nature and complexity of the contract. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the military departments to fully institutionalize OCS in professional military education by increasing the number of training offerings with a particular emphasis on contingency operations to ensure that CORs, commanders, senior leaders, and other personnel expected to perform OCS duties are prepared to do so. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2011, DOD reported obligating over $16 billion for contracts that were executed primarily in Afghanistan. GAO has previously identified the need for DOD to improve its oversight of contractors by non-acquisition personnel, such as CORs, and Congress has addressed this issue in legislation. CORs act as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the unit receiving support.
Following up on previous GAO work on this topic, GAO determined the extent to which (1) DODs required training prepares CORs to perform their contract management and oversight duties, (2) CORs have the subject area-related technical expertise needed to oversee contracts, and (3) the number of CORs is sufficient to oversee the contracts in Afghanistan. GAO conducted field work in Afghanistan and the United States and focused on the preparedness of CORs to manage and oversee contracts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to enhance its existing training program for contracting officers representatives (CORs), but the required training does not fully prepare them to perform their contract oversight duties in contingency areas such as Afghanistan. DOD requires that CORs be qualified by training and experience commensurate with the responsibilities to be delegated to them. DOD took several actions to enhance its training program, such as developing a CORs training course with a focus on contingency operations. However, GAO found that CORs are not prepared to oversee contracts because the required training does not include specifics on how to complete written statements of work and how to operate in Afghanistans unique contracting environment. For example, DOD contracting personnel told GAO about opening delays and additional expenses related to the construction of a dining facility, which was originally constructed without a kitchen because it was not included in the original statement of work. In some cases, contract-specific training was not provided at all. In addition, not all oversight personnel such as commanders and senior leaders receive training to perform contract oversight and management duties in Afghanistan because such training is not required of them. Because DODs required training does not prepare CORs and other oversight personnel to oversee contracts, units cannot be assured that they receive what they paid for.
CORs do not always have the necessary subject area-related technical expertise to oversee U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) contracts they were assigned to. Contracting officials noted, for example, that the staircases on guard towers at a forward operating base were poorly constructed and unsafe to climb. The COR assigned to that contract had inadequate subject area-related technical expertise, preventing the early identification of the defective welding on the staircases. According to contracting officials, situations like this often occurred due to the shortage of CORs with expertise in construction. Also, at the time of GAOs field work, CORs for contracts written by CENTCOM contracting officers did not have access to subject matter experts, particularly those with construction experience. According to contracting personnel, because CORs do not have the subject area-related technical expertise needed to oversee contracts or access to subject matter experts, facilities were sometimes deficient and had to be reconstructed at great additional expense to the taxpayer.
DOD does not have a sufficient number of CORs to oversee the numerous contracts in Afghanistan. CENTCOM requires CORs to be nominated for all service contracts over $2,500 that, unless exempted, require significant ongoing technical advice and surveillance from requirements personnel. However, there is no guidance on the number of contracts a single COR should oversee. According to contracting officials and CORs GAO interviewed in Afghanistan, some CORs were responsible for providing oversight to multiple contracts in addition to carrying out their primary military duty. For example, one COR GAO interviewed was assigned to more than a dozen construction projects. According to that COR, it was impossible to be at each construction site during key phases of the project because the projects were occurring almost simultaneously at different locations. Consequently, according to officials, in situations like these, construction was completed without sufficient government oversight and problems were sometimes identified after facilities had been completed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD enhance the current strategy for managing and overseeing contracts in contingency areas such as Afghanistan by, for example, developing training standards for providing operational contract support (OCS), fully institutionalizing OCS in professional military education, and developing standards regarding the number of contracts that CORs can oversee based on the technical nature and complexity of the contract. DOD concurred with all of GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-211 | gao_GAO-02-211_0 | We were provided access to OSM’s Civil Penalty Accounting Control System database. You requested that we determine the primary reason for the low collection rates and significant write- offs of OSM’s CFP debt, whether adequate processes exist at OSM to collect CFP debt, and what role, if any, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the Department of Treasury play in overseeing OSM’s collection of CFP debt. Interviewed OMB and Treasury officials to determine what role, if any, OMB and Treasury play in overseeing and monitoring the government’s collection of civil debts. 1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report focuses on debt collection processes and procedures used by the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining (OSM).
What GAO Found
GAO discusses (1) the primary reasons for the growth in civil monetary penalties owed to OSM; (2) whether OSM's receivables for civil monetary penalties have financial accountability and reporting issues similar to those of its other receivables; (3) whether adequate processes exist to collect this debt; and (4) what roles, if any, the Office of Management and Budget and the Treasury Department play in overseeing and monitoring OSM's collection of civil monetary penalties debt. |
gao_GAO-04-744 | gao_GAO-04-744_0 | In some cases, Congress may designate specific transportation projects for funding. In particular, the requirements describe various planning tasks that states and MPOs must perform, including (1) involving a wide range of stakeholders in the process; (2) identifying overall goals and objectives and data to support transportation investment choices; (3) developing long- and short-range transportation programs and plans; (4) specifying financing for the transportation programs and projects; and (5) ensuring that the transportation planning and decision-making process reflects a variety of planning factors, such as environmental concerns. Transportation Planning Requires Identifying an Overall Vision and Analyzing Alternatives before Deciding on Projects
In initiating the transportation planning process, states and MPOs are expected to have a long-term vision that articulates broad goals for the future of the transportation systems in the state or region. Transportation Planners Generally Have Discretion in Selecting Analytical Tools
Other than the NEPA requirements for environmental analyses, federal requirements give states and MPOs considerable flexibility in selecting specific analytical tools and elements used to evaluate projects and make investment decisions. Researchers acknowledge several practical challenges of benefit-cost analysis, such as difficulties in quantifying some benefits and costs and defining the scope of the project. Federal Guidance Supports the Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis
While federal planning regulations for transportation generally do not require the use of specific analytical models, several federal sources have identified benefit-cost analysis as a useful tool to help decision-makers determine trade-offs between alternatives and identify projects with the greatest estimated net social benefits. The systematic process of benefit-cost analysis also helps decision-makers because it organizes information about the alternatives and converts dissimilar values, such as hours of travel time and number of accidents, to a comparable dollar measure. Ensuring that investment choices will maintain the existing infrastructure or improve its operation, rather than expand the transportation system’s capacity, also appears to be an important priority for decision-makers. Finally, decision- makers are recognizing the importance of longer, multistate transportation corridors and the special challenges that they pose for investment decisions. Federal Financing Structure and Other Factors Limit Intermodal Investment Decision- Making
In evaluating and deciding on investments, the structure of federal funding and the lack of freight stakeholder involvement are important factors that focus decision-making principally on highways and transit and on stakeholders associated with these modes. This uneven influence may mean that a project’s priority can be determined by which agency sponsors the project. The department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our scope of work included reviewing the processes that decision-makers at all levels of government use to analyze and select surface transportation infrastructure investments. Using benefit-cost analysis, as described below, analysts determine the project that will result in the greatest benefit to society for a given level of cost. Finally, both passenger and freight options for addressing congestion should be considered. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance on choosing appropriate discount rates for different types of investments. In addition, according to Executive Order 12893, OMB guidance, and our past research, in the likely event that not all benefits and costs could be quantified and monetized when developing the benefit-cost analysis, the decision-maker should consider the nonquantifiable factors in addition to the numeric results of the analysis when evaluating alternatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Passenger and freight traffic are expected to grow substantially in the future, generating additional congestion and requiring continued investment in the nation's surface transportation system. Over the past 12 years, the federal government has provided hundreds of billions of dollars for investment in surface transportation projects through the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 and its successor legislation, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century. Reauthorization of this legislation is expected to provide hundreds of billions of dollars more in federal funding for surface transportation projects. For this investment to have the greatest positive effect, agencies at all levels of government need to select investments that yield the greatest benefits for a given level of cost. This report provides information about the processes that state and regional transportation decisionmakers use to analyze and select transportation infrastructure investments. GAO identified (1) key federal requirements for planning and deciding on such investments, (2) how benefit-cost analysis facilitates sound decisionmaking, and (3) other factors that decision-makers consider in evaluating and deciding on investments.
What GAO Found
Federal requirements specify the overall approach that states and regional organizations should use in planning transportation infrastructure projects, but generally do not specify what analytical tools planners should use to evaluate projects. These key requirements include developing strategic goals and objectives; considering a wide range of environmental and economic factors; preparing long- and short-range plans; and ensuring an inclusive process that involves many stakeholders. The Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and GAO have identified benefit-cost analysis as a tool to help decision-makers identify projects with the greatest net benefits. The systematic process of benefit-cost analysis helps decision-makers organize information about, and determine trade-offs between, alternatives. Researchers also acknowledged challenges in applying benefit-cost analysis, including quantifying some benefits and costs, defining the scope of the project, and ensuring the precision of estimates used in the analysis. Ongoing research by DOT and others is aimed at improving and expanding state and regional decision-makers' application of benefit-cost analysis. Many of the transportation planners we interviewed said that factors other than the analyses developed during the planning process often influenced final investment decisions. For example, state and regional decision-makers must consider the structure of federal funding sources. Since federal funding often is tied to a single transportation mode, it may be difficult to finance projects that do not have dedicated funding, such as railroad improvement projects. In addition, decision-makers must ensure that wideranging public participation is reflected in their deliberations and that their choices take into account numerous views. In some cases, voter support through referenda is required before a project may proceed or financing can be secured. The physical constraints of an area may also affect investment choices. Difficulties in expanding capacity and limits on existing infrastructure may direct investments to preserving and maintaining existing facilities or improving operations. Finally, multistate transportation corridors present special challenges in coordinating investment decisions. |
gao_GAO-06-1092T | gao_GAO-06-1092T_0 | We reported in February 2006 that four of the five monitoring programs had made progress in screening and monitoring affected individuals and gathering data. In contrast to the progress made by the other programs, the HHS WTC Federal Responder Screening Program had lagged behind and accomplished little. New Federal Funding for Monitoring and Treatment
In December 2005, the Congress appropriated $75 million to CDC to fund programs providing baseline screening, long-term monitoring, and health care treatment for emergency services and recovery personnel who responded to the WTC disaster. HHS Has Registered and Screened Additional Federal Responders, and Arrangements for Screening Former Federal Workers outside the New York Metropolitan Area Are under Development
Since February 2006, an additional 1,385 federal responders have registered for screening examinations, bringing the total number registered on the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program Web site to 1,762 as of late August 2006, including 283 former federal workers. Because the total number of federal responders involved in the WTC disaster is uncertain, it is not possible to determine what proportion of the total number of federal responders have registered. Through OPHEP’s agreement with NIOSH, the worker and volunteer WTC program has provided screening examinations to 13 former federal workers and scheduled 11 more. Most of the former federal workers reside outside the New York metropolitan area, where the worker and volunteer WTC program is located, and NIOSH is working to establish a national network of providers to screen these workers. Of the 1,762 federal responders who registered, 1,385 had registered since February 2006, including 1,134 current federal workers and 251 former federal workers. HHS Has Screened Additional Current Federal Workers
As of late August 2006, FOH had completed screening examinations for a total of 907 of the federal workers who had registered; 380 of the 907 were screened since February 2006. As of July 31, 2006, 13 screening examinations had been completed and 11 were scheduled. CDC Has Awarded a Small Portion of the $75 Million Appropriation and Plans to Make Decisions about Treatment Coverage before Awarding Most of the Funds
CDC plans to award the $75 million appropriated for screening, monitoring, and treatment to the five organizations that the law identified as having priority for funding. CDC officials expect to make awards to the WTC Health Registry, Project COPE, and the POPPA program over a 3-year period and to award funds to the FDNY WTC and worker and volunteer WTC programs in response to their treatment costs. CDC officials have a proposed spending plan but told us that because they are uncertain about how quickly treatment costs could deplete the available funds, they may need to make adjustments. As of August 2006, CDC awarded about $4.5 million of the $75 million—about $1.9 million to the WTC Health Registry, $1.5 million to the FDNY WTC program, and almost $1.1 million to the worker and volunteer WTC program. In addition, CDC expects to award $1.5 million to the POPPA program and $3 million to Project COPE in September 2006. CDC is waiting to make further awards until agency officials have reached certain decisions about the coverage of treatment services, such as which prescription drugs would be covered in the FDNY WTC and worker and volunteer WTC programs. CDC expects to begin making further awards around February 2007. CDC has made preliminary decisions about how to allocate the $75 million among the five organizations. As of September 1, 2006, CDC’s proposed spending plan indicated that awards would be made in the following way: $53.5 million for treatment and $8 million for monitoring, to be divided between the FDNY WTC and worker and volunteer WTC programs; $9 million for the WTC Health Registry; $3 million for Project COPE; and $1.5 million for the POPPA program. A CDC official told us that the agency would award funds to the latter two programs in response to the treatment costs they incur. Officials from the FDNY WTC and worker and volunteer WTC programs told us that they expected that their estimated portion of the appropriated funds would be depleted well before the end of 3 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
Responders to the World Trade Center (WTC) attack--individuals involved in rescue, recovery, or cleanup--included New York City Fire Department (FDNY) personnel, federal government workers, and others from New York and elsewhere. They were exposed to numerous hazards, and concerns remain about the long-term effects on their physical and mental health. In February 2006, GAO testified that four of the five key federally funded programs that were monitoring health effects in responders had made progress but that the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) WTC Federal Responder Screening Program, implemented by the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP), lagged behind (GAO-06-481T). GAO also reported that the Congress appropriated $75 million in December 2005 to HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for monitoring and treatment for responders and that CDC was deciding how to allocate the funds. This statement updates GAO's February 2006 testimony. GAO examined (1) progress made by HHS's WTC federal responder program and (2) actions CDC has taken to award the $75 million appropriated. GAO reviewed program documents and interviewed HHS officials and others involved in WTC monitoring and treatment programs.
What GAO Found
The WTC federal responder program has registered and screened additional federal responders since February 2006, and arrangements are being developed to screen responders who are former federal workers residing outside the New York area. An additional 1,385 federal responders have registered for screening, including 1,134 current federal workers and 251 former federal workers, bringing the total number registered as of late August 2006 to 1,762, including 283 former federal workers. Because the total number of federal responders is uncertain, the proportion of the total who have registered is unknown. As of late August 2006, Federal Occupational Health Services (FOH) had completed screening of 907 federal workers, 380 of whom were screened since February 2006. Under an OPHEP agreement with CDC's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), former federal workers are being screened through the worker and volunteer WTC program, one of the five key federally funded programs. As of July 31, 2006, the worker and volunteer WTC program provided screenings to 13 former federal workers and scheduled 11 more, and 139 former workers had been screened by FOH as part of the 907 workers. Most of the former federal workers reside outside the New York area, where the worker and volunteer WTC program is located, and NIOSH is working to establish a national network of providers to screen these workers. CDC has awarded a small portion of the $75 million appropriated for screening, monitoring, and treatment and plans to make decisions about treatment coverage before awarding most of the funds. The agency plans to award the $75 million to the five organizations that the law identified as having priority for funding. CDC officials expect to make awards to the WTC Health Registry, the Police Organization Providing Peer Assistance (the POPPA program), and the New York City Police Foundation's Project COPE over a 3-year period and to award funds to the FDNY WTC and worker and volunteer WTC programs in response to the treatment costs they incur. CDC officials have a proposed spending plan that allocates about $53.5 million for the latter two programs' treatment costs, but the officials told GAO that because they are uncertain about how quickly treatment costs could deplete the available funds, they may need to make adjustments. Officials from the FDNY WTC and worker and volunteer WTC programs told GAO that they anticipated that their estimated portion of the funds would be depleted well before the end of 3 years. As of August 2006, CDC awarded about $4.5 million of the $75 million: about $1.9 million to the WTC Health Registry, $1.5 million to the FDNY WTC program, and almost $1.1 million to the worker and volunteer WTC program. In addition, CDC expects to award $1.5 million to the POPPA program and $3 million to Project COPE in September 2006. CDC is waiting to make further awards until it has reached certain decisions about the coverage of treatment services, such as which prescription drugs would be covered. CDC expects to begin making further awards around February 2007. |
gao_GAO-05-625T | gao_GAO-05-625T_0 | Eligibility Determinations
The Millennium Challenge Act requires that the MCC board base its eligibility decisions, “to the maximum extent possible,” on objective and quantifiable indicators of a country’s demonstrated commitment to the criteria enumerated in the act. MCC is to sign compacts only with national governments. Finally, we found that reliance on the indicators carried certain inherent limitations. MCC Used Quantitative Indicators and Judgment to Determine Eligibility
MCC used the 16 quantitative indicators, as well as the discretion implicit in the Millennium Challenge Act, to select 17 countries as eligible for MCA compact assistance for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 (see fig. Fiscal year 2005: In October 2004, the MCC board selected 16 countries as eligible for fiscal year 2005 funding. MCC Is Refining Its Compact Development Process
MCC has received compact proposals, concept papers, or both, from 16 countries; of these, it has approved a compact with one country and is negotiating with four others. As part of this process, MCC has identified elements of country program implementation and fiscal accountability that can be adapted to eligible countries’ compact objectives and institutional capacities. MCC’s $110 million compact with Madagascar, averaging $27.5 million per year, would make it the country’s fifth largest donor (see app. In addition, MCC is exploring ways—such as providing grants—to facilitate compact development and implementation. MCC Is Taking Steps to Coordinate with Key Stakeholders
MCC has received advice and support from USAID, State, Treasury, and USTR and has signed agreements with five U.S. agencies for program implementation and technical assistance. MCC Is Consulting with Other Donors and Using Donor Expertise
MCC has received information and expertise from key multilateral and bilateral donors in the United States and eligible countries. MCC Has Made Progress in Developing Management Structures but Has Not Completed Corporatewide Plans, Strategies, and Time Frames
Since starting up operations, MCC has made progress in developing key administrative infrastructures that support its program implementation. MCC has also made progress in establishing corporatewide structures for accountability, governance, internal control, and human capital management, including establishing an audit and review capability through its IG, adopting bylaws, providing ethics training to employees, and expanding its permanent full-time staff. However, MCC has not yet completed plans, strategies, and time frames needed to establish these essential management structures on a corporatewide basis. We also provided the Departments of State and Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative an opportunity to review a draft of this statement for technical accuracy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed MCC’s activities in its first 15 months of operations, specifically its (1) process for determining country eligibility for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, (2) progress in developing compacts, (3) coordination with key stakeholders, and (4) establishment of management structures and accountability mechanisms. We determined the data to be reliable for the purposes of this study. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2004, Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to administer the Millennium Challenge Account. MCC's mission is to promote economic growth and reduce extreme poverty in developing countries. The act requires MCC to rely to the maximum extent possible on quantitative criteria in determining countries' eligibility for assistance. MCC will provide assistance primarily through compacts--agreements with country governments. MCC aims to be one of the top donors in countries with which it signs compacts. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, Congress appropriated nearly $2.5 billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation; for fiscal year 2006, the President is requesting $3 billion. GAO was asked to monitor MCC's (1) process for determining country eligibility, (2) progress in developing compacts, (3) coordination with key stakeholders, and (4) establishment of management structures and accountability mechanisms.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the MCC board used the quantitative criteria as well as judgment in determining 17 countries to be eligible for MCA compacts. Although MCC chose the indicators based in part on their public availability, our analysis showed that not all of the source data for the indicators were readily accessible. In addition, we found that reliance on the indicators carried certain inherent limitations, such as measurement uncertainty. Between August 2004 and March 2005, MCC received compact proposals, concept papers, or both, from 16 eligible countries. It signed a compact with Madagascar in April 2005 and is negotiating compacts with four countries. MCC's 4-year compact with Madagascar for $110 million would make it the country's fifth largest donor. MCC is continuing to refine its compact development process. In addition, MCC has identified elements of program implementation and fiscal accountability that can be adapted to eligible countries' compact objectives and institutional capacities. MCC is taking steps to coordinate with key stakeholders to use existing expertise and conduct outreach. The U.S. agencies on the MCC Board of Directors--USAID, the Departments of State and Treasury, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative--have provided resources and other assistance to MCC, and five U.S. agencies have agreed to provide technical assistance. Bilateral and multilateral donors are providing information and expertise. MCC is also consulting with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and abroad as part of its outreach activities. MCC has made progress in developing key administrative infrastructures that support its mission and operations. MCC has also made progress in establishing corporatewide structures for accountability, governance, internal control, and human capital management, including establishing an audit capability through its Inspector General, adopting bylaws, providing ethics training to employees, and expanding its permanent full-time staff. However, MCC has not yet completed comprehensive plans, strategies, and related time frames for establishing these essential management structures and accountability mechanisms on a corporatewide basis. |
gao_GAO-12-14 | gao_GAO-12-14_0 | Coast Guard Security Risk Models
From 2001 to 2006, the Coast Guard assessed maritime security risk using the Port Security Risk Assessment Tool (PSRAT), which was quickly developed and fielded after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In addition to providing decision makers with an understanding of how to interpret any uncertainty in MSRAM’s risk estimates, greater transparency and documentation could facilitate periodic peer reviews of the model—a best practice in risk management. MSRAM’s risk assessment methodology also generally aligns with the NIPP criteria for a reproducible risk assessment. Training. The Coast Guard has acknowledged these challenges and limitations and has actions underway to address them and make MSRAM more complete and reproducible. Additional Documentation Could Align MSRAM with NIPP Criteria for Documented and Defensible Risk Assessments
MSRAM is generally documented and defensible, but the Coast Guard could improve its documentation of the model’s assumptions and other sources of uncertainty, such as subjective judgments made by Coast Guard analysts about threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, and how these assumptions and other sources of uncertainty affect MSRAM’s results. For example, to assess risk in MSRAM, Coast Guard analysts make judgments regarding such factors as the likelihood of success in interdicting an attack and the number of casualties expected to result from an attack. Coast Guard officials agreed with the importance of documenting and communicating the sources and implications of uncertainty for MSRAM’s risk estimates, and noted that they planned to develop this documentation as part of an internal MSRAM verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) process that they expect to complete in the fall of 2011. National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis. Coast Guard Has Used a Risk-Informed Approach to Manage Maritime Security Risk, but Challenges Hinder Sector Efforts
MSRAM Informs Several National-Level Risk Management Efforts
MSRAM is a security risk analysis and risk management tool and the Coast Guard intends for it to be used to inform risk management decisions at all levels of command. MSRAM Has Informed Some Local-Level Risk Management Efforts, but Its Use Has Been Limited by Several Factors
MSRAM has been used to inform a variety of efforts at the sector level, such as strategic planning, communication with port stakeholders, and operational and tactical decision making, but its use for operational and tactical risk management efforts has been limited by a lack of staff time, the complexity of the MSRAM tool, and competing mission demands, among other factors. Providing training. MSRAM has the capability of informing operational, tactical, and resource allocation decisions at all levels of a sector, but the Coast Guard has generally provided MSRAM training to a limited number of sector staff with specific MSRAM risk assessment responsibilities, such as port security specialists, rather than sector staff who may have command or management responsibilities where MSRAM may apply. Such training on how MSRAM can be used at all levels of command for risk-informed decision making—including how MSRAM can assist with the selection of different types of security measures to address areas of risk and the evaluation of their impacts—could further the Coast Guard’s efforts to implement its risk management framework and meet its goal to institutionalize MSRAM as the risk management tool for maritime security. Coast Guard Measures Risk Reduction but Has Faced Challenges Using This Measure to Inform Decisions
Coast Guard Developed a Measure to Report Performance in Reducing Risk
The Coast Guard developed a performance measure and supporting model to measure and report its overall performance in reducing maritime security risk. This measure identifies the percentage reduction of maritime security risk, subject to Coast Guard influence, resulting from various Coast Guard actions. For example, given the inherent uncertainties in estimating risk reduction, it is unclear if a measure of risk reduction would provide meaningful performance information for tracking progress against goals and performance over time. Reliability refers to the precision with which performance is measured, while validity is the extent to which the measure adequately represents actual performance. Although the Coast Guard has taken steps to improve the quality of the supporting model to provide a more accurate measure, estimating risk reduction is inherently uncertain and this measure is based on largely subjective judgments of Coast Guard personnel, and therefore the risk reduction results reported by the Coast Guard are not based on measurable or observable activities. Using a risk reduction measure that more accurately reflects performance effectiveness can give Coast Guard leaders and Congress a better sense of progress toward goals, which can support efforts to identify areas for improvement. Taking these steps would make the Coast Guard’s risk management approach even stronger. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help the Coast Guard strengthen MSRAM and better align it with NIPP risk management guidance, as well as facilitate the increased use of MSRAM across the agency, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following three actions: (1) Provide more thorough documentation related to key assumptions and sources of uncertainty within MSRAM and inform users of any implications for interpreting the results from the model. (2) Make MSRAM available to appropriate parties for additional external peer review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the nation's ports and waterways have been viewed as potential targets of attack. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has called for using risk-informed approaches to prioritize its investments, and for developing plans and allocating resources that balance security and the flow of commerce. The U.S. Coast Guard--a DHS component and the lead federal agency responsible for maritime security--has used its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) as its primary approach for assessing and managing security risks. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which the Coast Guard's risk assessment approach aligns with DHS risk assessment criteria, (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard has used MSRAM to inform maritime security risk decisions, and (3) how the Coast Guard has measured the impact of its maritime security programs on risk in U.S. ports and waterways. GAO analyzed MSRAM's risk assessment methodology and interviewed Coast Guard officials about risk assessment and MSRAM's use across the agency.
What GAO Found
MSRAM generally aligns with DHS risk assessment criteria, but additional documentation on key aspects of the model could benefit users of the results. MSRAM generally meets DHS criteria for being complete, reproducible, documented, and defensible. Further, the Coast Guard has taken actions to improve the quality of MSRAM data and to make them more complete and reproducible, including providing training and tools for staff entering data into the model. However, the Coast Guard has not documented and communicated the implications that MSRAM's key assumptions and other sources of uncertainty have on MSRAM's risk results. For example, to assess risk in MSRAM, Coast Guard analysts make judgments regarding such factors as the probability of an attack and the economic and environmental consequences of an attack. These multiple judgments are inherently subjective and constitute sources of uncertainty that have implications that should be documented and communicated to decision makers. Without this documentation, decision makers and external MSRAM reviewers may not have a complete understanding of the uses and limitations of MSRAM data. In addition, greater transparency and documentation of uncertainty and assumptions in MSRAM's risk estimates could also facilitate periodic peer reviews of the model--a best practice in risk management. MSRAM is the Coast Guard's primary tool for managing maritime security risk, but resource and training challenges hinder use of the tool by Coast Guard field operational units, known as sectors. At the national level, MSRAM supports Coast Guard strategic planning efforts, which is consistent with the agency's intent for MSRAM. At the sector level, MSRAM has informed a variety of decisions, but its use has been limited by lack of staff time, the tool's complexity, and competing mission demands, among other things. The Coast Guard has taken actions to address these challenges, but providing additional training on how MSRAM can be used at all levels of sector decision making could further the Coast Guard's risk management efforts. MSRAM is capable of informing operational, tactical, and resource allocation decisions, but the Coast Guard has generally provided MSRAM training only to a small number of sector staff who may not have insight into all levels of sector decision making. The Coast Guard developed an outcome measure to report its performance in reducing maritime risk, but has faced challenges using this measure to inform decisions. Outcome measures describe the intended result of carrying out a program or activity. The measure is partly based on Coast Guard subject matter experts' estimates of the percentage reduction of maritime security risk subject to Coast Guard influence resulting from Coast Guard actions. The Coast Guard has improved the measure to make it more valid and reliable and believes it is a useful proxy measure of performance, noting that developing outcome measures is challenging because of limited historical data on maritime terrorist attacks. However, given the uncertainties in estimating risk reduction, it is unclear if the measure would provide meaningful performance information with which to track progress over time. In addition, the Coast Guard reports the risk reduction measure as a specific estimate rather than as a range of plausible estimates, which is inconsistent with risk analysis criteria. Reporting and using outcome measures that more accurately reflect mission effectiveness can give Coast Guard leaders and Congress a better sense of progress toward goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard provide more thorough documentation on MSRAM's assumptions and other sources of uncertainty, make MSRAM available for peer review, implement additional MSRAM training, and report the results of its risk reduction performance measure in a manner consistent with risk analysis criteria. The Coast Guard agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-97-110 | gao_AIMD-97-110_0 | Federal PMAs within the Department of Energy (DOE) market wholesale power generated primarily at federal water projects. RUS and PMA Activities Result in Recurring Net Costs to the Federal Government
For fiscal year 1996, we estimate that the federal government incurred $2.5 billion in net costs, including about $982 million in RUS loan write-offs,from the electricity-related activities of RUS and the PMAs. TVA generally recovers all power-related costs from its ratepayers. Cumulatively over the last 5 years, we estimate that the net financing costs totaled about $3.8 billion (in constant 1996 dollars). Cumulatively, for fiscal years 1992 through 1996, we estimate that the net financing cost in constant 1996 dollars has been over $1.1 billion for the three PMAs and nearly $2 billion for BPA. Federal Government Faces Risk of Future Losses Due to Financial Vulnerability of Electricity-Related Entities
The federal government has financial exposure stemming from its over $84 billion of direct and indirect financial involvement in the electricity-related activities of RUS, the PMAs, and TVA. The federal government’s risk of future losses is directly related to the ability of the RUS borrowers, the PMAs, and TVA to set their rates in a competitive and/or regulated market at a level sufficient to recover all of their costs. As of September 30, 1996, the federal government had over $53 billion of primarily direct lending to RUS borrowers, the PMAs, and TVA and appropriated debt owed by the PMAs and TVA. For this indirect involvement, the federal government would incur future losses if it incurred unreimbursed costs as a result of actions it took to prevent default or breach of contract by the federal entity on nonfederal debt. The three PMAs market power that is substantially lower in cost than nonfederal utilities and thus, in the current operating environment, are competitively sound overall. However, as discussed in detail in appendix VII of volume 2, each of the three PMAs has one or a few projects or rate-setting systems with problems that, taken as a whole, make the risk of some future losses to the federal government probable. This would reduce the risk to the federal government. However, we believe that as long as TVA remains in a protected position similar to a traditional regulated utility monopoly, the risk of loss to the federal government is remote. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The comments from USDA, the three PMAs, BPA and TVA generally focused on our analysis of net financing costs and the federal government’s risk of future financial losses related to the electricity-related activities of these entities. We do not agree. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal electricity activities, focusing on the: (1) federal government's net recurring cost from the electricity-related activities at the Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service (RUS), the Department of Energy's power marketing administrations (PMA), and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for fiscal year (FY) 1996 and, where possible, the cumulative net cost for FY 1992 through 1996; and (2) likelihood of future losses beyond the net recurring costs to the federal government from these entities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the federal government incurs net costs of over a billion dollars annually in supporting the electricity-related activities of RUS and the PMAs; (2) GAO estimates that the net costs to the federal government for FY 1996 totaled about $2.5 billion--$0.4 billion for BPA, $0.2 billion for the three PMAs, and about $1.9 billion for RUS, including about $982 million in RUS loan write-offs; (3) the federal government is exposed to additional future losses beyond the recurring net costs resulting from the government's more than $84 billion in direct and indirect financial involvement in the electricity-related activities of RUS, the PMAs, and TVA as of September 30, 1996; (4) these potential future losses relate to the possibility that RUS borrowers, the PMAs, and TVA would be unable to repay the full $53 billion in debt owed to the federal government or that the federal government would incur unreimbursed costs as a result of actions it took to prevent default or breach of contract on the $31 billion in nonfederal debt; (5) this risk exists because certain RUS borrowers, the PMAs (to varying degrees) and TVA are financially vulnerable primarily as a result of uneconomical construction projects and the accumulation of substantial debt, which have resulted in high fixed costs; (6) the Southeastern, Southwestern, and Western PMAs generally market wholesale power that consistently costs at least 40 percent less than power sold by nonfederal utilities and are therefore currently competitively sound overall; (7) however, the three PMAs maintain this overall soundness in part because they do not recover all power-related costs; (8) if they were required to recover some or all of these power-related costs, their ability to remain competitive might be impaired and the risk of future financial loss to the federal government increased; (9) also, each has one or a few projects or rate-setting systems with problems that, taken as a whole, make the risk of some loss to the federal government probable; and (10) for TVA, the risk that the federal government will incur losses is remote as long as TVA retains a position similar to a traditional regulated utility monopoly in its service area. |
gao_GAO-13-689 | gao_GAO-13-689_0 | See figure 1 for a map of the DRC’s provinces and neighboring countries. In July 2010, Congress included several provisions in section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act related to conflict minerals in the DRC and adjoining countries. Stakeholder- Developed Initiatives May Facilitate Compliance with Conflict Minerals Rule, but Other Factors May Affect the Rule’s Impact on Reducing Benefits to Armed Groups
SEC’s adoption of the final conflict minerals rule on August 22, 2012, has raised companies’ awareness regarding conflict minerals and the due diligence necessary to identify whether conflict minerals may have benefited armed groups. As mentioned in our 2012 report, stakeholder-developed initiatives—which include the development of guidance documents, audit protocols, and in-region sourcing—support efforts by companies reporting to SEC under the rule to (1) conduct due diligence of their conflict minerals supply chain, (2) identify the source of conflict minerals within their supply chain, and (3) responsibly source conflict minerals. Additionally, some agency officials stated that in- region initiatives can help develop capacity in the DRC. Lack of Security, Inadequate Infrastructure, and Capacity Constraints in the DRC Could Affect Companies’ Ability to Ensure Conflict-Free Sourcing of Minerals
Some agency officials as well as representatives we interviewed from NGOs, industry, and international organizations cited lack of security, inadequate infrastructure, and capacity constraints as factors that could affect the ability to expand on efforts to achieve conflict-free sourcing of minerals from the eastern DRC and thereby potentially contribute to armed groups benefiting from the conflict minerals trade. Officials from UNGoE and industry representatives we interviewed noted a lack of infrastructure in place that would enable companies to set up or expand operations in the DRC. Limited transportation and poor roads in eastern DRC also make it difficult to get to mine sites. Moreover, according to an NGO representative, the remoteness of mines also makes it difficult for DRC mine officials to validate mines and ensure that the mines have not been compromised by armed groups. These companies may supply components or parts that contain conflict minerals to companies reporting to SEC under the rule and may be asked by such companies to provide information specifying the origin of the minerals. Companies Not Required to Report to SEC under the Rule May Provide Information on the Origin of Conflict Minerals in Their Products to Companies That Will Report to SEC under the Rule
Companies Not Required to Report to SEC under the Rule May Supply Products That May Contain Conflict Minerals to SEC-Reporting Companies under the Rule
Companies that are not required to report to SEC under the rule may supply products that contain conflict minerals to SEC-reporting companies under the rule. SEC relied on estimates provided by a commentator indicating that 278,000 suppliers—most of which would be companies that would not report to SEC under the rule—could be indirectly impacted by the rule. While it is not possible to determine the universe of suppliers that would not be required to report under the rule, smelters and refiners are a more identifiable population for which there is some aggregated information, such as the types of conflict minerals they use, We found the following information on smelters and and their location.refiners:
Smelters and refiners constitute a small but important portion of suppliers that likely will not file a conflict minerals report under the SEC rule. Over half of the smelters and refiners of the conflict minerals we identified were located in three countries. Most smelters and refiners in our analysis did not have a conflict minerals policy publicly available. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To describe factors that may impact whether the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) conflict minerals rule denies armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries benefits from conflict minerals, we interviewed officials from SEC, the Department of State (State), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as representatives from international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), industry associations, consulting firms, and smelters and refiners of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold to get their views on the final SEC rule as well as any impacting factors. We reviewed Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. | Why GAO Did This Study
The eastern part of the DRC has experienced recurring conflicts involving armed groups that have resulted in severe human rights abuses. In addition, armed groups have profited from the exploitation of minerals. In 2010, Congress enacted Section 1502(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to address the exploitation of conflict minerals, which include tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, and the extreme levels of violence in the DRC. As required by Section 1502(b), the SEC issued a rule in August 2012 that requires companies to disclose their use of conflict minerals and the origin of those minerals. The act requires GAO to report on the rules effectiveness, among other issues, beginning in 2012 and annually thereafter.
Initial company disclosure reports to SEC that would enable GAO to assess the effectiveness of the rule will not be due until May 2014. This report describes, among other issues, (1) factors that may impact whether SECs rule denies armed groups in the DRC benefits from conflict minerals and (2) information about companies that use conflict minerals and are not required to report to SEC under the rule.
GAO reviewed and analyzed documents and interviewed representatives from SEC, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, industry associations, NGOs, consulting firms, and international organizations. GAO also analyzed smelter and refiner information. This report does not contain recommendations.
What GAO Found
Stakeholder-developed initiatives may facilitate companies' compliance with the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) final conflict minerals rule, but other factors may affect the rule's impact on reducing benefits to armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and neighboring countries. Agency and industry officials as well as representatives from international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) stated that adoption of the rule as well as stakeholder-developed initiatives--which include the development of guidance documents, audit protocols, and in-region sourcing of conflict minerals--can support companies' efforts to conduct due diligence and to identify and responsibly source conflict minerals. For example, officials GAO interviewed explained that the Conflict-Free Smelter Program enables suppliers to source conflict minerals from smelters (companies that refine the ore of the conflict minerals into metals) that have been certified by an independent third-party auditor as obtaining their minerals from sources that did not benefit armed groups. However, officials GAO interviewed cited constraining factors such as lack of security, lack of infrastructure, and lack of capacity in the DRC that could affect the ability to expand on efforts to achieve conflict-free sourcing of minerals from eastern DRC and thereby potentially contribute to armed groups' benefiting from the conflict minerals trade. For example, officials GAO interviewed noted that there is a lack of infrastructure in place that would enable companies to set up or expand operations in the DRC. Limited transportation and poor roads in eastern DRC also make it difficult to get to mine sites. Moreover, according to officials, the remoteness of mines also makes it difficult for DRC officials to validate mines and ensure that the mines have not been compromised by illegal armed groups.
Companies that are not required to file disclosures under SEC's conflict minerals rule may be affected by the rule. These companies may supply components or parts that contain conflict minerals to companies that report to SEC under the rule, many of which could be original equipment manufacturers and component parts manufacturers. Estimates provided by public commentators responding to the rule indicate that roughly 280,000 suppliers could provide products to roughly 6,000 companies that report to the SEC under the rule and may be asked to provide information on their use of conflict minerals and the origin of the minerals as part of the rule's due diligence requirements. GAO found little available aggregated information about companies that do not report to SEC under the rule. However, GAO found that for smelters and refiners there is some aggregated information, such as the types of conflict minerals they use and their location. For example, GAO found that over half of the 278 smelters and refiners of conflict minerals it identified were located in Asia, many processed tin, and most did not have a conflict minerals policy publicly available. |
gao_NSIAD-97-136 | gao_NSIAD-97-136_0 | We reviewed this draft policy and found that it addresses the types of medical surveillance problems experienced during the Gulf War—the lack of personnel deployment information and medical assessments, the failure to monitor environmental and disease health threats, and the failure to meet record-keeping requirements. The draft directive and implementing instruction are currently under review by various offices within DOD. DOD officials expect the directive and instruction to be issued by September 1997. DOD’s Implementation of a Medical Surveillance Plan in Operation Joint Endeavor
While DOD was still developing its joint medical surveillance policy for deployments, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs issued, in January 1996, a medical surveillance plan for U.S. forces deploying to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Hungary under Operation Joint Endeavor. Our review indicated that DOD continues to experience problems with its capability to track the population at risk during deployments. During the Gulf War, servicemembers frequently did not remain with their units. This is being done during Operation Joint Endeavor. Our review of the Deployment Surveillance Team’s database for the 6,624 Army personnel in our universe requiring medical assessments indicated that 43 percent of the personnel had not received the required in-theater postdeployment medical assessment, 82 percent had not received the home unit postdeployment medical assessment, and 41 percent did not have a postdeployment blood sample drawn. The medical surveillance plan includes provisions for the centralized collection and maintenance of a database for the in-theater and home unit postdeployment medical assessments done for servicemembers deployed under Operation Joint Endeavor. They are also important for epidemiological analyses following military deployments. Our review disclosed that many of the medical records were incomplete regarding documentation reflecting that (1) in-theater medical assessments were conducted, (2) servicemembers had received the tick-borne encephalitis vaccine, and (3) visits had been made by servicemembers to battalion aid stations. We did not test, however, the services’ implementation of the Southwest Asia medical surveillance requirements. Conclusions and Recommendations
Overall, DOD has taken initiatives to overcome the medical surveillance problems experienced during the Gulf War. In light of the problems discussed in this report, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, along with the military services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commands, as appropriate, to complete expeditiously and implement a DOD-wide policy on medical surveillance for all major deployments of U.S. forces, using lessons learned during Operation Joint Endeavor and the Gulf War; develop procedures to ensure that medical surveillance policies are implemented to include emphasizing (a) the need for unit commanders to ensure that all servicemembers receive the required medical assessments in a timely manner and (b) the need for medical personnel to maintain complete and accurate medical records; and develop procedures for providing accurate and complete medical assessment information to the centralized database. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO determined what action, if any, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to improve medical surveillance before, during, and after deployments, focusing on Operation Joint Endeavor.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has initiated actions to improve its medical surveillance for deployments since the Gulf War; (2) a joint medical surveillance policy, currently under development since late 1994, calls for a comprehensive DOD-wide medical surveillance capability to monitor and assess the effects of deployments on servicemembers' health; (3) provisions of the draft policy address the medical surveillance problems experienced during the Gulf War; however, its success in resolving the problems cannot be assessed until the directive and implementing instruction are finalized and applied to a deployment; (4) DOD officials expect the policy to be finalized by September 1997; (5) after the policy is issued, the services and responsible offices are to develop detailed implementing instructions; (6) DOD has also implemented two comprehensive medical surveillance plans--one for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Hungary, and the other for the current deployment in southwest Asia; (7) these plans address the medical surveillance problems experienced during the Gulf War and specifically call for identifying servicemember deployment information, monitoring environmental health and disease threats, doing personnel medical assessments, maintaining a centralized collection of medical assessment data, and employing certain medical record-keeping requirements; (8) recognizing that this is DOD's first attempt, its success in implementing the medical surveillance plan for Operation Joint Endeavor has been mixed; and (9) although the plan provided for enhanced medical surveillance compared to the Gulf War, GAO's review disclosed the following problems, all of which offer DOD and the services lessons to be learned as they continue to develop their medical surveillance capabilities: (a) the personnel database used for tracking which Air Force and Navy personnel were deployed is considered inaccurate by DOD personnel; (b) many Army personnel who should have received postdeployment medical assessments did not receive them; (c) when postdeployment medical assessments are done, they are frequently done late; (d) the centralized database for collecting both in-theater and home unit postdeployment medical assessments is incomplete for many Army personnel; and (e) many servicemembers' medical records GAO reviewed, maintained by medical units in Germany, were incomplete regarding in-theater postdeployment medical assessments done, medical servicemembers' visits during deployment, and documentation of personnel receiving the tick-borne encephalitis vaccine. |
gao_GAO-10-222T | gao_GAO-10-222T_0 | In 2001, NARA hired a contractor to develop policies and plans to guide the overall acquisition of an electronic records system. Through fiscal year 2008, NARA had spent about $237 million on ERA, including about $112 million in payments to Lockheed Martin. ● According to NARA’s 2010 ERA expenditure plan, Increment 3 is to include new Congressional and Public Access systems. NARA plans to complete this increment by June 2010. ● Increments 4 and 5 are to provide additional ERA functionality, such as backup and restore functions and wider search capabilities, and provide full system functionality by 2012. NARA Has Completed Two of Five ERA Increments, but Also Experienced Schedule Delays and Cost Overruns While Deferring Functionality
NARA’s progress in developing ERA includes achieving initial operating capability for the first two of its five planned increments. In response, NARA and Lockheed Martin agreed to a revised schedule and strategy that called for the concurrent development of two separate systems, which could later be reintegrated into a single system: ● First, they agreed to continue development of the original system but focused the first increment on the transfer of electronic records into the system. Other initially planned capabilities were deferred to later increments, including deleting records from storage, searching item descriptions, and ingesting records redacted outside of the system. NARA now refers to this as the “base” ERA system. ● Second, NARA conducted parallel development of a separate increment dedicated initially to receiving electronic records from the outgoing Bush Administration in January 2009. This system, referred to as the Executive Office of the President (EOP) system, uses a different architecture from that of the ERA base: it was built on a commercial product that was to provide the basic requirements for processing presidential electronic records, such as rapid ingestion of records and the ability to search content. NARA also reported that it completed Increment 2 on time in December 2008 at a cost of $10.4 million (compared to a planned cost of $11.1 million). In fiscal 2010, NARA plans to complete Increment 3 and begin work on Increment 4. It is to provide new systems for congressional records and public access, as well as improvements to the existing base system and the incorporation of several deferred functions, such as the ability to delete records and search and view their descriptions. These risks include the lack of specific plans describing the functions to be delivered in future increments, inconsistent application of earned value management (a key management technique), and the lack of a tested contingency plan for the ERA system. However, several of our reviews have found that NARA’s plans lacked sufficient detail. Most recently, we reported in July that NARA’s 2009 plan did not clearly show what functions had been delivered to date or what functions were to be included in future increments and at what cost. For example, the fiscal year 2009 plan did not specifically identify the functions provided in the two completed increments. EVM, if implemented appropriately, can provide objective reports of project status, produce early warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns, and provide unbiased estimates of a program’s total costs. We recently published a set of best practices on cost estimation that addresses the use of EVM. Another significant risk is the lack of a contingency plan for ERA. Implementation of GAO’s Recommendations Could Reduce Risks
To help mitigate the risks facing the ERA program, we previously recommended that NARA, among other things: include more details in future ERA expenditure plans on the functions and costs of completed and planned increments; ● strengthen its earned value management process following best ● develop and implement a system contingency plan for ERA. In its 2010 expenditure plan, NARA reported that it had taken action to address our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has been working to develop a modern Electronic Records Archive (ERA) system, a major information system that is intended to preserve and provide access to massive volumes of all types and formats of electronic records. The system is being developed incrementally over several years, with the first two pieces providing an initial set of functions and additional capabilities to be added in future increments. NARA plans to deploy full system functionality by 2012 at an estimated life-cycle cost of about $550 million. NARA originally planned to complete the first segment of ERA in September 2007. However, software and contracting problems led the agency and its contractor Lockheed Martin to revise the development approach. The revised plan called for parallel development of two different increments: a "base" ERA system with limited functionality and an Executive Office of the President (EOP) system to support the ingestion and search of records from the outgoing Bush Administration. GAO was asked to summarize NARA's progress in developing the ERA system and the ongoing risks the agency faces in completing it. In preparing this testimony, GAO relied on its prior work and conducted a preliminary review of NARA's fiscal year 2010 ERA expenditure plan.
What GAO Found
NARA has completed two of five planned increments of ERA, but has experienced schedule delays and cost overruns, and several functions planned for the system's initial release were deferred. Although NARA initially planned for the system to be capable of ingesting federal and presidential records in September 2007, the two system increments to support those records did not achieve initial operating capability until June 2008 and December 2008, respectively. In addition, NARA reportedly spent about $80 million on the base increment, compared to its planned cost of about $60 million. Finally, a number of functions originally planned for the base increment were deferred to later increments, including the ability to delete records and to ingest redacted records. In fiscal year 2010, NARA plans to complete the third increment, which is to include new systems for Congressional records and public access, and begin work on the fourth. GAO's previous work on ERA identified significant risks to the program and recommended actions to mitigate them. Specifically, GAO reported that NARA's plans for ERA lacked sufficient detail to, for example, clearly show what functions had been delivered to date or were to be included in future increments and at what cost. Second, NARA had been inconsistent in its use of earned value management (EVM), a project management approach that can provide objective reports of project status and early warning signs of cost and schedule overruns. Specifically, GAO found that NARA fully employed only 5 of 13 best practices for cost estimation that address EVM. Further, NARA lacked a contingency plan for ERA to ensure system continuity in the event that normal operations were disrupted. For example, NARA did not have a fully functional backup and restore process for the ERA system, a key component of contingency planning for system availability. To help mitigate these risks, GAO recommended that NARA: (1) include details in future ERA expenditure plans on the functions and costs of completed and planned increments; (2) strengthen its earned value management process following best practices; and (3) develop and implement a system contingency plan for ERA. NARA reported in its most recent expenditure plan that it had taken actions to address these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-225 | gao_GAO-02-225_0 | Ability of Reforms to Expand Pension Coverage and Benefits May Be Limited
Traditional reforms to the voluntary, single-employer-based pension system may have limited potential to significantly expand pension coverage and improve benefits for workers who traditionally lack pensions. Reforms aimed at encouraging plan sponsorship have focused on improving tax incentives and reducing the burden of pension regulation on small employers, but the effect of reforms aimed at increasing pension sponsorship and coverage may be offset by other policy actions. As a result, some reformers suggest proposals that move beyond the voluntary, single-employer private pension system. These categories are (1) pooled employer reforms, (2) universal access reforms, and (3) universal participation reforms. Pooled employer reforms focus on increasing the number of firms offering pension coverage through centralized third-party administration. Universal access reforms attempt to increase retirement savings by making payroll retirement saving accounts available to all workers without mandating an employer contribution. Universal participation reforms are intended to ensure coverage and retirement income for all workers by mandating pension availability and participation, similar to the existing Social Security system. To increase the likelihood of worker participation, most proposals call for payroll-based accounts. | What GAO Found
Although pensions are an important source of income for many retirees, millions of workers lack individual pension coverage. Only half of the nation's workers have been covered by private employer-sponsored pensions since the 1970s. Traditional reforms to the voluntary, single-employer-based pension system have limited potential to expand pension coverage and improve worker benefits. These pension reforms have concentrated mainly on improving tax incentives and reducing the regulatory burden on small employers. Furthermore, efforts to increase retirement savings by restricting the use of lump-sum distributions could limit worker participation in and contributions to pension plans. Three categories of reform--pooled employer reforms, universal access reforms, and universal participation reforms--go beyond the voluntary, single-employer private pension system. Pooled employer reforms seek to increase the number of firms offering pension coverage by creating centralized third-party administration and increasing pension plan portability. Universal access reforms seek to boost savings by offering payroll-based accounts, albeit without mandating employer contributions. Universal participation reforms would mandate pension availability and participation for all workers, similar to the existing Social Security system. |
gao_GAO-08-896 | gao_GAO-08-896_0 | To accomplish this, the program office is responsible for key program management areas, such as architectural alignment, economic justification, earned value management, requirements management, and risk management. FOC is now planned for fiscal year 2013, and the estimated life cycle cost is about $2.4 billion (31 percent increase over the original estimate). Prior GAO Reviews Have Identified IT Acquisition Management Control Weaknesses on DOD Business System Investments
We have previously reported that DOD has not effectively managed a number of business system investments. To varying degrees of effectiveness, Navy ERP has been managed in accordance with aspects of this framework. Specifically, compliance with DOD’s federated BEA has not been sufficiently investment in the program has been economically justified on the basis of expected life cycle benefits that will likely exceed estimated life cycle costs, although some estimating limitations nevertheless exist; earned value management has not been effectively implemented; an important requirements management activity has been effectively a risk management process has been defined, but not effectively implemented for all risks. The reasons that program management and oversight officials cited for why these key practices have not been sufficiently executed range from limitations in the applicable DOD guidance and tools to the complexity and challenges of managing and implementing a program of this size. By not effectively implementing all the above key IT acquisition management functions, the program is at increased risk of (1) not being defined in a way that best meets corporate mission needs and enhances performance and (2) adding to the more than 2 years in program schedule delays and about $570 million in program cost increases experienced to date. To its credit, the program office has followed DOD’s BEA compliance guidance. Therefore, we have no reason to believe that Navy ERP will not produce a positive return on investment. While important cost estimating practices were not implemented, it is nevertheless unlikely that these limitations would materially increase the $2.4 billion cost estimate to a level approaching the program’s $8.6 billion benefit expectations. To its credit, the program has elected to implement program-level EVM, which is a best practice that has rarely been implemented in the federal government. In doing so, however, basic EVM activities have not been executed. Not performing these important practices has contributed to the cost overruns and lengthy schedule delays already experienced on Release 1.0, and they will likely result in more. However, it has not conducted an integrated baseline review. The effectiveness to which key IT management controls have been implemented in Navy ERP varies, with one control and several aspects of others being effectively implemented, and others less so. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen Navy ERP management control and better provide for the program’s success, we are making the following recommendations: To improve the reliability of Navy ERP benefit estimates and cost estimates, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, through the appropriate chain of command, to ensure that future Navy ERP estimates include uncertainty analyses of estimated benefits, reflect the risks associated with not having cost data for comparable ERP programs, and are otherwise derived in full accordance with the other key estimating practices, and economic analysis practices discussed in this report. To improve Navy ERP’s management of program risks, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, through the appropriate chain of command, to ensure that (1) the plans for mitigating the risks associated with converting data from legacy systems to Navy ERP and positioning the commands for adopting the new business processes embedded in the Navy ERP are re-evaluated in light of the recent experience with NAVAIR and adjusted accordingly, (2) the status and results of these and other mitigation plans’ implementation are periodically reported to program oversight and approval authorities, (3) these authorities ensure that those entities responsible for implementing these strategies are held accountable for doing so, and (4) each of the risks discussed in this report are included in the program’s inventory of active risks and managed accordingly. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Department of the Navy is effectively implementing information technology management controls on the Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (Navy ERP) program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long been challenged in implementing key information technology (IT) management controls on its thousands of business system investments. For this and other reasons, GAO has designated DOD's business systems modernization efforts as high-risk. One of the larger business system investments is the Department of the Navy's Enterprise Resource Planning (Navy ERP) program. Initiated in 2003, the program is to standardize the Navy's business processes, such as acquisition and financial management. It is being delivered in increments, the first of which is to cost about $2.4 billion over its useful life and be fully deployed in fiscal year 2013. GAO was asked to determine whether key IT management controls are being implemented on the program. To do this, GAO analyzed, for example, requirements management, economic justification, earned value management, and risk management.
What GAO Found
DOD has implemented key IT management controls on its Navy ERP program to varying degrees of effectiveness. To its credit, the control associated with managing system requirements is being effectively implemented. In addition, important aspects of other controls have at least been partially implemented, including those associated with economically justifying investment in the program and proactively managing program risks. Nevertheless, other aspects of these controls, as well as the bulk of what is needed to effectively implement earned value management, which is a recognized means for measuring program progress, have not been effectively implemented. Among other things, these control weaknesses have contributed to the more than 2-year schedule delay and the almost $600 million cost overruns already experienced on the program since it began, and they will likely contribute to future delays and overruns if they are not corrected. Examples of the weaknesses are: (1) Investment in the program has been economically justified on the basis of expected benefits that far exceed estimated costs ($8.6 billion versus $2.4 billion over a 20-year life cycle). However, important estimating practices, such as using historical cost data from comparable programs and basing the cost estimate on a reliable schedule baseline were not employed. While these weaknesses are important because they limit the reliability of the estimates, GAO's analysis shows that they would not have altered the estimates to the point of not producing a positive return on investment. (2) Earned value management has not been effectively implemented. To its credit, the program office has elected to implement program-level earned value management. In doing so, however, basic prerequisites for effectively managing earned value have not been executed. In particular, the integrated master schedule was not derived in accordance with key estimating practices, and an integrated baseline review has not been performed on any of the first increment's releases. (3) A defined process for proactively avoiding problems, referred to as risk management, has been established, but risk mitigation strategies have not been effectively implemented for all significant risks, such as those associated with data conversion and organizational change management, as well the risks associated with the above-cited weaknesses. The reasons that program management and oversight officials cited for these practices not being executed range from the complexity and challenges of managing and implementing a program of this size to limitations in the program office's scope and authority. Notwithstanding the effectiveness with which important aspects of several controls have been implemented, the above-cited weaknesses put DOD at risk of investing in a system solution that does not optimally support corporate mission needs and mission performance, and meet schedule and cost commitments. |
gao_GAO-10-776 | gao_GAO-10-776_0 | 1.) VA monitors the prescription of nonformulary drugs to ensure appropriate use and accordingly, each VA medical center must have a nonformulary drug request process. VA’s Process for Reviewing Drugs for Its National Formulary Is Standardized
VA uses a standardized process to review drugs for its national formulary that is coordinated at the national level by its PBM. To begin reviewing a drug for inclusion on the national formulary, clinicians from PBM develop evidence-based drug monographs that include information on safety, efficacy, and cost, and seek comments on these monographs from VISN and medical center staff. A majority of the drugs VA considered for addition to the national formulary in 2008 and 2009 were reviewed within one year of FDA approval, but there were various factors that caused some reviews to take longer. VA’s PBM Initiates Most Drug Reviews in Response to FDA Approval of Drugs
VA’s drug review process is coordinated at the national level by its PBM, whose Chief Consultant told us that most reviews are initiated following FDA’s approval of a drug for use on the market to determine whether to add the drug to the national formulary. VISNS and Medical Centers Vary in Approaches to Implementing the Nonformulary Drug Request Process; Technology Enhancements Could Further Standardize the Process
VISNs and medical centers vary in approaches to implementing the nonformulary drug request process, including how they adjudicate nonformulary drug requests, collect and report required data to VA’s PBM, and address appeals of denied requests. We found that IT enhancements could help facilitate more consistent implementation of the process. Although VA intends to replace its pharmacy IT system, it is uncertain whether changes that would support the nonformulary drug request process will be implemented. While the total number of nonformulary drug request adjudications that exceed 96 hours is unknown, we found that data reported to VA’s PBM on quarterly average adjudication times for medical centers are sufficient to demonstrate that not all requests are adjudicated within this time frame. VA Is Unable to Determine the Total Number of Nonformulary Drug Request Adjudications That Exceed Its 96-Hour Standard, but Reported Data Are Sufficient to Demonstrate That Not All Are Completed within This Time Frame
VA policy requires that nonformulary drug requests be adjudicated within 96 hours, but it is unable to determine the total number of adjudications that exceed this standard due to limitations in the way data are collected, reported, and analyzed. VA’s PBM Has Limited Oversight of the Timeliness of Appeals of Denied Nonformulary Drug Requests
At the national level, VA’s PBM does not have the framework in place to ensure that appeals of denied nonformulary drug requests are resolved in a timely fashion. VA Has Some Mechanisms to Obtain Beneficiary Input on the National Formulary and Make Its Drug Review Process Transparent and Is Considering Additional Steps
VA obtains beneficiary input on the national formulary mainly through VSO meetings and complaints, though some VISNs have taken additional steps to seek this input. At the national level, VA officials are considering options for increasing beneficiary input on the national formulary and improving the transparency of the drug review process, and most VPEs and medical center officials told us there could be benefit to doing so. VA’s PBM Provides National Formulary Information on Its Web Site, and Some VISNs and Medical Centers Engage in Other Activities to Educate Beneficiaries about the Drug Review Process
Officials from VA’s PBM told us that they make the drug review process transparent to beneficiaries through national formulary information that is available online. Conclusions
In 2009, VA provided millions of prescriptions to veterans through its pharmacy benefit. While VA’s process for reviewing drugs to decide whether they should be included on its national formulary is overseen by its PBM, VISNs and medical centers are responsible for implementing the nonformulary drug request process, and there is variation in the approaches that VISNs and medical centers take. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and appropriate congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) spent nearly $4 billion on prescriptions for veterans. In general, VA provides drugs on its national formulary. However, all VA medical centers must have a nonformulary drug request process that is overseen by their regional Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN). This report responds to a House Committee on Appropriations report directing GAO to review VA's formulary process and to an additional congressional request. Specifically, GAO reviewed (1) the process VA uses to review drugs for its national formulary, (2) the approaches VISNs and medical centers take to implementing the nonformulary drug request process, (3) the extent to which VA ensures the timely adjudication of nonformulary drug requests, and (4) the mechanisms VA has in place to obtain beneficiary input on the national formulary and make the drug review process transparent. GAO reviewed VA policy guidance and VA's pharmacy-related information technology (IT) initiatives, analyzed 2008 and 2009 drug review data and 2009 nonformulary drug request data, and interviewed VA officials from the national level, each VISN, and a judgmental sample of four medical centers.
What GAO Found
VA uses a standardized process to review drugs for its national formulary that is coordinated at the national level by its Pharmacy Benefits Management Services (PBM). The Chief Consultant from VA's PBM told us that most drug reviews are initiated in response to FDA's approval of drugs for use on the market. To begin the process of deciding whether to include a drug on the national formulary, PBM develops evidence-based drug monographs that include information on safety, efficacy, and cost. PBM seeks comments on these monographs from VISN and medical center staff and, when appropriate, subject-matter experts. Once a monograph is complete, PBM sends it to its Medical Advisory Panel and the VISN Pharmacist Executive Committee, which review the monograph and vote on whether to add the drug to the national formulary. According to information provided by PBM, reviews for a majority of the drugs VA considered for addition to the national formulary in 2008 and 2009 were completed within a year of FDA approval, but there were a number of factors, such as safety concerns, that caused some to take longer. VISNs and medical centers vary in how they implement the nonformulary drug request process, including how they adjudicate nonformulary drug requests, collect and report required data to VA's PBM, and address appeals of denied requests. GAO found that IT enhancements could help facilitate more consistent implementation of the process. Although VA is working on replacing its pharmacy IT system, officials could not tell GAO whether components that would support the nonformulary drug request process will be implemented. VA requires that nonformulary drug requests be adjudicated within 96 hours, but it is unable to determine the total number of adjudications that exceed this standard due to limitations in the way data are collected, reported, and analyzed. While the total number of nonformulary drug request adjudications that exceed 96 hours is unknown, GAO found that data reported to VA's PBM on quarterly average adjudication times for medical centers are sufficient to demonstrate that not all requests are adjudicated within this time frame. Additionally, PBM does not have the framework in place to ensure that appeals of denied nonformulary drug requests are resolved in a timely fashion. VA obtains input from beneficiaries on the national formulary mainly through Veterans Service Organization meetings and complaints, though some VISNs have taken additional steps to seek this input. Officials from VA's PBM told GAO that they make the drug review process transparent to veterans through national formulary information available on PBM's Web site, and some VISN and medical center officials described undertaking other activities to educate beneficiaries. At the national level, VA officials are considering options for increasing beneficiary input on the national formulary and improving the transparency of the drug review process, and most VISN and medical center officials told us there could be benefit to doing so.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA establish additional mechanisms to ensure nonformulary drug requests are adjudicated in a timely fashion. VA concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-96-14 | gao_NSIAD-96-14_0 | In many cases, this may require specialized training. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The former Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Armed Services, asked us to examine (1) how the services incorporate peace operations into their various training programs, (2) what effect peace operations have on maintaining combat readiness, and (3) whether the services have the weapon systems and equipment they need for these operations. We did not assess whether the United States should participate in peace operations. Except in a few cases, the number of reserve component forces participating in these operations was relatively small. Commanders of major ground combat forces differ on when peace operations should be provided; some commanders include aspects of peace operations in standard unit training, and others prefer to maintain an exclusive combat focus until they are advised that their units are about to deploy to a peace operation. Naval and aviation forces perform similar tasks in peace operations and in war. Consequently, regional CINCs have conducted workshops and seminars to prepare their staffs for leading peace operations in their areas of responsibility; the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute held a peace operations training program, at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for command level personnel serving on the staffs of Unified Commands, which was attended by interagency, Joint Staff, potential joint task force commanders, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Army’s Battle Command Training Program and the Center for Army Lessons Learned provided mobile training teams, training support packages, and operational lessons to prepare staff prior to a peace operation deployment; the Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups, under CINCs, Atlantic Fleet and Pacific Fleet, will provide, starting with a pilot planned for November 1995, a 5-day class on peace operations for Naval Expeditionary Force staff officers and senior noncommissioned officers; and the Partnership for Peace program, utilizing peace operations training as a venue for military-to-military contact, sponsored a 3-week seminar and a large peace operations field exercise that included representatives from the U.S. military and from Ministries of Defense and General Staffs of other Partnership for Peace countries. 4 provides detail on nonlethal systems and equipment.) The recovery period is longest for ground combat forces. Some operations provide excellent experience that can improve the ability of various types of military units to operate in combat scenarios; others may benefit only certain types of units. The following variables determine the extent to which peace operations affect combat capability and the time needed to recover from a peace operation: skills used/not used, length of participation, and in-theater training opportunities. Most of the required tasks were different from the unit’s war-fighting tasks. As a result, it can take up to a month to ready these aircrews for a major conflict. The requirements center on three broad classifications: (1) force protection, (2) equipment for military operations in urban areas, and (3) nonlethalweapons. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined: (1) how the services incorporate peace operations into their various training programs; (2) what effect peace operations have on maintaining combat readiness; and (3) whether the services have the weapons systems and equipment they need for these operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) commanders of ground combat units differ on when special peace operations should be provided; (2) some commanders include aspects of peace operations in standard unit training; (3) other commanders prefer to maintain an exclusive combat focus until their units are formally assigned to a peace operation, in which case the amount of notification before deployment to a peace operation becomes an important factor; (4) aviation, naval, support, and special operations forces perform similar tasks in peace operations and in war and therefore do not need as much special training; (5) participation in peace operations can provide excellent experience for combat operations, but such participation can also degrade a unit's war-fighting capability; (6) the extent of degradation depends on a number of factors, such as the type of peace operation, the type of unit participating, the length of participation, and the opportunities available for training in theater; (7) it can take up to 6 months for a ground combat unit to recover from a peace operation and become combat ready; (8) the recovery period for aviation units is relatively short compared with that for ground forces; (9) participation in peace operations may interrupt naval training schedules, but there is little difference in the naval skills required for peace and for other operations; (10) determining whether the services have the appropriate weapon systems and equipment for peace operations is an ongoing process taking place primarily at the service level; (11) the services have identified requirements in three areas: (a) force protection; (b) equipment for military operations in built-up areas; and (c) nonlethal weapons; and (12) except for the recent withdrawal operation from Somalia, few nonlethal weapons have been used to date in peace operations. |
gao_GAO-06-773T | gao_GAO-06-773T_0 | Participants in the Exchange Visitor Program enter the United States with J-1 visas. More than 6,100 foreign physicians with J-1 visas took part in U.S. graduate medical education programs during academic year 2004–05. They may, however, obtain a waiver of this requirement from the Department of Homeland Security at the request of a state or federal agency, if the physician has agreed to practice in, or work at a facility that treats residents of, an underserved area for at least 3 years. States and federal agencies may impose additional limitations on their programs beyond federal statutory requirements, such as limiting the number of requests they will make for physicians to practice nonprimary care specialties. No one federal agency is responsible for managing or tracking states’ and federal agencies’ use of J-1 visa waivers to place physicians in underserved areas. Waivers Remain a Major Means for Providing Physicians, and States Request Most Waivers
J-1 visa waivers continue to be a major means of supplying physicians to underserved areas in the United States, with states and federal agencies reporting that they requested more than 1,000 waivers in each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005. In contrast to our findings a decade ago, states are now the primary source of waiver requests for physicians to practice in underserved areas. For example, in fiscal year 2005, about one-quarter of the states requested the maximum of 30 waivers, while slightly more than a quarter requested 10 or fewer (see fig. Some of these states limited these requests. Such redistribution would require legislation. Most States Reported That the Annual Waiver Limit Was Adequate, While Some Reported the Need for More
About 80 percent of the states reported that the annual limit of 30 waivers per state was adequate or more than adequate to meet their needs for J-1 visa waiver physicians. However, 13 percent of the states reported that the 30-waiver limit was less than adequate (see fig. States’ Views Differed on Having Unused Waiver Allotments Redistributed
Of the 44 states that did not use all of their waiver allotments in each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005, slightly over half (25 states) reported that they would be willing, at least under certain circumstances, to have their unused waiver allotments redistributed to other states. The 14 states that reported that they would not be willing to have their unused waiver allotments redistributed to other states cited varied concerns. Physician location preferences: Three states commented that physicians seeking J-1 visa waivers might wait until a redistribution period opened so that they could apply for waivers to practice in preferred states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many U.S. communities face difficulties attracting physicians to meet their health care needs. To address this problem, states and federal agencies have turned to foreign physicians who have just completed their graduate medical education in the United States under J-1 visas. Ordinarily, these physicians are required to return home after completing their education, but this requirement can be waived at the request of a state or federal agency if the physician agrees to practice in, or work at a facility that treats residents of, an underserved area. In 1996, GAO reported that J-1 visa waivers had become a major means of providing physicians for underserved areas, with over 1,300 requested in 1995. Since 2002, each state has been allotted 30 J-1 visa waivers per year, but some states have expressed interest in more. GAO was asked to report on its preliminary findings from ongoing work on (1) the number of J-1 visa waivers requested by states and federal agencies and (2) states' views on the 30-waiver limit and on their willingness to have unused waiver allotments redistributed. Such redistribution would require legislative action. GAO surveyed the 50 states, the District of Columbia, 3 U.S. insular areas--the 54 entities that are considered states for purposes of requesting J-1 visa waivers--and federal agencies about waivers they requested in fiscal years 2003-05.
What GAO Found
The use of J-1 visa waivers remains a major means of placing physicians in underserved areas of the United States. States and federal agencies reported requesting more than 1,000 waivers in each of the past 3 years. In contrast to a decade ago, states are now the primary source of waiver requests for physicians to practice in underserved areas, accounting for more than 90 percent of such waiver requests in fiscal year 2005. The number of waivers individual states requested that year, however, varied considerably. For example, about one-quarter of the states requested the maximum of 30 waivers, while slightly more than a quarter requested 10 or fewer. Regarding the annual limit on waivers, about 80 percent of the states--including many of those that requested the annual limit or close to it--reported the 30-waiver limit to be adequate for their needs. About 13 percent reported that this limit was less than adequate. Of the 44 states that did not always request the limit, 25 reported that they would be willing to have their unused waiver allotments redistributed, at least under certain circumstances. In contrast, another 14 states reported that they would not be willing to have their unused waiver allotments redistributed. These states cited concerns such as the possibility that physicians seeking waivers would wait until a redistribution period opened and apply to practice in preferred locations in other states. |
gao_GAO-01-475 | gao_GAO-01-475_0 | However, the components have not annually reviewed the analyses used to support their economic retention decisions, as required by the Department, and therefore have no assurance that the inventories held in economic retention status are appropriate. Conclusions
Components (other than the Air Force) have developed models designed to make economic retention decisions. However, none of the components currently use their economic retention models. Instead, they and the Air Force use ceilings to limit the amount of economic retention inventory they hold. Components have not properly documented their approaches to economic retention decisions. In addition, the Department did not have sound analytical support for the maximum levels they currently use. As a result, the components cannot currently depend on their models or ceilings to determine retention inventory levels without review and improvement. They also have not annually reviewed their approaches. Because the ceilings lack analytical support, and the model factors and assumptions vary without explanation and are out of date, the Department cannot provide reasonable assurance that inventories held in economic retention are the right amount. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to take the following actions: Taking into consideration the results of the congressionally mandated study, establish milestones for reviewing current and recently used approaches for making decisions on whether to hold or dispose of economic retention inventory to identify actions needed to develop and implement appropriate approaches to economic retention decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of September 1999, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that it owned secondary inventory worth about $64 billion and that $9.4 billion of that inventory is more economical to retain than to dispose of and possibly repurchase later. This report focuses on whether DOD's economic retention decisions are sound.
What GAO Found
GAO found that military components (other than the Air Force) have developed models to help make economic retention decisions on secondary inventory. However, none of the components now use their economic retention models. Instead, they and the Air Force use ceilings to limit the amount of economic retention inventory they hold. Components have not properly documented their approaches to economic retention decisions. For example, common model factors vary and assumptions are inconsistent and out of date. In addition, DOD lacked sound analytical support for the maximum levels it now uses. As a result, the components cannot depend on their models or ceilings to determine retention inventory levels without review and improvement. They also have not reviewed their approaches annually. As a result, the Department does not have a sound basis for its approach to manage items held in economic retention status. Consequently, the Department cannot guarantee that inventories held in economic retention are the right amount. |
gao_T-RCED-99-103 | gao_T-RCED-99-103_0 | Background
The Spallation Neutron Source Project is, according to DOE and its scientific advisers, vitally important to the nation’s scientific community. The Congress approved the start of the construction phase in fiscal year 1999 and provided $130 million for this purpose. As this Subcommittee is well aware, DOE has not always managed large projects successfully. One reason for the cost and schedule problems associated with these projects was the lack of sufficient DOE personnel with the appropriate skills to oversee contractors’ operations. Concerns About the Project’s Leadership
In a 1997 review, DOE reported that the success of the project depends on a having a project director skilled in accelerator science and in the management of large construction projects. “It will also be a mark of ability to execute this project that key scientific, technical, and management leadership, committed to making the succeed, can be successfully recruited to before the project is funded by Congress.” Despite this recognized need and the Congress’s approval of the project’s construction phase 5 months earlier (the Congress provided funding for design activities beginning in fiscal year 1996), Oak Ridge National Laboratory has just announced the hiring of an experienced project director. Other key positions remain unfilled. DOE’s independent reviewer expressed a similar concern, noting that the cost estimate in the project is based on its design and that “higher quality estimates are needed for a credible baseline.”
Of particular concern are the inadequate allowances for contingencies (unforeseen costs and delays) built into the project’s current cost and schedule estimates. In particular, integrating the efforts of five national laboratories on a project of this scope requires an unprecedented level of collaboration. Los Alamos, however, is primarily funded by DOE’s Defense Programs, a different component within DOE’s complex organizational structure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) management of the Spallation Neutron Source Project, focusing on the: (1) project's cost and schedule; and (2) effectiveness of the collaborating laboratories' coordination.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the project is not currently in trouble, but warning signs in three key areas raise concerns about whether it will be completed on time and within budget; (2) DOE has not assembled a complete team with the technical skills and experience needed to properly manage the project; (3) a permanent project director was just hired last week, 5 months after Congress approved the start of construction and over a year after the project's design was approved; (4) other important positions remain unfilled, including those of a technical director and an operations manager; (5) cost and schedule estimates for the project have not been fully developed; (6) furthermore, the project's contingency allowances for unforeseen costs and delays are too low for a project of this size and scope, according to project managers and DOE; (7) DOE's approach to managing the project requires an unprecedented level of collaboration among five different laboratories, managed through DOE's complex organizational structure; and (8) coupled with DOE's history of not successfully completing large projects on time and within budget, these warning signs make the Spallation Neutron Source project a significant management challenge for DOE and suggest a need for continued close oversight. |
gao_GAO-06-631T | gao_GAO-06-631T_0 | In addition to daily operations funding, the Park Service also allocates project-related funding to park units for specific purposes to support its mission. Since 2002, the Park Service has required park units to spend the majority of their visitor fees on deferred maintenance projects, such as road or building repair. Appropriations for the Operation of the National Park System Account Increased Overall from Fiscal Year 2001 to 2005; When Adjusted for Inflation, the Total Allocation for Daily Operations Declined Overall and the Total Allocation for Projects Increased Overall
Overall appropriations for the ONPS account—including the amounts the Park Service allocated for daily operations and projects—rose in both nominal and inflation-adjusted dollars overall from fiscal year 2001 through 2005. Increases in the Cyclic Maintenance and Repair and Rehabilitation programs reflect an emphasis on the effort for the Park Service to reduce its estimated $5 billion maintenance backlog. Increases in the Inventory and Monitoring Program reflect an emphasis on protecting natural resources primarily through an initiative called the Natural Resource Challenge. Allocation Trends for Projects and Daily Operations at 12 High- Visitation Park Units Varied, but All 12 Parks Reported Reduced Services and an Increasing Reliance on Other Authorized Sources to Supplement Daily Operations Allocations
All 12 park units we visited received allocations for projects from fiscal years 2001 through 2005 that varied among years and among park units. On an average annual basis, each unit experienced an increase in daily operations allocations, but most experienced a decline in inflation- adjusted terms. Officials at each park believed that their daily operations allocations were not sufficient to address increases in operating costs and new Park Service management requirements. Park Service officials reported that the Park Service covered these salary increases with appropriations provided in the ONPS account. While officials stated that these policies were important, implementing them without additional allocations reduced their management flexibility. Furthermore, while the Park Service may use visitor fees to pay salaries for permanent staff that manage and administer projects funded with visitor fees, it has a policy prohibiting such use. To address differences between allocations for daily operations and expenses, officials at the park units we visited reported that they reduced or eliminated some services paid with daily operations allocations— including some that directly affected visitors and park resources. The Park Service Has Undertaken Three Management Initiatives to Address Fiscal Performance and Accountability of Park Units
We identified three management initiatives that the Park Service has undertaken to address the fiscal performance and accountability of park units and to better manage within their available resources: the Business Plan Initiative (BPI), the Core Operations Analysis (COA), and the Park Scorecard. All 12 of the park units we visited have completed a business plan. Many officials—both at the unit level and headquarters—stated that business plans are, among other things, useful in helping them identify future budget needs. Park unit officials told us that the preliminary results have helped them determine where efficiencies in operations might accrue. GAO Recommendation and Agency Response
To reduce some of the pressure on funding for daily operations, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Park Service to revise its policy to allow park units to use visitor fee revenue to pay the cost of permanent employees administering projects funded by visitor fees to the extent authorized by law. The department also believes that while employment levels at individual park units may have fluctuated for many reasons, employment servicewide, including both seasonal and permanent employees, was stable. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, some reports prepared by advocacy groups have raised issues concerning the adequacy of the Park Service's financial resources needed to effectively operate the park units. This statement addresses (1) funding trends for park service operations and visitor fees for fiscal years 2001-2005; (2) specific funding trends for 12 selected high-visitation park units and how, if at all, the funding trends have affected operations; and (3) recent management initiatives the Park Service has undertaken to address fiscal performance and accountability of park units. This statement is based on GAO's March 2006 report, National Park Service: Major Operations Funding Trends and How Selected Park Units Responded to Those Trends for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005, GAO-06-431 (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006).
What GAO Found
Overall, amounts appropriated to the National Park Service (Park Service) in the Operation of the National Park System account increased from 2001 to 2005. In inflation-adjusted terms, amounts allocated by the Park Service to park units from this appropriation for daily operations declined while project-related allocations increased. Project-related allocations increased primarily in (1) Cyclic Maintenance and Repair and Rehabilitation programs to reflect an emphasis on reducing the estimated $5 billion maintenance backlog and (2) the inventory and monitoring program to protect natural resources through the Natural Resource Challenge initiative. Also, on an average annual basis, visitor fees collected increased about 1 percent--a 2 percent decline when adjusted for inflation. All park units we visited received project-related allocations, but most of the park units experienced declines in inflation-adjusted terms in their allocations for daily operations. Each of the 12 park units reported their daily operations allocations were not sufficient to address increases in operating costs, such as salaries, and new Park Service requirements. In response, officials reported that they either eliminated or reduced some services or relied on other authorized sources to pay operating expenses that have historically been paid with allocations for daily operations. Also, implementing important Park Service policies--without additional allocations--has placed additional demands on the park units and reduced their flexibility. For example, the Park Service has directed its park units to spend most of their visitor fees on deferred maintenance projects. While the Park Service may use visitor fees to pay salaries for permanent staff who administer projects funded with these fees, it has a policy prohibiting such use. To alleviate the pressure on daily operations allocations, we believe it would be appropriate to use visitor fees to pay the salaries of employees working on visitor fee funded projects. Interior believes that, while employment levels at individual park units may have fluctuated for many reasons, employment servicewide was stable, including both seasonal and permanent employees. GAO identified three initiatives--Business Plan, Core Operations Analysis, and Park Scorecard--to address park units' fiscal performance and operational condition. Of the park units with a business plan we visited, officials stated that the plan, among other things, have helped them better identify future budget needs. Due to its early development stage, only a few park units have participated in the Core Operations Analysis; for those we visited who have, officials said that they are better able to determine where operational efficiencies might accrue. Park Service headquarters used the Scorecard to validate and approve increases in funding for daily operations for fiscal year 2005. |
gao_GAO-15-110 | gao_GAO-15-110_0 | In March 2011, we found that agencies providing transportation services to transportation-disadvantaged persons often provide similar services to similar client groups leading to potential duplication and inefficiency. Twenty-one of these programs are administered or overseen by HHS. In addition, the types of eligible transportation expenses funded by these programs vary, and may include capital investments (e.g., purchasing vehicles, such as buses), reimbursement of transportation costs (e.g., transit fares, gasoline, and bus passes) or direct provision of transportation service to program clients (e.g., operating vehicles), travel training, and mobility management. Total Federal Spending on NEMT Is Unknown
Total federal spending on NEMT in fiscal year 2012 is significant but unknown because in many cases, federal departments do not separately track spending for these services. Only one of the six departments (8 of the 42 programs) for which NEMT is an eligible expense were able to provide information about NEMT spending. Data not available. NEMT incidental to program mission. Coordination of NEMT Service is Limited and There is Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential for Duplication
Coordinating Council
The Coordinating Council has taken some actions to address human service-transportation program coordination. The absence of key guidance documents include the lack of a strategic plan and a policy on cost sharing—that is, the ability to identify and allocate costs among programs and services. across agencies. Fragmentation, overlap, and duplication can result in service inefficiencies or increased costs when coordination does not occur. States and Localities Facilitate Coordination in Various Ways but Two Programs in Selected States Largely Do Not Participate in Coordination Efforts
States Use Variety of Ways to Facilitate Coordination of NEMT
States and localities use a variety of ways to facilitate coordination of transportation and human service programs, including programs that provide NEMT. These include state and regional coordinating bodies, cost and ride sharing, and one call/one-click centers. For example, although the Coordinating Council has not finalized cost- sharing methodologies, we found that cost and ride sharing is occurring in some locations and this has promoted coordination of NEMT service. These programs are important to NEMT, as they provide services to potentially over 90 million individuals. Important factors include ensuring that program integrity is maintained and proper controls are in place to prevent improper payments and fraud. However, coordination of NEMT without the Medicaid and VA programs increases the risk of potential program overlap and duplication. The Coordinating Council is tasked with promoting interagency cooperation and establishing appropriate ways to minimize duplication and overlap of federal programs so transportation-disadvantaged persons have access to more transportation services. Recommendations
To promote and enhance federal, state, and local NEMT coordination activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, as the chair of the Coordinating Council, convene a meeting of the member agencies of the Coordinating Council and take the following three actions:
Complete and publish a new or updated strategic plan that, among other things, clearly outlines a strategy for addressing NEMT and how it can be coordinated across federal agencies that fund NEMT service. DOT stated that it concurred in part with recommendations to develop a new strategic plan and to finalize a cost-sharing policy. We believe DOT’s efforts regarding the strategic plan and cost-sharing policy, in addition to identifying the challenges of coordinating Medicaid and VA NEMT programs with other federal programs that fund NEMT, are steps in the right direction toward providing the leadership necessary to help ensure the benefits of coordination are realized by all federal programs that fund NEMT services. Going forward, it will be important to (1) complete a new or updated strategic plan, (2) finalize and issue a cost-sharing policy, and (3) identify and report to Congress the challenges with coordinating NEMT, particularly with the Medicaid and VA NEMT programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) identify the federal programs that can or may provide funding for nonemergency medical transportation, (2) describe how federal agencies are coordinating nonemergency medical transportation services and providing potentially duplicative or overlapping services, and (3) describe how nonemergency medical transportation services are coordinated at the state and local levels and the challenges to coordination in select states and localities. To identify federal programs that provide funding for nonemergency medical transportation services, we examined prior GAO work that identified federal programs that provide funding and services for transportation disadvantaged populations, conducted a search of the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, and requested program information from the six federal departments—the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs—for the programs identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to transportation services is essential for millions of Americans to fully participate in society and access human services, including medical care. NEMT is nonemergency, nonmilitary, surface transportation service of any kind provided to beneficiaries or clients for the purpose of receiving medical care. GAO was asked to review the coordination of NEMT services. This report addresses (1) the federal programs that provide funding for NEMT services, (2) how federal agencies are coordinating NEMT services, and (3) how NEMT services are coordinated at the state and local levels and the challenges to coordination.
GAO analyzed a compendium of federal programs that provide assistance to the public; reviewed program information from the six departments that fund NEMT; interviewed officials of DOT, HHS, and VA; and interviewed state and local officials in five states, chosen based on a variety of considerations, including geographic diversity and existence of a coordinating body.
What GAO Found
Forty-two programs across six federal departments—Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services (HHS), Housing and Urban Development, Transportation (DOT), and Veterans Affairs (VA)—can provide funding for nonemergency medical transportation (NEMT) service, although NEMT is not their primary mission. Twenty-one of these programs, including Medicaid, are administered or overseen by HHS. The type of funding provided by these programs varies, but includes capital investments (such as bus purchases) and reimbursements of transportation costs (e.g., bus passes). Total federal spending on NEMT is unknown because federal departments do not separately track spending for these services. In some cases data were not available or NEMT was incidental to a program's mission. However, one of the six departments (HHS) was able to provide estimates indicating that its spending totaled at least $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2012—most of this attributable to Medicaid.
Coordination of NEMT programs at the federal level is limited, and there is fragmentation, overlap, and potential for duplication across NEMT programs. The federal Interagency Transportation Coordinating Council on Access and Mobility (Coordinating Council)—chaired by the Secretary of DOT and tasked with promoting interagency cooperation and establishing mechanisms to minimize duplication and overlap of programs for the transportation disadvantaged—has taken some actions to improve coordination, such as developing a strategic plan. The strategic plan identified the council's goal, priorities, and objectives for 2011 to 2013. However, the council has provided limited leadership and has not issued key guidance documents that could promote coordination. For example, the council has not met since 2008 and has not finalized a cost-sharing policy that would allow agencies to identify and allocate costs among programs. GAO has previously found that agencies providing similar transportation services to similar client groups may lead to duplication and overlap when coordination does not occur. This review found instances of fragmentation, overlap, and the potential for duplication, although the extent could not be quantified.
State and local officials in the selected states GAO visited identified a variety of ways they facilitate coordination of NEMT. These include state coordinating bodies (two states GAO visited), regional coordinating bodies (two states GAO visited), local metropolitan planning organizations, and local transit agencies. Cost and ride sharing and one-call/one-click information centers were also used to coordinate NEMT services. However, GAO found two programs—Medicaid and VA NEMT programs—largely do not participate in coordination activities. Requirements to serve only eligible individuals and ensuring proper controls are in place to prevent improper payments and fraud are among the challenges to coordination for these programs. These important NEMT programs provide services to potentially over 90 million individuals and coordination without the Medicaid and VA programs increases the risk for potential overlap and duplication of services.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation, as chair of the Coordinating Council, should publish a new strategic plan, issue a cost-sharing policy, and address the challenges associated with coordinating Medicaid and VA NEMT programs with other federal NEMT programs. DOT concurred in part with developing a new strategic plan and issuing a cost-sharing policy, and it concurred with identifying challenges of coordinating NEMT, particularly with HHS agencies. |
gao_GAO-04-659 | gao_GAO-04-659_0 | In contrast, those special educators who do not provide instruction in core academic subjects, such as those who provide consultative services to highly qualified general educators, do not have to comply with the NCLBA teacher requirements. All States Implemented at Least Two of Three NCLBA Teacher Requirements for Special Education Teachers
In the 2002-2003 school year, all states required that special education teachers have a bachelor’s degree and be certified to teach—two of the three NCLBA teacher qualification requirements—and half required special education teachers to demonstrate competency in core academic subjects, which is the third requirement. In the 26 states that did not require teachers to demonstrate subject matter competency, state-certified special education teachers who were assigned to instruct core academic subjects might not be positioned to meet the NCLBA requirements. The remaining 22 states offered two or more certifications. During the 2002-2003 school year, 24 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico required special education teachers to demonstrate some level of competency in the core academic subjects that they wished to teach at the time of their initial certification by having a degree or passing tests in the academic subjects that they wished to teach. Teachers in these states are better positioned to meet NCLBA’s teacher requirements. 1.) To meet NCLBA teacher requirements, these teachers would need to demonstrate subject matter competency by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. State officials and national education organizations’ representatives also cited several factors that impeded meeting the subject competency requirements, including uncertainty about how to apply the law to special education teachers in some circumstances, and the need for additional assistance from Education in identifying implementation strategies. Availability of Professional Development Funds Was among the Factors Cited as Facilitating the Implementation of NCLBA Requirements
Survey respondents, as well as state officials and national education organizations’ representatives we interviewed, reported that the availability of professional development funding and the flexibility to use funds were essential in helping teachers meet the NCLBA subject matter competency requirement. This guidance applies to all teachers, including special education teachers. Coordination among Education’s Offices Responsible for Educating Students with Disabilities Was Limited
Education has provided a range of assistance, such as site visits, Web- based guidance, and financial assistance, to help states implement the highly qualified teacher requirements. However, department coordination related to the implementation of NCLBA’s teacher requirements for special education teachers has been limited. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the 2001-2002 school year, more than 400,000 special education teachers provided instructional services to approximately 6 million students with disabilities in U.S. schools. Two federal laws contain teacher qualification requirements that apply to special education teachers: the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Given the committee's interest in issues related to highly qualified special education teachers, we are providing information about (1) the state certification requirements, including the use of alternative certification programs, for special education teachers, and how they relate to NCLBA requirements; (2) the factors that facilitate or impede state efforts to ensure that special education teachers meet NCLBA requirements; and (3) how different offices in the Department of Education (Education) assist states in addressing NCLBA teacher requirements.
What GAO Found
In the 2002-2003 school year, all states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico required that special education teachers have a bachelor's degree and be certified to teach--two of NCLBA's teacher qualification requirements--and half required special education teachers to demonstrate subject matter competency in core academic subjects, which is the third requirement. Specifically, 24 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico required their teachers to demonstrate some level of subject matter competency by having a degree or passing state tests in the core academic subjects that they wished to teach. Teachers of core academic subjects in the remaining states that did not have such requirements might not be positioned to meet the NCLBA requirements. To meet NCLBA teacher requirements, teachers would need to demonstrate competency in core academic subjects by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. State education officials reported that the availability of funds to support professional development facilitated implementation of the NCLBA teacher requirements, while other factors, such as uncertainty about how to apply the subject matter competency requirement to special education teachers, impeded implementation. State education officials and national education organizations' representatives we interviewed cited the need for more assistance from Education in explaining NCLBA's teacher requirements and identifying implementation strategies. Education has provided a range of assistance, such as site visits, Web-based guidance, and financial assistance, to help states implement the highly qualified teacher requirements. However, department coordination related to the implementation of NCLBA's teacher requirements for special education teachers has been limited. |
gao_GAO-12-590 | gao_GAO-12-590_0 | EPA Does Not Maintain Complete Information on Issued NSR Permits or Track the Impact of Its Comments
EPA does not maintain complete information on NSR permits issued to fossil fuel electricity generating units. In addition, EPA has the opportunity to review and comment on every draft NSR permit issued by state and local permitting agencies, but the agency does not compile data on which permitting authorities address EPA’s comments. State and local permitting agencies, which issue NSR permits in most parts of the country, track the NSR permits they issue. Regulators Face Challenges in Ensuring Compliance with NSR Permitting Requirements
In addition to a lack of comprehensive permitting data, EPA and state and local agencies face other challenges in ensuring that owners of fossil fuel electricity generating units comply with requirements to obtain NSR permits. Many of the challenges stem from two overarching issues: (1) determining whether an NSR permit is required and (2) identifying instances where unit owners should have obtained NSR permits but did not. Determining When NSR Applies Can Be Difficult
A major challenge to EPA, states, and local agencies in ensuring NSR compliance is that it can be difficult for unit owners and regulators to know whether an NSR permit is needed, because NSR’s rules governing applicability are complex and because NSR applicability is determined on a case-by-case basis. Identifying NSR Noncompliance Requires Long Investigations
The second major challenge EPA and state and local agencies face in ensuring compliance with NSR is that it is often difficult for regulators to identify noncompliance—that is, instances where owners did not obtain NSR permits before making major modifications to their generating units. 2. 3. Available Data on NSR Compliance Are Not Complete but Suggest Substantial Noncompliance
Available data, while not complete, suggest that a substantial number of generating units have not complied with requirements to obtain NSR permits. Complete data on NSR compliance do not exist for two primary reasons. First, EPA has not yet investigated all electricity generating units for compliance with requirements to obtain NSR permits. Second, NSR compliance is determined at a point in time, and EPA’s interpretation of compliance has, in some cases, differed from that of federal courts. EPA has investigated most—but not all—coal-fired generating units for compliance with NSR at least once. noncompliance stemming from EPA’s investigations do not necessarily mean that a violation has occurred, because in some cases federal courts have ultimately disagreed with EPA about the need for an NSR permit. EPA Has Found Noncompliance at a Majority of Units It Has Investigated
Although units must undergo NSR review for major modifications, some of the settlement agreements EPA has reached with electricity generating units include a provision precluding EPA, in certain circumstances, from suing the owner for making a major modification and not undergoing NSR. The initiative has led to 22 settlements covering a total of 263 units, or approximately 32 percent of the units EPA has investigated. According to our analysis of EPA data, the settlements will require affected unit owners to install and operate emissions controls costing an estimated $12.8 billion in total and levy civil penalties totaling around $80 million. These settlements are projected to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 1.8 million tons annually and nitrogen oxides emissions by about 596,000 tons annually. Several EPA regional offices maintain some information on the NSR permits issued by the state and local permitting agencies in their regions, but this information is in different formats and not compiled by EPA into a complete and centralized source of information on NSR permits issued nationwide, as recommended by the National Research Council in 2006. In cases where unit owners apply for permits before making physical or operational changes that would result in a significant net increase of emissions, EPA plays an important role because it has an opportunity to comment on every draft NSR permit under consideration by state and local permitting agencies and to influence decisions about the appropriate level of pollution control, among others. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve EPA’s implementation of NSR, we recommend that the EPA Administrator direct the entities responsible for implementing and enforcing NSR—specifically, the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, and EPA regions—to take the following two actions:
Working with EPA regions and state and local permitting agencies, consider ways to develop a centralized source of information on NSR permits issued to fossil fuel electricity generating units, and
Using appropriate methods, such as sampling or periodic assessments, develop a process for evaluating the effects of its comments on draft NSR permits. To examine what challenges, if any, EPA, state, and local agencies face in ensuring compliance by electricity generating units with requirements to obtain NSR permits, we reviewed relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act and NSR regulations; guidance and other information on implementing NSR maintained by EPA; and literature on NSR from government agencies, academic and research institutions, environmental organizations, and industry groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
Electricity generating units that burn fossil fuels supply most of the nations electricity and are major sources of air pollution. Under the Clean Air Act, such units are subject to NSR, a permitting process that applies to (1) units built after August 7, 1977, and (2) existing units that undertake a major modification. Owners of such units must obtain from the appropriate permitting agency a preconstruction permit that sets emission limits and requires the use of certain pollution control technologies. EPA oversees states implementation of NSR, including reviewing and commenting on draft permits issued by state and local permitting agencies. GAO was asked to examine (1) what information EPA maintains on NSR permits issued to fossil fuel electricity generating units; (2) challenges, if any, that EPA, state, and local agencies face in ensuring compliance with requirements to obtain NSR permits; and (3) what available data show about compliance with requirements to obtain NSR permits. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed EPA, state, and local officials, as well as representatives from industry, research, and environmental groups.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not maintain complete information on New Source Review (NSR) permits issued to fossil fuel electricity generating units. State and local permitting agencies track the NSR permits they issue, but EPA does not maintain complete or centralized information on permits, despite a 2006 recommendation by the National Research Council that it do so. EPA maintains several databases that compile data on draft and issued NSR permits, but these sources are incomplete and thus cannot be used to identify all of the NSR permits that have been issued nationwide. In addition, EPA has the opportunity to review and comment on every draft NSR permit issued by state and local permitting agencies, but it does not compile data on whether the permitting agencies address EPAs comments in final permits. The absence of more complete information on NSR permitting makes it difficult to know which units have obtained NSR permits or to assess how state and local permitting agencies vary from EPA in their interpretations of NSR requirements.
Officials from EPA, state, and local agencies face challenges in ensuring that owners of fossil fuel electricity generating units comply with requirements to obtain NSR permits. Many of these challenges stem from two overarching issues. First, in some cases it is difficult to determine whether an NSR permit is required. NSR applicability depends on, among other factors, whether a change to a unit qualifies as routine maintenance, repair, and replacement; and whether the change results in a significant net increase in emissions. The rules governing NSR are complex, however, and applicability is determined on a case-by-case basis. Second, it is often difficult to identify noncomplianceinstances where unit owners made a major modification without first obtaining an NSR permitpartly because owners of generating units determine whether a permit is needed, and in many cases their determinations are not reviewed by permitting agencies or EPA. State permitting agencies generally issue NSR permits, but EPA typically leads enforcement efforts, since identifying instances of noncompliance involves extensive investigations that go beyond the routine inspections conducted by state and local permitting agencies. EPA identifies NSR noncompliance through a lengthy, resource-intensive process that involves reviewing large amounts of information on units past emissions and construction activities.
Available data on compliance, although incomplete, suggest that a substantial number of generating units did not comply with requirements to obtain NSR permits. Complete NSR compliance data do not exist for two main reasons: (1) EPA has not yet investigated all generating units for compliance, and (2) NSR compliance is determined at a point in time, and in some cases federal courts have disagreed with EPA about the need for an NSR permit. Nonetheless, EPA has investigated most coal-fired generating units at least once, and has alleged noncompliance at more than half of the units it investigated. Specifically, of the 831 units EPA investigated, 467 units were ultimately issued notices of violation, had complaints filed in court, or were included in settlement agreements. In total, EPA reached 22 settlements covering 263 units, which will require affected unit owners to, among other things, install around $12.8 billion in emissions controls. These settlements will reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide by an estimated 1.8 million tons annually, and nitrogen oxides by an estimated 596,000 tons annually.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA, among other actions, consider ways to develop a centralized source of data on NSR permits issued to electricity generating units. EPA expressed its commitment to filling gaps in its data systems, but disagreed with the actions GAO recommended. GAO believes that its recommendations would enhance oversight of NSR permitting and enforcement. |
gao_GAO-08-196 | gao_GAO-08-196_0 | The most notable of these is the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act of 1998 (SNPLMA). BLM Has Raised Most FLTFA Revenue from Land Sales in Nevada
Since FLTFA was enacted in 2000, BLM has raised $95.7 million in revenue, mostly by selling 16,659 acres. As of May 2007, about 92 percent of the revenue raised, or $88 million, has come from land sales in Nevada—1 of the 11 western states under FLTFA. Nevada accounts for most of the sales because of rapidly expanding population centers coupled with a high percentage of BLM land in the state and experience selling land under the SNPLMA program. Most BLM field offices have not generated revenue under FLTFA. BLM Faces Several Challenges to Future Sales under FLTFA
BLM state and field office officials most frequently cited the availability of knowledgeable realty staff to conduct the sales as a challenge to raising revenue from FLTFA sales. These staff may not be available because they are working on activities that BLM has identified as a higher priority, such as reviewing and approving energy rights-of-way. We identified two additional issues hampering land sales activity under FLTFA. First, while BLM has identified land for sale in its land use plans, it has not made the sale of this land a priority during the first 7 years of the program. Furthermore, BLM has not set goals for FLTFA sales. However, revenue from these potential sales is not eligible for the FLTFA account because the act only applies to land that was identified for disposal in a land use plan on or before the date of the act. Agencies Have Purchased Few Parcels with FLTFA Revenue
Since the enactment of FLTFA 7 years ago, BLM reports that the four land management agencies have spent $13.3 million of the $95.7 million in FLTFA revenue—$10.1 million to acquire nine parcels of land and $3.2 million in administrative expenses for conducting FLTFA sales. To fund the acquisitions in the secretarial initiative of $18 million, the BLM FLTFA program lead told us that the Secretaries approved the use of $14.5 million of the funds from the 20 percent of revenue available for acquisitions outside the state in which they were raised, and $3.5 million of the revenue not used for administrative activities supporting the land sales program. State-Level Process Has Not Yet Resulted in Acquisitions Because of the Time Taken to Complete Interagency Agreements and Limited Funds outside of Nevada
Although the agencies envisioned it as the primary process for nominating land for acquisition under FLTFA, the state-level process established in the national MOU and state-level interagency agreements has yet to result in a completed land acquisition for two primary reasons. Furthermore, progress in acquiring priority land has been hampered by the agencies’ weak performance in identifying inholdings and setting priorities for acquiring them, as required by the act. The Agencies Have Yet to Establish Effective Procedures to Fully Comply with FLTFA and MOU Provisions
With respect to FLTFA, the agencies—and primarily BLM, as the manager of the FLTFA account—have not established a procedure to track the act’s requirement that at least 80 percent of funds allocated toward the purchase of land within each state must be used to purchase inholdings and that up to 20 percent may be used to purchase adjacent land. With respect to the national MOU, BLM has not established a procedure to track agreed-upon fund allocations—60 percent for BLM, 20 percent for the Forest Service, and 10 percent each for the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
With the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act of 2000 (FLTFA) set to expire in July 2010, we were asked to (1) determine the extent to which the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has generated revenue for the FLTFA program, (2) identify challenges BLM faces in conducting future sales, (3) determine the extent to which the agencies have spent funds under FLTFA, and (4) identify challenges the agencies face in conducting future acquisitions. We interviewed the FLTFA program leads at the headquarters offices for BLM, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Park Service within the U.S. Department of the Interior, and the Forest Service within the U.S. Department of Agriculture on program status, goals, and management oversight for the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service manage about 628 million acres of public land, mostly in the 11 western states and Alaska. Under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act (FLTFA), revenue raised from selling BLM lands is available to the agencies, primarily to acquire nonfederal land within the boundaries of land they already own--known as inholdings, which can create significant land management problems. To acquire land, the agencies can nominate parcels under state-level interagency agreements or the Secretaries can use their discretion to initiate acquisitions. FLTFA expires in 2010. GAO was asked to determine (1) FLTFA revenue generated, (2) challenges to future sales, (3) FLTFA expenditures, and (4) challenges to future acquisitions. To address these issues, GAO interviewed officials and examined the act, agency guidance, and FLTFA sale and acquisition data.
What GAO Found
Since FLTFA was enacted in 2000, through May 2007 BLM has raised $95.7 million in revenue, mostly from selling about 17,000 acres. About 92 percent of the revenue raised, or $88 million, has come from land transactions in Nevada--1 of the 11 western states. Nevada accounts for the lion's share of the sales because of a rapidly expanding population, plentiful BLM land, and experience with federal land sales in southern Nevada. Most BLM field offices have not generated sales revenue under FLTFA. BLM faces several challenges to raising revenue through future FLTFA sales. In particular, BLM state and field officials most frequently cited the limited availability of knowledgeable realty staff to conduct the sales. These staff are often not available because they are working on higher priority activities, such as reviewing and approving energy rights-of-way. We identified two additional issues hampering land sales activity under FLTFA. First, while BLM has identified land for sale in its land use plans, it has not made the sale of this land a priority during the first 7 years of the program. Furthermore, BLM has not set goals for sales or developed a sales implementation strategy. Second, GAO found that some of the additional land BLM has identified for sale since FLTFA was enacted would not generate revenue for acquisitions because the act only allows the deposit of revenue from the sale of lands identified for disposal on or before the date of the act. The four land management agencies have spent $13.3 million of the $95.7 million in revenue raised under FLTFA: $10.1 million using the Secretaries' discretion to acquire nine parcels of land and $3.2 million for administrative expenses to prepare land for FLTFA sales. The agencies acquired the land between August 2007 and January 2008--more than 7 years after FLTFA was enacted, and BLM spent the administrative funds between 2000 and 2007, primarily for preparing FLTFA sales in Nevada. As of October 2007, no land had been purchased through the state-level interagency nomination process, which the agencies envisioned as the primary mechanism for acquiring land. Agencies face several challenges to completing future land acquisitions under FLTFA. Most notably, the act requires that the agencies use most of the funds to purchase land in the state in which the funds were raised; this restriction has had the effect of making little revenue available for acquisitions outside of Nevada. Furthermore, progress in acquiring priority lands has been hampered by weak agency performance in identifying inholdings and setting priorities for acquiring them, as required by the act. In addition, GAO found that the agencies have not established procedures to track implementation of the act's requirement that at least 80 percent of FLTFA revenue raised in each state be used to acquire inholdings in that state or the extent to which BLM is complying with agreed-upon fund allocations among the four participating agencies. Of the revenue generated by FLTFA sales, the agencies have agreed to allocate 60 percent to BLM, 20 percent to the Forest Service, and 10 percent each to the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service. |
gao_GAO-09-375 | gao_GAO-09-375_0 | Therefore, if sponsor deeming occurs, benefits are only granted to sponsored noncitizens when both they and their sponsors are sufficiently low-income. 1). Restrictions on Sponsored Noncitizens’ Eligibility for Benefits, and Other Factors, Limit the Number Potentially Affected by Sponsor Deeming
The number of sponsored noncitizens potentially affected by sponsor deeming is unknown; however, factors such as the restrictions on their eligibility for TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI, as well as the deeming process itself, likely limit the number affected. The total number of sponsored noncitizens that apply for these benefits is also unknown, in part because most federal benefit agencies do not collect this data. Staff at all regional offices reported that they continue to encounter few sponsored noncitizens applying for SSI. For instance, less than 0.4 percent of SSI recipients were sponsored noncitizens during the years 2004 through 2007, according to SSA. Most Agencies Have Taken Steps to Implement Sponsor Deeming, but Gaps in Federal Guidance and Noncitizen Information Hinder Full Implementation
Most Administering Agencies Have Established Sponsor Deeming Policies but Report Needing Additional Federal Guidance
Although benefit administering agencies have generally established sponsor deeming policies for TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI, based on federal regulations and federal guidance, inaction by CMS has stalled some states’ implementation of sponsor deeming in Medicaid. 3.) Specifically, between 60 and 70 percent of state administering agencies with sponsor deeming policies for TANF, Medicaid, or SNAP expressed some desire for more guidance on various aspects of deeming (see fig. In addition, many reported that additional federal guidance on areas related to the indigence exception to deeming would be useful. Administering Agencies Also Reported Needing Assistance Accessing Federal Information Needed to Determine Who Is Sponsored
Administering agency officials reported that additional federal assistance on accessing DHS information needed to determine who is sponsored would also help them implement sponsor deeming policies. Agencies Generally Have Not Implemented Sponsor Repayment, Due in Part to Unclear Federal Guidance and Other Factors
Federal Regulations and Guidance Suggest Pursuit of Sponsor Repayment Is Optional, and Very Few Administering Agencies Pursue Repayment
Although federal law states that benefit granting agencies must administratively pursue sponsor repayment, DHS regulations on affidavits of support, as well as some federal benefit agency guidance, suggest that administrative pursuit of sponsor repayment is optional. SSI benefits, which applies nationwide. In New York, a state official reported that sponsor repayment is to be pursued when noncitizens receive TANF or SNAP benefits after qualifying for the indigence exception to deeming. In these cases, local staff are to send a request for repayment to the sponsor. Some state and local TANF, Medicaid, and SNAP officials told us that the staff who pursue sponsor repayment sometimes have competing priorities that also discourage the pursuit of sponsors for repayment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To obtain information on agency implementation of sponsor deeming and repayment, as well as the population affected, we reviewed available federal data on noncitizens, as well as available federal and state data on benefit applicants and recipients, to develop estimates of the sponsored noncitizen population and noncitizen applicants and recipients; conducted a nationwide survey of states regarding Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, and the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP); visited five states and selected localities within each state and interviewed officials administering TANF, Medicaid, and SNAP; interviewed officials from all 10 regional offices of the Social Security Administration (SSA) regarding relevant Supplemental Security Income (SSI) policies, implementation processes and challenges, and the frequency that officials had encountered related cases; interviewed officials from relevant federal agencies and reviewed pertinent federal laws, regulations, and agency guidance; and interviewed researchers knowledgeable in immigrant and public benefit issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal law restricts noncitizens' access to public benefits, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Further, when noncitizens who legally reside in this country through sponsorship of a family member apply for these benefits, they are subject to sponsor deeming, which requires benefit agencies to combine noncitizens' incomes with those of their sponsors to determine eligibility. Sponsors are also financially liable for benefits paid to the noncitizen, and benefit agencies must seek repayment for these costs. GAO was asked to analyze (1) what is known about the size of the noncitizen population potentially affected by the sponsor deeming requirements for TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI; (2) to what extent have agencies implemented sponsor deeming; (3) to what extent have agencies implemented sponsor repayment. To address these, GAO analyzed federal data, surveyed states, and interviewed federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
The number of sponsored noncitizens potentially affected by sponsor deeming is unknown; however, federal restrictions on their eligibility for TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI, as well as other factors, likely limit the number affected. The most recent data available suggest that 11 percent (473,000) of sponsored noncitizens applied for TANF, Medicaid, or SNAP during the course of 2007, and less than 1 percent (29,000) applied for SSI. In addition to federal restrictions, benefit agency officials reported that applicants' reluctance or inability to obtain sponsor income information further reduces instances of deeming. Nationwide, most benefit administering agencies have established sponsor deeming policies for TANF, SNAP, and SSI. However, agencies in 20 states have not done so for Medicaid, due in part to the lack of federal guidance for Medicaid on this requirement. Yet, even among administering agencies that have established policies, many expressed the desire for more federal guidance on various aspects of deeming. For example, over 60 percent of state officials reported that additional clarification on applying an exception to deeming when noncitizen applicants are indigent would be useful. Local officials also reported difficulties accessing information from the Department of Homeland Security needed to determine whether an applicant is sponsored--an essential part of the deeming process. Few agencies have taken steps to implement sponsor repayment of TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, and SSI, due in part to inconsistent federal guidance. While law requires that agencies administratively pursue repayment, federal regulations and guidance suggest it is optional. In total, only two states have pursued sponsor repayment. Benefit agency officials reported that several factors discourage pursuit of repayment. Specifically, they reported that the process involves high relative costs since noncitizens who receive benefits after deeming only qualify because both they and their sponsors have very low incomes. Officials also reported that local staff who pursue repayment for these benefits sometimes have competing priorities. |
gao_GAO-15-73 | gao_GAO-15-73_0 | In these instances, a plan signs a contract with an IRA provider, which may or may not be the plan’s record keeper, to establish and maintain the account. Target date funds are designed to be long-term investments for individuals with particular retirement dates in mind. Current Law Limits Forced Transfer Options and Permits Plans to Force Out Some Participants with Balances Larger Than $5,000
DOL and IRS Are Precluded from Permitting Alternative Destinations for Forced Transfers
Currently the default destination for forced transfers of more than $1,000 from active plans is an IRA. As a result, a smaller number of participants forced out of terminating plans will end up with savings in a forced-transfer IRA. Disregarding Rollovers Makes It Harder for Low-Wage Workers to Keep Retirement Savings in a 401(k) Plan
Current law allows plans that are determining if they can force out a participant to exclude rollover amounts and any investment returns that have been earned while in the plan.exclude a participant’s savings that were rolled into the plan when calculating their vested balance, which determines whether the participant may be forced out. Keeping Track of 401(k) Plan Accounts Can Be Difficult Because of Challenges with Consolidation, Communication, and Information, but SSA Is in a Position to Help
Having Multiple Accounts Makes It Difficult for Participants to Keep Track of Retirement Savings
401(k) plan participants often lose track of their accounts over time. Absent plan-to-plan rollovers, participants frequently roll over their accounts into IRAs or leave their 401(k) savings with their former employers, both of which increase the number of accounts for the participants if they then go on to enroll in their new employers’ plans. For example, one industry professional noted that if former participants’ e-mail contacts are work e-mails, they will lose contact with their plans when they change jobs and do not provide alternate e-mail addresses. Federal agency officials told us that inactive participants can fail to find their accounts with former employers and do not always know where to go to seek assistance or find information about their accounts. Although the models employed vary by country, the three countries with tracking tools we studied allow participants online access to consolidated information on their workplace retirement accounts, referred to as “pension registries” in this report. Switzerland—According to Swiss officials, forced transfers in Switzerland are consolidated in a single fund, the Substitute Plan, administered by a non-profit foundation and invested until claimed by participants (see fig. Workplace account information: All include information on workplace retirement accounts. Instead, they will refer participants to the pension Plans in Australia also use the pension registry to registry for answers.identify inactive accounts their participants have in other plans and to talk to participants about consolidating their accounts. SuperSeeker can also be used to locate lost accounts not held by ATO. The United States Lacks a Pension Registry That Can Provide New Opportunities for Participants
Currently, there is no national pension registry in the United States. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To better protect the retirement savings of individuals who change jobs, while retaining policies that provide 401(k) plans relief from maintaining small, inactive accounts, Congress should consider amending current law to: 1. Repeal the provision that allows plans to disregard amounts attributable to rollovers when determining if a participant’s plan balance is small enough to forcibly transfer it. GAO Response to DOL Comments
DOL agreed to evaluate the possibility of convening a taskforce to consider the establishment of a national pension registry. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) what happens to forced-transfer individual retirement accounts (IRA) over time; (2) the challenges 401(k) plan participants face keeping track of their retirement savings and what, if anything, is being done to help them; and (3) how other countries address the challenges of inactive accounts. To better understand forced-transfer IRAs, as well as the challenges people face in keeping track of multiple 401(k) plan accounts, we also interviewed plan sponsor groups, 401(k) plan industry groups, research entities, consumer groups, and six federal agencies (Department of Labor, Department of the Treasury, Social Security Administration, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), Securities and Exchange Commission, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) about plans’ use of forced-transfer IRAs and what challenges individuals and plans face related to multiple accounts and inactive accounts in the United States. On the basis of this initial review, we selected six countries—Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—that could potentially provide lessons for the United States. Based on that estimate and assuming an average account balance of $2,500 (half of the $5,000 cap), a total of $1.5 billion would be transferred into these accounts each year. Specifically, it must describe the plan’s forced-transfer IRA provisions (including an explanation that the forced-transfer IRA will be invested in an investment product designed to preserve principal and provide a reasonable rate of return and liquidity), a description of how fees and expense attendant to the individual retirement plan will be allocated (i.e., the extent to which expenses will be borne by the account holder alone or shared with the distributing plan or plan sponsor), and the name, address and phone number of a plan contact (to the extent not otherwise provided). Small balances may be eaten away by fees, necessitating forced-transfers to preserve their value. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of employees change jobs each year and some leave their savings in their former employers' 401(k) plans. If their accounts are small enough and they do not instruct the plan to do otherwise, plans can transfer their savings into an IRA without their consent. GAO was asked to examine implications for 401(k) plan participants of being forced out of plans and into these IRAs.
GAO examined: (1) what happens over time to the savings of participants forced out of their plans, (2) the challenges 401(k) plan participants face keeping track of retirement savings in general, and (3) how other countries address similar challenges of inactive accounts. GAO's review included projecting forced-transfer IRA outcomes over time using current fee and return data from 10 providers, and interviews with stakeholders in the United States, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
What GAO Found
When a participant has saved less than $5,000 in a 401(k) plan and changes jobs without indicating what should be done with the money, the plan can transfer the account savings—a forced transfer—into an individual retirement account (IRA). Savings in these IRAs are intended to be preserved by the conservative investments allowed under Department of Labor (DOL) regulations. However, GAO found that because fees outpaced returns in most of the IRAs analyzed, these account balances tended to decrease over time. Without alternatives to forced-transfer IRAs, current law permits billions in participant savings to be poorly invested for the long-term. GAO also found that a provision in law allows a plan to disregard previous rollovers when determining if a balance is small enough to force out. For example, a plan can force out a participant with a balance of $20,000 if less than $5,000 is attributable to contributions other than rollover contributions.
Some 401(k) plan participants find it difficult to keep track of their savings, particularly when they change jobs, because of challenges with consolidation, communication, and information. First, individuals who accrue multiple accounts over the course of a career may be unable to consolidate their accounts by rolling over savings from one employer's plan to the next. Second, maintaining communication with a former employer's plan can be challenging if companies are restructured and plans are terminated or merged and renamed. Third, key information on lost accounts may be held by different plans, service providers, or government agencies, and participants may not know where to turn for assistance. Although the Social Security Administration provides individuals with information on benefits they may have from former employers' plans, the information is not provided in a consolidated or timely manner that would be useful to recipients.
The six countries GAO reviewed address challenges of inactive accounts by using forced transfers that help preserve account value and providing a variety of tracking tools referred to as pension registries. For example, officials in two countries told GAO that inactive accounts are consolidated there by law, without participant consent, in money-making investment vehicles. Officials in the United Kingdom said that it consolidates savings in a participant's new plan and in Switzerland such savings are invested together in a single fund. In Australia, small, inactive accounts are held by a federal agency that preserves their real value by regulation until they are claimed. In addition, GAO found that Australia, the Netherlands and Denmark have pension registries, not always established by law or regulation, which provide participants a single source of online information on their new and old retirement accounts. Participants in the United States, in contrast, often lack the information needed to keep track of their accounts. No single agency has responsibility for consolidating retirement account information for participants, and so far, the pension industry has not taken on the task. Without a pension registry for individuals to access current, consolidated retirement account information, the challenges participants face in tracking accounts over time can be expected to continue.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Congress consider (1) amending current law to permit alternative default destinations for plans to use when transferring participant accounts out of plans, and (2) repealing a provision that allows plans to disregard rollovers when identifying balances eligible for transfer to an IRA. Among other things, GAO also recommends that DOL convene a taskforce to explore the possibility of establishing a national pension registry. DOL and SSA each disagreed with one of GAO's recommendations. GAO maintains the need for all its recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-337 | gao_GAO-10-337_0 | When the Forest Service issues a public notice in a newspaper of record of a proposed action, the public has either 30 or 45 days to comment, depending on the type of NEPA analysis document prepared. The objection can (1) be set aside from review, (2) be reviewed by the Forest Service resulting in a change to the final decision, (3) be reviewed by the Forest Service resulting in no change to the final decision, or (4) result in the reviewing officer directing the appropriate Forest Service official to complete additional analysis prior to issuing a final decision. Of the 29 litigated decisions in our study, 26 had been subject to appeal, representing 2 percent of the 1,191 decisions subject to appeal; the remaining 3 litigated decisions had been subject to objection, likewise representing 2 percent of the 121 decisions subject to objection. A total of 91 appeals were dismissed for various reasons, including 38 appeals that were resolved informally, of which 30 appeals were withdrawn by the appellant and 8 decisions were withdrawn by the agency (when an appeal is resolved informally, changes may or may not be made to the decision); 53 appeals that were dismissed without review, mostly for failing to meet procedural requirements, such as timeliness—however, 23 of these appeals were dismissed without review because, subsequent to receiving the appeal, the agency official who made the decision decided to withdraw the decision; For 1 appeal, the outcome could not be determined based on documentation in the agency’s regional files, according to an agency official. According to time frame information provided by Forest Service officials, all appeals of fiscal year 2006 through 2008 decisions were processed within the time frames prescribed in applicable laws and regulations. 15 objections were set aside from review. Of the 49 decisions for which objections were filed, 25 were signed between 35 days and 3 months of legal publication date of the proposed action. District courts reached an outcome on the 18 additional decisions, with 8 decided favorably to the plaintiffs and 10 decided favorably to the Forest Service. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Forest Service for comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the number and type of Forest Service decisions involving hazardous fuel reduction activities signed in fiscal years 2006 through 2008; (2) the number of these decisions that were objected to, appealed, or litigated, and the acreage associated with those decisions; (3) the outcomes of these objections, appeals, and lawsuits, including whether they were processed within prescribed time frames, and the identities of the objectors, appellants, and plaintiffs; (4) the treatment methods and contract types associated with fuel reduction decisions, and how frequently the different methods and types were objected to, appealed, and litigated; and (5) the number of decisions involving hazardous fuel reduction activities in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) and inventoried roadless areas (IRA), and how frequently these decisions were objected to, appealed, and litigated. Therefore, the 10.5 million acres covered by decisions in our review may include overlapping acreage. Appendix III: Number of Appeals, Objections, and Lawsuits of Fuel Reduction Decisions, by Forest Service Region
Figure 3 shows, for each of the Forest Service’s regions, information on appeals, objections, and litigation of fuel reduction decisions, including the total number of appeals, objections, and litigation and the percentage of decisions appealed, objected to, and litigated. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increases in the number and intensity of wildland fires have led the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service to place greater emphasis on thinning forests and rangelands to reduce the buildup of potentially hazardous vegetation that can fuel wildland fires. The public generally has an opportunity to challenge agency hazardous fuel reduction decisions with which it disagrees. Depending on the type of project being undertaken, the public can file a formal objection to a proposed decision, or can appeal a decision the agency has already made. Appeals and objections must be reviewed by the Forest Service within prescribed time frames. Final decisions may also generally be challenged in federal court. GAO was asked, among other things, to determine, for fiscal years 2006-2008, (1) the number of Forest Service fuel reduction decisions and the associated acreage; (2) the number of decisions subject to appeal and objection, the number appealed, objected to, and litigated, and the associated acreage; and (3) the outcomes of appeals, objections, and litigation, and the extent to which appeals and objections were processed within prescribed time frames. In doing so, GAO conducted a nationwide survey of forest managers and staff, interviewed officials in the Forest Service's regional offices, and reviewed documentation to corroborate agency responses. GAO requested, but did not receive, comments from the Forest Service on a draft of this report.
What GAO Found
Through a GAO-administered survey and interviews, Forest Service officials reported the following information: (1) In fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the Forest Service issued 1,415 decisions involving fuel reduction activities, covering 10.5 million acres. (2) Of this total, 1,191 decisions, covering about 9 million acres, were subject to appeal and 217--about 18 percent--were appealed. Another 121 decisions, covering about 1.2 million acres, were subject to objection and 49--about 40 percent--were objected to. The remaining 103 decisions were exempt from both objection and appeal. Finally, 29 decisions--about 2 percent of all decisions--were litigated, involving about 124,000 acres. (3) For 54 percent of the appeals filed, the Forest Service allowed the project to proceed without changes; 7 percent required some changes before being implemented; and 8 percent were not allowed to be implemented. The remaining appeals were generally dismissed for procedural reasons or withdrawn before they could be resolved. Regarding objections, 37 percent of objections resulted in no change to a final decision; 35 percent resulted in a change to a final decision or additional analysis on the part of the Forest Service; and the remaining 28 percent were set aside from review for procedural reasons or addressed in some other way. And finally, of the 29 decisions that were litigated, lawsuits on 21 decisions have been resolved, and 8 are ongoing. Of the lawsuits that have been resolved, the parties settled 3 decisions, 8 were decided in favor of the plaintiffs, and 10 were decided in favor of the Forest Service. All appeals and objections were processed within prescribed time frames--generally, within 90 days of a decision (for appeals), or within 60 days of the legal notice of a proposed decision (for objections). |
gao_GAO-08-793 | gao_GAO-08-793_0 | At Hanford, DOE’s planned cleanup process entails retrieving waste from the tanks; mixing this waste with molten glass through a process known as vitrification; and pouring the waste into steel canisters, where it will cool and solidify. Uncertainties Raise Questions about Tanks’ Long-Term Viability
Neither DOE nor its contractors have comprehensive information about the overall integrity or contents of Hanford’s underground waste tanks; as a result, they cannot predict the tanks’ long-term viability with any degree of certainty. Although recent studies indicate that the newer, double-shell tanks are generally sound, the integrity of many single-shell tanks has been compromised in the past, and the condition of the rest is difficult to ascertain. DOE tank management officials acknowledge that the integrity of the single-shell tanks is a continuing uncertainty—with potentially significant effects on DOE’s tank management strategy—and have taken steps, such as limited examination of the tanks’ external structure and in-tank observations and analysis, to learn more about the condition of the single- shell tanks. The radioactive elements, chemicals, and miscellaneous materials have been extensively mixed and commingled over the years. Some of these tanks may be more than 80 years old by the time they are emptied and the tank farms are closed (see app. DOE’s Tank Management Strategy Involves Continued Use of the Aging Tanks, Perhaps for Decades
DOE’s strategy for managing Hanford’s tanks involves transferring waste from the single- to the double-shell tanks and using the latter to store the waste until it can be treated and the tanks closed. 3). DOE Appears to Be Operating under More Than One Schedule
Within DOE’s general strategy for addressing the aging tanks, time frames for completing specific actions, such as emptying the tanks and closing them, remain in flux. Moreover, DOE has made limited progress in actually emptying the tanks, and at its present rate of progress, it will not achieve the milestones it agreed to. Emptying single-shell tanks will proceed two to three times faster than it has to date. DOE Cannot Weigh the Benefits of Pursuing Its Tank Management Strategy against Growing Costs Because It Lacks Critical Information
Without a comprehensive analysis that quantifies the risks of tank waste and the proposed strategies to address them, DOE lacks critical information to weigh the benefits of pursuing its present strategy against costs that continue to climb. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that DOE has the fundamental information needed to make appropriate and cost-effective decisions about how to manage Hanford’s tank waste, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following three actions: Give priority to carrying out the department’s assessment, in early planning stages as of 2008, of the structural integrity of Hanford’s single- shell tanks—an effort we fully support—and ensure that this assessment includes examining the following key attributes: corrosion of the tanks’ inner steel shells; the condition of concrete domes and outer shells, especially where waste has leaked; the integrity of long-obscured parts of the tanks for tanks that have been emptied; and the long-term viability of the tanks in light of their increasing age and DOE’s extended schedule for waste retrieval, waste treatment, and tank closure. Thus, in our view, DOE’s current knowledge is not adequate, for the single-shell tanks in particular, to assess the appropriateness of the department’s tank management strategy—which involves continuing to store waste in aging tanks until they can be emptied and closed—especially in light of lengthening cleanup time frames. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) manages more than 56 million gallons of radioactive and hazardous waste stored in 149 single-shell and 28 double-shell underground tanks at its Hanford Site in Washington State. Many of these aging tanks have already leaked waste into the soil. Meanwhile, DOE's planned process for emptying the tanks and treating the waste--mixing it with molten glass and solidifying it in canisters for storage--has experienced delays, lengthening the time the tanks will store waste and intensifying concerns about the tanks' viability during a long cleanup process. This report addresses (1) the condition, contents, and long-term viability of Hanford's underground tanks; (2) DOE's strategy for managing the tanks; and (3) the extent to which DOE has weighed the risks and benefits of its tank management strategy against the growing costs of that strategy. GAO analyzed numerous studies and reports on the tanks and interviewed DOE officials and other experts on relevant issues.
What GAO Found
DOE lacks comprehensive information about the condition, contents, and long-term viability of Hanford's waste tanks. Although recent work indicates that the newer, double-shell tanks are generally sound structurally, the condition of the older, single-shell tanks is less certain. All the tanks contain a complex mix of radioactive elements and chemicals, making the proportions of constituents in any tank uncertain and emptying the tanks technically challenging. DOE officials acknowledged the lack of information about the condition of the single-shell tanks and are in early stages of a study to assess these tanks' structural integrity. The uncertainties over tank condition, especially as the time frames for emptying tanks are extended and the tanks age, raise serious questions about the tanks' long-term viability. DOE's tank management strategy involves continuing to use Hanford's aging tanks to store waste until they can be emptied, the waste treated, and the tanks closed. As work proceeds, however, DOE's time frames for completion are lengthening by decades, and the agency appears to be operating under more than one schedule. For example, DOE's internal milestone for emptying single-shell tanks is 19 years later than the date agreed to with its regulators. Although DOE and its regulators have been discussing new tank waste management milestones, as of May 2008, no decisions had been reached. Moreover, DOE's tank management strategy relies on assumptions that may be overly optimistic, such as assuming that emptying single-shell tanks will proceed significantly faster than it has to date. DOE lacks comprehensive risk information needed to weigh the benefits of pursuing its tank waste removal and closure strategy against growing costs. In particular, DOE has not assessed the risks posed by continuing to store waste in the aging tanks until the waste is removed and cannot demonstrate that benefits are commensurate with the costs of its tank management strategy. DOE is nevertheless moving forward with negotiating new tank waste milestones with its regulators. |
gao_GAO-04-555 | gao_GAO-04-555_0 | Actual Renovation Costs Generally Were Consistent with or Less Than Budget Estimates
With a few exceptions, the services’ reported actual costs for renovation projects for general and flag officer quarters were generally consistent with or less than the budget estimates provided to Congress. Cost Increases Due to Customer-Requested Changes and Unforeseen Repairs
Customer requests for changes and unforeseen repairs were the primary reasons for cost increases to renovation projects. Customer driven requests, such as upgraded kitchen and bathroom renovations, or work that was not included in the original scope of work were responsible for about 45 percent of the total cost increase for the 5 Marine Corps projects that exceeded their budgets by more than 10 percent. For the 5 projects that exceeded their budgets by more than 10 percent, cost increases due to such unforeseen repairs as for termite damage or such undetected structural deficiencies as sagging floor supports occurred because these deficiencies or requirements were not identified during initial inspections. The Marine Corps budget estimate did not include this requirement. Marine Corps and Navy Did Not Properly Account for Gifts Used to Help Renovate the Home of the Commandants
The Army, Navy and Marine Corps each received private donations of cash, property, or services to furnish and renovate general and flag officer quarters. According to Marine Corps officials, they did not follow the prescribed procedures for accepting and accounting for the estimated $765,500 in nonmonetary gifts (materials such as kitchen cabinets, furniture, wall coverings, draperies, and furniture upholstery) from the Friends of the Home of the Commandants. However, the Marine Corps property records do not include the items purchased with the gift funds. The Navy and Army also accepted nonmonetary or monetary gifts for furnishings for flag and general officer quarters. However, similar to the Marine Corps, the Navy did not properly accept and account for about $3,970 of the gifts in the property records. By the end of fiscal year 2003, the services had privatized 65 of their 784 general and flag officer quarters and planned to privatize 426, or 54 percent, by the end of fiscal year 2008. For example, the Air Force draft guidance applies the same project approvals for renovations to privatized general officer homes as currently exist for government-owned homes, which is all renovation projects over $35,000. Finally, DOD and the military services could lose visibility over renovations to general and flag office quarters that are privatized. With regard to the first two recommendations, DOD indicated that the Navy has agreed to reemphasize the importance of limiting customer-driven changes to renovation projects for general and flag officer housing, properly accounting for all gifts accepted and used to help renovate the Home of Commandants of the Marine Corps, and incorporating accountability measures into revisions of Secretary of the Navy guidance governing the general and flag officer quarters program. To determine how the actual costs of renovation projects for general and flag officer quarters compared to the service budget estimates provided to Congress, we reviewed all renovation projects of more than $100,000 for fiscal years 1999 through 2003. To assess the extent to which DOD and the services have issued guidance to provide visibility and control over costs associated with renovation projects for privatized general and flag officer quarters, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense and service officials responsible for family housing and privatization. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent cost increases in renovation projects to general and flag officer quarters raised questions about the services' management of the programs. GAO was asked to determine (1) how actual costs of renovation projects for general and flag officer housing compare to service budget estimates provided to Congress and (2) the primary reasons for any increases and the services' procedures to control cost increases. Additionally, GAO is presenting observations about the services' accountability over gifts provided to help renovate some general and flag officer quarters and the extent to which Department of Defense (DOD) guidance provides visibility and control over costs associated with renovation projects for privatized general and flag officer quarters.
What GAO Found
With few exceptions, the services' reported costs for renovation projects for general and flag officer quarters were generally consistent with budget estimates provided to Congress. For fiscal years 1999 to 2003, GAO found that 184, or 93 percent, of the 197 renovation projects over $100,000 cost less than or the same as budget estimates. While the remaining 13 projects--6 Navy and 7 Marine Corps--exceeded cost estimates, 5 Marine Corps projects exceeded their budgets by more than 10 percent. Customer-requested changes and unforeseen repairs were the main reasons for cost increases to renovation projects. For 5 of the 7 projects that exceeded their budgets by over 10 percent, about 45 percent of the increased costs was for customer-driven changes, 53 percent for unforeseen repairs, and 2 percent could not be determined. Though the services have guidance to limit customer-requested changes, the Marine Corps approved many such changes that contributed to project costs exceeding budgets. Customer requests included upgraded kitchen and bathroom renovations or initially unplanned work. Unforeseen repairs, such as for termite damage or unexpected historic preservation requirements, occurred because problems were not identified in the inspections on which the estimates were based. Military services did not properly account for gifts used for general officer quarters in two instances, one involving renovation costs. In that instance, the Marine Corps did not comply with existing regulations to properly accept and account for all gifts used to renovate the Home of the Commandants. The Friends of the Home of the Commandants told GAO it provided about $765,500 in nonmonetary materials and services (e.g., furnishings and construction labor). However, the Marine Corps could list nonmonetary gifts totaling only $492,413 because it did not follow specified gift acceptance and accounting procedures. Navy General Gift Fund records show receipt of an additional $88,300 in monetary gifts from the Friends of the Home of the Commandants. The Marine Corps has receipts for monetary expenditures, but not property records for items purchased with the gift funds. The Navy and Army also accepted gifts to furnish general and flag officer homes. Of those, the Navy did not properly accept and account for about $3,970 in nonmonetary gifts. DOD and the military services could lose visibility over housing renovation costs for privatized general and flag officer homes. DOD does not require review of renovation costs for these quarters, such as costs over $35,000, as required for government-owned quarters. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are developing guidance to increase visibility and accountability over the spending for these quarters, but the draft guidance is not consistent. Although the services have privatized only 65 of their 784 general and flag officer quarters, they plan to privatize 426 or 54 percent by fiscal year 2008. |
gao_GAO-15-196 | gao_GAO-15-196_0 | Background
Enterprise Funds: Definition and History
A U.S. government–funded enterprise fund is an organization that is designed to promote the expansion of the private sector in developing and transitioning countries by providing financing and technical assistance to locally owned small and medium-sized enterprises. EAEF Has Not Made Any Investments in Egypt While TAEF Has Invested $2.4 Million in Tunisia
EAEF Has Not Made Any Investments in Egypt as Its Initial Investment Did Not Proceed as Planned
EAEF has not made any investments in Egypt, as its first investment, to purchase an Egyptian bank, did not come to fruition. EAEF’s investment strategy had been to purchase a bank that would lend money to small and medium-sized enterprises in Egypt. The Chairman stated that he anticipates investing $60 million to $90 million in these three areas. TAEF plans to promote private sector development in Tunisia by investing in (1) a private equity fund that supports SMEs, (2) direct investments in SMEs smaller than those targeted by the private equity fund, (3) microfinance institutions, and (4) start-ups. In June 2014, TAEF committed to its first investment of over $2.4 million in a private equity fund that invests in SMEs in a variety of industries, such as telecommunications, agribusiness, and renewable energy. The boards of both Funds have met regularly since their inceptions. In addition, the Funds have established corporate policies and procedures, which USAID has approved. Information and communication. According to USAID officials, the Funds plan to have their 2013 and 2014 financial statements audited. USAID has also not tracked the Funds’ use of cash in a way that allows the agency to monitor whether EAEF and TAEF are spending it in a timely manner. Last, the Funds’ corporate policies do not include key vetting procedures to prevent the illicit use of funds, the presence of which was expected by USAID. EAEF and TAEF Have Not Submitted Performance Monitoring Plans Required by the Grants
EAEF and TAEF have not yet submitted performance monitoring plans as required by the grant agreements. The Funds have generally complied with the requirements in their grant agreements with USAID. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further enhance USAID’s oversight of the Funds and to ensure the Funds fully implement the grant agreements, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following four steps: 1. establish a process to better manage cash advances to the Funds, 2. make certain that the Funds comply with grant agreement requirements related to performance monitoring, 3. ensure that the Funds comply with grant agreement requirements related to public communications, and 4. ensure that the Funds’ corporate policies reflect grant agreement provisions regarding vetting requirements designed to prevent transactions with prohibited individuals and organizations. 112-74) requested that we examine the management and oversight of the Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF) and the Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund (TAEF) (the Funds) to determine if appropriate and sufficient safeguards exist against financial misconduct. In this report, we examined (1) the status of EAEF’s and TAEF’s investments, (2) EAEF’s and TAEF’s progress in establishing key management structures to support their missions and operations, and (3) the extent to which EAEF and TAEF have complied with certain requirements of the USAID grant agreements. To examine what progress the Funds have made in establishing key management structures, we reviewed EAEF and TAEF documents, including the Funds’ statements of corporate policies and procedures, bylaws, employee job descriptions, organization charts, financial and annual reports, and board of director meeting minutes. In addition, we interviewed the EAEF and TAEF Chairmen and senior management about their efforts to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant agreements as well as USAID officials regarding their efforts to oversee the Funds’ compliance with the grant agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the wake of the economic and political transitions associated with the “Arab Spring,” Congress authorized the creation of enterprise funds for Egypt and Tunisia in 2011. EAEF and TAEF aim to develop the private sectors in these countries, particularly SMEs, through instruments such as loans, equity investments, and technical assistance. USAID signed grant agreements with both Funds in 2013 and has thus far obligated $120 million to EAEF and $60 million to TAEF. In this report, GAO examines (1) the status of the Funds' investments, (2) the Funds' progress in establishing key management structures to support their missions and operations, and (3) the extent to which the Funds have complied with requirements in the grant agreements. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed USAID and Fund documents, such as EAEF and TAEF grant agreements, policies and procedures, and the Funds' boards of directors meeting minutes. GAO also interviewed USAID and Fund officials.
What GAO Found
The Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund (EAEF) has not yet made any investments in Egypt, and the Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund (TAEF) has made an over $2.4 million investment in Tunisia. EAEF has not made any investments in Egypt as its initial investment did not proceed as planned. EAEF's attempt to purchase a bank in Egypt that would lend money to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) was rejected by the Egyptian Central Bank. EAEF is now considering other options, such as investments in the food and beverage sector. TAEF's investment strategy is to invest in four different areas: (1) a private equity fund investing in SMEs, (2) direct investments in SMEs smaller than those targeted by the private equity fund, (3) microfinance institutions, and (4) start-ups. In June 2014, TAEF made an over $2.4 million investment in a private equity fund that invests in and finances Tunisian SMEs.
EAEF and TAEF (the Funds) have made progress in establishing key management structures to support their mission and operations, with additional actions under way. In terms of administrative structures, both Funds have hired initial staff. Regarding their corporate governance, EAEF and TAEF both have boards of directors that have met regularly, adopted by-laws, and developed corporate policies and procedures. Both Funds plan to develop and implement additional management structures in the future, such as audits of their 2013 and 2014 financial statements.
While TAEF and EAEF have generally fulfilled the requirements of the grant agreements, GAO found three gaps in the Funds' implementation and one gap in the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) implementation. First, the Funds have not yet submitted their performance monitoring plans as required by the grant agreements. Second, EAEF has not implemented the provisions in its grant agreement related to public communications, such as development of its own logo. Third, the Funds' corporate policies do not include procedures to implement vetting requirements designed to prevent illicit use of the funds, the presence of which was expected by USAID. USAID has also not tracked the Funds' use of cash in a way that allows the agency to monitor whether EAEF and TAEF are spending it in a timely manner. Collectively, these gaps in implementation pose challenges for USAID's oversight of the Funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID take steps to further enhance its oversight of the Funds' compliance with the grant agreements and other requirements by establishing a process to better manage cash advances to the Funds; ensuring that the Funds comply with the grant agreement requirements related to performance monitoring and public communications; and ensuring that the Funds' corporate policies include vetting requirements. USAID concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-822T | gao_GAO-07-822T_0 | As part of its mission and as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the department is also responsible for coordinating efforts across all levels of government and throughout the nation, including with federal, state, tribal, local, and private sector homeland security resources. In addition, the department has deployed HSIN, a homeland security information- sharing application that operates on the public Internet. In addition, the total cost to develop, operate, and maintain these networks and HSIN in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, as reported by DHS, was $611.8 million. A key state and local-based initiative is the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) program. The RISS program helps state and local jurisdictions to, among other things, share information in support of their homeland security missions. This nationwide program, operated and managed by state and local officials, was established in 1974 to address crime that operates across jurisdictional lines. ● Bulletin board. ● Chat tool. Efforts to Coordinate HSIN with Key State and Local Information- Sharing Initiatives Have Been Limited
DHS did not fully adhere to the previously mentioned key practices in coordinating its efforts on HSIN with key state and local information-sharing initiatives. The department’s limited use of these practices is attributable to a number of factors: in particular, after the events of September 11, 2001, the department expedited its schedule to deploy HSIN capabilities, and in doing so, it did not develop an inventory of key state and local information initiatives. DHS has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and collaboration, including implementing the recommendations in our recent report. DHS did not engage the RISS program to determine how resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs. Finally, DHS has yet to fully develop coordination policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries with the RISS program. DHS’s Expedited Schedule Was Major Cause for Limited Coordination, Increasing the Risk of Ineffective Information Sharing and Duplication
The extent of DHS’s adherence to key practices (and the resulting limited coordination) is attributable to DHS’s expedited schedule to deploy an information-sharing application that could be used across the federal government in the wake of the September 11 attacks; in its haste, DHS did not develop a complete inventory of key state and local information initiatives. Specifically: ● HSIN and RISS ATIX currently target similar user groups. ● Document library. For example, the department is in the process of developing an integration strategy that is to include enhancing HSIN so that other applications and networks can interact with it. This would promote integration by allowing other federal agencies and state and local governments to use their preferred applications and networks—such as RISSNET and RISS ATIX—while allowing DHS to continue to use HSIN. We also recommended that this include (1) identifying and inventorying such initiatives to determine whether there are opportunities to improve information sharing and avoid duplication, (2) adopting and institutionalizing key practices related to OMB’s guidance on enhancing and sustaining agency coordination and collaboration, and (3) ensuring that the department’s coordination efforts are consistent with the Administration’s recently issued Information Sharing Environment plan. In closing, DHS has not effectively coordinated its primary information-sharing system with two key state and local initiatives. Consequently, the department faces the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring and that its HSIN application may be duplicating existing state and local capabilities. This also raises the issue of whether similar coordination and duplication issues exist with the other federal homeland security networks and associated systems and applications under the department’s purview. Until all the key coordination and collaboration practices are fully implemented and institutionalized, DHS will continue to be at risk that the effectiveness of its information sharing is not where it needs to be to adequately protect the homeland and that its efforts are unnecessarily duplicating state and local initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating the federal government's homeland security communications with all levels of government, the private sector, and the public. In support of its mission, the department has deployed a Web-based information-sharing application--the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)--and operates at least 11 homeland security networks. The department reported that in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, these investments cost $611.8 million to develop, operate, and maintain. In view of the significance of information sharing for protecting homeland security, GAO was asked to testify on the department's efforts to coordinate its development and use of HSIN with two key state and local initiatives under the Regional Information Sharing Systems--a nationwide information-sharing program operated and managed by state and local officials. This testimony is based on a recent GAO report that addresses, among other things, DHS's homeland security networks and HSIN. In performing the work for that report, GAO analyzed documentation on HSIN and state and local initiatives, compared it against the requirements of the Homeland Security Act and federal guidance and best practices, and interviewed DHS officials and state and local officials.
What GAO Found
In developing HSIN, its key homeland security information-sharing application, DHS did not work effectively with two key Regional Information Sharing Systems program initiatives. This program, which is operated and managed by state and local officials nationwide, provides services to law enforcement, emergency responders, and other public safety officials. However, DHS did not coordinate with the program to fully develop joint strategies and policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries, which are key practices for effective coordination and collaboration and a means to enhance information sharing and avoid duplication of effort. For example, DHS did not engage the program in ongoing dialogue to determine how resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs. A major factor contributing to this limited coordination was that the department rushed to deploy HSIN after the events of September 11, 2001. In its haste, it did not develop a comprehensive inventory of key state and local information-sharing initiatives, and it did not achieve a full understanding of the relevance of the Regional Information Sharing Systems program to homeland security information sharing. As a result, DHS faces the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring and that HSIN may be duplicating state and local capabilities. Specifically, both HSIN and one of the Regional Information Sharing Systems initiatives target similar user groups, such as emergency management agencies, and all have similar features, such as electronic bulletin boards, "chat" tools, and document libraries. The department has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and collaboration, including developing an integration strategy to allow other applications and networks to connect with HSIN, so that organizations can continue to use their preferred information-sharing applications and networks. In addition, it has agreed to implement recommendations made by GAO to take specific steps to (1) improve coordination, including developing a comprehensive inventory of state and local initiatives, and (2) ensure that similar coordination and duplication issues do not arise with other federal homeland security networks, systems, and applications. Until DHS completes these efforts, including developing an inventory of key state and local initiatives and fully implementing and institutionalizing key practices for effective coordination and collaboration, the department will continue to be at risk that information is not being effectively shared and that the department is duplicating state and local capabilities. |
gao_RCED-98-143 | gao_RCED-98-143_0 | Of the estimated $6.1 billion maintenance backlog, most of it—about $5.6 billion, or about 92 percent—is for construction projects. The Park Service’s list of projects in the construction portion of the maintenance backlog reveals that over 21 percent, or $1.2 billion, of the $5.6 billion is for new facilities. For example:
Acadia National Park’s estimate included $16.6 million to replace a visitor center and construct a park entrance. These projects are not aimed at addressing the maintenance of existing facilities within the parks. Including these types of enhancement projects in the maintenance backlog contributes to confusion about the actual maintenance needs of the national park system. These projects include new construction for adding, expanding, and upgrading facilities. The Park Service compiles its maintenance backlog estimates on an ad hoc basis in response to requests from the Congress or others; it does not have a routine, systematic process for determining its maintenance backlog. The January 1997 estimate of the maintenance backlog—the most recent estimate—was based largely on information that was compiled over 4 years ago. This fact, as well as the absence of a common definition of what should be included in the maintenance backlog, contributed to an inaccurate and out-of-date estimate. The $6.1 billion estimate, dated January 1997, was for the most part, compiled on the basis of information received from the individual parks in December 1993. Managing the Backlog
In order to begin addressing its maintenance backlog, the Park Service needs (1) an accurate estimate of its total maintenance backlog and (2) a means for tracking progress so that it can determine the extent to which its needs are being met. Park Service officials told us that they have not developed a precise estimate of the total maintenance backlog because the needs far exceed the funding resources available to address them. The recent actions by the Congress to provide the Park Service with substantial additional funding, which could be used to address its maintenance backlog, underscore the need to ensure that available funds are being used to address priority needs and to show progress in improving the conditions of the national park system. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the National Park Service’s estimate of the maintenance backlog and its composition, (2) how the agency determined the maintenance backlog estimate and whether it is reliable, (3) how the agency manages the backlog, and (4) recent requirements that have been placed on the Park Service and other federal agencies that may have a positive impact on what is being done in this area and current initiatives being taken by the Park Service to deal with the backlog issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Park Service's (NPS) efforts to identify and manage the maintenance backlog, focusing on: (1) NPS' estimate of the maintenance backlog and its composition; (2) how NPS determined the maintenance backlog estimate and whether it is reliable; (3) how NPS manages the backlog; and (4) what, if any, recent requirements or initiatives are being implemented by the NPS to help address its maintenance backlog problem.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NPS' most recent estimate of its maintenance backlog does not accurately reflect the scope of the maintenance needs of the park system; (2) NPS estimated, as of January 1997, that its maintenance backlog was about $6.1 billion; (3) most of this amount--about $5.6 billion, or about 92 percent--was for construction projects, which, for the most part, are aimed at correcting maintenance problems at existing facilities; (4) however, over 21 percent of the $5.6 billion in construction projects, or $1.2 billion, was for the construction of new facilities, such as $24 million for a bike path at the Colonial National Historical Park in Virginia and $16.6 million to replace a visitor center and construct a park entrance at Acadia National Park in Maine; (5) while GAO does not question the need for these facilities, including these kinds of new construction projects or projects that expand or upgrade park facilities in an estimate of the maintenance backlog is not appropriate because such projects go beyond what could reasonably be viewed as maintenance; (6) including them in the maintenance backlog contributes to confusion about the park system's actual maintenance needs; (7) NPS estimates of its maintenance backlog are compiled on an ad hoc basis in response to requests from Congress or others; the agency does not have a routine, systematic process for determining its maintenance backlog; (8) the most recent estimate, as of January 1997, was based largely on information that was compiled by NPS in 1993 and has not been updated to reflect changing conditions in individual park units; (9) this fact, as well as the absence of a common definition of what should be included in the maintenance backlog, contributed to an inaccurate and out-of-date estimate; (10) NPS does not use the estimated backlog in managing park maintenance operations; (11) as such, it has not specifically identified its total maintenance backlog; (12) because the identified backlog far exceeds the funding resources being made available to address it, NPS has focused its efforts on identifying its highest-priority maintenance needs; (13) however, given that substantial additional funding resources are being made available--over $100 million starting in fiscal year 1998--NPS needs to more accurately determine its total maintenance needs so that it can better track progress in meeting them; and (14) NPS is taking actions to help address the maintenance backlog problem in response to several requirements. |
gao_GGD-95-143 | gao_GGD-95-143_0 | The Service expected that agreeing to use postal employees for remote barcoding would improve its relations with APWU. If the 6 percent cost differential and the current ratio of 89 percent transitional and 11 percent career workhours were continued, we estimated the in-house cost for this volume would be about $36 million more per year, not adjusted for inflation. If the cost differential we found continues, using postal employees would cost the Service about $86 million more per year, or 14 percent, not adjusted for inflation, when the required ratio of 70 percent transitional and 30 percent career workhours has been achieved. If this occurred, the cost of in-house barcoding would increase significantly. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) compare, insofar as postal data were available, the direct costs of contracting out remote barcoding with the direct costs of having the work done by postal employees; and (2) identify possible advantages and disadvantages of using postal employees rather than contractors to do the work. III for the text of the Postal Service’s comments.) “3. “5. Comments From the U.S. 4. Rather, our report attributes to a Postal Service official the comment that a potential employee morale problem could result from the mix of transitional and career employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the direct costs to the U.S. Postal Service of contracting out for remote barcoding services versus having the work done by postal employees, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of using postal employees for these services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in-house barcoding would cost an estimated 6 percent more than using contractors, based on a mix of 89 percent transitional and 11 percent career employee workhours; (2) the cost differential is expected to increase to 14 percent annually to process 23 billion letters, based on an union agreement of 70 percent transitional and 30 percent career employee workhours; (3) if transitional employees receive benefits similar to career employees, as the union has requested, the cost differential would increase to 28 percent or $174 million annually; (4) using postal employees for barcoding would result in improved relations with the union; and (5) the postal union believes that using postal employees for barcoding provides the opportunity for the Postal Service and the union to cooperate in establishing and operating remote barcoding sites. |
gao_GAO-12-330 | gao_GAO-12-330_0 | OSHA’S Standard- Setting Time Frames Vary Widely and Are Influenced by the Many Procedural Requirements and Other Factors
OSHA’s Time Frames for Developing and Issuing Standards Vary
We analyzed the 58 significant health and safety standards that OSHA issued between 1981 and 2010 and found that the time frames for developing and issuing them ranged from 15 months to about 19 years (see table 1). For example, officials told us that Assistant Secretaries typically serve for about 3 years, and that new appointees tend to change the agency’s priorities. Several experts and agency officials noted that, in order to develop the rule so quickly, the vast majority of OSHA’s standard-setting resources were focused on this rulemaking effort, taking attention away from several standards that previously had been a priority. OSHA has Authority to Address Urgent Hazards through Emergency Temporary Standards, Enforcement, and Education
Although It Has the Authority, OSHA Has Found it Difficult to Issue Emergency Temporary Standards
OSHA has not issued any emergency temporary standards in nearly 30 years, citing, among other reasons, legal and logistical challenges. In 2006, the agency was urged to issue an emergency temporary standard for diacetyl after investigations showed its association with severe, irreversible lung disease among workers in microwave popcorn factories. OSHA may cite employers for failing to adequately protect workers from a specific workplace hazard even if it has not set a standard on that hazard. OSHA relied on the general duty clause when it cited Walmart for inadequate crowd management in the 2008 trampling death of a worker. In addition to setting standards, OSHA offers on-site consultations and publishes health and safety information to inform employers and workers about urgent hazards. contrast, the OSH Act does not specify when OSHA is to revise its standards. Both OSHA and MSHA supplement their employees’ knowledge by calling upon the expertise at NIOSH, with MSHA benefiting from a specialized research group within NIOSH focused on the mining industry. Experts Suggested Many Ideas to Improve OSHA’s Standard-Setting Process, Including More Interagency Coordination and Statutory Deadlines
Improve Coordination with Other Federal Agencies to Leverage Expertise
To fully leverage expertise at other federal agencies, experts and agency officials suggest improving interagency coordination. As mentioned previously, NIOSH conducts research and makes recommendations on occupational safety and health, and it was created at the same time as OSHA by the OSH Act. However, some experts and officials at both agencies noted that collaborating in a more systematic way could facilitate OSHA’s standard-setting process. Impose Statutory Deadlines and Provide Relief from Procedural Requirements for Setting Standards
To minimize the time it takes OSHA to develop and issue safety or health standards, experts and agency officials suggested that statutory deadlines for issuing occupational safety and health standards be imposed by Congress and enforced by the courts. Change the Standard of Judicial Review for OSHA Standards
Experts and agency officials suggested OSHA’s substantial evidence standard of judicial review be replaced with the arbitrary and capricious standard, which would be more consistent with other federal regulatory agencies. One expert suggested that OSHA develop a priority-setting process that more directly involves stakeholders with expertise in occupational safety and health in recommending new standards. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance collaboration and streamline the development of OSHA’s occupational safety and health standards, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services instruct the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health and the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to develop a more formal means of collaboration between the two agencies. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how long it takes the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to develop and issue safety and health standards, we reviewed occupational safety and health standards and substantive updates to those standards. To identify alternatives to the typical standard-setting process available for OSHA to address urgent hazards, we reviewed relevant federal laws and interviewed current OSHA staff and attorneys from the Department of Labor’s Office of the Solicitor. To determine whether rulemaking at other regulatory agencies offers insight into OSHA’s challenges with setting standards, we explored the regulatory process at three other federal regulatory agencies and offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Occupational safety and health standards are designed to help protect about 130 million public and private sector workers from hazards at more than 8 million U.S. worksites. Questions exist concerning how long it takes OSHA to issue its standards. GAO was asked to examine: (1) the time OSHA takes to develop and issue safety and health standards and the key factors that affect these time frames, (2) alternatives to the typical standard-setting process available for OSHA to address urgent hazards (3) whether other regulatory agencies rulemaking offers insight into OSHAs challenges with setting standards, and (4) ideas from occupational safety and health experts and agency officials for improving OSHAs process. GAO analyzed standards issued by OSHA between 1981 and 2010, interviewed subject matter experts and agency officials at OSHA and two similar federal regulatory agencies and offices, and reviewed the standard-setting process at OSHA and the comparison agencies and offices.
What GAO Found
Between 1981 and 2010, the time it took the Department of Labors Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to develop and issue safety and health standards ranged widely, from 15 months to 19 years, and averaged more than 7 years. Experts and agency officials cited increased procedural requirements, shifting priorities, and a rigorous standard of judicial review as contributing to lengthy time frames for developing and issuing standards. For example, they said that a shift in OSHAs priorities toward one standard took attention away from several other standards that previously had been a priority.
In addition to using the typical standard-setting process, OSHA can address urgent hazards by issuing emergency temporary standards, directing additional attention to enforcing relevant existing standards, and educating employers and workers about hazards. However, OSHA has not issued an emergency temporary standard since 1983 because it has found it difficult to compile the evidence necessary to meet the statutory requirements. Instead, OSHA focuses on enforcement and education when workers face urgent hazards. For example, OSHA can enforce the general requirement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) that employers provide a workplace free from recognized hazards, as it did in 2009 when it cited a major retail employer after one of its workers was crushed to death by uncontrolled holiday crowds. To educate employers and workers, OSHA coordinates and funds on-site consultations and publishes information on matters as diverse as safe lifting techniques for nursing home workers and exposure to diacetyl, a flavoring ingredient used in microwave popcorn linked to lung disease among factory workers.
Experiences of other federal agencies that regulate public or worker health hazards offer limited insight into the challenges OSHA faces in setting standards. For example, officials with the Environmental Protection Agency noted that certain Clean Air Act requirements to set and regularly review standards for specified air pollutants have facilitated that agencys standard-setting efforts. In contrast, the OSH Act does not require OSHA to periodically review and update its standards. Officials with the Mine Safety and Health Administration noted that their standard-setting process benefits from both the in-house knowledge of its inspectors, who inspect every mine at least twice yearly, and a dedicated mine safety research group within the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a federal research agency that makes recommendations on occupational safety and health. OSHA must rely on time-consuming site visits for hazards information and has not consistently coordinated with NIOSH to engage that agencys expertise on occupational hazards.
Experts and agency officials identified several ideas that could improve OSHAs standard-setting process. While some of the changes, such as improving coordination with other agencies to leverage expertise, are within OSHAs authority, others call for significant procedural changes that would require amending existing laws. For example, some experts recommended a statutory change that would allow OSHA to revise a group of outdated health standards at the same time, using industry consensus standards as support rather than having to analyze each hazard individually.
What GAO Recommends
To streamline OSHA standards development, GAO recommends that OSHA and NIOSH more consistently collaborate on researching occupational hazards, so that OSHA can more effectively leverage NIOSH expertise in determining the needs for new standards and developing them. Both agencies agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-1162T | gao_GAO-03-1162T_0 | Government employees in general, and GAO employees in particular, often conduct work that can have far reaching implications and impacts. Such work can positively or negatively affect segments of the population and thereby the general public’s perceptions of, and reactions to, the federal government, including Members of Congress. Citing federal agencies that already have many of these flexibilities, such as the Federal Aviation Administration and the new Department of Homeland Security, as well as agencies currently seeking reform, such as the Department of Defense, he has stated his belief that GAO needs to be “ahead of the curve.”
Under the proposal, rather than relying on the administration’s determination and the Congress’ mandate for an annual salary adjustment, GAO can develop and apply its own methodology for the annual cost-of- living adjustments and compensation differences by locality that the Comptroller General believes would be more representative of the nature, skills, and composition of GAO’s workforce. These categories set artificial limits on the number of staff being recognized for their contributions with merit pay and bonuses.”
Related to concerns about subjectivity in the performance assessment system, Council representatives and employees expressed concern about data indicating that as a group, minorities, veterans, and field-based employees have historically received lower ratings than the employee population as a whole. In this circumstance, employees would need to reconcile themselves to no permanent pay increases regardless of their performance. The EAC Appreciates the Comptroller General’s Efforts to Address Concerns of GAO Employees about Pay-Related Human Capital II Provisions
We appreciate the Comptroller General’s efforts to involve the Employee Advisory Council and to solicit employee input through discussions of the proposal. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses how the Comptroller General formed the Employee Advisory Council (EAC) about 4 years ago to be fully representative of the GAO population and to advise him on issues pertaining to both management and employees. The members of the EAC represent a variety of employee groups and almost all employees outside of the senior executive service (more than 3,000 of GAO's 3,200 employees or 94 percent). The EAC operates as an umbrella organization that incorporates representatives of GAO's long-standing employee organizations including groups representing the disabled, Hispanics, Asian-Americans, African-Americans, gays and lesbians, veterans, and women, as well as employees in various pay bands, attorneys, and administrative and professional staff.
What GAO Found
The EAC serves as an advisory body to the Comptroller General and other senior executives by (1) seeking and conveying the views and concerns of the individual employee groups it represents while being sensitive to the mutual interests of all employees, regardless of their grade, band, or classification group, (2) proposing solutions to concerns raised by employees, as appropriate, (3) providing input by assessing and commenting on GAO policies, procedures, plans, and practices and (4) communicating issues and concerns of the Comptroller General and other senior managers to employees. |
gao_GAO-07-84 | gao_GAO-07-84_0 | 1). HRSA designates three types of HPSAs: geographic, population-group, and facility. Geographic HPSAs include entire counties, a portion of a county, or a group of contiguous counties. HPSAs Are Located in Every State and Are Used by Multiple Federal Programs
More than 5,500 HPSAs were located throughout the country as of September 2005. Numerous federal programs have used these HPSA designations to allocate their programs’ resources or provide benefits, which is an incentive for obtaining and retaining the HPSA designation. We estimated that slightly more than half (3,032) of these HPSAs were designated for geographic areas or population groups. Federal Programs Using HPSA Designations
Although the HPSA designation system was originally used to designate areas for placement of providers through NHSC programs, the HPSA designation, and in some cases the HPSA score, have since been used by more than 30 federal programs to allocate resources or provide benefits. The use of the HPSA designation by more than 30 federal programs to allocate resources or provide benefits is an incentive for obtaining and retaining a HPSA designation, even if the HPSA does not want or need additional primary care providers. These six reports were consistent with what we reported in 1995. Recognizing the shortcomings in the HPSA designation system identified by available research and our prior work, HHS has been working on a proposal for a revised designation system since 1998. Many Health Centers and Rural Health Clinics Did Not Benefit from Automatic HPSA Designation
Many health centers and rural health clinics did not benefit from automatic designation as facility HPSAs because they were located in geographic or population-group HPSAs. Most health centers also received a HPSA score associated with the automatic designation that was too low to qualify them for programs that required a minimum HPSA score in 2005, although they qualified for programs that did not have such a requirement. Of the relatively few rural health clinics that chose to certify that they would treat anyone regardless of ability to pay and, as a result, received the automatic designation as facility HPSAs, most also received scores too low to qualify for benefits from certain programs that required a higher HPSA score. Few Rural Health Clinics Have Received Automatic HPSA Designation as Facility HPSAs
As of September 2005, 590 (16 percent) of the 3,637 rural health clinics in the United States had received automatic designation as facility HPSAs. Conclusions
Many federal programs continue to rely on HPSA designations to allocate federal resources or provide benefits, even though shortcomings we and others have reported since 1995 have not been addressed. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services take the following two actions: (1) publish a list of designated HPSAs in the Federal Register or otherwise remove, through Federal Register notification, the HPSA designations for those HPSAs that no longer meet the criteria or have not provided updated data in support of their designations and (2) complete and publish HHS’s proposal to revise the HPSA designation system and address the shortcomings that have been identified in the current methodology for designating HPSAs. Appendix I: Scoring of Health Professional Shortage Areas
Each designated health professional shortage area (HPSA) receives a score that the Department of Health and Human Services’s (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) uses to rank its shortage of primary care providers, or need, relative to other HPSAs. We focused our review on the HPSA criteria that were in effect both in 2002 when the Health Care Safety Net Amendments were enacted and at the time of our review. Health Care Shortage Areas: Designations Not a Useful Tool for Directing Resources to the Underserved. GAO/HEHS-95-200.Washington, D.C.: September 8, 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
To identify areas facing shortages of health care providers, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) relies on its health professional shortage area (HPSA) designation system. HHS designates geographic, population-group, and facility HPSAs. HHS also gives each HPSA a score to rank its need for providers relative to other HPSAs. The Health Care Safety Net Amendments of 2002 required GAO to report on the HPSA designation system. GAO reviewed (1) the number and location of HPSAs and federal programs that use HPSA designations to allocate resources or provide benefits, (2) available research on HPSA designation criteria and methodology, and (3) the impact of a 2002 provision that automatically designates federally qualified health centers and certain rural health clinics as facility HPSAs. GAO obtained and analyzed HHS's data on primary care HPSA designations as of September 2005 and January 2006 and identified reports on HPSA criteria and methodology through a literature search of peer-reviewed journals and other reports published since 1995.
What GAO Found
GAO identified more than 5,500 HPSAs designated throughout the United States as of September 2005; multiple federal programs relied on these designations to allocate resources or provide benefits. GAO estimated that slightly more than half of the HPSAs were designated for geographic areas--such as counties or portions of counties--or population groups, such as migrant farmworkers. The remaining HPSAs were designated for facilities, such as rural health clinics. In fiscal year 2005, more than 30 federal programs relied on HPSA designations, and in some cases HPSA scores, to allocate resources or provide benefits. The use of the HPSA designation by numerous federal programs to allocate resources or provide benefits is an incentive for obtaining and retaining a HPSA designation. Published reports have pointed to shortcomings in the methodology used for designating HPSAs. These reports' observations were consistent with findings in GAO's 1995 report, Health Care Shortage Areas: Designations Not a Useful Tool for Directing Resources to the Underserved, (GAO/HEHS-95-200, Sept. 8, 1995), including that HHS's methodology did not account for certain types of primary care providers already serving in a HPSA, which can result in an overstatement of the provider shortage. Recognizing the shortcomings of the current methodology, HHS has been working since 1998 on a proposal to revise the designation system. In addition, some HPSAs that no longer meet the criteria have retained their HPSA designation and possibly received benefits from federal programs that rely on that designation. HHS has not complied since 2002 with the statutory requirement to annually publish a list of designated HPSAs in the Federal Register--which would remove the designations of those HPSAs that are no longer listed. Many federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics did not benefit from automatic designation as facility HPSAs because they were located in geographic or population-group HPSAs. In addition, most of the more than 1,600 federally qualified health centers received HPSA scores associated with the automatic designation that were too low to qualify them for certain federal programs that required a minimum HPSA score in 2005, although they qualified for other programs that did not have such a requirement. Of the 590 rural health clinics that chose to certify that they would treat anyone regardless of ability to pay and, as a result, received automatic designation as facility HPSAs, most also received associated HPSA scores too low to qualify for benefits from certain federal programs that required a higher HPSA score. |
gao_NSIAD-97-153 | gao_NSIAD-97-153_0 | 1). The Joint Tactical UAV program was restructured in fiscal year 1996. However, DOD is not applying these lessons to the Outrider ACTD. Nevertheless, DOD awarded a contract for seven Hunter systems. Outrider May Not Satisfy User Needs
The Outrider system may not satisfy user needs unless problems associated with meeting joint requirements are resolved and interoperability with other DOD systems can be achieved. Recommendation
Because DOD’s strategy for acquiring the nondevelopmental Outrider system will not provide assurance of successful performance and interoperability before DOD’s planned low-rate production decision, and to avoid repeating the mistakes of prior UAV programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense delay low-rate production of the Outrider system until the results of operational testing of available systems demonstrate it is potentially operationally effective and operationally suitable for all intended users. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether DOD is applying lessons learned from prior UAV lessons learned to this program, and whether the Outrider would meet user needs, we reviewed program plans, test schedules, performance documents, and other records relating to the Outrider ACTD and examined DOD guidance related to systems acquisition, acquisition streamlining and reform, and ACTDs. GAO Comments
1. We understand that the purpose of the Outrider Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) is to assess the utility of the Outrider system and note that DOD is acquiring 6 Outrider systems with 24 air vehicles under the original ACTD contract. 2. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition of the Outrider, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system, through a streamlined acquisition process known as the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), focusing on whether: (1) DOD is applying lessons learned from prior UAV programs to the Outrider; and (2) the Outrider is likely to meet user needs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD is not applying lessons learned from prior UAV programs to the Outrider ACTD; (2) for example, despite problems with the Pioneer and Hunter stemming from DOD's decision to award further production contracts without conducting operational testing or demonstrating that the system is user-supportable, DOD is pursuing the same strategy for the Outrider; (3) in addition, DOD has underestimated, as it did for the Pioneer and Hunter programs, the time and effort necessary to integrate nondevelopmental items into Outrider; (4) moreover, the Outrider system may not satisfy user needs unless problems associated with meeting joint requirements are resolved and interoperability with other DOD systems is ensured; and (5) consequently, DOD will not have assurance that the Outrider will meet user needs by the time of the planned fiscal year 1998 low-rate production decision. |
gao_T-NSIAD-99-16 | gao_T-NSIAD-99-16_0 | Objectives and Costs of the Domestic Preparedness Program
The Domestic Preparedness Program is aimed at enhancing domestic preparedness to respond to and manage the consequences of potential terrorist WMD incidents. The authorizing legislation designated DOD as lead agency, and participating agencies include FEMA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Health and Human Services’ Public Health Service, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency. DOD received $36 million in fiscal year 1997 to implement its part of the program, and the Public Health Service received an additional $6.6 million. DOD’s fiscal year 1998 and 1999 budgets estimate that $43 million and $50 million, respectively, will be needed to continue the program. Training Program Is Beneficial
Domestic Preparedness Program training gives first responders a greater awareness of how to deal with WMD terrorist incidents. By December 31, 1998, DOD expects to have trained about one-third of the 120 cities it selected for the program. All training is to be complete in 2001. Cities Were Selected Based on Population Size
DOD decided to select cities based on core city population. In selecting the cities DOD did not take into account a city’s level of preparedness or financial need. Linking Future Training to Existing Structures Could Be More Efficient and Economical
In implementing the Domestic Preparedness Program, DOD could leverage state emergency management structures, mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions, or other collaborative arrangements for emergency response. Terms of DOD Equipment Agreement Concern Cities
The legislation authorizes DOD to lend rather than give or grant training equipment to each city. Some cities we visited viewed the acceptance of the equipment as tantamount to an unfunded federal mandate because DOD is providing no funds to sustain the equipment. However, in developing the program, some member agency officials stated that DOD did not always take advantage of the experience of agencies that were more accustomed to dealing with state and local officials and more knowledgeable of domestic emergency response structures. As noted in our December 1997 report and in our April 1998 testimony,the many and increasing number of participants, programs, and activities in the counterterrorism area across the federal departments, agencies, and offices pose a difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program duplication, fragmentation, and gaps. We believe that the National Security Council’s National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-Terrorism, established in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62, should review and guide the growing federal training, equipment, and response programs and activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its work and observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and related issues, focusing on: (1) program objectives and costs; (2) the training the Department of Defense (DOD) is providing to local emergency response personnel; (3) issues GAO identified on the way the program is structured and designed; (4) the equipment segment of DOD's program; and (5) interagency coordination of this and other related programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Domestic Preparedness Program is aimed at enhancing domestic preparedness to respond and manage the consequences of potential terrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents; (2) the authorizing legislation designated DOD as lead agency, and participating agencies include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Public Health Service, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency; (3) DOD received $36 million in fiscal year (FY) 1997 to implement its part of the program, and the Public Health Service received an additional $6.6 million; (4) DOD's FY 1998 and 1999 budgets estimate that $43 million and $50 million will be needed to continue the program; (5) Domestic Preparedness Program training gives first responders a greater awareness of how to deal with WMD terrorist incidents; (6) by December 31, 1998, DOD expects to have trained about one-third of the 120 cities it selected for the program; (7) all training is to be complete in 2001; (8) DOD decided to select cities based on core city population, and it did not take into account a city's level of preparedness or financial need; (9) in implementing the Domestic Preparedness Program, DOD could leverage state emergency management structures, mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions, or other collaborative arrangements for emergency response; (10) the legislation authorizes DOD to lend rather than give or grant training equipment to each city; (11) some cities GAO visited viewed the acceptance of the equipment as tantamount to an unfunded federal mandate because DOD is providing no funds to sustain the equipment; (12) in developing the program, some member agency officials stated that DOD did not always take advantage of the experience of agencies that were more accustomed to dealing with state and local officials and more knowledgeable of domestic emergency response structures; (13) the many and increasing number of participants, programs, and activities in the counterterrorism area across the federal departments, agencies, and offices pose a difficult management and coordination challenge to avoid program duplication, fragmentation, and gaps; and (14) GAO believes that the National Security Council's National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism, established in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 62, should review and guide the growing federal training, equipment, and response programs and activities. |
gao_GAO-07-154 | gao_GAO-07-154_0 | The Federal Reserve, SEC, and OTS vary in their missions in that the Federal Reserve and SEC have responsibilities outside of the supervision and regulation of financial institutions. Agencies Employ Differing Policies and Approaches to Provide Consolidated Supervision
The Federal Reserve, OTS, and SEC have all responded to the dramatic changes in the financial services industry, and now, for many of the largest, most complex financial services firms in the United States, these agencies examine risks, controls, and capital levels on a consolidated basis. Now, for many of the largest, most complex financial services firms in the United States, the agencies focus on the firms’ risks, controls, and capital levels on a consolidated basis. Consolidated supervision provides a basis for the supervisory agencies to oversee the way in which financial services firms manage risks and to do so on the same basis that many firms’ manage their risk. When applied to the consolidated supervision programs at the Federal Reserve, OTS, and SEC, clearly defined objectives of consolidated supervision programs, agency activities of these programs linked to those objectives, and performance measures to determine how well the programs are operating are the management approaches that would contribute to the desired accountability and efficiency for the programs. As a result, the regulatory burden would be as low as possible, consistent with maintaining safety and soundness of financial institutions and markets. Agencies Have Opportunities to Better Ensure Effective and Consistent Supervision, with Minimal Regulatory Burden
Because the U.S. regulatory structure assigns responsibility for financial supervision to multiple agencies, and a single firm may be subject to consolidated and primary or functional supervision by different agencies, not having objectives and performance measures for consolidated supervision programs increases the difficulty of ensuring effective, efficient, and consistent supervision with minimal regulatory burden and ensuring that each agency is appropriately accountable for its activities. In part, because OTS oversees a diverse set of firms and has been changing some of its consolidated supervisory activities, consistency is a difficult challenge. However, we found instances of duplication and regulatory gaps that could be minimized through more systematic collaboration. Federal Reserve officials noted, however, that risks would be lessened to the extent that the objectives of the consolidated supervisor and the primary bank supervisor are the same (e.g., to preserve the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions) and the consolidated supervisor takes action to prevent the holding company from taking actions that are deleterious to its insured depository institutions. Greater Collaboration among the Three Consolidated Supervisors Could Improve Supervisory Efforts
While the three consolidated supervisors have some mechanisms in place to share information and supervisory approaches, opportunities remain for them to collaborate more systematically to promote greater consistency, particularly in oversight of large, complex firms. Conclusions
As financial institutions have grown, become more complex and internationally active, and adopted enterprisewide risk management practices, consolidated supervision has become more important. These practices are particularly important in helping to ensure consistent treatment of financial services holding companies and in clearly defining accountability for providing consolidated supervision. While the agencies do exchange information, they have opportunities to improve collaboration. We have noted in the past that it is difficult to collaborate within the fragmented U.S. regulatory system and have recommended that Congress modernize or consolidate the regulatory system. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are recommending that the Federal Reserve, Office of Thrift Supervision, and Securities and Exchange Commission take the following seven actions, as appropriate: To better assess their agencies’ achievements as consolidated supervisors, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System’s Board of Governors, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should direct their staffs to develop program objectives and performance measures that are specific to their consolidated supervision programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the policies and approaches U.S. consolidated supervisors use to oversee large and small holding companies in the financial services industry; (2) review the supervisory agencies’ management of its consolidated supervision program, including program objectives and performance measures; and (3) evaluate how well consolidated supervisors are collaborating with other supervisors and each other. | Why GAO Did This Study
As financial institutions increasingly operate globally and diversify their businesses, entities with an interest in financial stability cite the need for supervisors to oversee the safety and soundness of these institutions on a consolidated basis. Under the Comptroller General's Authority, GAO reviewed the consolidated supervision programs at the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to (1) describe policies and approaches that U.S. consolidated supervisors use to oversee large and small holding companies; (2) review the management of the consolidated supervision programs, including use of program objectives and performance measures; and (3) evaluate how well consolidated supervisors are collaborating with other supervisors and each other in their activities. In conducting this study, GAO reviewed agency policy documents and supervisory reports and interviewed agency and financial institution officials.
What GAO Found
The Federal Reserve, OTS, and SEC have responded to the dramatic changes in the financial services industry and for many of the largest financial services firms the agencies focus on the firms' consolidated risks, controls, and capital. Reflecting in part differences in structure, traditional roles and responsibilities, and the length of time they have had to develop and refine their programs, the agencies employ somewhat differing policies and approaches for their consolidated supervision programs. Consolidated supervision becomes more important in the face of changes in the financial services industry, particularly with respect to the increased importance of enterprise risk management by large, complex financial services firms. Consolidated supervision provides a basis for the supervisors to oversee the risks of financial services firms on the same level that the firms manage those risks. GAO found that while all of these agencies were meeting international standards for effective oversight of large, internationally active conglomerates and have broad goals for supervision, they could more clearly articulate the specific objectives and performance measures for their evolving consolidated supervision programs. Both Federal Reserve and OTS, for example, focus on the safety and soundness of the depository institution but could take steps to better measure how consolidated supervision contributes to this in ways that differ from primary supervision of the depository institution. Such objectives and measures would help the agencies ensure consistent treatment of the firms that are subject to consolidated supervision. More effective collaboration can occur if agencies take a more systematic approach to agreeing on roles and responsibilities and establishing compatible goals, policies, and procedures on how to use available resources as efficiently as possible. While the three agencies coordinate and exchange information, they could take a more systematic approach to collaboration with respect to their consolidated supervision programs. For instance, SEC and OTS have authority for some of the same firms with no effective mechanism to prevent duplication, assign accountability, or resolve potential conflicts. Similarly, while the Federal Reserve and other federal bank supervisory agencies have taken steps to share information and examination activities when the Federal Reserve is not the primary supervisor of the lead bank in a bank holding company, some duplication and lack of accountability remain. As a result, consolidated supervision of U.S. financial institutions is not as efficient and effective as it could be if agencies collaborated more systematically. GAO has noted in the past that it is difficult to collaborate within the fragmented U.S. regulatory system and has recommended that Congress modernize or consolidate the regulatory system. However, if the current system is maintained, it is increasingly important for agencies to collaborate to ensure effective and efficient consolidated supervision, consistent treatment of financial services firms, and clear accountability of the agencies for their supervisory activities. |
gao_GAO-09-459T | gao_GAO-09-459T_0 | Challenges Making Realistic Assumptions Related to Proposed Policy Changes, Making Accurate Calculations, and Obtaining Sufficient Data
Our 2006 report on VA’s overall health care budget illustrated that in formulating its budget, VA faces challenges making realistic assumptions about the budgetary impact of its proposed policies. We reported that the President’s requests for additional funding for VA’s medical programs for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 were in part due to unrealistic assumptions VA made about how quickly the department would realize savings from proposed changes in its nursing home policy. Challenges Projecting the Amount and Cost of Long- Term Care Services
Our recent work on VA’s budget showed how VA continued to face challenges formulating its budget for long-term care services. To strengthen the credibility of the estimates of long-term care spending in VA’s budgeting proposals and increase transparency for Congress and stakeholders, we recommended that in future budget justifications VA use workload projections for estimating noninstitutional long-term care spending that are consistent with VA’s recent experience or report the rationale for using projections that are not. In commenting on a draft of our report, VA did not indicate whether it agreed with this recommendation, but stated it would complete an action plan that responds to the recommendation by the end of March 2009. In our January 2009 report, we also found that VA’s estimate of the amount it would spend for noninstitutional long-term care services in fiscal year 2009 appeared to be unreliable—in part because VA based this estimate on a cost assumption that appeared unrealistically low, when compared to VA’s recent experience and to economic forecasts of increases in health care costs. VA Faces Challenges in Executing Its Budget for Health Care Services
Our prior work highlights some of the challenges VA faces in executing its health care budget. Challenges Spending and Tracking Funds Designated for VA Health Care Initiatives
After formulating its estimates of likely spending on its health care services, VA is also responsible for executing its budget efficiently and effectively. However, our 2006 report on VA’s funding for specific mental health initiatives showed that in executing its budget, VA faces challenges spending and tracking the use of funds designated by VA for specific VA health care initiatives, in particular funds that VA intends to use to expand services to improve access to care for its veteran population. For example, in 2006, we reported that in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, VA had difficulty spending and tracking funds it had designated for new initiatives included in VA’s mental health strategic plan, which were to expand mental health services in order to address gaps previously identified by VA. These initiatives—which were to be funded by $100 million in fiscal year 2005 and $200 million in fiscal year 2006—were intended to enhance VA’s larger mental health program. As we reported in 2006, VA faced challenges in both spending the funds and tracking their use in fiscal years 2005 and 2006: Challenges in spending funds—We found that, by the end of fiscal years 2005 and 2006, some VA medical centers had not spent all of the funds they had received for mental health strategic plan initiatives for those fiscal years, according to VA medical center officials and other available information. Challenges Providing Timely and Useful Information to Congress Regarding Budget Execution Progress and Problems
As VA executes its budget, VA also faces the challenge of providing timely information to Congress about the agency’s progress and any problems the agency encounters during this process. For example, in our 2006 report on VA’s overall health care budget, we reported that although VA staff had closely monitored its budget execution and identified problems for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, VA did not report this information to Congress in a timely manner. For example, in 2006, we also found that VA’s reporting of its budget execution progress and problems to Congress could have been more informative. Concluding Observations
Sound budget formulation, monitoring of budget execution, and the reporting of informative and timely information to Congress for oversight continue to be essential as VA addresses budget challenges we have identified in recent years. While the budget process inevitably involves imperfect information and uncertainty about future events, VA has the opportunity to improve the credibility of its budgeting process by continuing to address problems that we have identified in recent years. In addition, our prior report on new VA mental health initiatives to address identified gaps in services may provide a cautionary lesson regarding the expansion of new VA health care programs more generally. Namely, that the availability of funding for new health care initiatives does not in itself mean that these initiatives will be fully implemented within a given fiscal year—in part because new initiatives can bring challenges in hiring and training new staff—or that monitoring and tracking of such funding will be adequate to report the extent to which new initiatives are being implemented as planned. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) estimates it will provide health care to 5.8 million patients with appropriations of $41.2 billion in fiscal year 2009. The President has proposed an increase in VA's health care budget for fiscal year 2010 to expand services for veterans. VA's patient population includes aging veterans who need services such as long-term care-- including nursing home and noninstitutional care provided in veterans' homes or community-- and veterans returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. Each year, VA formulates its medical care budget, which involves developing estimates of spending for VA's health care services. VA is also responsible for budget execution-- spending appropriations and monitoring their use. GAO was asked to discuss challenges related to VA's health care services budget formulation and execution. This statement focuses on (1) challenges VA faces in formulating its health care budget, and (2) challenges VA faces in executing its health care budget. This testimony is based on three GAO reports: VA Health Care: Budget Formulation and Reporting on Budget Execution Need Improvement (GAO-06-958) (Sept. 2006); VA Heath Care: Spending for Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives Was Substantially Less Than Planned (GAO-07-66) (Nov. 2006); and VA Health Care: Long-Term Care Strategic Planning and Budgeting Need Improvement (GAO-09-145) (Jan. 2009).
What GAO Found
VA faces challenges formulating its health care budget each fiscal year. As noted in GAO's 2006 report on VA's overall health care budget, these include making realistic assumptions about the budgetary impact of policy changes, making accurate calculations, and obtaining sufficient data for useful budget projections. For example, GAO found that VA made unrealistic assumptions about how quickly it would realize savings from proposed changes in nursing home policy. While VA took steps to respond to GAO's 2006 recommendations about VA budgeting, recent GAO work found similar issues. In 2009, GAO reported on VA's long-term care budget--namely, on challenges in projecting the amount and cost of VA long-term care. GAO found that in its fiscal year 2009 budget justification, VA used assumptions about the cost of nursing home and noninstitutional care that appeared unrealistically low given recent VA experience and other indicators. VA said it would complete an action plan responding to GAO's 2009 recommendations by the end of March 2009. VA also faces challenges executing its health care budget. These include spending and tracking funds for specific initiatives and providing timely and useful information to Congress on budget execution progress and problems. GAO's 2006 report on VA funding for new mental health initiatives found VA had difficulty spending and tracking funds for initiatives in VA's mental health strategic plan to expand services to address service gaps. The initiatives were to enhance VA's larger mental health program and were to be funded by $100 million in fiscal year 2005. Some VA medical centers did not spend all the funds they had received for the initiatives by the end of the fiscal year, partly due to the time it took to hire staff and renovate space for mental health programs. Also, VA did not track how funding allocated for the initiatives was spent. GAO's 2006 report on VA's overall health care budget found that VA monitored its health care budget execution and identified execution problems for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, but did not report the problems to Congress in a timely way. GAO also found that VA's reporting on budget execution to Congress could have been more informative. VA has not fully implemented one of GAO's two recommendations for improving VA budget execution. Sound budget formulation, monitoring of budget execution, and the reporting of informative and timely information to Congress for oversight continue to be essential as VA addresses budget challenges GAO has identified. Budgeting involves imperfect information and uncertainty, but VA has the opportunity to improve the credibility of its budgeting by continuing to address identified problems. This is particularly true for long-term care, where for several years GAO work has highlighted concerns about workload assumptions and cost projections. By improving its budget process, VA can increase the credibility and usefulness of information it provides to Congress on its budget plans and progress in spending funds. GAO's prior work on new mental health initiatives may provide a cautionary lesson about expanding VA programs--namely, that funding availability does not always mean that new initiatives will be fully implemented in a given fiscal year or that funds will be adequately tracked. |
gao_GGD-99-167 | gao_GGD-99-167_0 | Agencies report these data on EEOC form 462, Annual Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Statistical Report of Discrimination Complaints. EEOC requires agencies to report statistics on the length of time that cases have been in the agencies’ inventories of unresolved complaints, from the date of complaint filing. In addition, the Service provided the corrected figures to EEOC. In addition to the discrepancies already noted, we found that the Postal Service’s statistical reports to EEOC for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 did not include data for complaints involving certain categories of primary issues. After we brought the underreporting to the attention of the Postal Service officials, they provided corrected data to EEOC and us. However, because we examined only a limited portion of the reported data for obvious discrepancies and because the errors we identified were related to data generated by an automated complaint information system put in place in 1995, we have concerns about the completeness, accuracy, and reliability of the data that we did not examine. In response to our recommendation that the Service’s controls over the recording and reporting of EEO complaint data to EEOC be reviewed, this official said that the Postal Service plans to adopt more comprehensive management controls to ensure that the data submitted are complete, accurate, and reliable. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed certain discrepancies in the complaint data that the Postal Service reported to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the need for the Service to take additional steps to ensure that such data are complete, accurate, and reliable.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in GAO's limited analyses of the data the Service reported to EEOC, GAO found errors in statistics on the underlying bases for EEO complaints and on the length of time complaints had been in inventory; (2) GAO also found that required data on the issues raised in complaint information system; (3) these discrepancies were generally linked to statistical reports generated by the Service's automated complaint information system; (4) after GAO brought these discrepancies to the attention of Postal Service staff, they promptly corrected them and appeared to correct the underlying causes for the errors, with one exception; (5) that situation need not be resolved until EEOC revises its reporting form; and (6) because GAO examined only a portion of the reported data for obvious discrepancies and because the errors GAO identified were related to data generated by an automated complaint information system put in place in 1995, GAO has concerns about the completeness, accuracy, and reliability of the data that GAO did not examined. |
gao_GAO-01-315 | gao_GAO-01-315_0 | Asparagus Imports Under ATPA Have Displaced Some Domestic Production, but Consumers Have Benefited From Increased Availability
According to the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (ITC) 1999 study, ATPA has displaced an estimated 2 to 8 percent of the total value of domestic fresh asparagus production from what it would have been without the act. In addition, changes in consumer preference contributed to a downward shift in the domestic demand for processed asparagus. While imports from Peru have increased the supply of fresh asparagus in the United States, demand has been strong, as demonstrated by the increased per capita consumption of fresh asparagus. The decline in the consumption of processed asparagus particularly affects producers in Michigan and Washington, the two states that produce the majority of frozen and canned asparagus. Impacts on Producers and Consumers Likely to Continue With or Without ATPA
If ATPA is reauthorized, the producers of asparagus and, in particular, asparagus for processing will likely face some continued displacement from imports, but consumers can expect continued benefits from the year- round availability of fresh asparagus. Producers Face Continued Displacement, and Consumers Will Have Decreased Availability and Higher Prices if ATPA Is Not Reauthorized
Peruvian asparagus will likely remain a strong competitor for domestic producers even if ATPA is not reauthorized and the normal tariff is restored—5 percent in 2 of the 5 months when the majority of Peru’s fresh asparagus is imported and 21.3 percent in the other 3 months. Without ATPA, consumers would likely have decreased year-round availability of fresh asparagus and pay higher prices to the extent that the increase in tariff creates a reduction in imports from Peru. Under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, domestic industries can petition ITC to investigate whether increased imports have caused them serious injury or threat of serious injury. | What GAO Found
U.S. asparagus imports increased in the 1990s and now comprise nearly one-half of the asparagus consumed in the United States. Peru is the second largest source of imported asparagus and benefits from duty-free treatment under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). ATPA is estimated to have displaced between two and eight percent of the value of domestic production from what it would have been without the act. Although the supply of fresh asparagus from imports has increased since ATPA's enactment, consumer demand has been strong, and prices have risen. In addition, an apparent increase in consumer preference for fresh asparagus has contributed to a downward shift in the domestic demand for processed asparagus. Most of the decline in the domestic production of processed asparagus occurred in Michigan and Washington, the two states that produce most canned and frozen asparagus. If ATPA is reauthorized, domestic producers of asparagus and, in particular, asparagus for processing, will likely face continued displacement, but consumers can expect continued benefits from the year-round availability of fresh asparagus. However, some of this displacement will likely occur even if ATPA is not reauthorized and the normal tariff is imposed. If ATPA is not reauthorized, consumers would likely have decreased availability and pay higher prices to the extent that tariff increases reduce Peruvian asparagus imports and hence total asparagus supplies. Domestic industries can petition the U.S. International Trade Commission to investigate whether increased imports under the ATPA have caused them serious injury or threat of serious injury. If the Commission finds serious injury, it may recommend relief options to the President, including suspending duty-free treatment for imports. |
gao_GAO-07-862T | gao_GAO-07-862T_0 | Most purchasers said they also evaluated physicians on quality. Through Profiling, We Found That Physicians Likely to Practice Inefficiently in Medicare Were Present in All Areas Selected for Study
Having considered the efforts of other health care purchasers in profiling physicians for efficiency, we conducted our own profiling analysis of physician practices in Medicare and found individual physicians who were likely to practice medicine inefficiently in each of 12 metropolitan areas studied. We selected areas that were diverse geographically and in terms of Medicare spending per beneficiary. We focused our analysis on generalists—physicians who described their specialty as general practice, internal medicine, or family practice. Although we did not include specialists in our analysis, our method does not preclude profiling specialists, as long as enough data are available to make meaningful comparisons across physicians. Under our methodology, we computed the percentage of overly expensive patients in each physician’s Medicare practice. 1.) Based on 2003 Medicare claims data, our analysis found outlier generalist physicians in all 12 metropolitan areas we studied. Outlier generalists and other generalists saw similar average numbers of Medicare patients (219 compared with 235) and their patients averaged the same number of office visits (3.7 compared with 3.5). However, after taking into account beneficiary health status and geographic location, we found that beneficiaries who saw an outlier generalist, compared with those who saw other generalists, were 15 percent more likely to have been hospitalized, 57 percent more likely to have been hospitalized multiple times, and 51 percent more likely to have used home health services. By contrast, they were 10 percent less likely to have been admitted to a skilled nursing facility. CMS Has Tools Available to Profile Physicians for Efficiency
Medicare’s data-rich environment is conducive to identifying physicians who are likely to practice medicine inefficiently. As for ways CMS could use profiling results, actions taken by other health care purchasers we interviewed may be instructive in suggesting future directions for Medicare. Educational outreach to physicians has been a long-standing and widespread activity in Medicare as a means to change physician behavior based on profiling efforts to identify improper billing practices and potential fraud. In some cases, physicians are given comparative information on how the physician varies from other physicians in the same specialty or locality with respect to use of a certain service. A physician education effort based on efficiency profiling would therefore not be a foreign concept in Medicare. For example, CMS could provide physicians a report that compares their practice’s efficiency with that of their peers. This would enable physicians to see whether their practice style is outside the norm. MedPAC suggested that such an approach would enable CMS to gain experience in examining resource use measures and identifying ways to refine them while affording physicians the opportunity to change inefficient practices. We agree that any such undertaking would need to be adequately funded. Several structural features of the Medicare program would appear to pose challenges to the use of other strategies designed to encourage efficiency. Having considered the tools CMS has available and the structural challenges the agency would likely face in seeking to implement certain incentives used by other purchasers, we recommended in our April 2007 report that the Administrator of CMS develop a profiling system—seeking legislative authority, as necessary—that includes the following elements: total Medicare expenditures as the basis for measuring efficiency, adjustments for differences in patients’ health status, empirically based standards that set the parameters of efficiency, a physician education program that explains to physicians how the profiling system works and how their efficiency measures compare with those of their peers, financial or other incentives for individual physicians to improve the efficiency of the care they provide, and methods for measuring the impact of physician profiling on program spending and physician behavior. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to discuss--based on Medicare: Focus on Physician Practice Patterns Can Lead to Greater Program Efficiency, GAO-07-307 (Apr. 30, 2007)--the importance in Medicare of providing feedback to physicians on how their use of health care resources compares with that of their peers. GAO's report discusses an approach to analyzing physicians' practice patterns in Medicare and ways the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) could use the results. In a related matter, Medicare's sustainable growth rate system of spending targets used to moderate physician spending growth and annually update physician fees has been problematic, acting as a blunt instrument and lacking in incentives for physicians individually to be attentive to the efficient use of resources in their practices. GAO's statement focuses on (1) the results of its analysis estimating the prevalence of inefficient physicians in Medicare and (2) the potential for CMS to profile physicians in traditional fee-for-service Medicare for efficiency and use the results in ways that are similar to other purchasers' efforts to encourage efficiency.
What GAO Found
Having considered efforts of 10 private and public health care purchasers that routinely evaluate physicians for efficiency and other factors, GAO conducted its own analysis of physician practices in Medicare. GAO focused the analysis on generalists--physicians who described their specialty as general practice, internal medicine, or family practice--and selected metropolitan areas that were diverse geographically and in terms of Medicare spending per beneficiary. Although GAO did not include specialists in its analysis, its method does not preclude profiling specialists, as long as enough data are available to make meaningful comparisons across physicians. Based on 2003 Medicare claims data, GAO's analysis found outlier generalist physicians--physicians who treat a disproportionate share of overly expensive patients--in all 12 metropolitan areas studied. Outlier generalists and other generalists saw similar numbers of Medicare patients and their respective patients averaged the same number of office visits. However, after taking health status and location into account, GAO found that Medicare patients who saw an outlier generalist--compared with those who saw other generalists--were more likely to have been hospitalized, more likely to have been hospitalized multiple times, and more likely to have used home health services. By contrast, they were less likely to have been admitted to a skilled nursing facility. GAO concluded that outlier generalists were likely to practice medicine inefficiently. CMS has tools available to evaluate physicians' practices for efficiency, including a comprehensive repository of Medicare claims data to compute reliable efficiency measures and substantial experience adjusting for differences in patients' health status. The agency also has wide experience in conducting educational outreach to physicians with respect to improper billing practices and potential fraud--providing individual physicians, in some cases, comparative information on how the physician varies from other physicians in the same specialty or in other ways. A physician education effort based on efficiency profiling would therefore not be a foreign concept in Medicare. For example, CMS could provide physicians a report that compares their practice's efficiency with that of their peers, enabling physicians to see whether their practice style is outside the norm. As for implementing other strategies to encourage efficiency, such as the use of certain financial incentives, CMS would likely need additional legislative authority. CMS agreed with the need to measure physician resource use in Medicare but raised concerns about the costs involved in reporting the results and was silent on other strategies discussed beyond physician education. GAO concurs that resource use measurement and reporting activities would require adequate funding; however, GAO is concerned that efforts to achieve efficiency that rely solely on physician education without financial or other incentives for physicians to curb inefficiencies will be suboptimal. |
gao_GAO-07-819T | gao_GAO-07-819T_0 | RMA Has Strengthened Procedures for Preventing Questionable Claims, but the Program Remains Vulnerable to Potential Abuse
RMA has taken a number of steps to improve its procedures to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, such as data mining, expanded field inspections and quality assurance reviews. However, as we testified in 2006, RMA was not effectively using all of the tools it had available and that some farmers and others continued to abuse the program, as the following discussion indicates. Inspections during the growing season were not being used to maximum effect. FSA was not providing RMA with inspection assistance in accordance with USDA guidance. For example, between 2001 and 2004, farmers filed claims on about 380,000 policies annually, and RMA’s data mining identified about 1 percent of these claims as questionable and needing FSA’s inspection. Under USDA guidance, FSA should have conducted all of the 11,966 requested inspections, but instead conducted only 64 percent of them; FSA inspectors said that they did not conduct all requested inspections primarily because they did not have sufficient resources. RMA’s data analysis of the largest farming operations was incomplete. Because it did not know the ownership interests in the largest farming operations, RMA could not readily identify potential fraud. According to our analysis, RMA should be able to recover up to $74 million in claims payments for 2003. RMA was not effectively overseeing insurance companies’ quality assurance programs. RMA agreed with our recommendation to improve oversight of companies’ quality assurance programs, but we have not yet followed up with the agency to examine its implementation. RMA has infrequently used its new sanction authority to address program abuses. RMA agreed with our recommendation that it promulgate regulations to implement its expanded authority, and has developed draft regulations. RMA’s Regulations and Some Statutory Requirements Hinder Efforts to Reduce Abuse in the Crop Insurance Program
While RMA can improve its day-to-day oversight of the federal crop insurance program in a number of ways, the program’s design, as laid out in RMA’s regulations or as required by statute, hinders the agency’s efforts to administer certain program provisions in order to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, as the following discussion indicates. RMA’s regulations allow farmers the option of insuring their fields individually rather than combined as one unit. Insuring fields separately enables farmers to “switch” production among fields—reporting production of a crop from one field that is actually produced on another field—either to make false insurance claims based on low production or to build up a higher yield history on a particular field in order to increase that field’s eligibility for higher future insurance guarantees. Statutorily high premium subsidies may inhibit RMA’s ability to control program abuse. High premium subsidies shield farmers from the full effect of paying higher premiums. Since the crop insurance program was revised under ARPA—that is, from 2002 through 2006—USDA has paid the insurance companies a total of $2.8 billion in underwriting gains. In terms of profitability, these underwriting gains represent an average annual rate of return of 17.8 percent over this 5-year period. According to industry statistics, the benchmark rate of return for U.S. insurance companies selling private property and casualty insurance was 6.4 percent during this period. However, they stated that this program should have a somewhat higher rate of return because of the (1) high volatility of underwriting gains for this program compared with the relatively steady gains associated with the property and casualty insurance industry, and (2) lack of investment opportunities when participating in the program because premiums are paid to the companies at harvest, not when farmers purchase a policy. In 2006, USDA paid them underwriting gains of $886 million—a rate of return of 24.3 percent. From 2002 through 2006, USDA paid the insurance companies over $4 billion in cost allowances. Specifically, USDA recommends renegotiating the SRA financial terms and conditions once every 3 years. Congress has an opportunity in its reauthorization of the Farm Bill to provide USDA with the authority to periodically renegotiate the financial terms of the SRA with the insurance companies so that the companies’ rate of return is more in line with private insurance markets. Crop Insurance: More Needs to Be Done to Reduce Program’s Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. Crop Insurance: Actions Needed to Reduce Program’s Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Dept. of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program in partnership with private insurers. In 2006, the program cost $3.5 billion, including millions in losses from fraud, waste, and abuse, according to USDA. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 granted RMA authority to renegotiate the terms of RMA's standard reinsurance agreement with companies once over 5 years. This testimony is based on GAO's 2005 report, Crop Insurance: Actions Needed to Reduce Program's Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, as well as new analyses this Committee requested on underwriting gains and administrative and operating expenses USDA paid companies. GAO discusses (1) USDA's processes to address fraud, waste, and abuse; (2) extent the program's design makes it vulnerable to abuse; and (3) reasonableness of underwriting gains and other expenses. USDA agreed with most of GAO's 2005 recommendations to improve program integrity. RMA agreed that GAO's new analyses were technically accurate.
What GAO Found
GAO reported that RMA did not use all available tools to reduce the crop insurance program's vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. RMA has since taken some steps to improve its procedures. In particular, USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) inspections during the growing season were not being used to maximum effect. Between 2001 and 2004, FSA conducted only 64 percent of the inspections RMA requested. Without inspections, farmers may falsely claim crop losses. However, FSA said it could not conduct all requested inspections, as GAO recommended, because of insufficient resources. RMA now provides information more frequently so FSA can conduct timelier inspections. RMA's data analysis of the largest farming operations was incomplete. In 2003, about 21,000 of the largest farming operations did not report all of the individuals or entities with an ownership interest in these operations, as required. Therefore, RMA was unaware of ownership interests that could help it prevent potential program abuse. FSA and RMA now share information to identify such individuals or entities. USDA should be able to recover up to $74 million in improper payments made during 2003. RMA was not effectively overseeing insurance companies' efforts to control program abuse. According to GAO's review of 120 cases, companies did not complete all the required quality assurance reviews of claims, and those that were conducted were largely paper exercises. RMA agreed to improve oversight of their reviews, but GAO has not followed up to examine its implementation. RMA's regulations to implement the crop insurance program, as well as some statutory requirements, create design problems that hinder its efforts to reduce abuse. For example, the regulations allow farmers to insure fields individually rather than together. As such, farmers can "switch" reporting of yield among fields to make false claims or build up a higher yield history on a field to increase its eligibility for higher insurance guarantees. RMA did not agree with GAO's recommendation to address the problems associated with insuring individual fields. Statutorily high premium subsidies may also limit RMA's ability to control program abuse: the subsidies shield farmers from the full effect of paying higher premiums associated with frequent claims. From 2002 through 2006, USDA paid the insurance companies underwriting gains of $2.8 billion, which represents an average annual rate of return of 17.8 percent. In contrast, according to insurance industry statistics, the benchmark rate of return for companies selling property and casualty insurance was 6.4 percent. USDA renegotiated the financial terms of its standard reinsurance agreement with the companies in 2005, but their rate of return was 30.1 percent in 2005, and 24.3 percent in 2006. It also paid the companies a cost allowance of $4 billion to cover administrative and operating costs for 2002 through 2006. USDA recommended that Congress provide RMA with authority to renegotiate the financial terms and conditions of its standard reinsurance agreement once every 3 years. |
gao_GAO-03-798 | gao_GAO-03-798_0 | Visa Revocation Policies and Procedures
Our analysis indicates that the U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written procedures that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither they nor the FBI have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials articulated their agencies’ policies on how revocations help their agencies prevent suspected terrorists from entering the United States. The department reviews this information to determine if a suspected terrorist has a U.S. visa. In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (a) notification of revocations did not always reach the appropriate unit within INS and the FBI; (b) State did not consistently post lookouts on the individuals; (c) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States either before or after the revocation and may still remain in the country; and (d) INS and the FBI were not consistently taking action to investigate; locate; or, where appropriate, clear, prosecute, or remove any of the people who had entered the country before or after their visas were revoked. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General: develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information is transmitted from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and their respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely manner; develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in the United States after revocation; and determine if persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat. To assess the policies and procedures governing the visa revocation process, we interviewed officials from State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and reviewed relevant documents. 1. 2. We agree that these individuals may not be terrorists. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and, where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective visa revocation actions and (2) determine the effectiveness of the process.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism grounds. Further, State, INS, and the FBI do not have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials said they use the revocation process to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the country, but none of the agencies has a policy that covers investigating, locating, and taking action when a visa holder has already entered. This lack of formal written policies and procedures has contributed to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the possibility of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United States. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notifications of all the revocations; names were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had entered the United States either before or after revocation and may still remain; and INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. |
gao_GGD-95-210 | gao_GGD-95-210_0 | Regulation of Bank and Thrift Mutual Fund Activities
The mutual fund activities of banks and thrifts are subject to a number of federal and state securities and banking laws and regulations—and to the shared oversight of a variety of federal and state securities and banking regulators. Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent and nature of bank and thrift involvement in mutual fund sales, (2) assess whether the sales practices followed by banks and thrifts provide bank customers adequate disclosures of the risks of investing in mutual funds, and (3) analyze whether the existing framework for regulation and oversight of bank and thrift mutual fund sales practices and proprietary fund operations adequately protects investors. Growth of Proprietary Funds Has Outpaced the Industry as a Whole
As of December 31, 1993, about 114 bank and thrift companies had established proprietary mutual funds. This figure includes both proprietary and nonproprietary funds sold through banks and thrifts. Inadequate Disclosure of Risks Associated With Mutual Fund Investing
In response to the rapid growth of sales of mutual funds by banks and concerns that bank customers may be confused or ill-informed about the differences between mutual funds and traditional bank products, the federal banking regulators have increased their regulatory and supervisory oversight of banks’ mutual fund sales activities. During our visits to the institutions we found that these employees complied with statements in the guidance about not providing investment advice. In February 1994, the four regulators jointly issued the “Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products.” This new guidance superseded the guidelines previously issued and unified the guidance to banks and thrifts on the policies and procedures that they should follow in selling mutual funds and other nondeposit investment products. This creates a potential for different regulatory treatment of the same activity and a potential for conflict and inconsistency among banking and securities regulators. On the basis of these responses, we estimate that about 180 of the 2,300 banking institutions that were selling mutual funds to their retail customers at the end of 1993 did so directly using only their own employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO reviewed bank and thrift sales of mutual funds, focusing on: (1) the extent and nature of bank and thrift mutual fund sales activities; (2) banks' and thrifts' disclosure of their mutual fund sales practices; and (3) the regulatory framework for overseeing bank and thrift mutual fund operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of the end of 1993, about 2,300 banks and thrifts were involved in mutual fund sales and about 114 institutions had established their own mutual funds; (2) during the 5 previous years, the value and numbers of bank-owned funds grew faster than the mutual fund industry as a whole and banks and thrifts became major sellers of nonproprietary funds; (3) banks and thrifts sell mutual funds to retain customers and increase fees; (4) in February 1994, bank regulators issued guidelines on policies and procedures that financial institutions are to follow in selling nondeposit investment products due to their concern that banks and thrifts are not disclosing the risks of investing in mutual funds; (5) GAO visits to selected banks and thrifts in 1994 disclosed that only about one-third of the institutions followed the disclosure guidelines, while nearly one-fifth of the institutions failed to disclose any risks; (6) the bank regulators are including steps in their examinations to assess how well these institutions are complying with the guidelines; (7) the existing regulatory framework is inadequate to deal with the rapid increase in banks' and thrifts' involvement in securities sales and management; (8) banks that directly sell to customers are predominantly regulated by bank regulators, while securities regulators mainly oversee banks which sell or advise through affiliates or third party brokers; (9) the existing regulatory framework could lead to inconsistent or overlapping regulatory treatment of the same activity and to conflict among the regulators; and (10) conflicts of interest may arise between banks' mutual fund activities and traditional banking functions. |
gao_GAO-09-483 | gao_GAO-09-483_0 | SEC Initially Focused on Large and Persistent FTD in Certain Securities, but Growing Concerns about Investor Confidence Led SEC to Address FTD across the Market
When it initially promulgated Regulation SHO, SEC sought to curb the potential for manipulative naked short selling by imposing (1) uniform requirements on broker-dealers to locate a source of securities available for borrowing and (2) additional delivery requirements on broker-dealers for securities in which a substantial amount of FTD occurred. 2). 3). It is unclear whether the number of threshold securities and their FTD would have increased further in the absence of Regulation SHO. Preexisting FTD in any equity security do not have be closed out, unless the security enters the threshold list. In that case, the close out provision for threshold securities applies, and the clearing broker-dealer has 13 consecutive days to close out the FTD. Furthermore, they said that the current close-out requirements do not address manipulation that can occur within the 3-day settlement period. To mitigate this potential, these commenters advocate requiring short sellers to first borrow securities before effecting their short sales. To mitigate this type of market manipulation, the commenters recommended that SEC require broker-dealers to preborrow securities prior to effecting a short sale on behalf of a customer, which they said would eliminate the potential for manipulative short selling within the 3-day settlement period and more generally provide greater assurance that short sales do not result in FTD. Others, however, did not follow these practices. As a result, under Regulation SHO, FTD resulting from naked short sales could persist for many days. As the Commission considers whether to finalize the temporary rule, Trading and Markets staff said that they are continuing to evaluate the appropriateness of a preborrow requirement for addressing FTD and market manipulation related to naked short selling. CBOE staff also have developed surveillance to help detect noncompliance with the close-out requirements of Regulation SHO. In Part Because SEC Has Not Finalized Guidance, the Industry Has Experienced Some Challenges in Complying with the Locate Requirement
Regulation SHO requires broker-dealers to demonstrate that the sources on which they rely for locates are reasonable—that is, the broker-dealer does not have reason to believe that the source will be unable to deliver shares in time for settlement. According to OCIE examinations, some broker-dealers are not monitoring to determine whether locates are resulting in FTD because firms do not expect that the source from which the firm obtained the locate will be the source from which the firm will obtain shares for settlement. Without timely and clear interpretive guidance from SEC, SROs may be unable to effectively enforce SEC rules and regulations, and SEC cannot ensure the consistent implementation of the rules and regulations. In response to an alternate suggestion to implement a marketwide preborrow requirement, Trading and Markets and FINRA staffs said such a requirement might be costly to the industry because FTD represent a very small percentage of the dollar value of trades and only a small group of securities would likely be the target of any manipulative scheme. Moreover, while providing formal responses to all requests for interpretive guidance may not be appropriate, establishing a formal process would provide a basis for consistently addressing matters relating to compliance with SEC regulations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address the current information gap in Regulation SHO for prime brokerage arrangements and mitigate the impact of any unintended consequences caused by SEC rules, as well as ensure consistent implementation of SEC rules by the industry, we recommend that the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission take the following two steps: finalize, in an expedited manner upon finalization of the temporary rule, the revised 1994 Prime Broker Letter and develop a process that allows Commission staff to raise and resolve implementation issues that arise from SEC regulations, including interim final temporary rules, in a timely manner. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To provide an overview of the actions that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken to address manipulative naked short selling and failures to deliver (FTD), including Regulation SHO and the recent emergency orders—and the factors SEC considered in taking these actions, we reviewed Regulation SHO; the recent July and September 2008 emergency orders, including associated amendments; and the interim final temporary rule (temporary rule) and interviewed staff from SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets (Trading and Markets). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Regulation SHO to, among other things, curb the potential for manipulative naked short selling in equity securities. Selling a security short without borrowing the securities needed to settle the trade within the standard 3-day period, can result in failures to deliver (FTD), and can be used to manipulate (drive down) the price of a security. To further address this concern, SEC recently issued an order amending Regulation SHO. This report (1) provides an overview of Regulation SHO and related SEC actions, (2) discusses regulators' and market participants' views on the effectiveness of the rule, and (3) analyzes regulators' efforts to enforce the rule. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed SEC rules and draft industry guidance, analyzed FTD data, reviewed SEC and self-regulatory organization (SRO) examinations, and interviewed SEC and SRO officials and market participants.
What GAO Found
To address FTD and curb the potential for manipulative naked short selling in equity securities, Regulation SHO required broker-dealers to (1) locate securities available for borrowing before effecting short sales in that security and (2) close out FTD lasting ten consecutive settlement days in securities for which a substantial number of FTD accumulated (threshold securities). SEC imposed the close-out requirement only on threshold securities because it believed high levels of FTD could indicate potential manipulative naked short selling. Increasing market volatility led SEC to issue a September 2008 emergency order requiring broker-dealers to close out FTD resulting from short sales in any security the day after the settlement date. SEC extended thisrequirement until July 2009 in an interim final temporary rule. GAO found that the number of threshold securities declined after the implementation of the stricter close-out requirement, but it is not clear whether this trend can be sustained. Some market participants believe that the stricter close-out requirement does not prevent manipulative trading from occurring within the 3-day settlement period. They recommend that SEC address potential abuse by requiring all short sellers to borrow securities before a short sale. As the Commission considers whether to finalize the temporary rule, SEC staff said that they are continuing to evaluate the appropriateness of a preborrow requirement for addressing FTD and market manipulation related to naked short selling. However, SEC staff said that the costs of a preborrow requirement might outweigh the benefits because FTD represent 0.01 percent of the dollar value of trades, and that a small group of securities (small market capitalization, thinly traded, or illiquid) are likely to be the target of any manipulative scheme. SEC and SRO examiners have found that some broker-dealers do not monitor whether the source a broker-dealer uses to locate available securities is reasonable (i.e., does not result in FTD). The broker-dealers may not have done so because firms do not expect that the source from which it obtained the locate will be used to obtain shares for settlement. In some cases, the executing broker-dealer may lack information needed to establish whether the locates were reasonable. SEC staff worked with the industry to draft guidance in 2007 to clarify communication responsibilities in such instances, but SEC has not finalized it. As a result, some firms may continue to be noncompliant with the locate requirement. Furthermore, SEC sometimes did not provide interpretive guidance for questions on the implementation of Regulation SHO and temporary rule-related requirements, or did so after lengthy delays. SEC does not have formal processes for determining which requests for guidance merit a formal response, nor does it have a process by which implementation issues that arise from temporary rules can be readily addressed. Without timely and clear guidance to the industry, SEC cannot ensure the consistent implementation of its rules or help address the unintended consequences of operational issues that occur while awaiting rule expiry or finalization. |
gao_GAO-14-608T | gao_GAO-14-608T_0 | Observations on DHS Efforts to Identify Facilities, Assess Risk, Review Security Plans, and Verify Compliance
Identifying Facilities Covered by CFATS
DHS has begun to take action to work with other agencies to identify facilities that are required to report their chemical holdings to DHS but may not have done so. The first step of the CFATS process is focused on identifying facilities that might be required to participate in the program. As a result of the CFATS rule, about 40,000 chemical facilities reported their chemical holdings and their quantities to DHS’s ISCD. Among other things, the hearing focused on whether the West, Texas, facility should have reported its holdings to ISCD given the amount of ammonium nitrate at the facility. On August 1, 2013, the same day as the hearing, the President issued Executive Order 13650–Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, which was intended to improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators. In February 2014, DHS officials told us that the working group has taken actions in the areas described in the executive order. Assessing Risk and Prioritizing Facilities
DHS has also begun to take actions to enhance its ability to assess risk and prioritize facilities covered by the program. ISCD uses a risk assessment approach to develop risk scores to assign chemical facilities to one of four final tiers. As a result, in April 2013 we recommended that ISCD enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk and conduct a peer review after doing so. Reviewing of Facilities’ Security Plans
DHS has begun to take action to lessen the time it takes to review site security plans which could help DHS reduce the backlog of plans awaiting review. The security plan is to describe security measures to be taken and how such measures are to address applicable risk-based performance standards. If ISCD determines that the site security plan is in compliance with the CFATS regulation, ISCD approves the site security plan, and issues a letter of approval to the facility, and the facility is to implement the approved site security plan. We also noted in April 2013 that ISCD had revised its process for reviewing facilities’ site security plans. In February 2014, ISCD officials told us that they are taking a number of actions intended to lessen the time it takes to complete reviews of remaining plans including the following: providing updated internal guidance to inspectors and ISCD updating the internal case management system; providing updated external guidance to facilities to help them better prepare their site security plans; conducting inspections using one or two inspectors at a time over the course of 1 day, rather than multiple inspectors over the course of several days; conducting pre-inspection calls to the facility to help resolve technical issues beforehand; creating and leveraging the use of corporate inspection documents (i.e., documents for companies that have over seven regulated facilities in the CFATS program); supporting the use of alternative security programs to help clear the backlog of security plans because, according to DHS officials, alternative security plans are easier for some facilities to prepare and use; and taking steps to streamline and revise some of the on-line data collection tools such as the site security plan to make the process faster. In April 2013, we also reported that DHS had not finalized the personnel surety aspect of the CFATS program. In implementing this provision, we reported that DHS intended to (1) require facilities to perform background checks on and ensure appropriate credentials for facility personnel and, as appropriate, visitors with unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets, and (2) check for terrorist ties by comparing certain employee information with the federal government’s consolidated terrorist watch list. However, as of February 2014, DHS had not finalized its information collection request that defines how the personnel surety aspect of the performance standards will be implemented. As an interim step, in February 2014, DHS published a notice about its Information Collection Request (ICR) for personnel surety to gather information and comments prior to submitting the ICR to the Office According of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and clearance.to ISCD officials, it is unclear when the personnel surety aspect of the CFATS program will be finalized. Inspecting to Verify Compliance with Facility Plans
DHS reports that it has begun to perform compliance inspections at regulated facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations establishing standards for the security of these facilities. DHS established the CFATS program to assess risk at facilities covered by the regulations and inspect them to ensure compliance.
This statement provides observations on DHS efforts related to the CFATS program. It is based on the results of previous GAO reports issued in July 2012 and April 2013 and a testimony issued in February 2014. In conducting the earlier work, GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on the program and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
In managing its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a number of efforts underway to identify facilities that are covered by the program, assess risk and prioritize facilities, review and approve facility security plans, and inspect facilities to ensure compliance with security regulations.
Identifying facilities. DHS has begun to work with other agencies to identify facilities that should have reported their chemical holdings to CFATS, but may not have done so. DHS initially identified about 40,000 facilities by publishing a CFATS rule requiring that facilities with certain types and quantities of chemicals report certain information to DHS. However, a chemical explosion in West, Texas last year demonstrated the risk posed by chemicals covered by CFATS. Subsequent to this incident, the President issued Executive Order 13650 which was intended to improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators. Under the executive order, a federal working group is sharing information to identify additional facilities that are to be regulated under CFATS, among other things.
Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. DHS has begun to enhance its ability to assess risks and prioritize facilities. DHS assessed the risks of facilities that reported their chemical holdings in order to determine which ones would be required to participate in the program and subsequently develop site security plans. GAO's April 2013 report found weaknesses in multiple aspects of the risk assessment and prioritization approach and made recommendations to review and improve this process. In February 2014, DHS officials told us they had begun to take action to revise the process for assessing risk and prioritizing facilities.
Reviewing security plans. DHS has also begun to take action to speed up its reviews of facility security plans. Per the CFATS regulation, DHS is to review security plans and visit the facilities to make sure their security measures meet the risk-based performance standards. GAO's April 2013 report found a 7- to 9-year backlog for these reviews and visits, and DHS has begun to take action to expedite these activities. As a separate matter, one of the performance standards—personnel surety, under which facilities are to perform background checks and ensure appropriate credentials for personnel and visitors as appropriate—is being developed. Of the facility plans DHS had reviewed as of February 2014, it conditionally approved these plans pending final development of the personal surety performance standard. According to DHS officials, it is unclear when the standard will be finalized.
Inspecting to verify compliance. In February 2014, DHS reported it had begun to perform inspections at facilities to ensure compliance with their site security plans. According to DHS, these inspections are to occur about 1 year after facility site security plan approval. Given the backlog in plan approvals, this process has started recently and GAO has not yet reviewed this aspect of the program.
What GAO Recommends
In a July 2012 report, GAO recommended that DHS measure its performance implementing actions to improve its management of CFATS. In an April 2013 report, GAO recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, conduct a peer review, and gather feedback on its outreach to facilities. DHS concurred and has taken actions or has actions underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-06-703T | gao_GAO-06-703T_0 | The 1996 amendments required the use of ELCs instead of cumulative AIDS cases. Table 1 describes CARE Act formula grants for Titles I and II. They also required that HIV data be used no later than the beginning of fiscal year 2007. Multiple CARE Act Provisions Contribute to Disproportionate Funding per AIDS Case
Provisions in the CARE Act funding formulas result in a distribution of funds among grantees that does not reflect the relative distribution of AIDS cases in these jurisdictions. We found that provisions affect the proportional allocation of funding as follows: (1) the AIDS case-count provisions in the CARE Act result in a distribution of funding that is not reflective of the distribution of persons living with AIDS, (2) CARE Act provisions related to metropolitan areas result in variability in the amounts of funding per ELC among grantees, and (3) the CARE Act hold- harmless provisions and grandfather clause protect the funding of certain grantees. Provisions in CARE Act Funding Formulas Incorporate Measures of AIDS Cases That Do Not Reflect an Accurate Count of Persons Living with AIDS
Provisions in the CARE Act use measurements of AIDS cases that do not reflect an accurate count of people currently living with AIDS. This method for estimating cases was first included in the CARE Act Amendments of 1996. CARE Act Funding Provisions for Metropolitan Areas Result in Disproportionate Funding
When total Title I and Title II funding is considered, states with EMAs and Puerto Rico receive more funding per ELC than states without EMAs because cases within EMAs are counted twice, once in connection with Title I base grants and once for Title II base grants. The remaining 20 percent is based on the number of ELCs in each jurisdiction outside of any EMA. The eligibility of these EMAs was protected based on a CARE Act grandfather clause. Eight states became eligible for this hold-harmless funding in fiscal year 2004. Funding Effect of Using HIV Case Counts Would Depend on Multiple Factors
CARE Act funding for Title I, Title II, and ADAP base grants would have shifted among grantees if HIV case counts had been used with ELCs, instead of ELCs alone, to allocate fiscal year 2004 formula grants. Grantees in the South and Midwest would generally have received more funding if HIV cases were used in funding formulas along with ELCs. However, there would have been grantees that would have received increased funding and grantees that would have received decreased funding in every region of the country. We found that those grantees that would receive increased funding from the use of HIV cases tend to be those with the oldest HIV case-reporting systems. Grantees with more mature HIV-reporting systems have generally identified more of their HIV cases. We reported in February 2006 that if Congress wishes CARE Act funding to more closely reflect the distribution of persons living with AIDS, and to more closely reflect the distribution of persons living with HIV/AIDS when HIV cases are incorporated into the funding formulas, it should take the following five actions: revising the funding formulas used to determine grantee eligibility and grant amounts using a measure of living AIDS cases that does not include deceased cases and reflects the longer lives of persons living with AIDS, eliminating the counting of cases in EMAs for Title I base grants and again for Title II base grants, modifying the hold-harmless provisions for Title I, Title II, and ADAP base grants to reduce the extent to which they prevent funding from shifting to areas where the epidemic has been increasing, modifying the Title I grandfather clause, which protects the eligibility of metropolitan areas that no longer meet the eligibility criteria, and eliminating the two-tiered structure of the Emerging Communities program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The CARE Act, a federal effort to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, is administered by HHS. The Act uses formulas based upon a grantee's number of AIDS cases to distribute funds to eligible metropolitan areas (EMA), states, and territories. The use of AIDS cases was prescribed because most jurisdictions tracked and reported only AIDS cases when the grant programs were established. HIV cases must be incorporated with AIDS cases in CARE Act formulas no later than fiscal year 2007. GAO was asked to discuss factors that affect the distribution of CARE Act funding. This testimony is based on HIV/AIDS: Changes Needed to Improve the Distribution of Ryan White CARE Act and Housing Funds, GAO-06-332 (Feb. 28, 2006). GAO discusses how specific funding-formula provisions contribute to funding differences among CARE Act grantees and what distribution differences could result from using HIV cases in CARE Act funding formulas.
What GAO Found
Multiple provisions in the CARE Act grant funding formulas as enacted result in funding not being comparable per AIDS case across grantees. First, the CARE Act uses measures of AIDS cases that do not accurately reflect the number of persons living with AIDS. For example, the statutory funding formulas require the use of cumulative AIDS case counts, which could include deceased cases. Second, CARE Act provisions related to metropolitan areas result in variability in the amounts of funding per AIDS case among grantees. For example, AIDS cases within EMAs are counted once for determining funding under Title I of the CARE Act for EMAs and again under Title II for determining funding for the states and territories in which those EMAs are located. As a result, states with EMAs receive more total funding per AIDS case than states without EMAs. Third, CARE Act hold-harmless provisions under Titles I and II and the grandfather clause for EMAs under Title I sustain funding and eligibility of CARE Act grantees on the basis of a previous year's measurements of the number of AIDS cases in these jurisdictions. For example, the CARE Act Title I hold-harmless provision results in one EMA continuing to have deceased AIDS cases factored into its allocation because its hold-harmless funding dates back to the mid-1990s when formula funding was based on a count of AIDS cases from the beginning of the epidemic. If HIV case counts had been incorporated along with the number of estimated living AIDS cases (ELC) in allocating fiscal year 2004 CARE Act grants instead of ELCs alone, funding would have shifted among jurisdictions. Grantees in the South and the Midwest generally would have received more funding if HIV cases were used in the funding formulas, but there would have been grantees that would have received increased funding and grantees that would have received decreased funding in every region of the country. Although CARE Act grantees have established HIV case-reporting systems, differences between these systems--in their maturity and reporting methods, for instance--would have affected the distribution of CARE Act funds based on ELCs and HIV case counts. Grantees with more mature HIV-reporting systems would tend to receive more funds. |
gao_GAO-10-723 | gao_GAO-10-723_0 | EDA did not receive a supplemental appropriation for postdisaster recovery assistance following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. SBA Provided Gulf Coast Small Businesses with Assistance to Repair Disaster-Damaged Property and Address Economic Losses
SBA provided about $1.4 billion in loans to Gulf Coast businesses of all sizes following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through its Disaster Loan and GO Loan programs to assist with the repair or replacement of disaster- damaged property, mitigate economic losses that small businesses incurred as a result of the hurricanes, and provide working capital loans to businesses in severely distressed areas. SBA approved about 96 percent of these loans in fiscal year 2006. SBA awarded Mississippi small businesses the greatest number of these loans, but Louisiana small businesses received the greatest amount of funds. Under this program, the state has assisted small businesses that applied for conventional or SBA loans but either had not received them or still needed additional assistance. The state targeted $3 million in CDBG disaster relief funds for this program. Two small business owners told us that their commercial insurance rates at least doubled after the hurricanes. However, we found that the Corps and DOD could not demonstrate that they were consistently monitoring subcontracting accomplishment information as required for 13 of the 43 construction contracts awarded directly to large businesses for Katrina- and Rita-related recovery efforts during that time. 2). The Corps and DOD use these reports to monitor contractor performance under subcontracting plans. Without monitoring, the Corps and DOD are limited in their ability to determine the extent to which their prime contractors are following their subcontracting plans. Economic Conditions Have Varied Across the Gulf Coast Region Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Appear to Be Related in Part to the Level of Damage Sustained in Different Areas
Indicators of economic conditions in the Gulf Coast—including population estimates, the number of small businesses, unemployment rates, and housing prices—suggest that the effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on local economies have varied across the region. Housing Prices in Selected Heavily Damaged Areas Have Shown Some Steady Increases
From 2005 to 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s housing price index—a nationally recognized housing price index—increased in four metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) heavily damaged by the hurricanes. Impact of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Gulf Coast Economy Is Uncertain
Representatives of state and local organizations and organizations that assist small businesses, as well as small business owners with whom we met, expressed uncertainty regarding the impact on the small business economy that will result from the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 9). For example, many of the heavily damaged areas saw substantial losses in population and in the number of businesses after the hurricanes, while less damaged areas saw an increase in the population and business levels. Gulf Coast small businesses were awarded almost $3 billion in prime contracts for hurricane recovery efforts. Recommendation for Executive Action
For contracts awarded by the Corps and other DOD departments, the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that contracting officials consistently comply with requirements to monitor the extent to which contractors are meeting subcontracting plan goals, including requirements for contractors with subcontracting plans to submit subcontracting accomplishment reports. The Acting Director of the DOD Office of Small Business Programs stated that DOD nonconcurred with the implication that DOD contracting personnel do not enforce requirements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) the amount of assistance provided to Gulf Coast small businesses as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Disaster and Gulf Opportunity (GO) Pilot Loan programs, state-administered business assistance programs funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), and the Economic Development Administration’s (EDA) Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) Program; the benefits and challenges experienced by participants in these programs; and the performance of loans extended to small businesses using assistance from these programs; (2) the extent to which Gulf Coast small businesses received federal contract funds for recovery efforts; and (3) the current state of and improvements in the region’s economy since the hurricanes, with a focus on the small business economy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita wreaked havoc on small businesses in the Gulf Coast, and much federal assistance has been provided to help these businesses. GAO was asked to describe (1) the amount of assistance provided to Gulf Coast small businesses through the Small Business Administration's (SBA) disaster and Gulf Opportunity (GO) loans, state-administered business assistance programs funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), and the Economic Development Administration's (EDA) Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) program; (2) the extent to which Gulf Coast small businesses received federal contract funds; and (3) the current state of and improvements in the region's economy. GAO analyzed data on SBA and EDA loans and states' use of supplemental CDBG appropriations, data on prime and subcontracts awarded for hurricane recovery activities, and economic indicators both before and after the hurricanes.
What GAO Found
Several federal programs provided assistance to Gulf Coast small businesses after the 2005 hurricanes; however, despite this assistance, some small businesses still face recovery challenges. Of the programs we reviewed, SBA provided the greatest amount of assistance to small businesses. SBA approved about $1.4 billion in loans through its Disaster Loan and GO Loan programs to assist with the repair or replacement of damaged property and to address economic losses suffered after the hurricanes. In addition, Louisiana expended about $179 million and Mississippi targeted $3 million in CDBG disaster relief funds for small business assistance grant, loan, and other programs to further assist businesses that in some or all cases, may not have been eligible for SBA loans. EDA did not receive supplemental appropriations after the hurricanes, but Gulf Coast small businesses did receive about $36 million in loans from EDA's RLF grantees, which provide gap financing to small businesses to start or expand their business. Even with federal assistance, however, some small business owners with whom GAO met have encountered recovery challenges. For example, a few of these small business owners told GAO that they had problems applying for SBA loans because the hurricanes destroyed needed financial records. Other owners face higher expenses, especially the cost of commercial insurance and added debt from these loan programs, which has made recovering difficult. Gulf Coast small businesses received almost $2.9 billion in federal contracts awarded in response to the hurricanes. The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that agency contracting officials monitor prime contractors' performance under subcontracting plans. However, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD)--two of four agencies that awarded the most in federal contracts for hurricane recovery--could not demonstrate that they were consistently monitoring subcontracting accomplishment data for 13 of the 43 construction contracts for which subcontracting plans were required. Without such monitoring, the Corps and the rest of DOD are limited in their ability to determine the extent to which contractors are following their subcontracting plans. Indicators--including population estimates, number of small businesses, unemployment rates, and housing prices--suggest that the hurricanes' effects on local economies varied across the Gulf Coast. From 2005 to 2006, some heavily damaged areas experienced steep declines in population and number of small businesses, while less-damaged areas experienced steady increases in these indicators. Since that time, the population and number of small businesses in heavily damaged areas have increased, but they both still remain below prehurricane levels. House prices have shown some steady increases from 2005 to 2008 in heavily damaged metropolitan areas. The impact of the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on small businesses is uncertain.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that contracting officials with the Corps and other DOD departments consistently comply with requirements to monitor the extent to which contractors are meeting subcontracting plan goals. DOD did not concur with the implication that its contracting personnel do not enforce requirements. |
gao_GAO-17-153 | gao_GAO-17-153_0 | The plan identified three federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience of the grid: (1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to enhance awareness of potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising coordinated responses to disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable intelligence on threats is communicated between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner. Three Federal Agencies Implemented 27 Grid Resiliency Efforts since 2013 and Reported a Variety of Results
DOE, DHS, and FERC reported implementing 27 grid resiliency efforts since 2013 that supported a range of activities and that addressed multiple hazards and federal priorities for enhancing the resilience of the electricity grid. Agency officials reported a variety of results stemming from these efforts. II for more information on each effort). In addition, DHS reported that its Recovery Transformer Program supported research and development activities by designing and demonstrating a type of rapidly deployable large, high- power transformer for use in the event of the unexpected loss of multiple large, high-power transformers. As table 3 shows, the agencies reported that their federal grid resiliency efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards, including cyberattacks (i.e. attacks on physical infrastructure such as targeted shooting of transformers or intentional downing of power lines); natural disasters (e.g. As shown in the selected examples in table 5, these results included the development, and in some cases the deployment, of new technologies and analytical tools; the planning and exercising of coordinated responses to disruptive events; and improved coordination and information sharing between the federal government and industry related to potential cyberattacks and other threats or hazards to the electricity grid. Federal Efforts Were Fragmented with Some Overlap but Were Not Duplicative, and Agencies Have Taken Actions to Coordinate Their Efforts
We found that the 27 federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the electricity grid were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC and overlapped to some degree, but we did not find any instances of duplication among these efforts. These activities and mechanisms include serving as members on formal coordinating bodies that bring together federal, state, and industry stakeholders in the energy sector to discuss resiliency issues on a regular basis; contributing to the development of federal plans and reviews that address grid resiliency gaps and priorities; and participating in direct coordination activities at the program level. Efforts Were Fragmented Across Agencies with Some Overlap but Were Not Duplicative
According to our analysis of agency questionnaire responses, federal grid resiliency efforts were fragmented and overlapped to some degree, but none were duplicative. The 27 federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the electricity grid were fragmented in that they were implemented by three different agencies—DOE, DHS, and FERC—and addressed the same broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the electricity grid. In the case of federal grid resiliency efforts, we found that DOE, DHS, and FERC generally have tailored their efforts to contribute to their specific missions and needs. For example, DOE’s 11 efforts related to its strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy infrastructure; DHS’s 3 efforts addressed its strategic priority to enhance critical infrastructure security and resilience by, among other things, promoting resilient critical infrastructure design; and FERC’s 13 efforts related to the agency’s roles in reviewing and approving reliability standards and regulating the interstate transmission of electricity. We did not find any instances of duplication among the 27 federal grid resiliency efforts because none of the efforts had the same goals or engaged in the same activities. DOE, DHS, and FERC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the Resilience of the Electricity Grid
Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid at Three Federal Agencies
We identified 27 efforts across three agencies—the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)—that aimed to enhance the resilience of the electricity grid. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of increasing threats to the nation's electricity grid, national policies have stressed the importance of enhancing the grid's resilience—its ability to adapt to changing conditions; withstand potentially disruptive events, such as the loss of power lines; and, if disrupted, to rapidly recover. Most of the electricity grid is owned and operated by private industry, but the federal government has a significant role in promoting the grid's resilience. DOE is the lead agency for federal grid resiliency efforts and is responsible for coordinating with DHS and other relevant federal agencies on these efforts.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the electricity grid. This report (1) identifies grid resiliency efforts implemented by federal agencies since 2013 and the results of these efforts and (2) examines the extent to which these efforts were fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative, and the extent to which agencies had coordinated the efforts.
GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance; identified a list of federal grid resiliency efforts; sent a questionnaire to officials at DOE, DHS, and FERC to collect information on each effort and its results; analyzed questionnaire responses and agency documents to assess whether federal efforts were fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative and how agencies coordinated those efforts; and interviewed agency officials and industry group representatives.
This report contains no recommendations. DOE, DHS, and FERC provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reported implementing 27 grid resiliency efforts since 2013 and identified a variety of results from these efforts. The efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards—including cyberattacks, physical attacks, and natural disasters—and supported different types of activities (see table). These efforts also addressed each of the three federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience of the electricity grid: (1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to enhance awareness of potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising coordinated responses to disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable intelligence on threats is communicated between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner. Agency officials reported a variety of results from these efforts, including the development of new technologies—such as a rapidly-deployable large, high-power transformer—and improved coordination and information sharing between the federal government and industry related to potential cyberattacks.
Federal grid resiliency efforts were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC and overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative. GAO found that the 27 efforts were fragmented in that they were implemented by three agencies and addressed the same broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the electricity grid. However, DOE, DHS, and FERC generally tailored their efforts to contribute to their specific missions. For example, DOE's 11 efforts related to its strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy infrastructure. GAO also found that the federal efforts overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative because none had the same goals or engaged in the same activities. For example, three DOE and DHS efforts addressed resiliency issues related to large, high-power transformers, but the goals were distinct—one effort focused on developing a rapidly deployable transformer to use in the event of multiple large, high-power transformer failures; another focused on developing next-generation transformer components with more resilient features; and a third focused on developing a plan for a national transformer reserve. Moreover, officials from all three agencies reported taking actions to coordinate federal grid resiliency efforts, such as serving on formal coordinating bodies that bring together federal, state, and industry stakeholders to discuss resiliency issues on a regular basis, and contributing to the development of federal plans that address grid resiliency gaps and priorities. GAO found that these actions were consistent with key practices for enhancing and sustaining federal agency coordination. |
gao_RCED-97-195 | gao_RCED-97-195_0 | These activities include, among others, the acquisition of real property; the rehabilitation of real property, either publicly owned or acquired; housing rehabilitation and preservation; and economic development. From the program’s inception through September 1996, HUD made 930 commitments to guarantee loans totaling $4.4 billion. About 38 percent of entitlement communities have received 884 loan guarantees totaling $4.2 billion. HUD provided $369 million in EDI grants from fiscal year 1994 through September 1996. EDI Grants Encouraged Increased Loan Program Use
Recent growth in the use of the loan program was primarily stimulated by the introduction of EDI grants in fiscal year 1994, according to HUD and associations representing community development officials. According to one CDBG entitlement community, the ability to receive an EDI grant along with a loan commitment from the loan fund was the key factor making it possible for the community to take out the loan. Collateral Requirements May Discourage Use of the Loan Program
Even though communities and states generally view the loan program favorably, they have concerns about the current collateral requirements and the proposed guidance to communities on the collateral to be used when providing third-party loans. By an overwhelming margin, both entitlement and nonentitlement borrowers reported that they used their loan funds to finance economic development activities. Some Field Offices Are Not Including the Loan Program in CDBG Monitoring
According to its regulations, the Department must conduct an annual performance review of CDBG communities and states to determine whether CDBG-funded activities are being carried out (1) in a timely manner, (2) in accordance with approved plans, and (3) in compliance with primary and national objectives. However, in 5 of the 30 field offices we contacted, these loan commitments were not reviewed. The five offices that did not include loan fund activities said that they did not do so because they (1) did not believe they had guidance on how to monitor the program, (2) did not believe they had a responsibility to monitor the loans, (3) had other priorities, or (4) lacked loan-specific information. Loan to a for-profit business is in default. (continued)
What number of loans financed specific types of economic development activities? Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested, we reviewed (1) the extent to which communities and states are using the loan fund; (2) factors affecting communities’ and states’ willingness to use the program; (3) the types of projects being financed with loan proceeds; and (4) the Department of Housing and Urban Development ’s (HUD) procedures for overseeing the program. We also reviewed HUD’s annual reports to the Congress for community development programs for 1994 and 1996. However, we were able to describe these offices in terms of the number of loan commitments for which they were responsible. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined how changes to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Economic Development Loan Fund have affected the program, focusing on: (1) the extent to which communities are using the loan fund; (2) factors affecting communities' willingness to use the fund; (3) the types of projects being financed with loan proceeds; and (4) HUD's procedures for overseeing the program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from the loan program's inception through fiscal year (FY) 1996, HUD made 930 loan commitments totaling $4.4 billion; (2) about 38 percent of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) entitlement communities have received one or more loan commitments; 16 states, on behalf of their nonentitlement communities, have also received loans; (3) although communities' and states' use of the loan program has fluctuated--generally, 50 or fewer loans were approved each year--program activity increased sharply in FY 1994 through 1996, when the Department approved about 400 loans and nearly 60 percent of the dollars loaned since the program's inception; (4) according to HUD and associations representing community development officials, the key factor responsible for communities' and states' increased willingness to use the loan program has been the availability of Economic Development Initiative (EDI) grants to loan recipients; (5) in 1994, when the Department provided $19 million in grants, loan activity doubled--88 loans compared with 43 the previous year; in 1995, when the Department awarded $350 million in grants, the number of loans jumped to 218; however, in 1996, when no EDI grants were awarded, the number of loans dropped to 89; (6) the officials attributed any unwillingness to use the loan program to communities' concerns over collateral requirements and their reluctance to pledge future CDBGs as collateral for loans; (7) communities and states reported to HUD that they have used about 73 percent of their loans to finance economic development activities; (8) other eligible CDBG activities for which loans were reported to be used included acquisition of real property, housing rehabilitation, and public property rehabilitation; (9) the Department requires an annual review of grantees to determine, among other things, whether the activities funded by CDBGs are being carried out in a timely manner and in accordance with Department-approved plans; and (10) however, according to officials in 5 of the 30 field offices responsible for the loans in GAO's sample, they did not routinely include the loans in their annual reviews because they: (a) did not believe they had guidance on how to monitor the program; (b) did not believe they had a responsibility to monitor the loans; (c) had other priorities; or (d) lacked loan-specific information. |
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