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gao_AIMD-96-115 | gao_AIMD-96-115_0 | Booz-Allen found that the Library’s staff, management structure, and resources are in danger of being overwhelmed by this growth. The three missions can be used to characterize the potential scope of activity and the customers the Library might serve: (1) Congress; (2) Congress and the nation; and (3) Congress, the nation, and the world community of libraries, publishers, and scholars. Booz-Allen concluded that the Library would require significantly fewer staff and financial resources to carry out this mission. Booz-Allen concluded that this expanded mission would require increased staff and financial resources. Booz-Allen identified two role options: (1) independent archive/knowledge developer and (2) information/knowledge broker. On the basis of these discussions as well as its other findings from the overall management review of the Library, Booz-Allen recommended that the Library’s mission be focused within the Congress/nation alternative, and planning should begin toward a future mission of serving Congress and performing the role of a national information/knowledge broker. Library’s Management and Operational Processes Need Improving
Booz-Allen reported that the Library’s management processes could be more effective. Financial Statements
Price Waterhouse found that the Library had mixed results in implementing GAO’s recommendations made in its 1991 report. . . except for the effects of such adjustments, if any, as might have been determined to be necessary had (Price Waterhouse) been able to examine evidence regarding property and equipment balances, the Consolidated Statement of Financial Position presents fairly, in all material respects, the Library’s financial position as of September 30, 1995, in conformity with the basis of accounting described in Note 1 to the Consolidated Statement of Financial Position.”
Internal Financial and Compliance Controls
Price Waterhouse concluded that the Library’s financial internal controls in place as of September 30, 1995, were not effective in safeguarding assets from material loss and in ensuring that there were no material misstatements in the Consolidated Statement of Financial Position. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed two independent management and financial reviews of the Library of Congress.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the management review found that the Library's mission needed to be reassessed because its enormous growth threatens to overwhelm its staff, structure, and resources; (2) alternative missions include service to Congress exclusively, Congress and the nation, or Congress, the nation, and the world community; (3) the first two mission options would require fewer staff and resources, but the third mission would require staff and funding increases; (4) after determining its mission, the Library's service role options include being an independent archive-knowledge developer or an information-knowledge broker; (5) the review recommended that the Library focus on the Congress-nation mission alternative and become a national information-knowledge broker; (6) the review also recommended that the Library improve its human and financial resources management and operational processes; (7) the financial review found that the Library had mixed results in implementing previous GAO recommendations and certain financial management weaknesses remain; (8) except for property and equipment accounts, the Library's financial statements presented fairly, in all material respects, its financial position as of September 30, 1995; (9) the Library's internal controls were not effective in safeguarding assets, ensuring that material misstatements did not occur, and ensuring that gifts complied with applicable laws and regulations; and (10) the review made several recommendations for safeguarding assets and improving accounting processes. |
gao_RCED-96-56 | gao_RCED-96-56_0 | DOE subsequently found itself unable to comply with the characterization deadline and renegotiated the agreement. Characterization Has Fallen Behind Schedule
DOE and Westinghouse have made limited progress in meeting the agreed-upon deadlines for characterization. 2). The result has been excessive cost due to inefficient sampling and an inadequacy of data required to meet DQOs.”
Conclusions
After more than 10 years and about $260 million invested in trying to characterize the tank wastes at Hanford, little definitive progress has occurred. Disagreement still exists over how much and what kind of characterization data are needed to reliably predict actual quantities of waste constituents and build appropriate treatment facilities. Furthermore, these uncertainties could undermine the savings DOE expects to realize by privatizing the tank waste remediation program. The review should focus on determining (1) how much and what kind of information is sufficient to reliably characterize the tank wastes and predict the quantities and conditions of the waste constituents and (2) the amount and quality of characterization information needed for DOE to proceed with the design and construction of waste treatment facilities. Second, DOE’s projected completion of characterization by 2004 is based on a characterization approach that has not been validated. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in characterizing its tank waste at its Hanford site, focusing on: (1) whether it has met its characterization deadlines; (2) the impediments to meeting characterization deadlines; and (3) the impact that continued delays have on the characterization process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) over the past 10 years, DOE has spent over $260 million and made little definitive progress in characterizing the tank wastes at Hanford; (2) DOE has not been able to meet characterization deadlines for the 54 tanks with known safety problems; (3) the DOE contractor has been unable to characterize any of the 177 tanks as ready for remediation; (4) DOE and its contractor have had problems performing reliable top-to-bottom samples, gathering sampling data, reconciling tank contents, and developing an effective tank characterization management system; (5) disagreement exists as to what kind and how much information is needed to reliably predict actual waste quantities and build appropriate treatment facilities; (6) Congress, DOE, and private contractors need better sampling and characterization information to reliably predict total program costs; and (7) these uncertainties could undermine the savings DOE expects to realize by privatizing the tank waste remediation program. |
gao_GAO-07-126 | gao_GAO-07-126_0 | Background
In addition to the 50-50 requirement in 10 U.S.C. DOD’s Compliance with the 50-50 Requirement for Fiscal Year 2005 Could Not Be Validated
Although DOD reported that the military departments complied with the 50-50 requirement for fiscal year 2005, we could not validate compliance because of systemic weaknesses in DOD’s financial management systems and persistent deficiencies in the processes used to collect and report 50- 50 data. Our current review showed that 50-50 funding data were not being consistently reported because some maintenance depots were reporting expenditures rather than obligations as directed by OSD guidance. We also found that amounts associated with interservice depot maintenance work and certain contract agreements between depots and private contractors may not accurately reflect the distribution reported for private- and public-sector funds because visibility over the allocation of these funds is limited. DOD Reported Compliance with the 50-50 Requirement in Fiscal Year 2005, but Reported Data Contained Inaccuracies
In DOD’s April 2006 report to Congress on funding allocations for depot maintenance, all three military departments reported that their private- sector depot maintenance allocation was below the 50 percent limitation for fiscal year 2005. Table 1 shows the reported allocation between the public and private sectors and the exempted workload funding. On the basis of our evaluation of selected 50-50 data, DOD’s April 2006 report provides an approximation of depot maintenance funding allocations between the public and private sectors for fiscal year 2005. The net effects of correcting the data inaccuracies we identified would increase the Army’s private-sector funding allocation from 49.4 percent to 50 percent. OSD guidance requires that the military departments establish measures to ensure correct accounting of interservice workloads; however the allocation of these funds may not always be accurately reported. Fiscal Year 2006 and 2007 Projections Are Not Reasonable Due to Data Inaccuracies
DOD’s reported projections for fiscal years 2006 through 2007 do not represent reasonable estimates of public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations, in part because some errors in DOD’s fiscal year 2005 data are carried into the projected years. If the adjustments we made to the Army’s fiscal year 2005 data—increasing the private-sector percentage by about 0.6 percentage points—are carried forward into fiscal year 2007 projections, it could cause the Army to come within 2 percent of the 50 percent limitation on contracting for depot-level maintenance and repair. To avoid breaching the 50 percent threshold, the Air Force is implementing a plan to ensure compliance in fiscal years 2007 through 2010. Under this plan, the Air Force is identifying and evaluating candidate weapon system programs for shifting maintenance workload from the private sector to the public sector. Our current review shows that while DOD has taken some additional actions to improve the quality of reported data for fiscal year 2005, it has not fully addressed the persistent deficiencies that have limited 50-50 data accuracy in the past. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the consistency and accuracy of depot maintenance funding allocation data in DOD’s annual 50-50 report to Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: Direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to follow OSD guidance and report funding obligations rather than expenditures. Our reasons for including these adjustments are discussed in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under 10 U.S.C. 2466, the military departments and defense agencies may use no more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding for work performed by private-sector contractors. The Department of Defense (DOD) must submit a report to Congress annually on the allocation of depot maintenance funding between the public and private sectors for the preceding fiscal year and projected distribution for the current and ensuing fiscal years for each of the armed forces and defense agencies. As required by Section 2466, GAO reviewed the report submitted in April 2006 and is, with this report, submitting its view to Congress on whether (1) the military departments and defense agencies complied with the 50-50 requirement for fiscal 2005 and (2) the projections for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 represent reasonable estimates. GAO obtained data used to develop the April 2006 report, conducted site visits, and reviewed supporting documentation.
What GAO Found
Although DOD reported to Congress that it complied with the 50-50 requirement for fiscal year 2005, GAO could not validate compliance due to weaknesses in DOD's financial management systems and the processes used to collect and report 50-50 data. DOD's April 2006 report provides an approximation of the depot maintenance funding allocation between the public and private sectors for fiscal year 2005. GAO identified errors in the reported data which, if adjusted, would increase the Army's private-sector funding allocation percentage from 49.4 percent to 50 percent. GAO found that 50-50 funding allocation data were not being consistently reported because some maintenance depots were reporting expenditures rather than following Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance and reporting obligations. Combining obligations and expenditures produces an inaccurate accounting of 50-50 funding allocations. GAO also found amounts associated with interservice depot maintenance work may not accurately reflect the actual allocation of private- and public-sector funds because visibility over the allocation of these funds is limited. OSD guidance requires that the military departments establish measures to ensure correct accounting of interservice workloads. In prior years' reports on DOD's compliance with the 50-50 requirement, GAO discussed deficiencies limiting data accuracy and recommended specific corrective actions. While DOD has taken some additional actions to improve the quality of reported data for fiscal year 2005, it has not fully addressed the persistent deficiencies that have limited 50-50 data accuracy. Reported projections do not represent reasonable estimates of public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 due to data inaccuracies. Errors GAO identified for fiscal year 2005 could affect these projections. If the adjustments GAO made to the Army's fiscal year 2005 data--increasing the private-sector percentage by about 0.6 percentage points--are carried forward, it could move the Army's projection to within 2 percent of the 50 percent limitation for fiscal year 2007. GAO also found that the projected numbers often did not include supplemental funds, which could change the allocation percentages. These errors and omissions affect the reasonableness and accuracy of the reported projections. To avoid breaching the 50 percent threshold in future years, the Air Force is implementing its plan to ensure compliance with the 50-50 requirement until fiscal year 2010. The plan involves moving some maintenance workload, including the F-100 engine, from the private sector to the public sector. |
gao_GAO-02-1 | gao_GAO-02-1_0 | These three on-line procurement programs are small but growing in comparison to overall federal procurement dollars. According to the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), the government procured about $232 billion and $209 billion in goods and services in fiscal years 2000 and 1999, respectively. Some of these obstacles relate to the general readiness of small businesses to conduct electronic commerce while others are specific to how the government has implemented electronic procurement activities. were small, which may at least partially account for the relatively large share of dollars awarded to small businesses in these programs. Obstacles to Small Businesses Conducting Electronic Procurements With the Government Reported
Although small businesses received a higher share of awards in the three on-line procurement programs than the governmentwide share, some small businesses still face reported obstacles to successfully participating in on-line government purchasing activities. An example of such an action is GSA’s Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) Web site, which has been designated the single governmentwide point of electronic entry on the Internet where vendors can access all the information they need to bid on available government business opportunities greater than $25,000. Federal Programs Provided Locally Coordinated Electronic Commerce Education to Businesses
Each of the four federally funded business assistance programs in our review provided electronic commerce education as part of its operations, although the level of involvement varied. | What GAO Found
The federal government has been pursuing electronic initiatives to strengthen its buying processes, reduce costs, and create a competitive "virtual" marketplace. Small businesses, however, may have difficulty participating in federal on-line procurement programs. Furthermore, the government's business outreach and education programs related to electronic commerce may not be adequately coordinated. For the three federal on-line procurement programs GAO reviewed, the dollar share of awards to small businesses exceeded the overall small business share of total federal contract dollars awarded in fiscal years 2000 and 1999. Although small businesses successfully participated in these three programs, they still face obstacles in conducting electronic procurements with the government. The federal government is taking steps to address some of these obstacles, such as implementing a single point of entry on the Internet for vendors to access information on available government business opportunities greater than $25,000. Each of the four business assistance programs GAO examined had taken steps to educate its clients on electronic commerce as part of its operations. However, GAO could not fully determine the extent of these activities because they are conducted by hundreds of local and regional offices, and only one of the programs collected performance metrics specific to electronic commerce. |
gao_GAO-13-20 | gao_GAO-13-20_0 | Background
As previously stated, TSA’s 2008 regulation requires passenger rail agencies to report potential threats and significant security concerns to the TSOC. This variation is compounded by inconsistency in compliance inspections and enforcement actions, due in part to limited utilization of oversight mechanisms at the headquarters level. According to PARIS data, from January 2011 through July 2012, Amtrak was inspected 145 times. To help fulfill TSA’s stated purpose for collecting rail security incident information and improve the accuracy and completeness of the incident data in TSA’s incident management system, WebEOC, we recommend that the Administrator of TSA take the following three actions: establish a process for updating the database when incidents that had not previously been reported are discovered through compliance activities; develop guidance for TSOC officials that includes definitions of data entry options to reduce errors resulting from data entry problems; and establish a systematic process for regularly conducting trend analysis of the rail security incident data, in an effort to identify potential security trends that could help the agency anticipate or prevent an attack against passenger rail and develop recommended security measures. TSA plans to disseminate the guidance to passenger rail agencies. According to DHS, existing oversight mechanisms include RSI-Ss, who serve as technical specialists, oversee and implement transportation security policy and programs, and conduct field office audits and visits, among other things. To what extent has TSA analyzed passenger rail security incident information to identify security trends and potential threats against passenger rail systems? To assess the extent to which TSA has overseen and enforced the rail security reporting requirement, we interviewed officials from the selected rail systems discussed earlier on how they have implemented this requirement, including the guidance they have received from TSA on the types of incidents to report to the TSOC. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist attacks on foreign passenger rail systems, which include rail transit and intercity rail, have underscored the importance of collecting and analyzing security incident information to identify potential vulnerabilities. Within the federal government, TSA is the primary agency responsible for overseeing and enhancing passenger rail security, and has several programs to fulfill this responsibility. In 2008, TSA issued a regulation requiring U.S. passenger rail agencies to report all potential threats and significant security concerns to TSA, among other things. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) TSA has overseen and enforced this reporting requirement and (2) TSA has analyzed passenger rail security incident information to identify security trends. GAO reviewed TSA policy documents, guidance, and incident data from January 2011 through June 2012, and interviewed federal officials and security officials from 19 passenger rail agencies. GAO selected these agencies, in part, because of their ridership volume. The results of these interviews are not generalizable but provide insights.
What GAO Found
GAO recommends, among other things, that TSA (1) develop guidance on the types of incidents that should be reported, (2) enhance existing oversight mechanisms for compliance inspections and enforcement actions, (3) develop guidance to reduce errors from data entry problems, and (4) establish a process for regularly conducting trend analysis of incident data. TSA concurred and is taking actions in response. |
gao_GAO-13-575 | gao_GAO-13-575_0 | Background
AD/CV Duty Laws
U.S. laws authorize the imposition of AD/CV duties to remedy unfair trade practices of other countries and foreign companies that cause material injury (or threat thereof) to domestic industries, namely dumping (i.e., sales at less than fair market value), and countervailable foreign government subsidies. In addition, prospective petitioners must demonstrate that they have sufficient support from the domestic industry. ITC’s Office of Investigations and Trade Remedy Assistance Office. Some SMEs Have Petitioned for the Imposition of AD/CV Duties and Most SME Petitioners Had Annual Sales Revenue of at Least $10 Million
SMEs Were Listed on a Third of the Petitions for AD/CV Duties and Represented a Quarter of Petitioners over the Past 6 Years
Our analysis showed that some SMEs petitioned for the imposition of AD/CV duties to seek relief from unfair trade practices; over the past 6 years, about one-third of the petitions for AD/CV duties listed SME petitioners and about a quarter of the total number of petitioners were SMEs. Close to half (17) of the 38 SME petitioners were in the iron and steel industry (see fig. Producers of goods under investigation, including SMEs, can benefit from successful AD/CV duty petitions even if they are not petitioners. The challenges most frequently cited were (1) high legal costs, (2) difficulty obtaining domestic and foreign pricing and production data, and (3) difficulty demonstrating industry support. Five of the six trade lawyers we interviewed roughly estimated that the average legal cost for pursuing an AD or CV duty case from petition through the investigation was between $1 million and $2 million, with approximately 70 to 75 percent of the cost incurred during the investigation phase. Pricing and Production Data Required during the Petition and Investigation Phases Are Difficult to Obtain
During the petition and investigation phases, it is often difficult for prospective petitioners to obtain domestic and foreign pricing and production data required by Commerce and ITC regulations and guidance. Commerce and ITC Assistance Can Help SMEs Address Key Challenges
Commerce and ITC Staff Help SMEs Obtain Data Required to File a Petition and Review Draft Petitions
Both Commerce and ITC have staff that respond to inquiries and provide information and assistance to SMEs to relieve some of the administrative challenges and costs of filing a petition. Self-Initiation of AD/CV Duty Investigations May Reduce Some Initial Costs but Could Also Have Adverse Effects
Commerce Reserves Use of its Authority to Self-Initiate Investigations to Special Circumstances
U.S. law authorizes Commerce to initiate an AD/CV duty investigation without a petition, but according to Commerce officials, the department reserves the use of this authority to special circumstances consistent with international trade agreements. Commerce has used this authority once since 1991, under special circumstances. Because self-initiation opens an investigation without a petition, it could reduce some initial costs to SMEs but could also have adverse effects, including raising questions of whether the action was taken consistent with U.S. obligations under international trade agreements. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Department of Commerce, the International Trade Commission, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the United States Small Business Administration. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) have petitioned for the imposition of antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) duties, (2) key challenges to SMEs’ ability to pursue the imposition of AD/CV duties, and (3) assistance provided by Commerce and ITC to help SMEs address these challenges. fewer than 500 employees), and (2) the company affiliation information. In addition, we interviewed three academics, representatives from two industry associations, six trade lawyers, two Congressional Research Service trade experts, and two SME petitioners. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States and many of its trading partners have enacted laws to remedy the unfair trade practices of other countries and foreign companies that cause or threaten to cause material injury to domestic producers and workers. U.S. laws authorize the imposition of AD duties on certain imports that were dumped (i.e., sold at less than fair market value) and CV duties on certain imports subsidized by foreign governments. Commerce and ITC conduct AD/CV duty investigations, most of which are initiated based on petitions filed on behalf of a domestic industry. According to the U.S. Census, in 2010, small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for 45 percent of employment in the manufacturing sector.
GAO was asked to review SMEs pursuit of trade remedies. This report examines (1) the extent to which SMEs have petitioned for the imposition of AD/CV duties, (2) key challenges to SMEs ability to pursue the imposition of AD/CV duties, and (3) assistance provided by Commerce and ITC to help SMEs address these challenges. GAO examined petition data from ITC and interviewed petitioners, trade lawyers, trade association officials, academics, trade experts from the Congressional Research Service, and Commerce and ITC officials. In addition, GAO reviewed AD/CV duty petitions and reports.
What GAO Found
Some small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)--which are defined by the Small Business Administration's Office of Advocacy as independent businesses with fewer than 500 employees--have petitioned for the imposition of antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) duties to seek relief from unfair trade practices. Among the 56 petitions filed between 2007 and 2012, GAO found 21 that included at least 1 SME petitioner. In addition, the 56 petitions represented a total of 147 petitioners, of which 38 were SMEs. The majority of these SME petitioners had annual sales revenue of at least $10 million. Close to half of the total SME petitioners were in the iron and steel industry. Since participation in the petitions is not mandatory, producers, including SMEs, may benefit from a successful petition even if they choose not to join as a petitioner.
SMEs face three key challenges when pursuing the imposition of AD/CV duties: (1) high legal costs, (2) difficulty obtaining domestic and foreign pricing and production data, and (3) difficulty demonstrating industry support. Trade lawyers estimated that the cost of pursuing an AD or CV case during the petition and investigation phases can average between $1 million and $2 million and sometimes more, especially if the case involves multiple countries. It is often difficult for prospective petitioners to obtain domestic and foreign pricing and production data required by Department of Commerce (Commerce) and International Trade Commission (ITC) regulations and guidance. In addition, it can be difficult for prospective petitioners to demonstrate enough industry support to meet statutory requirements.
Commerce and ITC both have offices that provide information and assistance to SMEs to help them meet some of the administrative requirements and reduce costs. Commerce has the authority to self-initiate an AD/CV duty investigation without a petition and has used this authority only once since 1991. According to Commerce officials, the Department uses this authority only when it has significant participation from the industry. Self-initiation would likely have little impact on SMEs' overall costs since SMEs incur most costs during the investigation phase. Also, self-initiation could have adverse effects, including raising questions of whether the action was taken consistent with U.S. obligations under international trade agreements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-171 | gao_GAO-04-171_0 | USAID’s microenterprise development program, which is highly decentralized, funded projects in 52 countries in 2001. USAID takes a collaborative approach in its microenterprise development program. 2). USAID annually collects data on its microenterprise program through the MRR. USAID Has Met Some Program Objectives
USAID’s microfinance activities have achieved some of the agency’s key program objectives but made limited progress toward others. First, microfinance can help to alleviate the effects of poverty among participants. Third, the program appears to have succeeded in encouraging the participation of women through micro loans. 3.) 4.) Although microfinance can help alleviate some of the impacts of poverty, the research literature does not show conclusively that it has lifted large numbers of people above the poverty line. In fiscal year 2001, 294 USAID-supported MFIs reported sustainability levels; of these, 112, or 38 percent, said that they were fully sustainable, a percentage that had remained consistent since 1999. MRR Data Generally Reliable but May Not Accurately Reflect USAID’s Microenterprise Activities
Although the basic data collected for USAID’s MRR are generally reliable, certain methodological problems may impede accurate reporting on the agency’s progress in meeting key goals. Specifically, it may not be reporting accurately (1) the actual amounts obligated to microenterprise activities, (2) whether 50 percent of USAID’s resources went to the very poor, and (3) the sustainability of USAID-supported MFIs. In addition, the agency has provided information on best practices to missions and implementing partners through policy guidance, training, and technical assistance. USAID Has Made Efforts to Identify and Disseminate Best Practices
According to officials from the World Bank and other organizations, USAID has recognized the importance of identifying and disseminating successful and unsuccessful attempts to design and implement microenterprise activities. SEEP has published two studies on microenterprise best practices. However, evidence suggests that microfinance alone has not lifted large numbers of the poor over the poverty line. Despite the general reliability of its data, certain methodological weaknesses in USAID’s MRR system may prevent the agency from reporting with precision its program expenditures, the percentage of its funds going to the very poor, the percentage of MFIs that are sustainable, and the extent of USAID’s contributions to the institutions it supports. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) microenterprise development program is meeting its key objectives, we first identified those objectives by reviewing the agency’s policy guidance and the pertinent legislation. Offer an array of services. Promote MFI sustainability. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. According to the 2001 MRR, “Microenterprises are small, often informally organized businesses that are owned and operated by poor and very poor entrepreneurs. This could potentially improve this aspect of USAID’s reporting. In addition to our assessment of its impact on poverty alleviation and poverty reduction, there are sections focused on reaching the poor and very poor and other services these groups may need; outreach to women; the sustainability of MFIs; the reliability of the MRR; best practices identified by the microenterprise development industry; USAID’s efforts to identify and promote best practices; whether USAID incorporates best practices in their projects; and a synopsis of 22 key studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Microenterprises--small businesses owned and operated by poor entrepreneurs--have potential to help the world's poorer populations. For this reason, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) included microenterprise development in its programming. In 2001, the agency reported that its was conducting microenterprise projects in 52 countries and had obligated almost $2 billion since 1988 to support its program. The program supports micro loans, among other services, to assist poor entrepreneurs. Since 1996, USAID has annually reported the program's results. To help Congress oversee USAID's management of its microenterprise development program, GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which the agency's microfinance activities are meeting the program's key objectives, (2) assess the reliability of USAID's reporting on its overall microenterprise activities, and (3) examine the agency's role in identifying and disseminating microenterprise best practices.
What GAO Found
USAID's microfinance activities have met some, but not all, of the agency's microenterprise program objectives. These objectives are to (1) reduce poverty among participants; (2) target the poor and very poor; (3) encourage women's participation; and (4) develop sustainable microfinance institutions (MFI). First, regarding reducing poverty--defined as alleviating its impacts or lifting and keeping a large number of people above the poverty line--GAO found that microfinance can help alleviate some impacts of poverty, incrementally improving borrowers' income levels and quality of life and offering an important coping mechanism to poor workers and their families. However, there is little evidence that it can lift and keep many over the poverty line. Second, microfinance generally has served the poor clustered around the poverty line but not the very poor. Third, USAID has successfully encouraged the participation of women, who have comprised about two-thirds of micro loan clients since 1997. Fourth, USAID has emphasized the importance of MFI sustainability. In fiscal 2001, of 294 USAID-supported MFIs that reported on sustainability, 38 percent reported achieving full sustainability--a percentage consistent since 1999. The basic data in USAID's Microenterprise Results Reporting (MRR) system are reliable, but certain methodological problems may affect the accuracy of some of the agency's reporting on key program objectives. Specifically, USAID may not be reporting accurately (1) the amounts it has obligated to microenterprise activities; (2) whether 50 percent of its resources went to the very poor, as required by Congress; and (3) the sustainability of USAID-supported institutions. Further, although the agency reports annually on the activities of institutions it supports, it does not show the percentage of those institutions' total funding that its contribution represents. USAID has identified and disseminated microenterprise best practices, providing information to its missions and implementing partners through policy guidance, training, and technical assistance. In addition, USAID has collaborated with microenterprise development provider networks and others to publish information about these practices. |
gao_RCED-97-4 | gao_RCED-97-4_0 | Since deregulation, established airlines have expanded into many new markets and numerous new airlines have started up. While such arrangements exist at many airports across the country, their predominance at several important airports in the East and upper Midwest exacerbates the negative impact of slots on competition in those regions. “As a means to improve access for new air carrier entrants, we have previously proposed a modest withdrawal of air carrier slots, not to exceed 3 percent on an annual basis, for reallocation to new entrants and small incumbents by lottery. . . . the FAA is urged to consider this option which would improve the competitive environment, but would not seriously compromise existing operations.”
Congressional Efforts to Spur Entry at Slot-Controlled Airports Have Had Limited Success
Recognizing the need for new entry at the slot-controlled airports, in 1994 the Congress directed DOT to (1) study whether slot controls were still needed and (2) grant exemptions from those controls—in effect, issue new slots—for new entrants seeking to serve either O’Hare, LaGuardia, or Kennedy when DOT “finds it to be in the public interest and the circumstances to be exceptional.” In part, the Congress was responding to the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, which in 1993 recommended that the slot controls be reviewed “with the aim of either removing these artificial limits or raising them to the highest practical level consistent with safety requirements.”
In its congressionally directed study, DOT found that eliminating slots would not affect safety and would result in increased competition, thereby lowering fares and expanding air service options for consumers. Long-Term, Exclusive-Use Gate Leases Also Continue to Hinder Airline Entry
In 1990, our survey of the 66 largest U.S. airports revealed that 85 percent of their gates were leased to established airlines under long-term, exclusive-use leases. As table 2 shows, the vast majority of gates at each airport are exclusively leased, usually to one established airline. As a result, according to executives at many airlines that started after deregulation, it is extremely difficult to gain competitive access to these airports. Barriers to Entry Contribute to Higher Airfares, but Effect on Quality of Service Is More Difficult to Measure
While many factors, such as the relative amounts of business and leisure travel, affect the average airfares at an airport, the markets affected by operating barriers tend to have much higher fares. By discouraging entry, the airlines’ various marketing strategies perpetuate such dominance. Measuring the effects of barriers to entry on the quality of service in these markets, however, is more difficult. While barriers to entry reduce the number of airline options available, consumers in these markets receive benefits in other ways. For example, consumers receive free trips as a result of frequent flier plans. Scope and Methodology
To determine if barriers to entry exist and, if so, the extent to which they prevent airlines from entering new markets, we interviewed the senior management of all 10 established airlines and 26 of the 38 airlines that started after deregulation and that operated in 1995. Airline Competition: Industry Operating and Marketing Practices Limit Market Entry (GAO/RCED-90-147, Aug. 29, 1990). Airline Takeoff and Landing Slots: Department of Transportation’s Slot Allocation Rule (GAO/RCED-86-92, Jan. 31, 1986). A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on airline operating and marketing practices that restrict the entry of new airlines in the deregulated airline industry, focusing on: (1) whether barriers still exist that prevent airlines, particularly those started after deregulation, from servicing new markets; and (2) how these barriers have affected fares and service.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) barriers to entry persist in the airline industry; (2) federal limits on takeoff and landing slots at certain major airports, long-term exclusive-use gate leases, and perimeter rules prohibiting flights of certain distances at LaGuardia and Washington National Airport continue to impede new airlines' access to airports; (3) while such barriers can potentially affect any airline, they primarily affect airlines started after deregulation because the established airlines hold nearly all of the slots, are usually the beneficiaries of exclusive-use gate leases, and have their hubs located close enough to airports to avoid perimeter rule limitations; (4) these barriers particularly impede the entry of newer airlines in key markets in the East and upper Midwest because several airports in those regions have leased most of their gates to one airline; (5) even where airport access is not a problem, airlines sometimes choose not to enter new markets because certain strategies of established airlines make it extremely difficult for other carriers to attract traffic; (6) taken together, these marketing strategies deter new as well as established airlines from entering those markets where an established airline is dominant; (7) as a result, competition suffers, leading to higher airfares; and (8) the effect of these strategies tends to be the greatest, and fares the highest, in markets where the dominant carrier's position is protected by operating barriers. GAO also found that: (1) measuring the effects of barriers to entry on the quality of service is more difficult; and (2) while barriers may reduce the number of competing service options, consumers receive benefits in other ways, such as free frequent flier trips. |
gao_GAO-13-128 | gao_GAO-13-128_0 | DOD is a supporting agency which provides assistance to the lead federal agency for a specific civil support mission. Some DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Mission Guidance Is Outdated or Incomplete, and No Routine Process Exists to Ensure Regular Updating
DOD has issued numerous policies and guidance related to its homeland defense and civil support missions; however some of it is outdated or incomplete, and no process exists to ensure updates are made to its primary homeland defense and civil support strategy. Further, DOD’s existing homeland defense and civil support guidance does not incorporate important details related to the dual-status commander construct and the department’s response to a domestic cyber incident, such as its roles and responsibilities. DOD has established processes to issue and regularly update its directives and joint publications for homeland defense and civil support missions, but the department has not updated its primary strategy for these missions—the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support— since it was initially issued in 2005, and it does not have a process similar While DOD plans to that for its directives and joint publications to do so.to issue an updated strategy in the fall of 2012 in response to a 2010 GAO recommendation and internal department discussions, it has not yet developed a process to assess the need for future updates. In August 2010, the Joint Staff determined that the joint publication on homeland defense, Joint Publication 3-27 needed a complete revision based on feedback they received from the joint doctrine development community. According to Joint Staff officials, the revised joint publications are expected to reflect changes in national and department priorities and incorporate lessons learned from exercises and events such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Moreover, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and prior GAO audit work state that, to be effective, In the guidance—including strategies—should be current and complete.intervening years since the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs issued the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, key national- and department-level guidance has been issued and significant civil support events have occurred that are not reflected in the department’s primary strategy. Nevertheless, gaps in guidance remain because DOD has not yet developed comprehensive policies and procedures regarding the use and availability of dual-status commanders. Also, without guidance on a process to determine the appropriate mix of individuals trained and certified to be dual-status commanders from the National Guard and active duty federal officers for the 54 U.S. states and territories, DOD’s ability to adequately prepare for and effectively use dual-status commanders for a range of civil support events, including those affecting multiple states, may be hindered. Although DOD has some civil support guidance and an agreement with DHS for preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents, these documents do not provide some aspects of how DOD will support a domestic cyber incident. While DOD’s guidance for its civil support mission broadly describes how the department can support other federal agencies during a civil support incident, DOD has not updated its civil support guidance to reflect current DOD cyber roles and responsibilities. In addition, the chartering directives for the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs have assigned overlapping roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents. Second, DOD has not taken adequate steps to ensure that its guidance aligns with national-level guidance and preparations for domestic cyber incidents. Without guidance that aligns with national level plans and preparations, DOD’s ability to support DHS during a domestic cyber incident could be hindered. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and in collaboration with other appropriate stakeholders such as U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and the National Guard Bureau, to develop implementation guidance on the dual-status commander construct that, at a minimum, includes: more specific criteria for determining when and how to use dual-status commanders, especially for civil support incidents affecting multiple states and territories and a process for determining the appropriate mix of National Guard and active duty federal officers to meet DOD’s anticipated needs. Such guidance should, at a minimum, include a description of DOD’s roles and responsibilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued current and comprehensive guidance, we reviewed homeland defense and civil support doctrine, policy, and strategy and other relevant documentation, and met with officials from DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss the currency of the department’s guidance and identify any potential gaps in the guidance that may exist. Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Defending U.S. territory and citizens is the highest priority of DOD, and providing defense support of civil authorities is one of the department's primary missions. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility for homeland defense, whereas for civil support missions DOD provides assistance to the lead civilian federal agency, such as DHS, when requested by the agency or directed by the President for major disasters, emergencies, and special events. This report examines the extent to which DOD has issued current guidance, including doctrine, policy, and strategy, for its homeland defense and civil support missions. To do this, GAO analyzed DOD homeland defense and civil support guidance and plans and met with select DOD and National Guard officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) protects the U.S. homeland through two distinct but interrelated missions: (1) homeland defense, which defends against threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber incidents; and (2) civil support, which involves supporting other federal agencies in responding to major domestic disasters, emergencies, and special events. DOD has issued and updated several key pieces of doctrine, policy, and strategy for homeland defense and civil support, but it has not updated its primary Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support since it was initially issued in 2005 and does not have a process--similar to that for its joint publications and directives-- to do so. The Joint Staff determined in August 2010 that joint publications on homeland defense needed a complete revision. The joint publication on civil support is also being revised. U.S. Northern Command, the combatant command responsible for homeland defense, is revising these publications to reflect changes in national and department priorities and to incorporate lessons learned from exercises and events such as Hurricane Katrina. Still, such key national and department-level strategies and significant events are not reflected in DOD's strategy, in part because the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs does not have a process for periodically assessing the currency of its homeland defense and civil support strategy and ensuring that needed updates are completed in a timely manner. Reliance on an outdated strategy could hinder DOD's ability to effectively plan for and respond to major disasters and emergencies.
DOD issued some guidance on the dual-status commander construct--through which, during a civil support incident or special event, a single military officer has authority over both National Guard and active-duty military personnel, serving as a link between state and federal forces. Nevertheless, gaps in guidance remain because DOD has not yet developed comprehensive policies and procedures regarding the use and availability of dual-status commanders, including specific criteria and conditions for when and how a state governor and the Secretary of Defense would mutually appoint a commander. As a result, DOD's ability to adequately prepare for and effectively use dual-status commanders for a range of civil support events, including those affecting multiple states, may be hindered.
While a 2010 DOD Directive, a 2007 joint publication, and an agreement with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide some details on how DOD should respond to requests for civil support in the event of a domestic cyber incident, they do not address some aspects of how DOD will provide support during a response. First, DOD has not clarified its roles and responsibilities, and chartering directives for DOD's Offices of the Assistant Secretaries for Global Strategic Affairs and for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs outline conflicting and overlapping roles and responsibilities. Second, DOD has not ensured that its civil support guidance is aligned with national plans and preparations for domestic cyber incidents. Consequently, it is unclear whether DOD will be adequately prepared to support DHS during a cyber incident. This report makes several recommendations to address gaps in DOD's guidance for homeland defense and civil support, including for DOD to assess and, when needed, update its primary strategy; develop implementation guidance on the dual status commander construct; and align guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with national-level guidance to include roles and responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
This report makes several recommendations to address gaps in DOD's guidance for homeland defense and civil support, including for DOD to assess and, when needed, update its primary strategy; develop implementation guidance on the dualstatus commander construct; and align guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with national-level guidance to include roles and responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-17-693 | gao_GAO-17-693_0 | Background
To help fulfill its role as the nation’s health protection agency, HHS’s CDC conducts and supports research, including prevention research. CDC makes its PRC awards through a competitive process; there are currently 26 PRCs, located in 24 states, funded for fiscal years 2014 through 2019. According to CDC, eligibility for SIPs is limited to PRCs because the centers are “uniquely positioned to oversee, coordinate, and perform applied public health research that promotes the field of health promotion and disease prevention research due to their established relationships with multidisciplinary faculty and community partners.”
SIP Award Process and Public Disclosure
Subject matter experts (SME) within CDC sponsoring units propose potential SIPs each year, depending on unit needs—e.g., particular research gaps that have been identified—and available funding. CDC Chooses the SIP Mechanism to Fund Community- Based Prevention Research
CDC Chooses the SIP Mechanism to Fund Research Focused on Public Health Prevention Involving Community Participation
In general, CDC officials we spoke with told us they will choose the SIP mechanism when seeking to fund prevention research that is community- based and would benefit from having access to a multidisciplinary group of researchers. In addition, CDC officials told us that they choose the SIP mechanism to conduct research when seeking to access researchers who have established partnerships with diverse population groups across the country. In contrast, CDC officials explained that they would not choose the SIP mechanism if the desired research would be better suited for an entity other than an academic health center. Sponsoring unit officials also told us that they will not choose the SIP mechanism when the research they want to fund is not focused on public health prevention, such as when the research is clinical or laboratory based, or when the timing of the research does not align with the PRC funding cycle (e.g., a longitudinal study or a study that would cross two PRC funding cycles). Collaboration with Federal and Nonfederal Experts Informs Development of SIP Funding Opportunities and Reduces Potential for Unnecessary Duplication
CDC officials told us that CDC SMEs’ relationships and collaboration with experts in the field—including federal and nonfederal experts—help inform the development of the research funding opportunities made available through SIPs, as well as other mechanisms. (See table 1 for examples of the workgroups and advisory committees in which CDC SMEs participate.) These interactions, as well as the SME’s review of the scientific and nonscientific literature, are used to determine gaps in knowledge and inform the research proposed to be funded through SIPs or other mechanisms. Ability to Rapidly Initiate Research Cited as Key Advantage of Limited Eligibility for SIPs; Disadvantages Included Potentially Reduced Access to Outside Expertise
The main advantage of limiting eligibility for SIPs to the PRCs is the ability to rapidly initiate high-quality research, due to the infrastructure and relationships the PRCs have in place, according to officials from CDC, outside organizations, and PRCs. Officials from CDC and outside organizations identified a few potential disadvantages to limiting eligibility for SIPs, including the potential for reduced access to expertise outside of the PRCs and the risk of being unable to conduct desired research at the desired time. CDC officials and officials from PRCs said that PRCs have the ability to bring in the expertise from outside the PRC institution through subcontracts with other entities, which could help alleviate this concern. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Information on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Special Interest Projects (SIPs)
Appendix I: Information on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Special Interest Projects (SIPs)
Tables 2, 3, and 4 below present data on SIPs awarded in fiscal years 2014 through 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
CDC, an agency within HHS, created the SIP program in 1993 as a supplemental funding mechanism to support health promotion and disease-prevention research being done at its PRCs. Currently, there are 26 PRCs. In fiscal years 2014 through 2016, CDC awarded more than $40 million for SIPs. SIP topics vary from year to year but are to be aligned with public health priorities, such as the Healthy People 2020 Objectives—HHS's 10-year national objectives for improving Americans' health. SIPs are sponsored and primarily funded by CDC organizational units, referred to as sponsoring units.
House Report 114-195 included a provision for GAO to review the SIP program. This report describes (1) what research CDC chooses to fund through the SIP mechanism, and (2) what have been identified as advantages and disadvantages of SIP eligibility being limited to PRCs. GAO reviewed documents from CDC and analyzed CDC data on SIPs awarded in fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also interviewed CDC officials, including officials from 5 of the 10 sponsoring units that together accounted for over 90 percent of SIP funding during this time period, officials from 4 PRCs with varying experience with SIPs, and 4 organizations with knowledge of prevention research.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) uses the Special Interest Project (SIP) mechanism to fund community-based prevention research that would benefit from a multidisciplinary group of researchers. SIPs are supplemental funding awards that focus on topics of interest or gaps in knowledge or research and can also support the development of state and local public health interventions and policies. SIPs are only available to CDC's Prevention Research Centers (PRC)—selected academic health centers at universities with schools of public health or medical schools with residency programs in preventive medicine.
CDC officials said that they would choose the SIP mechanism when the research they want to fund is intended to involve community-based organizations or members of the community. They also use SIPs when they seek access to researchers who have established partnerships with diverse population groups across the country. They would not choose the SIP mechanism when the research they want to fund is not focused on public health prevention, including research that is clinical or laboratory-based; would be better suited for an entity other than an academic health center; or would be better funded through a contract to allow CDC to direct the research protocol. CDC's collaborations with experts in the field—including those at other federal agencies—help to inform its development of the research funding opportunities offered through SIPs. For example, CDC officials use information they learn through participation in multiagency workgroups and advisory committees to identify gaps in knowledge that SIP funding could help to address. CDC officials also stated that this collaboration can also help to avoid potential duplication of research.
The key advantage of SIPs being limited to PRCs is the ability to rapidly initiate research, according to officials with whom GAO spoke—including officials from CDC, PRCs, and organizations with knowledge of prevention research. Factors cited as contributing to this ability included the research infrastructure and community relationships already established at the PRCs. Officials from CDC and outside organizations also identified a few potential disadvantages to limiting eligibility for SIPs, including the potential for reduced access to expertise from researchers or others who are not affiliated with the universities in which PRCs are located, although some noted that PRCs may bring in outside expertise through subcontracts with other entities.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-859 | gao_GAO-06-859_0 | VA Estimates about 194,000 Veterans Are Homeless and Has Increased Its Capacity to Provide Transitional Housing
VA estimates that on a given night in fiscal year 2005 about 194,000 veterans were homeless. The estimate, generally lower than the numbers reported prior to 2004, is considered by VA officials to be the best estimate available. While VA has increased its capacity to provide transitional housing for homeless veterans in recent years, its program planning efforts indicate that an additional 9,600 transitional housing beds from various sources are needed to meet current demand. We also found that communication issues related to program policies could prevent veterans from being offered care. GPD Providers Create Partnerships to Help Veterans Meet Program Goals, but Resource Gaps Remain
GPD providers generally created partnerships to help prepare veterans to obtain permanent housing and, ultimately, to live independently. Table 2 lists examples of services and partners of GPD providers we visited. To meet the needs of veterans who were not eligible for VA health care, GPD providers made other arrangements. VA Data Show That the GPD Program Helps Veterans Get Housing and Income, but Data Are Limited on Veterans’ Circumstances after They Leave the Program
VA data show that in fiscal years 2000-2005 a steady or increasing percentage of veterans had stable housing, income, and greater self- determination at the time they left the GPD program. Also, VA recently completed a onetime study looking at longer-term outcomes for homeless veterans, including 520 who participated in the GPD program, and preliminary results show that positive housing outcomes were maintained 1 year after veterans left the GPD program. However, VA does not routinely collect follow-up information to determine the status of participants at specified times after they leave the program and may not be able to rely on the results of its study to determine the success of future program participants. Limited resources— particularly the availability of affordable permanent housing—make this job even more difficult. However, the agency disagreed with the statement in our draft report that VA officials attribute the decrease in the estimates of homeless veterans to VA’s estimation process and better local data. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to review (1) Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) estimates of the total number of homeless veterans and the number of transitional beds available, (2) the extent of collaboration involved in the provision of Homeless Providers Grant and Per Diem (GPD) program and related services, and (3) VA’s assessment of GPD program performance. We did not review the validity of VA’s estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
About one-third of the nation's adult homeless population are veterans, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Many of these veterans have experienced substance abuse, mental illness, or both. The VA's Homeless Providers Grant and Per Diem (GPD) program, which is up for reauthorization, provides transitional housing to help veterans prepare for permanent housing. As requested, GAO reviewed (1) VA homeless veterans estimates and the number of transitional housing beds, (2) the extent of collaboration involved in the provision of GPD and related services, and (3) VA's assessment of GPD program performance. GAO analyzed VA data and methods used for the homeless estimates and performance assessment, and visited selected GPD providers in four states to observe the extent of collaboration.
What GAO Found
VA estimates that on a given night about 194,000 veterans were homeless in 2005. The estimate, generally lower than the numbers reported prior to 2004, is considered by VA officials to be the best available. VA officials believe that its new estimation process and use of better local data have improved the estimate. While VA has increased the capacity of the GPD program over the past several years, VA reports that an additional 9,600 transitional housing beds from various sources are needed to meet current demand. VA has plans to make 2,200 additional GPD beds available. GPD providers collaborate with other agencies to help veterans regain their health and obtain housing, jobs, and various services to enable them to live independently. However, resource and communications gaps may stand in the way of VA and provider efforts to meet these goals. Limited availability of affordable permanent housing, for example, may make it difficult to move veterans out of homelessness, according to GPD providers. We also identified instances of misunderstandings of program policies related to eligibility and program stay limits that could prevent homeless veterans from being admitted into the GPD program. VA assesses overall program performance by the success of veterans in attaining stable housing, income, and self-determination at the time they leave the program. VA data show that the percentage of veterans achieving these goals has generally increased or held steady over time. In 2006, VA also stepped up its assessment of the performance of GPD providers. While these assessments do not indicate how veterans fare after they leave the program, preliminary results of a onetime VA study indicate positive housing outcomes were maintained 1 year later. However, VA does not routinely collect follow-up data and may not be able to determine how veterans who were not included in the study are faring after they leave the program. |
gao_GAO-09-314T | gao_GAO-09-314T_0 | Today’s Financial Regulatory System Was Built over the Course of More Than a Century, Largely in Response to Crises or Market Developments
As a result of 150 years of changes in financial regulation in the United States, the regulatory system has become complex and fragmented. Today, responsibilities for overseeing the financial services industry are shared among almost a dozen federal banking, securities, futures, and other regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies. Changes in Financial Institutions and Their Products Have Significantly Challenged the U.S. Financial Regulatory System
Several key developments in financial markets and products in the past few decades have significantly challenged the existing financial regulatory structure. Regulators have struggled, and often failed, to mitigate the systemic risks posed by these conglomerates, and to ensure they adequately manage their risks. A second dramatic development in U.S. financial markets in recent decades has been the increasingly critical roles played by less-regulated entities. In particular, the increasing prevalence of new and more complex investment products has challenged regulators and investors, and consumers have faced difficulty understanding new and increasingly complex retail mortgage and credit products. Fourth, standard setters for accounting and financial regulators have faced growing challenges in ensuring that accounting and audit standards appropriately respond to financial market developments, and in addressing challenges arising from the global convergence of accounting and auditing standards. Finally, with the increasingly global aspects of financial markets, the current fragmented U.S. regulatory structure has complicated some efforts to coordinate internationally with other regulators. A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Alternatives for Reforming the U.S. Financial Regulatory System
As a result of significant market developments in recent decades that have outpaced a fragmented and outdated regulatory structure, significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory system are critically and urgently needed. The current system has important weaknesses that, if not addressed, will continue to expose the nation’s financial system to serious risks. Our report offers a framework for crafting and evaluating regulatory reform proposals; it consists of the following nine characteristics that should be reflected in any new regulatory system. By applying the elements of this framework, the relative strengths and weaknesses of any reform proposal should be better revealed, and policymakers should be able to focus on identifying trade-offs and balancing competing goals. Similarly, the framework could be used to craft proposals, or to identify aspects to be added to existing proposals to make them more effective and appropriate for addressing the limitations of the current system. 1. 2. As we noted in our report, gaps in the current level of federal oversight of mortgage lenders, credit rating agencies, and certain complex financial products such as CDOs and credit default swaps likely have contributed to the current crisis. 3. Efficient and effective. Key issues to be addressed: Consider the appropriate role of the states in a financial regulatory system and how federal and state roles can be better harmonized. Such efforts are under way in other jurisdictions. Washington, D.C.: January 8, 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's January 8, 2009, report that provides a framework for modernizing the outdated U.S. financial regulatory system. GAO prepared this work under the authority of the Comptroller General to help policymakers weigh various regulatory reform proposals and consider ways in which the current regulatory system could be made more effective and efficient. This testimony (1) describes how regulation has evolved in banking, securities, thrifts, credit unions, futures, insurance, secondary mortgage markets and other important areas; (2) describes several key changes in financial markets and products in recent decades that have highlighted significant limitations and gaps in the existing regulatory system; and (3) presents an evaluation framework that can be used by Congress and others to shape potential regulatory reform efforts.
What GAO Found
The current U.S. financial regulatory system has relied on a fragmented and complex arrangement of federal and state regulators--put into place over the past 150 years--that has not kept pace with major developments in financial markets and products in recent decades. Today, almost a dozen federal regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies share responsibility for overseeing the financial services industry. As the nation finds itself in the midst of one of the worst financial crises ever, it has become apparent that the regulatory system is ill-suited to meet the nation's needs in the 21st century. Several key changes in financial markets and products in recent decades have highlighted significant limitations and gaps in the existing regulatory system. First, regulators have struggled, and often failed, to mitigate the systemic risks posed by large and interconnected financial conglomerates and to ensure they adequately manage their risks. Second, regulators have had to address problems in financial markets resulting from the activities of large and sometimes less-regulated market participants--such as nonbank mortgage lenders, hedge funds, and credit rating agencies--some of which play significant roles in today's financial markets. Third, the increasing prevalence of new and more complex investment products has challenged regulators and investors, and consumers have faced difficulty understanding new and increasingly complex retail mortgage and credit products. Fourth, standard setters for accounting and financial regulators have faced growing challenges in ensuring that accounting and audit standards appropriately respond to financial market developments, and in addressing challenges arising from the global convergence of accounting and auditing standards. Finally, as financial markets have become increasingly global, the current fragmented U.S. regulatory structure has complicated some efforts to coordinate internationally with other regulators. These significant developments have outpaced a fragmented and outdated regulatory structure, and, as a result, significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory system are critically and urgently needed. The current system has significant weaknesses that, if not addressed, will continue to expose the nation's financial system to serious risks. Our report offers a framework for crafting and evaluating regulatory reform proposals consisting of nine characteristics that should be reflected in any new regulatory system. By applying the elements of the framework, the relative strengths and weaknesses of any reform proposal should be better revealed, and policymakers should be able to focus on identifying trade-offs and balancing competing goals. Similarly, the framework could be used to craft proposals, or to identify aspects to be added to existing proposals to make them more effective and appropriate for addressing the limitations of the current system. |
gao_GAO-17-337 | gao_GAO-17-337_0 | In addition to the requirements for the participating agencies, the reauthorization act included requirements for the participating agencies’ OIGs. Implementation of Agency Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Prevention Requirements Has Varied, and SBA Has Provided Limited Oversight of the Implementation
Agencies have varied in their implementation of the SBIR and STTR fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements in SBA’s policy directives, although some agencies have taken actions beyond those required in the policy directives. For 6 other requirements, more than half of the agencies had fully implemented the requirements while the other agencies had partially or not implemented them. For the remaining 2 requirements, 3 agencies had fully implemented 1, while only 1 agency had fully implemented the other. Site visits allow officials to view, either in person or remotely, the awardee’s research efforts and can confirm that the necessary facilities exist for technical R&D work. SBA officials told us that they believe that they have fulfilled their role to oversee agencies’ implementation of the fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements by convening the group of program managers and OIG officials to develop and issue the requirements. The Majority of OIG Requirements Have Been Implemented by Most Offices, but DOD Military Services’ OIGs Are Not Implementing These Requirements
Most OIGs for the 11 participating agencies have implemented the majority of their SBIR and STTR fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements, as specified in the reauthorization act, with 2 OIGs engaging in additional activities to prevent and address fraud. Between 5 and 11 OIGs have fully implemented each of the requirements. Each of the 11 agencies’ OIGs submitted reports for each of the 4 years. Specifically, we found that none of the three military services’ OIGs had taken actions to implement their SBIR fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements, although the DOD OIG had taken some steps to implement these requirements. The division of duties between the military services’ OIGs and their respective investigative services makes it difficult to track DOD’s implementation of the requirements. Without the three military services’ OIGs implementing the requirements themselves or delegating the implementation of the requirements to the investigative services, the DOD OIGs may not be able to detect fraud, waste, and abuse in DOD’s SBIR and STTR programs, which have the largest budgets for these programs. Without confirming that participating agencies are implementing the minimum fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements in the policy directives by, for example, requesting documentation, SBA does not have reasonable assurance that each agency has a fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system in place to help reduce their vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. However, the three military services’ OIGs within DOD have not implemented all of the requirements or delegated them to the investigative services. To help ensure that DOD is implementing the fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements to the OIGs, we recommend that the Inspectors General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force implement the requirements themselves or delegate the implementation of the requirements to the investigative services. Specifically, DOD stated that it concurred with our recommendation that the Army, Navy, and Air Force OIGs implement the fraud, waste, and abuse requirements themselves or delegate the implementation of the requirements to the investigative services, but provided no additional details. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which (1) participating agencies and the Small Business Administration (SBA) have implemented fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs and (2) OIGs have implemented fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements in the SBIR and STTR programs. We requested and reviewed documentation from the 11 participating agencies’ OIGs on their actions to address the fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements and compared this information to the requirements in the reauthorization act. The full text of the requirements, as they appear in the statute reauthorizing the programs, is as follows: The Inspector General of each Federal agency that participates in the SBIR program or STTR program shall cooperate to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the SBIR program and the STTR program by:
Establishing fraud detection indicators. | Why GAO Did This Study
For about 35 years, federal agencies have made awards to small businesses for technology research and development through the SBIR program and, for the last 25 years, through the STTR program. Following a 2009 congressional hearing about fraud in the programs, the SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011 included separate requirements for SBA and OIGs to address and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.
The act also included a provision for GAO to review what the agencies and their OIGs have done to address fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs. This report examines (1) the extent to which SBA and the participating agencies have implemented measures to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse for the SBIR and STTR programs and (2) the extent to which the agencies' OIGs have implemented the act's requirements.
GAO compared documentation from SBA, the 11 participating agencies, and the agencies' OIGs to their respective requirements and interviewed SBA, agency, and OIG officials.
What GAO Found
The 11 agencies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs have varied in their implementation of the fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements developed by the Small Business Administration (SBA) after the programs were reauthorized in 2011. SBA, which oversees the programs, amended the SBIR and STTR policy directives in 2012, as required by the reauthorization act, to include 10 minimum requirements to help agencies prevent potential fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs. GAO found that the extent to which the agencies have fully implemented each of the requirements in the directives varies. For example, all 11 agencies have fully implemented 2 requirements, more than half of the agencies have fully implemented 6 other requirements, and 1 and 3 agencies, respectively, have fully implemented the remaining 2 requirements. Officials from 9 agencies told GAO they have implemented other activities beyond the minimum requirements included in the directives, such as conducting site visits to small businesses to confirm that the necessary facilities exist for technical research and development work. Although SBA issued the policy directives, it has taken few actions to oversee agencies' efforts to implement the requirements. SBA officials said they checked on the implementation of one of the requirements, but did not know whether the participating agencies were implementing the other requirements because they had not confirmed this information. Without confirming that each participating agency is implementing the fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements in the policy directives, SBA does not have reasonable assurance that each agency has a system in place to reduce its' vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse.
Similarly, Offices of Inspectors General (OIG) varied in their implementation of the fraud, waste, and abuse prevention requirements specifically assigned to them in the reauthorization act, with between 5 and 11 OIGs implementing each requirement. For example, OIGs at each of the 11 agencies have shared information on fraud, waste, and abuse. Of the 11 participating agencies, the Department of Defense (DOD) is the only one whose oversight and audit responsibilities are separated between its various OIGs and specific investigative services, so that DOD has both an OIG as well as an investigative service as do each of the military services. By law, the OIGs of each military service within DOD—Army, Navy, and Air Force—are each required to implement these requirements. However, GAO found that none of the three military service OIGs had taken actions to implement the requirements, although the DOD OIG had taken some steps to implement them. The division of duties between the military services' OIGs and their respective investigative services makes it difficult to track the implementation of these requirements at DOD. Without the three military services' OIGs implementing the requirements themselves or delegating the implementation of the requirements to the investigative services, the DOD OIGs may not be able to detect fraud, waste, and abuse in DOD's SBIR and STTR programs, which have the largest budgets for these programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that SBA confirm agency implementation of the fraud, waste, and abuse requirements, and that the Army, Navy, and Air Force OIGs implement the OIG requirements or delegate them to the investigative services. These agencies generally agreed with the recommendations addressed to them. |
gao_GAO-09-678 | gao_GAO-09-678_0 | Federal and Industry Stakeholders Have Assessed Individual Elements of Risk, Which Have Informed TSA’s Security Strategy, but TSA Could Strengthen Its Approach by Conducting a Risk Assessment and Updating Its Security Strategy
Since 2004, federal and industry stakeholders have conducted assessments of individual elements of risk—threat, vulnerability and consequence— and this information has informed TSA’s mass transit and passenger rail security strategy. Additionally, TSA has gathered vulnerability data through such programs as the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE). While TSA reported using these various assessments to inform its mass transit and passenger rail security strategy, it could further strengthen its approach for securing these systems by combining the results from these assessments to conduct a risk assessment of the mass transit and passenger rail systems. Completing a risk assessment would provide TSA greater assurance that it is directing its resources toward mitigating the highest priority risks. For example, TSA plans to introduce a performance measure for its BASE review program. Federal and Industry Stakeholders Have Taken Key Actions to Strengthen Transit Security and Federal Actions Have Been Generally Consistent with TSA’s Strategy, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Some Programs
Since 2004, federal and industry stakeholders have implemented several key actions to strengthen the security of the nation’s mass transit and passenger rail systems and federal actions have generally been consistent with TSA’s security strategy. However, TSA’s security directives contained limited requirements for passenger rail, and TSA has not enforced their implementation. TSA Reported Implementing Some 9/11 Commission Act Provisions for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but Implementing New Regulations May Pose Challenges for TSA and Industry Stakeholders
In March 2009, TSA reported that it had implemented some of the 9/11 Commission Act’s provisions related to mass transit and passenger rail security. But the reports did not include a plan for addressing these challenges or milestones for implementing several 9/11 Act Commission provisions, as called for by project management best practices. However, until TSA develops a plan with milestones, it will be difficult to provide reasonable assurance that the provisions of the act are being developed and that a strategy is in place for overcoming identified challenges. Additionally, these 12 agencies also reported concerns about the logistical feasibility of implementing the training requirement. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Transportation Security Administration is successfully prioritizing resources and collaborating with federal and industry stakeholders in implementing actions to secure the mass transit and passenger rail systems from acts of terrorism, and that its strategy is consistent with the characteristics of a successful national strategy, we are making six recommendations to the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration: To help ensure that the federal strategy to secure the mass transit and passenger rail systems considers assessment information within the context of risk, TSA, as the sector-specific agency for mass transit and passenger rail, should conduct a risk assessment that integrates all three elements of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to: (1) determine the extent that federal and industry stakeholders assessed or supported assessments of the security risks to mass transit and passenger rail since 2004, and how, if at all, TSA used risk assessment information to inform and update its security strategy; (2) describe key actions, if any, that federal and industry stakeholders implemented or initiated, since 2004, to strengthen the security of mass transit and passenger rail systems, the extent to which federal actions were consistent with TSA’s security strategy, and what challenges, if any, TSA faces in implementing these actions; and (3) describe TSA’s reported status in implementing provisions of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 related to mass transit and passenger rail security, and discuss challenges, if any, TSA and the mass transit and passenger rail industry face in implementing the actions required by the act. Moreover, to obtain information on industry perspectives of potential challenges, we interviewed officials from 30 mass transit and passenger rail systems and Amtrak as well as APTA. Homeland Security Advisory System
6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist incidents worldwide have highlighted the need for securing mass transit and passenger rail systems. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal entity responsible for securing these systems. GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent to which federal and industry stakeholders have assessed risks to these systems since 2004, and how TSA has used this information to inform its security strategy; (2) key actions federal and industry stakeholders have taken since 2004 and the extent to which federal actions are consistent with TSA's security strategy, and the challenges TSA faces in implementing them; and (3) TSA's reported status in implementing 9/11 Commission Act provisions for mass transit and passenger rail security. GAO reviewed documents including TSA's mass transit and passenger rail strategic plan, and interviewed federal officials and industry stakeholders from 30 systems and Amtrak--representing 75 percent of U.S. mass transit and passenger rail ridership.
What GAO Found
Since 2004, federal and industry stakeholders have conducted assessments of individual elements of risk--threat, vulnerability and consequence--for mass transit and passenger rail systems and this information has informed TSA's security strategy; however, TSA has not combined information from these three elements to conduct a risk assessment of these transportation systems. By completing a risk assessment, TSA would have reasonable assurance that it is directing its resources toward the highest priority needs. Further, while TSA's mass transit and passenger rail security strategy contains some information, such as goals and objectives, that is consistent with GAO's prior work on characteristics of a successful national strategy, it could be strengthened by including performance measures to help TSA track progress in securing these systems, among other things. Federal and industry stakeholders have taken several key actions to strengthen the security of mass transit and passenger rail systems since 2004, and while federal actions have been generally consistent with TSA's security strategy, TSA faces coordination challenges, and opportunities exist to strengthen some programs. TSA has deployed surface inspectors to assess industry security programs and worked with DHS to develop security technologies, among other actions. Mass transit and passenger rail systems, including Amtrak, also reported taking actions to increase security, such as implementing passenger and baggage screening programs. Although TSA has taken steps to enhance its efforts, it can further strengthen security programs by, for example, expanding its efforts to obtain and share security technology information with industry. By improving information sharing with industry, TSA can help to ensure that its and industry's limited resources are used more productively to secure mass transit and passenger rail systems. As of March 2009, TSA reported implementing some of the 9/11 Commission Act provisions related to securing mass transit and passenger rail such as developing a strategy for securing transportation, but had missed deadlines, for example, for issuing new regulatory requirements for mass-transit and passenger-rail employee security training. In addition, TSA's progress reports that track its implementation of 9/11 Act provisions lack milestones to guide this effort as called for by project management best practices. Additionally, in some cases, TSA progress reports identify challenges to meeting 9/11 Act provisions, but these reports do not include a plan for addressing these challenges. Until TSA develops a plan with milestones, it will be difficult for TSA to provide reasonable assurance that the act's provisions are being implemented and that a plan is in place for overcoming challenges that arise. Additionally, officials from almost half of the mass transit and passenger rail systems GAO visited reported concerns with the potential costs and the feasibility of implementing pending employee security training requirements. |
gao_GAO-03-356 | gao_GAO-03-356_0 | Background
In the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress authorized IRS to collect delinquent tax debt by continuously levying up to 15 percent of certain federal payments made to delinquent taxpayers. IRS plans to continue expanding the program by adding additional federal employee salaries and other types of federal payments. II for more detailed information on the amount of delinquent taxes collected as a result of FPLP by the type of federal payment taxpayers received (i.e., Social Security benefits, federal retirement payments, and vendor payments) and by the method of collection.) IRS does not measure the extent that FPLP helps IRS function more efficiently by decreasing its accounts receivable inventory. These 55,900 taxpayers owed about $460 million in delinquent taxes and received $4.1 billion in federal payments during 2002. Agency officials said that they plan to unblock a portion of the remaining delinquent accounts sometime in 2005, although they have not yet established a firm time frame for doing so. IRS’s Criterion for Determining Which Social Security Beneficiaries Can Afford to Have Their Payments Levied Is an Inaccurate Indicator of Ability to Pay
IRS established an income threshold to exclude Social Security beneficiaries who cannot afford to pay their taxes from FPLP. Although IRS recognizes that broader measures of FPLP results are needed, its study to determine how to do so will not be completed until calendar year 2003, at which time IRS will then decide how to revise its measurement approach. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether the data the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses to manage the Federal Payment Levy Program (FPLP) adequately measures program results, (2) how IRS’s decision to block some delinquent accounts from being matched to federal payments under FPLP impacts the agency’s ability to collect taxes efficiently, and (3) whether the criterion IRS uses to include taxpayers receiving Social Security Administration benefit payments in FPLP effectively targets taxpayers who can afford to pay their tax debts. We also analyzed the level and type of account activity that occurred prior to inclusion in FPLP, including the elapsed time since the last significant action initiated by either IRS or the taxpayer, to determine whether the account activity that occurred after IRS issued a notice of intent to levy could be attributed to the continuous levy program. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), taxpayers currently owe about $249 billion in delinquent taxes. At the same time, the government pays billions of dollars in Social Security, retirement, and other federal payments to thousands of these individuals. To help IRS administer tax laws fairly and collect delinquent taxes effectively, Congress included a provision authorizing the Federal Payment Levy Program, which allows IRS to continuously levy up to 15 percent of certain federal payments made to delinquent taxpayers. Because of congressional interest about whether the Federal Payment Levy Program is being implemented as intended, GAO was asked to assess how well the program is operating.
What GAO Found
The Federal Payment Levy Program enables IRS to continuously levy (take a portion of) federal payments to individuals and businesses owing delinquent taxes. IRS measures only about 27 percent of the revenues that can be attributed to the continuous levy program. IRS does not measure revenues that are received through voluntary payments as taxpayers respond to the notice of intent to levy or certain other results. Understating the program's impact may hinder IRS in making well-founded decisions on program management and resource allocation. IRS plans to revise its measure of program results but has not yet decided how to do so. IRS blocks many eligible delinquent accounts from being included in the Federal Payment Levy Program, thereby missing an opportunity to gather information on which debtors are receiving federal payments, that could be used to collect these delinquent taxes more efficiently. IRS recently unblocked some accounts and plans to unblock more, but has not established a time frame to complete these changes. IRS uses an inaccurate income criterion of ability to pay when determining whether taxpayers receiving Social Security benefits can afford to have their benefits levied under the Federal Payment Levy Program. As a result, fair treatment of taxpayers is compromised because taxpayers with a similar ability to pay their delinquent taxes likely are treated differently. IRS recognizes that the criterion is flawed but continues to use it. |
gao_GAO-02-80 | gao_GAO-02-80_0 | However, the impact of this “free riding” might be greater on a small business. Federal legislation, such as the School-to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994 (STWOA) and the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), has encouraged communities to create systems that address the education and training of young adults and the workforce needs of business in a modern, competitive work economy. Advantage Carolina initiatives were funded with a combination of public and private funds. Consortia Activities Address Current and Future Workforce Needs
Small businesses can seek solutions to their workforce problems by linking with a consortium of community organizations that help them address both their current and future workforce development issues. Current needs include both hiring new employees and training existing employees. Consortia officials we interviewed identified four key principles common to all of the communities we visited: (1) activities are focused primarily on businesses’ workforce needs and are structured around key industry sectors represented in their community; (2) consortium organizations provide leadership and maintain on-going, positive working relationships with their partners; (3) workforce development activities are accessible by both businesses and prospective employees; and (4) consortium organizations create ways to make participation in activities more attractive to small businesses. Some noted that providing businesses with skilled workers to meet their workforce needs could be a significant enough incentive to participate. Limited Information Available on Program Outcomes
Outcome studies of workforce development activities at the sites we visited were limited in scope. | What GAO Found
Small businesses often have serious difficulty finding skilled employees, upgrading the skills of their existing employees, and identifying strategies to meet future workforce needs. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 seeks to address these workforce development issues and give federal training programs a greater employer focus. Although these problems are common throughout the country, small businesses in some areas have joined with business and trade organizations, community colleges, and other public and private groups to form workforce development networks--often referred to as workforce consortia. This new approach offers small businesses access to various workforce development activities in which they might otherwise be unable to participate. Limited information exists on the outcome of workforce consortia at the sites GAO reviewed. There were no systematic efforts to evaluate overall consortium effectiveness, but there were isolated attempts to monitor participation rates and assess the impact of specific activities on job retention and future earnings. |
gao_RCED-00-126 | gao_RCED-00-126_0 | Sugar Program Increases Users’ Costs
We estimate that the sugar program cost domestic sweetener users about $1.5 billion in 1996 and about $1.9 billion in 1998.Sweetener users included (1) sugarcane refiners that bought raw cane sugar, (2) food manufacturers that bought refined sugar and other sweeteners, and (3) final consumers who bought sweeteners and sweetener-containing products. The program’s costs to U.S. sweetener users depend on the world price of sugar and can vary from year to year—they will be higher, other things being equal, when the difference between the domestic and the world price is greater. In 1998, for example, the program’s costs to users were higher than in 1996 because the world price dropped while the domestic price remained about the same. Sugar Program Benefits Producers
The primary beneficiaries of the sugar program’s higher prices are domestic sugar beet and sugarcane producers who, we estimate, received benefits of about $800 million in 1996 and about $1 billion in 1998.About 70 percent of the benefits went to sugar beet growers and processors. Sugarcane producers received about 30 percent of the benefits. Net Losses to the U.S. Economy Were Sizeable
We estimate that the sugar program resulted in net losses to the U.S. economy of about $700 million in 1996 and about $900 million in 1998. Our net loss estimates include economic inefficiencies and transfers to foreign producers. Economic inefficiencies occurred, for example, when the sugar program’s artificially high domestic prices encouraged farmers to grow sugar beets instead of another crop, such as wheat, that, without the sugar program, might have been relatively more profitable. Inefficiencies also occurred when artificially high sugar prices discouraged consumers from purchasing sugar. The cost of these inefficiencies totaled about $300 million in 1996 and about $500 million in 1998. Transfers from the U.S. economy to foreign producers occurred because foreign producers received artificially high prices for the raw sugar they exported to the United States. V.) We estimate that these transfers amounted to about $400 million in both 1996 and 1998. The transfers were about the same in each year despite the larger difference between domestic and world prices in 1998 because the United States imported less sugar in 1998. 4. 7. 8. 10. 11. 13. 14. 15. 5. 6. As stated in the objectives, this report focuses on the U.S. sugar program’s (1) costs to domestic sweetener users, (2) benefits to domestic sugar and HFCS producers, and (3) net effects on the U.S. economy. 9. 12. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO estimated the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) sugar program's: (1) costs to domestic sweetener users; (2) benefits to domestic sugar and high-fructose corn syrup producers; and (3) net effects on the U.S. economy--the differences between the costs to users and the benefits to producers that result from artificially high sweetener prices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO estimates that the sugar program cost domestic sweetener users about $1.5 billion in 1996 and about $1.9 billion in 1998; (2) sweetener users included: (a) sugarcane refiners that bought raw cane sugar; (b) food manufacturers that bought refined sugar and other sweeteners; and (c) final consumers who bought sweeteners and sweetener-containing products; (3) the program's costs to U.S. sweetener users depend on the world price of sugar and can vary from year to year--they will be higher, other things being equal, when the difference between the domestic and the world price is greater; (4) in 1998, for example, the program's costs to users were higher than in 1996 because the world price dropped while the domestic price remained about the same; (5) the primary beneficiaries of the sugar program's higher prices are domestic sugar beet and sugarcane producers who, GAO estimates, received benefits of about $800 million in 1996 and about $1 billion in 1998; (6) about 70 percent of the benefits went to sugar beet growers and processors; (7) sugarcane producers received about 30 percent of the benefits; (8) GAO estimates that the sugar program resulted in net losses to the U.S. economy of about $700 million in 1996 and about $900 million in 1998; (9) GAO net loss estimates include economic inefficiencies and transfers to foreign producers; (10) economic inefficiencies occurred, for example, when the sugar program's artificially high domestic prices encouraged farmers to grow sugar beets instead of another crop, such as wheat, that, without the sugar program, might have been relatively more profitable; (11) inefficiencies also occurred when artificially high sugar prices discouraged consumers from purchasing sugar; (12) the cost of these inefficiencies totalled about $300 million in 1996 and about $500 million in 1998; (13) transfers from the U.S. economy to foreign producers occurred because foreign producers received artificially high prices for the raw sugar they exported to the United States; (14) GAO estimates that these transfers amounted to about $400 million in both 1996 and 1998; and (15) the transfers were about the same in each year despite the larger difference between domestic and world prices in 1998 because the United States imported less sugar in 1998. |
gao_GAO-14-787T | gao_GAO-14-787T_0 | TSA Has Developed Program Application Guidance to Help Improve Transparency of Its Process and Assist Airports in Completing Their Applications
TSA has developed guidance to assist airport operators in completing their SPP applications, as we recommended in December 2012. Specifically, in December 2012, we reported that TSA had developed some resources to assist SPP applicants, but it had not provided guidance on its application and approval process to assist airports. Further, in December 2012, we found that airport operators who completed the applications generally stated that they faced difficulties in doing so and that additional guidance would have been helpful. Thus, we recommended that TSA develop guidance that clearly (1) states the criteria and process that TSA is using to assess whether participation in the SPP would compromise security or detrimentally affect the cost- efficiency or the effectiveness of the screening of passengers or property at the airport, (2) states how TSA will obtain and analyze cost information regarding screening cost-efficiency and effectiveness and the implications of not responding to the related application questions, and (3) provides specific examples of additional information airports should consider providing to TSA to help assess an airport’s suitability for the SPP. TSA concurred with our recommendation and, in January 2014, we reported that TSA had taken actions to address it. As we reported in January 2014, these actions address the intent of our recommendation. Performance between SPP and Non-SPP Airports Varied; TSA Recently Developed a Mechanism to Monitor Private versus Federal Screener Performance
In our December 2012 report, we analyzed screener performance data for four measures and found that there were differences in performance between SPP and non-SPP airports, and those differences could not be exclusively attributed to the use of either federal or private screeners. However, TSA officials stated at the time that they did not plan to conduct similar analyses in the future, and instead, they were using across-the-board mechanisms of both private and federal screeners, such as the Scorecard, to assess screener performance across all commercial airports. However, in December 2012, we found that the Scorecard and PMR did not provide a complete picture of screener performance at SPP airports because, while both mechanisms provided a snapshot of private screener performance at each SPP airport, this information was not summarized for the SPP as a whole or across years, which made it difficult to identify changes in performance. We concluded that monitoring private screener performance in comparison with federal screener performance was consistent with the statutory requirement that TSA enter into a contract with a private screening company only if the Administrator determines and certifies to Congress that the level of screening services and protection provided at an airport under a contract will be equal to or greater than the level that would be provided at the airport by federal government personnel. TSA concurred with the recommendation, and has taken actions to address it. Specifically, in January 2013, TSA issued its first SPP Annual Report. Further, in September 2013, the TSA Assistant Administrator for Security Operations signed an operations directive that provides internal guidance for preparing the SPP Annual Report, including the requirement that the SPP PMO must annually verify that the level of screening services and protection provided at SPP airports is equal to or greater than the level that would be provided by federal screeners. TSA Continues to Address Limitations in the Methodology for Comparing the Costs of SPP and Non-SPP Screening Services
TSA has faced challenges in accurately comparing the costs of screening services at SPP and non-SPP airports. In 2007, TSA estimated that SPP airports would cost about 17 percent more to operate than airports using federal screeners. In our January 2009 report we noted strengths in the methodology’s design, but also identified seven limitations in TSA’s methodology that could affect the accuracy and reliability of cost comparisons, and its usefulness in informing future management decisions. TSA generally concurred with our findings and recommendation. In the update, TSA estimated that SPP airports would cost 3 percent more to operate in 2011 than airports using federal screeners. In March 2011, we found that TSA had also taken actions that partially addressed the four remaining limitations related to cost, but needed to take additional actions or provide additional documentation. In July 2014, TSA officials stated they are continuing to make additional changes to the cost estimation methodology and we are continuing to monitor TSA’s progress in this area through ongoing work. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA maintains a federal workforce to screen passengers and baggage at the majority of the nation's commercial airports, but it also oversees a workforce of private screeners at airports who participate in the SPP. The SPP allows commercial airports to apply to have screening performed by private screeners, who are to provide a level of screening services and protection that equals or exceeds that of federal screeners.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA (1) provides guidance to airport operators for the SPP application process, (2) assesses and monitors the performance of private versus federal screeners, and (3) compares the costs of federal and private screeners. This statement is based on reports and a testimony GAO issued from January 2009 through January 2014.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's December 2012 report on the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed guidance for airport operators applying to the SPP. In December 2012, GAO found that TSA had not provided guidance to airport operators on its SPP application and approval process, which had been revised to reflect statutory requirements. Further, airport operators GAO interviewed at the time identified difficulties in completing the revised application, such as obtaining cost information requested in the application. GAO recommended that TSA develop application guidance and TSA concurred. In December 2012, TSA updated its SPP website with general application guidance and a description of TSA's assessment criteria and process. The new guidance addresses the intent of GAO's recommendation.
TSA has also developed a mechanism to regularly monitor private versus federal screener performance. In December 2012, TSA officials stated that they planned to assess overall screener performance across all commercial airports instead of comparing the performance of SPP and non-SPP airports as they had done previously. Also in December 2012, GAO reported differences between the performance at SPP and non-SPP airports based on screener performance data. In addition, GAO reported that TSA's across-the-board mechanisms did not summarize information for the SPP as a whole or across years, making it difficult to identify changes in private screener performance. GAO concluded that monitoring and comparing private and federal screener performance were consistent with the statutory provision authorizing TSA to contract with private screening companies. As a result, GAO recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to regularly do so. TSA concurred with the recommendation and in January 2013, issued its SPP Annual Report , which provided an analysis of private versus federal screener performance. In September 2013, TSA provided internal guidance requiring that the report annually verify that the level of screening services and protection provided at SPP airports is equal to or greater than the level that would be provided by federal screeners. These actions address the intent of GAO's recommendation.
TSA has faced challenges in accurately comparing the costs of screening services at SPP and non-SPP airports. In 2007, TSA estimated that SPP airports cost about 17 percent more to operate than airports using federal screeners. In January 2009, GAO noted strengths in TSA's methodology, but also identified seven limitations that could affect the accuracy and reliability of cost comparisons. GAO recommended that TSA update its analysis to address the limitations. TSA generally concurred with the recommendation. In March 2011, TSA described efforts to address the limitations and a revised cost comparison estimating that SPP airports would cost 3 percent more to operate in 2011 than airports using federal screeners. In March 2011, GAO found that TSA had taken steps to address some of the limitations, but needed to take additional actions. In July 2014, TSA officials stated that they are continuing to make additional changes to the cost estimation methodology and GAO is continuing to monitor TSA's progress in this area through ongoing work.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made several recommendations since 2009 to improve SPP operations and oversight, which GAO has since closed as implemented based on TSA actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-15-646 | gao_GAO-15-646_0 | PFS Is a Mechanism for Contracting for Social Outcomes
PFS is a program funding mechanism that some U.S. state and local and foreign governments are using to contract for prevention services to address entrenched social problems. The first PFS project began in the United Kingdom in 2010. These payments are, in theory, based on the savings that result from decreased use of government services. If the program is successful, the government obtains improved outcomes for vulnerable populations. In addition, PFS can potentially capture cost savings by reducing the need to provide costly remediation services to the individuals in vulnerable populations. They provide capital on the condition that the government will repay the investment if outcomes are achieved, usually with a rate of return. PFS Projects Were Structured in a Variety of Ways and Sought to Achieve Potential Benefits, Such as Improved Social Outcomes and Cost Savings
PFS Projects Were Structured to Implement Prevention Programs to Address Entrenched Social Problems
In our selected case illustrations, governments used PFS to address entrenched social problems. Participating Organizations Sought to Manage Risks in the Feasibility Assessment, Design, and Implementation Phases of Complex PFS Contracts
Governments, Service Providers, and Investors Recognize that PFS Projects Present Risk
PFS is predicated on the idea that governments shift the risk associated with developing and implementing a prevention program to investors. As a result of the perverse incentive to focus on those that are easiest to serve, those that are most in need and most difficult to serve could receive fewer services or a diminished focus. For example, the New York project included performance measures on both reducing recidivism and increasing employment for individuals who were recently released from prison. Stakeholders said that evaluations can manage potential perverse incentives, such as creaming. The Federal Government Could Play a Role in Funding, Building Capacity for, and Managing Investor Risk in PFS, but a Formal Mechanism to Collaborate and Share Lessons Learned Does Not Exist
The Federal Government Could Play Several Roles to Address PFS Challenges at the State and Local Level
While the effectiveness of the PFS model remains to be seen, stakeholders cited three potential roles the federal government could play to help address challenges at the state and local levels of government and further develop the PFS field: providing outcome payments, building capacity, and providing loan guarantees. There Is No Formal Mechanism for Federal Agencies to Collaborate on PFS
In our prior work, we stated that collaborative mechanisms, such as interagency groups or collaboration technology, can be used to develop policies, implement programs, and share information. Officials from one federal agency said that information about the various roles that federal agencies have played in the PFS field would be informative, given that the approach to supporting PFS has varied by agency. Recommendation for Executive Action
To identify and broadly disseminate information on leading practices and lessons learned, the Director of OMB should establish a formal means for federal agencies to collaborate on PFS. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided written comments concurring with our recommendation and is working with agencies to explore options for continued collaboration on Pay for Success. We examined (1) how selected PFS projects have been structured and what potential benefits these projects can provide; (2) how selected PFS contracts have been structured to address potential project risks; and (3) the potential roles for the federal government’s involvement in PFS projects. Through this review, we identified eight federal agencies that were involved in an informal working group and played different roles vis-à-vis PFS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal, state, and local agencies play an important role in improving social outcomes for society's most vulnerable populations. A small number of state, local, and foreign governments are employing PFS to fund efforts designed to better serve these vulnerable populations.
GAO was asked to provide information about PFS. This report examines (1) how selected PFS projects have been structured and what potential benefits these projects can provide; (2) how selected PFS contracts have been structured to address potential project risks; and (3) the potential roles for the federal government's involvement in PFS projects.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant literature on PFS; selected 10 PFS projects that reflected a variety of policy areas and were in different stages of implementation in state and local governments in the United States and the United Kingdom, where PFS originated; reviewed key documents and interviewed stakeholders from organizations that played a role in the selected projects; and reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the eight federal agencies that participated in an informal PFS working group.
What GAO Found
Pay for Success (PFS), also known as Social Impact Bonds, is a new contracting mechanism to fund prevention programs, where investors provide capital to implement a social service— for example, to reduce recidivism by former prisoners. If the service provider achieves agreed upon outcomes, the government pays the investor, usually with a rate of return, based on savings from decreased use of more costly remedial services, such as incarceration. Stakeholders from the 10 PFS projects in GAO's study said that PFS offers potential benefits to all parties in the project. For example, governments can implement prevention programs that potentially lead to reduced spending on social services and transfer the risk of failing to achieve outcomes to investors.
The PFS projects in GAO's review sought to manage potential risks in the feasibility assessment, design, and implementation of complex PFS contracts. For example, without safeguards, there is a risk that paying for outcomes could create perverse incentives, such as focusing on individuals who are easiest to serve rather than those most in need. To address this risk, PFS contracts included various provisions, such as only including those with the greatest need in the evaluation that determines if the government makes payments.
To date, federal government involvement in PFS has been limited. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has encouraged agencies to explore the use of PFS as appropriate. Potential roles federal agencies could play in PFS projects include making outcome payments or helping build capacity. We have previously reported that collaborative mechanisms, such as interagency groups, can be used to implement programs and share information. However, a formal mechanism for federal agencies to collaborate on PFS does not exist. Given the evolving nature of PFS, a mechanism for federal agencies to collaborate on PFS would increase access to leading practices.
What GAO Recommends
To identify and broadly disseminate information on leading practices and lessons learned, the Director of OMB should establish a formal means for federal agencies to collaborate on PFS. OMB concurred with this recommendation and is working with agencies to explore options for collaboration. |
gao_GAO-16-104 | gao_GAO-16-104_0 | DOE and Industry Expect the United States to Play a Large Role in the LNG Market over the Next 10 Years
DOE and Industry Expect the United States to Become a Significant Exporter of LNG
According to DOE, due to advances in extraction technologies and growing worldwide demand for natural gas, the United States is expected to become a net exporter of natural gas in the next few years. The total daily capacity of these five facilities is nearly 10-billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas, which constitutes about 12.4 percent of expected U.S. natural gas production and approximately 18.1 percent of the world’s expected LNG capacity in 2020. Customers of U.S. LNG Have Responsibility for Transporting LNG from Liquefaction Facilities
According to representatives from the liquefaction facilities we spoke with, under current business models and contracts, the costs associated with importing LNG (including, for example, feed gas, liquefaction services, and transportation) are separate, and U.S. liquefaction facilities have no responsibility for shipping LNG. About 100 or More LNG Carriers May Be Needed to Transport Expected U.S. LNG Exports in the Coming Years
Estimates of the number of LNG carriers necessary for transporting U.S. LNG vary, but based on estimates of representatives from the five liquefaction facilities with whom we spoke, about 100 or more LNG carriers will be needed to transport U.S. exports once liquefaction facilities are fully operational. Most U.S. liquefaction capacity has been contracted to customers in Asia. As mentioned previously, currently operating LNG carriers are nearly all foreign built and flagged. According to MARAD officials and a shipbuilder representative, LNG carriers have not been built in the United States since 1980, and no LNG carriers are currently registered under U.S. flag. If the Proposed Requirement Does Not Reduce the Expected Demand for U.S. LNG, It Could Expand Employment for U.S. Mariners and Shipbuilders
If Demand Is Not Reduced, Maritime Stakeholders Say the Proposed Requirement Could Expand Employment for U.S. Mariners, Though Time Would Be Needed for Training
While we cannot reliably estimate the total number of U.S. mariner jobs that would be created due to the possibility that the proposed requirement could reduce demand for U.S. LNG (discussed in the next section), Coast Guard officials and representatives from four mariner unions estimated that each U.S.-flagged LNG carrier would likely employ a crew of between 40 and 52 mariners, as discussed below. Based on these rates, we estimate it would take over 30 years to build the 100-carrier fleet potentially needed for U.S. exports. However, representatives from the three U.S. shipyards we spoke with estimated that U.S.-built carriers would cost about two to three times as much as similar carriers built in Korean shipyards, depending on factors such as volume. If LNG Customers Contract to Purchase U.S.-Built Carriers, Construction of Those LNG Carriers Could Provide Employment in U.S. Shipyards, according to Shipyard Representatives
Officials from the two U.S. shipyards with sufficient dock space stated that hiring of U.S. shipyard workers would depend on the number of LNG carriers ordered and would rely in part on foreign workers. Increasing or stabilizing jobs in the shipbuilding industry for a period of time, if it occurred, could have additional benefits for military readiness. This decreased competitiveness may in turn reduce demand for U.S LNG. The extent of this reduction is unclear. Several stakeholders told us that implementation of the proposed requirement and associated increases in transportation costs could prompt customers to attempt to modify, renegotiate, or terminate their liquefaction contracts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Howard Coble Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014 includes a provision for GAO to report on the number of positions that would be created in the United States maritime industry each year in 2015 through 2025 if liquefied natural gas (LNG) exported from the United States were required to be carried: (1) before December 31, 2018, on vessels documented under the laws of the United States; and (2) after such date, on vessels documented under the laws of the United States and constructed in the U.S. This report discusses: (1) current industry and Department of Energy (DOE) expectations for the market for U.S. exports of LNG, and how that market is expected to operate, (2) stakeholders’ views on how the proposed requirement to use U.S.-flagged-and-built carriers for LNG exports could affect jobs in the maritime, shipbuilding, and other related sectors, and (3) potential effects of the proposed requirement on the market for U.S. LNG and the broader U.S. economy, including the market for U.S. LNG and other industries. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 30 companies have received approval from DOE for large-scale exports of U.S. LNG—natural gas cooled for transportation—beginning in 2015 or 2016 via specialized LNG carriers.
Congress is considering whether to propose legislative language that would require U.S. LNG be exported via U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers with the goal of supporting U.S. shipbuilders and mariners. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the number of vessel-construction and operating jobs that would be created in the U. S. maritime industry each year in 2015 through 2025 if exported LNG were required to be carried (1) before December 31, 2018, on vessels documented under the laws of the United States and (2) after such date, on vessels documented under the laws of and constructed in the United States. This report discusses (1) DOE and industry expectations for the market for U.S. LNG exports and (2) how the proposed requirement could affect jobs in the U.S. maritime industry and the broader U.S. economy.
GAO reviewed and analyzed economic forecasts of the LNG market and interviewed relevant stakeholders including officials from DOD, DOE, the Department of Transportation, Coast Guard, and the U.S. Trade Representative; representatives of mariner groups, three U.S. shipyards that expressed interest in this market, the five U.S. liquefaction facilities that are under construction, and economic-research firms that have studied the LNG market.
What GAO Found
According to Department of Energy (DOE) and industry expectations, in the next few years the United States is expected to change from a net importer of natural gas to a net exporter, with those exports destined for different regions of the world, especially Asia. Five large-scale U.S. liquefaction facilities—necessary for conversion of natural gas to liquefied natural gas (LNG) (see fig. below)—are under construction with a projected capacity to export more than 12 percent of U.S. natural gas production in 2020. According to representatives from these five facilities, their liquefaction capacity has already been sold mainly through 20-year contracts and their customers are responsible for transporting the LNG to export markets. Based on estimates from these liquefaction facilities, transport of the full capacity of these liquefaction facilities will require about 100 or more LNG carriers. Currently operating LNG carriers are nearly all foreign built and operated. LNG carriers have not been built in the United States since before 1980, and no LNG carriers are currently registered under the U.S. flag.
The proposed requirement to transport exports of LNG via U.S.-built-and-flagged carriers could expand employment for U.S. mariners and shipbuilders if it does not reduce the expected demand for U.S. LNG. According to representatives of U.S. mariner groups, between 4,000 and 5,200 mariners would be needed to operate the estimated 100 LNG carriers needed to transport the five U.S. facilities' full capacity of LNG once the five are fully operational. Based on the current capacity of U.S. shipyards we spoke with, building 100 carriers would likely take over 30 years, with employment in U.S. shipyards increasing somewhat or becoming more stable, according to shipyard representatives. Department of Defense (DOD) officials also indicated that any policy or requirement that increases and stabilizes jobs in the U.S. maritime industry could support military readiness. However, according to industry representatives, U.S. carriers would cost about two to three times as much as similar carriers built in Korean shipyards and would be more expensive to operate. Based on GAO analysis, these costs would increase the cost of transporting LNG from the United States, decrease the competitiveness of U.S. LNG in the world market, and may, in turn, reduce demand for U.S. LNG. The extent of these effects depends on customers' circumstances and business decisions. For example, several stakeholders told us implementing the proposed requirement may prompt customers to attempt to modify, renegotiate, or terminate their existing contracts for liquefaction. Additionally, limited availability of U.S. carriers in the early years of construction may decrease the amount of LNG that could be exported from the United States for a period of time, leading customers to seek alternate sources. Further, a reduction in the level of expected U.S. LNG exports could impact the broader U.S. economy, including potential job and profit losses in the oil and gas sector. |
gao_GAO-11-518 | gao_GAO-11-518_0 | Funds must be obligated within 3 years from the time of apportionment or they lapse. In our 2009 report on JARC, we found that about 14 percent of the fiscal year 2006 JARC funds lapsed, in part due to the fact that some applicants did not meet administrative requirements, such as developing a coordinated public transit-human service transportation plan, in time to apply for funds. Recipients—with FTA Help—Have Made Progress Using Apportioned Funds, but a Few Areas Continue to Let Funds Lapse
Recipients Have Made Progress Using JARC Funds
JARC funds have been apportioned to 258 geographic areas and each year since SAFETEA-LU was enacted the number of designated recipients allowing JARC funds to lapse has decreased. In fiscal year 2008, 29 designated recipients (or 11.2 percent of all designated recipients) let all funds apportioned in fiscal year 2006 lapse. By the end of fiscal year 2010, 11 designated recipients (or 4.3 percent of all designated recipients) allowed all the JARC funds to lapse that were apportioned to them for fiscal year 2008. The Amount of Funding Allowed to Lapse Decreased
In addition, the amount of funding allowed to lapse also steadily declined from the end of fiscal year 2008 through 2010. In fiscal year 2008, approximately $16.7 million, or 12 percent of all apportioned funds, were allowed to lapse. However, three challenges remain: Limited funding available to provide the local match. Formula funding not aligned with local demands. FTA Has Taken Steps to Address Difficulties Recipients Faced
The designated recipients and subrecipients we interviewed reported that they have overcome many of the challenges we identified in our 2009 report. Some designated recipients attribute the improvement to actions taken by FTA to help recipients overcome barriers to using JARC funds. While these classifications allow designated recipients to transfer funds among small urban and rural areas, the funds can not be distributed away from large urban areas. However, other proposals suggested merging JARC with other programs. For example, one state said it has more demand for services to help people who are elderly and/or have disabilities than for JARC grants and could better respond to state priorities by shifting its JARC funds to New Freedom or Section 5310 programs. Agency Comment
DOT reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical corrections, which were incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act–A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) requires that we evaluate the Job Access and Reverse Commute program (JARC) every 2 years. This report addresses (1) the progress the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and recipients have made in reducing the instances and amounts of lapsed funds; (2) the challenges recipients have faced in implementing JARC; and (3) the tradeoffs of proposals to revise JARC, according to stakeholders, during the upcoming surface transportation reauthorization process. To examine challenges recipients have encountered in implementing the program, we interviewed 9 designated recipients and 10 subrecipients in five states and compared the challenges to those we identified in our 2009 report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Established in 1998, the Job Access and Reverse Commute program (JARC)--administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)-- awards formula based grants to states and localities to provide transportation to help low-income individuals access jobs. In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act-A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) reauthorized this program and made changes, such as allocating funds by formula to subrecipients in three areas--large urban, small urban, and rural--through designated recipients (usually transit agencies and states). SAFETEA-LU required GAO to periodically review JARC. This third report under the mandate examines (1) the progress FTA and recipients have made in reducing the instances and amounts of funds they allowed to lapse without using them; (2) the challenges recipients have faced in implementing JARC; and (3) the tradeoffs, according to stakeholders, of proposals to revise JARC during the next surface reauthorization process. For this work, GAO reviewed FTA grant data; interviewed officials from FTA, 9 designated recipients, 10 subrecipients, and industry associations; and reviewed recent proposals to revise JARC. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOT officials reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical corrections, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's last report on JARC in 2009, the instances of recipients letting their funds lapse--allowing the funds to be reapportioned to all recipients-- have decreased. Recipients have 3 years from the time of apportionment to use the funding before it is reapportioned. In fiscal year 2008, 29 designated recipients, or 11.2 percent, let their entire fiscal year 2006 apportioned funds lapse. In fiscal year 2010, 11 designated recipients, or 4.3 percent, let their entire fiscal year 2008 apportioned funds lapse. In addition, the amount of funds lapsing has decreased. In fiscal year 2008, $16.7 million (12 percent) of apportioned funds lapsed, and fiscal year 2010, $10.2 million (6.5 percent) of apportioned funds lapsed. A few recipients have allowed a large amount of funds to lapse; however, others have made progress in using JARC funds, in part due to FTA's efforts. The designated recipients GAO interviewed reported that they have overcome many of the challenges identified in our 2009 report. This improvement was due in part to actions taken by FTA, such as issuing guidance on project eligibility and providing workshops to help officials in areas where a large portion of JARC funds had lapsed. However, three challenges remain. First, some JARC funds have been allowed to lapse because subrecipients have difficulty providing the local funding required to receive JARC funding. Second, three recipients we interviewed faced challenges coordinating with human service organizations, as required. Finally, officials from three of the five states we interviewed said that the funding classifications they receive either do not align with local demands for JARC services or create confusion among local area recipients. Stakeholders have proposed changing JARC. Officials GAO interviewed cited various tradeoffs to these proposals. Some proposals would combine JARC with other transit programs designed to help people who are elderly and/or have disabilities. Proponents of these proposals cited potential benefits such as increased flexibility to use funding to meet specific needs, while critics of these proposals were concerned that targeted populations will no longer receive the same amount of funding unless they are protected. |
gao_GAO-02-734 | gao_GAO-02-734_0 | Starting in 1999, OMB required that agencies with GWACs should identify, account for, and recover fully allocated actual costs in accordance with federal financial accounting standards. They have developed their own approaches to accounting and to reporting program costs, and these approaches are evolving as the agencies make periodic changes. Such fluctuations significantly impact reported program operating results. OMB guidance on earnings stipulates that (1) GWAC fees should be adjusted so that total revenues do not exceed actual costs and (2) revenues generated in excess of the agency’s actual costs are to be transferred to the miscellaneous receipts account of the U.S. Treasury’s General Fund. Other interagency contracting services we reviewed allow the providing agency to retain funds. Support of the stock program primarily involved offsetting substantial losses in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. However, some agencies are not identifying, determining accurately, or recovering the full costs of their programs as directed by OMB. The conflict between the way agencies are operating their revolving funds—using GWAC earnings to support other programs—and OMB’s guidance on the handling of earnings is a matter of concern. Program customers are, in effect, being consistently overcharged for the contract services they are buying, while GSA is using excess earnings to support other programs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We focused our review on all five agencies granted executive agent status by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide governmentwide acquisition contracts (GWACs) for information technology. The term of the contracts is 5 years. Fees are not charged to NASA customers because of an agency policy against charging fees for internal use of NASA-based contracts. NITAAC provides a variety of client services. GovWorks establishes its fee for the franchise fund at the beginning of the project based on an assessment of the amount of assistance needed for the planned procurement. Appendix XIII: Program Data Sheet – Federal Supply Schedules
Program Description:
The General Services Administration’s (GSA) Federal Supply Service (FSS) organization offers a supply and procurement business under the Federal Supply Schedules Program (Schedules program), which provides federal customers with services from more than 7,400 program vendors, as well as a wide range of commercial products. | What GAO Found
Federal interagency contract service programs are being used in a wide variety of situations, from those in which a single agency provides limited contracting assistance to an approach in which the provider agency's contracting officer handles all aspects of the procurement. This increased use of interagency contracts is a result of reforms and legislation passed in the 1990s, allowing agencies to streamline the acquisition process, operate more like businesses, and offer increasing numbers of services to other agencies. Most of the contract service programs GAO reviewed reported an excess of revenues over costs in at least one year between fiscal years 1999 and 2001. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance directs agencies with governmentwide acquisition contracts (GWAC) or franchise fund programs to account for and recover fully allocated actual costs and to report on their financial results. Agencies are to identify all direct and indirect costs and charge fees to ordering agencies based on these costs. However, some GWAC programs have not identified or accurately reported the full cost of providing interagency contract services. OMB's guidance further directs that agencies return GWAC earnings to the miscellaneous receipts account of the U.S. Treasury's General Fund. However, this guidance conflicts with the operations of agencies' revolving funds, which were established by statutes that allow retention of excess revenues. The Federal Supply Schedules program has generated hefty earnings, largely because of the rapid growth of information technology sales. Rather than adjust the fee, however, the General Services Administration has used the earnings primarily to support its stock and fleet programs. However, the significant amount of earnings means that Federal Supply Schedules program customers are being consistently overcharged for the contract services they are buying. |
gao_GAO-11-950T | gao_GAO-11-950T_0 | Serious DOD Funds Control Challenges
For years, GAO and DOD IG have reported on DOD’s inability to provide effective funds control and report reliable financial information, including budgetary information. In 2008, we reported that DOD’s complex and inefficient payment processes, nonintegrated business systems, and weak internal controls impair its ability to maintain proper funds control, putting DOD at risk of overobligating or overspending its appropriations. Specifically, DOD’s weak internal control environment has hindered its ability to ensure that transactions are accurately recorded, sufficiently supported, and properly executed by trained personnel subject to effective supervision. Examples of reported weaknesses in DOD’s funds control include: Inadequately trained funds control personnel. DOD’s ineffective funds control has resulted in overobligations and overexpenditures in violation of the Antideficiency Act (ADA). According to copies of ADA violation reports received by the Comptroller General, and as shown in table 1, DOD reported 64 ADA violations from fiscal year 2007 through September 15, 2011, with a total dollar amount of $927.4 million. Problem disbursements include unmatched disbursements (UMD) that represent disbursements that have been paid by an accounting office but that have not been matched to the correct obligation records. DOD’s Funds Control Weaknesses and Problem Disbursements Impair the Reliability of DOD’s Financial Information
As we and DOD’s auditors have reported, DOD’s funds control and related internal control weaknesses and problem disbursements have impaired its ability to produce reliable financial information for reporting, especially the reliability of the department’s SBR, as well as its other budgetary information. Risk of DOD Improper Payments
DOD, in its Agency Financial Report for Fiscal Year 2010, reported that it made an estimated $1 billion in improper payments under five of its programs. However, this estimate is incomplete because DOD did not include estimates from its commercial payment programs, which account for approximately one-third of the value of DOD payments. Further, both we and the DOD IG have reported on weaknesses in DOD’s payment controls, including weaknesses in its process for assessing the risk of improper payments and reporting estimated amounts of them. In addition, the DOD IG recently reported their assessment that DOD’s risk of making improper payments is high. Our prior work and reports issued by DOD IG have highlighted the department’s long-standing and significant problems with estimating and preventing improper payments. Concluding Observations
Although DOD has dedicated significant resources under its FIAR Plan to remediate its identified financial management weaknesses, it faces significant challenges in addressing those persistent weaknesses. DOD has been addressing its problem disbursements, but they are a contributing factor to the department’s funds control issues. The department’s weak controls over payments increase the risk of inaccurate cost information and improper payments. Given DOD’s stated goal of achieving audit readiness on its consolidated financial statements by the end of fiscal year 2017, it will be critical that the department continue to ensure that steady progress is being made. Moreover, for DOD to move forward, it will be important for the department to resolve its problems with multiple, disparate nonintegrated systems and to ensure that whatever systems solutions are chosen will provide the underlying foundation for auditable financial statements. Managers with responsibilities for determining entitlement, authorizing and executing payments and collections shall create, document, and maintain an organizational structure and business processes that appropriately segregates assigned duties, emphasizes adherence to policies and procedures, and employs sound internal accounting and system access controls; implement finance and accounting systems that comply with the federal financial management systems requirements, keep disbursement (entitlement), and accounting records accurate and in balance from contract execution through closeout, and monitor the causes of late payments and interest penalties incurred; establish systematic controls that capture adequate audit trails to allow the tracing from source documents of financial events to general ledger account balances through successive levels of summarization and financial reports/statements; ensure data is processed using accurate coding and errors are employ systems that ensure the authenticity of data that are electronically transmitted, including the electronic signature and ensure controls provide reasonable assurance that deliberate or inadvertent manipulation, modification, or loss of data during transmission is detected; and validate cash management and payment performance quality and effectiveness on an annual basis: and periodically test effectiveness of internal controls, document results of testing, and take necessary corrective actions. Financial Audit Guide: Auditing the Statement of Budgetary Resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is required to design and implement effective internal controls, including controls over its use of public funds ("funds controls") and controls over its payment processes ("payment controls"). As a steward of the public's resources, DOD is responsible and accountable for (1) using public funds efficiently and effectively and for the purposes and within the time frames and amounts prescribed by law, (2) making payments to the right parties in the correct amount within allowable time frames and recouping any improper payments, and (3) accurately recording and reporting on its transactions and use of public funds. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) challenges DOD faces in its funds control, and their effect on the reliability of DOD's financial information, especially the budgetary information in DOD's Statement of Budgetary Resources and (2) weaknesses in DOD's payment controls that put the department at risk of making improper payments. This statement is based on our prior work and reports issued by the department's Inspector General (DOD IG). The panel requested that GAO provide its perspective on the status of DOD's process for identifying and reporting on improper payments, examples of Antideficiency Act violations within DOD along with the causes of these violations, and the effect of problem disbursements on DOD's ability to report reliable information on its financial statements.
What GAO Found
For years, GAO and DOD IG have reported on DOD's inability to provide effective funds control and report reliable financial information, including budgetary information. In 2008, GAO reported that DOD's complex and inefficient payment processes, nonintegrated business systems, and weak internal controls impair its ability to maintain proper funds control, putting DOD at risk of overobligating or overspending its appropriations. Specifically, DOD's weak internal control environment has hindered its ability to ensure that transactions are accurately recorded, sufficiently supported, and properly executed by trained personnel subject to effective supervision. Funds control weaknesses place DOD at risk of violating the Antideficiency Act (ADA), specifically through overobligations and overexpenditures. DOD reported ADA violations from fiscal year 2007 through September 15, 2011, with a total dollar amount of $927.4 million. DOD has identified payment transactions and related accounting steps as "problem disbursements." Problem disbursements include unmatched disbursements (UMD) that represent disbursements that have been paid by an accounting office but that have not been matched to the correct obligation records. DOD reports that it has reduced overaged UMDs from $666.5 million to $109.6 million between second quarter of fiscal year 2009 to the same time in fiscal year 2011. These and other weaknesses have prevented DOD from reporting reliable financial information, including budgetary information in an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources. Although DOD has dedicated significant resources to remediate its identified weaknesses, it faces significant challenges to address those persistent weaknesses. DOD reported for fiscal year 2010 that it made an estimated $1 billion in improper payments. However, this estimate is incomplete because DOD did not include estimates from its commercial payment programs, which account for approximately one-third of the value of DOD payments. Further, both GAO and the DOD IG have reported on weaknesses in DOD's payment controls, including weaknesses in its process for assessing the risk of improper payments and reporting estimated amounts of them. DOD's problem disbursements continue to be a concern and are a contributing factor to the department's funds control issues. The department's weak controls over payments increase the risk of inaccurate cost information and improper payments. Given DOD's stated goal of achieving audit readiness on its consolidated financial statements by the end of fiscal year 2017, it will be critical that the department continue to ensure that steady progress is being made. Moreover, for DOD to move forward, it will be important that the department resolve its problems with multiple, disparate nonintegrated systems to ensure that whatever systems solutions are chosen will provide the underlying foundation for auditable financial statements. |
gao_GAO-12-108 | gao_GAO-12-108_0 | Since then, several other efforts have been conducted to identify federal STEM programs and provide recommendations to improve both coordination and program evaluation as well as reduce potential duplication. Overlap occurs when multiple programs offer similar services to similar target groups in similar STEM fields to achieve similar objectives. Agencies reported that they developed the majority (130) of these programs through their general statutory authority and that Congress specifically directed agencies to create 59 of these programs.The number of programs each agency administered ranged from 3 to 46 with three agencies—HHS, the Department of Energy, and NSF— administering more than half of all programs—112 of 209. Almost a third of the programs had obligations of $1 million or less, with 5 programs having obligations of more than $100 million each. In addition, many programs served multiple target groups. However, even when programs overlapped, the services they provided and the populations they served may differ in meaningful ways and would therefore not necessarily be duplicative:
There may be important differences between the specific field(s) of focus and the program’s stated goals. Although 83 percent of STEM education programs overlapped to some degree with at least one other program, only 33 percent of programs reported coordinating with other agencies that provide similar STEM education services to similar program beneficiaries, not including basic governmentwide inventory efforts. Limited Use of Performance Measures and Evaluations May Hamper Ability to Assess Effectiveness
Programs Varied in Their Ability to Provide Information on Populations Served
Program officials varied in their ability to provide reliable information on the number of students, teachers, or institutions directly served by their programs—which is a type of output measure. Outcome Data Are Not Clearly Reflected in Agencies’ Performance Plans and Reports
Agencies in our review did not use outcome measures in a way that is clearly reflected in their performance plans and performance reports— publicly available documents they use for performance planning. This may hinder decisionmakers’ ability to assess how agencies’ STEM efforts contribute to agencywide performance goals and the overall federal STEM effort. While nearly all of the STEM education programs that reported completing an evaluation reported using different mechanisms to disseminate results, they did not always share results in a way that facilitated knowledge sharing. NSTC’s ongoing strategic planning efforts provide an opportunity to develop guidance on how to incorporate STEM- and program-specific education goals and measures in agencies’ performance planning and reporting process and align their STEM education efforts with a governmentwide STEM education strategy. However, most agencies have not conducted comprehensive evaluations since 2005 to assess the effectiveness of their STEM education programs. 3. Work with agencies, through its strategic planning process, to identify programs that might be candidates for consolidation or elimination. OSTP provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. OMB had no concerns with the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to determine (1) the number of federal agencies and programs that provided funding for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education programs in fiscal year 2010; (2) the extent to which STEM programs have similar objectives, serve similar target groups, provide similar types of services, and, if necessary, what opportunities exist to increase coordination; and (3) the extent to which STEM programs have measured their effectiveness. To inform all of our objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. Definition of STEM Education Program
For the purposes of our study, we defined a federally funded STEM education program as a program funded in fiscal year 2010 by congressional appropriation or allocation that includes one or more of the following as a primary objective: attract or prepare students to pursue classes or coursework in STEM areas through formal or informal education activities (informal education programs provide support for activities provided by a variety of organizations that offer students learning opportunities outside of formal schooling through contests, science fairs, summer programs, and other means; outreach programs targeted to the general public should not be included), attract students to pursue degrees (2-year, 4-year, graduate, or doctoral degrees) in STEM fields through formal or informal education activities, provide training opportunities for undergraduate or graduate students in STEM fields (this can include grants, fellowships, internships, and traineeships that are targeted to students; general research grants that are targeted to researchers that may hire a student to work in the lab should not be considered a STEM education program), attract graduates to pursue careers in STEM fields, improve teacher (preservice or in-service) education in STEM areas, improve or expand the capacity of K-12 schools or postsecondary institutions to promote or foster education in STEM fields, or conduct research to enhance the quality of STEM education programs provided to students. | Why GAO Did This Study
Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education programs help to enhance the nations global competitiveness. Many federal agencies have been involved in administering these programs. Concerns have been raised about the overall effectiveness and efficiency of STEM education programs.
GAO examined (1) the number of federal agencies and programs that provided funding for STEM education programs in fiscal year 2010; (2) the extent to which STEM education programs have similar objectives, serve similar target groups, and provide similar types of services, and, if necessary, what opportunities exist to increase coordination; and (3) the extent to which STEM education programs measured effectiveness. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and plans; surveyed federal STEM education programs; analyzed programs STEM evaluations; and interviewed relevant federal officials. An electronic supplementGAO-12-110SPprovides survey results.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2010, 13 federal agencies invested over $3 billion in 209 programs designed to increase knowledge of STEM fields and attainment of STEM degrees. The number of programs within agencies ranged from 3 to 46, with the Departments of Health and Human Services and Energy and the National Science Foundation administering more than half of these programs. Almost a third of the programs had obligations of $1 million or less, while some had obligations of over $100 million. Beyond programs specifically focused on STEM education, agencies funded other broad efforts that contributed to enhancing STEM education.
Eighty-three percent of the programs GAO identified overlapped to some degree with at least 1 other program in that they offered similar services to similar target groups in similar STEM fields to achieve similar objectives. Many programs have a broad scopeserving multiple target groups with multiple services. However, even when programs overlap, the services they provide and the populations they serve may differ in meaningful ways and would therefore not necessarily be duplicative. Nonetheless, the programs are similar enough that they need to be well coordinated and guided by a robust strategic plan. Currently, though, less than half of the programs GAO surveyed indicated that they coordinated with other agencies that administer similar STEM education programs. Current efforts to inventory federal STEM education activities and develop a 5-year strategic plan present an opportunity to enhance coordination, align governmentwide efforts, and improve efficiency of limited resources by identifying opportunities for program consolidation and reducing administrative costs.
Agencies limited use of performance measures and evaluations may hamper their ability to assess the effectiveness of their individual programs as well as the overall STEM education effort. Specifically, program officials varied in their ability to provide reliable output measuresfor example, the number of students, teachers, or institutions directly served by their program. Further, most agencies did not use outcomes measures in a way that is clearly reflected in their performance planning documents. This may hinder decision makers ability to assess how agencies' STEM education efforts contribute to agencywide performance goals and the overall federal STEM effort. In addition, a majority of programs did not conduct comprehensive evaluations since 2005 to assess effectiveness, and the evaluations GAO reviewed did not always align with program objectives. Finally, GAO found that completed STEM education evaluation results had not always been disseminated in a fashion that facilitated knowledge sharing between both practitioners and researchers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that as OSTP leads the governmentwide STEM education strategic planning effort, it should work with agencies to better align their activities with a governmentwide strategy, develop a plan for sustained coordination, identify programs for potential consolidation or elimination, and assist agencies in determining how to better evaluate their programs. OSTP provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. OMB had no concerns with the report. |
gao_GAO-04-378 | gao_GAO-04-378_0 | Background
Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act in 1970 to ensure safe and healthy working conditions for every worker in the nation. OSHA Has Employed a Variety of Voluntary Compliance Strategies, Which Has Extended the Agency’s Reach to a Growing Number of Employers
OSHA’s voluntary compliance strategies—four programs plus compliance assistance activities such as education and outreach—have expanded the agency’s reach to a growing number of employers. Voluntary Strategies Appear to Have Many Positive Outcomes, but the Absence of Comprehensive Data Limits Assessment
While OSHA’s voluntary compliance strategies have increased the number of worksites the agency reaches, and participants and others have provided enthusiastic testimony regarding their ability to foster better safety and health practices, the lack of comprehensive data on the outcomes of the programs has hindered our ability to assess their effectiveness. Improved Relationships with OSHA and between Employers and Employees
According to employers and employees at worksites we visited, voluntary compliance programs also improved their relationships with OSHA and improved the relationships between management officials and employees. For example, one partnership only provided data on injuries and illnesses for 25 of its 222 participants. Alliance Program—Goals for each alliance are individually developed and are often not readily measurable. The strategies that researchers and specialists proposed generally fell into four categories: (1) providing more incentives to encourage additional employers to voluntarily improve safety and health in the workplace; (2) promote more systematic approaches to workplace safety and health; (3) focusing more specifically on high-hazard, high-injury workplaces; and (4) using third-party approaches to achieve voluntary compliance. It may be similarly difficult for OSHA to monitor and verify this process through employers participating in its voluntary programs. Furthermore, the agency must balance its plans to expand its voluntary compliance programs with its enforcement responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) can inspect only a fraction of 7 million U.S. worksites each year in its efforts to ensure safe and healthy working conditions, the agency has increasingly supplemented enforcement with "voluntary compliance strategies" to reach more employers and employ its resources most effectively. GAO assessed the types of strategies used, the extent of their use, and their effectiveness. GAO also obtained suggestions from specialists for additional voluntary compliance strategies.
What GAO Found
OSHA has implemented four voluntary programs, using a mix of strategies, that have extended its reach to a growing number of employers. For example, one program recognizes more than 1,000 worksites with exemplary records and practices while another focuses on hazardous industries, encouraging more than 200 employers to eliminate serious hazards. The agency plans to significantly expand its voluntary compliance programs over the next few years, although such expansion may tax its limited resources. OSHA's voluntary compliance programs appear to have yielded many positive outcomes, but the agency does not yet have adequate data to assess their individual and relative effectiveness. Employers and employees at nine worksites we visited attested to reductions in injuries and illnesses and improved relationships with one another and with OSHA. However, the agency has just begun to evaluate its programs and much of its data are insufficient for evaluation. For example, data on one program are inconsistent, making comparisons difficult, and goals for another program are individually developed and not readily measurable. The lack of such data makes it difficult for OSHA to articulate priorities and necessary resource allocations. The additional strategies that researchers and specialists suggested generally fell into four categories: providing more incentives to encourage additional employers to voluntarily improve workplace safety and health; promoting more systematic approaches to workplace safety and health; focusing more specifically on high-hazard, high-injury workplaces; and using third-party approaches to achieve voluntary compliance. |
gao_GAO-17-141 | gao_GAO-17-141_0 | NNSA’s Methods of Accounting for and Tracking Costs
NNSA contractors use different methods to account for costs, according to NNSA officials. Legislative Requirement for NNSA to Develop a Plan to Improve and Integrate Financial Management
Section 3128 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires NNSA to develop a plan for improving and integrating financial management of the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA’s plan includes the four elements required under section 3128—a feasibility assessment, estimated costs, expected results, and an implementation timeline—but contains few details related to each of these elements. Feasibility assessment. NNSA’s feasibility assessment does not provide any specific information regarding these concerns. NNSA’s cost estimate, however, provides no details regarding how the estimate was developed, beyond stating that it is based on professional judgment and input from NNSA’s contractors. Moreover, the plan does not identify which elements are considered the “core elements” or explain the reasoning behind the implementation timeframe of 3 to 5 years. NNSA’s Plan Does Not Fully Follow Leading Practices for Planning, Limiting Its Usefulness As a Road Map for Guiding NNSA’s Effort
NNSA’s plan does not fully incorporate leading practices, which limits its usefulness as a planning tool and limits the effectiveness of NNSA’s effort to provide meaningful financial information to Congress and other stakeholders. In developing plans for implementing new initiatives, agencies— including NNSA—can benefit from following leading practices for strategic planning. NNSA’s plan, however, does not fully incorporate any of these leading practices. For example, the plan’s executive summary states that NNSA developed the plan to address specific requirements set forth in section 3128 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014; however, information presented in the plan’s conclusions suggests that the plan may also be intended to satisfy the information needs of NNSA decision makers. NNSA’s plan includes a list of the challenges NNSA will face during implementation of the plan—including challenges related to the availability of resources and identifying and implementing an information technology solution—and provides a “notional” implementation timeline with milestones for certain significant actions. However, beyond the high- level cost estimate provided, NNSA’s plan does not include a description of the specific resources needed to meet specific elements of the plan or define strategies that address these management challenges. However, NNSA did not involve key stakeholders in the development of its financial integration plan. Because NNSA’s plan does not fully incorporate leading strategic planning practices, such as those included in table 1, it has not provided a useful road map for guiding NNSA’s effort. In addition, other NNSA officials told us that the plan they submitted to Congress was never intended to provide a road map to guide their efforts. Instead, according to these NNSA officials, the purpose of the plan was to identify general principles and a strategic vision for achieving financial integration. Conclusions
Effective management and oversight of the contracts, projects, and programs that support NNSA’s mission are dependent upon the availability of reliable enterprise-wide management information and, as required, NNSA has provided Congress with a plan for improving and integrating its financial management. In particular, NNSA’s plan has not provided an effective framework for guiding NNSA’s effort because it does not incorporate leading planning practices including (1) defining the missions and goals of a program or initiative, (2) defining strategies and identifying resources needed to achieve goals, (3) ensuring leadership involvement, and (4) involving stakeholders in planning. The Director of Financial Integration has taken steps to develop an actionable plan, but it is unclear when the plan will be finalized or the extent to which it will incorporate leading practices. Until a plan that incorporates leading practices is in place, NNSA cannot be assured that its efforts will result in a cost collection model that satisfies the information needs of Congress or improves program and financial management through improved cost analysis, cost estimating, and program evaluation. Such information would better position NNSA to address longstanding contract and project management challenges. Without proper planning NNSA could waste valuable resources, time, and effort in its financial management improvement and integration process. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help provide a roadmap to effectively guide NNSA’s effort to integrate and improve its financial management, we recommend that the NNSA Administrator direct the Program Director of Financial Integration to develop a plan for producing cost information that fully incorporates leading practices. In its written comments, NNSA stated that it will update the plan and address the items GAO identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective management and oversight of contracts, projects, and programs are dependent upon the availability of reliable enterprise-wide financial management information. Such information is also needed by Congress to carry out its oversight responsibilities and make budgetary decisions. However, meaningful cost analysis of NNSA programs, including comparisons across programs, contractors, and sites, is not possible because NNSA's contractors use different methods of accounting for and tracking costs.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required NNSA to develop and submit to Congress a plan to improve and integrate its financial management. An explanatory statement accompanying the act included a provision for GAO to review the adequacy of NNSA's plan. This report evaluates the extent to which NNSA's plan (1) addresses the objectives of the act and (2) follows leading practices for planning. GAO reviewed NNSA's plan and compared it with legislative requirements and leading practices for planning and interviewed NNSA officials.
What GAO Found
On February 5, 2016, more than 13 months after the statutory reporting deadline, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) submitted to Congress a plan for improving and integrating its financial management. The plan includes the four elements required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014—a feasibility assessment, estimated costs, expected results, and an implementation timeline—but contains few details related to each of these elements. For example, NNSA's feasibility assessment includes a list of implementation concerns—including general concerns related to the availability of resources and to identifying and implementing an information technology solution—but does not provide any specific information regarding these concerns. In addition, NNSA's plan includes a cost estimate of between $10 million and $70 million but provides no details on how the estimate was developed beyond stating that it is based on professional judgment and input from NNSA's contractors. The plan also includes a “notional” implementation timeline that calls for the plan's core elements to be completed in 3 to 5 years but does not include details on which elements are considered core elements.
NNSA's financial integration plan does not fully incorporate leading strategic planning practices, which limits its usefulness as a planning tool as well as the effectiveness of NNSA's effort to provide meaningful financial information to Congress and other stakeholders. As GAO has reported previously, in developing plans for implementing new initiatives, agencies can benefit from following leading practices for strategic planning. These leading practices include (1) defining the missions and goals of a program or initiative, (2) defining strategies and identifying resources needed to achieve goals, (3) ensuring leadership involvement, and (4) involving stakeholders in planning. However, NNSA's plan does not fully incorporate any of these leading practices. For example, beyond the high-level cost estimate provided, NNSA's plan does not include a description of the specific resources needed to meet specific elements of the plan or define strategies that address management challenges, including the implementation concerns identified in the plan's feasibility assessment. In addition, NNSA did not involve key stakeholders in developing its plan. Because NNSA's plan does not incorporate leading strategic planning practices, it has not provided a useful road map for guiding NNSA's effort. NNSA officials told GAO that the plan they submitted to Congress was never intended to provide a road map to guide their efforts. Instead, they said the purpose of the plan was to identify general principles and a strategic vision for achieving financial integration. The NNSA official responsible for overseeing the plan's execution told GAO, he has begun to develop a more comprehensive and actionable plan to guide NNSA's effort. However, it is unclear when the new plan will be finalized or the extent to which it will incorporate leading practices. Until a plan is in place that incorporates leading strategic planning practices, NNSA cannot be assured that its efforts will result in a cost collection tool that produces reliable enterprise-wide information that satisfies the needs of Congress and program managers. Such information would better position NNSA to address long-standing contract and project management challenges. Without proper planning, NNSA could waste valuable resources, time, and effort on its financial integration effort.
What GAO Recommends
To provide a road map to guide NNSA's financial management improvement effort, GAO recommends that the NNSA Administrator direct the Program Director of Financial Integration to develop a plan for producing cost information that fully incorporates leading planning practices. NNSA agreed to update its plan and address the items GAO identified. |
gao_NSIAD-97-93 | gao_NSIAD-97-93_0 | Current Longbow Missile Quantities Are Significantly Overstated
According to OSD PA&E and our calculations, the current Longbow Hellfire missile procurement quantity of 12,722 missiles could be overstated by 7,145 missiles. Our work shows that the current Longbow Hellfire missile requirement contained an outdated helicopter missile-carrying capability and double counted missiles. Our review of this data showed that the Army used a helicopter carrying capability of 16 missiles instead of the current 12 and double counted missiles when it calculated the residual readiness element of the requirement. However, one study that may change the requirements—the Deep Attack Weapons Mix study—is not yet complete. Therefore, the current Longbow Hellfire requirement of 12,722 could be reduced by 7,145 missiles. The Army Material System Analysis Activity’s (AMSAA) independent evaluation of the Longbow Apache helicopter weapon system revealed that neither version of the airframe is meeting its vertical rate of climb requirement. The report states that to meet this requirement, weight needs to be reduced further. In addition, the December 1995 Selected Acquisition Report for the Longbow Apache system reported that the system’s demonstrated capability was only eight missiles. If the Army has to reduce requirements from 12 to 8 missiles to reduce weight, the combined total Longbow Hellfire and Hellfire II missile requirement would decline from the recalculated 11,153 missiles to 8,785. Using the one-to-one ratio between the 2 missiles, the Longbow Hellfire missile requirement would be lowered by an additional 1,184 missiles to 4,393; a reduction of over 8,300 missiles from the existing 12,722 requirement. To determine if the Army had successfully demonstrated the Longbow Hellfire missile’s requirements during IOT&E, we reviewed operational test reports and Army studies. We discussed these documents with officials in the Longbow Missile Program Office, the Longbow Radar Project Office in St. Louis, Missouri, and with representatives from the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Washington, D. C.
To determine if the missile was on schedule to achieve its planned cost reduction, we reviewed the Army’s Cost Reduction Plan, current estimates, and projected costs for reduced quantities with officials in the Army’s Air to Ground Project Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, D. C.; and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation Office. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Army's Longbow Hellfire missile program, focusing on whether the: (1) Army had adequately justified the requirement and quantities of the missile; and (2) missile had successfully demonstrated its requirements during the initial operational testing and evaluation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Apache Longbow weapon system, which includes the Longbow Hellfire missile, completed initial operational test and evaluation in March 1995; (2) the tests concluded that the system was operationally effective and suitable; (3) however, the Army's current Longbow Hellfire missile requirement of 12,722 may be overstated by over 8,300 missiles; (4) the Army made computational errors and a questionable assumption in calculating missile requirements that resulted in a potential overstatement of 7,145 missiles; (5) in addition, test results indicate that the missile quantity could be reduced by another 1,184 missiles; (6) moreover, significant cost reductions can be achieved with lower missile quantities; (7) while cost estimates for an 8,300-missile quantity reduction are not yet available, the Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates that up to $500 million in program cost savings can be achieved by reducing quantities by approximately 4,000 units; (8) the Army's method of computing the quantities contains three critical errors; (9) the Army used an outdated helicopter carrying capability of 16 missiles instead of the current 12, double counted missiles when figuring the residual readiness portion of the requirement, and used an unsubstantiated mix ratio between the Longbow Hellfire and Hellfire II missiles; (10) correcting these mistakes would potentially reduce the current 12,722-missile requirement for Longbow Hellfire missiles by 7,145 missiles; (11) in addition, the Army Materiel System Analysis Activity's independent evaluation of the Apache Longbow weapon system disclosed that the Apache Longbow system's weight needs to be reduced by almost 600 pounds to achieve its vertical rate of climb specification; (12) according to Army data, the system's current demonstrated capability is calculated using 8 missiles instead of 12; and (13) if the Army lowers its missile carrying capability to 8 to meet the Apache Longbow system weight limitation, this would further reduce the missile requirement by 1,184. |
gao_NSIAD-98-65 | gao_NSIAD-98-65_0 | All corrective actions detailed in this plan are to be completed by December 1999. The Army May Have Difficulty Achieving Material Weakness Plan’s Completion Date
The Army has made some progress by developing a material weakness plan, but it may have difficulty achieving the plan’s December 1999 completion date for the following three reasons. Second, as of October 1997, critical subplans outlining how the Army intends to meet its milestones had not been developed for the costing system and the computer-based methodology. The material weakness plan acknowledges this problem, stating that “. . .managers at all levels do not have the information needed to improve work performance, improve organizational efficiency, and determine and support staffing needs, manpower budgets, and personnel reductions.”
The Army’s plan contains some logical steps to correct this material weakness, including the Army’s two near-term solutions to identifying the number of institutional positions based on an analysis of the workload. For this reason, our review primarily focused on these initiatives. Without a detailed implementation schedule, however, the Army lacks the tools it needs to ensure that it can meet the milestones in the material weakness plan. However, the subplan detailing the specific steps and milestones for implementing the system has not been developed. Even though redesign efforts began in January 1995, there has been no net decrease in the number of major commands, and two of the redesign studies have been canceled. Also, the dollar and personnel savings estimates are overstated. Also, most of the 4,000 active Army positions that were to be transferred from institutional to operational forces were based on assumptions that may not occur. The pamphlet is consistent with this principle, stating that “clear performance measures should be identified to gauge organizational progress.”
Redesign Effort Has Not Resulted in Major Organizational Changes or Efficiencies
The Army’s institutional redesign effort has not reduced the number of major commands, even though redesign documents state that the Army will strive to do so. The Army also created a new major command—the Space and Missile Defense Command. If the Army reduced its reliance on active military institutional personnel, more military personnel would be available for operational units, including deployable support units, which have historically experienced shortfalls.Although the number of Army institutional positions has decreased since 1992, Army data show that the proportion of active Army institutional to operational forces has remained at about 29 percent and is projected to remain at this level through fiscal year 2003, as shown in figure 3. According to an official from this office, limited cost data were included in the memorandum because the offices responsible for the initiatives did not provide cost data in a timely manner. Such a methodology is essential for the Army to make data-based decisions on how to allocate resources among institutional organizations, have assurance the highest priority functions are funded, and be aware of the risks in not funding some institutional functions. As a result, further reductions or retention of institutional personnel may result without the benefits of workload analysis and assessments of risks and tradeoffs. To improve the Army’s ability to make informed, analysis-based decisions on benefits, risks, and tradeoffs in realigning major command organizations and functions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army require that workload-based analyses, such as the 12-step methodology, be used to demonstrate the benefits, risks, and tradeoffs of Force XXI institutional redesign decisions. To assess the extent to which the Army’s streamlining initiatives identified opportunities to reduce Army personnel devoted to institutional functions and realize savings, we reviewed streamlining guidance and interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the Directorate of Force Programs within the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; Forces Command; Training and Doctrine Command; and Army Materiel Command. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the extent to which the Army has: (1) taken corrective action to resolve its material weakness in determining institutional personnel requirements; and (2) identified opportunities to reduce personnel and realize savings through its Force XXI Institutional Redesign Effort.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army developed a corrective action plan to resolve its material weakness in determining institutional personnel requirements but may have difficulty achieving the plan's completion date; (2) two critical subplans have been developed, one that implements a new costing system and another that develops a new computer-based methodology--the Army Workload Performance System (AWPS); (3) without specific steps and milestones for both of these efforts, the Army lacks the tools it needs to ensure that the plan will be completed by December 1999; (4) milestones for both efforts have slipped from original estimates, and in the case of the computer-based methodology, the Army has missed some of its interim goals; (5) in addition, a plan initiative to ensure that major commands use a 12-step methodology to analyze workload may not be implemented on time unless more personnel are assigned to the office responsible for this effort; (6) the Army's institutional redesign effort has not resulted in a reduction in major command headquarters, and the dollar and position savings identified are overstated; (7) one redesign initiative resulted in the redesignation of a major command as a subcommand; (8) however, the Army also created a new command, resulting in no net decrease in the number of commands; (9) also, the Army transferred a command but did not recognize it to achieve efficiencies; therefore, this effort produced virtually no decrease in the command's 9,000 positions; (10) the Army transferred about 2,800 active Army positions from institutional to operational forces based on two initiatives, but these initiatives did not produce the anticipated savings, and personnel cuts had to be made elsewhere; (11) the Army's efforts to establish workload-based requirements and redesign institutional functions have produced few results; (12) Army personnel trend data from 1992-2003 show that the Army has not been successful in reducing the proportion of institutional to operating forces within the active Army; (13) in addition, the Army does not currently have a workload basis for allocating its personnel resources among institutional organizations and ensuring that the highest priority functions are funded first; (14) as a result, the Army may not have the analysis it needs to efficiently allocate many of the institutional positions that are programmed to be eliminated by fiscal year 2003 or additional reductions mandated by the Quadrennial Defense Review; and (15) without senior leadership attention, the Army's current initiatives may not achieve meaningful and measurable changes. |
gao_GAO-08-622 | gao_GAO-08-622_0 | The U.S. Government Has Not Met National Security Goals in Pakistan’s FATA
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in the FATA, despite more than $10.5 billion in U.S. support to Pakistan since 2002. Despite this effort, the 2007 NIE, State and embassy documents, and Defense and State officials, including those operating in Pakistan, have concluded that al Qaeda has regenerated its ability to attack the United States and succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA. The United States Has Relied Primarily on the Pakistani Military to Accomplish Its Goals in Pakistan’s FATA, with Little Focus on Economic Development and Improving Governance
Since 2002, the United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. Approximately $5.8 billion of this amount has been directed at efforts to combat terrorism in Pakistan’s FATA and the border region. According to State, Pakistan has helped kill or capture hundreds of suspected terrorists, including al Qaeda operatives and Taliban leaders. In addition, Pakistani military operations have resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,400 members of its security forces. No Comprehensive Plan for Guiding U.S. Efforts in the FATA Has Been Developed, as Called for by the Administration and Congress
Despite the recognition of U.S. government officials, including the U.S. President and Congress, that a comprehensive plan employing all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA region, a comprehensive plan to meet U.S. national security goals in the region was never developed. Recognizing in 2006 that military efforts alone would not succeed in the FATA, the embassy, with Defense, State, and USAID support, and in conjunction with the Pakistani government in power at that time, began an effort to focus more attention on the other key elements of national power, such as development and public diplomacy, to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. Despite Executive, Congressional, and Independent Calls for Comprehensive Plans to Combat Terrorism and Close Terrorist Safe Havens, Such Plans Were Never Developed
As table 1 shows, the need for the development of comprehensive plans employing all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—to combat terrorism and close terrorist safe havens has been recognized by the President’s national security strategies (2003), the independent 9/11 Commission (2004), and by Congress in repeated legislation (2004 and 2007). However, this new approach does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan, and all of the agencies’ individual efforts have not been fully approved in Washington. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, are vast unpoliced regions attractive to extremists and terrorists seeking a safe haven. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress in meeting these national security goals for Pakistan's FATA, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. To address these objectives, GAO compared national security goals against assessments conducted by U.S. agencies and reviewed available plans.
What GAO Found
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. Since 2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for military operations there. According to the Department of State, Pakistan deployed 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and helped kill and capture hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives; these efforts cost the lives of approximately 1,400 members of Pakistan's security forces. However, GAO found broad agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007). Furthermore, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004 specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism. However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--called for by the various national security strategies and Congress. As a result, since 2002, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the embassy, in conjunction with Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and in cooperation with the government of Pakistan, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of national power, such as development assistance and public diplomacy, to address U.S. goals in the FATA. However, this does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan. |
gao_HEHS-96-161 | gao_HEHS-96-161_0 | State Taxes Typically Increase Insured Health Plans’ Costs
One of the most direct and quantifiable costs that insured health plans incur compared with self-funded health plans results from state premium taxes and other assessments paid by health insurers. Appendix II shows state assessments for guaranty funds and deductions from premium taxes. Appendix III shows state assessments for high-risk pools. Mandated Benefits Increase Health Insurance Costs but Magnitude Varies
The cost impact of mandated benefits varies because states differ in the number and type of benefits mandated. For small employers, who typically purchase fully insured health plans and are less likely to offer any health coverage, mandates may impose claims costs for benefits that they otherwise might not have covered. Similarly, a survey of Wisconsin insurers also found that “self-funded health plans provide at least as many of the mandated benefits as insured health plans and in some cases provide more generous coverage.” This result may partially be due to the tendency of large employers to both self-fund and offer more comprehensive benefits. State Solvency Standards’ Impact on Insurers’ Costs Is Limited
State solvency requirements add costs only to the extent that they exceed prudent industry practices a health insurance carrier would follow in the absence of state requirements. Most insurers have capital and surplus levels that exceed these minimum requirements. Specifically, state taxes on health insurers raise the costs of fully insured plans by about 2 percent in most states, with the actual level determined by state tax rate and type of health plan. In addition, the extent to which mandated benefits and solvency requirements raise costs differs by state, depending upon the scope of state laws. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the costs of state health insurance requirements, focusing on: (1) premium taxes on insured health plans; (2) mandated health benefits; (3) financial solvency standards; and (4) state health insurance reforms affecting small employers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) state health insurance regulation imposes requirements and costs on third-party health plans, but not on employers' self-funded health plans; (2) state premium taxes and other assessments for guaranty fund and high-risk pool fees, are the most direct and quantifiable costs on insured health plans; (3) the extent to which these requirements increase insured health plans' costs varies by state because of differences in the nature and scope of state regulation and plans' operating practices; (4) most states mandate that insurance policies cover certain benefits and providers that might not otherwise be covered; (5) costs are higher in states that mandate more costly benefits; (6) most self-funded health plans offer many of the same mandated benefits, but these plans would lose flexibility in offering uniform health plans across all states; (7) state solvency standards have a limited potential effect on plan costs, since most insurers maintain capital and surplus levels that exceed state minimum requirements and typically perform tasks similar to state reporting requirements; and (8) the cost implications of states' small employer health insurance reforms are unclear because of incomplete cost data and the difficulty of isolating the impact of such reforms. |
gao_GAO-05-671 | gao_GAO-05-671_0 | Background
Productivity is defined as the efficiency with which inputs are used to produce outputs. Measuring Productivity at IRS Is Challenging because Measuring the Output of Services Is Difficult
Because IRS provides services, such as providing information to taxpayers and enforcing the tax laws, that are intangible and complex, measuring output—and therefore productivity—is challenging. IRS, like other service providers, could measure output in terms of its results—its impact on taxpayers—or in terms of activities. IRS’s activities are easier to measure than results but still present challenges. For example, an increase in exam cases closed per FTE would not indicate an increase in true productivity if the increase occurred because FTEs were shifted to less complex cases or the examiner allowed the quality of the case review to decline to close cases more quickly. However Output Is Measured, IRS Can Improve Its Current Productivity Measures by Using Alternative Methods
The appropriate method for calculating productivity depends on the purpose for which the productivity measure is being calculated. The alternative methods that can be used for calculating productivity range from computing single ratios—exams closed per FTE—to using complex statistical methods to form composite indexes that combine multiple indicators of outputs and inputs. The single ratios may be useful for evaluating the efficiency of a single noncomplex activity. Composite indexes can also be used to measure productivity of resources across an entire organization, where many different activities are being performed. On the other hand, technology changes might improve productivity even if the management of resources has not changed. Illustrations of Alternative Methods of Measuring Productivity
Currently available IRS data can be used to produce productivity indexes that control for complexity and quality. For individual exams, the comparison of productivity indexes shows that the unweighted index understates the decline in productivity. By controlling for complexity and quality, IRS managers would have more complete information about the true productivity of activities, such as exams, that can differ in these dimensions. In addition, the weighted measures can be used to measure productivity for the organization, where many different activities are being performed. More complete productivity measures would provide better information about the effectiveness of IRS resources, IRS’s budget needs, and IRS’s efforts to improve efficiency. These improved data could be integrated with the methods for calculating productivity illustrated in this report to further improve IRS’s productivity measurement. However, this type of productivity index allows for only a single output and a single input. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the past, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has experienced declines in enforcement productivity as measured by cases closed per Full Time Equivalent. Increasing enforcement productivity through a variety of enforcement improvement projects is one strategy being pursued by IRS. Evaluating the benefits of different projects requires good measures of productivity. In addition, IRS's ability to correctly measure its productivity has important budget implications. GAO was asked to illustrate available methods to better measure productivity at IRS. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) describe challenges that IRS faces when measuring productivity, (2) describe alternative methods that IRS can use to improve its productivity measures, and (3) assess the feasibility of using these alternative methods by illustrating their use with existing IRS data.
What GAO Found
Measuring IRS's productivity, the efficiency with which inputs are used to produce outputs, is challenging. IRS's output could be measured in terms of impact on taxpayers or the activities it performs. IRS's impacts on taxpayers, such as compliance and perceptions of fairness, are intangible and costly to measure. IRS's activities, such as exams or audits conducted, are easier to count but must be adjusted for complexity and quality. An increase in exams closed per employee would not indicate an increase in productivity if IRS had shifted to less complex exams or if quality declined. IRS can improve its productivity measures by using a variety of methods for calculating productivity that adjust for complexity and quality. These methods range from ratios using a single output and input to methods that combine multiple outputs and inputs into composite indexes. Which method is appropriate depends on the purpose for which the productivity measure is being calculated. For example, a single ratio may be useful for examining the productivity of a single simple activity, while composite indexes can be used to measure the productivity of resources across an entire organization, where many different activities are being performed. Two examples show that existing data, even though they have limitations, can be used to produce a more complete picture of productivity. For individual exams, composite indexes controlling for exam complexity show a larger productivity decline than the single ratio method. On the other hand, for exams performed in the Large and Mid-Size Business (LSMB) division, the single ratio understates the productivity increase shown, after again controlling for complexity. By using alternative methods for measuring productivity, managers would be better able to isolate sources of productivity change and manage resources more effectively. More complete productivity measures would provide better information about IRS effectiveness, budget needs, and efforts to improve efficiency. |
gao_AIMD-95-167 | gao_AIMD-95-167_0 | RCRIS Is Not Meeting User Needs
RCRIS falls short of meeting its overall goal of helping EPA and the states manage the hazardous waste program because it has not met three of its primary objectives. RCRIS Is Difficult to Use
RCRIS is not easy to use, particularly with regard to data entry and retrieval. RCRIS Data Are Not Reliable
RCRIS does not provide a mechanism for maintaining highly reliable data. These data provided information on the types of violations detected and enforcement actions taken. RCRIS Shortfalls Have Not Significantly Affected the RCRA Program
Although RCRIS has not met its original objectives, system problems have not significantly affected the RCRA program because users do not rely on it as a primary management tool. At that time, we will send copies to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and interested congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on whether the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Resource Conservation and Recovery Information System (RCRIS) is meeting its primary objectives and its effect on implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) RCRIS does not meet its overall goal of helping EPA and the states manage the hazardous waste program; (2) most users of RCRIS do not rely on the system because they find data entry and retrieval to be too difficult; (3) RCRIS data are not reliable because the system requires users to manually verify data; and (4) RCRIS shortfalls have not significantly affected RCRA implementation because users do not consider the system to be the key tool for program management and have developed workarounds. |
gao_GAO-03-358 | gao_GAO-03-358_0 | The assistance approach generally incorporates four elements: (1) rule of law, (2) governance (3) human rights, and (4) elections. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the nature, impact, and sustainability of U.S. assistance programs to strengthen democratic institutions in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru, we first interviewed headquarters officials in Washington, D.C., at the departments and agencies providing rule of law, governance, human rights, and election assistance, including USAID, the State and Justice Departments, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Inter-American Foundation. To analyze the overarching management issues that have affected program outcomes, we analyzed project documentation, interviewed knowledgeable officials, and reviewed assistance activities on field visits to the six countries. In some cases, other donors have taken steps to replicate or expand USAID’s programs. USAID also has been instrumental in supporting the creation of Human Rights Ombudsman Offices in five of the six countries by providing technical assistance, office equipment, and salaried professionals. Although U.S. election-related assistance has supported efforts that have contributed to free and fair elections in the six countries we reviewed, most of this assistance has gone to three of these countries— Nicaragua, Peru, and El Salvador—to help them improve electoral institutions and enhance voter access. U.S. agencies have not always managed their programs in a way that would leverage the contributions from all of these organizations, particularly other major donors, and maximize the impact and sustainability of U.S. funded programs. Furthermore, evaluation of program results and sharing lessons learned has been limited among U.S. agencies and implementers across countries where this assistance is provided. U.S. government agencies have not outlined a long-term, strategic approach to this assistance that considers all of the major parties and available resources and information. Donors and Latin American countries have been collaborating regionally on anticorruption activities since the early 1990s. Agencies
The U.S. agencies implementing democracy assistance programs have not consistently evaluated the results of their activities. Conclusions
Local resources for sustaining democracy programs are difficult to mobilize given the serious economic problems in the countries we visited, and funding shortages were often cited by program implementers and beneficiaries as major obstacles to long-term program success. Therefore, it is crucial that the U.S. government and other international donors manage available international resources as efficiently as possible. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that U.S. assistance activities designed to support and strengthen democracies in Latin America have the maximum impact and sustainability, we recommend that the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of USAID develop more comprehensive interagency strategic plans at the regional and country level for democracy assistance addressing how U.S. agencies will cooperate with each other and other major donors to achieve greater impact and sustainability in democracy programs; establish a strategy for periodically evaluating democracy assistance projects that is consistent across agencies, countries, and types of programs; and establish a systematic mechanism to share information on development approaches, methods, materials, and results from all democracy assistance projects among U.S. agencies and implementers. The Inter-American Foundation did not comment on this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Supporting democracy abroad is a major U.S. foreign policy objective. To better understand how this assistance has been implemented in Latin America, GAO was asked to review programs in six countries--Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru--that have been of particular importance to U.S. interests in Central and South America. Between fiscal years 1992 and 2002, U.S. agencies have funded more than $580 million in democracy-related programs in these countries. This report discusses the impact of and factors affecting this assistance and the overarching management issues that have affected program planning and implementation.
What GAO Found
U.S. programs to strengthen democratic institutions in six Latin American countries have had a modest impact to date. These programs have primarily focused on promoting (1) the rule of law, (2) governance, (3) human rights, and (4) elections. U.S. assistance has helped bring about important reforms in criminal justice in five of the six countries, improved transparency and accountability of some government functions, increased attention to human rights, and supported elections that observation groups have considered free and fair. However, host governments have not always sustained these reforms by providing the needed political, financial, and human capital. For example, host countries often did not support training programs, computer systems, or equipment after U.S. funding ended. In other cases, U.S.-supported programs were limited and targeted, and countries have not adopted these programs on a national scale. Since host country resources for sustaining democracy programs are difficult to mobilize, it is crucial that the U.S. government and other donors manage available international resources as efficiently as possible for maximum impact and sustainability. Several management issues have affected democracy assistance programs. Poor coordination among the key U.S. agencies has been a long-standing management problem, and cooperation with other foreign donors has been limited. U.S. agencies' strategic plans do not outline how these agencies will overcome coordination problems and cooperate with other foreign donors on program planning and implementation to maximize scarce resources. Also, U.S. agencies have not consistently evaluated program results or shared lessons learned from completed projects, thus missing opportunities to enhance the outcomes of their programs. |
gao_GAO-05-463 | gao_GAO-05-463_0 | Scope and Methodology
As agreed with your offices, we assessed whether the program was consistently implemented across the country, paying particular attention to the extent to which the Bureau reviewed the census data for errors that could have been caused by broader, more systemic problems, such as shortcomings with a particular census-taking procedure. We also evaluated how well the Bureau transitioned from an earlier quality assurance program used in the 2000 Census, Full Count Review. At the same time, however, we identified several shortcomings with the CQR program, including inconsistent handling of internal cases by the Bureau’s regional offices and inaccurate data being posted to the Bureau’s public Web site. Moreover, while CQR found the counting of group quarters in their correct location—a problem known as geocoding error—to be particularly challenging, the Bureau did not perform a nationwide review of these known trouble spots, and thus missed an opportunity to improve the accuracy of the data for these dwellings. The corrections affected over 1,180 governmental units in the United States. Although this is a small percentage of the nation’s more than 39,000 governmental units, the impact of those changes on local governments was, in some cases, substantial, and could have implications for federal assistance and state funding programs that use census numbers in their allocation formulas, as well as other applications of census data. 4) at the University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill. The population count of Morehead, Kentucky, increased by more than 1,600 when CQR found that a large number of students from Morehead State University’s dormitories were erroneously excluded from the city’s population. However, given the number of prisons and other group quarters geocoded to the wrong location, refinements are needed. Better Strategic Planning and Other Actions Could Improve Future Count Correction Efforts
The CQR program was preceded by a quality assurance program called Full Count Review, which ran from June 2000 through March 2001 and, like CQR, was designed to find problems with the census data. However, although the Bureau planned to fold unresolved full count issues into CQR, many full count issues were rejected from CQR because the latter program had more stringent documentation requirements. Because these numbers were later found to be flawed for some jurisdictions, as the Bureau proceeds with its plans for the 2010 Census, it will be important for it to explore options for reviewing and correcting this essential information before it is released. Conclusions
The CQR program played an important role in improving the quality of data from the 2000 Census. Third, it will be important for the Bureau to address persistent strategic planning challenges. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) conducted the Count Question Resolution (CQR) program to correct errors in the count of housing units as well as dormitories and other group living facilities known as group quarters. GAO was asked to assess whether CQR was consistently implemented across the country, paying particular attention to whether the Bureau identified census errors that could have been caused by more systemic problems. GAO also evaluated how well the Bureau transitioned to CQR from an earlier quality assurance program called Full Count Review.
What GAO Found
The CQR program, which ran from June 30, 2001, to September 30, 2003, played an important role in improving the quality of data from the 2000 Census in that it corrected numbers affecting 47 states and over 1,180 governmental units. Although this is a small percentage of the nation's more than 39,000 government entities, the count revisions impacted private homes, prisons, and other dwellings and, in some cases, were significant. For example, when the Bureau deleted duplicate data on students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and made other corrections, that state's head count dropped by 2,828 people. Similarly, CQR found that more than 1,600 people in Morehead, Kentucky, were counted in the wrong location. GAO identified several shortcomings with the CQR program, including inconsistent implementation by the Bureau's regional offices and the posting of inaccurate data to the Bureau's Web-based errata report. Moreover, while CQR found the counting of group quarters to be particularly problematic, the Bureau did not perform an active, nationwide review of these known trouble spots, and thus missed an opportunity to potentially improve the accuracy of the data for these dwellings. Further, because CQR had more stringent documentation requirements compared to a preceding program called Full Count Review, CQR rejected hundreds of unresolved full count issues, missing another opportunity to improve the data. As its plans proceed for the 2010 Census, it will be important for the Bureau to address the operational issues GAO identified. Moreover, because the data for apportionment and redistricting were later found to be flawed for some jurisdictions, it will be important for the Bureau to develop a count correction program that is designed to systematically review and correct these essential figures. |
gao_GAO-15-511 | gao_GAO-15-511_0 | DOD components are responsible for making LQA eligibility determinations for individual job applicants or employees, and for ensuring that employees are paid LQA properly, in accordance with DOD’s LQA Instruction and the DSSR. DOD Has Taken Steps to Clarify Requirements for LQA Eligibility, but Is Not Monitoring LQA Eligibility Determinations Made by Its Components
DOD and Its Components Have Taken Some Steps to Clarify LQA Eligibility Requirements
DOD, through its components and DCPAS, has taken some steps to clarify LQA eligibility requirements, particularly as they relate to the single employer interpretation and the definition of a U.S. hire. In addition, DOD components have taken steps to clarify LQA eligibility requirements, including issuing memorandums and adopting new procedures for making LQA eligibility determinations. Similarly, U.S. Air Forces in Europe developed a flow chart to help local human resource specialists determine whether overseas job applicants are eligible for LQA. DOD Has Not Monitored DOD Components’ LQA Eligibility Determinations
DOD has not monitored DOD components’ LQA eligibility determinations for civilian employees overseas to help ensure the consistent application of DOD’s LQA Instruction across the department. In implementing the Office of the Inspector General’s recommendation, DCPAS charged the heads of DOD components with conducting periodic quality assurance reviews. Agencies Have Missed Opportunities to Help Ensure Consistent Determinations of LQA Eligibility Requirements
DOD Has Not Discussed with State Its Concerns about DSSR LQA Eligibility Requirements
DOD, through DCPAS, has not discussed its concerns related to the DSSR with State’s Office of Allowances to determine whether LQA eligibility requirements should be revised, notwithstanding DOD components’ concerns that some of those requirements are ambiguous or outdated. According to State officials, they have done so when other federal agencies have initiated the collaboration. OPM Has Not Posted Its Compensation Claim Decisions in a Timely Fashion
Until recently, past OPM compensation claim decisions have not been widely available to federal agencies, including DOD, and the public. OPM officials told us that they are implementing a new web application for posting compensation claim decisions to the OPM website in a more timely manner. Until OPM develops and implements timeframes for posting individual LQA-related compensation claim decisions online in a timely manner, it cannot ensure that agencies, including DOD, have access to the most up-to-date information to provide accurate guidance on issues relating to LQA eligibility determinations to their employees. Conclusions
Since DOD’s 2013 audit determined that 680 of its civilian employees assigned overseas had erroneously received LQA because of misinterpretations of eligibility requirements, DCPAS and DOD components have taken steps to clarify the eligibility requirements outlined in DOD’s LQA Instruction. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that DCPAS and DOD components are determining LQA eligibility consistently with DOD’s LQA Instruction, the DSSR, and OPM compensation claim decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following two actions: require the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy or DCPAS, as delegated, to monitor reviews of LQA eligibility determinations conducted by DOD components; and discuss with State its concerns related to the DSSR to determine whether LQA eligibility requirements should be revised and then, as appropriate based on those discussions, request that State make any revisions deemed necessary, particularly with regard to the requirement for “substantially continuous employment by such employer” and the definition of a U.S. hire. To evaluate the extent to which DOD has clarified its LQA eligibility requirements and is monitoring its components’ LQA eligibility determinations, we reviewed DOD Instruction 1400.25, Volume 1250, DOD Civilian Personnel Management System: Overseas Allowances and Differentials and a related September 2013 policy advisory. We also reviewed the Department of State (State) Standardized Regulations (DSSR) and selected Office of Personnel Management (OPM) compensation claim decisions to determine if DOD had incorporated into DOD’s current LQA Instruction OPM’s interpretation of the DSSR’s requirement for federal overseas civilian employees to be in “substantially continuous employment by such employer” prior to their current job. To evaluate the extent to which DOD, State, and OPM have helped ensure consistency in the interpretation of LQA eligibility requirements, we interviewed officials from DCPAS, DOD components, and the local human resource offices to determine the extent to which DOD has communicated with State and received and disseminated OPM compensation claim decisions with implementation instructions during and since the 2013 LQA audit. For example, a team from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service traveled to local human resource offices in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility to directly assist employees who were determined to have been erroneously paid LQA with preparing requests for waivers of debt. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD provides LQA as an incentive to recruit eligible individuals for civilian employee assignments overseas. In 2014 DOD spent almost $504 million on LQA for about 16,500 civilian employees to help defray overseas living expenses, such as rent and utilities. GAO was asked to review DOD's implementation of LQA policies for overseas employees. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD has clarified its LQA eligibility requirements and is monitoring its components' LQA eligibility determinations; and (2) DOD, State, and OPM have helped ensure consistency in the interpretation of LQA eligibility requirements.
GAO reviewed the DSSR, DOD's LQA Instruction, and OPM compensation claim decisions. GAO interviewed DOD, State, and OPM officials responsible for overseeing, implementing, or interpreting LQA eligibility requirements, including a nongeneralizable sample of 15 DOD local human resource offices in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility selected based on the number of employees determined to have been erroneously paid LQA in DOD's 2013 LQA audit.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and its components have taken steps to clarify living quarters allowance (LQA) eligibility requirements for civilian employees overseas, but DOD has not monitored its components' LQA eligibility determinations. DOD and its components are to make LQA eligibility determinations in accordance with Department of State (State) Standardized Regulations (DSSR) as well as department-wide and component-level guidance. However, after conducting an audit in 2013, DOD determined that 680 of its civilian employees had erroneously received LQA. Most erroneous LQA payments were attributed to misinterpretations of eligibility requirements. This determination was based in part on a 2011 interpretation of a DSSR eligibility requirement for LQA by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which settles federal employee compensation claims. After the audit, DOD issued a memorandum and point paper to implement OPM's interpretation and clarify LQA eligibility requirements. DOD is also updating its LQA Instruction, DOD Instruction 1400.25, Volume 1250, to incorporate OPM's 2011 interpretation. Some DOD components also issued clarifying guidance and adopted new procedures for making LQA eligibility determinations. For example, U.S. Air Forces in Europe developed a flow chart to help human resource specialists determine whether overseas job applicants are eligible for LQA. DOD's LQA Instruction directs DOD components to conduct periodic quality assurance reviews of LQA eligibility and payments, but according to DOD and component officials, they have not consistently done so. Further, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy is responsible for monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of DOD's LQA Instruction and administers this responsibility through the Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service. However, this office has not monitored its components' reviews of LQA eligibility determinations. Without such monitoring, DOD cannot ensure that LQA eligibility determinations are being made in accordance with applicable regulations and policies.
Agencies have missed opportunities to ensure consistent interpretation of LQA eligibility requirements.
DOD components have raised concerns that some DSSR LQA eligibility requirements are ambiguous or outdated, but DOD has not discussed these concerns with State to determine whether the DSSR should be revised. State officials told GAO that they have collaborated with DOD and other agencies on eligibility issues for other allowances in the past and would be open to future discussions. Without communicating its concerns to State, DOD cannot ensure that State has the information it needs to make any adjustments to the DSSR, if appropriate.
Until recently, OPM had not made its compensation claim decisions widely available to federal agencies, including DOD, and the public because of limited funding. OPM is implementing a new web application for posting compensation claim decisions to its website, but has not established timeframes to routinely post individual decisions. In the absence of doing so, OPM cannot ensure that agencies will have timely access to the most up-to-date information on LQA eligibility issues.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD monitor components' reviews of LQA eligibility determinations and discuss concerns about DSSR LQA eligibility requirements with State. GAO also recommends that OPM develop timeframes for the timely web posting of its decisions. DOD and OPM concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-639 | gao_GAO-09-639_0 | Background
Under MD-715, federal agencies are to identify and eliminate barriers that impede free and open competition in their workplaces. EEOC defines a barrier as an agency policy, principle, or practice that limits or tends to limit employment opportunities for members of a particular gender, race, ethnic background, or disability status. According to EEOC’s instructions, many employment barriers are built into the organizational and operational structures of an agency and are embedded in the day-to-day procedures and practices of the agency. In its oversight role under MD- 715, EEOC provides instructions to agencies on how to complete their barrier analyses and offers other informal assistance. Based on agency submissions of MD-715 reports, EEOC provides assessments of agency progress in its Annual Report on the Federal Workforce, feedback letters addressed to individual agencies, and the EEO Program Compliance Assessment (EPCA). DHS Has Generally Relied on Workforce Data and Has Not Regularly Included Employee Input in Identifying Potential Barriers
According to EEOC’s MD-715 instructions, barrier identification is a two- part process. First, using a variety of sources, an agency is to identify triggers. Second, the agency is to investigate and pinpoint actual barriers and their causes. According to DHS’s MD-715 reports, DHS identified 13 of the 14 triggers based on its analysis of participation rates contained in the workforce data tables. Obtaining the input of employees in identifying triggers would provide a frontline perspective on where potential barriers exist. Employee input can come from a number of sources including employee groups, exit interviews, and employee surveys. Without employee input on DHS personnel policies and practices, DHS is missing opportunities to identify potential barriers. 2. Overreliance on noncompetitive hiring authorities. 3. 4. Nondiverse interview panels; specifically, interview panels that did not reflect the diversity of applicants. DHS Modified Nearly All Target Completion Dates on Planned Actions to Address Barriers
Our analysis of DHS’s MD-715 2007 and 2008 reports showed DHS articulated 12 different planned activities to address the identified barriers, including 1 new planned activity in 2008. According to CRCL officials, although it has not completed any planned activities to address identified barriers, DHS has completed some planned activities identified in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 related to improving its EEO program. According to DHS officials, its MD-715 reports and Human Capital Strategic Plan represent the extent of DHS project plans and milestones for completing planned activities. These documents include only the anticipated outcome, not the essential activities needed to achieve the outcome. For example, in DHS’s 2007 and 2008 MD-715 reports, CRCL identifies an applicant flow tool to analyze recruitment and hiring results as a planned activity to address the barrier of overreliance on the use of the Internet to recruit applicants. In order to help ensure that agency programs are effectively and efficiently implemented, it is important that agencies implement effective internal control activities. We have previously reported that it is essential to establish and track implementation goals and establish a timeline to pinpoint performance shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. Identifying the critical phases of each planned activity necessary to achieve the intended outcome with interim milestones could help DHS ensure that its efforts are moving forward and manage any needed midcourse corrections, while minimizing modifications of target completion dates. DHS Reports Using a Variety of Means to Oversee and Support Components
According to MD-715 and its implementing guidance, a parent agency is to ensure that its components implement the provisions of MD-715 and make a good faith effort to identify and remove barriers to equality of opportunity in the workplace. Because CRCL does not regularly include employee input from available sources, such as the FHCS and DHS’s internal employee survey, it is missing opportunities to identify potential barriers to EEO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under MD-715, federal agencies are to identify and eliminate barriers that impede free and open competition in their workplaces. EEOC defines a barrier as an agency policy, principle, or practice that limits or tends to limit employment opportunities for members of a particular gender, race, ethnic background, or disability status. According to EEOC's instructions, many employment barriers are built into the organizational and operational structures of an agency and are embedded in the day-to-day procedures and practices of the agency. In its oversight role under MD-715, EEOC provides instructions to agencies on how to complete their barrier analyses and offers other informal assistance. Based on agency submissions of MD-715 reports, EEOC provides assessments of agency progress in its Annual Report on the Federal Workforce, feedback letters addressed to individual agencies, and the EEO Program Compliance Assessment (EPCA).
What GAO Found
DHS has generally relied on workforce data and has not regularly included employee input from available sources to identify "triggers," the term EEOC uses for indicators of potential barriers. GAO's analysis of DHS's MD-715 reports showed that DHS generally relied on workforce data to identify 13 of 15 triggers, such as promotion and separation rates. According to EEOC, in addition to workforce data, agencies are to regularly consult a variety of sources, such as exit interviews, employee groups, and employee surveys, to identify triggers. Involving employees helps to incorporate insights about operations from a frontline perspective in determining where potential barriers exist. DHS does not consider employee input from such sources as employee groups, exit interviews, and employee surveys in conducting its MD-715 analysis. Data from the governmentwide employee survey and DHS's internal employee survey are available, but DHS does not use these data to identify triggers. By not considering employee input on DHS personnel policies and practices, DHS is missing opportunities to identify potential barriers. Once a trigger is revealed, agencies are to investigate and pinpoint actual barriers and their causes. In 2007, through its departmentwide barrier analysis, DHS identified four barriers: (1) overreliance on the Internet to recruit applicants, (2) overreliance on noncompetitive hiring authorities, (3) lack of recruitment initiatives that were directed at Hispanics in several components, and (4) nondiverse interview panels. GAO's analysis of DHS's 2007 and 2008 MD-715 reports showed that DHS has articulated planned activities to address identified barriers, has modified nearly all of its original target completion dates by a range of 12 to 21 months, and has not completed any planned activities; although officials reported completing other activities in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 associated with its EEO program. Nearly half of the planned activities involve collaboration between the civil rights and human capital offices. DHS said that it modified the dates because of staffing shortages. In order to ensure that agency programs are effectively and efficiently implemented, it is important for agencies to implement internal control activities, such as establishing and tracking implementation goals with timelines. This allows agencies to pinpoint performance shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. DHS has not developed project plans with milestones beyond what is included in its MD-715 report and its Human Capital Strategic Plan. These documents include only the anticipated outcomes and target completion dates, not the essential activities needed to achieve the outcome. Identifying the critical phases of each planned activity necessary to achieve the intended outcome with interim milestones could help DHS ensure that its efforts are moving forward and manage any needed midcourse corrections, while minimizing modification of target dates. DHS uses a variety of means to oversee and support components, including providing written feedback on draft reports to components that are required to prepare their own MD-715 reports, conducting program audits, and convening a council of EEO directors from each of the components. |
gao_GAO-14-603T | gao_GAO-14-603T_0 | For example, we reported that community goals such as building housing and promoting economic development may be higher priorities than formulating mitigation regulations that may include restrictive development regulations and more stringent building codes. Information Required to Support Risk Decision Making is Imprecise, Incomplete, and Complex
In January 1998, we described three sets of issues that complicate assessing the cost-effectiveness of actions to build resilience. Similarly, in our February 2014 testimony on limiting fiscal exposure from and increasing resilience to climate change, we noted that local decision makers need expert assistance translating climate change information into something that is locally relevant. These issues are longstanding and difficult policy issues. We are encouraged that DHS finalized the National Mitigation Framework in 2013 to coordinate interagency and intergovernmental efforts and that the framework established a Mitigation Framework Leadership Group to coordinate mitigation efforts of relevant local, state, tribal, and federal organizations. Federal Response to Hurricane Sandy Demonstrated Increased Focus on Mitigation and Resilience-Building
In ongoing work on federal resilience efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, we identified three high-level actions that demonstrated an intensified federal focus on incorporating resilience-building into the recovery. Among other things, the executive order charged the task force to work with partners in the affected region to understand existing and future risks and vulnerabilities from extreme weather events; identify resources and authorities that strengthen community and regional resilience during recovery; and plan for the rebuilding of critical infrastructure in a manner that increases community and regional resilience. In August 2013, the Sandy Rebuilding Task Force issued the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy, which contained 69 recommendations to various federal agencies and their nonfederal partners aimed at improving recovery from both Hurricane Sandy and future disasters. We plan to issue a report on these issues later this year. Congress Appropriated Funds to Key Federal Programs that Can Help Support Resilient Rebuilding
In January 2013, Congress passed and the President signed the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (Sandy Supplemental), which appropriated about $50 billion in funding to support recovery. These four agencies administer five programs that play a key role in helping to promote resilience-building as part of recovery: (1) FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), (2) FEMA’s Public Assistance Program (PA), (3) HUD’s Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) Program, (4) DOT’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program, and (5) USACE’s Flood Risk Management Program. Changes to HMGP. SRIA required FEMA to make recommendations for the development of a national strategy to reduce costs on future disasters. Nonfederal Groups Have a Variety of Initiatives to Help Incentivize Resilience Building
As we have previously reported, most responsibility and authority for resilience activities rests largely outside the federal government; therefore, nonfederal incentives are also a critical piece of the overall strategy to reduce future losses. Several examples of mitigation efforts at the state and local levels help illustrate the variety of ways that incentives help drive communities to be more resilient—with a range of activities from shoring up building codes to facilitating buyouts of repetitive loss properties. As part of our ongoing work, we are reviewing studies about efforts to build resilience to extreme weather events and climate change. For the purposes of this statement, we selected illustrative examples from those studies to describe a range of nonfederal efforts to incentivize mitigation. The U.S. Resiliency Council, a nonprofit organization based in California, is working on creating building “report cards” to provide technically defensible metrics to evaluate and communicate the resilience of individual buildings. The initial focus is on seismic risk, and officials plan to extend their efforts to creating metrics for resilience to catastrophic wind and flood risk. GAO Related Products
Extreme Weather Events: Limiting Federal Fiscal Exposure and Increasing the Nation’s Resilience. High Risk Series: GAO’s High-Risk Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Multiple factors including increased disaster declarations, climate change effects, and insufficient premiums under the National Flood Insurance Program increase federal fiscal exposure to severe weather events. Managing fiscal exposure from climate change and the National Flood Insurance Program are both on GAO's High Risk list. GAO has previously reported that building resilience to protect against future damage is one strategy to help limit fiscal exposure. However, in prior reports GAO also identified multiple challenges to doing so. Responsibility for actions that enhance resilience rests largely outside the federal government, so nonfederal entities also play a key role.
This testimony discusses (1) resilience-building challenges GAO has previously identified; (2) federal efforts to facilitate resilience-building as part of Hurricane Sandy recovery; and (3) examples of nonfederal efforts to incentivize resilience building. This testimony is based on previous GAO reports issued from 1998 through 2014 related to hazard mitigation, climate change, flood insurance, and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work for this committee on federal resilience efforts related to the Sandy recovery. For the ongoing work, GAO reviewed documents such as the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy and a 2012 National Academies Study on building resilience. GAO also interviewed officials from FEMA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
What GAO Found
GAO has identified various challenges to resilience building—actions to help prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adapt to adverse events including those caused by extreme weather. These include challenges for communities in balancing hazard mitigation investments with economic development goals, challenges for individuals in understanding and acting to limit their personal risk, and broad challenges with the clarity of information to inform risk decision making. GAO's work over more than 30 years demonstrates that these are longstanding policy issues, without easy solutions. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) May 2013 release of a National Mitigation Framework and establishment of a group to help coordinate interagency and intergovernmental mitigation efforts offers one avenue for leadership on these issues.
In ongoing work on federal resilience efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, GAO identified three high-level actions that demonstrated an intensified federal focus on incorporating resilience-building into the recovery.
The President issued an executive order to coordinate the recovery effort and created a task force that issued 69 recommendations aimed at improving recovery from Sandy and future disasters—including recommendations designed to facilitate resilient rebuilding.
Congress appropriated about $50 billion in supplemental funds for multiple recovery efforts, including at least five federal programs that help support resilience-building efforts. One of these, FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), is the only federal program designed specifically to promote mitigation against future losses in the wake of a disaster; while, another, the Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program made more than $4 billion available for transit resilience projects.
The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 provided additional responsibilities and authorities related to FEMA's mitigation and recovery efforts. In response, FEMA has undertaken efforts to make HMGP easier for states to use—for example by streamlining application procedures. The act also provided additional authorities for FEMA to fund hazard mitigation with other disaster relief funds and required FEMA to provide recommendations for a national strategy on reducing the cost of future disasters to Congress, which FEMA finalized in September 2013.
For the purposes of this statement GAO reviewed studies that discuss resilience building and climate change adaptation and identified examples efforts at the state and local levels that illustrate a variety of nonfederal initiatives that may drive communities to build resilience. For example, a nonprofit group is creating report cards to assess the resilience of a building to earthquakes and plans to extend these efforts to wind and flood risk. In some localities public-private partnerships have helped promote efforts to buy properties that were at risk from repeat losses. |
gao_GAO-11-739 | gao_GAO-11-739_0 | The prohibited behavior could involve, for example, fraudulently receiving payments under federal health care programs or violating export control regulations. Contracting officers are responsible for checking EPLS to ensure that they do not award contracts to these firms or individuals. Several civilian departments and agencies had few or no such cases. For fiscal years 2006 through 2010, about 4,600 cases—about 16 percent of all cases in EPLS—involved suspension and debarment actions taken at the discretion of agencies against firms and individuals based on any of the numerous causes specified in either the FAR or NCR, such as fraud, theft, or bribery or history of failure to perform on government contracts or transactions. Such cases generally result in exclusion from all federal contracts, grants, and benefits. During this same time period, about 84 percent—or about 24,000 of the approximately 29,000 total cases reported in EPLS—were other exclusions based on a determination that the parties had violated certain statutes or regulations. Agencies with Few or No Procurement-Related Suspension and Debarment Cases Lacked the Traits Common among Agencies with More Active Programs
The remaining six agencies we studied—HHS, FEMA, Commerce, Justice, State, and Treasury—do not have the characteristics common to the four agencies with the most suspension and debarment cases. Based on our review of agency documents and interviews with agency officials, none of these six agencies had dedicated suspension and debarment staff, detailed policies and guidance other than those to implement the FAR, or practices that encourage an active referral process. OMB assigned responsibility for governmentwide coordination to ISDC; however, ISDC relies on agencies’ voluntary participation in its processes and member agencies’ limited resources to fulfill its mission. More recently, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 strengthened the committee’s role by specifying functions ISDC was to perform, including resolve lead agency responsibility and coordinate actions among interested agencies with respect to suspension or debarment proceedings, report to Congress annually on agency suspension and debarment activities and accomplishments as well as agency participation in the committee’s work, recommend to OMB committee-approved changes to the government suspension and debarment system and its rules, and encourage and assist agencies in cooperating to achieve operational efficiencies in the governmentwide suspension and debarment system. Likewise, in part because it could not compel agencies to respond to its inquiries, ISDC took almost 2 years to submit its required annual report to Congress on agencies’ suspension and debarment activities. These officials also noted that their limited resources to devote to committee responsibilities further delayed the report. In addition, to improve suspension and debarment programs at all agencies and enhance governmentwide oversight, we recommend that the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy issue governmentwide guidance that (1) describes the elements of an active suspension and debarment program, and (2) emphasizes the importance of cooperating with ISDC in terms of helping to resolve lead agency issues, providing required reporting information in a timely manner, and designating existing resources as needed to enable the committee to function effectively. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the nature and extent of governmentwide suspensions and debarments, we analyzed data for fiscal years 2006 through 2010 from the web-based Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) managed by the General Services Administration. We selected a mix of these agencies, including the Defense Logistics Agency, the Department of the Navy, the General Services Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—all of which had relatively more cases involving federal procurement than other agencies—and the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, State, and the Treasury, and DHS’s Federal Emergency Management Agency—all of which had relatively few or no exclusions involving federal procurements. To identify governmentwide efforts to oversee and coordinate the use of suspension and debarment, we met with officials from the Office of Management and Budget, which provides overall direction of governmentwide procurement policies; the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee; CIGIE’s Suspension and Debarment Working Group; and the General Services Administration, which manages and maintains the governmentwide EPLS. Develop detailed implementing guidance. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spent more than $535 billion on contracted goods and services in fiscal year 2010. One tool for ensuring that agencies are only awarding contracts to responsible sources is the use of suspensions and debarments--actions taken by agencies to exclude firms or individuals from receiving federal contracts or assistance based on various types of misconduct. This report analyzed (1) the nature and extent of governmentwide exclusions reported in the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) maintained by the General Services Administration; (2) the relationship, if any, between practices at various agencies and the level of suspensions and debarments under federal acquisition regulations; and (3) governmentwide efforts to oversee and coordinate the use of suspensions and debarments across federal agencies. GAO reviewed EPLS data and suspension and debarment programs at 10 federal agencies, including those with relatively more suspensions and debarments and those with few or none to identify differences between the two groups.
What GAO Found
Suspensions and debarments made up about 16 percent of exclusions in EPLS for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. These are discretionary exclusions taken by agencies based on causes specified in regulations for acquisitions or grants and assistance, including fraud, bribery, or a history of failure to perform on government contracts. The remaining 84 percent were exclusions based on violations of statutes or other regulations, including health care fraud or illegal exports. In these cases, agencies are generally required to exclude the party from participating in specified government transactions or activities. More than half of the governmentwide suspensions and debarments were based on acquisition regulations. Several agencies did not report any such cases. The four agencies GAO reviewed with the most suspensions and debarments based on acquisition regulations shared certain characteristics that were not present at agencies with relatively few or no such cases. These agencies had staff dedicated to the suspension and debarment program, detailed implementing guidance, and practices that encourage an active referral process. The six agencies without such characteristics had virtually no suspensions or debarments, regardless of the dollar level of their contract obligations. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services, the civilian agency among those GAO reviewed with the highest amount of contract obligations, had no suspensions and debarments based on acquisition regulations. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement had considerably less in contract obligations, but was one of the top four agencies of those GAO reviewed. The interagency committee responsible for governmentwide oversight and coordination of suspensions and debarments faces challenges as it relies on voluntary agency participation and only the limited resources of member agencies to fulfill its mission. For example, the committee took almost 2 years to submit a required annual report to Congress on agencies' suspension and debarment activities because agencies had been slow in providing needed information and it had limited resources to devote to the report.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the six agencies it examined that did not have the characteristics associated with active suspension and debarment programs incorporate those characteristics, and that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) improve its governmentwide efforts and enhance governmentwide oversight. Five of the six agencies and OMB generally concurred with the recommendations. The Department of Justice believes its existing guidelines are sufficient, but GAO does not agree. |
gao_GAO-16-641T | gao_GAO-16-641T_0 | Federal Agencies Have Taken Various Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks; Some Actions Align with the 2008 EMP Commission Recommendations
DHS, DOE and FERC have taken various actions to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid, and these actions generally fall into four categories: (1) standards, guidelines, tools and demonstration projects; (2) research reports; (3) strategy development and planning; and (4) training and outreach. Although DHS and DOE did not report that any of their actions were taken in response to the EMP Commission recommendations, some actions taken by both agencies have aligned with some of the recommendations. Specifically, of the seven recommendations made by the EMP Commission related to the electric grid, some of the actions that DHS and DOE took aligned with four of them: conducting research to better understand the interdependencies of critical infrastructures, addressing the vulnerability of control systems to an EMP attack; identifying responsibilities for responding to an EMP attack; and utilizing industry and other governmental institutions to assure the most cost-effective outcomes. Additional Opportunities Exist To Enhance Federal Efforts to Address Electromagnetic Risks to the Electric Grid
DHS Has Not Clearly Identified Roles and Responsibilities for Addressing Electromagnetic Risks
In our March 2016 report, we found that DHS had not clearly identified internal roles and responsibilities for addressing electromagnetic risks to the electric grid or communicated these to external federal and industry partners. We concluded that designating internal roles and responsibilities within DHS regarding electromagnetic risks and communicating these to federal and industry partners could provide additional awareness of related activities and help ensure more effective and coordinated engagement with other federal agencies and industry stakeholders, and could help reduce the risk of potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation within the department or across federal agencies. As a result, we recommended in our March 2016 report that DHS and DOE direct responsible officials to review FERC’s electrical infrastructure analysis and collaborate to determine whether further assessment is needed to adequately identify critical electric infrastructure assets. DHS Has Not Fully Leveraged Existing Opportunities to Collect and Analyze Information on Electromagnetic Risks
We found in March 2016 that although DHS components had independently conducted some efforts to assess electromagnetic risks, the department had not fully leveraged available risk information or conducted a comprehensive analysis of these risks. Within the Office of Policy, there is recognition that “space weather” and “power grid failure” are significant risk events, which DHS officials have determined pose great risk to the security of the nation. We concluded that better collection of threat, vulnerability, and consequence information through existing DHS programs and strengthened collaboration with federal partners could help DHS better assess the relative risk ranking of electromagnetic events versus other risks and help inform asset protection priorities. Federal Agencies Have Not Fully Coordinated Efforts to Implement EMP Risk Management Activities
We also found in March 2016 that key federal agencies, including DHS and DOE, as well as industry partners had not established a fully coordinated approach to identifying and implementing risk management activities to address EMP risks. According to the NIPP Risk Management Framework, such activities include identifying and prioritizing research and development efforts, and evaluating potential mitigation options, including the cost-effectiveness of specific protective equipment. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's March 2016 report, entitled Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks, but Opportunities Exist to Further Assess Risks and Strengthen Collaboration , GAO-16-243 .
What GAO Found
Key federal agencies have taken various actions to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid, and some actions align with the recommendations made in 2008 by the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (EMP Commission). Since 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken actions such as establishing industry standards and federal guidelines, and completing EMP-related research reports. GAO found that their actions aligned with some of the EMP Commission recommendations related to the electric grid. For example, DHS developed EMP protection guidelines to help federal agencies and industry identify options for safeguarding critical communication equipment and control systems from an EMP attack. Further, agency actions and EMP Commission recommendations generally align with DHS and DOE critical infrastructure responsibilities, such as assessing risks and identifying key assets.
Additional opportunities exist to enhance federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid. Specifically, DHS has not identified internal roles and responsibilities for addressing electromagnetic risks, which has led to limited awareness of related activities within the department and reduced opportunity for coordination with external partners. Doing so could provide additional awareness of related activities and help ensure more effective collaboration with other federal agencies and industry stakeholders. Moreover, although DHS components have independently conducted some efforts to assess electromagnetic risks, DHS has not fully leveraged opportunities to collect key risk inputs—namely threat, vulnerability, and consequence information—to inform comprehensive risk assessments of electromagnetic events. Within DHS, there is recognition that space weather and power grid failure are significant risk events, which DHS officials have determined pose great risk to the security of the nation. Better collection of risk inputs, including additional leveraging of information available from stakeholders, could help to further inform DHS assessment of these risks. DHS and DOE also did not report taking any actions to identify critical electrical infrastructure assets, as called for in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Although FERC conducted a related effort in 2013, DHS and DOE were not involved and have unique knowledge and expertise that could be utilized to better ensure that key assets are adequately identified and all applicable elements of criticality are considered. Finally, DHS and DOE, in conjunction with industry, have not established a coordinated approach to identifying and implementing key risk management activities to address EMP risks. Such activities include identifying and prioritizing key research and development efforts, and evaluating potential mitigation options, including the cost-effectiveness of specific protective equipment. Enhanced coordination to determine key research priorities could help address some identified research gaps and may help alleviate concerns voiced by industry regarding the costs and potential adverse consequences on grid reliability that may be caused by implementation of such equipment. |
gao_GAO-04-302 | gao_GAO-04-302_0 | Different Interpretations of Critical Technologies May Increase the Risk of Some Going Unprotected
DOD officials acknowledged that the identification of critical technologies—a basis for determining if anti-tamper protection is needed—is subjective, which can result in different conclusions regarding what needs protection. While different conclusions can be reached regarding what is critical, various organizations can serve as a check on a program manager’s assessment. However, no organization has complete information or visibility of all programs across the services and agencies. While it was apparent that the systems had critical technologies, some program managers needed assistance to determine which specific technologies were critical. Generally, anti-tamper implementation is treated as an added requirement that is not separately funded for most programs. Most programs we visited experienced or estimated cost increases, and some encountered schedule delays as they attempted to apply anti-tamper techniques. DOD is working to oversee the development of generic anti-tamper techniques and tools to help program managers identify potential techniques, but many of these efforts are still in progress and it is uncertain how they will help program managers. Problems in applying anti-tamper techniques typically arose when the programs were already in design or production or when the techniques were not fully developed or specifically designed for the system. According to Air Force Research Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories officials, generic anti-tamper techniques can be considered, but program managers have to design and incorporate the techniques needed for their unique systems. For program managers expected to implement anti-tamper protection, the policy can compete with their goals of meeting cost and schedule objectives, particularly when the anti-tamper requirement is identified late in the system development process. To help minimize the impact to program cost and schedule objectives, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to work with program managers to ensure that the cost and techniques needed to implement anti-tamper protection are identified early in a system’s life cycle and to reflect that practice in guidance and decisions. DOD’s letter is reprinted in the appendix. Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in developing the most sophisticated weapon systems and technologies in the world. Yet, U.S. weapons and technologies are vulnerable to exploitation, which can weaken U.S. military advantage, shorten the expected combat life of a system, and erode the U.S. industrial base's technological competitiveness. In an effort to protect U.S. technologies from exploitation, the Department of Defense (DOD) established in 1999 a policy directing each military service to implement anti-tamper techniques, which include software and hardware protective devices. This report reviews DOD's implementation of the anti-tamper policy as required by the Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
What GAO Found
Program managers have encountered difficulties in implementing DOD's anti-tamper policy on individual weapon systems. First, defining a critical technology--a basis for determining the need for anti-tamper--is subjective, which can result in different conclusions regarding what needs anti-tamper protection. While different organizations can check on program managers' assessments, no organization has complete information or visibility across all programs. Some program managers said they needed assistance in determining which technologies were critical, but resources to help them were limited or unknown and therefore not requested. Second, anti-tamper protection is treated as an added requirement and can affect a program's cost and schedule objectives, particularly if the program is further along in the acquisition process. Programs GAO contacted experienced or estimated cost increases, and some encountered schedule delays when applying antitamper protection. Officials from one program stated that their existing budget was insufficient to cover the added cost of applying anti-tamper protection and that they were waiting for separate funding before attempting to apply such protection. Finally, anti-tamper techniques can be technically difficult to incorporate in some weapon systems--particularly when the techniques are not fully developed or when the systems are already in design or production. One program that had difficulty incorporating the techniques resorted to alternatives that provided less security. While DOD is overseeing the development of generic anti-tamper techniques and tools to help program managers, many of these efforts are still in progress, and program managers ultimately have to design and incorporate techniques needed for their unique systems. |
gao_GAO-14-700 | gao_GAO-14-700_0 | For most policies, the statutory premium subsidy rates range from 38 percent to 80 percent. Federal Crop Insurance Costs and Farm Sector Income and Wealth Grew Significantly from 2003 through 2012
Federal crop insurance program costs and farm sector income and wealth grew significantly during the period 2003 through 2012. For fiscal years 2003 through 2007, federal crop insurance costs averaged $3.4 billion a year, but for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, the crop insurance program cost an average of $8.4 billion a year. For example, for crop year 2012, revenue policy premium subsidies cost $5.5 billion that year, which accounted for 82 percent of the $6.7 billion in total premium subsidy costs to the government. For example, median farm household income rose from 2003 to 2012 and was higher than the median income for all U.S. households every year during this More specifically, on average, median period, according to ERS data.farm household income was $7,205, or 13.8 percent, more than median U.S. household income annually during this time period (in constant 2012 dollars that reflect adjustments for inflation). Farm sector income also grew from $73.8 billion in 2003 to $113.8 billion in 2012. U.S. farm real estate values increased by 72 percent from 2003 through 2012 due to high farm income and low interest rates, according to USDA data. Lower ratios signify that farmers are relying less on borrowed funds to finance their asset holdings. Figure 10 shows these farm sector debt ratios from 2003 through 2012. Reducing Federal Premium Subsidies for Revenue Policies Would Potentially Save Millions of Dollars with Limited Costs to Individual Farmers
According to our analysis of RMA data, the federal government would have potentially saved more than $400 million in 2012 by reducing premium subsidies on federal crop insurance revenue policies by 5 percentage points, and the savings would have been nearly $2 billion with a 20 percentage point premium subsidy reduction. As a percentage of the total production cost per acre, these increases would usually have been less than 2 percent and often less than 1 percent. In 2000, when Congress enacted legislation to increase crop insurance premium subsidy rates, the new rates immediately became effective (i.e., upon enactment of the legislation). In contrast, according to RMA officials, when the agency increases the premiums charged for crop insurance policies based on new actuarial data, as it did in 2012, it generally phases in the increases over several years so the impact on farmers is less dramatic. For example, the average production costs for corn farmers were about $656 per acre that year; with the premium cost increases, their production costs would have increased an average of 0.4 percent, 0.9 percent, 1.3 percent, and 1.7 percent with premium subsidy reductions of 5, 10, 15, or 20 percentage points, respectively. We note that the ultimate impact of such limited production cost increases on farmers’ income would depend on their individual profit margins. However, for the industry as a whole, the impact on farmers’ income appears to be minimal. Farm industry groups and some researchers have stated that changes to crop insurance premium subsidies could result in reductions in farmer participation and insurance coverage levels. However, available economic literature on the impact on farmer participation due to premium subsidy reductions indicates that farmers’ response to changes in premium subsidies may be small due to factors such as their heavy reliance on crop insurance, the attractiveness of revenue policies, and the increasing importance of crop insurance as other farm programs are reduced or eliminated. According to some farm industry stakeholders, many farmers have made crop insurance their primary risk management tool. Conclusions
Federal crop insurance plays an important role in protecting farmers from losses caused by natural disasters and price declines, and it has become one of the most important programs in the farm safety net for farmers, according to USDA officials and some farm industry stakeholders. Although the impact of such a reduction is unknown, in the event that Congress reduced the crop insurance premium subsidy rates, actual information on the impact on farmer participation would be available if participation were monitored. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To reduce the cost of the crop insurance program and achieve budgetary savings for deficit reduction or other purposes, Congress should consider reducing the level of federal premium subsidies for revenue crop insurance policies. In addition, Congress should consider directing the Secretary of Agriculture to monitor and report on the impact, if any, of the reduction on farmer participation in the crop insurance program. In its written comments, which are reproduced in appendix II, USDA said it had no comment with the report’s findings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) trends in federal crop insurance costs and farm sector income and wealth from 2003 through 2012 and (2) the potential savings to the government and impacts to farmers, if any, of reducing federal premium subsidies for revenue insurance policies. We analyzed RMA crop insurance program data including data on the level of premium subsidies for revenue policies, the top 10 states that received revenue policy premium subsidies, the insurance coverage levels chosen by farmers with revenue policies, and the crops that received the most revenue policy premium subsidies. At the time of our analysis, USDA officials said that 2012 would be the most recent year with complete and stable crop insurance program data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federally subsidized crop insurance, which farmers can buy to help manage the risk inherent in farming, has become one of the most important programs in the farm safety net. Revenue policies, which protect farmers against crop revenue loss from declines in production or price, are the most popular policy type and account for nearly 80 percent of all premium subsidies. The crop insurance program's cost has come under scrutiny while the nation's budgetary pressures have been increasing.
GAO was asked to look at the cost of the crop insurance program. This report examines (1) trends in federal crop insurance costs and farm sector income and wealth from 2003 through 2012 and (2) the potential savings to the government and impacts on farmers, if any, of reducing federal premium subsidies for revenue policies. GAO analyzed USDA crop insurance program data and farm sector income and wealth data from 2003 through 2012 (most recent year with complete crop insurance data); reviewed economic literature and documents from stakeholders including farm industry groups and researchers; and interviewed USDA officials.
What GAO Found
The cost of the federal crop insurance program and farm sector income and wealth grew significantly from 2003 through 2012. The cost of crop insurance averaged $3.4 billion a year from fiscal years 2003 through 2007, but it increased to $8.4 billion a year for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA), the agency that administers the crop insurance program, subsidies for crop insurance premiums accounted for $42.1 billion─or about 72 percent─of the $58.7 billion total program costs from 2003 through 2012. Revenue policies, the most frequently purchased crop insurance option, accounted for $30.9 billion of the total premium subsidy costs for 2003 through 2012. Crop insurance premium subsidy rates—the percentage of premiums paid by the government—are set by Congress and would require congressional action to be changed. For most policies, the rates range from 38 to 80 percent, depending on the policy type, coverage level chosen, and geographic diversity of crops insured. As premium subsidy costs increased, farm sector income and wealth indicators also increased. For example, for each year from 2003 through 2012, median farm household income exceeded median U.S. household income. Specifically, on average, median farm household income was $7,205, or 13.8 percent, greater each year than U.S. household income, in constant 2012 dollars. Farm sector income also grew from $73.8 billion in 2003 to $113.8 billion in 2012, in constant 2012 dollars. Farm real estate values, another measure of farm prosperity, increased by 72 percent from 2003 through 2012, in constant 2012 dollars, and farmers relied less on borrowed funds to finance their holdings.
Reducing premium subsidies for revenue policies could potentially result in hundreds of millions of dollars in annual budgetary savings with limited costs to individual farmers. For example, the federal government would have potentially saved more than $400 million in 2012 by reducing premium subsidies by 5 percentage points, and the savings would have been nearly $2 billion by reducing these subsidies by 20 percentage points. Although such reductions would have required farmers to pay more of their premiums, the impact on their average production costs per acre would have been limited, usually less than 2 percent, and often less than 1 percent. For example, for corn, premium subsidy reductions of 5 and 20 percentage points in 2012 would have raised average production costs per acre by about $2.80 and $11.20, respectively. These increases would have been about 0.4 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively, of the total average production cost per acre of $656 that year for corn. The ultimate impact of such limited production cost increases on farmers' income would depend on their individual profit margins. However, for the industry as a whole, the impact appears to be minimal. In 2000, when Congress enacted new premium subsidy rates, the new rates immediately became effective. In contrast, when RMA increases the premiums charged for policies, it generally phases in the increases over several years to lessen the impact on farmers. Documents from farm industry groups and some researchers note that reductions in premium subsidies could result in lower farmer participation in the program and lower insurance coverage levels. However, available economic literature indicates that farmers' response to such reductions may be small due to factors such as the attractiveness of revenue policies and increasing importance of crop insurance as other farm programs are reduced or eliminated. In addition, other stakeholders identified incentives that would help keep farmers in the program, including pressure from lenders to maintain crop insurance coverage and the importance of crop insurance to many farmers as their primary risk management tool. In the event that subsidy rates were reduced, actual information on the impact on farmer participation would be available if participation were monitored.
What GAO Recommends
To reduce the cost of the crop insurance program, Congress should consider reducing the level of federal premium subsidies for revenue crop insurance policies, including a phased reduction, if appropriate, and directing USDA to monitor and report on the impact, if any, of this reduction on crop insurance program participation. In written comments, USDA said it had no comments on the report's findings. |
gao_GAO-14-505 | gao_GAO-14-505_0 | For such contracts, most, but not all, of the requirements include an expected outcome, but the manner in which that outcome is to be achieved is left to the contractor. TMA then reviewed the revised proposals and, based on this review, awarded the contract to UnitedHealth. TMA’s Guidance on Contract Transitions Was Inadequate, and Its Oversight Was Insufficient
TMA’s Transition Guidance Was Inadequate for Both TRO-West and UnitedHealth
TMA provided some guidance to both TRO-West and UnitedHealth for the West region’s managed care support contract transition, but the guidance was inadequate because it lacked sufficient specificity on how to both oversee the transition and meet certain transition requirements. As a result, contractors would need to have a referral management system that could electronically interface with the referral management systems used by the region’s MTFs to facilitate this process. In addition, while we recognize that under a performance-based contract an agency does not provide detailed instructions to the contractor on how to meet its requirements, we do not believe that a performance-based contract diminishes TMA’s responsibility to provide an oversight structure for managing the contractor’s performance during the transition period. As we have previously reported, important attributes of a performance-based contract include measurable performance standards and a quality The assurance plan for evaluating the contractor’s performance.contract with UnitedHealth contains these features. However, UnitedHealth officials did not recall these discussions in our interviews, and TRO-West officials could not provide documentation that they took place. Inadequate Guidance and Insufficient Oversight during the Contractor Transition Contributed to Health Care Delivery Problems, but Ultimately Led to Greater Oversight
TMA’s inadequate guidance and insufficient oversight of UnitedHealth’s transition contributed to problems at the start of health care delivery, which in turn led to the disruption in the continuity of care for some beneficiaries and potentially cost the department millions of dollars, according to Army officials. On May 2, 2013, the director of TMA issued a temporary waiver of the requirement for TRICARE Prime beneficiaries to obtain referral authorizations for specialty care. Call centers: TMA’s oversight of UnitedHealth’s plans for staffing its call centers was insufficient, which contributed to a delayed resolution of UnitedHealth’s performance problems, which lasted until the third month of health care delivery. UnitedHealth began meeting its telephone response time requirements in June 2013. A majority of this penalty resulted from its failure to answer 90 percent of all customer service calls within the required 30 seconds. Conclusions
The transition of managed care support contractors in the West region did not go smoothly. Many problems arose that negatively affected TRICARE beneficiaries and potentially resulted in additional costs for DOD. UnitedHealth was the first new managed care support contractor since the TRICARE program began, and its transition highlighted numerous deficiencies in TMA’s guidance and oversight. Furthermore, TMA failed to ensure that the incoming and outgoing contractors used the same version of transition guidance, resulting in information gaps that were left largely to the contractors to resolve, contributing to UnitedHealth’s delay in meeting transition requirements related to its provider network. Moreover, the transition guidance for UnitedHealth also lacked sufficient detail for some requirements, including the development of a critical interface for managing specialty care referrals, which was not pretested to ensure that it was fully operational prior to health care delivery, unlike pretesting that was done for other system interfaces. Eventually, TMA did begin taking steps to hold the contractor accountable for the problems that surfaced, including the use of corrective action requests and financial penalties. In addition, to ensure that future managed care support contractors have the information they need to successfully complete transition requirements and are fully prepared for health care delivery, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Director of DHA to 5. DOD stated that we made two specific assertions that it wanted to clarify: (1) that TMA guidance and oversight during the transition period contributed to issues with health care delivery; and (2) that this is the first transition to a nonincumbent contractor since the start of the TRICARE program. Our report acknowledges that TMA conducted readiness reviews and some pretesting activities. However, these financially related sanctions were for missed requirements that took place after health care delivery began, and were not imposed as a result of the missed transition requirements. DOD concurred or partially concurred with each of our recommendations. However, DOD disagreed with some of the related findings upon which these recommendations were based. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD provides health care through TRICARE, its regionally structured health care program. In each of its regions (North, South, West), DOD uses contractors to manage health care delivery through civilian providers, among other tasks. UnitedHealth—an organization new to TRICARE—was awarded the contract in the West region. After health care delivery began, UnitedHealth experienced problems fulfilling some requirements and delivering care to TRICARE beneficiaries.
GAO was asked to review the West region's transition to UnitedHealth. This report provides information on (1) the extent to which TMA provided guidance and oversight of the new contractor's transition period in preparation for health care delivery; and (2) how, if at all, TMA's guidance and oversight during the transition period contributed to issues with health care delivery. GAO reviewed and analyzed TMA guidance, contract requirements, and other relevant documentation, and interviewed TMA and UnitedHealth officials.
What GAO Found
The recent transition of TRICARE's managed care support contractors (contractors) in the West region did not go smoothly and highlighted numerous deficiencies in guidance and oversight by the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA)—the Department of Defense's (DOD) office responsible for awarding and managing these contracts at the time of GAO's review. For example, TMA did not ensure that its outgoing and incoming contractors used the same version of transition guidance, resulting in problems that were left largely to the contractors to resolve. Additionally, TMA's guidance lacked sufficient specificity for some requirements, such as the development of a referral management system that could interface with the referral systems used by the regions' military treatment facilities—a system that was also not tested prior to health care delivery, unlike other critical system interfaces. In addition, TMA lacked a process for holding the contractor accountable when transition requirements were delayed or not met. TMA officials explained that the regional contracts are performance-based, meaning that most—but not all—of the contract requirements include an expected outcome, but the manner in which that outcome is to be achieved is left to the contractor. As a result, TMA officials stated that, regardless of their concerns, it was difficult to hold UnitedHealthcare Military & Veterans Services (UnitedHealth) accountable until the requirement was actually missed. However, as GAO has previously reported, important attributes of a performance-based contract include features that allow for the evaluation of a contractor's performance. UnitedHealth's contract contained these features, and as a result, GAO believes that this performance-based contract structure did not diminish TMA's responsibility for providing sufficient oversight to ensure that the contractor was performing as required.
TMA's inadequate guidance and insufficient oversight contributed to problems with health care delivery. UnitedHealth experienced difficulty in meeting some of its requirements early on, disrupting continuity of care for some beneficiaries and potentially resulting in unnecessary costs. For example, the lack of guidance on developing a referral management interface contributed to problems with the processing of specialty care referrals. Consequently, the requirement for beneficiaries to obtain a referral authorization for specialty care was temporarily waived—a move that the Army estimated could cost DOD over a million dollars as beneficiaries may have obtained more specialty care from civilian providers than from military treatment facilities. Further, insufficient oversight related to UnitedHealth's determination of the number of staff needed to man its call center contributed to a delayed resolution in meeting telephone response time requirements. As a result, it was not until the third month of health care delivery that UnitedHealth was able to meet its requirement to answer 90 percent of calls within 30 seconds. These and other problems ultimately resulted in TMA holding the contractor accountable through the use of corrective action requests and financial penalties.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD review and revise as necessary, its transition guidance to strengthen its oversight and ensure that future managed care support contractors have sufficient information to successfully complete transition requirements. DOD concurred or partially concurred with GAO's recommendations, but disagreed with some of GAO's findings. GAO maintains that the information presented is accurate, and recommendations valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-368 | gao_GAO-15-368_0 | Agency guidance documents are not legally binding. Guidance documents are considered “significant” when they have a broad and substantial impact on regulated entities, on the public or on other federal agencies. In 1997, Congress established certain aspects of FDA’s guidance processes as law and directed the agency to evaluate the effectiveness of its practices and develop and issue regulations specifying its procedures.FDA’s Good Guidance regulations define the subset of guidance that must be published in the Federal Register.internal policies and practices to ensure appropriate adherence to their good guidance practices, including a written process to document decisions about the appropriate level of review for each guidance document. Departments and Components Used Guidance for Multiple Purposes and Weighed Various Factors when Deciding whether to Issue Regulations or Guidance
Components Issued a Wide Variety of Guidance Serving Multiple Purposes
Component officials used guidance for multiple purposes, including interpreting regulations, disseminating suggested practices, and providing grant administration information. Agency Guidance Processes Differed and Could Be Strengthened by Enhanced Internal Controls
Two of Four Selected Departments Had Written Procedures for Significant Guidance as Directed by OMB’s Good Guidance Practices
What are the OMB Good Guidance Practices for Approval of Significant Guidance? However, without written procedures or wide knowledge of these procedures—a basic internal control standard—HHS and DOL may be unable to ensure that their components consistently follow other requirements of the OMB bulletin, such as required standard elements for significant guidance, and cannot ensure consistency in their processes over time. In the Absence of Specific Government-Wide Standards for Non- significant Guidance, Components Could Strengthen Application of Internal Controls
As previously discussed, the Administrative Procedures Act does not establish standards for the production of guidance. Officials told us that feedback from external nonfederal stakeholders often served as the impetus for the initiation of guidance, and 15 of the 25 selected components cited examples in which they conferred with external nonfederal stakeholders during the guidance development process. We found that Education, USDA, and DOL consistently applied OMB Bulletin requirements for public access and feedback for significant guidance while HHS did not. Highlighted new or important guidance. Easy access to current and relevant guidance could also facilitate opportunities for affected parties and stakeholders to provide feedback on those documents. However, many components did not use web metrics to improve how they disseminated guidance through their websites (see table 4). Because all components we studied primarily relied on their websites to disseminate guidance, there is an opportunity for them to build on their use of web metrics to improve how they disseminate guidance online. Further, officials reported receiving useful feedback directly from the public at conferences, webinars, stakeholder/grantee meetings, or from monitoring visits. Education and USDA had written departmental procedures for the approval of significant guidance, as directed by the OMB bulletin. Further, not all components documented approval for guidance clearance and nearly half of them did not regularly evaluate whether issued guidance was effective and up to date. Education stated that it will review components’ procedures for guidance development and production and develop and provide to its components standard protocols they can use to clarify management roles, document management review and approval of guidance, and review posted guidance to ensure it is current and accessible to the public. USDA generally concurred with our recommendations. For this report, we reviewed how the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, and Labor and selected subagencies or components at these four departments (1) use guidance and the processes and criteria they use to determine whether to issue guidance or undertake rulemaking; (2) follow applicable criteria and leading practices in their policies, procedures, and practices for producing guidance; and (3) ensure they follow dissemination requirements and facilitate end users’ access to and comment on documents. The scope of review included the 25 selected subagencies, or components, in the four selected departments that (1) were within the requesting committee’s jurisdiction, and (2) engaged in regulatory or grantmaking activities, as the components engaged in these activities were likely to issue guidance interpreting regulations or other requirements to external parties (in contrast to agencies that issue only informational guidance or other resources). Agency Use of Guidance. Used web metrics to evaluate online guidance dissemination? Typically, it decided to issue guidance in close consultation with the department’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC). OLMS had no written procedures for the guidance production process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies rely on guidance to clarify regulatory text or statutes, to respond to the questions of affected parties in a timely way, and to inform the public about complex policy implementation topics. Unlike regulations, guidance is not legally binding.
GAO was asked to examine guidance processes at four departments. This report reviews how (1) agencies use guidance and decide to issue guidance rather than regulations; (2) follow applicable criteria and leading practices in their policies, procedures, and practices for producing guidance; and (3) agencies disseminate guidance to ensure public access and feedback. GAO reviewed guidance processes at all 25 components in the four departments that (1) were within the requesting committee's jurisdiction, and (2) engaged in regulatory or grant activities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements, written procedures, guidance and websites, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The four departments—Agriculture (USDA), Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Labor (DOL)—and their selected components used guidance for multiple purposes, such as clarifying or interpreting regulations and providing grant administration information. The terminology used for agency guidance varied and agency components issued varying amounts of guidance, ranging from about 10 to over 100 guidance documents each year. The key criterion used when deciding whether to issue a regulation or guidance was whether it needed to be binding; in such cases agencies proceeded with regulation. Officials reported that they routinely consulted with legal counsel when making these choices. Departments typically identified few of their guidance documents as “significant,” generally defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as guidance with a broad and substantial impact on regulated entities.
All four departments identified standard practices to follow when developing guidance. They addressed OMB's requirements for significant guidance to varying degrees and could strengthen internal controls for issuing guidance. Education and USDA had written departmental procedures for approval of significant guidance as required by OMB. DOL's procedures were not available to staff and required updating. HHS had no written procedures. Ensuring these procedures are available could better ensure that components consistently follow OMB's requirements. In the absence of specific government standards for non-significant guidance—the majority of issued guidance—the application of internal control standards is particularly important. The 25 components GAO reviewed addressed some control standards more regularly than others. For example, few components had written procedures to ensure consistent application of guidance processes. All components could describe standard review practices and most used tools to document management approval of draft guidance. Of the 25 components, 15 cited examples in which they conferred with external nonfederal stakeholders while developing guidance and nearly half did not regularly evaluate whether issued guidance remained current and effective.
Components used different strategies to disseminate guidance and all relied primarily on posting the guidance on their websites. As such, components should follow applicable requirements for federal websites. One of these requirements—easy access to current and relevant guidance—could also facilitate opportunities for affected parties and stakeholders to provide feedback on those documents. USDA, DOL, and Education posted their significant guidance on a departmental website as directed by OMB; HHS did not. Components used several strategies—including organizing guidance by audience or topic and highlighting new or outdated guidance—to facilitate access. However, GAO identified factors that hindered online access, including long lists of guidance and documents dispersed among multiple web pages. All components GAO studied collected web metrics and many used them to evaluate online guidance dissemination. However, many of these components did not use metrics to improve how they disseminated guidance through their websites. Beyond their websites, components found other ways to disseminate and obtain feedback on issued guidance, including focus groups, surveys, and direct feedback from the public at conferences, webinars, and from monitoring visits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that HHS and DOL ensure consistent application of OMB requirements for significant guidance. GAO also recommends that USDA, Education, HHS, and DOL strengthen the use of internal controls in guidance production processes and improve online guidance dissemination. USDA, Education, HHS and DOL generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-837 | gao_GAO-08-837_0 | Figure 1 shows that the overall levels of violence in Iraq—as measured by enemy-initiated attacks—decreased about 70 percent from June 2007 to February 2008, a significant reduction from the high levels of violence in 2006 and the first half of 2007. Security conditions deteriorated in March 2008, with the average number of attacks increasing from about 50 per day in February 2008 to about 70 attacks per day in March—about a 40 percent increase (see fig. Several Factors Have Complicated the Development of Capable Iraqi Security Forces
The United States faces several challenges in enhancing the capabilities of Iraq’s security forces: (1) the lack of a single unified force; (2) sectarian and militia influences; (3) continued dependence upon U.S. and coalition forces for logistics and combat support; and (4) training and leadership shortages. Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq budgeted about $27 billion in capital investments for its own reconstruction effort, as shown in table 3. However, Iraq’s central ministries spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007—a decline from similarly low spending rates of 14 and 13 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively. These challenges include violence and sectarian strife, a shortage of trained staff, and weak procurement and budgeting systems. In May 2008, crude oil production was 2.5 million barrels per day and exports were 1.96 million barrels per day, according to the State Department. For example, a recent State Department report shows that for June 3 to 9, the daily supply of electricity from the grid met only 52 percent of demand. U.S. Efforts to Update Strategies to Stabilize and Rebuild Iraq
According to State and DOD officials, as of late May 2008, the Administration has not revised its prior Iraq strategy document (NSVI) to include U.S. goals and objectives for The New Way Forward, which ends in July 2008, or the phase that follows. In May 2008, the State Department reported that the MNF-I/U.S. The current strategy—The New Way Forward—responds to failures in prior plans that prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. The United States has made some progress in achieving key goals stated in The New Way Forward, but progress is fragile and unmet goals and challenges remain: Violence has declined from the high levels of 2006 and early 2007, largely the result of an increase in U.S. combat forces, the creation of nongovernmental security forces, and the Mahdi Army’s cease fire. However, the security environment remains volatile and dangerous. However, the number of Iraqi units capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has remained about 10 percent. The Iraqi government has passed key legislation to return some Ba’athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. However, it has not enacted other important legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections, and its efforts to complete a constitutional review have stalled. However, the departments stated they shall review and refine the strategy as necessary. We reaffirm the need for an updated strategy for several reasons. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we discuss progress in meeting key U.S. goals outlined in The New Way Forward, specifically, (1) improving security conditions; (2) developing Iraqi security forces’ capabilities and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government; (3) facilitating Iraqi government efforts to draft, enact, and implement key legislative initiatives; (4) assisting Iraqi government efforts to spend budgets; and (5) helping the Iraqi government provide key essential services to its people. The New Way Forward established goals to achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. A number of documents outline the goals and objectives of The New Way Forward: (1) National Security Council, Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, January 2007; (2) the President’s address to the nation, January 10, 2007; (3) Fact Sheet: New Way Forward in Iraq, January 10, 2007; (4) Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials, January 10, 2007; and (5) the July and November 2007 MNF-I/U.S. However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation, stating that The New Way Forward strategy remains valid. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global war on terrorism, the majority of this for operations in Iraq. In January 2007, the President announced The New Way Forward to stem violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi government to foster national reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to achieve over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. GAO discusses progress in meeting key goals in The New Way Forward: (1) improve security conditions; (2) develop capable Iraqi security forces; and help the Iraqi government (3) enact key legislation, (4) spend capital budgets, and (5) provide essential services. GAO also discusses U.S. strategies for Iraq. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, the United Nations, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed in Baghdad. Since May 2003, GAO has issued over 130 Iraq-related audits, which provided baseline information for this assessment. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority.
What GAO Found
The New Way Forward responded to failures in prior strategies that prematurely transferred security responsibilities to Iraqi forces or belatedly responded to growing sectarian violence. Overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent in Iraq, from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008. Security gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army's declaration of a cease fire. Average daily attacks were at higher levels in March and April before declining in May 2008. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. The number of trained Iraqi forces has increased from 323,000 in January 2007 to 478,000 in May 2008; many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the Department of Defense reported in March 2008 that the number of Iraqi units capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has remained at about 10 percent. Several factors have complicated the development of capable security forces, including the lack of a single unified force, sectarian and militia influences, and continued dependence on U.S. and coalition forces. The Iraqi government has enacted key legislation to return some Ba'athists to government, give amnesty to detained Iraqis, and define provincial powers. However, it has not yet enacted other important legislation for sharing oil resources or holding provincial elections. Efforts to complete the constitutional review have also stalled. A goal of The New Way Forward was to facilitate the Iraqis' efforts to enact all key legislation by the end of 2007. Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. More specifically, Iraq's central ministries, responsible for security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007--down from similarly low rates of 14 and 13 percent in the 2 prior years. Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq's efforts to spend its capital budgets. Although oil production has improved for short periods, the May 2008 production level of about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) was below the U.S. goal of 3 mbpd. The daily supply of electricity met only about half of demand in early May 2008. Conversely, State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are close to being reached. The unstable security environment, corruption, and lack of technical capacity have contributed to the shortfalls. The Departments disagreed with our recommendation, stating that The New Way Forward strategy remains valid but the strategy shall be reviewed and refined as necessary. We reaffirm the need for an updated strategy given the important changes that have occurred in Iraq since January 2007. An updated strategy should build on recent gains, address unmet goals and objectives and articulate the U.S. strategy beyond July 2008. |
gao_GAO-15-158 | gao_GAO-15-158_0 | The Older Americans Act of 1965 (OAA) was enacted to provide services to older adults to help them remain in their homes and communities for as long as possible. The Coordinating Council is chaired by the Secretary of Transportation and is charged with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of human service transportation by coordinating related programs at the federal level and promoting the maximum feasible coordination at the state and local levels. These key features include defining outcomes; monitoring progress to show accountability; establishing clear leadership; and determining key resources, such as funding. Transportation Funding Flows to Older Adults through Key Federal Programs, but Outcomes of Coordination Efforts Are Not Measured
Transportation Funding Can Flow to Older Adults through Two Targeted Federal Programs and Several Other Federal Programs That Serve Broader Populations
We identified two key federal agency programs, AoA’s Title III Part B Supportive Services and FTA’s Enhanced Mobility program, and six other federal agency programs that can provide funding or transportation services for older adults. FTA’s Enhanced Mobility program also targets older adults as one of its primary populations and is focused on improving the mobility of seniors and people with disabilities. Federal Coordination Efforts Vary and Outcome Measures Are Not Clearly Identified or Tracked
Federal agency involvement in the Coordinating Council varies, with coordination on older adult transportation primarily occurring between FTA and AoA, the two primary agencies involved in human services transportation planning activities. For example, current working group initiatives have focused on mobility management tools, such as one-call one-click centers, to better connect transportation service providers and riders. Our concurrent report related to the coordination of NEMT services recommended that the Council update its strategic plan, which covered the period from 2011 through 2013. In addition, current federal coordination efforts do not identify or incorporate clear short- and long-term desired outcomes, a key issue to consider when implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms to ensure participation from all member agencies. Additionally, without a clear method to collect and track information and data to demonstrate progress, it is difficult to show the benefits of coordination, and whether current Coordinating Council efforts are achieving the outcomes intended to improve transportation coordination for transportation-disadvantaged populations, including older adults. State and Local Transportation Agencies and Aging Network Organizations Coordinate in Various Ways, but Challenges Continue
A Variety of State and Local Coordination Efforts Are Under Way
State and local transportation agencies and aging network organizations in the four states we selected used a variety of different mechanisms to coordinate transportation services for older adults. In our selected states, they were also being used to help older adults access transportation services (see table 2). Building from the efforts described above, some selected transportation and aging network organizations have implemented or are piloting more extensive or innovative approaches to coordination intended to help older adults access transportation services, such as offering a wide range of volunteer transportation and expanded mobility management services. For example, Ride Connection—a transportation provider operating in Oregon—relies heavily on volunteers and a network of service partners throughout the region to provide over 400,000 rides a year to older adults, people with disabilities, and those living in rural areas through a range of programs. Challenges May Inhibit Coordination and Make It Difficult to Meet Older Adults’ Needs
We identified funding eligibility and reporting requirements for different programs, geographic boundaries, and limited data on the extent of need given the growing population of older adults as challenges at the state and local levels that may inhibit coordination in our selected states. Officials in all four of our selected states noted that rural areas often have very few transportation options available to serve older adults and other residents. In addition, examples from our selected states suggest that transportation for life-sustaining needs in those states are being met (e.g., to access medical and nutrition services), but there is a significant gap in transportation for social and recreational purposes. Recommendation
To promote and enhance federal, state, and local coordination activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, as the chair of the Coordinating Council, convene a meeting of the member agencies of the Coordinating Council and define and report on desired outcomes and collect related data to track and measure progress in achieving results, including the extent of coordination efforts that are under way, such as improved services for older adults. DOT partially concurred with our conclusions and recommendation in an email response. What federal programs provide funding for transportation services for older adults, and to what extent are the programs that fund these services coordinated? To identify federal programs that provide funding for transportation services for older adults, we reviewed our 2012 report on transportation- disadvantaged populations, which identified federal programs that provide funding and services for transportation-disadvantaged populations, which includes older adults, a 2013 AARP report that that identified federal programs that provide funding for older adults, and conducted a search of the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. To determine how selected state and local transportation agencies and aging network organizations coordinate transportation for older adults and the challenges they face in coordinating or providing these services, we conducted site visits in four states—Florida, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas—to discuss the coordination of transportation services between transportation agencies and aging network organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the U.S. population ages, access to safe and reliable transportation alternatives is critical to helping older adults remain in their homes as long as possible. HHS, DOT, VA, and other federal agencies may provide funds to state and local entities to help older adults access transportation. GAO was asked to review access to transportation services for older adults. This report examines (1) the federal programs that provide funding for transportation services for older adults and the extent to which the programs that fund these services are coordinated, and (2) how state and local transportation agencies and aging network organizations in selected states coordinate transportation for older adults and the challenges they face in coordinating or providing these services. GAO reviewed past work on programs for transportation-disadvantaged populations, reviewed federal program information, and conducted interviews with HHS, DOT, and VA, as well as, state and local transportation agencies and aging organizations in selected states. GAO selected four states based on populations of older adults, federal funding received for transportation, and geography, among other factors.
What GAO Found
Two key federal programs and several other programs identified by GAO provide funding for transportation services for older adults. The Administration on Aging (AoA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides funding for supportive services—including transportation—to state and local agencies exclusively for older adults. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) Enhanced Mobility of Seniors and Individuals with Disabilities program is focused on improving the mobility of older adults as one of its two primary populations. Other federal agency programs, including some within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), can fund access to transportation services for eligible older adults, among other beneficiaries. The Interagency Coordinating Council on Access and Mobility (Coordinating Council) is responsible for leading federal efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of human service transportation by coordinating related programs. Federal agencies' involvement in the council and its activities varies, with coordination on older adult transportation primarily occurring between AoA and FTA through working groups, initiatives, and technical assistance efforts. While some federal coordination activities are ongoing, current efforts do not identify desired outcomes, a key feature GAO has identified to consider when implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms. Specifically, the Coordinating Council's latest strategic plan, which covers the period 2011 to 2013, lacks clearly defined outcomes and measures to track progress toward those outcomes. Without defined outcomes and a clear method to collect data to monitor progress, it is difficult to determine whether current efforts of the council are achieving their intended results and providing the benefits of coordination, such as improved access to transportation, for older adults. In a concurrent report ( GAO-15-110 ), GAO is recommending that the council update its plan.
State and local transportation agencies and aging organizations in the four states GAO visited used a variety of mechanisms to coordinate transportation services for older adults. For example, many state and local activities are currently focused on mobility management approaches—such as travel training programs—to help older adults identify and access the various transportation resources available. Some organizations GAO interviewed have also implemented more extensive approaches to coordination that are intended to help older adults access transportation services, such as offering a wide range of volunteer transportation. For example, Ride Connection—a transportation provider operating in Oregon—relies heavily on volunteers and service partners to provide over 400,000 rides a year to older adults and others, through travel training, community shuttles, and other programs. However, funding eligibility and reporting requirements for different programs , geographic boundaries , and limited data on the extent of need were identified as challenges that, at the state and local level, may inhibit coordination in the selected states. For example, officials in all four of the selected states noted that rural areas often have very few transportation options available to serve older adults and other residents, particularly for social and recreational outings. Examples from the selected states also suggest that funding for these types of life-enhancing activities may be limited as states prioritize their funding to ensure life-sustaining trips, such as medical and nutrition services, are provided.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT define and report on desired outcomes and collect related data to track and measure progress in achieving results, including the extent of coordination efforts under way. DOT partially concurred with the recommendation and plans to consider what information may be needed to measure and evaluate ongoing coordination efforts. |
gao_RCED-95-18 | gao_RCED-95-18_0 | Evaluation of potentially hazardous sites occurs in several stages. 1.) EPA attributed the decline since 1985 to the fact that many states now have their own Superfund programs. EPA Region I site assessment officials suggested that states generally report sites that present challenging enforcement or cleanup problems. 2.) However, the officials believe that contamination at newly discovered sites is generally not less severe than at previously reported sites—just less obvious. In congressional testimony in February 1994, EPA forecast the smallest increase—1,700 new sites. In the base case, CBO estimated that 25,394 sites would be added to the inventory by the year 2027. This estimate was about 5,000 sites higher than EPA’s medium estimate. Given the limited pace of site cleanup by the Superfund program to date, any of the increases in Superfund’s size discussed in this report may be difficult for the program to manage. Nonfederal Sites Accepted and Rejected for Further Consideration After Preliminary Assessment
Nonfederal Sites Accepted and Rejected for Further Consideration After Site Inspection
EPA’s Estimate of Future National Priorities List Size Through 2020
Nonfederal Sites That Could Be Added to the National Priorities List From the Inventory If Fiscal Year 1993 Evaluation Rates Continue
Number of sites in inventory (col A)
Percent of sites that could be listed (col B)
Range of sites that could col B)
Sites evaluated—not placed on priorities list Sites evaluated—placed on priorities list Sites still to be evaluated Sites awaiting final listing decision Backlogged sites awaiting final evaluation Subtotal of sites still to be evaluated Overall percentage of sites that could be placed on the priorities list(Table notes on next page)
CBO’s Estimate of the Future Number of Nonfederal Sites on the National Priorities List
Number of federal and nonfederal inventory sitesPlacement rate (percent)
Estimated priority list size before rounding Estimated priority list size (rounded)
Major Contributors to This Report
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C.
Chicago/Detroit Regional Office
Boston Regional Office
Bruce Skud, Senior Evaluator The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund Program, focusing on: (1) trends in the number of reported hazardous waste sites; (2) EPA evaluation of potential contamination at these sites; and (3) recent estimates of the program's future growth.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the number of sites reported each year has steadily declined since 1985, primarily because the states believe that they can handle cleanups more efficiently and prefer to do the cleanups themselves; (2) states generally report sites that present challenging enforcement or cleanup problems; (3) the percentage of seriously contaminated sites among those reported has remained constant at 43 percent over the past 10 years; (4) EPA officials believe that contamination at newly discovered sites is not less severe, just less obvious; (5) EPA believes 1,700 new federal and nonfederal sites could be added to the National Priorities List through the year 2020; (6) the Congressional Budget Office believes that 3,300 new nonfederal sites could be added to the list through the year 2027; (7) the future Superfund workload could be higher than EPA estimated; and (8) any additions to the Superfund program will be difficult for EPA to manage. |
gao_NSIAD-95-60 | gao_NSIAD-95-60_0 | The Department of Defense (DOD) considered AGMC’s work conducive to conversion to the private sector and recommended closing Newark AFB/AGMC through privatization and/or transferring the workload to other depots. DOD estimated that implementing its recommendation on Newark AFB/AGMC would cost $31.3 million, result in an annual savings of $3.8 million, and have an 8-year payback period for closure and relocation expenses. Other Closure and Privatization Issues
Other privatization issues relate to (1) proprietary data claims, (2) the effect of the closure on excess depot maintenance capacity, (3) the impact of privatizing core workload, (4) the segmentation of the metrology and calibration mission, and (5) the transfer of AGMC property and facilities to the local reuse commission. We discussed the Newark Air Force Base closure and privatization of the Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) with Air Force officials responsible for implementing the BRAC decision at AGMC, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), and Air Force headquarters. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the cost and savings issues related to the closure and privatization of the Newark Air Force Base Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the justification for closing AGMC is not clear; (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) considers AGMC work conducive to conversion to the private sector and has recommended closing AGMC through privatization and transferring its workload to other depots; (3) DOD estimates that closing AGMC would cost $31.3 million and would result in annual savings of $3.8 million; (4) one-time closure costs have doubled in the past year and may still be underestimated; (5) the projected costs of conducting post-privatization operations could exceed the cost of current Air Force operations and reduce or eliminate projected savings; and (6) other closure and privatization issues create uncertainty about the validity of the Air Force's planned action, including the disposition of proprietary data claims, the effect of the closure on excess depot maintenance capacity, the segmentation of the metrology and calibration mission, and the transfer of AGMC property to a local reuse commission. |
gao_AIMD-95-97 | gao_AIMD-95-97_0 | OIRM officials estimate that by consolidating and optimizing FTS 2000 telecommunications services at many of these sites, the Department could save $5 million to $10 million a year. Although OIRM has identified these and other cost-savings opportunities over the past 2.5 years, OIRM senior management has not carried out its responsibility to reduce departmentwide telecommunications costs where possible. Moreover, although the Secretary has begun restructuring agency field offices to consolidate operations at 2,531 new Field Office Service Centers, USDA has no operational plan or time frame for consolidating and optimizing telecommunications at these centers to ensure the most cost-effective use of FTS 2000 services. However, OIRM has not demonstrated this leadership. At a minimum, the Assistant Secretary should: advise appropriate Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries immediately about all opportunities identified by the Office of Information Resources Management and the Telecommunications Services Division to reduce telecommunications costs; work directly with the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to develop a plan for (1) consolidating and optimizing FTS 2000 telecommunications at USDA’s new Field Office Service Centers and (2) identifying additional USDA headquarters and field office sites where it is cost-effective to consolidate and optimize FTS 2000 telecommunications services; establish, in cooperation with the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, an implementation team consisting of OIRM and agency staff who have the technical capabilities and resources necessary to implement departmentwide FTS 2000 cost-savings solutions based on the established priorities; oversee implementation of all telecommunications cost-savings initiatives and report progress to the Secretary periodically as deemed appropriate; and preclude USDA component agencies and offices from obtaining and using redundant FTS 2000 telecommunications services by requiring that OIRM technical approvals be made contingent on the component agencies having considered and sufficiently addressed departmentwide consolidation and optimization of FTS 2000 services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Department of Agriculture (USDA) is consolidating and optimizing Federal Telecommunications Systems (FTS) 2000 services across the department to maximize savings.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) USDA has identified opportunities to significantly reduce telecommunications costs by consolidating and optimizing its FTS 2000 services, but it has not acted on all the identified opportunities and is wasting millions of dollars each year; (2) USDA field offices are failing to coordinate their FTS 2000 acquisitions and are often purchasing redundant systems; (3) USDA could save up to $10 million a year if its field offices consolidate and optimize FTS 2000 services; (4) the USDA Office of Information Resources Management (OIRM) has not effectively carried out its responsibility to reduce telecommunications costs; (5) some USDA agencies are independently consolidating and optimizing FTS 2000 services and reducing telecommunication costs; (6) senior USDA officials state that leadership transitions have made it difficult for OIRM to implement FTS 2000 consolidation plans; and (7) although USDA is reducing and consolidating its field offices, it has no operational plan or time frame for consolidating and optimizing telecommunications at the centers or to ensure that FTS 2000 is cost-effectively used. |
gao_GAO-03-711 | gao_GAO-03-711_0 | For example, IRS is to be responsible for developing the strategic workforce plan across IRS and for analyzing current and future workforce needs. Thus, a strategic workforce plan for a unit within a division could be developed by IRS, the division, or the unit. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether TEC has a workforce plan that conforms to the critical elements for what should be in a plan and how it should be developed and implemented. TEC Does Not Have a Workforce Plan That Includes the Critical Elements
TEC does not have a strategic workforce plan that includes the critical elements, such as analyses of the workforce gaps and strategies. Without such a workforce plan, TEC has less assurance that it has the necessary workforce to meet its current program goals and to manage changes in its programs and goals. IRS and SB/SE officials said that TEC does not have a strategic workforce plan because of the effort in creating the division and its units such as TEC to meet SB/SE taxpayer needs. SB/SE officials also said that they needed to have some experience with TEC as a new unit and some data on its new TEC workforce before developing a strategic workforce plan for TEC. Both types of analyses are needed to determine the gap between the current TEC workforce and the workforce needed in the future. Without such a plan, TEC is less likely to have the right number of staff with the right skills in the right places at the right time to address its priorities. Recommendation for Executive Action
Given the uncertainty on how the workforce plan for TEC will be developed and implemented, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ensure that the workforce plan for TEC be developed in conformance with the critical elements for what a plan should include and how a plan should be developed and implemented. | Why GAO Did This Study
Strategic workforce planning helps ensure that agencies have the right people with the right skills in the right positions to carry out the agency mission both in the present and future. The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Taxpayer Education and Communication (TEC) unit within its Small Business and Self- Employed Division assists some 45 million small business and self-employed taxpayers. Given the number of taxpayers it is to assist and changes in its priorities and strategies, GAO was asked to determine whether TEC has a workforce plan that conforms to critical elements for what should be in a plan and how it should be developed and implemented.
What GAO Found
Although it has existed for more than 2-and-a-half years, TEC does not have a strategic workforce plan that includes certain critical elements. For example, it has not identified gaps between the number, skills, and locations of its current workforce and the workforce it will need in the future, and the strategies to fill gaps. Such a workforce plan for TEC could be developed by IRS, the Small Business and Self-Employed Division, and/or TEC. Small Business and Self-Employed Division officials said that TEC does not have a strategic workforce plan because they focused on creating the division and units such as TEC to begin addressing taxpayer needs, and because they first wanted to gain some experience with TEC as a new unit. IRS and the Small Business and Self-Employed Division are creating a process for developing a workforce plan for TEC that in broad terms would incorporate the critical elements common to workforce planning. However, it is not yet clear whether the workforce plan for TEC will be developed and implemented consistent with these critical elements. For example, IRS and the Small Business and Self-Employed Division have not analyzed the skills that the TEC workforce will need to meet its program goals or outlined the process and data to be used to do these analyses. |
gao_GAO-03-809 | gao_GAO-03-809_0 | While most state officials we interviewed and those responding to our survey said that they recognize the benefits their state will achieve by developing a statewide system, many states reported that the development of their SACWIS is delayed between 2 months and 8 years beyond the time frames the states set for completion, with a median delay of 2-½ years. In response to some of these challenges, HHS has provided technical assistance to help states develop their systems and conducted on-site SACWIS reviews to verify that the systems meet all federal requirements. In developing a system, states have considerable flexibility in the design of their SACWIS. For example, in Iowa child welfare work is divided between child abuse and neglect investigations and ongoing case management for children brought into the care of the child welfare agency. Some of the common difficulties states reported in developing SACWIS included receiving state funding approval, reaching internal agreement on system development, and creating a system that reflects child welfare work processes and is user friendly (see table 7). In addition to the development challenges reported in our survey, 2 of the 5 states we visited reported that insufficient funding affected ongoing SACWIS maintenance. Several Factors Affect the States’ Ability to Ensure Reliable Data on Children’s Experiences, and Some of HHS’s Oversight and Assistance Is Problematic
Several factors affect states’ ability to collect and report reliable data on children served by state child welfare agencies, and some problems exist, such as a lack of clear and documented guidance, with HHS’s oversight and technical assistance. Almost all of the states responding to our survey reported that insufficient caseworker training and inaccurate and incomplete data entry affect the quality of the data reported to HHS. States Are Using Various Practices to Overcome System Development Challenges and Improve Data on Children’s Experiences
Some states are using a variety of practices to address the challenges associated with developing SACWIS and improving data reliability, although no formal evaluations are available on their effectiveness. States Use Strategies, such as Producing Reports That Identify Missing Data, in an Attempt to Improve the Reliability of the Data Reported to HHS
Twenty-eight states reported using approaches to help caseworkers identify the data elements that are required for federal reporting and to help them better understand the importance of entering timely and accurate data. Although states began reporting to NCANDS in1990 and were mandated to begin reporting to AFCARS in 1995, most states continue to face challenges providing complete, accurate, and consistent data to HHS. Recommendation to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
To improve the reliability of state-reported child welfare data, we are recommending that the Secretary of HHS consider, in addition to HHS’s recent efforts to improve AFCARS data, ways to enhance the guidance and assistance offered to states to help them overcome the key challenges in collecting and reporting child welfare data. We obtained and reviewed available SACWIS and Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) reports. Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information Systems: Survey of State Progress. | Why GAO Did This Study
To better monitor children and families served by state child welfare agencies, Congress authorized matching funds for the development of statewide automated child welfare information systems (SACWIS) and required that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) compile information on the children served by state agencies. This report reviews (1) states' experiences in developing child welfare information systems and HHS's role in assisting in their development, (2) factors that affect the reliability of data that states collect and report on children served by their child welfare agencies and HHS's role in ensuring the reliability of those data, and (3) practices that child welfare agencies use to overcome challenges associated with SACWIS development and data reliability.
What GAO Found
HHS reported that 47 states are developing or operating a SACWIS, but many continue to face challenges developing their systems. Most state officials said they recognize the benefit their state will achieve by developing SACWIS, such as contributing to the timeliness of child abuse and neglect investigations; however, despite the availability of federal funds since 1994, states reported a median delay of 2 and a half years beyond the timeframes they set for completion. States reported that they encountered some difficulties during SACWIS development, such as challenges receiving state funding and creating a system that reflected their work processes. In response to some of these challenges, HHS has provided technical assistance to help states develop their systems and conducted on-site reviews of SACWIS to verify that the systems meet federal requirements. Despite efforts to implement comprehensive information systems, several factors affect the states' ability to collect and report reliable adoption, foster care, and child abuse and neglect data. States responding to GAO's survey and officials in the 5 states GAO visited reported that insufficient caseworker training and inaccurate and incomplete data entry affect the quality of the data reported to HHS. In addition, states reported technical challenges reporting data. Despite HHS's assistance, many states report ongoing challenges, such as the lack of clear and documented guidance on how to report child welfare data. In addition, although states were mandated to begin reporting data to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) in 1995, few reviews of states' AFCARS reporting capabilities have been conducted to assist states in resolving some of their reporting challenges. Some states are using a variety of practices to address the challenges associated with developing SACWIS and improving data reliability. For example, 44 states included caseworkers and other system users in the design and testing of SACWIS, and 28 states reported using approaches to help caseworkers identify and better understand the data elements that are required for federal reporting. |
gao_GAO-05-710 | gao_GAO-05-710_0 | Some Efforts to Increase Awareness of Section 609(e) Were Under Way as of June 2005
At the time of our review, some efforts to educate consumers, business entities, and local enforcement officials about their rights and obligations under section 609(e)—notably efforts undertaken by the FTC, U.S. Other FTC outreach efforts on section 609(e) include links on FTC’s Web site at www.consumer.gov/idtheft to its model summary of identity theft victim rights and other information on identity theft, a toll-free hotline (1-877-IDTHEFT) offering counseling to help consumers who want or need more information about dealing with the consequences of identity theft, and FTC’s Consumer Response Center and Distribution Office that provides publications on identity theft, among other topics. According to FTC staff, section 609(e) will also be incorporated into the public education campaign that FTC is required by the FACT Act to implement by December 2005 which will help increase outreach on the provisions. Many Believe the New Provision Will Be Useful, but Some Potential Concerns Were Identified
While not all identity theft victims will need section 609(e), FTC, law enforcement agencies and consumer groups with whom we spoke believed that the provision giving victims access to data on fraudulent business transactions would help in resolving identity theft cases. State agencies and consumer advocacy groups also identified some potential concerns with the provision. FTC staff told us that as part of their overall FACT Act outreach efforts, they intend to monitor the implementation of section 609(e) to determine whether any additional efforts are necessary to ensure that the provision is working as Congress intended. Federal Banking Regulators Had a Favorable View of FTC’s Process of Developing the Model Summary
On November 30, 2004, FTC published its final version of the model summary of identity theft rights as mandated by the FACT Act (see app. FTC intends to assess the effectiveness of its mandated identity theft campaign which will include coverage of section 609(e). It is too early to assess the actual impact of section 609(e) on consumers’ ability to get business records relating to suspected fraudulent transactions. These potential concerns center primarily on the limited availability of a Spanish version of the summary of rights and, to a lesser extent, on the clarity of the summary of rights to the general population. While it is too early to determine the extent of any implementation issues, FTC efforts to monitor the implementation of section 609(e) should provide additional information on the usefulness of the summary of rights in aiding identity theft victims. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our reporting objectives were to (1) provide information on outreach efforts to consumers, businesses, and local law enforcement agencies on the provision in the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions (FACT) Act of 2003 that allows identity theft victims to obtain business records relating to fraudulent transactions; (2) describe the views and opinions of relevant federal agencies, private business entities, and consumer groups regarding the expected impact of the provision; and (3) discuss the process used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to develop the model summary of rights of identity theft victims mandated in the FACT Act and examine the opinions of related groups on this process. Postal Inspection Service, and U.S. Secret Service—and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, which includes the heads of police departments around the country and abroad; met with officials of the five federal banking regulators—Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision— regarding compliance by federally insured depository institutions with the FACT Act provision and their interaction with consumers on identity theft issues; spoke with representatives of the three national credit reporting agencies (CRAs)—Experian, Equifax, and Transunion—which play a key role in distributing the summary of identity theft victim rights and in helping identity theft victims correct their credit records; held meetings with representatives of two states—California and Washington—that had previously enacted identity theft laws with provisions similar to the section 609(e) to obtain their views on the expected effectiveness of the federal provision; contacted five consumer advocacy groups—Consumers Union, Identity Theft Resource Center, National Consumer Law Center, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group—that were identified as being active in identity theft issues to obtain their views and perspectives as representatives of consumers and identity theft victims; and obtained limited information from a few businesses and trade associations on these subjects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions (FACT) Act of 2003 which amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), contains provisions intended to help consumers remedy the effects of identity theft. For example, section 609(e) of the amended FCRA gives identity theft victims the right to obtain records of fraudulent business transactions, and section 609(d) requires the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to develop a model summary of identity theft victims' rights. This report provides information on (1) outreach efforts to inform consumers, businesses, and law enforcement entities about section 609(e); (2) the views of relevant groups on the provision's expected impact; and (3) FTC's process for developing its model summary of rights and views on the summary's potential usefulness.
What GAO Found
Some efforts to educate consumers, business entities, and local law enforcement officials about their rights and obligations under section 609(e), which grants identity theft victims access to fraudulent business transaction records, were under way as of June 2005--notably by the FTC, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, International Association of Chiefs of Police, and National Credit Union Administration. For example, FTC had a number of outreach efforts on section 609(e) including coverage in conferences and presentations as well as information available through its Web site, toll-free hotline, and identity theft publications. While many of the other federal regulators and law enforcement agencies have undertaken outreach efforts on identity theft, most did not specifically include information on section 609(e). FTC staff indicated that the public education campaign on identity theft prevention mandated to be implemented by December 2005 by the FACT Act will also include coverage of section 609(e). According to FTC, law enforcement agency officials, and consumer advocacy group representatives we spoke with, section 609(e) should help victims to remedy the effects of identity theft more quickly. Other cited benefits include allowing victims to build stronger cases that could assist law enforcement agencies in developing intelligence data for their investigations. However, due to the limited experience with victims attempting to obtain business records, it is too early to assess the actual effectiveness of the section 609(e) provisions. Consumer groups and state agencies identified some potential problems with the timeliness of business transaction data and the extent of documents needed to verify a victim's identity theft claim. Given the newness of the provision, additional experience is needed to verify the validity of these potential concerns or other concerns not yet anticipated. FTC staff told us that as part of their overall FACT Act outreach efforts, they intend to monitor the implementation of section 609(e) to determine whether the provision is working as intended. Most of the agencies and groups we spoke with had favorable views of FTC's process to develop the model summary of identity theft victim rights mandated under section 609(d). FTC published its final form of the summary on November 30, 2004, and as required by FTC's guidance, the three national credit reporting agencies told us they began distributing a summary to consumers who contacted them with identity theft concerns before January 31, 2005. While most of the groups that we contacted felt that FTC had been responsive to their comments, consumer advocacy groups identified two potential concerns. These potential concerns center on the limited availability of a Spanish version of the summary of rights and the clarity of the model summary of rights to the general population. However, due to the limited time that the summary has been available, it is too early to determine the extent of any implementation issues. |
gao_GAO-06-560 | gao_GAO-06-560_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) assist IRS management in tracking the status of financial audit and financial management-related recommendations and the actions needed to address them and (2) demonstrate how the recommendations fit into IRS’s overall management and internal control structure. Over the years since we first began auditing IRS’s financial statements in fiscal year 1992, we have closed out over 200 financial management-related recommendations we made based on actions IRS has taken to improve its internal controls and operational efficiency. At the same time, however, our audits continue to identify significant internal control deficiencies, resulting in our making further recommendations for corrective action, including 22 new financial management-related recommendations resulting from our fiscal year 2005 financial audit. Status of Recommendations Based on the Fiscal Year 2005 Financial Statement Audit
In April 2005, we issued a report on the status of IRS’s efforts to implement corrective actions to address financial management recommendations stemming from our fiscal year 2004 and prior year financial audits and other financial management-related work. Open Recommendations Grouped by Control Activity
Linking the open recommendations from our financial audits and other financial management-related work, and the issues that gave rise to them, to the internal control activities identified in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides insight regarding their significance to IRS’s ability to effectively achieve the objectives associated with the control activities and, thus, to its overall mission and goals. IRS is charged with collecting over $2 trillion in taxes each year, a significant amount of which is collected in the form of checks and cash accompanied by tax returns and related information. In addition, the number of staff increases significantly during the peak of the tax filing season. The following open recommendation would assist IRS in its management of human capital in its financial operations. IRS has made substantial progress in improving its financial management since its first financial audit, as evidenced by consecutive clean audit opinions on its financial statements for the past 6 years, resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, and the closing of hundreds of financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work and commitment at the top. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to fully address the financial management challenges the agency faces. Effective implementation of the recommendations we have made and continue to make through our financial audits and related work could greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management. We will review the effectiveness of these corrective actions and the status of IRS’s progress in addressing all open recommendations as part of our fiscal year 2006 IRS financial statement audit. Management Report: Improvements Needed in IRS’s Internal Controls (GAO-06-543R, May 12, 2006)
Because this is a recent recommendation, GAO did not obtain information on IRS’s status in addressing it. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its role as the nation's tax collector, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in annually collecting over $2 trillion in taxes, processing hundreds of millions of tax and information returns, and enforcing the nation's tax laws. Since its first audit of IRS's financial statements in fiscal year 1992, GAO has identified a number of weaknesses in IRS's financial management operations. In related reports, GAO has recommended corrective action to address those weaknesses. Each year, as part of the annual audit of IRS's financial statements, GAO not only makes recommendations to address any new weaknesses identified but also follows up on the status of weaknesses GAO identified in previous years' audits. The purpose of this report is to (1) assist IRS management in tracking the status of audit recommendations and actions needed to fully address them and (2) demonstrate how the recommendations fit into IRS's overall management and internal control structure.
What GAO Found
IRS has made significant progress in improving its internal controls and financial management since its first financial audit in 1992, as evidenced by 6 consecutive years of clean audit opinions on its financial statements, the resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, and the closing of over 200 financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work and commitment at the top levels of the agency. However, IRS still faces financial management challenges. At the beginning of GAO's audit of IRS's fiscal year 2005 financial statements, 84 financial management-related recommendations from prior audits remained open because IRS had not fully addressed the issues that gave rise to them. During the fiscal year 2005 financial audit, IRS took actions that enabled GAO to close 34 of those recommendations. At the same time, GAO identified additional internal control deficiencies resulting in 22 new recommendations. In total, 72 recommendations currently remain open. To assist IRS in evaluating its internal controls and in making improvements, GAO categorized the 72 open recommendations by various internal control activities which, in turn, were grouped into three broad control activity groupings. The continued existence of internal control weaknesses that gave rise to these recommendations represents a serious obstacle that IRS needs to overcome. Effective implementation of GAO's recommendations can greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management. IRS stated that it is taking action to address the recommendations included in the report. GAO will review the effectiveness of these corrective actions and the status of IRS's progress as part of the fiscal year 2006 audit. |
gao_GAO-07-164 | gao_GAO-07-164_0 | Background
DOD’s lodging programs were established to maintain mission readiness and improve productivity, and were intended to provide good quality temporary lodging facilities and service for authorized personnel. DOD has approximately 82,000 transient lodging rooms. The Marine Corps operates its PCS lodging as part of its MWR program, which is operated as a Category C, revenue generating program. The Army estimates that, absent privatization, it would cost about $1.1 billion and would take more than 20 years to renovate or build new lodging facilities. Services Use Decentralized Approach to Manage and Fund Lodging Programs
Each military service takes its own approach to manage and fund its lodging programs, but current DOD lodging guidance does not establish performance standards and measures needed to assess program effectiveness. The Army and the Air Force each manage their TDY and PCS lodging under one organization, while the Navy and Marine Corps both opt to have one organization manage TDY lodges and another one for PCS facilities. The military services’ lodging programs receive varying levels of appropriated and nonappropriated fund support. While DOD lodging programs are collecting and reporting some of these measures, lodging officials are unclear how the data is being used, since performance standards have not been established. Army’s Privatization Plans Could Upgrade Facilities Faster but Will Increase Government Costs and Create Other Challenges
The Army believes the lodging developer will renovate existing or construct new lodging facilities sooner—in 7 years by 2014—than otherwise planned by the Army, and provide for adequate sustainment of lodging facilities over the 50-year project life. Our analysis indicates that the Army’s travel costs could increase by about $75 million per year if all lodging facilities in the United States are privatized. In addition, the Army could incur approximately $17.3 million in onetime costs associated with severance pay and discontinued service retirement annuities for nonappropriated fund lodging employees who would be let go if lodging is privatized. The Army estimated that appropriated fund support for the expenses associated with these items, across the United States, totaled about $27.9 million in fiscal year 2005. Other Potential Operating Challenges of Lodging Privatization
The privatization of Army lodging may potentially affect occupancy levels and exacerbate rate disparities among bases and between official and unofficial travelers, as well as promote more notable inconsistencies in room rates among services at planned joint bases. While the Army does not believe that privatization will affect plans for joint basing, we believe it could lead to inconsistencies in room rates among services at joint bases. Revised DOD Lodging Policy Does Not Provide Clear Performance Standards
On October 6, 2006, DOD provided the military services with revised lodging guidance, which addressed some issues raised in prior GAO recommendations but does not provide clear program performance standards and measures. Additionally, as the Army moves forward with its plans to privatize lodging, it needs to provide the same level of accountability to the Congress and OSD for program costs and performance as it does for its housing privatization projects. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to (1) clarify their respective roles for establishing policy and overseeing the lodging program, and (2) update the DOD lodging program strategic plan, to include developing performance standards and measures to ensure that the goals of the lodging program strategic plan and Army plans to privatize its lodging are being achieved. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how the military services’ operate and assess their lodging programs, we reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and military service lodging policy, analyzed data regarding program funding, room rates, and occupancy rates by type of traveler. We interviewed officials from: the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps offices responsible for managing the temporary duty (TDY) and permanent- change-of-station (PCS) lodging programs. To determine the effect on Army travel costs, we compared the average daily room rate for Army lodging to the projected room rate under the privatization effort. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) transient lodging programs were established to provide quality temporary facilities for authorized personnel, and reduce travel costs through lower rates than commercial hotels. DOD has approximately 82,000 temporary duty (TDY) and permanent-change-of-station (PCS) rooms worldwide, and reported that it cost about $860 million in appropriated and nonappropriated funds to operate them in fiscal year 2005. While the Army plans to privatize its lodging in the United States, there are concerns as to whether these plans are cost-effective, and how they relate to DOD-wide lodging efforts. GAO was asked to address (1) how each military service and DOD manages, funds, and assesses the performance of its lodging programs to meet short- and long- term needs, and (2) the effect that lodging privatization would have on the costs to the Army and the ability to maintain and recapitalize facilities. GAO is also providing information on DOD's actions to implement prior recommendations regarding the lodging program. GAO obtained data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services and visited nine military installations.
What GAO Found
Each military service takes its own approach to manage and fund its lodging programs, but current DOD lodging guidance does not establish performance measures to assess program effectiveness. The Army and Air Force each manage their TDY and PCS lodging under a single organization, while the Navy and Marine Corps have separate organizations managing TDY and PCS facilities. The Marine Corps manages PCS lodging separately because it operates as a profit-generating morale, welfare, and recreation program. The services' lodging programs are provided varying levels of appropriated and nonappropriated fund support, which correlates with the room rates charged. For example, since the Air Force allocates more appropriated funds for program expenses, it charges less than does the Navy PCS program, which is sustained with the revenues generated from room rates. Determining total program costs across the services is difficult because some of the data reported are estimated or hard to collect. Though DOD has a lodging strategic plan, it has not been updated since 1999. DOD has not established lodging performance measures, and the services vary in their efforts to determine program effectiveness. Performance measures could help in assessing future program plans. The Army believes privatization will provide for faster improvement and long-term sustainment of lodging facilities and avoid costs. GAO recognizes these benefits, but its analysis shows privatization could increase costs through increased room rates and create operating challenges that have implications beyond the Army, such as uneven lodging occupancy and room rates where joint basing is planned. Under privatization, the Army projects that a developer will renovate existing or construct new lodging facilities in 7 years, and provide for their adequate sustainment over the 50-year project life. In contrast, the Army projects it would take over 20 years and cost about $1.1 billion to upgrade all lodging facilities under current plans, which do not provide for adequate long-term sustainment. GAO found that lodging privatization could increase costs to the government by about $75 million per year through increased room rates if all lodging facilities in the U.S. are privatized, with those costs borne by the operations and maintenance and military personnel appropriation accounts. The Army currently estimates it will also incur at least $17.3 million in onetime costs related to severance pay and discontinued service retirement annuities for lodging employees let go because of privatization. Privatization also may affect occupancy levels and exacerbate rate disparities among bases and between official and unofficial travelers, as well as lead to inconsistencies in room rates among services at future joint bases. Complying with relevant housing privatization legislation will allow congressional oversight of the Army's privatization of lodging. On October 6, 2006, DOD provided the military services with revised lodging guidance, but this guidance lacks performance standards and measures, and does not address which office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for lodging policy and oversight of privatized lodging facilities. |
gao_GAO-08-94 | gao_GAO-08-94_0 | The reaffirmation agreement requirements include, among other things, disclosures notifying debtors of reaffirmed terms. We also estimate that 67 percent (in AL-N and WV-S) to 88 percent (in IL-N) of non-credit union agreements included monthly income, expense, and net income information— conversely, an estimated 12 percent (in IL-N) to 33 percent (in AL-N and WV-S) were missing this required information (as mentioned previously, these data are not required of credit union agreements signed by a debtor attorney). This information helps to inform debtors, debtor attorneys, creditors, and court officials of the potential inability of the debtor to make payment on reaffirmed debt. Financial Data, Asset Information, and Debtor Notifications Included in Most Reaffirmation Agreements
The Reform Act requires that reaffirmation agreements include financial data disclosure statements for the amount reaffirmed and the annual percentage rate for the amount reaffirmed. This disclosure statement differs for credit unions. Federal Judiciary Has Proposed a New Form to Evaluate Undue Hardship
In March 2007, the Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules proposed the use of a reaffirmation agreement coversheet form that, if approved, would make it mandatory for debtors to provide financial information on the coversheet, such as amount of debt reaffirmed, the annual percentage rate for reaffirmed debt, monthly reaffirmation payment, and monthly income and expense information at the time of petition and reaffirmation agreement filings, to facilitate the evaluation of undue hardship. If approved, the coversheet would appear to address the issue of missing financial information. Reaffirmation agreements were not signed by debtor attorneys in an estimated 3 percent to 10 percent of agreements for the five districts. Secured Debts for Autos and Homes Most Frequent Type of Reaffirmed Debt; for Most Agreements, Reaffirmed Debt Burden Less than 25 Percent of Total Debt
Secured Debts Most Frequently Reaffirmed
An estimated 90 percent (in AL-N) to 98 percent (in TX-N and WV-S) of reaffirmations in the five districts were for secured debts. Unsecured debt was reaffirmed infrequently—occurring in an estimated 2 percent to 10 percent of all reaffirmation agreements in the five districts. In one of the five district bankruptcy courts (WV-S), the reaffirmed interest rate was less than the original interest rate in an estimated 44 percent of reaffirmation agreements. For the 61 (of 1,164) reaffirmation agreements we reviewed with credit unions (that disclosed both an original and a reaffirmed interest rate), in each of the five bankruptcy courts the interest rate on the reaffirmed debt was equal to or less than the interest rate on the original debt in all but 2 reaffirmation agreements—10 of 10 agreements in AL-N, 27 of 28 agreements in CA-C, 2 of 2 agreements in IL-N, 16 of 17 agreements in TX-N, and 4 of 4 agreements in WV-S.
We interviewed four creditors who were among the firms that most frequently engaged in reaffirmations that we reviewed in the five selected districts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the following: To what extent have required Reform Act disclosure statements and other required information (such as the annual percentage rate for the reaffirmed debt) been incorporated into reaffirmation agreements? What types of debts were reaffirmed and to what extent did reaffirmed debt amounts comprise debtors’ overall debt burden when they filed for bankruptcy? How did the reaffirmed and original interest rates compare? When reviewing reaffirmation agreements, we determined both whether complete disclosure information was included in the reaffirmation agreement and whether the language in the disclosure, while complete, varied at all from what is required by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (referred to here as the Reform Act). The five districts we selected collectively represented about 12 percent of those quarterly filings. Estimates from these samples are not generalizable to the population of all bankruptcy courts; however, they can be generalized to each of the selected bankruptcy court districts and are intended for illustrative purposes. Some percentage estimates we present have a margin of error greater than plus or minus 10 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (referred to hereafter as the Reform Act) included provisions to better inform individuals who file for personal bankruptcy about their options for reaffirming debt--whereby filers may voluntarily agree to pay certain creditors in an effort to retain assets, such as an automobile. Reaffirmation agreements between debtors and creditors are required, by law, to formally disclose to debtors the terms of the agreement, such as the amount of debt reaffirmed. Some requirements differ for credit unions, such as an exemption for reporting debtor financial information when the debtor's attorney signs the agreement. The Reform Act required GAO to study the bankruptcy reaffirmation process. This report discusses (1) the extent to which required Reform Act disclosures and other information have been incorporated into reaffirmation agreements, (2) the types of debts reaffirmed and the percent this debt comprised of debtors' overall debt burden, and (3) how reaffirmed and original interest rates compare. GAO reviewed a representative sample of bankruptcy files with agreements in five bankruptcy courts (in AL, CA, IL, TX, and WV) selected by, among other things, filing volume and geographic dispersion. Estimates from our sample cannot be generalized to all bankruptcy courts, but can be generalized to each of the selected bankruptcy courts.
What GAO Found
Most reaffirmation agreements across the five districts included Reform Act disclosure statements and other required information. For example, for the five districts, the required disclosure statement for the "Annual Percentage Rate" was included in an estimated 86 to 97 percent of agreements and the disclosure statement for the "Amount Reaffirmed" and the amount was included in an estimated 87 to 98 percent of agreements. We also estimate that, for the five districts, 67 to 88 percent of non-credit union agreements included monthly income, expense, and net income information--conversely, 12 to 33 percent were missing this information. This information helps to inform debtors, debtor attorneys, creditors, and court officials of the potential inability of the debtor to make payment on reaffirmed debt. In May 2007, a federal judiciary advisory committee proposed the use of a reaffirmation agreement coversheet that, if approved, would make it mandatory for debtors to provide required financial information to determine an undue hardship. If approved, the coversheet would appear to address the issue of missing financial information. For the five districts, debts secured by assets, such as an automobile, were the most frequently reaffirmed type of debt--comprising an estimated 90 percent or more of all reaffirmations. Unsecured debt--such as credit card debt--was reaffirmed infrequently in reaffirmation agreements, occurring in an estimated 2 percent to 10 percent among all agreements in the five districts. For the five districts, we estimate that in approximately two-thirds of cases the reaffirmed debt burden comprised 25 percent or less of the debtors' total debts. In those cases where an original interest rate was provided, rates on reaffirmed debt were generally less than or equal to the original rate. Specifically, the interest rates were equal to the original rate in an estimated 56 to 84 percent of reaffirmed debts for the five districts, less than the original rate for 10 to 44 percent of debts, and greater in 0 to 8 percent of debts. (The margin of error for these estimates is at most plus or minus 16 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.) |
gao_GAO-03-239 | gao_GAO-03-239_0 | Table 4 shows the definitions of each of these terms. Thus, program year 2000 funds must be spent by the end of program year 2001 for localities and by the end of program year 2002 for states. States Have Spent Most of Their WIA Funds, Labor’s Estimate Overstates Funds Available to Spend
Our analysis of Labor’s data shows that states are spending their WIA funds within the authorized 3-year timeframe—virtually all funds allocated for program year 1999 have been spent within the requisite 3 years and 90 percent of program year 2000 funds have been spent within 2 years. By contrast, Labor’s estimate of expenditure rates suggests that states are not spending their funds as quickly because the estimate is based on all funds states currently have available—from older funds carried in from prior program years to those only recently distributed. Moreover, many of the remaining funds carried over may have already been obligated. In addition, states had expended 56 percent of program year 2001 funds, with 2 years still remaining (see fig. Lacking Consistent Information on Obligations, Labor Overstates Available Funds by Considering Only Expenditures
Labor’s data on obligations do not consistently reflect local commitments; therefore, Labor relies on expenditure data to estimate available funds. 8). Labor uses the benchmarks to formulate budget requests and identify which states need monitoring and additional guidance. Despite Labor’s guidance and assistance efforts, some state and local officials cited several concerns about financial reporting. Delays in reporting expenditures result from lengthy spending approval processes and cumbersome contract procurement procedures as well as from a lack of timely provider billing. Some States and Localities Have Mitigated Factors Affecting Spending Rates
To manage spending more effectively, some states and local areas have developed strategies to mitigate factors affecting spending levels or delays in reporting expenditures. This pace of spending has occurred even though the law allows states 3 years to spend the funds. Obligations—funds that have been committed on behalf of WIA customers—must also be considered to accurately gauge how much is truly available for spending. In so doing, Labor does not take into account longer-term commitments made to customers and service providers and, as a result, overestimates available funds. State officials told us that they seek more guidance and assistance in managing their WIA funds wisely and some states have implemented strategies to do so. Through collaboration with states, Labor should clarify the definition of unliquidated obligations to include funds committed at the point of service delivery in addition to those funds obligated at the state level for statewide WIA activities and not funds that states merely allocate to their local areas, specify what constitutes an obligation to address state and local area concerns regarding contracts, and specify the timeframe for recording an obligation particularly when it covers time periods that are longer than a program year. To help states and local areas manage their spending more judiciously, Labor should proactively provide states and local areas with guidance and technical assistance focused on reporting financial information, communicate spending benchmarks that states should meet, and systematically share promising practices and effective spending management strategies. Workforce Investment Act: New Requirements Create Need for More Guidance GAO-02-94T. | Why GAO Did This Study
The administration has twice proposed reducing the Workforce Investment Act's (WIA) budget, citing large amounts of states' unspent funds carried over from the prior year. However, in light of current economic conditions, state and local workforce officials have expressed a need for more funds, not less. GAO was asked to assess whether the Department of Labor's spending information is a true reflection of states' available funds. GAO examined the spending rate for states, what Labor does to determine how states are managing their spending, and what factors affect states' WIA expenditure rates.
What GAO Found
States are spending their WIA funds much faster than required under the law, according to GAO's analysis of Labor's data. By the end of program year 2001, states had spent virtually all funds allocated in 1999 as well as 90 percent of 2000 funds and 56 percent of 2001 funds. By contrast, Labor's estimate suggests a slower pace of spending because it is based on all available funds, including those only recently distributed. Even though 44 percent of program year 2001 funds are being carried over into program year 2002, many of these funds may have already been committed at the point of service delivery. Furthermore, because of reporting inconsistencies, Labor's data do not accurately reflect funds that have been obligated long-term commitments made by states and local areas on behalf of WIA customers. For a truer picture of available funding, both expenditures and obligations must be considered. But, because Labor lacks consistent data on obligations, it focuses only on expenditures to gauge budgetary need and overestimates funds states have available to spend. Labor compares state expenditures against its benchmarks to determine how states manage their spending, to target guidance and assistance efforts, and to formulate next year's budget request. But Labor does not often communicate these benchmarks to states. Despite active monitoring and additional guidance, state and local officials remain confused by some of Labor's financial reporting requirements. They seek more definitive guidance and the opportunity to share promising strategies to help them better manage spending. Financial reporting delays result from lengthy spending approval and contract procurement procedures lasting as long as 8 months and untimely service provider billing. Also, yearly funding fluctuations affect states' and local areas' willingness to commit resources in the long term and inhibit workforce system planning. Some states and localities have implemented strategies to overcome these factors and better manage their WIA spending. |
gao_GAO-12-493 | gao_GAO-12-493_0 | DOD Established Targets for Reducing Excess Inventory Based on the Best Data Available, but Its Targets May Not Effectively Guide Continued Improvement
DOD may find that the two targets for reducing on-order and on-hand excess inventory that it established when developing the Plan in fiscal year 2010 are ineffective in guiding future inventory management improvement efforts. DOD reduced its percentage of on-order excess inventory from 8.5 percent, or approximately $1.15 billion, in fiscal year 2009 to 5.5 percent, or about $940 million, at the end of fiscal year 2010, thereby achieving its 2014 target 4 years early. In fiscal year 2011, based on further analysis of the inventory data, DOD revised the definition of on-hand excess inventory, which resulted in a reduction in its percentage of on-hand excess from 9.4 percent, or $8.9 billion, in fiscal year 2009 to 8.3 percent, or $8.4 billion, in fiscal year 2010, which is well below its fiscal year 2012 target of 10 percent. It also notes that it is DOD policy to periodically conduct performance evaluations of its supply chain operations and inventory. DOD Has Made Progress in the Early Stages of the Plan’s Implementation, but Has Experienced Delays and Challenges Remain in Implementation
In addition to making progress toward achieving the targets discussed above, DOD has made progress implementing the Plan’s actions for improving inventory management, which began in late fiscal year 2010. However, DOD is only 18 months into a 4-year implementation effort and has experienced some delays and faces continued challenges during the remainder of implementation. Inventory categorization. DOD Is Developing a Set of Metrics to Assess Inventory Management Effectiveness and Efficiency, but Has Not Determined If It Will Incorporate These Metrics into Guidance
As part of the Plan, DOD is developing a set of metrics to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of its inventory management beyond the percentage targets for on-order and on-hand excess inventory identified in the Plan, but it has not determined if it will incorporate the set of metrics into guidance. This may hamper its ability to assess inventory management performance and sustain management attention on improvement beyond the Plan’s implementation. Some of the potential metrics are currently reported by OSD, while others would be new metrics that would require establishing a data source and methodology. Based on our previous reporting, we have found that such metrics should be reportable in a consistent fashion and used to evaluate performance. The services and DLA will be relied upon to generate the data for some of the departmentwide inventory management metrics; thus, efforts to monitor and evaluate inventory management performance may be hampered without standardized definitions, methodologies, and procedures for the consistent collection of data for the metrics. DOD Has Achieved Cost Avoidances Based on Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 Inventory Data and Plans to Reduce Resources Available for the Purchase of Secondary Items
DOD officials emphasized that the reductions achieved in the amount of on-order and on-hand excess inventory represent about $710 million in cost avoidances on the part of the department. The program completed $73.8 million lateral redistributions and procurement offsets in fiscal year 2010 and $68.3 million in fiscal year 2011, which prevented the acquisition of additional items. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve implementation of the Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan and ensure sustained management attention beyond the Plan’s implementation consistent with results-oriented management practices, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness to take the following three actions: conduct and document periodic re-examinations of its existing on- order and on-hand excess inventory percentage targets (such as those officials say are planned) and update the targets and associated timelines, if necessary, to guide continued improvement in its inventory management through the Plan’s implementation; develop and implement guidance that establishes a comprehensive, standardized set of departmentwide inventory management metrics, including standardized definitions and procedures for measuring and reporting the metrics; and employ these metrics in periodically monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of its inventory management practices. In written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our work were to determine the extent to which (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) established and achieved targets for reducing excess inventory in the Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan (Plan), (2) DOD made progress in implementing the Plan, (3) DOD has established and implemented standardized metrics to track their progress in improving inventory management, and (4) DOD has identified and realized any cost savings or cost avoidance from implementing the Plan. Assessment: Not started, on schedule. Inventory that is not in DOD’s possession but for which a contract has been awarded or funds have been obligated is considered to be on-order. DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Observations on DOD’s Progress and Challenges in Strategic Planning for Supply Chain Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has identified supply chain management as a high-risk area due in part to ineffective and inefficient inventory management practices that have caused DOD to accumulate billions of dollars worth of unneeded inventory. DOD reported that as of September 2010 it had $8.4 billion worth of on-hand excess inventory, categorized for potential reuse or disposal, and $940 million worth of on-order excess inventory, already purchased but likely to be excess due to changes in requirements. Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, GAO is required to assess DODs implementation of the Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan (Plan) DOD submitted to Congress. GAOs objectives were to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) established and achieved targets for reducing excess inventory in the Plan, (2) made progress in implementing the overall Plan, (3) metrics to track progress in improving inventory management, and (4) identified and realized any cost savings or avoidance. GAO reviewed relevant data, assessed DODs actions through January 1, 2012, and interviewed officials implementing the Plan.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) set two goalsreducing on-order and on-hand excess inventorywith percentage targets for each based on the best available data in fiscal year 2009 as part of its Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan (Plan). Sustained management oversight led to reductions in on-order and on-hand excess inventory in fiscal year 2010 prior to the Plans implementation, and thus DOD may find the current targets are not meaningful in guiding improvement. Specifically, at the end of fiscal year 2010, DOD had reduced its percentage of on-order excess inventory to 5.5 percent, thereby achieving its 2014 target 4 years early. It also revised the definition and calculation of on-hand excess inventory, which resulted in DOD being below the fiscal year 2012 target of 10 percent. It is DOD policy to conduct periodic evaluations of its inventory management, and results-oriented management practices emphasize validating performance measures to ensure they remain appropriate. Without challenging, yet achievable targets, DODs Plan will not be effective in guiding further improvement.
DOD has made progress implementing its Plan since implementation began in late fiscal year 2010, but DOD is only 18 months into a 4-year implementation effort and many planned activities still remain. Most but not all of the progress to date has been in gathering and analyzing data, and reviewing guidance and practices. In addition, DOD has made progress in particular areas, such as developing tentative sub-categories to further clarify its existing inventory categories. Overall implementation is generally on schedule, but some of the Plans efforts have experienced delays. Moving forward, DOD faces such challenges as adjusting demand planning to changing circumstances, and enforcing consistent implementation of guidance at the military service level.
As part of the Plan, DOD is developing metrics to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of its inventory management, but it has not determined if it will incorporate these metrics into guidance. This may hamper its ability to assess inventory management performance and sustain management attention on improvement. Materiel managers should evaluate and be capable of reporting on the performance of inventory management. Based on previous reporting, GAO has found that such metrics should be reportable in a consistent fashion. DOD is currently developing a portfolio of metrics that fall under five key areas: readiness, responsiveness, reliability, cost, and planning and precision. Some metrics that have been identifiedsuch as customer wait timeare currently reported by DOD, while others would be new metrics that would require establishing a data source and methodology. However, the Plan does not include steps to incorporate the metrics, including their methodologies, into DOD guidance. Without guidance specifying standardized definitions, methodologies, and procedures for data collection procedures, DODs efforts to employ metrics to monitor and evaluate inventory management performance may be hampered.
Finally, DOD achieved about $710 million in cost avoidances reducing excess inventory in fiscal year 2010, and plans to reduce funding for the purchase of items by $365 million between fiscal year 2012 and 2016. Additionally, DOD completed about $140 million in lateral redistributions and procurement offsets in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, which prevented the acquisition of additional items.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD periodically re-examine its targets for on-hand and on-order excess inventory; and develop guidance to establish a set of metrics including standardized definitions and calculations that are then employed to monitor its inventory management practices. DOD concurs with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-803T | gao_GAO-15-803T_0 | Many of these activities may be subject to legal challenge.and Clean Water Act require EPA to take certain actions, such as issuing rules, to implement provisions of the law within certain statutorily designated time frames, and EPA is subject to legal challenge for not taking the mandatory actions by the required deadline. Second, the major environmental statutes typically include judicial review provisions authorizing citizens to challenge certain EPA actions, such as promulgating regulations or issuing permits. Third, the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes challenges to certain agency actions that are considered final actions, such as rulemakings and decisions on permit applications. FWS is responsible for administering the Endangered Species Act for freshwater and land species. According to EPA and Justice officials, when a deadline suit is filed, the agencies work together to determine how to respond to the lawsuit, including whether or not to negotiate a settlement with the plaintiff to issue a rule by an agreed upon deadline or allow the lawsuit to proceed. The Number of Environmental Litigation Cases against EPA and Their Associated Costs Varied with No Discernible Trend, and Information on FWS Lawsuits Is Limited
As discussed in our August 2011 report, the number of environmental litigation cases brought against EPA each year from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2010 varied with no discernible trend. Similarly, data available from Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and EPA show that the costs associated with environmental litigation cases against EPA have varied from year to year for fiscal years 1998 through 2010, averaging at least $3.6 million per year with no discernible trend. Information regarding lawsuits against FWS is limited, with FWS data showing that the agency paid about $1.6 million in 26 cases from fiscal years 2004 through 2010. As shown in figure 2, most cases against EPA were brought under the Clean Air Act, which represented about 59 percent of the approximately 2,500 cases that were filed during the 16-year period of our August 2011 report (i.e., fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2010). Cases filed under the Clean Water Act represented the next largest group of cases (20 percent), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act represented the third largest group of cases (6 percent). According to the stakeholders we interviewed for our August 2011 report, a number of factors—particularly a change in presidential administration, the passage of regulations or amendments to laws, and EPA’s failure to meet statutory deadlines—affect plaintiffs’ decisions to bring litigation against EPA. In addition, owing to statutory requirements to pay certain successful plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs, Treasury paid a total of about $15.5 million to prevailing plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs related to these cases for fiscal years 2003 through 2010, averaging about $2 million per year. EPA paid a total of $1.5 million from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010 in attorney fees and costs, averaging about $305,000 per year. Settlements in EPA Deadline Suits Established a Schedule for Issuing Rules, and according to EPA Officials, These Settlements Primarily Impacted a Single EPA Office
In December 2014, we reported that the terms of settlements in deadline suits that resulted in EPA issuing major rules from May 31, 2008, through June 1, 2013, established a schedule for issuing rules. Specifically, the settlements were to either promulgate a statutorily required rule or make a determination that doing so is not appropriate or necessary pursuant to the relevant statutory provision. They were all Clean Air Act rules. Of the 32 major rules that EPA issued from May 31, 2008 to June 1, 2013, 9 rules following seven settlements in deadline suits were Clean Air Act rules. According to EPA Officials, Settlements in Deadline Suits Primarily Affected Rulemaking Priorities in a Single EPA Office
According to EPA officials interviewed for our December 2014 report, settlements in deadline suits primarily affected a single office within EPA—the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS)— because most deadline suits were based on provisions of the Clean Air Act for which that office is responsible. These provisions have recurring deadlines requiring EPA to set standards and to periodically review—and revise as appropriate or necessary—those standards. OAQPS sets these standards through the rulemaking process. OAQPS officials said that deadline suits affect the timing and order in which rules are issued by the National Ambient Air Quality Standards program and the Air Toxics program, but not which rules are issued. Available data did not show discernible trends in the number of cases or costs associated with the litigation against EPA and there was limited information on FWS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, allow citizens to file suit against EPA to challenge certain agency actions, such as issuing regulations or rules. Such laws also require EPA to take certain actions, such as issuing rules, to implement provisions of the law within certain statutorily designated time frames. Citizens can sue EPA to compel the agency to take required actions, such as issuing a rule on time, in lawsuits often called deadline suits. EPA can negotiate a settlement to issue a rule by an agreed upon deadline.
Where EPA is named as a defendant, Justice provides EPA's legal defense. If successful, plaintiffs may be paid for certain attorney fees and costs. Payments are made from Treasury's Judgment Fund or EPA's appropriations.
Under the Endangered Species Act, FWS also faces lawsuits over its regulations and actions to carry out the act. As with EPA, Justice defends suits against FWS in court.
This testimony is based on GAO reports issued from August 2011 through December 2014 about litigation directed at EPA and FWS. It focuses on (1) information on cases and associated costs, as available, for EPA and FWS and (2) information on the impact of deadline cases on EPA rulemaking.
GAO did not make recommendations in the reports on which this testimony is based and is not making any in this testimony.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in August 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faces legal challenges implementing the nation's key environmental laws. The number of environmental litigation cases brought against EPA each year for fiscal years 1995 through 2010 varied with no discernible trend. Data available from the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and EPA show that the costs associated with such cases against EPA have also varied from year to year with no discernible trend. Specifically,
Justice staff defended EPA on an average of about 155 such cases each year from fiscal years 1995 through 2010, for a total of about 2,500 cases during that time. Most cases were filed under the Clean Air Act (59 percent of cases) and the Clean Water Act (20 percent of cases).
According to stakeholders GAO interviewed, a number of factors—particularly a change in presidential administrations, new regulations or amendments to laws or EPA's not meeting statutorily required deadlines—affected environmental litigation.
Justice spent at least $46.9 million, averaging $3.6 million annually, to defend EPA in court from fiscal years 1998 through 2010. In addition, owing to statutory requirements to pay certain successful plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs, the Treasury paid about $15.5 million from fiscal years 2003 through 2010—averaging about $2 million per fiscal year—to plaintiffs in environmental cases. EPA paid approximately $1.5 million from fiscal years 2006 through 2010—averaging about $305,000 per fiscal year—to plaintiffs for environmental litigation claims. (All amounts are in constant 2015 dollars.)
As one of the primary agencies responsible for implementing the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) faces litigation over its regulations and actions to carry out provisions of the act. In April 2012, GAO reported that FWS did not use a data system to track cases and associated fees and costs it paid. As a result, information regarding cases against FWS and associated costs was limited, with FWS data showing that the agency paid about $1.6 million in 26 cases from fiscal years 2004 through 2010.
As GAO reported in December 2014, of the 32 major rules that EPA stated it promulgated from May 31, 2008 to June 1, 2013, nine were issued following seven settlements in deadline lawsuits, all under the Clean Air Act. The terms of the settlements in these deadline suits established a schedule to issue a statutorily required rule(s) or to issue a rule(s) unless EPA determined that doing so was not appropriate or necessary pursuant to the relevant statutory provision. None of the seven settlements included terms that finalized the substantive outcome of a rule. The impact of settlements in deadline suits on EPA's rulemaking priorities was limited primarily to one office within EPA—the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS)—because most deadline suits are based on provisions of the Clean Air Act for which that office is responsible. These provisions have recurring deadlines requiring EPA to set standards and to periodically review—and revise as necessary—those standards. OAQPS sets these standards through the rulemaking process. OAQPS officials said that deadline suits affect the timing and order in which rules are issued. |
gao_GAO-02-710 | gao_GAO-02-710_0 | Within this range of frequencies, FAA currently has 524 channels available for air traffic services. Agency and industry representatives agree that it is not possible to precisely predict when the existing system with its planned improvements will no longer meet aviation’s needs. To Help Ensure NEXCOM Will Meet Future Communications Needs, FAA Has Collaborated with the Aviation Industry to Assess Alternative Technologies
In consultation with stakeholders from the aviation industry, FAA selected VDL-3 as the preferred solution to meet its future communications needs. For example, while satellite technology is used to provide voice and data communications across the oceans and in remote regions, it is expensive, it does not support the need for direct aircraft-to-aircraft communications, and does not meet international standards for air traffic control communications. FAA Needs to Resolve Three Key Issues Before It Can Make a Final Decision on the Technology for NEXCOM
Before selecting VDL-3 as the technology for NEXCOM, FAA needs to demonstrate the technical and operational merits of VDL-3, certify VDL-3 as a “safety critical system,” and prove its cost-effectiveness to the aviation industry. Because communications are critical to ensuring safe aircraft operations, FAA is developing a process to certify that VDL-3 and the new equipment it requires could be used in the National Airspace System. The Product Team Lead for Air/Ground Voice Communications and officials from Spectrum Policy and Management, FAA, indicated that they generally agreed with the facts and recommendation. | What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides air-ground voice and data communications for pilots and air traffic controllers to safely coordinate all flight operations, ground movement of aircraft at airports, and in-flight separation distances between aircraft. However, the anticipated growth in air traffic, coupled with FAA's efforts to reduce air traffic delays and introduce new air traffic services, will create a demand for additional channels of voice communications that FAA's current system cannot provide. FAA and the aviation industry agree that the existing communications system, even with enhancements, cannot meet aviation's expanding need for communications. To ensure that the technology it wants to use for Next Generation Air/Ground Communications (NEXCOM) will meet its future needs, FAA, in collaboration with the aviation industry, conducted a comparative analysis of numerous technologies, to assess each one's ability to meet technical requirements, minimize program risk, and meet the agency's schedule. However, before making a final decision on the technology for NEXCOM, FAA will need to efficiently address three major issues: whether the preferred technology is technically sound and will operate as intended, if the preferred technology and the equipment it requires can be certified as safe for use in the National Airspace System, and whether it is cost effective for users and the agency. |
gao_GAO-03-148T | gao_GAO-03-148T_0 | However, as shown in figure 1, the Navy’s average delinquency rate was nearly identical to the Army’s, which, as we have previously testified, is the highest delinquency rate in the government. The Navy’s quarterly delinquency rate fluctuated from 10 to 18 percent, and on average was about 6 percentage points higher than that of federal civilian agencies. The high level of delinquencies and charge-offs have also cost the Navy millions of dollars in lost rebates, higher fees, and substantial resources spent pursuing and collecting past due accounts. We found that the Navy’s overall delinquency and charge-off problems are primarily associated with young, low- and mid-level enlisted military personnel with basic pay levels ranging from $12,000 to $27,000. During fiscal year 2001 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2002, over 5,100 Navy employees wrote at least one nonsufficient fund (NSF), or “bounced” check, to Bank of America as payment for their travel card bills. Of these, over 250 wrote 3 or more NSF checks, a potentially fraudulent act. These 10 accounts were subsequently charged-off or placed in salary offset or voluntary fixed payment agreements with Bank of America. For the cases we reviewed, we found a significant correlation between travel card fraud, abuse, and delinquencies and individuals with substantial credit history problems. However, ineffective controls over the notification process resulted in the APC not being aware that this had occurred. However, additional preventive solutions are necessary if DOD is to effectively address these issues. For example, we plan to include recommendations that will address actions needed in the areas of exempting individuals with histories of financial problems from the requirement to use a travel card; providing sufficient infrastructure to effectively manage and provide day-to-day monitoring of travel card activity related to the program; deactivating cards when employees are not on official travel; taking appropriate disciplinary action against employees who commit fraud or abuse of the travel card; ensuring that information on travel card fraud or abuse of cardholders with secret or top-secret security clearances is provided to appropriate security officials for consideration in whether such clearances should be suspended or revoked; and moving towards mandating use of the split disbursement payment process. To assess the overall control environment for the travel card program at the Department of the Navy, we obtained an understanding of the travel process, including travel card management and oversight, by interviewing officials from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of the Navy, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), Bank of America, and the General Services Administration, and by reviewing applicable policies and procedures and program guidance they provided. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Department of the Navy's internal controls over the government travel card program. The Navy's average delinquency rate of 12 percent over the last 2 years is nearly identical to the Army's, which has the highest delinquency rate in the Department of Defense, and 6 percentage points higher than that of federal civilian agencies. The Navy's overall delinquency and charge-off problems, which have cost the Navy millions in lost rebates and higher fees, are primarily associated with lower-paid, enlisted military personnel. In addition, lack of management emphasis and oversight has resulted in management failure to promptly detect and address instances of potentially fraudulent and abusive activities related to the travel card program. During fiscal year 2001 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2002, over 250 Navy personnel might have committed bank fraud by writing three or more nonsufficient fund checks to Bank of America, while many others abused the travel card program by failing to pay Bank of America charges or using the card for inappropriate transactions such as for prostitution and gambling. However, because Navy management was often not aware of these activities, disciplinary actions were not consistently taken against these cardholders. GAO also found a significant relationship between travel card fraud, abuse, and delinquencies and individuals with substantial card history problems. Many cardholders whose accounts were charged off or put in salary offset had bankruptcies and accounts placed in collection prior to receiving the card. The Navy's practice of authorizing a travel card to be issued to virtually anyone who asked for it compounded an already existing problem by giving those with a history of bad financial management additional credit.
What GAO Found
Although GAO found that Navy management had taken some corrective actions to address delinquencies and misuse, additional preventive solutions are necessary if Navy is to effectively address these issues. |
gao_GGD-96-158 | gao_GGD-96-158_0 | Otherwise, any comparative analysis of operational costs or quality of service could be skewed. Comparisons of Operational Costs Indicated Little Difference And/or Mixed Results
Four of the five studies (Texas, California, Tennessee, and Washington) assessed operational costs of private and public correctional facilities. The New Mexico study reported equivocal findings, and the Tennessee study reported no difference in quality between the compared private and public institutions. The Texas study did not empirically assess the quality of service at the private correctional facilities. Generalizability of the Studies’ Results
The few studies that have compared the operational costs and/or the quality of service of private and public prisons provide little information that is widely applicable to various correctional settings. Thus, it is important that any study focus on both operational costs and quality of service. The best approach for evaluating operational costs is to study existing comparable facilities, not hypothetical facilities. In this regard, it is important to use multiple indicators or data sources to provide cross-checks. Description of Studies Comparing Private and Public Prisons
We identified five studies completed since 1991 that compare private and public correctional facilities in relation to operational costs and/or quality of service. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed several studies that compared privatized and public correctional facilities in terms of operational costs and quality of service.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) five studies comparing operational costs or quality of service at private and public correctional facilities in California, Tennessee, Washington, Texas, and New Mexico had been completed since 1991; (2) it could not draw any conclusions about cost savings or quality of service, since the four studies that assessed operational costs indicated little difference or mixed results, and the two studies that addressed quality of life reported either equivocal findings or no differences between private and public facilities; and (3) the studies provide little information that is applicable to various correctional settings, since states may differ widely in terms of correctional philosophy, economic factors, and inmate population characteristics. GAO believes that future comparative studies of public and private correctional facilities should: (1) focus on both operational costs and quality of service; (2) evaluate operational costs at existing comparable, not hypothetical, facilities; (3) employ multiple indicators or data sources to objectively measure quality of service issues; and (4) be based upon data collected over several years. |
gao_GAO-02-52 | gao_GAO-02-52_0 | The last three methods use computer-based equipment. FEC Has Developed Voting Equipment Standards but Has Not Maintained Them
While neither FEC nor any other federal agency has explicit statutory responsibility to develop voting equipment standards, the Congress has appropriated funds for FEC to develop and update the standards. Configuration Management. Quality Assurance. Given that no federal or state entity has been assigned explicit authority or responsibility for testing voting equipment against the FEC standards, the Congress may wish to consider what, if any, federal role is appropriate, regarding implementation of the standards, including the accreditation of ITAs and the qualification of voting equipment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) identify Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) role regarding voting equipment and assess how well FEC is fulfilling its role and (2) identify the National Association of State Election Director’s (NASED) process for testing and qualifying voting equipment against FEC’s voluntary voting equipment standards. We provide the relevant elements of this chronology in this report. Requirements for system maintenance, software support, and system transportation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Events surrounding the last presidential election raised concerns about the people, processes, and technology used to administer elections. GAO has already reported on the scope of congressional authority in election administration and voting assistance to military and overseas citizens. This report focuses on the status and use of federal voting equipment standards, which define minimum functional and performance requirements for voting equipment.
What GAO Found
The standards define minimum life-cycle management processes for voting equipment developers to follow, such as quality assurance. No federal agency has been assigned explicit statutory responsibility for developing voting equipment standards; however, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) developed voluntary standards for computer-based systems in 1990, and Congress has provided funding for this effort. No federal agency is responsible for testing voting equipment against the federal standards. Instead, the National Association of State Election Directors accredits independent test authorities who test voting equipment against the standards. |
gao_GAO-16-530 | gao_GAO-16-530_0 | Background
EPA provides financial assistance to a variety of recipients, including states, tribes, and nongovernmental organizations, through assistance agreements such as grants. EPA awards these grants noncompetitively to states in amounts based on formulas prescribed by law to support water infrastructure projects, among other things. Categorical grants. EPA generally awards these grants—which EPA also refers to as continuing environmental program grants— noncompetitively, mostly to states and Indian tribes to operate environmental programs that they are authorized by statute to implement. EPA determines the amount of funding each grantee receives based on agency-developed formulas or program-specific factors. According to EPA data, in fiscal year 2015, EPA awarded about $0.513 billion of $3.95 billion (about 13 percent) of grant funds as discretionary grants. EPA also awarded $0.09 billion of $3.95 billion (about 2 percent) of grant funds to special appropriations act projects for specific drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects in specific communities. Additionally, the environmental results directive calls for EPA program offices to report on significant grant results through reporting processes established by national program managers, such as data submissions to EPA databases. EPA Monitors Written Performance Reports and Program-Specific Numeric Data to Ensure Grants Achieve Results
According to EPA policies and officials, after EPA approves grantee work plans that identify agreed-upon environmental and other results for each grant, grantees generally report information on their progress and grant results to EPA in two ways: (1) submitting performance reports— generally written—that describe the grantees’ progress toward the planned grant results in their work plans, such as using grant funds to provide technical assistance to local officials, and (2) electronically submitting program-specific data—generally numeric—on certain program measures, such as the number of hazardous waste violations issued, which EPA tracks in various program databases. Performance reports. Certain EPA Monitoring Practices Hinder EPA’s Ability to Efficiently Monitor Some Results and May Increase EPA’s and Grantees’ Administrative Burden
Based on our review of the three program offices that award the majority of EPA grant funding, we found that certain EPA monitoring practices in these offices hinder EPA’s ability to efficiently monitor some results and may increase EPA’s and grantees’ administrative burden. Second, EPA collects certain information from grantees twice, once in a written report and once in an electronic database. OGD officials told us that—depending on the availability of funds—they plan to develop a web-based portal for grantees to submit documents, including their performance reports, centrally as part of their new grants management database. Our prior work and EPA analyses of its business processes have shown that duplication of efforts can increase administrative costs and reduce the funds available for other priorities. By identifying grant programs where existing program-specific data reporting requirements can meet EPA’s performance reporting requirements for grants management purposes, the agency can help reduce duplicative reporting for grantees in a manner consistent with EPA’s ongoing streamlining efforts. Third, because grantees submit performance reports in a written format, there are no built-in quality controls to ensure these reports’ consistency with EPA’s directive. However, a 2014 analysis of EPA’s grants management business processes found that EPA relied heavily on manual processes and could incorporate several improvements into its new grants management database system, including using electronic templates to increase information consistency and reduce the administrative burden of manual activities. By incorporating built-in data quality controls for performance reports into its planned web-based portal, EPA could improve these reports’ consistency with the environmental results directive and potentially reduce project officers’ administrative burden in performing manual reviews. Identify grant programs where existing program-specific data reporting can meet EPA’s performance reporting requirements for grants management purposes to reduce duplicative reporting by grantees. Incorporate built-in data quality controls for performance reports into the planned web-based portal based on EPA’s environmental results directive. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awards grants, (2) the federal and EPA requirements and guidelines for monitoring grant and program results, and (3) how EPA monitors its grants to ensure that environmental and other program results are achieved. To examine how EPA awards grants and the federal and EPA requirements and guidelines for monitoring grant and program results, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and EPA’s policies and guidance for awarding and monitoring grants. To examine how EPA monitors its grants to ensure that environmental and other program results are achieved, we reviewed EPA’s monitoring processes for grants in the three program offices that award the majority of EPA grant dollars. 2. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Grants comprised about half of EPA's budget in 2015, or about $4 billion. Through several grant programs, EPA headquarters and 10 regional offices award these grants to a variety of recipients, including state and local governments. EPA provides guidance through directives that seek to ensure the appropriate use of funds and achievement of environmental results or public health protection, among other purposes. GAO was asked to review how EPA monitors environmental and other grant results. This report examines (1) how EPA awards grants, (2) the federal and EPA requirements for monitoring grant and program results, and (3) how EPA monitors its grants to ensure that environmental and other program results are achieved. GAO analyzed relevant federal laws, regulations, and EPA guidance; reviewed processes for ensuring that environmental results are achieved for the three EPA program offices that award the majority of EPA grant dollars; and interviewed EPA officials and officials from eight state environmental agencies—selected based on the amount of environmental funding they receive from EPA.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) generally awards three different categories of grants: formula, categorical, and discretionary. According to EPA data, in fiscal year 2015, EPA awarded the majority of its grant funds— $2.25 billion of $3.95 billion (57 percent)—as formula grants, primarily to states to support water infrastructure based on funding formulas prescribed by law. EPA awarded $1.09 billion (about 28 percent) of its grant funds as categorical grants. These grants were generally awarded noncompetitively, mostly to states and Indian tribes to operate environmental programs. EPA determines the amount of funding each grantee receives based on agency formula or program factors. EPA awarded $0.513 billion (about 13 percent) in discretionary grants for specific activities, such as research. EPA also awarded $0.09 billion (2 percent) in grant funds to special appropriations act projects for specific drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects in specific communities.
Multiple federal and agency requirements and guidelines apply to monitoring grant and grant program results. For example, under EPA regulations, grantees must submit performance reports to EPA at least annually. EPA policies and guidance, such as its environmental results directive, call for EPA program officials to review performance reports to determine if the grantee achieved the planned results and for program offices to report on significant grant results through other processes, such as submissions to EPA databases. EPA incorporates requirements related to grantee reporting frequency, content, and reporting processes into grant terms and conditions.
EPA monitors performance reports and program-specific data from grantees to ensure that grants achieve environmental and other program results. However, GAO found that certain practices may hinder EPA's ability to efficiently monitor some results and increase administrative burden. For example, EPA collects some information from grantees twice—once in a performance report and once in a database—because EPA uses the information for different purposes. GAO's prior work and EPA analyses have shown that duplication of efforts can increase administrative costs and reduce the funds available for other priorities. By identifying grant programs where existing data reporting can meet EPA's performance reporting requirements, the agency can help reduce duplicative reporting for grantees. Also, GAO's review of grantee performance reports found issues that may hinder EPA's ability to efficiently identify factors affecting grantee results. For example, because grantees submit performance reports in a written format, there are no built-in quality controls to ensure these reports' consistency with EPA's environmental results directive. Rather, EPA officials must perform a manual review. A 2014 analysis of EPA's grants management processes found that EPA relied heavily on manual processes and could incorporate improvements into its new grants management database system. EPA officials said they plan to develop a web-based portal for grantees to submit documents, such as performance reports. By incorporating built-in data quality controls, such as required fields, for performance reports into its planned web-based portal, EPA could improve these reports' consistency with the environmental results directive and reduce the administrative burden of performing manual reviews.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that EPA (1) reduce duplicative reporting by identifying grant programs where existing data reporting can meet EPA's performance reporting requirements and (2) incorporate data quality controls for performance reports into its planned web-based portal. In response, EPA agreed with GAO's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-503 | gao_GAO-04-503_0 | III for a detailed description of federal organizations involved in investigating and prosecuting copyright infringement.) Selected Universities Report Taking Action to Reduce Illegal File Sharing on Campus Networks
The college and university officials we interviewed are aware of the use of file-sharing applications on their networks, almost all of them have experienced some problems and increased costs as a result of the use of these applications, and they are taking steps to reduce the use of peer-to- peer file-sharing technology on their networks. University Officials We Interviewed Are Aware of the Use of File-Sharing Applications on Their Networks
All of the university officials we interviewed indicated that their colleges or universities routinely monitor their networks and most of them indicated that the institutions also actively monitored their networks specifically for the use of peer-to-peer file-sharing applications during the 2003 to 2004 academic term. When file downloading was discovered, all the officials stated that enforcement actions were taken against the individuals responsible. These actions included issuing a warning to the user or users, banning them from the network for a period of time, and shaping the bandwidth available for a group of users. These groups use a wide range of Internet technologies—including file sharing over peer-to- peer networks—to illegally distribute copyrighted materials over the Internet. Federal law enforcement officials did not identify any specific legislative barriers to investigation and prosecution of illegal file sharing on peer-to- peer networks. The Deputy Assistant Attorney General also noted that the department’s recently created Intellectual Property Task Force will examine how the department handles intellectual property issues and recommend legislative changes, if needed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) the views of major universities on the extent of problems experienced with student use of file-sharing software applications, as well as the actions that the universities are taking to deal with them and (2) the actions that federal enforcement agencies have taken to address the issue of copyright infringement on peer-to-peer networks, as well as agency views on any legislative barriers to dealing with these problems. Prosecuting Agencies
Department of Justice
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section. | Why GAO Did This Study
The emergence of peer-to-peer file-sharing applications that allow networks to share computer files among millions of users has changed the way copyrighted materials, including digital music, videos, software, and images can be distributed and has led to a dramatic increase in the incidence of copyright infringement (piracy) of these digital materials. These applications enable direct communication between users, allowing users to access each other's files and share digital music, videos, and software. According to a coalition of intellectual property owners in the entertainment industry, an increasing number of students are using the fast Internet connections offered by college and university networks to infringe copyrights by illegally downloading and sharing massive volumes of copyrighted materials on peer-to-peer networks. GAO was asked to describe (1) the views of major universities on the extent of problems experienced with student use of file-sharing applications as well as the actions that the universities are taking to deal with them and (2) the actions that federal enforcement agencies have taken to address the issue of copyright infringement on peer-to-peer networks as well as agency views on any legislative barriers to dealing with the problems.
What GAO Found
The college and university officials we interviewed are aware of the use of file-sharing applications on their networks, almost all of them have experienced some problems and increased costs as a result of the use of these applications, and they are taking steps to reduce the use of these applications on their networks. All of the officials interviewed indicated that their colleges or universities routinely monitor their networks, and most of them indicated that the institutions also actively monitor their networks specifically for the use of these file-sharing applications. When infringing use is discovered, all of the representatives stated that enforcement actions are taken against the individuals responsible. These actions included issuing a warning to the user or users, banning them from the network for a period of time, and managing the bandwidth available for a group of users. Federal law enforcement officials have been taking action to investigate and prosecute organizations involved in significant copyright infringement. These groups use a wide range of Internet technologies to illegally distribute copyrighted materials over the Internet. Federal law enforcement officials did not identify any specific legislative barriers to investigation and prosecution of illegal file sharing on peer-to-peer networks. According to the Department of Justice officials, the department's recently created Intellectual Property Task Force will examine how the department handles intellectual property issues and recommend legislative changes, if needed. |
gao_GGD-95-8 | gao_GGD-95-8_0 | Employment Deposit Experience Holds Lessons to Improve Future Interactions With Stakeholders
Although the final employment tax deposit regulations were well received, certain stakeholders were dissatisfied with various aspects of the process used as Treasury and IRS developed the revisions. IRS officials say that they informally communicate with stakeholders while regulations are being developed. According to Treasury and IRS officials, although regulatory guidance did not require officials to do so, they used some measures of simplicity as the employment tax deposit regulations were revised to make judgments concerning the balance between achieving simplicity and obtaining other regulatory objectives. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether Treasury and IRS developed the employment tax deposit regulations by applying principles from IRS’ Compliance 2000 approach, which is designed to improve voluntary taxpayer compliance, reduce taxpayer burden, and increase IRS’ attention to the needs of those affected by its actions; (2) whether, and, if so, how the process used by Treasury and IRS to develop and revise the regulations could be improved; and (3) how Treasury and IRS officials know when their efforts to develop and revise regulations result in regulations that are sufficiently simple and easy to follow. After Treasury and IRS officials considered the written and oral comments on the proposed regulations, the final regulations were issued on September 24, 1992. These regulations replaced the existing employment tax deposit process with a new one that is considered to be significantly simpler and easier to understand and comply with. Further, under the final regulations, employers can determine their deposit status for an entire calendar year rather than for each quarter. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the revised federal employment tax deposit regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on September 24, 1992, focusing on: (1) whether the Treasury and IRS developed the regulations by applying principles from the IRS Compliance 2000 initiative; (2) how the revision process could be improved; and (3) how Treasury and IRS officials know when their efforts to develop and revise regulations result in regulations that are sufficiently simple and easy to follow.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the new tax deposit regulations are considered to be significantly simpler and easier for stakeholders to understand and comply with than the proposed regulations; (2) the new regulations provide most employers with a fixed deposit rule that they can follow for an entire calendar year; (3) in keeping with Compliance 2000, IRS obtained stakeholders' input throughout the revision process; (4) although stakeholders are satisfied with the final employment tax deposit regulations, certain stakeholders are dissatisfied with various aspects of the regulatory development process; (5) although Treasury and IRS officials are not always able to interact with all stakeholders to the extent the stakeholders desire, Treasury and IRS officials could improve their future communications with stakeholders by directing drafters' attention to stakeholders' concerns; and (6) IRS officials used some measures to gauge the simplicity of the revised regulations and to balance simplicity with other regulatory objectives while revising the employment tax deposit regulations. |
gao_GAO-17-631T | gao_GAO-17-631T_0 | Actions Needed to Address Growth in Improper Payments
Improper payments remain a significant and pervasive government-wide issue. Since fiscal year 2003—when certain agencies began reporting improper payments as required by the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA)—cumulative reported improper payment estimates have totaled over $1.2 trillion, as shown in figure 1. Although primarily concentrated in three areas (Medicare, Medicaid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit), the reported estimated improper payments for fiscal year 2016 were attributable to 112 programs spread among 22 agencies (see figure 4). Opportunities Exist to Improve the Acquisition and Operation of IT and to Address Cybersecurity Challenges
The federal government is projected to invest more than $89 billion on IT in fiscal year 2017. Our work has found that federal IT investments have too frequently failed or incurred cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Our ongoing work has shown that OMB and agencies’ implementation of these recommendation will likely result in billions of dollars in cost savings. Cybersecurity Presents an Ongoing Challenge
In addition to improving the acquisition and operation of IT, opportunities also exist to better ensure the security of federal information systems and cyber critical infrastructure and protect the privacy of personally identifiable information (PII). Challenges Remain in Reducing Unneeded Federal Facilities and Managing the Federal Fleet of Vehicles
In 2003, we added Federal Real Property to our High-Risk List, in part due to long-standing challenges federal agencies face in managing federally owned real property, including disposal of excess and underutilized property. Continuing to maintain these unneeded facilities puts the government at risk for wasting resources due to ongoing maintenance costs as well as lost revenue from failing to sell surplus property. Challenges to Managing the Federal Vehicle Fleet
In fiscal year 2015, federal agencies spent about $4.3 billion on over 640,000 vehicles that agencies own or lease. In two reviews we conducted between 2015 and 2017, we found that selected agencies were spending over $20 million annually on vehicles that may not have been fully utilized. However, given the decentralized nature of federal fleets and our analysis of a small sample of agencies, it is likely that additional cost savings are possible through enhanced agency practices. Ultimately, addressing the federal government’s long-term unsustainable fiscal path will require broad fiscal policy changes to address the imbalance between federal revenues and spending. However, by taking immediate action on government-wide management challenges, Congress and the executive branch can begin to address our fiscal situation by preventing fraud, waste, and abuse and ensuring funds are put to the best possible use. Related GAO Products
2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. Information Technology
Information Technology: Opportunities for Improving Acquisitions and Operations. Federal Software Licenses: Better Management Needed to Achieve Significant Savings Government-Wide. Long-Term Fiscal Outlook
The Nation’s Fiscal Health: Action is Needed to Address the Federal Government’s Fiscal Future. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces a long-term, unsustainable fiscal path based on an imbalance between federal revenues and spending. To put the government on a more sustainable long-term path, policymakers will need to have a broad fiscal plan that considers reducing spending, increasing revenue, or more likely, a combination of the two. While addressing this structural imbalance will require fiscal policy changes, in the near term, opportunities exist to act in a number of areas to improve this situation.
This statement highlights several areas in which the federal government is facing government-wide management challenges and the opportunities to act: improper payments; IT acquisitions, operations, and cybersecurity; and federal real property. This statement draws from GAO's 2017 High-Risk List, the 2017 annual report on fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, and other related work.
Properly managing government resources can help address the federal government's fiscal challenges by preventing fraud, waste, and abuse and ensuring funds are put to the best possible use. Although these actions alone cannot put the U.S. government on a sustainable fiscal path, they would improve both the fiscal situation and the federal government's operations.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work has resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars in financial benefits over the last decade as agencies and Congress acted on its recommendations. However, there are significant opportunities for further action to address government-wide challenges by implementing GAO's recommendations that would result in billions of dollars in additional benefits.
Action Needed to Address Growth in Improper Payments. Reducing payments that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount could yield significant savings. The reported government-wide improper payment estimate for fiscal year 2016 was over $144 billion. This estimate was attributable to 112 programs spread among 22 agencies. Since fiscal year 2003, cumulative estimates have totaled over $1.2 trillion.
Improvements Needed in Information Technology (IT) Acquisition and Operation and in Addressing Cybersecurity Challenges. The government is projected to invest more than $89 billion on IT in fiscal year 2017. However, historically, these investments have frequently failed, incurred cost overruns and schedule slippages, or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Better managing IT could result in billions of dollars in savings and much more efficient and effective government. Opportunities also exist to better ensure the security of federal information systems and cyber critical infrastructure and protect the privacy of personally identifiable information.
Challenges Remain in Reducing Unneeded Federal Facilities and Managing the Federal Fleet of Vehicles. Continuing to maintain unneeded facilities puts the government at risk for wasting resources due to ongoing maintenance costs as well as lost revenue from failing to sell surplus property. In addition, in fiscal year 2015, federal agencies spent about $4.3 billion on over 640,000 vehicles that agencies own or lease. In prior work, GAO found that selected agencies were spending over $20 million annually on vehicles that may not have been fully utilized. It is likely that additional cost savings are possible through enhanced agency practices. |
gao_GAO-12-411 | gao_GAO-12-411_0 | The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), enacted in January 2011, gives FDA new authorities to improve its ability to oversee the safety of imported foods. According to NMFS officials, FSIS did not adequately demonstrate that Salmonella was a significant problem with catfish because data are not available to confirm this hazard. FSIS’s Proposed Program Mirrors Existing Programs, Introducing Overlap and Inefficiencies
FSIS’s proposed catfish inspection program would further divide responsibility for overseeing seafood safety and introduce overlap at considerable cost. In reviewing the proposed catfish program, we identified four areas that raise concerns about the potential for overlap or inefficient use of resources if FSIS were to implement the catfish inspection program: (1) similar HACCP requirements, (2) inspection overlap and unnecessary frequency of inspection, (3) inconsistent oversight of imported seafood, and (4) the cost of implementing FSIS’s catfish inspection program. With the implementation of FSIS’s catfish inspection program, facilities that process only catfish may be inspected by FSIS and NMFS, and facilities that process both catfish and other seafood may be inspected by all three agencies—FSIS, FDA, and NMFS. FDA officials told us FSIS’s continuous monitoring approach is counter to HACCP-based requirements for seafood and not based on risk. However, FSMA gives FDA authority to establish a system to accredit third-party auditors, including foreign governments, to take responsibility for certifying seafood processors or seafood meets FDA regulatory requirements. With comparability assessments, FDA can leverage the work of foreign governments whose food safety systems FDA has determined provide protections that are comparable to those of the U.S. food safety system. FSIS estimates that the implementation of its proposed catfish inspection program would cost the federal government and industry an additional $14 million annually. Moreover, FSIS would oversee a small fraction of all seafood imports to the United States— about 3 percent—while FDA, using its enhanced authorities, could undertake oversight of all imported seafood. Conclusion
To implement the catfish inspection requirement in the Farm Bill, FSIS has proposed a program that seeks to mitigate the primary food safety hazard most associated with domestic and imported catfish, which FSIS identified as Salmonella. With FDA’s new authority under FSMA, the federal government has an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the food safety system of all imported seafood, including catfish, and avoid the duplication of effort and costs that would result from FSIS’s implementation of its proposed catfish inspection program. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To enhance the effectiveness of the food safety system for catfish and avoid duplication of effort and cost, Congress should consider repealing provisions of the Farm Bill that assigned USDA responsibility for examining and inspecting catfish and for creating a catfish inspection program. USDA added that it is committed to completing the rulemaking process on catfish inspection in a manner that is consistent with the 2008 Farm Bill provisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2007, federal oversight of food safety has been on GAOs list of highrisk areas, largely because of fragmentation that has caused inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (Farm Bill) further fragmented the food safety system by directing FSIS to issue catfish inspection regulations. FSIS prepared a risk assessment to determine risks associated with catfish and identified Salmonella as the primary food safety hazard in catfish. The Farm Bill split responsibility for seafood safety between FSIS, for catfish inspection, and FDA, for seafood generally; in addition, NMFS provides fee-for-service inspections of seafood-processing facilities. GAO was asked to examine FSISs proposed catfish inspection program.
What GAO Found
Salmonella was a problem with catfish.
With the implementation of FSISs proposed catfish inspection program, responsibility for overseeing seafood safety would be further divided and would duplicate existing federal programs at a cost. Under FSISs proposed program, processers would implement written sanitation and hazard control plans; FSIS would conduct continuous inspections of domestic catfish processing; and for imported catfishwhich equal about 3 percent of all seafood importsforeign countries would need to demonstrate equivalence to U.S. standards. According to FSIS, implementing this program will cost the government and industry about $14 million annually. If FSISs proposed program were implemented, GAO expects it would cause duplication and inefficient use of resources in several key areas. First, the program requires implementation of hazard analysis plans that are essentially the same as FDAs hazard analysis requirements. Second, if the program is implemented, as many as three agenciesFDA, FSIS, and NMFScould inspect facilities that process both catfish and other types of seafood. Both FDA and NMFS officials stated that continuous inspection will not improve catfish safety and is counter to the use of FDAs hazard analysis requirements, in which systems are most efficiently monitored periodically rather than daily. Third, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) gives FDA authority to establish a system to accredit third party auditors, including foreign governments, to certify imported seafood meets FDA regulatory requirements. FDA officials stated that this new authority complements FDAs existing authority to obtain assurances about the safety of seafood exports from countries with food safety systems FDA determined are comparable to the United States. Under these systems more than catfish could be covered. With FDAs new authority under FSMA, the federal government has an opportunity to enhance the safety of all imported seafoodincluding catfishand avoid the duplication of effort and cost that would result from FSISs implementation of its proposed program.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider repealing provisions of the Farm Bill assigning USDA responsibility for catfish inspection. USDA stated it is committed to completing the rulemaking process on catfish inspection consistent with the 2008 Farm Bill provisions. |
gao_GGD-98-21 | gao_GGD-98-21_0 | To determine what actions had been taken to implement the strategy along the southwest border and whether initial results expected from the strategy’s implementation have occurred, we conducted in-person interviews with officials from six of the nine Border Patrol sectors along the southwest border and telephone interviews with officials from the remaining three sectors. To carry out the priority to strengthen the border, the Border Patrol was to, among other things, (1) concentrate personnel and technology resources in a four-phased approach, starting first with the sectors with the highest level of illegal immigration activity (as measured by apprehensions) and moving to the areas with the least activity; (2) make maximum use of physical barriers to deter entry along the border; (3) increase the proportion of time Border Patrol agents spent on border control activities; and (4) identify the appropriate quantity and mix of technology and personnel needed to control the border. Implementation of the Strategy
INS has made progress in implementing the Attorney General’s strategy to deter illegal entry along the southwest border. In fiscal year 1993, the San Diego and El Paso sectors had the highest levels of apprehensions of illegal immigrants, accounting for 68 percent of all apprehensions along the southwest border. 3). 6). To handle the increased activity, Congress authorized an increase of about 800 inspectors for southwest ports of entry since 1994 (see fig. 8). Prosecutions
The strategy called for increasing prosecutions for immigration related violations. The available data suggest that some of the predicted changes have occurred. Formal Evaluation Based on Multiple Indicators Would Be Needed to Assess Effectiveness of the Attorney General’s Strategy
The Attorney General’s strategy for deterring illegal entry across the southwest border envisions three distinct but related results: fewer aliens will be able to cross the border illegally; fewer aliens will try to illegally immigrate into the United States; and, consequently, the number of illegal aliens in the United States will decrease. We recognize that the results envisioned by the strategy are complex and interrelated and that a rigorous and comprehensive approach to evaluating the results would be challenging and potentially costly. In addition, illegal aliens differ in their mode of arrival. INS has collected data and reported on some, but not all, of these indicators. We recognize that developing a formal evaluation plan and implementing a rigorous and systematic evaluation of the strategy could require a substantial investment of resources, in part because the needed data may not be presently available, thereby possibly requiring support for new data collection efforts. Attorney General’s Strategy to Deter Illegal Entry Into the United States Along the Southwest Border
In February 1994, the Attorney General and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner announced a comprehensive five-part strategy to strengthen enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. The new border strategy involved “prevention through deterrence.” This strategy called for concentrating new resources on the front lines at the most active points of illegal entry along the southwest border. INS will produce the cards. 4. 1. 2. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Attorney General's strategy to deter illegal entry into the United States along the southwest border, focusing on: (1) what the strategy calls for; (2) actions taken to implement the strategy along the southwest border; (3) whether available data confirm the strategy's hypotheses, with respect to expected initial results from the strategy's implementation along the southwest border; and (4) the types of indicators that would be needed to evaluate the strategy.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to carry out the priority to strengthen the detection of and deterrence to illegal entry along the border, the Attorney General's strategy called for the Border Patrol to: (a) allocate additional Border Patrol resources in a four-phased approach starting first with the areas of highest known illegal activity; (b) make maximum use of physical barriers; (c) increase the proportion of time Border Patrol agents spend on border enforcement activities; and (d) identify the appropriate mix of technology, equipment, and personnel needed for the Border Patrol; (2) since the strategy was issued in 1994, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has made progress in implementing some, but not all, aspects of the strategy; (3) at the southwest border land ports of entry, INS has added about 800 inspector positions since fiscal year 1994, increasing its on-board strength to about 1,300; (4) INS and other data indicate that some of the initial results of the strategy's implementation along the southwest border correspond with the expected results stated in the strategy; (5) however, sufficient data were not available for GAO to determine whether other expected results have occurred; (6) INS data indicated that, as a percentage of total apprehensions along the southwest border, apprehensions of illegal aliens have decreased in the two sectors that in 1993 accounted for the most apprehensions and received the first influx of new resources--San Diego and El Paso; (7) the Attorney General's strategy for deterring illegal entry across the southwest border envisions three distinct but related results: (a) fewer aliens will be able to cross the border illegally; (b) fewer aliens will try to illegally immigrate into the United States; and (c) the number of illegal aliens in the United States will decrease; (8) evaluating the overall effectiveness of the strategy for deterring illegal entry would require a formal, rigorous plan for: (a) collecting and analyzing consistent and reliable data on several different indicators related to the three expected results from the strategy; and (b) examining their interrelationships; and (9) although developing a formal evaluation plan and implementing a rigorous and comprehensive evaluation of the strategy may prove to be both difficult and potentially costly, without such an evaluation the Attorney General and Congress will have no way of knowing whether the billions of dollars invested in reducing illegal immigration have produced the intended results. |
gao_GAO-01-426 | gao_GAO-01-426_0 | Recent literature suggests that using the Internet to expand supply sources and compare prices can produce savings. According to the Office of Inspector General’s report on computer acquisitions at DOE’s Idaho laboratory, the contractor there determined that millions of dollars in cost savings were possible if mandatory performance standards for purchasing such equipment were implemented. The laboratory contractor required all departments to comply with the standard. Standardizing the Brands and Models of Computer and Computer-Related Equipment
The Los Alamos contractor could save money if it increased its use of a standard brand of computer and computer-related equipment. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether supplemental funding was being spent in the most economical fashion, we randomly selected 17 items of replacement equipment that had already been purchased for further review. Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Energy | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) received $13.2 million in supplemental funding to replace equipment lost at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the May 2000 Cerro Grande fire. GAO reviewed the practices used by the contractor that runs the laboratory--the University of California (UC)--to determine whether it can benefit from modified purchasing practices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that UC can save money by (1) expanding its supply sources to include suppliers such as the General Services Administration and the Internet; (2) establishing mandatory maximum performance standards for computer purchases to avoid unjustified, costly, and unnecessary capabilities; and (3) increasing its use of a standard brand of computer and computer-related equipment to maximize volume discounts with selected suppliers. |
gao_GAO-04-1012 | gao_GAO-04-1012_0 | Health Coverage Tax Credit. Most Workers Are Enrolling in Services Sooner, but Some May Be Negatively Affected by the Enrollment Deadline
States report that most trade affected workers are enrolling in services sooner than in prior years because of some of the key provisions of the TAA Reform Act, but the new training enrollment deadline has had unintended consequences for some workers. The new 40-day time limit for Labor to process petitions has enabled workers to receive services more quickly after being laid off. But it reduced the average processing time from 107 days in fiscal year 2002, before the new time limit took effect, to 38 days in fiscal year 2003 (see fig. The deadline requires workers to be enrolled in training or have a training waiver by the later of two dates: either 16 weeks after being laid off or 8 weeks after the petition is certified. Labor’s national data indicate that overall states issued over 40 percent more training waivers in fiscal year 2003 than in 2002 (see fig. According to officials in four of the five states we visited, issuing waivers to enable workers to qualify for the HCTC causes a significant administrative workload. Wage Insurance Provision
Officials in all of the states we visited told us either that workers have expressed an interest in or they expect workers to be interested in the new Alternative TAA program—a 5-year demonstration project providing a wage insurance subsidy to older workers who find reemployment quickly but at a lower wage. At this stage of implementation, it is unclear how many workers will take advantage of the wage insurance benefit. States have struggled to meet the higher demand with the TAA resources available to them, and some states have temporarily discontinued enrolling TAA-eligible workers in training, partly because of funding shortfalls. Most states anticipate that in fiscal year 2004 they will have difficulties meeting the demand for TAA training with TAA training funds alone—even though the amount of funds available nationally for TAA training was doubled from $110 million to $220 million between fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Labor has taken steps to improve the accuracy of this information by requiring states to use UI wage records to track outcomes. Furthermore, some find the eligibility criteria for the wage insurance program problematic, for example because the criteria require workers to lack easily transferable skills yet find re- employment without TAA-funded training. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to provide information on (1) how key provisions of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Reform Act have affected program services, (2) what have been the challenges in implementing the TAA Reform Act’s new provisions, (3) whether demand for TAA training has changed, and how states are meeting this demand, and (4) what is known about what the TAA program is achieving. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Reform Act of 2002 consolidated two programs serving trade-affected workers and made changes to expand benefits and decrease the time it takes for workers to get services. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) how key reform provisions have affected program services, (2) what have been the challenges in implementing new provisions, (3) whether demand for TAA training has changed and how states are meeting this demand, and (4) what is known about what the TAA program is achieving.
What GAO Found
Most workers are enrolling in services more quickly than in prior years, partly because of a new 40-day time limit Labor must meet when processing a request, or petition, for TAA coverage. Labor reduced its average petition-processing time from 107 days in fiscal year 2002 to 38 days in fiscal year 2003 after the Reform Act took effect. Also, most states reported that workers are enrolling in training sooner because of a new deadline requiring workers to be enrolled in training by the later of 8 weeks after petition certification or 16 weeks after a worker's layoff. However, this deadline may have negatively affected some workers--especially during large layoffs--as it does not always leave enough time to assess workers' training needs. States reported challenges implementing some new provisions of the TAA Reform Act. Officials in most of the states we visited reported an increased administrative workload from issuing training waivers to allow workers to qualify for the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC)--over 40 percent more waivers were issued in fiscal year 2003 than in 2002. While officials in all the states we visited said workers are or are likely to be interested in the wage insurance provision (Alternative TAA, or ATAA) that supplements the wages of certain workers aged 50 and over, it is still unclear how many workers will take advantage of this benefit. However, some found the provision's eligibility criteria problematic, partly because they require workers to lack easily transferable skills yet find reemployment within 26 weeks of layoff. Demand for TAA training increased substantially in fiscal year 2002, prior to the implementation of the reforms. States have struggled to meet this higher demand with available TAA training funds, even though TAA training funds available nationally doubled between fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Most states have responded by using other federal employment and training resources. Information on TAA program results has been limited, but Labor is making improvements by requiring states to use wage records to track TAA outcomes. Labor also initiated a new, 5-year evaluation study. |
gao_GAO-02-308 | gao_GAO-02-308_0 | To determine whether any obstacles were hampering RHS from referring eligible SFH loans, we interviewed RHS officials and obtained and reviewed relevant documents, including the agency’s debt- referral schedule and Agriculture’s request to Treasury to exempt delinquent SFH loans from referral for cross-servicing for up to a year after liquidation of collateral. We did not independently verify the reliability of certain information that RHS provided to us (e.g., debts more than 180 days delinquent and debts classified as currently not collectible (CNC) and information in RHS’s loan-accounting and loan-servicing systems). Because of a software deficiency that prevented automated identification of direct SFH loans eligible for cross-servicing and an agency plan to obtain an exemption from referring direct SFH loans for cross-servicing, RHS had referred virtually no delinquent SFH loans for cross-servicing as of September 30, 2000. First, the agency included in its reporting of delinquent debts only the delinquent portions of installment loans rather than the total unpaid loan balances as required by Treasury. According to RHS’s debt- referral plan as of the completion of our fieldwork, the agency intends to refer about 30 percent of eligible direct SFH loans to FMS for cross- servicing in fiscal year 2002. In addition, by underreporting direct SFH loan amounts eligible for referral for offset through TOP, RHS is forgoing opportunities to maximize the collection of delinquent debt. We cautioned that the reliability of the amounts reported as excluded needed to be independently verified on a periodic basis. Rural Development disagreed with our findings that RHS has failed to make DCIA a priority and delayed implementation of certain key provisions. We will also provide copies to the secretary of agriculture, the inspector general of the Department of Agriculture, the administrator of the Rural Housing Service, and the secretary of the treasury. | What GAO Found
The Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 seeks to maximize the collection of billions of dollars of nontax delinquent debt owed to the federal government. The act requires agencies to refer eligible debts delinquent more than 180 days to the Department of the Treasury for payment offset and to Treasury or a Treasury-designated debt collection center for cross-servicing. The Treasury Offset Program, includes the offset of benefit payments, vendor payments, and tax refunds. Cross-servicing involves locating debtors, issuing demand letters, and referring debts to private collection agencies. The Rural Housing Service (RHS) has initiatives to ensure the timely referral of all delinquent debt. However, the agency's failure to make the act a priority has left key provisions of the legislation unimplemented and severely reduced collection opportunities. The agency had referred no direct single-family housing (SFH) loans to the Financial Management Service for cross-servicing. Three major factors delayed implementation. First, RHS's loan-servicing system had not incorporated key features necessary to implement the act's referral provisions. Second, RHS did not refer any debts for cross-servicing while pursuing an exemption from Treasury. Third, amounts reported as delinquent and eligible for consideration for referral were materially understated. RHS had not kept the documentation needed to independently verify the accuracy and validity of the exclusion amounts in its certified fiscal year 2000 year-end report. Accordingly, GAO was unable to determine whether RHS had appropriately excluded $182 million of delinquent loans from referral for offset and for cross servicing as of September 2000. |
gao_GAO-01-686 | gao_GAO-01-686_0 | At DFAS Columbus, two offices are involved in collecting contractor debts owed to the government. We found that the debt files did not contain required documentation. In one case, a debt of $17,339 was being pursued as a duplicate payment because two invoices for similar services and amounts were paid a few days apart. The Debt Management Office is not promptly sending the third demand letter. Our investigation of the 10 cases and discussions with DFAS Columbus officials indicate that the Debt Management Office is not making appropriate referrals to the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the Department of Justice. However, in the interim, management commitment and targeted efforts are critical to ensuring that DFAS Columbus collects or resolves delinquent debts by contractors that are unresponsive to the government’s demands. Recommendations
In order to promote more effective and proactive debt collection, we recommend that the Director of DFAS, establish internal controls to ensure that the Debt Management Office validates debts, internal controls to ensure that debt files include all necessary supporting documentation, specific time frames for issuing the third demand letter and procedures to track issuance of these letters against the established time frames, requirements that Debt Management Office personnel engage in direct communications and interactions with contractor officials and others to actively identify and resolve issues related to debts, specific requirements and time frames for referring appropriate debts to the Treasury’s centralized debt collection programs, and procedures for utilizing the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the Department of Justice when debts could involve criminal activities. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the DOD Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Director of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and interested congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments are a long-standing problem throughout the government. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been overpaying contractors by hundreds of millions of dollars each year. For fiscal years 1994 through 1999, DOD contractors returned nearly $1.2 billion that the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) had mistakenly paid them as a result of errors, such as paying the same invoice twice or misreading invoice amounts. Sometimes, however, the contractors do not promptly respond to government demands that the overpayments be returned. The Debt Management Office was created at the DFAS Columbus Center to deal with contractors that are unresponsive to the government's demands that overpayments be returned.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Debt Management Office at DFAS Columbus is not effectively and proactively pursuing collections of debts assigned to it. Specifically, the Office is not (1) taking appropriate action to establish the validity of the debts that it receives for collection, (2) promptly issuing letters demanding payment, (3) actively communicating with contractors or resolving issues related to the debts, and (4) effectively using the Department of the Treasury's centralized debt collection programs to maximize collections and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service to pursue potential fraud. Ineffective and insufficient efforts by the Office are the results of both deficiencies in and lack of adherence to policies and procedures. |
gao_GAO-15-443 | gao_GAO-15-443_0 | Additionally, air traffic control and airline operation centers may be unable to determine an aircraft’s location if communications equipment onboard the plane is damaged, malfunctioning, or has been manually turned off. According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the agency leading the search for the plane, MH370’s flight path includes three distinct sections: 1. an initial stage after takeoff in which the aircraft was under secondary radar, the transponder was operational, and ACARS messages were being transmitted; 2. a second stage in which onboard communications equipment were no longer working and the plane was only being tracked by military radar; and 3. a final stage in which the only available information on the flight’s path comes from satellite communications log data. Several technologies that are already on board most domestic aircraft can be used to meet this standard, although airlines would face some costs to equip if they do not already have those systems or satellite communications equipment. Most Long-Haul Aircraft Are Equipped with Technologies That Can Transmit Location Information, but More Frequent Position Reporting Can Add Costs to Airlines, and Some Challenges Remain
In the aftermath of the MH370 tragedy, the international aviation community has undertaken a number of efforts to improve global aircraft tracking capabilities. The Task Force developed a set of voluntary performance standards to establish a baseline aircraft The tracking capability for all commercial passenger aircraft worldwide.key aircraft tracking performance standards proposed by the Task Force include:
Position reporting every 15 minutes, with capability to increase the reporting rate in response to an emergency. This concept of operations is discussed further below. To help mitigate these costs and enhance tracking capabilities in the near term, aviation stakeholders have offered a number of proposals to enhance flight tracking. ICAO’s Long-Term Framework for Aircraft Tracking during All Flight Phases Proposes Tamper- Proof Autonomous Distress Tracking, but Poses Several Implementation Challenges
In parallel with the Aircraft Tracking Task Force, an ICAO-led Ad-Hoc Working Group on Flight Tracking developed a long-term framework— called the Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System (GADSS)—to ensure that accurate information about the aircraft’s location is known during the sequence of events before and after an accident. This framework is designed to maintain an up-to-date record of aircraft progress and, in the case of a forced landing, the location of survivors, the aircraft, and the flight recorders.Force recommendations on tracking aircraft, but goes further, as described below. assessment of the shortcomings in coordination and information sharing between air navigation service providers and search and rescue authorities is needed. Improvements to Flight Data Recovery Are Starting with Extended Beacons, While Other Proposals May Impose Significant Costs, according to Stakeholders
In response to recent aviation accidents, government, international organizations, and industry have been developing proposals to enhance flight recorder recovery in oceanic regions. Actions Under Way to Extend Battery Life and Introduce Low Frequency Devices Are Intended to Enhance Flight Recorder Recovery in the Near Term
To help address challenges in locating flight recorders and aircraft wreckage in oceanic areas, FAA and other international aviation authorities have taken actions recommended by the French BEA investigating the AF447 accident to enhance ULBs. ICAO and NTSB Have Proposed Flight Data Recovery without Underwater Retrieval, Though Some Stakeholders Identified Concerns for the Commercial Fleet
In addition to enhancing the ULBs to help locate the recorders underwater, governments, international organizations, and industry have been looking at additional changes to improve flight data recovery in oceanic regions, one prescribing a specific technology and another using a performance-based approach. While these technologies are designed to improve flight data recovery, some aviation stakeholders had concerns with installing either of these technologies on the commercial fleet. Infrequency of accidents and success of fixed recorder recovery: One avionics manufacturer and two U.S. domestic airlines that we spoke with questioned the need for deployable recorders given the safety concerns discussed above and the infrequency of aviation accidents. Industry stakeholders cited various potential benefits of triggered transmissions of flight data. Provides data when physical FDR cannot be recovered: Streaming FDR data allows for post-flight analysis in instances where the physical FDR or its data cannot be easily recovered, including cases where a deployable FDR may not be recovered. Concluding Observations
In response to the AF447 and MH370 disasters, the international aviation community is considering short- and long-term steps to improve aircraft tracking and flight data recovery with the goal of enhancing accident investigation and aviation safety. Numerous technologies—including communications systems onboard most commercial aircraft today, flight recorders that deploy from aircraft, devices capable of streaming flight recorder data in real time, and global satellite surveillance systems under development—have the potential to enhance aircraft tracking and expedite flight data recovery in the event of an oceanic accident, and industry continues to develop solutions for these tasks. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOT and NTSB for review and comment. Both DOT and NTSB provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The AF447 and MH370 disasters have raised questions about why authorities have been unable to locate passenger aircraft. In response to these aviation accidents, government accident investigators, international organizations, and industry have offered proposals that aim to enhance oceanic flight tracking and flight data recovery on a global scale. Given the implications for the U.S. commercial fleet, it is essential that the Congress understand the strengths and weaknesses of these proposals.
GAO was asked to review efforts to enhance aircraft tracking and flight data recovery. This report describes (1) the challenges in tracking aircraft and recovering flight data highlighted by recent commercial aviation accidents over oceanic regions; (2) government and industry proposals to enhance aircraft tracking, and how aviation stakeholders view their strengths and weaknesses; and (3) government and industry proposals to enhance the recovery of flight data, and how aviation stakeholders view the proposals' strengths and weaknesses. GAO reviewed reports by government accident investigators and others, and technology presentations by avionics manufacturers, including current cost data, which was not available in all cases. GAO also interviewed 21 aviation stakeholders, including FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and industry, selected based on their expertise in aviation technology and flight operations. FAA and NTSB provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The crash of Air France Flight 447 (AF447) off the coast of Brazil in June 2009 and the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 (MH370) in the southern Indian Ocean in March 2014 highlight several challenges authorities may face in locating aircraft in distress and recovering flight recorders. First, oceanic surveillance is limited, and an aircraft's position may not be precisely known. For example, MH370 continued to fly for several hours outside of radar coverage after onboard communications equipment were no longer working, according to investigators. Additionally, communication and coordination between air traffic control centers in oceanic regions pose challenges. Finally, these accidents show that investigators may have difficulty locating and recovering flight recorders, which are used to determine accident causes, because of the ocean's depth and terrain. For instance, locating AF447's flight recorders took 2 years at a cost of approximately $40 million.
Proposals to enhance aircraft tracking: Following the disappearance of MH370, the international aviation community developed voluntary performance standards to establish a near-term aircraft tracking capability using existing technologies and a long-term comprehensive aircraft tracking concept of operations.
Near-term voluntary aircraft tracking performance standards : An industry task force called for automatic position reporting to airlines every 15 minutes and faster reporting when triggers, such as an unusual change in altitude, are met. According to stakeholders, existing technologies can meet this standard, and many domestic long-haul aircraft are equipped to do so, although some additional ground infrastructure may be needed. However, some airlines may face costs to equip aircraft with these technologies. In the longer term, technologies like satellite-based surveillance may provide global aircraft tracking.
Long-term global aeronautical distress system : The International Civil Aviation Organization has proposed a long-term framework, which is designed to ensure an up-to-date record of aircraft progress and, in the case of emergency, the location of survivors, the aircraft, and its flight recorders. Stakeholders noted that the new framework begins to address the need for improved coordination and information sharing. One component is a tamper-proof distress tracking system, which is not yet available.
Proposals to enhance flight data recovery: Low-cost actions are planned to increase the battery life of the underwater locator beacon—which emits a “ping” to help locate the flight recorders—from 30 to 90 days. In the longer term, two proposals seek to enable flight data recovery without underwater retrieval; however, neither would eliminate investigators' need to recover the wreckage itself or eliminate all search and recovery costs.
Automatic deployable recorders : Designed to separate automatically before a crash and float, deployable recorders may be easier to recover. However, stakeholders are divided on equipping the commercial fleet. Some raised concerns that safety testing is needed and that equipage costs are high and potentially unnecessary given the rarity of oceanic accidents.
Triggered transmission of flight data : Transmitting data automatically from the aircraft during emergencies would allow for some post-flight analysis when the flight recorders cannot be easily recovered. However, some stakeholders raised feasibility and data protection concerns. |
gao_GAO-08-569T | gao_GAO-08-569T_0 | Background
The Joint Strike Fighter is DOD’s most expensive aircraft acquisition program. DOD is expected to develop, procure, and maintain 2,443 operational aircraft at a cost of more than $950 billion over the program’s life cycle. Since awarding that contract, DOD’s last three budget submissions have included no funding for the alternate engine program and DOD has proposed canceling it, stating that (1) no net acquisition cost benefits or savings are to be expected from competition and (2) low operational risk exists for the warfighter under a sole-source engine supplier strategy. Program Cost Estimate Increased Since Last Year
DOD reported that total acquisition cost estimate increased by more than $23 billion since our last report in March of 2007, and $55 billion since the program underwent a major restructure in 2004. JSF Development Program Faces Increased Risks of Further Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
Midway through its planned 12-year development period, the JSF program is over cost and behind schedule. Facing a probable contract cost overrun, DOD officials decided not to request additional funding and time for development, opting instead to reduce test resources in order to replenish management reserves from $400 million to $1 billion. Specifically, the program cost estimate: (1) is not comprehensive because it does not include all applicable costs, including $6.8 billion for the alternate engine program; (2) is not accurate because some of its assumptions are optimistic and not supportable—such as applying a weight growth factor only half as large as historical experience on similar aircraft—and because the data system relied upon to report and manage JSF costs and schedule is deficient; (3) is not well documented in that it does not sufficiently identify the primary methods, calculations, results, rationales and assumptions, and data sources used to generate cost estimates; and (4) is not credible according to individual estimates from OSD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and the Naval Air Systems Command. Additional investment of between $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion may be required should the Department decide to continue competition. While Pratt & Whitney design responsibilities and associated costs may actually be reduced under a sole-source contract, we remain confident that competitive pressures could yield enough savings to offset the costs of competition over the program’s life. Given certain assumptions with regard to these factors, the additional costs of having the alternate engine could be recouped if competition were to generate approximately 9 to 11 percent savings—about 2 percent less than we estimated previously. According to actual Air Force data from past engine programs, including the F-16 aircraft, we still believe it is reasonable to expect savings of at least that much. For example, in the first 4 years of the competition, when comparing actual costs to the program’s baseline estimate, results included nearly 30 percent cumulative savings for acquisition costs, roughly 16 percent cumulative savings for operations and support costs, and total savings of about 21 percent in overall life cycle costs. Our prior work, along with studies by DOD and others, indicate there are a number of non financial benefits that may result from competition, including better performance, increased reliability, and improved contractor responsiveness. In addition, the long term impacts of the JSF engine program on the global industrial base go far beyond the two competing contractors. Concluding Observations
DOD is challenged once again with weighing short-term needs against potential long-term payoffs within the JSF program, especially in terms of the test program and the approach for developing, procuring, and sustaining the engine. We and others believe that the JSF risk reduction plan is too risky—cutting test resources and flight tests will constrain the pace and fidelity of development testing—and additional costs and time will likely be needed to complete JSF development. These actions may postpone events, but a major restructuring appears likely—we expect DOD will need more money and time to complete development and operational testing, which will delay the full- rate production decision. Likewise, the way forward for the JSF engine acquisition strategy entails one of many critical choices facing DOD today, and underscores the importance of decisions facing the program. Such choices made today on the JSF program will have long term impacts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most expensive aircraft acquisition program. DOD is expected to develop, procure, and maintain 2,443 aircraft at a cost of more than $950 billion. DOD plans for the JSF to replace or complement several types of aircraft in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Given the program's cost and importance, it is critical that decisions are made within this program to maximize its benefit to the nation. This testimony highlights a number of those decisions and impacts. It (1) discusses emerging risks to the overall program, and (2) updates information for GAO's cost analysis of last year regarding sole-source and competitive scenarios for acquisition and sustainment of the JSF engine. Information on the overall program is from our mandated annual report, also issued today. GAO tracked annual cost and schedule changes, reasons for changes, decisions affecting development, and compared DOD cost estimating methodologies to best practices. For the two engines, GAO updated cost data from last year's testimony and made new projections.
What GAO Found
GAO believes recent DOD decisions, while potentially reducing near-term funding needs, could have long-term cost implications. DOD's recent plan to reduce test resources in order to pay for development cost overruns adds more risk to the overall JSF program. Midway through development, the program is over cost and behind schedule. Difficulties in stabilizing aircraft designs and the inefficient manufacturing of test aircraft have forced the program to spend management reserves much faster than anticipated. To replenish this reserve, DOD officials decided not to request additional funding and time for development at this time, but opted instead to reduce test resources. GAO believes this plan will hamper development testing while still not addressing the root causes of related cost increases. While DOD reports that total acquisition costs have increased by $55 billion since a major restructuring in 2004, GAO and others in DOD believe that the cost estimates are not reliable and that total costs will be much higher than currently advertised. Another restructuring appears likely--GAO expects DOD will need more money and time to complete development and operational testing, which will delay the full-rate production decision and the fielding of capabilities to the warfighter. This year, DOD is again proposing cancellation of the JSF alternate engine program. The current estimated remaining life cycle cost for the JSF engine program under a sole-source scenario is $54.9 billion. To ensure competition by continuing the JSF alternate engine program, an additional investment of about $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion may be required. However, potential advantages from a competitive strategy could result in savings equal to or exceeding that amount across the life cycle of the engine. GAO's updated cost analysis suggests that a savings of 9 to 11 percent--about 2 percent less than what GAO estimated last year--would recoup that investment. Also, as we noted last year, prior experience indicates that it is reasonable to assume that competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at least that much. Further, non financial benefits in terms of better engine performance and reliability, more responsive contractors, and improved industrial base stability are more likely outcomes under a competitive environment than under a sole-source strategy. While cancellation of the program provides needed funding in the near term, recent test failures for the primary JSF engine underscore the importance and long-term implications of DOD decision making with regard to the ultimate engine acquisition approach. |
gao_GAO-12-517 | gao_GAO-12-517_0 | DOJ Grant Programs Overlap, Contributing to the Risk of Unnecessarily Duplicative Grant Awards for the Same or Similar Purposes
DOJ’s Grant Solicitations Overlap across 10 Key Justice Areas
We reviewed all 253 of the fiscal year 2010 grant solicitations that OJP, OVW, and the COPS Office published on their respective websites and found overlap across 10 justice areas—as table 2 illustrates. Within the justice areas, a variety of activities—including research, direct service provision, or technical assistance—can be conducted. For example, 56 of DOJ’s 253 grant solicitations—or more than 20 percent—were providing grant funds available for activities related to victim assistance or to support the research and prevention of violence against women. After reviewing a sample of 26 grant applications from recipients who received funds from grant programs we identified as having similar purpose areas, we found instances where applicants used the same or similar language to apply for multiple streams of funding. For example, one grant recipient applied for funding to reduce child endangerment through cyber investigations from both the COPS Office’s Child Sexual and OJP’s Internet Crimes Against Children Predator (CSPP) Program(ICAC) program. In both of these applications, the applicant stated that it planned to use the grants to increase the number of investigations in the state, provide training for cyber crime investigations, serve as a forensic resource for the state, and establish an Internet safety program. In a third instance, an applicant received fiscal year 2010 grant funding for planned sexual assault victim services from both OJP’s Office for Victims of Crime and OVW. The COPS Office hiring grant awarded to this county was for fiscal year 2009. DOJ Has Taken Actions That Address Overlap in Grant Programs but Could Further Reduce the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication in Grant Funding
DOJ Has Taken Some Action to Consolidate and Coordinate Similar Grant Programs
According to DOJ officials, the statutory creation of grant programs with similar purposes requires grant design coordination within and among DOJ’s granting agencies to limit the risk of unnecessary duplication from overlapping programs. DOJ Has Not Assessed Its Grant Programs to Identify and Reduce Overlap
Even with efforts to coordinate its programs, DOJ officials told us they have not conducted a formal assessment or study of their grant programs to determine if and to what extent they overlap and where opportunities exist to more consistently pursue consolidation or better coordinate grant programs. In some instances, DOJ may deem it appropriate for distinct grant programs to serve the same goal, or for one community or grantee to benefit from multiple streams of grant funding. For example, if DOJ granting officials are coordinating their activities across overlapping grant programs and are aware that a grantee is receiving funds from more than one DOJ program, making funding decisions of this kind may be warranted. DOJ Could Benefit from Examining Its Programmatic Grant Monitoring and Assessment Functions and Considering Expansion of OAAM’s Authorities
OAAM Uses Programmatic Grant Monitoring and Program Assessment for Grant Oversight, but Program Assessments Yield Richer Information
The statute establishing OAAM tasked the OAAM Director with selecting and carrying out program assessments of not less than 10 percent of the aggregate amount of grant funding awarded annually by OJP, the COPS Office, and any other grant programs carried out by DOJ that the Attorney OAAM officials told us that to meet the General considers appropriate.directive to conduct program assessments, and in recognition of its own resource constraints, OAAM relies on the programmatic grant monitoring that OJP’s and the COPS Office’s grant staff already conduct. According to OAAM officials, additional program assessments would be beneficial; however, they told us that OAAM does not have sufficient resources to conduct more. Such assessments could provide OVW with more substantive information on its grant programs. As part of DOJ’s evaluation of its grant management systems, DOJ should ensure that it assesses the feasibility, costs, and benefits of moving to a single grants management system, including the steps needed to harmonize DOJ grant processes, so that any variation in how the granting agencies manage their portfolios is not an encumbrance to potential system unification. To examine the extent to which DOJ has taken steps to reduce overlap in its grant programs and the potential for unnecessary duplication in grant awards, we reviewed agency policies, procedures, and guidance on grant program design and award, such as the COPS Office Program Development Team charter and template, and the OJP Grant Manager’s Manual. To analyze the extent to which DOJ uses programmatic grant monitoring and assessment to determine grant program effectiveness and uses the results to enhance its grant programs, we analyzed DOJ documentation, such as assessments DOJ conducted of its own programs and specific programmatic grant monitoring reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since fiscal year 2005, approximately $33 billion has been appropriated to DOJ for the administration of more than 200 federal financial assistance solicitations, such as grants, that support criminal justice activities at the state and local levels. Pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, this report addresses the extent to which (1) overlap exists across DOJ grant programs and if it contributes to the risk of unnecessary duplication in grant awards, (2) DOJ has taken steps to reduce overlap and the potential for unnecessary duplication in its grants awards, and (3) DOJ uses monitoring and assessment to determine grant program effectiveness and uses the results to enhance its grant programs. GAO assessed DOJ’s fiscal year 2010 announcements of grant award funding; categorized them according to key justice areas to identify any overlap; and interviewed DOJ officials about their grant making practices, systems, and assessment methods. Further, GAO interviewed officials from 11 states receiving DOJ grants, selected for the levels and types of funding received. Though not generalizable, the interviews provided their perspectives on funding.
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) grant programs overlap across 10 justice areas contributing to the risk of unnecessarily duplicative grant awards for the same or similar purposes. For example, GAO reviewed all 253 grant award announcements that DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW), and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office published on their websites for fiscal year 2010 and found overlap across the justice areas. For example, 56 of DOJ’s 253 grant solicitations—or more than 20 percent—were providing grant funds for victim assistance and related research. GAO also found instances where applicants used the same or similar language to apply for funding from these overlapping programs. In one example, a grant recipient applied for, and received, funding from both OJP’s Internet Crimes Against Children program and the COPS Office’s Child Sexual Predator Program to provide training for cyber crime investigations and establish an Internet safety program. In some instances, DOJ may deem it appropriate for distinct grant programs to serve one goal, or for one community or grantee to benefit from multiple streams of grant funding. However, DOJ generally lacks visibility over the extent to which its grant programs overlap and thus is not positioned to minimize the risk of potential, unnecessary duplication before making grant awards.
DOJ has taken some actions that address overlap in its grant programs; for example, by requesting statutory authorization in some instances to consolidate programs that are similar. However, DOJ has not conducted an assessment of its grant programs to systematically identify and reduce overlap. Doing so would enable DOJ to identify program areas where overlap may be desirable and where a consolidation of programs may be more efficient. Further, OJP and OVW use a separate grants management system than the COPS Office uses, limiting their ability to share information on the funding they have awarded or are preparing to award to a recipient. According to COPS Office officials, its mission and grant management processes are unique enough to necessitate a separate system. However, OJP officials told GAO that its system has been and can be modified with minimal investment to accommodate different grant processes. DOJ has initiated a study to assess the feasibility, costs, and benefits of unifying the systems among other options. By ensuring that such a study accounts for the effort necessary to harmonize departmental grant processes, DOJ could ensure that variations in such processes do not encumber system unification.
DOJ’s Office of Audit, Assessment, and Management (OAAM) oversees monitoring of grantees’ compliance and conducts grant program assessments to gauge program effectiveness. GAO found that OAAM’s program assessments yield richer information than its monitoring reports because they identify improvement areas. OAAM officials believe additional assessments could be beneficial. They also said they lacked resources to conduct more, but had not conducted a feasibility analysis to confirm this. By OAAM examining its mix of monitoring and assessment activities, including the costs and benefits of current resource allocations, it could better ensure continuous improvement in grant programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the department assess its grant programs for overlap, ensure its comprehensive study of DOJ grant management systems also includes an analysis of steps necessary to harmonize business processes, and examine its mix of grant monitoring and program assessment activities. DOJ agreed with GAO’s recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-218T | gao_GAO-11-218T_0 | Background
As we reported in 2009, more than 5 million third parties submitted more than 82 million miscellaneous income information forms (Form 1099- MISC) to the IRS reporting more than $6 trillion in payments for tax year 2006. The types of payments reportable on a Form 1099-MISC—shown in figure 1—and their reporting thresholds vary widely. By matching 1099-MISCs received from payers with what payees report on their tax returns, IRS can detect underreporting of income including failure to file a tax return. 1099-MISC Information Reporting Increases Voluntary Taxpayer Compliance, Reduces the Cost and Intrusiveness of IRS Compliance Programs, and May Reduce Payees’ Costs of Preparing Their Tax Returns
Third-party information reporting is widely acknowledged to increase voluntary tax compliance in part because taxpayers know that IRS is aware of their income. IRS has long recognized that if payments made to businesses are not reported on 1099- MISCs, it is less likely that they will be reported on payee tax returns. IRS estimated the gross tax gap—the difference between what taxpayers actually paid and what they should have paid on a timely basis—to be $345 billion for tax year 2001, the most recent estimate made. Of this, IRS estimated that $68 billion was caused by sole proprietors underreporting their net business income. In the report, we noted that a key reason for this noncompliance was that sole proprietors were not subject to tax withholding, and only a portion of their net business income was reported to IRS by third parties. The 1099-MISCs are a powerful tool through which IRS can encourage voluntary compliance by payees and detect underreported income of payees that do not voluntarily comply. To help IRS improve its use of 1099-MISC information, we recommended in 2009 that IRS collect data to help refine its matching process and select the most productive cases for review. IRS does not know the magnitude of 1099-MISC payer noncompliance or the characteristics of payers that fail to comply with the reporting requirements. Third Parties Incur Costs to File 1099- MISCs, but Case Study Entities Reported That the Costs of Complying with Current Requirements Were Relatively Low
Existing information reporting requirements impose costs on the third- party businesses required to file Form 1099-MISC. In the nine case studies we conducted in 2007, filers of information returns told us that existing information return costs, both in-house and for external payments, were relatively low. While these nine case studies are not to be generalized to the entire population, they do provide examples of costs and insights from the perspective of organizations of different sizes and from different industries and of organizations filing their own information returns and those filing on behalf of others. One small business employing under five people told us of possibly spending 3 to 5 hours per year filing Form 1099 information returns manually, using an accounting package to gather the information. Two external parties selling services reported prices for preparing and filing Forms 1099 with IRS of about $10 per form for 5 forms to about $2 per form for 100 forms, with one of them charging about $0.80 per form for 100,000 forms. These prices do not include the payers’ recordkeeping costs. According to IRS, advisory group members, and others we interviewed for our 2009 report, payers are confronted with a variety of impediments to preparing and submitting 1099-MISC forms. Opportunities Exist to Mitigate the Burden and Promote Reporting Compliance for Third Parties Submitting 1099-MISC Information Returns
Although businesses will face additional costs for each additional Form 1099, some options for modifying the 1099-MISC reporting requirements could help mitigate the burden and promote payer reporting compliance. Some options to change 1099-MISC reporting requirements require congressional action, and other options would be costly for IRS to implement. To reduce the submission burden facing many payers submitting small numbers of 1099-MISCs, we also recommended that IRS evaluate the cost- effectiveness of eliminating or relaxing the red ink requirement to allow payers to submit computer-generated black and white 1099-MISCs. Our prior work did not assess requiring 1099-MISC reporting on payments for goods. | Why GAO Did This Study
Third parties, often businesses, reported more than $6 trillion in miscellaneous income payments to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in tax year 2006 on Form 1099-MISC. Payees are to report this income on their tax returns. It has been long known that if these payments are not reported on 1099-MISCs, it is less likely that they will be reported on payee tax returns. In 2010, the reporting requirements were expanded to cover payments for goods and payments to corporations, both previously exempt, beginning in 2012. This testimony summarizes recent GAO reports and provides information on (1) benefits of the current requirements in terms of improved compliance by taxpayers and reduced taxpayer recordkeeping, (2) costs to the third-party businesses of the current 1099-MISC reporting requirement, and (3) options for mitigating the reporting burden for third-party businesses. GAO has not assessed the expansion of 1099-MISC reporting to payments for goods.
What GAO Found
Information reporting is a powerful tool for encouraging voluntary compliance by payees and helping IRS detect underreported income. Also, information reporting may sometimes reduce taxpayers' costs of preparing their tax returns, although by how much is not known. IRS estimated that $68 billion of the annual $345 billion gross tax gap for 2001, the most current available estimate, was caused by sole proprietors underreporting their net business income. A key reason for this noncompliance was that sole proprietors were not subject to tax withholding and only a portion of their net business income was reported to IRS by third parties. The benefits from information reporting are affected by payers' compliance with reporting requirements and IRS's ability to use the information in its process that matches third-party data with tax returns. However, IRS does not have estimates of the number or characteristics of payers that fail to submit 1099-MISCs as required. To improve its use of 1099-MISC information, IRS has collected data to help identify ways to refine its matching process and select the most productive cases for review, as GAO recommended in 2009. Current 1099-MISC requirements impose costs on the third parties required to file them. The magnitude of these costs is not easily estimated because payers generally do not track these costs separate from other accounting costs. In nongeneralizable case studies conducted in 2007 with four payers and five vendors that file information returns on behalf of their clients, GAO was told that existing information return costs were relatively low. One small business employing under five people told GAO of possibly spending 3 to 5 hours per year filing Form 1099 information returns manually, using an accounting package to gather the information. Two vendors reported prices for preparing and filing Forms 1099 of about $10 per form for 5 forms to about $2 per form for 100 forms, with one charging about $0.80 per form for 100,000 forms. However, these prices did not include clients' recordkeeping costs. Payers face a variety of impediments preparing and submitting 1099-MISC forms, including complex rules and an inconvenient submission process. For example, payers must determine whether payees are incorporated, must get the payees' taxpayer identification number, and must use special forms if filing on paper. A variety of options exist for mitigating the costs of filing Form 1099-MISC. Most have pros and cons. IRS has already exempted payments, including those paid by credit card, which will be reported to IRS by other means. Other options include improving IRS guidance and education; adding a check-the-box question to business tax forms that would force return preparers to ask their clients whether they have complied with 1099-MISC reporting requirements; waiving late submission penalties for first-time payers; raising the payment reporting threshold; initially limiting the types of payments covered; having IRS develop an online filing capability; and allowing paper filers to submit computer-generated black and white 1099-MISCs rather than IRS's printed forms.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony. In 2009, GAO suggested that Congress consider requiring payers to report service payments to corporations. GAO did not study reporting of payments for goods. Other prior GAO recommendations included ways for IRS to improve its use of 1099-MISC information received. IRS agreed with six of eight recommendations and is taking action to address them. |
gao_RCED-98-46 | gao_RCED-98-46_0 | DOE Seeks Reductions in Plutonium Stockpiles, but Disposition Program Faces Uncertainties
U.S. executive branch officials told us that the United States and Russia should ultimately reduce their plutonium stockpiles to equivalent levels. Furthermore, Russia may not have the financial resources to implement its program in a time frame that would be comparable to the U.S. disposition schedule. In January 1997, DOE formally announced that it would pursue two technologies to convert excess plutonium to safer, more proliferant-resistant forms. On the basis of preconceptual design data and preliminary plans, DOE estimates that implementing its plutonium disposition program—excluding long-term storage—will cost approximately $2.2 billion. DOE officials told us that, in their opinion, a U.S.-only plutonium disposition program would not be supported by the Congress because it could put the United States at a strategic disadvantage. Disposition Technologies Have Not Been Demonstrated on a Large Scale in the United States
DOE’s plutonium disposition program is expected to be completed in about 25 years but faces technological uncertainties that could increase program costs and time frames because neither disposition technology has been demonstrated on an industrial scale in the United States. Uncertainties Facing the Implementation of a Plutonium Disposition Program in Russia
According to U.S. executive branch officials, Russia’s plutonium disposition efforts are not as advanced as U.S. activities and face impediments, including Russia’s ongoing production of weapons-grade plutonium. According to DOE, the costs for the disposition of about 50 metric tons of plutonium in Russia could range from $1 billion to $2 billion. U.S. Officials Recognize a Bilateral Plutonium Disposition Agreement Is Needed
According to officials from DOE, the Department of State, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, an agreement between the United States and Russia on plutonium disposition should be negotiated before large-scale expenditures are made for U.S. disposition facilities. These officials said that a bilateral agreement should address such major issues as the following: the quantities of plutonium to be dispositioned by both countries and the amounts of plutonium that will remain in their respective military stockpiles; the dates when both sides plan to complete the dispositioning of their excess plutonium; the methods to ensure that plutonium and disposition facilities are properly safeguarded to reduce the risks of diversion and/or theft; the assurances that the plutonium to be dispositioned will be subject to verification and inspection measures; the assurances that the facilities to fabricate MOX fuel will only be used for plutonium disposition until all declared excess weapons plutonium is processed through them and that spent nuclear fuel will not be reprocessed and recycled for continued use in civilian nuclear power reactors as long as Russia has surplus stocks of weapons plutonium; and the funding arrangements. U.S. Views on Impact of DOE’s Plutonium Disposition Program Differ
Representatives of the U.S. government, private industry, and nongovernmental groups have differing views about the potential effects of DOE’s plutonium disposition program on nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, there is a concern that Western assistance would help create a MOX fuel industry in Russia that does not now exist and would increase the risk of the diversion or the theft of nuclear material. Furthermore, the U.S. program depends heavily on Russia’s adoption of a similar program that also faces many impediments. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Because of the uncertainties about Russia’s commitment to implement a program similar to the U.S. program, the Congress may wish to consider linking DOE’s future funding requests for large-scale projects to design and construct plutonium disposition facilities in the United States and Russia to the progress being made in negotiating and signing a bilateral agreement. U.S. Nuclear Weapons That Are Sources of Plutonium for DOE’s Disposition Plan
DOE’s programmatic environmental impact statement for plutonium disposition analyzes the disposition of about 50 metric tons of excess weapons-usable plutonium over the next 25 years. Russia’s A. DOE is placing significant resources in this program and plans to contribute $40 million to $80 million over the next 5 to 7 years for research and development and for the design and the construction of a pilot-scale plutonium conversion facility in Russia. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the goals of the Department of Energy's (DOE) plutonium disposition program and the impediments facing its implementation; (2) U.S. government officials' views on the importance of a U.S.-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition and the status of efforts to negotiate an agreement; (3) the costs to implement plutonium disposition programs in the United States and Russia; (4) experts' views about the potential nonproliferation impacts of the U.S. plutonium disposition program; and (5) surplus nuclear weapons that are among the sources of plutonium for DOE's disposition plan.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE's plutonium disposition program seeks to decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation by reducing U.S. plutonium stockpiles by about half over the next 25 years and by influencing Russia to take reciprocal actions, with the goal of reducing Russia's stockpiles to U.S. levels; (2) achieving these mutual reductions is a challenge because DOE's immobilization and mixed oxide fuel technologies have not yet been demonstrated on an industrial scale in the United States, and licensing, regulatory, and environmental issues will need to be addressed for both options; (3) the Russian plutonium stockpile is estimated to be about twice as large as the U.S. stockpile, and Russia may not have the financial resources to implement its program in a time frame comparable to that of the United States; (4) according to some U.S. executive branch officials, the success of the U.S. plutonium disposition program depends on Russia's implementing a similar program because a U.S.-only program could be seen as putting the United States at a strategic disadvantage and would not be supported by Congress or the international community; (5) executive branch officials told GAO that a plutonium disposition agreement between the United States and Russia should be negotiated before large-scale expenditures are made for U.S. plutonium disposition facilities; (6) no formal negotiations have begun to implement such an agreement; (7) DOE's preliminary estimates indicate that implementing the U.S. disposition program, which focuses on two technologies to convert plutonium to safer, more proliferant-resistant forms, could cost approximately $2.2 billion over the next 25 years; (8) the cost for a similar program in Russia could range between $1 billion and $2 billion, according to DOE's estimates; (9) U.S. assistance to Russia's program is expected to total between $40 million and $80 million over the next 5 to 7 years and includes plans to construct a pilot-scale plutonium conversion facility; (10) differing views exist about the potential nuclear nonproliferation impacts of DOE's plutonium disposition program and include: (a) a contention that DOE's consideration of burning plutonium in commercial nuclear reactors may pave the way for plutonium recycling and reverse a long-standing policy; and (b) a concern that an industry for mixed oxide fuel would be created in Russia that would increase opportunities for diversion and theft of nuclear materials; and (11) Department of State officials state that these and other issues will have to be addressed in a future binding agreement with Russia. |
gao_GAO-16-803 | gao_GAO-16-803_0 | 1.) Internal and External Reviews of VHA Organizational Structure
Recent internal and external reviews of VHA operations have identified deficiencies in VHA’s organizational structure and recommended changes that require significant restructuring to address, including eliminating and consolidating program offices and reducing VHA central office staff. In addition to the reviews required by the Choice Act, VHA initiated internal task forces to examine organizational structure changes and make recommendations. VHA Does Not Have a Process That Ensures Recommended Organizational Structure Changes Are Evaluated and Implemented
Despite several critical internal and external reviews, VHA does not have a process that ensures that recommendations resulting from these reviews are evaluated to determine appropriate actions and that any such appropriate actions are implemented. The lack of such processes is inconsistent with federal standards for internal control, which state that management should remediate identified internal control deficiencies on a timely basis. We found instances where VHA task force actions in response to recent recommendations for organizational structure changes were incomplete, not documented, or not timely: Governance task force. For example, the Independent Assessment and the VHA governance task force reports both noted that VHA central office programs and staff had increased dramatically in recent years, resulting in a fragmented and “silo-ed” organization without any discernible improvement in business or health outcomes, and recommended restructuring and downsizing VHA central office. The task force, made up of 18 senior VA and VHA officials, conducted its work over about 6 months but did not produce the detailed implementation plan of the Independent Assessment recommendations it was chartered to create, according to VHA officials. VHA also cannot ensure that it is making efficient use of internal resources allocated to developing and implementing recommendations. VHA Central Office Has Provided Little Monitoring and Did Not Anticipate Challenges for a Recent and Significant Organizational Structure Change, the VISN Realignment
The VISN realignment is a significant change to VHA’s organizational structure; it is the first large-scale reorganization of VISN boundaries since the VISNs were created in 1995. However, VISNs have been implementing this change with little monitoring from VHA’s central office. In addition, VHA did not proactively identify and provide guidance to address challenges VISNs and VAMCs have encountered. These actions are inconsistent with federal standards for internal control concerning monitoring and risk assessment. Specifically, these controls state that management should establish monitoring activities, evaluate the results, and remediate identified deficiencies in a timely manner. In addition, these controls state management should identify, analyze, and respond to changes that could affect the system. This involved decreasing the number of VISNs from 21 to 18 and reassigning some VAMCs to different VISNs. VHA chartered a task force—the VISN Realignment Workgroup—to implement the realignment across the VISNs. “double-encumbered” positions. information technology. It can also help inform future organizational structure changes by offering VHA the opportunity to anticipate challenges and proactively provide guidance to address them. In addition, without adequate monitoring, including a plan for evaluation, VHA cannot be certain it is effectively implementing the ongoing VISN realignment. This process should include the documentation of decisions and assigning officials or offices responsibility for ensuring that approved recommendations are implemented. 2. Conduct an evaluation of the implementation of the VISN realignment to determine whether deficiencies exist that need corrective actions, and apply lessons learned from the evaluation to future organizational structure changes, such as possible changes to VISN staffing models or actions to implement Commission on Care recommendations. In its comments, VA stated that VHA plans to develop processes to ensure organizational structure changes are evaluated and implemented appropriately and to evaluate the implementation of the VISN realignment, with estimated completion dates for the development of these processes by March 2017 and September 2017, respectively. Appendix II: Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) MyVA Regions and the Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) Realignment
VA announced a major organizational initiative in September 2014 called MyVA. 2.) The VISN realignment began in October 2015 and VHA officials anticipate it will be completed, at the earliest, by the end of fiscal year 2018. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO and others have expressed concerns about VHA's management of its health care system. In response, VA initiated a new regional framework to improve internal coordination and customer service, and VHA initiated an effort to realign its VISNs.
GAO was asked to review VHA's organizational structure—the operating units, processes, and other components used to achieve agency objectives. This report examines the extent to which (1) VHA has a process for evaluating recommended organizational structure changes to determine actions needed and implementing them as appropriate; and (2) VHA monitored and provided guidance for implementing the VISN realignment. GAO reviewed VHA documents, reviewed internal and external assessments of VHA, and interviewed officials from VHA central office and all VISNs. GAO evaluated VHA's actions against relevant federal standards for internal control.
What GAO Found
Recent internal and external reviews of Veterans Health Administration (VHA) operations have identified deficiencies in its organizational structure and recommended changes that would require significant restructuring to address, including eliminating and consolidating program offices and reducing VHA central office staff. However, VHA does not have a process that ensures recommended organizational structure changes are evaluated to determine appropriate actions and implemented. This is inconsistent with federal standards for internal control for monitoring, which state that management should remediate identified internal control deficiencies on a timely basis. GAO found instances where VHA actions in response to recent recommendations for organizational structure changes were incomplete, not documented, or not timely. For example, VHA chartered a task force to develop a detailed plan to implement selected recommendations from the independent assessment of VHA's operations required by the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014; according to VHA, the assessment cost $68 million. It found, among other things, that VHA central office programs and staff had increased dramatically in recent years, resulting in a fragmented and “silo-ed” organization without any discernible improvement in business or health outcomes. It recommended restructuring and downsizing VHA's central office. The task force of 18 senior Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and VHA officials conducted work over about 6 months, but did not produce a documented implementation plan or initiate implementation of recommendations. Without a process that documents the assessment, approval, and implementation of organizational structure changes, VHA cannot ensure that it is making appropriate changes, using resources efficiently, holding officials accountable for taking action, and maintaining documentation of decisions made.
VHA central office's monitoring of the Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) realignment—a recent and significant organizational structure change—has been limited, and the office has provided little implementation guidance. In October 2015, VHA began to implement a realignment of its VISN boundaries, which involves decreasing the number of VISNs from 21 to 18 and reassigning some VA medical centers (VAMC) to different VISNs. VHA officials anticipate this process will be completed by the end of fiscal year 2018. VHA officials on the task force implementing the realignment told GAO they thought VISNs could implement the realignment independently without the need for close monitoring. VHA also did not provide guidance to address VISN and VAMC challenges that could have been anticipated, including challenges with services and budgets, double-encumbered positions (two officials in the same position in merging VISNs), and information technology. Further, VHA officials said they do not have plans to evaluate the realignment. VHA's actions are inconsistent with federal internal control standards for monitoring (management should establish monitoring activities, evaluate results, and remediate identified deficiencies) and risk assessment (management should identify, analyze, and respond to changes that could affect the system). Without adequate monitoring, including a plan for evaluating the VISN realignment, VHA cannot be certain that the changes being made are effectively addressing deficiencies; nor can it ensure lessons learned can be applied to future organizational structure changes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VHA (1) develop a process to ensure that organizational structure recommendations are evaluated for implementation; and (2) evaluate the implementation of the VISN realignment to determine and correct deficiencies, and apply lessons learned to future organizational structure changes, such as possible changes to VISN staffing models. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-176 | gao_HEHS-98-176_0 | Among the health care services, the pharmacy benefit is most in demand by military beneficiaries. Accordingly, DOD has taken steps to improve pharmacy program management. 105-85), required us to review DOD’s pharmacy programs, focusing on (1) the adequacy of the information that DOD and its contractors have to manage the pharmacy benefit; (2) the merits and feasibility of DOD and its contractors applying commercial best practices, including a uniform formulary, in managing DOD’s pharmacy programs; (3) the merits and limitations of recent mail-order and retail pharmacy initiatives to secure discounted DOD drug prices; and (4) the potential effects MTF funding and formulary management decisions can have on beneficiaries’ access to pharmacies and TRICARE contractors’ costs. Drugs are chosen for a formulary on the basis of medical value and price. The consequences of not using these commercial best practices more extensively in DOD pharmacy programs are likely significant. Nonetheless, DOD and its contractors lack adequate prescription drug cost and use information as well as integrated pharmacy patient databases needed to effectively manage beneficiaries’ pharmaceutical benefits. Because of such problems as well as formularies that differ among its pharmacy programs, DOD is unable to fully apply proven PBM practices that could save hundreds of millions of dollars each year. The recent DOD mail-order program and retail pharmacy initiative, aimed at achieving savings by using DAPA prices, could cause financial and other problems for TRICARE contractors because pharmacy care would be separated from the contractors’ management of medical care. Also, efforts to cut MTF costs by dropping some prescription drugs from formularies could reduce beneficiaries’ MTF pharmacy access and increase other MTFs’ and potentially the TRICARE contractors’ pharmacy costs. Such efforts can be particularly hard financially on retirees aged 65 and older who have no outpatient prescription drug coverage under Medicare or any plan. In our view, the problems DOD is experiencing delivering its pharmacy benefit stem largely from the way it manages its $1.3 billion pharmacy programs. Also, DOD must commit itself to managing pharmacy programs as a system and bringing needed reforms to the system. Otherwise, DOD’s pharmacy problems will continue and likely worsen in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) pharmacy programs, focusing on the: (1) adequacy of the information that DOD and its contractors have to manage the pharmacy benefit; (2) merits and feasibility of DOD and its contractors applying commercial best practices, including a uniform formulary, in managing its pharmacy programs; (3) merits and limitations of recent mail-order and retail pharmacy initiatives to secure discounted DOD drug prices; and (4) potential effects the military treatment facilities' (MTF) funding and formulary management decisions can have on beneficiaries' access to pharmacies and TRICARE contractors' costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite ongoing efforts to improve its pharmacy benefit programs, DOD and its contractors lack basic prescription drug cost and beneficiary use information as well as integrated pharmacy patient databases needed to effectively manage military beneficiaries' pharmaceutical care; (2) because of these problems, as well as formularies that differ among its pharmacy programs, DOD is unable to fully apply proven pharmacy benefit manager commercial best practices that could save millions of dollars each year; (3) recent DOD mail-order and retail pharmacy initiatives aimed at achieving savings by using distribution and pricing agreement drug prices could cause financial and other problems for TRICARE contractors because pharmacy care would be separated from the contractors' management of medical care; (4) moreover, MTFs' efforts to hold down costs by restricting the prescription drugs available on formularies could reduce beneficiaries' access to certain prescription drugs at MTF pharmacies and allegedly has increased TRICARE contractors' pharmacy costs; (5) such efforts can be particularly hard financially on retirees over age 64 with no prescription drug coverage under Medicare or any plan; (6) the significant problems DOD is experiencing in delivering its pharmacy benefit result largely from the way DOD manages its three pharmacy programs; (7) rather than viewing the programs as integral parts of a single pharmacy system, DOD manages the programs as separate entities, not taking into account, for example, the merits of establishing a uniform DOD formulary and integrated databases, or the effects that new initiatives, such as implementing a separate mail service pharmacy program, will have on the other programs; and (8) unless DOD begins to manage the various components of the pharmacy programs as a single system, the problems identified will continue and potentially worsen in the future. |
gao_GAO-10-824 | gao_GAO-10-824_0 | Human factors R&D focuses on people as they interact with the design of products. HFREG is divided into three R&D areas: (1) Flight Deck/Aviation Maintenance/System Integration, which develops human performance information that the agency uses in fulfilling its regulatory responsibility and provides to the aviation industry for use in designing and operating aircraft and training pilots and maintenance personnel; (2) Air Traffic Control/Technical Operations, which researches human factors issues with respect to the roles of air traffic controllers, air traffic managers, and maintenance technicians; and (3) general Human Factors Research and Engineering, which attempts to ensure that the incorporation of human factors engineering is explicit, timely, systematic, comprehensive, efficient, and effective. Because of the scope of NextGen, FAA contracted with Volpe to provide a chief system engineer for human factors to identify and help the agency better ensure that human factors issues are integrated into the development of NextGen aviation systems. FAA and NASA Have Several Ongoing Human Factors R&D Efforts That Support NextGen, but a Majority of Experts Suggest FAA and NASA Adopt Additional Measures, Including Strengthening Human Factors Leadership
FAA and NASA Have Undertaken a Variety of Human Factors R&D Efforts and Designated Funding to Support NextGen
FAA and NASA have created and shared planning documents for how the agency will incorporate human factors R&D into NextGen. Over the last 2 years, FAA has also dedicated financial resources specifically to incorporating human factors R&D into NextGen. Experts Cited Suggestions Regarding Human Factors Efforts Supporting NextGen
For the most part, aviation human factors experts we interviewed stated that FAA’s and NASA’s human factors R&D efforts adequately support NextGen. However, a majority of experts offered suggestions for further incorporating human factors issues into NextGen. Improve collaboration of human factors efforts across FAA departments. Furthermore, a September 2008 National Academy of Public Administration’s report identified leadership as the single most important element of success for large-scale systems integration efforts like NextGen. FAA has not prioritized consistently staffing the top two leadership positions within FAA that are formally responsible for human factors R&D. Specifically, the Chief Systems Engineer for Human Factors position has been vacant since the previous chief retired in January 2010. Moreover, FAA did not assign a permanent program director of HFREG for 16 months, from January 2009 until FAA filled the position in June 2010. These positions currently lack the authority to ensure that human factors issues are addressed early and throughout the NextGen system development process. Such authority could mitigate the need to redesign these systems after implementation has begun, which can cause delays and add costs. Some suggest that FAA can meet this challenge by incorporating two elements into its human factors R&D efforts: a cross-agency plan developed in cooperation with NASA to identify, prioritize, and coordinate NextGen human factors issues, and strong and consistent leadership with the authority to not only prioritize human factors issues but ensure that they are taken into account throughout NextGen. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following two actions: create a cross-agency human factors coordination plan in cooperation with NASA, as JPDO has previously recommended, that establishes an agreed-upon set of initial focus areas for research, inventories existing facilities for research, and capitalizes on past and current research of all NextGen issues, and assign a high priority to filling the vacancy of human factors integration lead and structure that position and the program director of HFREG position in a manner that provides the authority to ensure that human factors research and development is coordinated, considered, and prioritized in all phases of NextGen development. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In response to your request, this report provides information on the status of the Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) efforts to incorporate human factors issues into the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). In particular, we sought to identify the extent to which (1) FAA’s and NASA’s human factors research and development (R&D) is coordinated, and (2) FAA’s and NASA’s human factors R&D supports NextGen. We assessed the information FAA and NASA officials provided us regarding their coordination mechanisms by comparing those efforts with recommendations issued by the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)—an interagency organization responsible for planning NextGen. In 2008, JPDO issued a cross-agency gap analysis that found FAA and NASA lacked a cross-agency plan for identifying and addressing priority NextGen human factors issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
To address challenges to the aviation industry's economic health and safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is collaborating with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other federal partners to plan and implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen will transform the current radar-based air traffic control system into a satellite-based system. Pilot and air traffic controller roles and responsibilities are expected to become more automated, thereby requiring an understanding of human factors, which studies how humans' abilities, characteristics, and limitations interact with the design of the equipment they use, environments in which they function, and jobs they perform. FAA and NASA are tasked with incorporating human factors issues into NextGen. As requested, this report discusses the extent to which FAA's and NASA's human factors research (1) is coordinated and (2) supports NextGen. To address these issues, GAO reviewed coordination mechanisms and planning documents and synthesized the views of nine aviation human factors experts.
What GAO Found
While FAA and NASA officials are coordinating their NextGen human factors research efforts in a variety of ways, they lack a cross-agency human factors plan for coordination. FAA and NASA have participated in research advisory committees and interagency research transition teams, signed interagency agreements, and held cross-agency meetings and conferences focused on human factors issues. FAA also created a human factors portfolio to identify and address priority human factors issues but not a cross-agency human factors coordination research plan in cooperation with NASA, as previously recommended by FAA's Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)--an interagency organization responsible for planning NextGen. As a result, FAA has not established an agreed-upon set of initial focus areas for research that identifies and capitalizes on past and current research and establishes focus areas for human factors research and development, among other things. The experts GAO contacted generally agreed that FAA's and NASA's human factors research efforts adequately support NextGen, but made several suggestions, including enhancing human factors research leadership, for further incorporating human factors issues into NextGen systems. FAA and NASA have undertaken a variety of human factors efforts to support NextGen, including, among other things, creating planning documents detailing how human factors research will be incorporated into NextGen and dedicating financial resources specifically to NextGen human factors research. While the human factors experts GAO interviewed stated that these efforts support NextGen, a majority offered the following suggestions for further integrating human factors issues into NextGen: (1) Better ensure that human factors issues are fully integrated throughout the development of NextGen systems. FAA did not do this in the development of past systems, a fact that led to schedule slippages and cost increases. (2) Improve collaboration of human factors efforts within FAA departments. (3) Establish strong leadership. A 2008 National Academy of Public Administration's report identified leadership as the single most important element of success for large-scale systems integration efforts like NextGen. FAA has not prioritized consistently staffing the top two human factors positions. Specifically, the position of the Chief Systems Engineer for Human Factors (now referred to as the human factors integration lead) has been vacant since January 2010. Moreover, FAA did not have a permanent program director of its Human Factors Research and Engineering Group from January 2009 until June 2010. These two positions currently lack the authority to ensure that human factors issues are addressed early and throughout the NextGen system development process to prevent the need to redesign these systems after implementation, which can cause delays and add costs. As a result, FAA may lack consistent leadership with the sufficient authority to not only prioritize human factors issues but ensure that human factors issues are addressed throughout NextGen. FAA should (1) create a coordination plan and (2) give priority to filling vacant leadership positions and provide the positions with authority for prioritizing human factors. FAA agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-97-21 | gao_RCED-97-21_0 | This panel recommended potential urban designees to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. In addition, all of the EZs have included public housing officials and public housing residents in planning and implementing the program. Involvement of Public Housing Officials and Residents
The EZ program requires the participation of various segments of the community, including the residents. The questionnaire asked the survey recipients to indicate the extent to which each factor had helped or hindered the program’s implementation. Factors That Helped the Program’s Implementation
Five factors were identified by more than half of the survey respondents as having helped them plan and implement the EZ program: community representation on the EZ governance boards, assistance from HUD’s contractors (called generalists), enhanced communication among stakeholders, support from the city’s mayor, and support from White House and cabinet-level officials. Factors That Constrained the Program’s Implementation
Six factors were frequently identified by survey respondents as having constrained their efforts to plan and implement the EZ program: difficulty in selecting an appropriate governance board structure, the additional layer of bureaucracy created by the state government’s involvement, preexisting relationships among EZ stakeholders, pressure for quick results from the media, the lack of federal funding for initial administrative activities, and pressure for quick results from the public and private sectors. All six of the urban EZs prepared strategic plans that include a section on evaluation. The benchmarks are revised, as needed, to reflect changes in the community and to include activities that will be performed after the first 2 years of the program. However, HUD and the EZs are not yet measuring performance in a way that allows them to assess how much progress is being made in satisfying the program’s four key principles because they have not yet (1) described measurable outcomes for the program’s key principles or (2) indicated how the outputs anticipated from one or more benchmarks will help to achieve those outcomes. Factors That Have Helped or Hindered the EZs’ Planning and Implementation Efforts
Scope and Methodology
To assess the status of HUD’s implementation of the six urban EZs and to describe the Department’s plans for evaluating the initiative, we interviewed officials from HUD and HHS who were responsible for the EZ program. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) Program, focusing on the: (1) status of the program's implementation in the urban EZs, including the extent to which public housing officials and residents have been involved; (2) factors that participants believe have either helped or hindered efforts to carry out the program; and (3) plans for evaluating the program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the six urban EZs reviewed resemble each other in some ways, but also differ in ways that reflect the diversity of the communities; (2) all of the EZs have included public housing authority officials in planning and implementing the program; (3) many officials involved in implementing the program generally agreed on factors that have either helped or hindered their efforts; (4) in a survey GAO conducted of program participants at the federal, state, and local levels, over half of the 27 program officials who responded agreed that community representation on the EZ governance boards, technical assistance provided by HUD's contractors, enhanced communication among stakeholders, and support from the city's mayor and from White House and cabinet-level officials had helped the program's implementation; (5) conversely, the difficulty in selecting a governance structure, the additional layer of bureaucracy created by the state government's involvement, preexisting relationships among EZ stakeholders, pressure for quick results, and the lack of federal funding for the program's initial administrative activities were frequently identified as factors constraining implementation; (6) HUD required each EZ to prepare a strategic plan indicating how it would satisfy the EZ program's four key principles and required the strategic plan to include realistic performance benchmarks for measuring progress in implementing the program; (7) all six of the urban EZs prepared strategic plans that include benchmarks describing the activities that the EZ planned to accomplish during the first 2 years of the program; and (8) HUD and the EZs have not yet described measurable outcomes for the program's key principles or indicated how the outputs anticipated from one or more benchmarks will help to achieve those outcomes. |
gao_GAO-15-670 | gao_GAO-15-670_0 | The program was intended to help eligible borrowers stay in their homes and avoid potential foreclosures by reducing monthly mortgage payments to affordable levels. modification. Home Affordable Unemployment Program. Treasury Continues Its Efforts to Reach More Borrowers and Address Interest Rate Increases
Treasury Has Disbursed More Than 40 Percent of Allocated TARP Housing Funds
Between February 2009 and May 2015, Treasury disbursed approximately $16.3 billion (43 percent) of the $37.5 billion in TARP funds allocated to support housing programs. 1). Treasury Has Not Fully Assessed the Benefits and Costs of Recent MHA Program Changes
Treasury had taken steps to assess the benefits and costs of the three recent MHA program changes we reviewed but did not fully meet all of the key elements of effective benefit-cost analyses. Treasury officials told us they do consider the benefits and costs of their program changes. Further, program benefits extend beyond individual borrowers to the larger community and are difficult to quantify. 5). Further, according to Treasury officials it is difficult to estimate the number of borrowers that will ultimately receive assistance under HAMP Tier 2 or other programs, given borrowers’ unique situations, the dynamic nature of the housing market, and broader economic forces including changes in unemployment rates and rates of new mortgage defaults. Treasury officials said that the survey’s results confirmed that borrowers responded to performance incentives. Treasury estimated the total cost of the additional incentives at between $4 billion and $6 billion in additional TARP fund outlays, depending on how many potentially eligible homeowners participate and remain current. Further, Treasury does not have a plan for evaluating the effectiveness of the pay-for- performance incentive on HAMP Tier 2, RD-HAMP, FHA-HAMP, and enterprise borrowers. As a result, Treasury will be limited in its ability to adequately determine whether the incentive has helped prevent redefaults after the interest rate increases. Recommendations for Executive Action
To bring greater rigor and efficiency to decisions about the use of federal funds allocated for TARP housing programs, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury develop and implement policies and procedures that establish a standard process to better ensure that TARP- funded housing program changes are based on analyses that comprehensively and consistently meet the key elements of benefit-cost analysis. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to a provision in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), this report examines (1) the status of TARP-funded housing programs and (2) the extent to which Treasury’s analytic framework for considering recent program changes was consistent with federal guidance and best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Treasury has allocated $37.5 billion in TARP funds to help struggling homeowners avoid potential foreclosure since 2009. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 includes a provision for GAO to report every 60 days on TARP activities. This 60-day report examines (1) the status of TARP-funded housing programs and (2) the extent to which Treasury's analytic framework for considering recent program changes was consistent with federal guidance and best practices. To do this work, GAO analyzed borrower participation levels, reviewed program documentation, and interviewed Treasury officials.
What GAO Found
Between February 2009 and May 2015, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) disbursed approximately $16.3 billion of the $37.5 billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds allocated to support housing programs. The number of new borrowers with permanent modifications added to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), the key component of these programs, began to decline in late 2013 but has stabilized at between 9,000 and 15,000 additions per month. Activity under HAMP Tier 1, the original modification for qualified borrowers seeking to reduce their mortgage payments to affordable levels (rates periodically reset), has gradually declined. HAMP Tier 2, a broader fixed rate modification announced in 2012, has gradually grown to account for the majority of new entrants. Since October 2014, Treasury has expanded incentives in order to draw new entrants into the programs and further assist existing participants.
In making program changes, Treasury took steps to assess their benefits and costs but did not fully meet all of the key elements of federal benefit-cost analysis guidance, and thus has limited assurance that the additional expenditures are an effective and efficient use of taxpayer dollars (see figure below). For example, it is unclear whether the recent changes, such as extending performance incentives to borrowers in the sixth year of their HAMP modification (estimated to cost $4-6 billion), will reduce redefaults. Treasury officials told GAO that borrower surveys confirmed that borrowers responded to performance incentives. But Treasury does not have the estimates needed to fully assess the effectiveness of this or other recent changes. Treasury officials said that program benefits and costs depended on unknown factors and macroeconomic trends and that program benefits were difficult to quantify. Office of Management and Budget guidance and GAO's past work stress that analyzing benefits and costs can help decision makers choose among alternatives. Without full and comprehensive analyses, Treasury will be challenged to determine whether program changes are actually achieving desired goals and are an efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
What GAO Recommends
To bring greater rigor and efficiency to decisions about the use of federal funds, GAO recommends that Treasury develop and implement policies and procedures that establish a standard process to better ensure that TARP-funded housing program changes are based on benefit-cost analyses that meet key elements. Treasury agreed to consider applying GAO's recommendation going forward. |
gao_GAO-02-1049 | gao_GAO-02-1049_0 | How Contracts Exhibited Performance Attributes Varied
Most of the 25 contracts we reviewed exhibited at least one of the performance-based attributes, but there was a wide range in the extent to which they did. These contracts described what outcomes the government was looking for and left it up to the contractor to decide how best to achieve these outcomes, set measurable performance standards, subjected the contractor to a quality assurance plan, and included performance penalties and incentives when appropriate. As a result, they missed out on an opportunity to achieve better outcomes with their spending for services. However, implementation was not fully pursued until the past few years when Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) encouraged the use of performance-based service contracting methods. | What GAO Found
Federal agencies spent $136 billion dollars in 2001 acquiring services ranging from clerical support and consulting services to information technology services, such as network support, and management and operations of government facilities, such as national laboratories. To achieve greater cost savings and better outcomes with this spending, Congress and the administration have encouraged greater use of performance-based contracting. Under this approach, the contracting agency specifies the outcome or result it desires and leaves it to the contractor to decide how best to achieve the desired outcome. Most of the 25 contracts GAO reviewed exhibited at least one or more performance-based attributes, but there was a range in the degree to which they exhibited these attributes. |
gao_GAO-07-403 | gao_GAO-07-403_0 | It also established several initiatives designed to improve state and local hazard mitigation planning—the process these governments use to identify risks and vulnerabilities associated with natural hazards and to develop long-term strategies for protecting people and property in future hazard events. The United States Is at Risk from a Number of Natural Hazards, and Our Vulnerability Is Increasing
Flooding is the most common and destructive hazard facing the nation, but earthquakes, hurricanes, wildland fires, tornadoes, and landslides are also significant risks in certain regions. Some of these hazards, including thunderstorms, extreme heat, and winter storms can occur in most areas of the country. Population Trends and Climate Change Are Increasing the Nation’s Vulnerability
Population growth in hazard-prone areas and the resulting increase in development in these areas are increasing the vulnerability of the nation to losses resulting from natural hazards. Building codes and design standards also can be used to help reduce losses from natural hazards by creating structures that are better able to withstand a hazard event. Finally, hazard control structures such as levees, dams, and floodwalls can help protect existing at-risk developments from flood losses. Insurance discounts can also encourage communities and individuals to undertake mitigation measures. Some states also use insurance discounts to promote mitigation. Federal, state, and local officials all cited the importance of political support in implementing mitigation actions and, said that without political support, the amount of mitigation activities that occur would be limited. A Number of Collaboration Efforts Exist but Do Not Provide a Comprehensive Strategic Framework for National Natural Hazard Mitigation Goals
Collaboration among federal, state, and local agencies as well as nongovernmental stakeholders on natural hazard mitigation efforts tends to occur on a hazard-specific basis, typically after a disaster, or through informal methods. This fragmented approach does not provide a comprehensive strategic framework for federal agencies and other stakeholders to collectively work toward accomplishing common national hazard mitigation goals. In this report, for example, we describe a variety of mitigation activities that exist to reduce the risk of losses from natural hazards, including hazard mitigation planning, the adoption and enforcement of more rigorous building codes, and the use of hazard control structures. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the (1) natural hazards that present a risk to life and property in the United States, areas that are most susceptible to them, and factors that may be increasing these risks; (2) mitigation activities that reduce losses from natural hazards; (3) impediments to implementing and methods for encouraging mitigation activities; and (4) collaborative efforts of federal agencies and other stakeholders to promote mitigation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation has experienced vast losses from natural hazards. The potential for future events, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, demonstrates the importance of hazard mitigation--actions that reduce the long-term risks to life and property from natural hazard events. GAO was asked to examine (1) natural hazards that present a risk to life and property in the United States, areas that are most susceptible to them, factors that may be increasing these risks, and mitigation activities that reduce losses; (2) methods for encouraging and impediments to implementing mitigation activities; and (3) collaborative efforts of federal agencies and other stakeholders to promote mitigation. To address these objectives, GAO collected and analyzed hazard data, reviewed population information, conducted site visits to locations with comprehensive mitigation programs, and collected information from relevant agencies and officials.
What GAO Found
Natural hazards present risks to life and property throughout the United States. Flooding is the most widespread and destructive of these, resulting in billions of dollars in property losses each year. Hurricanes, earthquakes, and wildland fires also pose significant risks in certain regions of the country. Tornadoes, landslides, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions can also occur in some areas. Population growth in hazard-prone areas, especially coastal areas, is increasing the nation's vulnerability to losses because more people and property are at risk. Climate change may also impact the frequency and severity of future natural hazard events. A variety of natural hazard mitigation activities exist, which are primarily implemented at the state and local level, and include hazard mitigation planning; strong building codes and design standards; and hazard control structures (e.g., levees). For example, strong building codes and design standards can make structures better able to withstand a hazard event and hazard control structures help protect existing at-risk areas. Public education, financial assistance, and insurance discounts can help encourage mitigation. For example, federal, state, and local governments provide financial assistance to promote mitigation and insurance discounts can encourage the use of mitigation measures. However, significant challenges exist to implementing natural hazard mitigation activities. Some of these challenges include the desire for local economic development--often in hazard-prone areas--which may conflict with long-term mitigation goals and the cost of mitigation may limit the amount of activities that occur. FEMA, other federal agencies, and nonfederal stakeholders have collaborated on natural hazard mitigation, but the current approach is fragmented and does not provide a comprehensive national strategic framework for mitigation. Collaboration typically occurs on a hazard-specific basis, after a disaster, or through informal methods. A comprehensive framework would help define common national goals, establish joint strategies, leverage resources, and assign responsibilities among stakeholders. |
gao_GGD-95-77 | gao_GGD-95-77_0 | The Causes of the Problem and Postal Service Actions
Mail service in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area is poor for a number of reasons, including (1) the Postal Service’s inability to effectively deal with the unexpected growth in mail volume, (2) mail handling process problems, and (3) labor-management problems. The Postal Service has taken action to address, at least in part, each of these problems. Overnight service areas that are too large: Consistent overnight delivery service in some parts of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area is difficult to achieve because some service areas may be too large for the current collection, transportation, and delivery network. The Postal Service agreed with our conclusion that improving labor-management relations is a key element in any long-term solution to mail service problems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) document the recent history of on-time mail delivery service problems for overnight First-Class Mail in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area; (2) determine the reasons why mail service was below the desired level; and (3) identify any Postal Service actions to improve service. In addition, the EOS index suggested that Washington, D.C., area employee attitudes about postal management ranked among the lowest in the country. Long-term improvements require substantive improvements in labor-management relations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed mail delivery service in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, focusing on the: (1) recent on-time delivery service problems for overnight first-class mail; (2) reasons why mail service is below the desired level; and (3) United States Postal Service's (USPS) actions to improve service in the area.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) mail service in the Washington, D.C. area has declined in part due to an unexpected increase in mail volume; (2) labor-management relations in the Washington, D.C. area are among the worst in the country; (3) customer satisfaction in the area declined dramatically in 1994 because local units were unable to maintain mail service at previous levels due to employee shortages, poor labor-management relations, and the recent organizational change; (4) USPS has taken action to address unnecessary duplicate mail handling; (5) postal managers believe that metropolitan overnight delivery areas are too large for the current delivery network; and (6) USPS agreed with the conclusion that the key element in improving mail service is to improve labor-management relations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-147 | gao_NSIAD-98-147_0 | In June 1995, we reported that the U.S. funds required to design, launch, and operate the space station would be about $94 billion—over $48 billion to complete assembly and almost $46 billion to operate and conduct research. In particular, the development cost estimate has increased by more than 20 percent, in-house personnel requirements have increased dramatically, and eight shuttle flights have been added to the development program. The higher development costs—$21.9 billion versus $17.4 billion—are attributable to schedule delays, additional prime contractor effort not covered by funding reserves, additional crew return vehicle costs, and costs incurred as a result of delays in the Russian-made Service Module. Potential Added Program Costs
A number of potential program changes could significantly increase the current estimate. Assuming NASA would continue to spend at the rate assumed in its current estimate for fiscal year 2003, the program would incur additional costs of more than $100 million for every month of schedule slippage. Potential Debris Tracking Costs
The estimate we derived in 1995 and our latest estimate include those costs related to the space station’s development, assembly, and operations. As mentioned previously, NASA updated its overall requirement for space debris tracking as it relates to supporting the space station, to include the ability to track and catalog objects as small as 1 centimeter. Status of Funding Reserves
We have previously expressed our concern with the adequacy of space station financial reserves. The program has used, or identified specific uses for a significant portion of its available reserves, with almost 6 years left before the last assembly flight is scheduled to be launched. Through September 1997, $398 million in cost growth had already accumulated. On September 30, 1997, Boeing formally asked NASA to consider rebaselining the program using a more “meaningful program baseline against which performance measurements (could) be taken.” In October 1997, NASA granted approval to Boeing to begin tracking cost and schedule performance using a new performance measurement baseline. According to Boeing, this change provides the program with the most accurate cost information and incorporates updated program schedules to reflect the most achievable recovery plans. For reporting purposes, the change had the effect of resetting cost and schedule variances to zero. That analysis shows that, as of February 1998, the total variance was $448 million. While NASA approved the new baseline for reporting purposes, it continues to use Boeing’s estimate of overrun at completion—$600 million—as the basis for calculating the contractor’s incentive award fee. Potential program changes, such as additional schedule slippage and more shuttle flights, could increase our latest cost estimate. Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The following are GAO’s comments on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) letter dated April 27, 1998. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 7. 8. 10. 11. 12. 13. We believe these nonrecurring costs are completely relevant to the discussion of space station life-cycle cost estimates. 14. 18. A crew return vehicle is required for space station operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed issues associated with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) International Space Station program, focusing on: (1) estimates of the station's development, assembly, and operations costs and comparing this estimate with the estimate in GAO's June 1995 report; (2) program uncertainties that may affect those costs; (3) potential debris tracking costs; (4) the status of program reserves; and (5) recent actions to measure prime contractor performance based on rebaselined information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) life-cycle cost is the sum total of direct, indirect, recurring, and nonrecurring cost of a system over its entire life through disposal; (2) overall, the estimated U.S. cost to develop, assemble, and operate the space station is about $96 billion, an increase of almost $2 billion over GAO's last estimate made in 1995; (3) development costs represent the largest increase--more than 20 percent; (4) the development increase is attributable to schedule slippages, prime contract growth, additional crew return vehicle costs, and the effects of delays in delivery of the Russian-made Service Module; (5) overall costs would have been significantly higher had there not been an offsetting reduction in shuttle support costs; (6) a number of potential program changes could significantly increase the updated cost estimate; (7) they include the potential or additional schedule slippage and the need for shuttle launches to test and deliver the crew return vehicle; (8) at the current estimated spending rate, the program would incur additional costs of more than $100 million for every month of schedule slippage; (9) in addition, NASA may have to incur costs related to protecting the station from space debris; (10) in August 1997, the agency updated its overall space debris tracking requirement; (11) the new requirement, as it relates to supporting the space station, includes the ability to track and catalog objects as small as 1 centimeter; (12) the adequacy of the space station program's funding reserves has been a concern of GAO's; (13) the program has used, or identified potential uses for, a significant portion of its available reserves, with almost 6 years left before the last assembly flight is scheduled to be launched; (14) in October 1997, NASA granted approval to Boeing Corporation to begin tracking cost and schedule performance using a new performance measurement baseline; (15) the purpose of the change was to incorporate updated program schedules to reflect the most achievable recovery plans; (16) for reporting purposes, the change had the effect of resetting cost and schedule variances to zero; (17) the original baseline shows that the February 1998 cost variance would have been about $50 million higher than the $398 million Boeing reported prior to the change; and (18) while NASA approved the new baseline for reporting purposes, it continues to use Boeing's estimate of overrun at completion--$600 million--as the basis for calculating the contractor's incentive award fee. |
gao_GAO-06-1065 | gao_GAO-06-1065_0 | Background
IRS has two major programs to collect tax debts. Finishing work to address the critical success factors could help achieve desired results—such as collecting tax debts—but cannot guarantee success, which depends, in part, on how well IRS addresses the factors, identifies problems, and resolves problems in the limited implementation phase. Although IRS officials indicated that a purpose of the limited implementation phase is to assure readiness for full implementation, IRS has not yet documented how it will identify and use the lessons learned to ensure that each critical success factor is adequately addressed before expanding the program. Because program success will be affected by how well IRS identifies and makes needed adjustments to resolve problems, tracking the lessons learned in the limited implementation phase is critical. Also, IRS has not documented criteria that it will use to determine whether limited implementation phase performance was sufficient to warrant program expansion. IRS officials indicated that they plan to further discuss performance criteria that could trigger a go/no go decision, and might consider criteria such as the amount of taxes collected and indications of PCAs abusing taxpayers or misusing taxpayer data. IRS has not decided on whether these targets will include the amounts of collected taxes compared to program costs, which was a key reason for canceling the 1996 PCA pilot program. Finally, IRS will have a little more than a half year to identify the lessons learned before incorporating them into the solicitation for the next contract, which IRS intends to release in March 2007 in order to begin expanding the number of PCAs in January 2008. In the documented study design, IRS would exclude the fees paid to PCAs from the costs and subtract those fees from the tax debts collected by PCAs. While such a study might produce useful information, it will not meet the intent of our recommendation. The study would not compare the results of using PCAs with the results IRS could get if given the same amount of resources, including the fees to be paid to PCAs (which are to be paid from federal tax receipts), to use in whatever fashion that officials determine would best meet tax collection goals. Conclusions
Although IRS’s actions do not guarantee PDC program success, IRS made significant progress in addressing the 5 critical success factors and 17 related subfactors before sending cases to PCAs for the limited implementation phase. Taken together, these actions were intended to achieve such important ends as ensuring that the selected PCAs will be able to do the job and work the range of cases assigned, that IRS will have the necessary resources and caseload ready to do its part, and that taxpayers’ rights and data will be protected. Even with this progress, IRS has not yet completed the related steps that it must take for 3 subfactors on setting goals and measures, determining all program costs, and evaluating the program. Related to such decisions on expansion is IRS’s planned comparative study of using PCAs. If this study is not adequately designed and implemented, policymakers may not be aware of the true costs of contracting with PCAs—including the fees paid to PCAs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that IRS decision makers will timely have the information needed to make informed, data-based decisions about the private debt collection program, we recommend that, as soon as possible, and certainly before any expansion of the PDC program beyond the initial round of cases sent to PCAs, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue complete establishing: results-oriented goals and measures for the program based on the best available information; reliable, verifiable information on all the costs of the program, to the extent possible; plans for evaluating the results of the program in terms of expected costs, goals, and desired results; and clear criteria and processes for assessing how IRS addressed the critical success factors in the limited implementation phase and whether PDC program performance warrants program expansion. To determine whether IRS’s planned approach to study using PCAs will provide useful information with which to determine if contracting is the best use of federal funds for achieving tax collection goals, we reviewed program documents and interviewed officials from IRS supported by contractor staff assisting them in developing the study. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, the inventory of tax debt with collection potential had grown to $132 billion. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not pursued some tax debt because of limited resources and higher priorities. Congress has authorized IRS to contract with private collection agencies (PCA) to help collect tax debts. IRS has developed a Private Debt Collection (PDC) program to start with a limited implementation in September 2006 and fuller implementation in January 2008. As requested, GAO is reporting whether (1) IRS addressed critical success factors before limited implementation, (2) IRS will assess lessons learned before fuller implementation, and (3) IRS's planned study will help determine if using PCAs is the best use of federal funds.
What GAO Found
IRS made major progress in addressing the 5 critical success factors and 17 related subfactors for the PDC program before sending cases to PCAs. GAO reviewed program documents and interviewed officials to identify IRS's approaches and steps taken to address the factors. Taken together, IRS's actions were intended to ensure that the PCAs will be able to do the job and work the range of cases assigned, IRS will have the necessary resources and caseload ready, and taxpayer rights and data will be protected. Even with this progress, IRS has not completed work for three subfactors--setting results-oriented goals and measures, determining all PDC program costs, and evaluating the program based on the results-oriented goals and measures, once they are established. As a result, IRS risks not providing complete information that decision makers would find useful. Finishing work on the factors could help achieve but cannot guarantee program success, which also depends, in part, on how IRS addresses the factors and identifies and resolves any problems in the limited implementation phase. Although IRS officials indicated that a purpose of the limited implementation phase is to assure readiness for full implementation to up to 12 PCAs, IRS has not yet documented how it will identify and use the lessons learned to ensure that each critical success factor is addressed before expanding the program starting in January 2008. Because program success will be affected by how well IRS makes adjustments, assessing the lessons learned in limited implementation is critical. Also, IRS has not documented criteria that it will use to determine whether the limited implementation performance warrants program expansion. IRS officials indicated that they are considering criteria that could trigger a go/no go decision, such as the amount of taxes collected and indications of PCAs abusing taxpayers or misusing taxpayer data. IRS has not decided on whether these targets will include comparing the taxes collected to program costs, which was a key reason for canceling a 1996 PCA pilot program. Finally, IRS will have a little more than a half year to identify the lessons learned before incorporating them into the next contract solicitation, which IRS intends to release in March 2007. Related to such decisions on expansion is IRS's planned comparative study of using PCAs. That study is to compare using PCAs to investing IRS's PDC-related operating costs into having IRS staff work IRS's "next best" collection cases. Under the documented study design, IRS would exclude the fees paid to PCAs from the costs and subtract those fees from the tax debts collected by PCAs. While such a study might produce useful information, it will not compare the results of using PCAs with the results IRS could get if given the same amount of resources, including the fees to be paid to PCAs, to use in what IRS officials would judge to be the best way to meet tax collection goals. Adequately designing and implementing the study is important to ensure policymakers are aware of the true costs of contracting with PCAs and know whether PCAs offer the best use of federal funds. |
gao_NSIAD-98-154 | gao_NSIAD-98-154_0 | As a result of this visit, the Mexican military agreed to accept U.S. counternarcotics assistance as part of the Mexican President’s decision to expand the role of the military in counternarcotics activities. Nature of the Drug-Trafficking Threat
Mexico is the principal transit country for cocaine entering the United States and, despite the Mexican government’s attempts to eradicate marijuana and opium poppy, Mexico remains a major source country for marijuana and heroin used in the United States. In recent years, drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico have expanded their cocaine and methamphetamine operations. Some of the actions include (1) eradicating and seizing illegal drugs; (2) increasing counternarcotics cooperation with the United States; (3) initiating efforts to extradite Mexican criminals to the United States; (4) passing an organized crime law, as well as other legislation to enhance Mexico’s authority to prevent money laundering and the illegal use and diversion of precursor and essential chemicals; and (5) implementing measures aimed at reducing corruption within law enforcement organizations and increasing the role of Mexico’s military forces in law enforcement activities. Although these are positive efforts, the results of these actions are yet to be realized because (1) many of them have just been put in place and (2) some have not been broadly applied. Mexico has taken actions to enhance its capacity to combat money laundering. The establishment of screening procedures or the involvement of the military cannot ensure that corruption will not continue to be a significant impediment to U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts. Key elements of the logistical support package were not provided on a timely basis. According to DOD, the Mexican military has indicated that it has no plans to invest in U.S. surveillance equipment. Performance Measures for U.S. and Mexican Drug Control Efforts
Without performance measures of effectiveness, it is difficult for decisionmakers to evaluate the progress that the United States and Mexico are making to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. We have previously noted the need for ONDCP to develop drug control plans that include measures to allow it to assess the effectiveness of antidrug programs. To assess the issues related to the provision of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Mexican military, we met with DOD officials from the Office of the Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support; the Defense Security Assistance Agency; and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. To determine how the U.S. government plans to assess the effectiveness of U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts, we interviewed officials from ONDCP and the Department of State. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided an update on the status of counternarcotics activities in Mexico, focusing on: (1) the nature of the drug threat from Mexico; (2) the progress that Mexico has made in improving its counternarcotics efforts; (3) issues related to the provision of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Mexican military; and (4) the plans that the U.S. government has to assess the effectiveness of U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Mexico continues to be the primary transit country for cocaine entering the United States from South America, as well as a major source country for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines; (2) according to the Drug Enforcement Administration, drug-trafficking organizations are increasing their activities, posing a threat to citizens in the United States and Mexico; (3) Mexico, with U.S. assistance, has taken steps to improve its capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by: (a) increasing the eradication of marijuana and opium poppy and seizing significant amounts of cocaine; (b) enhancing its counternarcotics cooperation with the United States; (c) initiating efforts to extradite Mexican criminals to the United States; (d) passing new laws on organized crime, money laundering, and chemical control; and (e) instituting reforms in law enforcement agencies and expanding the role of the military in counternarcotics activities to reduce corruption; (4) the results of these actions have yet to be realized because many of them are in the early stages of implementation and some are limited in scope; (5) also, the Mexican government faces a shortage of trained personnel, a lack of adequate funding to support operations, and extensive corruption; (6) U.S. counternarcotics assistance has enhanced the ability of the Mexican military to conduct counternarcotics missions by allowing it to perform reconnaissance, increase eradication missions, and bolster the air mobility of its ground troops; (7) however, key elements of the Department of Defense's counternarcotics assistance were of limited usefulness or could have been better planned and coordinated by U.S. and Mexican military officials; (8) although the Mexican government has agreed to a series of actions to enhance its counternarcotics capacity and the United States has begun to provide a larger level of assistance, no performance measures have been established to assess the effectiveness of these efforts; and (9) the Office of National Drug Control Policy has recognized the need to develop such measures and has indicated that it plans to devise methods for evaluating U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics performance by the end of 1998 as part of the binational drug control strategy. |
gao_GAO-17-496 | gao_GAO-17-496_0 | Internal Control Material Weaknesses, Significant Deficiencies, and Other Challenges Pose Risks to Federal Spending Data Quality
Financial Audits and Readiness Reviews Indicate That Agencies Face Data Quality Issues in Three Broad Areas
As of February 2017, 22 of the 24 CFO Act agencies had issued annual financial reports for fiscal year 2016 and 19 of the 22 CFO Act agencies’ auditors reported material weaknesses and/or significant deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting in their audit reports that may affect the quality of information reported under the DATA Act. Treasury officials told us that they are aware of these challenges, but they do not expect that these issues will be resolved before the May 2017 reporting deadline. Longstanding issues related to agency financial information, systems and internal controls, and reporting challenges related to agency DATA Act report submissions underscore the need for OMB to address our open recommendation to provide additional guidance to address potential clarity, consistency, or data quality issues and for OMB to implement a process for communicating data quality limitations to the public. OMB Guidance Directs Agencies to Leverage Existing Assurance Processes Despite Known Limitations
Another area of risk to data quality is the agency senior accountable official (SAO) assurance process that leverages assurance processes of existing source systems with known data quality challenges. However, our review of the assurance statement posted on GSA’s website found that the statement focuses on security controls rather than data quality and appears to apply specifically to procurement management. We will continue to monitor this issue moving forward. Accordingly, we are not making a recommendation at this time but will assess the quality of the assurance process in our future work. Efforts to Establish Data Governance Structure Are Still at an Early Stage
OMB has taken some actions to improve its data governance framework, but efforts to establish a fully functioning data governance structure are at an early stage with many specifics yet to be worked out. In September 2016, OMB established a Data Standards Committee to focus on clarifying existing data element definitions and identifying the need for new standards. OMB approved a charter for this committee in November 2016. The charter states that the committee is to make publicly available both the topics of its proceedings and the resulting outcomes. Keeping records of the Data Standards Committee’s activities and releasing them publicly could facilitate consultation with stakeholders. Conclusions
Across the federal government, agencies are making final preparations to submit the data required by the DATA Act’s May 2017 deadline. This represents the culmination of almost 3 years of effort by OMB, Treasury, and federal agencies to address the many policy and technical challenges presented by the act’s requirements including the need to standardize data elements across the entire federal government, link data contained in agencies’ financial and award management systems, and expand the type and amount of data to be reported. Looking forward, attention will increasingly focus on another critical goal of the act—improving the quality of the data being produced and the mechanisms and assurances needed to communicate such information to users. These reviews have identified material weaknesses and significant deficiencies reported in agencies’ financial audits and identified several widespread and longstanding issues that present risks to agencies’ ability to submit quality data for DATA Act reporting. Recommendation for Executive Action
To promote transparency in the development and management of data standards for reporting federal spending, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget should ensure that the Data Standards Committee makes information about the topics of the committee’s proceedings and any resulting outcomes available to the public. OMB generally agreed with our recommendation. More specifically, it addresses the following: (1) risks to data quality related to known material weaknesses and other deficiencies, including internal controls over financial reporting, that have been identified in selected previous audits, reviews, and reports conducted by GAO, inspectors general (IG), and external auditors; (2) risks to data quality related to challenges in operationalizing DATA Act policy and technical guidance; (3) approaches that agencies will use to assure the quality of their data submissions and any associated limitations; and (4) efforts taken to establish a data governance structure. In our analysis of agencies’ material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and other challenges reported by independent auditors, we identified three overall categories that could affect data quality: (1) Accounting and Financial Management, (2) Financial Management Systems, and (3) Information Technology (IT) Security and Controls. OMB and Treasury are working to implement the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), which includes several provisions that may address these recommendations once fully implemented. However, OMB has not documented this monitoring plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Across the federal government, agencies are making final preparations to submit the required data by the DATA Act's May 2017 deadline. This represents the culmination of almost 3 years of effort by OMB, Treasury, and federal agencies to address many policy and technical challenges. Moving forward, attention will increasingly focus on another critical goal of the act: improving the quality of the data produced.
Consistent with GAO's mandate under the act, this is the latest in a series of reports reviewing the act's implementation. This report examines (1) risks to data quality related to known material weaknesses and other deficiencies previously identified by GAO, IGs, and external auditors; (2) risks to data quality related to challenges in operationalizing policy and technical guidance; (3) agencies' assurances of the quality of their data submissions; and (4) efforts taken to establish a data governance structure. GAO reviewed DATA Act implementation documents and auditors' reports on known challenges and interviewed staff at OMB, Treasury, and other agencies.
What GAO Found
Internal control weaknesses and other challenges pose risks to data quality. Material weaknesses and significant deficiencies reported in agencies' financial audits and other challenges reported in Inspectors General (IG) readiness review reports show several widespread and longstanding issues that present risks to agencies' abilities to submit quality data as required by the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act). These issues fall into three categories: (1) accounting and financial management, (2) financial management systems, and (3) information technology security and controls. GAO has also reported weaknesses and challenges in government-wide financial management systems used for DATA Act reporting.
Challenges with guidance will impact data quality. Challenges related to how agencies report certain intragovernmental transactions, reconcile recipient address information, and align required DATA Act files with missing data continue to present risks to the quality of data displayed on USASpending.gov. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have stated that they do not expect to resolve these challenges before the May 2017 reporting deadline. Unresolved challenges affecting data quality could lead policymakers and the public to draw inaccurate conclusions from the data. This challenge underscores the need for OMB to address GAO's open recommendation that it provide agencies with additional guidance to address data quality issues. GAO will continue to assess how OMB, Treasury, and agencies address data quality issues moving forward.
Limitations exist with data quality assurance processes. OMB guidance directs senior accountable officials at each agency to rely on existing assurance processes when they certify that their agencies' DATA Act submissions are valid and reliable. However, GAO identified concerns regarding some existing assurance processes. For example, OMB directed agencies to use a General Services Administration assurance statement attesting to the quality of data in two source systems, but the assurance statement focuses on data security rather than data quality, and it is unclear whether it applies to both procurement and financial assistance data. OMB is aware of these issues and expects to finalize the assurance process in time for the May 2017 reporting deadline. Accordingly, GAO is not making a recommendation at this time but will assess the quality of the assurance process in future work.
Efforts to establish a data governance structure are still at an early stage. OMB has taken some actions to improve its data governance framework, but efforts to establish a fully functioning data governance structure are at an early stage with many specifics yet to be worked out. OMB formally chartered the Data Standards Committee as an advisory body in November 2016 to focus on clarifying existing data element definitions and identifying needs for new standards. The charter states that the committee will promote transparency by making the topics and outcomes of its proceedings public, but OMB has not kept records of the committee's meetings nor has the committee produced a work plan for moving forward. Public information about the committee's activities and outcomes would facilitate consultation with stakeholders, as required by the act.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of OMB ensures that the Data Standards Committee publicly releases information about the topics of its proceedings and any resulting outcomes. OMB generally agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-48T | gao_GAO-08-48T_0 | TSA’s well-publicized recent policy change in response to the alleged transatlantic bomb plot of August 2006 is an important example of risk-based planning. The passenger checkpoint screening process is composed of the following three elements: Transportation security officers (also known as TSOs) screen all passengers and their carry-on luggage prior to allowing passengers access to their departure gates. Creating Functioning IED and IID Devices
Investigators found instructions on the Internet for creating both an IED and IID and purchased the components from the Internet and from a local store for approximately $150. In addition, we obtained information about creating an IID from the Internet. One of the components for the IID is a liquid that TSA prohibits passengers from bringing through security checkpoints. Specific details regarding the device components and the methods of concealment we used during our covert testing are classified by TSA; as such, they are not discussed in this testimony. A test performed by local law enforcement officials confirmed that the detonator would cause damage to an aircraft and threaten the safety of passengers. Several tests conducted at a national laboratory demonstrated that this IED can function as intended, with the initial explosion by the detonator successfully causing the liquid explosive to detonate in several tests. Explosion data indicate that this device exploded with a force sufficient to cause severe damage to an aircraft. Our work with a law enforcement organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area in February 2006 confirmed that the components of the IID (one of which is a liquid) could function as intended, causing damage to an aircraft and threatening the safety of passengers. Testing at 19 Airport Security Checkpoints
Our investigators devised methods that would allow them to conceal the prohibited components for these devices from transportation security officers. During this planning phase, they considered publicly advertised TSA policies related to liquids and other items, including prohibited items. They also judged that some components could be hidden in either their carry-on luggage or on their persons. By using various concealment methods, our investigators demonstrated that it is possible to bring the components for several functioning IEDs and one functioning IID through checkpoints and onto airline flights without being challenged by transportation security officers. In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA procedures and used technology appropriately; however, we uncovered weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a result of these tests. For example, although transportation security officers generally enforced TSA’s 3-1-1 rule, we were able to bring a liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by taking advantage of weaknesses we identified in TSA’s policies based on a review of public information. TSA determined that specific details regarding these weaknesses are sensitive security information and are therefore not discussed in this testimony. We did not notice any difference between the performance of private screeners and transportation security officers during our tests. However, a liquid component of the IID—despite being prohibited by TSA—was allowed to pass undetected through the checkpoint. At these briefings, we suggested that TSA consider how the results of our covert testing should affect its risk- based approach to airport security. They acknowledged vulnerabilities in human capital, processes, and technology. Conclusion
Our tests clearly demonstrate that a terrorist group, using publicly available information and few resources, could cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers by bringing prohibited IED and IID components through security checkpoints. GAO is currently performing a more systematic review of these issues and expects to issue a comprehensive public report with recommendations for TSA in early 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 2006, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) substantially modified its passenger screening policies based on the alleged transatlantic bomb plot uncovered by British authorities. With the aim of closing security gaps revealed by the alleged plot, the revised policies severely restricted the amount of liquids, gels, and aerosols TSA allowed passengers to bring through the checkpoint. At the Committee's request, GAO tested whether security gaps exist in the passenger screening process. To perform this work, GAO attempted to (1) obtain the instructions and components needed to create devices that a terrorist might use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers and (2) test whether GAO investigators could pass through airport security checkpoints undetected with all the components needed to create the devices. GAO conducted covert testing at a nonrepresentative selection of 19 airports across the country. After concluding its tests, GAO provided TSA with two timely briefings to help it take corrective action. In these briefings, GAO suggested that TSA consider several actions to improve its passenger screening program, including aspects of human capital, processes, and technology. GAO is currently performing a more systematic review of these issues and expects to issue a comprehensive public report with recommendations for TSA in early 2008.
What GAO Found
GAO investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for several improvised explosive devices (IED) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) concealed in their carry-on luggage and on their persons. The components for these devices and the items used to conceal the components were commercially available. Specific details regarding the device components and the methods of concealment GAO used during its covert testing were classified by TSA; as such, they are not discussed in this testimony. Using publicly available information, GAO investigators identified two types of devices that a terrorist could use to cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. The first device was an IED made up of two parts--a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator. Although the detonator itself could function as an IED, investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid explosive and cause even more damage. In addition, the second device was an IID created by combining commonly available products (one of which is a liquid) that TSA prohibits in carry-on luggage. Investigators obtained the components for these devices at local stores and over the Internet for less than $150. Tests that GAO performed at a national laboratory in July 2007, in addition to prior tests in February 2006 that GAO performed in partnership with a law enforcement organization in the Washington, D.C., metro area, clearly demonstrated that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to an airplane and threaten the safety of passengers. Investigators then devised methods to conceal the components for these devices from TSA transportation security officers, keeping in mind TSA policies related to liquids and other items, including prohibited items. By using concealment methods for the components, two GAO investigators demonstrated that it is possible to bring the components for several IEDs and one IID through TSA checkpoints and onto airline flights without being challenged by transportation security officers. In most cases, transportation security officers appeared to follow TSA procedures and used technology appropriately; however, GAO uncovered weaknesses in TSA screening procedures and other vulnerabilities as a result of these tests. For example, although transportation security officers generally enforced TSA's policies, investigators were able to bring a liquid component of the IID undetected through checkpoints by taking advantage of weaknesses identified in these policies. These weaknesses were identified based on a review of public information. TSA determined that specific details regarding these weaknesses are sensitive security information and are therefore not discussed in this testimony. GAO did not notice any difference between the performance of private screeners and transportation security officers during our tests. |
gao_GAO-15-660 | gao_GAO-15-660_0 | Unlike many other federal agencies that have budgets established for broad program activities, most Corps civil works funds are appropriated for specific projects. Steps for Developing Corps Projects
The Corps is responsible for planning, designing, and operating much of the nation’s water resources infrastructure. The Corps Considers the Potential Impact of Extreme Weather in Its Planning and Operations of Water Resources Infrastructure Projects
The Corps addresses the potential impact of extreme weather events in its planning and operations of water resources infrastructure projects in various ways including updating and developing guidance to be used in the planning process; using tools, such as water control manuals, in its operation of projects; and through collaboration with key federal agencies and stakeholders. In 2014, the Corps issued additional guidance on how to evaluate the effects of projected future sea level change on Corps projects and what to consider when adapting projects to this projected change.incorporate sea level change into the planning process to improve the resilience of projects and maximize performance over time. According to the Corps guidance, water control manuals also must contain provisions for the Corps to temporarily deviate from operations, when necessary, to alleviate critical situations. For example, in December 2014, the Corps approved a deviation from operations at Prado Dam in southern California, which allowed the Corps to temporarily retain water captured behind the dam following a rainstorm. The Corps Has Assessed Certain Infrastructure Projects to Prepare for Extreme Weather Events
The Corps has assessed certain water resources infrastructure projects to determine whether they are designed to withstand extreme weather events. Specifically, the Corps has national programs in place to perform risk assessments on dams and levees, as required by law, but, unlike these programs, the Corps is not required to perform systematic, national risk assessments on other types of infrastructure, such as floodwalls and hurricane barriers and has not done so. However, Corps officials said they have been required to assess such infrastructure after an extreme weather event in response to statutory requirements. The Corps also operates the Levee Safety Program, which began in 2006. According to Corps officials, the agency has not performed systematic, national risk assessments on other types of existing infrastructure given funding limitations (see table 2). However, the Corps has received appropriations for and has been required to assess such infrastructure after an extreme weather event, such as in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. However, the Corps has not worked with Congress to develop a more stable funding approach, as we recommended in September 2010, which could facilitate such risk assessments. That report found that a more stable funding approach could improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Works program. The department partially concurred with our recommendation, stating that it would promote efficient funding. As the frequency and intensity of some extreme weather events are increasing, without performing risk assessments on other types of existing infrastructure, such as hurricane barriers and floodwalls, before an extreme weather event (e.g., using a risk-based model), the Corps will continue to take a For this piecemeal approach to assessing risk on such infrastructure. reason, we continue to believe our recommendation is valid. The Corps Has Conducted Some Vulnerability Assessments of Water Infrastructure Projects to Prepare for Extreme Weather Events
The Corps has conducted two nationwide screening level assessments to assess its vulnerability to climate change in its management and operation of water infrastructure. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps plans, designs, and constructs water resources infrastructure, such as dams and levees. According to the U.S. Global Change Research Program, the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events are increasing. Much of the Corps' infrastructure was built over 50 years ago and may not be designed to operate within current climate patterns, according to the U.S. Geological Survey.
The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 included a provision for GAO to study the Corps' management of water resources in preparation for extreme weather. This is the first in a series of reports GAO is issuing on this topic. GAO's other reports will examine operations and dam and levee safety, which GAO plans to issue in fiscal year 2016. This report explores (1) how the Corps prepares for and responds to extreme weather events in its planning and operation of water resources projects, and (2) the extent to which the Corps has assessed whether existing water resources infrastructure is prepared for extreme weather events. GAO reviewed Corps guidance on planning, operations, and assessments, and interviewed Corps officials from headquarters and eight districts— selected, in part, on number of projects.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) considers the potential impact of extreme weather events in its planning and operations of water resources infrastructure projects by, among other things, updating and developing guidance on how to incorporate different extreme weather scenarios in its planning of projects. For example, in 2014, the Corps issued guidance on how to evaluate the effects of projected future sea level change on its projects and what to consider when adapting projects to this projected change. In addition, Corps districts prepare water control manuals, guidance outlining project operations. The Corps can approve deviations from the manuals to alleviate critical situations, such as extreme weather events. For example, in December 2014, the Corps approved a deviation from operations at a southern California dam, which allowed the Corps to retain rainwater to help respond to the state's extreme drought conditions.
The Corps has assessed certain water resources infrastructure projects to determine whether they are designed to withstand extreme weather events. Specifically, the Corps has national programs in place to perform risk assessments on dams and levees, as required by law. Unlike the requirements for dams and levees, the Corps is not required to perform systematic, national risk assessments on other types of existing infrastructure, such as hurricane barriers and floodwalls and has not done so (see table). However, the Corps has been required to assess such infrastructure after an extreme weather event in response to statutory requirements, as it did in November 2013 and in January 2015, after Hurricane Sandy. Also, the Corps has performed initial vulnerability assessments for sea level rise on its coastal projects and has begun conducting such assessments at inland watersheds.
Unlike federal agencies that have budgets established for broad program activities, most Corps civil works funds are appropriated for specific projects. However, the Corps has not worked with Congress to develop a more stable funding approach, as GAO recommended in September 2010, which could facilitate conducting risk assessments. The Corps partially concurred with this recommendation, stating that it would promote efficient funding. As the frequency and intensity of some extreme weather events are increasing, without performing systematic, national risk assessments on other types of infrastructure, such as hurricane barriers and floodwalls, the Corps will continue to take a piecemeal approach to assessing risk on such infrastructure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously recommended that the Corps work with Congress to develop a more stable funding approach. The Corps has not taken action, but GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid. Agencies had no comments on a draft of this report. |
gao_GAO-12-351 | gao_GAO-12-351_0 | In 2011, A/B MACs managed more than 1.5 million Medicare providers and suppliers. Additionally, CMS contracts with the NSC to centralize the enrollment process and site visits for DMEPOS suppliers. While prepayment edits are in place to prevent improper payments, factors such as frequency of information updates and the limitations of the data used to update information in PECOS may affect the timeliness and accuracy of provider and supplier information. Enrollment-Related Prepayment Edits Are Designed to Prevent Payments to Ineligible Providers and Suppliers
Enrollment-related prepayment edits are designed to prevent payments to ineligible providers and suppliers—such as those that are no longer active in the Medicare program or that are not properly credentialed or licensed to provide the services for which they have submitted claims. For example, such edits verify the validity of the entity’s NPI, which indicates whether the claim was submitted by an active provider or supplier. In turn, the timeliness and accuracy of information in PECOS—which is downloaded as provider files into the shared systems each night—is affected by factors such as the frequency with which contractors update this information and limitations of the sources of the information used. These sources vary in the ease with which A/B MACs and the NSC have been able to access their data and the frequency with which they are updated. However, A/B MACs and the We have previously reported concerns about the accuracy of the provider and supplier enrollment information in PECOS and CMS’s oversight of A/B MACs’ provider and supplier enrollment activities. CMS has acknowledged these concerns and indicated that the agency is working to address these issues. CMS Has Implemented Some New Enrollment Screening Procedures Since PPACA, While Others Remain in Progress
Since the enactment of PPACA, CMS has implemented new provider and supplier enrollment screening procedures and has also implemented other measures intended to strengthen existing procedures. However, the implementation of some additional enrollment screening procedures by CMS is still in progress. New screening procedures that define conditions for provider and supplier enrollment in Medicare include CMS’s determination of different levels of screening according to the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse with respect to categories of providers or suppliers, and a new application fee for some types of providers. CMS also published a regulation consistent with its existing practice, requiring providers and suppliers to include their NPI on all enrollment applications and claims, and added two new Medicare contractors—an automated screening contractor and a site visit contractor—that are intended to conduct enhanced enrollment screening and site visits. Based on these new risk levels, providers and suppliers are subject to different screening procedures, with those in the high-risk level subject to the most rigorous screening. In addition, CMS officials said that the agency has taken a centralized approach to automated screening of enrollment data because of weaknesses observed in enrollment screening efforts, which were due generally to the large number of providers and suppliers for which the A/B MACs and the NSC had to manually screen applications and the lack of efficient access to data sources containing enrollment information. For example, CMS has directed the automated screening contractor to identify additional data sources for screening checks, such as financial, tax and business, and geospatial data sources. Several New Screening Procedures Remain in Progress
CMS’s implementation of some enrollment screening procedures authorized by PPACA remains in progress, including efforts to (1) extend surety bond requirements to additional providers and suppliers, (2) conduct fingerprint-based criminal background checks of high-risk providers and suppliers, (3) require enrolling providers and suppliers to disclose additional types of information, and (4) require compliance and ethics programs for providers and suppliers. The surety bond would be in an amount commensurate with the provider’s or supplier’s billing volume, but not less than $50,000. CMS officials said the agency was working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to gain access to its criminal background information for use in conducting fingerprint-based criminal background checks of high-risk providers and suppliers. Our previous work has found, and we recommended, that contractor monitoring is needed to ensure that CMS and its contractors identify and address the causes of improper payments. Agency Comments
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and in its written comments highlighted continuing steps that CMS is taking to improve the accuracy and timeliness of data used to screen providers and suppliers and to further strengthen contractor oversight and PECOS data integrity. HHS’s comments are printed in appendix I. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Administrator of CMS and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers the Medicare programmore than 1.5 million health providers and suppliers of medical equipment were enrolled in the Medicare program in 2011, and 30,000 more enroll each month. CMS has established Medicare enrollment standards and procedures intended to ensure that only qualified providers and suppliers can enroll. While most providers and suppliers pose a limited risk to the Medicare program, our previous work found persistent weaknesses in CMSs Medicare enrollment standards and procedures that increased the risk of enrolling entities intent on defrauding the program. In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) authorized CMS to implement procedures to strengthen the Medicare enrollment process.
GAO was asked to review CMSs Medicare provider enrollment procedures. In this report, GAO describes (1) how CMS and its contractors use provider and supplier enrollment information to prevent improper payments and factors that may affect the usefulness of this information, and (2) the extent to which CMS has implemented new provider and supplier enrollment screening procedures since the enactment of PPACA. To do so, GAO reviewed relevant regulations and documents, and interviewed officials from CMS and a sample of four of the agencys contractors based on the volume of claims they processed and the status of their contracts with CMS.
What GAO Found
Medicare claims are screened against enrollment information, using automated enrollment-related prepayment edits, in an effort to prevent improper payments to ineligible providers and supplierssuch as those that are no longer active in the Medicare program or are not properly licensed to provide the services for which they have submitted claims. Officials with the contractors we interviewed described the use of several types of prepayment edits to ensure that claims data are valid. For example, verification edits are intended to check the providers National Provider Identifier (NPI), which indicates whether the claim was submitted by an active provider or supplier. However, factors such as the frequency with which contractors have updated provider and supplier enrollment information and limitations of the data used may affect the timeliness and accuracy of data used to screen claimsin turn limiting the ability of the edits to prevent improper payments from occurring. For example, to update information maintained in the Provider Enrollment, Chain and Ownership System (PECOS)CMSs centralized database for Medicare enrollment informationthe contractors have relied on a variety of data sources that vary in the frequency with which they are updated and the ease with which the data can be accessed. We have previously reported concerns about the accuracy of the enrollment information in PECOS and recommended CMS increase its oversight of its contractors provider and supplier enrollment activities. CMS acknowledged these concerns and indicated that the agency is working to address these issues.
Since the enactment of PPACA, CMS has implemented some new provider and supplier enrollment screening procedures and other measures intended to strengthen the existing Medicare enrollment process. New screening procedures include the designation of three different levels of risk of fraud, waste, and abuse, with categories of providers and suppliers assigned to limited, moderate, and high-risk levelsand those in the highest level subject to the most rigorous screening. For example, providers and suppliers in all three risk levels must undergo licensure checks, while those in moderate- and high-risk levels are subject to unannounced site visits. In addition, CMS implemented new application fees for some providers and suppliers. CMS also added two new Medicare contractors, an automated screening contractor and a site visit contractor, to conduct enhanced enrollment screening and site visits. CMS officials said that they expect the new automated screening contractor to identify additional data sources against which to screen, such as financial, tax, and business data sources. CMSs implementation of some additional enrollment screening procedures is still in progress. For example, by the end of 2012, CMS plans to contract with two Federal Bureau of Investigation-approved contractors to conduct fingerprint-based criminal background checks of high-risk providers and suppliers. In addition, the agency plans to extend the requirement for surety bonds to high-risk providers and suppliers beyond those already required of suppliers of durable medical equipment, orthotics and supplies. A surety bond guarantees that if a provider or supplier does not fulfill its obligation to Medicare, CMS can recover its losses via the surety bond.
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and in its written comments noted CMSs ongoing efforts to improve provider and supplier enrollment procedures. HHS also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-345 | gao_GAO-12-345_0 | DOD’s Efficiencies Include Headquarters- Related Reductions, but Additional Opportunities for Cost Savings May Exist
DOD has taken some steps to examine its headquarters resources for efficiencies, but additional opportunities for cost savings may exist by further consolidating organizations and centralizing functions. For the purposes of the Secretary of Defense’s efficiency initiative, DOD components, including the military departments, were asked to focus in particular on headquarters and administrative functions, support activities, and other overhead in their portfolios. In reviewing these headquarters-related efficiency initiatives, however, we found that they generally fell into two categories: (1) consolidating or eliminating organizations based on geographic proximity or span of control, and (2) centralizing overlapping functions and services (see figs. The DOD efficiencies that GAO reviewed to reduce headquarters resources are expected by DOD to save about $2.9 billion through fiscal year 2016, less than 2 percent of the $178 billion in savings DOD projected departmentwide. Our work indicates that DOD may be able to find additional efficiencies by further examining opportunities to consolidate organizations or centralize functions at headquarters. DOD may not have identified all areas where reductions in headquarters personnel and operating costs could be achieved because, according to DOD officials, the department was working quickly to identify savings in the fiscal year 2012 budget. To accomplish this quickly, DOD used a top- down approach that identified several targets of opportunity to reduce costs, including headquarters organizations, but left limited time for a detailed data-driven analysis. In February 2012, in DOD’s fiscal year 2013 budget request, the department proposed an additional $61 billion in savings from fiscal years 2013 to 2017 through reductions in overhead and support requirements, and improved business practices. However, it provided limited information as to what portions of these savings were specific to headquarters and how they would be achieved. Without systematic efforts to reexamine its headquarters resources on a more comprehensive basis, DOD may miss opportunities to shift resources away from overhead. Lack of Complete and Reliable Headquarters Information Hinders Efforts to Identify and Implement Efficiencies
DOD does not have complete and reliable major DOD headquarters activity data available for use in making efficiency assessments and decisions because the department continues to have challenges in identifying and tracking personnel and other resources devoted to headquarters. DOD officials stated that they have delayed updating the instruction to allow time for components to adjust to the statutory changes enacted by Congress in 2009 that created new reporting requirements for major DOD headquarters activity personnel. According to DOD officials, the ever-changing statutory reporting requirements have contributed to DOD’s failure to report to Congress about the numbers of headquarters personnel. The DOD Instruction Does Not Include All Major DOD Headquarters Activity Organizations or Address Tracking of Contractors
According to our internal control standards, an agency must have relevant, reliable, and timely information in order to run and control its operations. Some of the services and functions performed by contractors could be considered part of major DOD headquarters activities. Some Information DOD Used to Identify Headquarters-Related Efficiency Initiatives Was Inaccurate and Some Resource Adjustments Will Be Made during Implementation
As the department did not have reliable major DOD headquarters activity data, DOD gathered information from multiple sources to compile headquarters-related information for the Secretary of Defense’s 2010 efficiency initiative. Because of the short timelines given to identify efficiencies and limitations on the sharing of information imposed on personnel by DOD to prevent disclosure of the decisions, this information was not validated with the DOD officials responsible for implementing the decisions to ensure that it was accurate. As a result, some information used to identify headquarters-related efficiency initiatives was inaccurate and some adjustments in resource allocations will have to be made during implementation to achieve planned savings. Without updating its guiding instruction to ensure that it has complete and reliable data on headquarters personnel and operating costs, DOD will not have the information it needs, which could affect its efforts to direct resources toward its main priorities. To improve DOD’s ability to identify how many headquarters personnel it has, including military, civilian and contractor personnel, and improve the information Congress and DOD need to ensure that headquarters organizations are appropriately sized and overhead positions are reduced to the extent possible, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of Administration and Management, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to revise DOD Instruction 5100.73, Major DOD Headquarters Activities, to include all major DOD headquarters activity organizations, specify how contractors performing major DOD headquarters activity functions will be identified and included in headquarters reporting, clarify how components are to compile the major DOD headquarters activities information needed to respond to the reporting requirements in section 1109 of the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, and establish time frames for implementing the actions above to improve tracking and reporting headquarters resources. This report evaluated the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) (1) examined its headquarters resources for efficiencies and (2) has complete and reliable headquarters information available for use in making efficiency decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defenses (DOD) headquarters and support organizations have grown since 2001, including increases in spending, staff, and numbers of senior executives and the proliferation of management layers. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to undertake a departmentwide initiative to reduce excess overhead costs. In response to a mandate, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD (1) examined its headquarters resources for efficiencies and (2) has complete and reliable headquarters information available for use in making efficiency decisions. For this review, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials regarding DODs headquarters resources and information.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken some steps to examine its headquarters resources for efficiencies, but additional opportunities for cost savings may exist by further consolidating organizations and centralizing functions. For purposes of the Secretary of Defenses efficiency initiative, DOD components were asked to focus in particular on headquarters and administrative functions, support activities, and other overhead in their portfolios. DODs fiscal year 2012 budget request included several efficiencies related to headquarters organizations or personnel. GAO found that these efficiencies generally fell into two categories: (1) consolidating or eliminating organizations based on geographic proximity or span of control and (2) centralizing overlapping functions and services. The DOD efficiencies that GAO reviewed to reduce headquarters resources are expected by DOD to save about $2.9 billion through fiscal year 2016, less than 2 percent of the $178 billion in savings DOD projected departmentwide. GAOs work indicates that DOD may be able to find additional efficiencies by further examining opportunities to consolidate organizations or centralize functions at headquarters. DOD may not have identified all areas where reductions in headquarters personnel and operating costs could be achieved because the department was working quickly to identify savings in the fiscal year 2012 budget and used a top-down approach that identified several targets of opportunity to reduce costs, including headquarters organizations, but left limited time for a detailed data-driven analysis. In February 2012, DOD proposed $61 billion in additional savings over fiscal years 2013 to 2017, but provided limited information as to what portions of these savings were specific to headquarters. Without systematic efforts to reexamine its headquarters resources on a more comprehensive basis, DOD may miss opportunities to shift resources away from overhead.
An underlying challenge facing DOD is that it does not have complete and reliable headquarters information available for use in making efficiency assessments and decisions. According to GAOs internal control standards, an agency must have relevant, reliable, and timely information in order to run and control its operations. DOD Instruction 5100.73 guides the identification and reporting of headquarters information. However, GAO found that this instruction is outdated and does not identify all headquarters organizations, such as component command headquarters at U.S. Africa Command and certain Marine Corps headquarters. Also, although some of the services and functions performed by contractors could be considered as headquarters activities, the instruction does not address the tracking of contractors that perform these functions. DOD has delayed updating the instruction to allow time for components to adjust to the statutory changes enacted by Congress in 2009 that created new headquarters reporting requirements. According to DOD officials, ever-changing statutory reporting requirements have contributed to DODs failure to report to Congress about the numbers of headquarters personnel. As the department did not have reliable headquarters data, DOD compiled related information from other sources to inform its 2010 efficiency initiative. Because of the short timelines given to identify efficiencies and limitations on the sharing of information, this information was not validated before decisions were made. As a result, some of the information used to identify headquarters-related efficiencies was inaccurate and some adjustments in resource allocations will have to be made during implementation to achieve planned savings. Looking to the future, until DOD has updated its instruction to ensure that it has complete and reliable headquarters data, the department will not have the information it needs, which could affect its efforts to direct resources to its main priorities during future budget deliberations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD continue to examine opportunities to consolidate organizations and centralize functions and services and revise DOD Instruction 5100.73 to include all headquarters organizations, specify how contractors performing headquarters functions will be identified and included in reporting, clarify how components are to compile information needed to respond to headquarters reporting requirements, and establish time frames for implementing these actions. DOD concurred with GAOs first recommendation and partially concurred with GAOs second recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-208 | gao_GAO-04-208_0 | Under the program, approved nonprofit organizations receive a discount when purchasing HUD-owned single-family properties and are required to rehabilitate and resell them to low- or moderate-income homebuyers. HUD did not implement all of the Inspector General’s recommendations. Specifically, the Inspector General’s report recommended that HUD suspend the program and evaluate it to determine whether the program was viable or should be discontinued. In 2002, the Discount Sales Program Cost HUD at Least $18.8 Million
We estimate that the Discount Sales Program cost HUD between $18.8 and $23.9 million in calendar year 2002. Most of this cost, between $15.1 and $20.2 million, was a reduction in net revenue resulting from HUD’s selling properties through the program rather than through its regular sales process. Personnel expenses for administering the program accounted for the remaining $3.7 million of HUD’s cost. The Discount Sales Program Is Not Likely to Benefit Most Homebuyers Financially but Can Help Them Access Homeownership Services and Assistance
Our analysis of 238 properties sold under the Discount Sales Program in calendar year 2002 indicates it is likely that most homebuyers did not benefit financially from the program. Specifically, assuming that nonprofits and homebuyers had the same rehab costs, we estimate that 76 percent of the homebuyers would have spent less if they had purchased the properties through HUD’s regular sales process and paid for the rehab work themselves. The Financial Benefit of the Program to Most Homebuyers is Doubtful
To determine the extent to which homebuyers benefited financially from purchasing a rehabilitated home through the Discount Sales Program, we performed a statistical analysis comparing what the homebuyers actually paid for these homes with our estimate of what they would have spent had they purchased the homes under HUD’s regular process and paid for the rehab work themselves. Limited Monitoring Efforts Have Uncovered Numerous Violations, but Effective Enforcement Has Been Difficult
The HOCs use two monitoring tools to assess nonprofits’ compliance with program requirements: desk reviews of annual reports and on-site evaluations. As shown in figure 1, 28 of the 44 nonprofits that had submitted annual reports as of July 2003 overcharged homebuyers for one or more properties. The instructions also mandated that nonprofits use the excess profits they earn by exceeding the 110 percent limit to pay down the mortgages of the homebuyers they overcharged. As of July 2003, the HOCs’ desk reviews had identified 28 nonprofits that made an estimated total of $704,720 in excess profits. Our analysis suggests that the program is of questionable benefit to most homebuyers. And despite the program’s significant cost, HUD has not determined whether the program is meeting its objectives of expanding affordable housing opportunities, helping to revitalize neighborhoods, and reducing HUD’s property inventory in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the cost of the Discount Sales Program to HUD, (2) the benefits of the program to homebuyers, and (3) HUD’s efforts to monitor participating nonprofits and enforce program requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2001, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Inspector General reported on serious problems in HUD's Discount Sales Program, under which nonprofit organizations purchase HUD-owned properties at a discount, rehabilitate them, and resell them to low- and moderate-income homebuyers. The objectives of the program are to expand affordable housing opportunities, help revitalize neighborhoods, and reduce HUD's property inventory in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner. Although the Inspector General recommended that the agency suspend the program and evaluate its viability, HUD did neither. GAO was asked to assess (1) the costs of the program to HUD, (2) the benefits of the program to homebuyers, and (3) HUD's efforts to monitor participating nonprofits and enforce program requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Discount Sales Program poses significant costs to HUD, is of questionable benefit to homebuyers, and has serious monitoring and compliance problems. GAO estimates that the program cost HUD between $18.8 and $23.9 million in calendar year 2002. Between $15.1 and $20.2 million was a reduction in net revenue resulting from HUD's selling approximately 1,200 properties through the program instead of through its regular sales process. Personnel expenses for administering the program accounted for the remaining $3.7 million. GAO's analysis of 238 properties sold under the program in 2002 suggests that most of the homebuyers did not benefit financially. Assuming that nonprofits and homebuyers would incur the same rehabilitation costs, GAO estimates that 76 percent of the homebuyers would have spent less purchasing the properties through HUD's regular process and paying for the rehabilitation work themselves. And while the program can help homebuyers access a range of homeownership services, these services are also available from other sources. GAO did not evaluate the extent to which the program generated other benefits, such as neighborhood revitalization. While uncovering numerous program violations, HUD's monitoring efforts have faced challenges. For example, HUD monitors nonprofits through desk reviews of the annual reports it requires nonprofits to submit each February. However, as of July 2003, HUD's four homeownership centers, which administer the program, had not received reports for more than half of the properties the agency estimates were purchased and resold under the program in 2002. Even with this problem, the desk reviews found that 28 of the 44 nonprofits that submitted reports violated resale limits, earning an estimated total of $704,720 in excess profits. HUD requires that nonprofits use their excess profits to pay down the mortgages of the homebuyers they overcharged, but the agency's ability to enforce this requirement is extremely limited. As of July 2003, nonprofits had made only $62,000 in payments on mortgages. |
gao_GAO-08-177T | gao_GAO-08-177T_0 | Background
Intellectual property, for which the U.S. government provides broad protection through means such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks, plays a significant role in the U.S. economy, and the United States is an acknowledged leader in its creation. Intellectual Property Rights Coordinator, industries that relied on IP protection were estimated to account for over half of all U.S. exports, represented 40 percent of U.S. economic growth, and employed about 18 million Americans in 2006. However, the economic benefits that copyrights, trademarks, and patents bring are threatened by the fact that legal protection of IP varies greatly around the world, and several countries are havens for the production of counterfeit and pirated goods. Although the public is often not aware of the issues and consequences surrounding IP theft, counterfeit products raise serious public health and safety concerns, and the annual losses that companies face from IP violations are substantial. Eight federal agencies as well as entities within them undertake a wide range of activities in support of protecting IP rights, as shown in figure 1. Intellectual Property Increasingly at Risk As Firms Operate Globally and Economic Incentives and Technology Facilitate IP Theft, Which is Exacerbated by Weak Enforcement
U.S. intellectual property is increasingly at risk of theft as U.S. firms become more integrated into the world economy and the production of more sophisticated processes and investments move overseas. High profits and technological advances have also increased the risk of IP infringements by making counterfeiting and piracy progressively attractive and easy, while the deterrents, such as penalties and other measures, fail to keep pace. The seriousness of these risks has been exacerbated by weak enforcement in some countries, particularly China, whose enforcement problems has persisted despite U.S. efforts. U.S. Efforts to Coordinate IP Activities and Enforce Laws at the Border Need Improvement
While the U.S. faces significant obstacles when trying to ensure effective IP protection abroad, it also faces some significant challenges in coordinating domestic efforts and ensuring that this issue remains a priority. The large number of agencies involved in IP protection issues (see figure 1) demonstrates the cross-cutting nature of the issue and the importance of coordination. However, in our recent report on the law enforcement coordinating council, we found that the effectiveness and the long-term viability of the coordinating structure is uncertain. Another challenge is that each of these agencies have multiple missions, and within the agencies it may be a challenge to ensure that IP enforcement gets sufficient priority. Our report on the efforts of CBP to interdict counterfeit goods at the border found that the bulk of CBP’s enforcement outcomes in recent years have been generated by pockets of activity within certain modes of transport and product types as well as among a limited number of port locations. Despite recent increases in seizure outcomes, CBP lacks an approach to further improve border enforcement outcomes, and has been focused on efforts that have produced limited results, while not taking the initiative to understand and address the variations among ports. Although CBP has reported increases in the number and value of IP seizures, our analysis found that the bulk of these seizures have been generated by a limited number of ports and that recent increases in seizure actions can be attributed to a growing number of small-value seizures made from air-based modes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Intellectual property plays a significant role in the U.S. economy, and the United States is an acknowledged leader in its creation. Industries that relied on IP protection were estimated to account for over half of all U.S. exports and employed about 18 million Americans in 2006. However, legal protection of IP varies greatly around the world, and several countries are havens for the production of counterfeit and pirated goods. Counterfeit products raise serious public health and safety concerns, and the annual losses that companies face from IP violations are substantial. Eight federal agencies undertake a wide range of activities in support of protecting IP rights, and two mechanisms coordinate protection efforts: the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC) and the Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP). GAO was asked to address: (1) the nature of the risks that U.S. corporations face in protecting IP, particularly in countries such as China, and (2) U.S. methods for implementing and coordinating domestic IP enforcement activities. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports that focused on IP protection and related trade matters.
What GAO Found
U.S. intellectual property is increasingly at risk of theft as U.S. firms become more integrated into the world economy and the production of more sophisticated processes and investments move overseas. High profits and technological advances have also increased the risk of IP infringements by making counterfeiting and piracy more attractive and easy to conduct. At the same time, deterrents such as penalties and other measures have failed to keep pace. The seriousness of these risks has been exacerbated by weak enforcement in some countries, particularly China. While the U.S. faces significant obstacles when trying to ensure effective IP protection abroad, it also faces serious challenges in coordinating domestic efforts and ensuring that IP protection remains a priority. The large number of federal agencies involved, due to the cross-cutting nature of IP protection, makes coordination particularly important. However, GAO's recent report on coordinating mechanisms for federal IP protection, we found that the effectiveness and long-term viability of the coordinating structure is uncertain. In addition, each of the agencies involved in IP has multiple missions, and it is a challenge to ensure that IP enforcement is a sufficiently high priority. GAO's report on the efforts of the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) to interdict counterfeit goods at the border found that the bulk of CBP's enforcement outcomes in recent years have been generated by pockets of activity within certain modes of transport and product types as well as among a limited number of port locations. While the number of seizure actions has increased, this growth can be attributed to a growing number of small-value seizures made from air-based modes. CBP lacks an approach to further improve border enforcement outcomes; it has been focused on efforts that have produced limited results, while not taking the initiative to understand and address the variations among ports. |
gao_GAO-06-971T | gao_GAO-06-971T_0 | Background
CMS calculates payment rates for each Part B drug with information on price data that manufacturers report quarterly to the agency. Certain prices, including prices paid by federal purchasers, are excluded, as are prices for drugs furnished under Medicare Part D. CMS instructs pharmaceutical manufacturers to report data to CMS—within 30 days after the end of each quarter—on the average sale price for each Part B drug sold by the manufacturer. ASP Is a Practical Payment Approach, Given the Limitations of Other Data Sources Available for Rate- Setting
Using an ASP-based method to set prices for Medicare Part B drugs is a practical approach compared with alternative data sources for several reasons. First, unlike AWP, ASP is based on actual transactions, making it a useful proxy for health care providers’ acquisition costs. In addition, basing payments on charges does not offer any incentives for health care providers to minimize their acquisition costs. Second, ASPs offer relatively timely information for rate-setting purposes. In comparison, rates for other Medicare payment systems are based on data that may be at least 2 years old. Third, acquiring price data from manufacturers is preferable to surveying health care providers, as the manufacturers have data systems in place that track prices, whereas the latter generally do not have systems designed for that purpose. CMS Lacks Information on ASP Necessary to Monitor Payment Rate Accuracy and Appropriateness
Despite its practicality as a data source, ASP remains a “black box.” That is, CMS lacks detailed information about the components of manufacturers’ reported price data—namely, methods manufacturers use to allocate rebates to individual drugs and the sales prices paid by type of purchaser. This bundle may include more than one drug or a mixture of drugs and other products, such as bandages and surgical gloves. As a result, CMS lacks the detail it needs to validate the reasonableness of the data underlying the reported prices. In particular, to the extent that some of the sales are to wholesalers that may subsequently mark up the manufacturer’s price in their sales to health care providers, the ASP’s representation of providers’ acquisition costs is weakened. In our 2005 report on Medicare’s proposed 2006 SCOD payment rates, we recommended that CMS collect information on price data by purchaser type to validate the reasonableness of ASP as a measure of hospital acquisition costs. For most types of providers of Medicare Part B drugs—physicians, dialysis facilities, and DME suppliers—no empirical support exists for setting rates at 6 percent above ASP. In commenting on CMS’s proposed 2006 rates to pay for SCODs, we raised questions about CMS’s rationale for proposing rates that were set at 6 percent above ASP. Lacking detail on the components of ASP, CMS is not well-positioned to confirm ASP’s accuracy. Concluding Observations
Because ASP is based on actual transaction data, is relatively timely, and is administratively efficient for CMS and health care providers, we affirm the practicality of the ASP-based method for setting Part B drug payment rates. However, we remain concerned that CMS does not have sufficient information about ASP to ensure the accuracy and appropriateness of the rates. Equally important is the ability to evaluate the appropriateness of Medicare’s ASP-based rate for all providers of Part B drugs over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), as required by law, began paying for physician-administered Part B drugs using information on the drugs' average sales price (ASP). Subsequently, CMS selected ASP as the basis to pay for a subset of Part B drugs provided at hospital outpatient departments. To calculate ASP, CMS uses price data submitted quarterly by manufacturers. GAO was asked to discuss its work on Medicare payment rates for Part B drugs. This testimony is based on several GAO products: Medicare Hospital Pharmaceuticals: Survey Shows Price Variation and Highlights Data Collection Lessons and Outpatient Rate-Setting Challenges for CMS, GAO-06-372 , Apr. 28, 2006; Medicare: Comments on CMS Proposed 2006 Rates for Specified Covered Outpatient Drugs and Radiopharmaceuticals Used in Hospitals, GAO-06-17R , Oct. 31, 2005; and Medicare: Payments for Covered Outpatient Drugs Exceed Providers' Costs, GAO-01-1118 , Sept. 21, 2001. Specifically, GAO's statement discusses (1) ASP as a practical and timely data source for use in setting Medicare Part B drug payment rates and (2) components of ASP that are currently unknown and implications for Medicare rate-setting.
What GAO Found
In summary, using an ASP-based method to set payment rates for Part B drugs is a practical approach compared with methods based on alternative data sources, for several reasons. First, ASP is based on actual transactions and is a better proxy for providers' acquisition costs than average wholesale price or providers' charges included on claims for payment, neither of which is based on transaction data. Second, ASPs, which manufacturers update quarterly, offer information that is relatively timely for rate-setting purposes. In comparison, rates for other Medicare payment systems are based on data that may be at least 2 years old. Finally, using manufacturers as the data source for prices is preferable to collecting such data from health care providers, as the manufacturers have data systems in place to track prices, whereas health care providers generally do not have systems designed for that purpose. CMS lacks certain information about the composition of ASP that prompted GAO, in commenting on CMS's 2006 proposed payment rates for a subset of Part B drugs, to call ASP "a black box." Significantly, CMS lacks sufficient information on how manufacturers allocate rebates to individual drugs sold in combination with other drugs or other products; this is important, as CMS does not have the detail it needs to validate the reasonableness of the data underlying the reported prices. In addition, CMS does not instruct manufacturers to provide a breakdown of price and volume data by purchaser type--that is, by physicians, hospitals, other health providers, and wholesalers, which purchase drugs for resale to health care providers. As a result, CMS cannot determine how well average price data represent acquisition costs for different purchaser types. In particular, to the extent that some of the sales are to wholesalers that subsequently mark up the manufacturer's price in their sales to providers, the ASP's representation of providers' acquisition costs is weakened. Additionally, a sufficient empirical foundation does not exist for setting the payment rate for Medicare Part B drugs at 6 percent above ASP, further complicating efforts to determine the appropriateness of the rate. Given these information gaps, CMS is not well-positioned to validate the accuracy or appropriateness of its ASP-based payment rates. |
gao_GAO-02-627T | gao_GAO-02-627T_0 | President Bush took a number of important steps in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks to strengthen the country’s homeland security efforts, including the creation of an Office of Homeland Security (OHS). The success of a homeland security strategy relies on the ability of all levels of government and the private sector to communicate and cooperate effectively with one another. Among other things, it is incumbent on the federal government to formulate realistic budget and resource plans to support the implementation of an efficient and effective homeland security program. A fundamental review of existing programs and operations can create much-needed fiscal flexibility to address emerging needs by weeding out programs that are out-dated, poorly targeted, or inefficiently designed and managed. | What GAO Found
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Administration took several steps to strengthen homeland security, including the creation of an Office of Homeland Security (OHS). The success of a homeland security strategy requires all levels of government and the private sector to communicate and cooperate with one another. The federal government must formulate realistic budget and resource plans to support the implementation of an efficient and effective homeland security program. A fundamental review of existing programs and operations can create the necessary fiscal flexibility by weeding out out-dated, poorly targeted, or inefficient programs. Although Congress called upon GAO to evaluate the effectiveness of OHS programs, GAO has experienced difficulty in gaining access to this information. |
gao_GAO-03-16 | gao_GAO-03-16_0 | A 1999 amendment established the requirement for the future-years report. Weaknesses in Data Preclude Determinations of Compliance in Prior-Years Report
DOD’s prior-years report for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 showed the Departments of the Army and Navy to be below the 50-percent funding limitation on private-sector workloads and the Air Force to be above it (see table 1). However, recurring weaknesses in DOD’s data gathering and reporting processes prevented us from determining with precision whether the services had complied with the 50-50 requirement. As a result of transcription errors in compiling the Army’s prior-years report, depot maintenance funds for two major commands were reported in the millions rather than thousands of dollars, greatly overstating both public and private workloads by a total of $414 million for 2000 and 2001—an 8 percent overstatement. As authorized under 10 U.S.C. Support contracts. Contractor augmentees. Future-Year Projections Are Not Reasonable and Not Very Useful
The projections of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in DOD’s 50-50 report for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 are not reasonable estimates of the future allocations of funding for public- and private-sector workloads. We also noted that they are based, in part, on incorrect data, questionable assumptions, and some inconsistencies with existing budgets and management plans. For example, compared to the future-years report submitted to the Congress last year, the Army reported substantially more workload in total and increased private-sector percentages this year. The Navy’s data did not include the Trident missile work and Aegis software maintenance, understating private-sector funding an estimated $162 million per year and understating public-sector funding about $80 million per year. This occurs because of the changing nature of projections, a combination of errors and omissions, less emphasis by the services on the collection and validation of future-years data, and the use of ever-changing budgetary estimates to construct projections. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the 50-50 data collection, validation, and reporting processes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy, Programs, and Resources, in conjunction with the secretaries of the military departments, clarify guidance on (1) the exemption of partnering workloads from the 50-50 requirement and (2) the treatment of component repair costs to prevent the double counting in 50-50 reports when the repaired items are used in higher-level assemblies; the Secretary of the Navy to (1) direct the use of the Naval Audit Service to review and validate 50-50 processes and data during next year’s and subsequent reporting cycles and (2) revise its guidance in order to report nonnuclear-related depot maintenance and modification work accomplished on aircraft carriers in conjunction with nuclear refueling overhauls as discussed in this report; the Secretary of the Army to (1) initiate steps to improve management and controls of the 50-50 data collection and documentation process and (2) finalize and issue guidance concerning the reporting of depot maintenance at nondepot locations; the Secretary of the Air Force to determine the extent and nature of depot maintenance and depot-like tasks accomplished at nondepot locations (including field and regional maintenance centers) and apart from Air Force Materiel Command reporting responsibility and, pending the outcome of that determination, revise Air Force 50-50 guidance and management processes for tasking, collecting, and validating data in order to ensure more complete and consistent reporting of 50-50 data; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to (1) initiate steps to improve management and controls of the 50-50 data collection and documentation process and (2) ensure that 50-50 reporting guidance is disseminated and understood by all potential reporting organizations. 2466. Defense Depot Maintenance: Information on Public and Private Sector Workload Allocations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under 10 U.S.C. 2466, the military services and defense agencies can use no more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding for work by private-sector contractors. The Department of Defense (DOD) is to submit two reports to the Congress annually on the costs of public- and private-sector depot maintenance workloads: a "prior-years" report on the past 2 fiscal years and a "future-years" report on the next 5. Section 2466 also requires GAO to report to the Congress on whether DOD complied with the so-called "50-50 requirement" in the prior-years report and whether the future-years projections are reasonable. This report fulfills that requirement.
What GAO Found
While DOD's prior-years report for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 showed the U.S. Army and Navy to be below the 50-percent funding limitation on private sector workloads and the Air Force to be above it, continuing weaknesses in DOD's data gathering and reporting processes prevented GAO from determining with precision whether the services complied with the 50-50 requirement. As in past years, GAO found errors and omissions in the data. For example, the Army erroneously reported workloads at two commands in millions of dollars instead of thousands of dollars, resulting in a $414 million--or 8 percent--overstatement of both public- and private-sector obligations for the 2 years in total. Because of the changing nature of budget projections and supporting data deficiencies, the future-years report does not provide reasonable estimates of public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations for fiscal years 2002 through 2006. The services tend to place less emphasis and priority on collecting and validating future-years data. The reported projections are based, in part, on incorrect data, questionable assumptions, and some inconsistencies with existing budgets and management plans. For example, the Navy did not report depot maintenance workloads for a missile system and a ship defensive system, understating funding for private-sector work each year by an estimated $162 million and public-sector work by about $80 million. |
gao_GAO-17-474 | gao_GAO-17-474_0 | Known Smuggling Events Persisted but Generally Declined from Fiscal Years 2011 through 2016, According to DHS Data
Tunnel Discoveries Were Concentrated on the Southwest Border and Have Generally Declined since Fiscal Year 2011
Our analysis of Border Patrol tunnel data showed that there were 67 cross-border tunnels discovered along U.S. borders from fiscal years 2011 through 2016, all located on the southwest border, as shown in figure 4. However, the actual number of maritime smuggling events and the amount of drugs smuggled by these methods is unknown. As discussed later, DHS S&T has projects underway to enhance maritime domain awareness. Facilitating this type of comprehensive assessment could help better inform management resource allocation decisions. In addition, DHS has established coordination mechanisms that specifically target the selected smuggling methods. Specifically, we found that not all officials addressing cross-border tunnels were aware of—and thus not accessing—all relevant DHS systems or offices with tunnel information. Documenting such assessments, consistent with standards for internal control, prior to making investment decisions would also enhance transparency by providing stakeholders visibility into rationales for investment decisions over time. Establishing and Monitoring Performance Measures Could Allow DHS to Better Assess Effectiveness of Efforts to Address the Selected Smuggling Methods
DHS has established or is in the process of establishing high-level smuggling-related performance measures and DHS components collect data regarding the prevalence of cross-border tunnel, ultralight aircraft and selected maritime smuggling, but DHS has not assessed the effectiveness of its efforts specific to addressing these smuggling methods. Conclusions
As transnational criminal organizations have adapted their techniques to smuggle drugs and humans through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels to evade detection, it is vital that DHS respond accordingly in its border security enforcement efforts. DHS has also invested in technology to help detect and track subterranean, aerial, and maritime smuggling, including various technologies to help detect and track ultralight aircraft; however, CBP has not assessed and documented how all of the alternative ultralight aircraft technical solutions being considered will fully address operational requirements or the costs and benefits associated with different approaches. By establishing performance measures and regularly monitoring performance against targets, managers could obtain valuable information on successful approaches and areas that could be improved to help ensure that both technology investments and operational responses to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following six actions: 1. develop standardized, departmentwide definitions for maritime vessels used for smuggling in the DHS Lexicon; 2. direct the CBP-ICE tunnel committee to convene and establish standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, including procedures for sharing information; 3. direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess and document how the alternative technological solutions being considered will fully meet operational needs related to ultralight aircraft; 4. direct the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE to jointly establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to cross-border tunnels; 5. direct the Commissioner of CBP to establish and monitor performance targets related to ultralight aircraft; and 6. direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of ICE to establish and monitor RECOM performance measures and targets related to panga boat and recreational vessel smuggling. DHS concurred with four of the six recommendations in the report and described actions underway or planned to address them. For example, as noted in our report, the BEST Tunnel Task Forces do not currently have documented standard operating procedures for addressing tunnels. How has DHS addressed smuggling by these methods? The information gathered from our site visits is not generalizable to other locations but provides insights into DHS’s responses to these incursions and efforts to use risk and performance information to stop future smuggling incidents using these methods. | Why GAO Did This Study
As DHS has increased the security of overland smuggling routes, transnational criminal organizations have adapted their techniques to smuggle drugs and humans through alternative methods. These methods include cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational maritime vessels. While these methods account for a small proportion of known smuggling, they can be used to transport significant quantities of drugs or for terrorist activity. GAO was asked to review DHS's efforts to address subterranean, aerial, and maritime smuggling. This report addresses, among other things, (1) the known prevalence of the aforementioned smuggling methods, (2) efforts to address them, and (3) efforts to assess the results of activities to counter them. GAO analyzed relevant procedures, reports, and data for fiscal years 2011 through 2016. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and conducted site visits to locations in California, Arizona, and Florida, chosen based upon past detection of smuggling by the selected methods, among other things. The information from the site visits is not generalizable, but provided valuable insights.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data showed that there were 67 discovered cross-border tunnels, 534 detected ultralight aircraft incursions, and 309 detected drug smuggling incidents involving panga boats (a fishing vessel) and recreational vessels along U.S. mainland borders from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. The number of known smuggling events involving these methods generally declined over this period, but they remain threats.
DHS has established various coordination mechanisms and invested in technology to address select smuggling methods in the subterranean, aerial, and maritime domains. For example, DHS established interagency task forces to investigate cross-border tunnels. However, DHS has not established comprehensive standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, and we found that relevant officials were not aware of all DHS systems or offices with tunnel information. By establishing procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, DHS could provide strategic guidance and facilitate information sharing departmentwide, consistent with standards for internal control. DHS has also invested or plans to invest in at least five technology projects to help detect and track ultralight aircraft. However, DHS has not assessed and documented how all of the alternative ultralight aircraft technical solutions it is considering will fully address operational requirements or the costs and benefits associated with these different solutions. This type of analysis could help better position DHS to use its resources effectively and ensure that operational needs are met, consistent with risk management best practices.
DHS has established high-level smuggling performance measures and collects data on smuggling by tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels; however, DHS has not assessed its efforts specific to addressing these smuggling methods to, for example, compare the percent of detected panga boat and recreational smuggling events that are interdicted against targeted performance levels. By establishing measures and regularly monitoring performance against targets, managers could obtain valuable information on successful approaches and areas that could be improved to help ensure that technology investments and operational responses to address these smuggling methods are effective, consistent with standards for internal control. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in February 2017. Information DHS deemed For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that DHS establish procedures for addressing tunnels, assess ultralight aircraft technology, and establish performance measures and targets. DHS concurred with four recommendations and disagreed with those to establish tunnel procedures and maritime performance measures, citing other efforts. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-04-333 | gao_GAO-04-333_0 | The CFSR Is a Valuable yet Substantial Undertaking, but Data Enhancements Could Improve Its Reliability
ACF and many state officials perceive the CFSR as a valuable process— highlighting many areas needing improvement—and a substantial undertaking, but some state officials and child welfare experts told us that data enhancements could improve its reliability. Further, 26 of the 36 states responding to a relevant question in our survey commented that they generally or completely agreed with the results of the final CFSR report, even though none of the 41 states with final CFSR reports released through 2003 has achieved substantial conformity on all 14 outcomes and systemic factors. In addition, both ACF and the states have dedicated substantial financial and staff resources to the process. However, several state officials and child welfare experts we interviewed questioned the accuracy of the data used to compile state profiles and establish the national standards. While ACF officials in the central office contend that stakeholder interviews and case reviews compliment the data profiles, many state officials and experts reported that additional data from the statewide assessment could bolster the evaluation of state performance. ACF staff in 8 of the 10 regions considered the CFSR a helpful tool to improve outcomes for children. All of the states we visited experienced discrepant findings between the aggregate data from the statewide assessment and the information obtained from the on-site review, which complicated ACF’s determination of states’ performance. Further, at least 9 states responding to our survey indicated that insufficient time, funding, and staff, as well as high caseloads, were the greatest challenges to PIP implementation. As states progress in PIP implementation, some ACF officials expressed a need for more guidance on how to monitor state accomplishments, and both ACF and state officials were uncertain about how the estimated financial penalties would be applied if states fail to achieve the goals described in their plans. ACF’s Focus Rests Almost Exclusively on Implementing the CFSR
To implement the CFSRs, ACF has focused its activities almost entirely on the four phases of the review process. However, staff in several regions report limitations in providing assistance to states in helping them to meet key federal goals. While ACF officials in the central office said that the CFSR has become the primary method for evaluating states’ performance, they acknowledged that regional staff might still be adjusting to the new way ACF oversees child welfare programs. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, state child welfare directors, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
The objectives of our study were to report on (1) ACF’s and the states’ experiences preparing for and conducting the statewide assessments and on-site reviews; (2) ACF’s and the states’ experiences developing, funding, and implementing items in the PIP; and (3) additional efforts that ACF has taken beyond the CFSR to ensure that all states meet federal goals of safety, permanency, and well-being. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2001, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF) implemented the Child and Family Services Reviews (CFSR) to increase states' accountability. The CFSR uses states' data profiles and statewide assessments, as well as interviews and an on-site case review, to measure state performance on 14 outcomes and systemic factors, including child well-being and the provision of caseworker training. The CFSR also requires progress on a program improvement plan (PIP); otherwise ACF may apply financial penalties. This report examines (1) ACF's and the states' experiences preparing for and conducting the statewide assessments and on-site reviews; (2) ACF's and the states' experiences developing, funding, and implementing items in PIPs; and (3) any additional efforts that ACF has taken beyond the CFSR to help ensure that all states meet federal goals related to children's safety, permanency, and well-being.
What GAO Found
ACF and many state officials perceive the CFSR as a valuable process and a substantial undertaking, but some data enhancements could improve its reliability. ACF staff in 8 of the 10 regions considered the CFSR a helpful tool to improve outcomes for children. Further, 26 of 36 states responding to a relevant question in our survey commented that they generally or completely agreed with the results of the final CFSR report, even though none of the 41 states with final CFSR reports released through 2003 has achieved substantial conformity on all 14 outcomes and systemic factors. Additionally, both ACF and the states have dedicated substantial financial and staff resources to the process. Nevertheless, several state officials and child welfare experts we interviewed questioned the accuracy of the data used in the review process. While ACF officials contend that stakeholder interviews and case reviews complement the data profiles, many state officials and experts reported that additional data from the statewide assessment could bolster the evaluation of state performance. Program improvement planning is under way, but uncertainties have affected the development, funding, and implementation of state PIPs. Officials from 3 of the 5 states we visited said ACF's PIP-related instructions were unclear, and at least 9 of the 25 states reporting on PIP implementation in our survey said that insufficient funding and staff were among the greatest challenges. While ACF has provided some guidance, ACF and state officials remain uncertain about PIP monitoring efforts and how ACF will apply financial penalties if states fail to achieve their stated PIP objectives. Since 2001, ACF's focus has been almost exclusively on the CFSRs and regional staff report limitations in providing assistance to states in helping them to meet key federal goals. While staff from half of ACF's regions told us they would like to provide more targeted assistance to states, and state officials in all 5 of the states we visited said that ACF's existing technical assistance efforts could be improved, ACF officials acknowledged that regional staff might still be adjusting to the new way ACF oversees child welfare programs. |
gao_GAO-07-812T | gao_GAO-07-812T_0 | Under New Starts, FTA identifies and recommends fixed-guideway transit projects for funding—including heavy, light, and commuter rail; ferry; and certain bus projects (such as bus rapid transit). 1). FTA Has Made Progress in Implementing SAFETEA-LU Changes, but Work Remains
SAFETEA-LU made a number of changes to the New Starts program and FTA has made progress in implementing some of those changes. However, FTA has more work to do to implement these changes. For example, SAFETEA-LU added economic development to the list of evaluation criteria that FTA must use in evaluating and rating New Starts projects and required FTA to issue notice and guidance each time significant changes are made to the program. This program is intended to advance smaller-scale projects through an expedited and streamlined evaluation and rating process. The July 2006 interim guidance introduced a separate eligibility category within the Small Starts program for “Very Small Starts” projects. Small Starts projects that qualify as Very Small Starts are simple, low-cost projects that FTA has determined qualify for a simplified evaluation and rating process. Project sponsors identified two key issues for FTA to consider as it moves forward in implementing SAFETEA-LU changes: further streamline the Small Starts program and fully incorporate economic development into the New Starts and Small Starts evaluation and rating processes. Project Sponsors Would Like FTA to Further Streamline the Small Starts Program
In implementing the Small Starts program, FTA has taken steps to streamline the application and evaluation and rating process for smaller- scale transit projects, as envisioned by SAFETEA-LU. According to our analysis of the number and types of requirements for the New Starts and Small Starts application processes, the Small Starts process has fewer requirements. Specifically, FTA currently assigns a weight of 50 percent each to cost-effectiveness and land use to calculate a project’s overall rating; the other four statutorily-identified criteria, including economic development, mobility improvements, operating efficiencies, and environmental benefits, are not weighted. However, FTA officials told us that few project sponsors submit information on their projects’ economic development benefits for consideration as an “other factor.” We previously reported that FTA’s reliance on two evaluation criteria to calculate a project’s overall rating is drifting away from the multiple-measure evaluation and rating process outlined in statute and current New Starts regulations. Specifically, by not weighting economic development, the project sponsors and industry groups said that the evaluation and rating process does not consider an important benefit of some transit projects. FTA Officials and Project Sponsors Attribute Changes in the Size and Composition of the New Starts Pipeline to Different Factors
The number of projects in the New Starts pipeline has decreased since the fiscal year 2001 evaluation and rating cycle, and the types of projects in the pipeline have changed. The Number of Projects in the New Starts Pipeline Has Decreased, and the Types of Projects Have Changed
Since the fiscal year 2001 evaluation cycle, the number of projects in the New Starts pipeline—which includes projects that are in the preliminary engineering or final design phases—has decreased by more than half, from 48 projects in the fiscal year 2001 evaluation cycle to 19 projects in the fiscal year 2008 evaluation cycle. 2). FTA officials cited their increased scrutiny of applications to help ensure that only the strongest projects enter the pipeline, and said they had taken steps to remove projects from the pipeline that were inactive, not advancing, or did not adequately address identified problems. 3). Our survey results also reflect many of the reasons for the decline in the New Starts pipeline. Future Demand for New Starts and Small Starts Programs Expected
Our survey of project sponsors indicates that there will be a future demand for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts funding. Although the project sponsors we surveyed indicated that they were considering a range of project type alternatives in their planning, the most commonly cited alternatives were bus rapid transit and light rail. In addition, of 28 project sponsors that intend to seek Small Starts or Very Small Starts funding for their planned projects, 13 have not previously applied for New Starts, Small Starts, or Very Small Starts funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through the New Starts program, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) identifies and recommends new fixed-guideway transit projects for funding--including heavy, light, and commuter rail; ferry; and certain bus projects. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) authorized the New Starts program through fiscal year 2009 and made a number of changes to the program, including creating a separate program commonly called Small Starts. This program is intended to offer an expedited and streamlined evaluation and rating process for smaller-scale transit projects. FTA subsequently introduced a separate eligibility category within the Small Starts program for "Very Small Starts" projects. Very Small Starts projects are simple, low-risk projects that FTA has determined qualify for a simplified evaluation and rating process. This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary findings on (1) FTA's implementation of SAFETEA-LU changes to the New Starts program, (2) the extent to which the New Starts pipeline (i.e., projects in the preliminary engineering and final design phases) has changed over time, and (3) future trends for the New Starts and Small Starts pipelines. To address these objectives, GAO surveyed 215 project sponsors and interviewed FTA officials, 15 project sponsors, and 3 industry groups. Our survey response rate was 77 percent.
What GAO Found
FTA has made progress in implementing SAFETEA-LU changes, but more work remains. Project sponsors frequently identified two key issues for FTA to consider as it moves forward in implementing SAFETEA-LU changes: (1) further streamline the Small Starts program and (2) fully incorporate economic development as a criterion in the New Starts and Small Starts evaluation and rating processes. According to our analysis of the number and types of requirements for New Starts and Small Starts application processes, the Small Starts process has fewer requirements. However, project sponsors said that FTA should further streamline the process by, for example, eliminating requests for duplicate information requested in required worksheets. SAFETEA-LU added economic development to the list of project justification evaluation criteria that FTA must use to evaluate and rate projects. However, FTA currently assigns a weight of 50 percent each to cost-effectiveness and land use in calculating a project's overall rating--the other 4 statutorily identified criteria, including economic development, are not weighted. We previously reported that FTA's reliance on two evaluation criteria to calculate a project's overall rating is drifting away from the multiple-measure evaluation and rating process outlined in statute. Further, without a weight for economic development, project sponsors say, the evaluation and rating process does not reflect an important benefit of certain projects. FTA officials said they are currently working to develop an appropriate economic development measure as part of their upcoming rulemaking. The New Starts pipeline--that is, projects in different stages of planning--has changed in size and composition since the fiscal year 2001 evaluation and rating cycle, and a variety of factors have contributed to these changes. Since then, the number of projects in the New Starts pipeline has decreased by more than half. Additionally, the types of projects in the pipeline have changed during this time frame, as bus rapid transit projects are now more common than commuter or light rail projects. FTA officials attributed the decrease in the pipeline to their increased scrutiny of applications to help ensure that only the strongest projects enter the pipeline, and to their efforts to remove projects from the pipeline that were not advancing or did not adequately address identified problems. Project sponsors GAO interviewed provided other reasons for the pipeline's decrease, including that the New Starts process is too complex, time-consuming, and costly. Our survey results reflect many of these same reasons for the decline in the pipeline. Despite these concerns, GAO's survey of project sponsors indicates future demand for New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts funding. The sponsors GAO surveyed reported having 137 planned projects and intend to seek New Starts, Small Starts, or Very Small Starts funding for almost three-fourths of these projects. Project sponsors GAO surveyed also reported considering a range of project type alternatives in their planning. The most commonly cited alternatives were bus rapid transit and light rail. |
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