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The Supreme Court's recent clarification of the scope of .the Confrontation Clause also eliminates any need to analyze the admissibility of the tape-recording under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, under which "[a]n accused is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when the confession of a non-testifying codefendant that implicates the accused is introduced into evidence at their joint trial ... even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only as evidence against the codefendant." Because it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimonial statements. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction",
"sentence": "Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 191-92, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (discussing when statements otherwise inadmissible under Bruton may be cured by redaction)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112",
"parenthetical": "\"[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Pugh, 273 Fed.Appx. 449, 455 (6th Cir.2008) (“[T]he statement at issue ... is nontestimonial in nature, and therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause as analyzed under Bruton or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Vargas, 570 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that Bruton does not apply to nontestimonial co-defendant statements); United States v. Pike, 292 Fed.Appx. 108, 112 (2d Cir.2008) (“[Bjecause the statement was not testimonial, its admission does not violate either Crawford [] or Bruton [ ].”). The inapplicability of Bruton and the Confrontation Clause to O’Reilly’s statements also forecloses Johnson’s argument that the tape-recording should have been redacted to eliminate the use of Johnson’s name."
} | 5,755,359 | b |
Here, only Pearson's mental state was disputed at trial. The jury had the opportunity to convict Pearson of either aggravated murder, which requires knowing or intentional killing, or simple murder, which in the case of killing a peace officer requires only recklessness. Because the jury chose to convict for aggravated murder, the court's refusal to give an instruction on manslaughter, an offense requiring recklessness, constituted at most harmless error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "685 P.2d 551, 555-56",
"parenthetical": "reversing conviction for assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury where defendant's request for instruction on lesser included offense of simple assault was refused and jury was thus forced to choose between conviction and acquittal",
"sentence": "But see State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah 1984) (reversing conviction for assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury where defendant’s request for instruction on lesser included offense of simple assault was refused and jury was thus forced to choose between conviction and acquittal)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "782 P.2d 459, 464",
"parenthetical": "holding that where jury had opportunity to convict defendant of manslaughter but convicted of greater offense of second degree murder, refusing to give instruction on negligent homicide was, if error, harmless",
"sentence": "See State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah 1989) (holding that where jury had opportunity to convict defendant of manslaughter but convicted of greater offense of second degree murder, refusing to give instruction on negligent homicide was, if error, harmless)."
} | 11,912,479 | b |
The plaintiffs' representative received either a copy of the motion presented at the board meeting or a draft copy of the Notice of Action the day after the decision was rendered and thus was able to discern the reasons for the board's denial. The motion contained the reasons for the denial of the site plan application, and the draft Notice of Action also contained reasons for the board's decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 N.H. 290, 290",
"parenthetical": "statute satisfied because plaintiff well aware of primary reasons for denial of plan",
"sentence": "See K & P, Inc., 133 N.H. at 290, 575 A.2d at 808 (statute satisfied because plaintiff well aware of primary reasons for denial of plan). Lack of a final version of the reasons for the board’s decision, which was not statutorily required as of the time the decision was rendered, did not divest the plaintiffs of the ability to file their appeal timely."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "109 N.H. 176, 176",
"parenthetical": "temporary unavailability of minutes did not relieve plaintiffs of necessity of stating ground for their motion for rehearing",
"sentence": "Cf. DiPietro, 109 N.H. at 176, 246 A.2d at 696 (temporary unavailability of minutes did not relieve plaintiffs of necessity of stating ground for their motion for rehearing)."
} | 1,401,713 | a |
The plaintiffs' representative received either a copy of the motion presented at the board meeting or a draft copy of the Notice of Action the day after the decision was rendered and thus was able to discern the reasons for the board's denial. The motion contained the reasons for the denial of the site plan application, and the draft Notice of Action also contained reasons for the board's decision. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "246 A.2d 696, 696",
"parenthetical": "temporary unavailability of minutes did not relieve plaintiffs of necessity of stating ground for their motion for rehearing",
"sentence": "Cf. DiPietro, 109 N.H. at 176, 246 A.2d at 696 (temporary unavailability of minutes did not relieve plaintiffs of necessity of stating ground for their motion for rehearing)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 N.H. 290, 290",
"parenthetical": "statute satisfied because plaintiff well aware of primary reasons for denial of plan",
"sentence": "See K & P, Inc., 133 N.H. at 290, 575 A.2d at 808 (statute satisfied because plaintiff well aware of primary reasons for denial of plan). Lack of a final version of the reasons for the board’s decision, which was not statutorily required as of the time the decision was rendered, did not divest the plaintiffs of the ability to file their appeal timely."
} | 1,401,713 | b |
The plaintiffs' representative received either a copy of the motion presented at the board meeting or a draft copy of the Notice of Action the day after the decision was rendered and thus was able to discern the reasons for the board's denial. The motion contained the reasons for the denial of the site plan application, and the draft Notice of Action also contained reasons for the board's decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 A.2d 808, 808",
"parenthetical": "statute satisfied because plaintiff well aware of primary reasons for denial of plan",
"sentence": "See K & P, Inc., 133 N.H. at 290, 575 A.2d at 808 (statute satisfied because plaintiff well aware of primary reasons for denial of plan). Lack of a final version of the reasons for the board’s decision, which was not statutorily required as of the time the decision was rendered, did not divest the plaintiffs of the ability to file their appeal timely."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "109 N.H. 176, 176",
"parenthetical": "temporary unavailability of minutes did not relieve plaintiffs of necessity of stating ground for their motion for rehearing",
"sentence": "Cf. DiPietro, 109 N.H. at 176, 246 A.2d at 696 (temporary unavailability of minutes did not relieve plaintiffs of necessity of stating ground for their motion for rehearing)."
} | 1,401,713 | a |
The plaintiffs' representative received either a copy of the motion presented at the board meeting or a draft copy of the Notice of Action the day after the decision was rendered and thus was able to discern the reasons for the board's denial. The motion contained the reasons for the denial of the site plan application, and the draft Notice of Action also contained reasons for the board's decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 A.2d 808, 808",
"parenthetical": "statute satisfied because plaintiff well aware of primary reasons for denial of plan",
"sentence": "See K & P, Inc., 133 N.H. at 290, 575 A.2d at 808 (statute satisfied because plaintiff well aware of primary reasons for denial of plan). Lack of a final version of the reasons for the board’s decision, which was not statutorily required as of the time the decision was rendered, did not divest the plaintiffs of the ability to file their appeal timely."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "246 A.2d 696, 696",
"parenthetical": "temporary unavailability of minutes did not relieve plaintiffs of necessity of stating ground for their motion for rehearing",
"sentence": "Cf. DiPietro, 109 N.H. at 176, 246 A.2d at 696 (temporary unavailability of minutes did not relieve plaintiffs of necessity of stating ground for their motion for rehearing)."
} | 1,401,713 | a |
Noerr-Pennington immunity exists in certain circumstances even if the protected petitioning involved making misrepresentations. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 228, 228",
"parenthetical": "\"When the concerted activities occur in a legislative or other non-adjudicatory governmental setting, they are not within the Sherman Act even though they include 'conduct that can be termed unethical,' such as deception and misrepresentation.\"",
"sentence": "Metro Cable Co., 516 F.2d at 228 (“When the concerted activities occur in a legislative or other non-adjudicatory governmental setting, they are not within the Sherman Act even though they include ‘conduct that can be termed unethical,’ such as deception and misrepresentation.”) (citations omitted); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383-84, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991) (“In Noerr itself, where the private party ‘deliberately deceived the public and public officials’ in its successful lobbying campaign, we said that ‘deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned.’ ”) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 145, 81 S.Ct. 523)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In Noerr itself, where the private party 'deliberately deceived the public and public officials' in its successful lobbying campaign, we said that 'deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned.' \"",
"sentence": "Metro Cable Co., 516 F.2d at 228 (“When the concerted activities occur in a legislative or other non-adjudicatory governmental setting, they are not within the Sherman Act even though they include ‘conduct that can be termed unethical,’ such as deception and misrepresentation.”) (citations omitted); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383-84, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991) (“In Noerr itself, where the private party ‘deliberately deceived the public and public officials’ in its successful lobbying campaign, we said that ‘deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned.’ ”) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 145, 81 S.Ct. 523)."
} | 5,757,776 | a |
Noerr-Pennington immunity exists in certain circumstances even if the protected petitioning involved making misrepresentations. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In Noerr itself, where the private party 'deliberately deceived the public and public officials' in its successful lobbying campaign, we said that 'deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned.' \"",
"sentence": "Metro Cable Co., 516 F.2d at 228 (“When the concerted activities occur in a legislative or other non-adjudicatory governmental setting, they are not within the Sherman Act even though they include ‘conduct that can be termed unethical,’ such as deception and misrepresentation.”) (citations omitted); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383-84, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991) (“In Noerr itself, where the private party ‘deliberately deceived the public and public officials’ in its successful lobbying campaign, we said that ‘deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned.’ ”) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 145, 81 S.Ct. 523)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "516 F.2d 228, 228",
"parenthetical": "\"When the concerted activities occur in a legislative or other non-adjudicatory governmental setting, they are not within the Sherman Act even though they include 'conduct that can be termed unethical,' such as deception and misrepresentation.\"",
"sentence": "Metro Cable Co., 516 F.2d at 228 (“When the concerted activities occur in a legislative or other non-adjudicatory governmental setting, they are not within the Sherman Act even though they include ‘conduct that can be termed unethical,’ such as deception and misrepresentation.”) (citations omitted); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383-84, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991) (“In Noerr itself, where the private party ‘deliberately deceived the public and public officials’ in its successful lobbying campaign, we said that ‘deception, reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned.’ ”) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 145, 81 S.Ct. 523)."
} | 5,757,776 | b |
The United States Constitution reserves to the federal government and to Congress in particular the power to regulate commerce among the states. Although the clause speaks explicitly only of the extensive powers given to Congress, it has been interpreted as having a second purpose of preventing individual states from erecting trade barriers and discriminating against out-of-state products and manufacturers or otherwise burdening the flow of interstate commerce. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895",
"parenthetical": "\"Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Granholm v. Heald, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) (“Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’ ”) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon., 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 278, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.' \"",
"sentence": "General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) (“The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby ‘impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.’ ”) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 8,954,177 | b |
The United States Constitution reserves to the federal government and to Congress in particular the power to regulate commerce among the states. Although the clause speaks explicitly only of the extensive powers given to Congress, it has been interpreted as having a second purpose of preventing individual states from erecting trade barriers and discriminating against out-of-state products and manufacturers or otherwise burdening the flow of interstate commerce. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "519 U.S. 278, 287",
"parenthetical": "\"The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.' \"",
"sentence": "General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) (“The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby ‘impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.’ ”) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Granholm v. Heald, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) (“Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’ ”) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon., 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994))."
} | 8,954,177 | a |
The United States Constitution reserves to the federal government and to Congress in particular the power to regulate commerce among the states. Although the clause speaks explicitly only of the extensive powers given to Congress, it has been interpreted as having a second purpose of preventing individual states from erecting trade barriers and discriminating against out-of-state products and manufacturers or otherwise burdening the flow of interstate commerce. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.' \"",
"sentence": "General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) (“The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby ‘impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.’ ”) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895",
"parenthetical": "\"Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Granholm v. Heald, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) (“Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’ ”) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon., 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994))."
} | 8,954,177 | a |
The United States Constitution reserves to the federal government and to Congress in particular the power to regulate commerce among the states. Although the clause speaks explicitly only of the extensive powers given to Congress, it has been interpreted as having a second purpose of preventing individual states from erecting trade barriers and discriminating against out-of-state products and manufacturers or otherwise burdening the flow of interstate commerce. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Granholm v. Heald, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) (“Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’ ”) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon., 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.' \"",
"sentence": "General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) (“The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby ‘impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.’ ”) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 8,954,177 | b |
The United States Constitution reserves to the federal government and to Congress in particular the power to regulate commerce among the states. Although the clause speaks explicitly only of the extensive powers given to Congress, it has been interpreted as having a second purpose of preventing individual states from erecting trade barriers and discriminating against out-of-state products and manufacturers or otherwise burdening the flow of interstate commerce. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895",
"parenthetical": "\"Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Granholm v. Heald, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) (“Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’ ”) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon., 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994))."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.' \"",
"sentence": "General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) (“The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby ‘impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.’ ”) (internal citations omitted)."
} | 8,954,177 | b |
The United States Constitution reserves to the federal government and to Congress in particular the power to regulate commerce among the states. Although the clause speaks explicitly only of the extensive powers given to Congress, it has been interpreted as having a second purpose of preventing individual states from erecting trade barriers and discriminating against out-of-state products and manufacturers or otherwise burdening the flow of interstate commerce. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.' \"",
"sentence": "General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287, 117 S.Ct. 811, 136 L.Ed.2d 761 (1997) (“The negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby ‘impedfes] free private trade in the national market place.’ ”) (internal citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 'differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.' \"",
"sentence": "See also Granholm v. Heald, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1895, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005) (“Time and time again this Court has held that, in all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests, that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’ ”) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon., 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994))."
} | 8,954,177 | a |
The Union argues first that the Plaza has been expressly designated by the city as a public park. Assuming this is so, the Union reasons, the Plaza would automatically warrant traditional public forum status. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "691 F.2d 160, 160",
"parenthetical": "\"Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., N.J. Sports, 691 F.2d at 160 (“Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..”); cf. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (noting that public streets and parks enjoy “a traditional right of access”). We express no opinion on whether a dedicated public park must necessarily qualify as a traditional public forum, without regard to the context of its location and use."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 789, 814",
"parenthetical": "noting that public streets and parks enjoy \"a traditional right of access\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., N.J. Sports, 691 F.2d at 160 (“Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..”); cf. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (noting that public streets and parks enjoy “a traditional right of access”). We express no opinion on whether a dedicated public park must necessarily qualify as a traditional public forum, without regard to the context of its location and use."
} | 9,303,045 | a |
The Union argues first that the Plaza has been expressly designated by the city as a public park. Assuming this is so, the Union reasons, the Plaza would automatically warrant traditional public forum status. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "691 F.2d 160, 160",
"parenthetical": "\"Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., N.J. Sports, 691 F.2d at 160 (“Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..”); cf. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (noting that public streets and parks enjoy “a traditional right of access”). We express no opinion on whether a dedicated public park must necessarily qualify as a traditional public forum, without regard to the context of its location and use."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that public streets and parks enjoy \"a traditional right of access\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., N.J. Sports, 691 F.2d at 160 (“Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..”); cf. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (noting that public streets and parks enjoy “a traditional right of access”). We express no opinion on whether a dedicated public park must necessarily qualify as a traditional public forum, without regard to the context of its location and use."
} | 9,303,045 | a |
The Union argues first that the Plaza has been expressly designated by the city as a public park. Assuming this is so, the Union reasons, the Plaza would automatically warrant traditional public forum status. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "691 F.2d 160, 160",
"parenthetical": "\"Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., N.J. Sports, 691 F.2d at 160 (“Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..”); cf. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (noting that public streets and parks enjoy “a traditional right of access”). We express no opinion on whether a dedicated public park must necessarily qualify as a traditional public forum, without regard to the context of its location and use."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that public streets and parks enjoy \"a traditional right of access\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., N.J. Sports, 691 F.2d at 160 (“Streets, parks and sidewalks are the paradigms of a public, forum .:..”); cf. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (noting that public streets and parks enjoy “a traditional right of access”). We express no opinion on whether a dedicated public park must necessarily qualify as a traditional public forum, without regard to the context of its location and use."
} | 9,303,045 | a |
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, however, applies "only to actions of the federal government -- not to those of state or local governments." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 F.3d 116, 120",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.\"",
"sentence": "Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir.2001); see also Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)(“[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.”); cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "534 U.S. 161, 167",
"parenthetical": "\"The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without 'due process of law.' \"",
"sentence": "Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir.2001); see also Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)(“[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.”); cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’ ”)."
} | 3,629,505 | a |
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, however, applies "only to actions of the federal government -- not to those of state or local governments." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without 'due process of law.' \"",
"sentence": "Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir.2001); see also Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)(“[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.”); cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 F.3d 116, 120",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.\"",
"sentence": "Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir.2001); see also Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)(“[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.”); cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’ ”)."
} | 3,629,505 | b |
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, however, applies "only to actions of the federal government -- not to those of state or local governments." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "77 F.3d 116, 120",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.\"",
"sentence": "Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir.2001); see also Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)(“[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.”); cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’ ”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without 'due process of law.' \"",
"sentence": "Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir.2001); see also Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 120 (5th Cir.1996)(“[T]he Fifth Amendment applies only to the actions of the federal government, and not to the actions of a municipal government as in the present case.”); cf. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the United States, as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States, from depriving any person of property without ‘due process of law.’ ”)."
} | 3,629,505 | a |
Although the defendant's first motion to dismiss under the IAD could have served to toll the 180-day period, at the time he filed the motion, the 180-day period was already tolled by the continuance of trial from March 10 to September 25, 2006. More significantly, the defendant's filing of his motion to dismiss did not "occasion" the period of delay from September 25 to November 13, 2006. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "637 So. 2d 921, 925",
"parenthetical": "holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions",
"sentence": "See Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla.) (holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994); Cf. State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant’s motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial” because: (1) “the record disclose[d] no reason why those motions could not have been disposed of within a short time after they were filed”; (2) “[t]here [wa]s no evidence the process of discovery did in fact delay the trial”; and (3) the record failed to suggest “how those pleadings could have resulted in delay”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "686 S.W.2d 543, 548",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant's motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial\" because: (1",
"sentence": "See Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla.) (holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994); Cf. State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant’s motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial” because: (1) “the record disclose[d] no reason why those motions could not have been disposed of within a short time after they were filed”; (2) “[t]here [wa]s no evidence the process of discovery did in fact delay the trial”; and (3) the record failed to suggest “how those pleadings could have resulted in delay”)."
} | 4,139,202 | a |
Although the defendant's first motion to dismiss under the IAD could have served to toll the 180-day period, at the time he filed the motion, the 180-day period was already tolled by the continuance of trial from March 10 to September 25, 2006. More significantly, the defendant's filing of his motion to dismiss did not "occasion" the period of delay from September 25 to November 13, 2006. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "686 S.W.2d 543, 548",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant's motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial\" because: (1",
"sentence": "See Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla.) (holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994); Cf. State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant’s motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial” because: (1) “the record disclose[d] no reason why those motions could not have been disposed of within a short time after they were filed”; (2) “[t]here [wa]s no evidence the process of discovery did in fact delay the trial”; and (3) the record failed to suggest “how those pleadings could have resulted in delay”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions",
"sentence": "See Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla.) (holding that, although the defendant filed a number of motions, because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions, no delay could be attributed to the motions), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994); Cf. State v. Smith, 686 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “[t]he state did not meet its burden [under the IAD of] establishing] that the defendant’s motions and request[s] [for discovery] delayed the trial” because: (1) “the record disclose[d] no reason why those motions could not have been disposed of within a short time after they were filed”; (2) “[t]here [wa]s no evidence the process of discovery did in fact delay the trial”; and (3) the record failed to suggest “how those pleadings could have resulted in delay”)."
} | 4,139,202 | b |
P34 The County's interest in the strip of land, whether an easement or a determinable fee, cannot exceed the interest granted to it by the documents of conveyance. The Railroad or its successors in interest thus retain either a possessory interest encumbered by a servitude or a possibility of reverter, respectively. A statute which acts to destroy that interest would constitute the taking of a property interest without just compensation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "107 Wn.2d 444, 457",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "483 U.S. 825, 831-32",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | 12,462,346 | b |
P34 The County's interest in the strip of land, whether an easement or a determinable fee, cannot exceed the interest granted to it by the documents of conveyance. The Railroad or its successors in interest thus retain either a possessory interest encumbered by a servitude or a possibility of reverter, respectively. A statute which acts to destroy that interest would constitute the taking of a property interest without just compensation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "483 U.S. 825, 831-32",
"parenthetical": "concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | 12,462,346 | a |
P34 The County's interest in the strip of land, whether an easement or a determinable fee, cannot exceed the interest granted to it by the documents of conveyance. The Railroad or its successors in interest thus retain either a possessory interest encumbered by a servitude or a possibility of reverter, respectively. A statute which acts to destroy that interest would constitute the taking of a property interest without just compensation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "107 Wn.2d 444, 457",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | 12,462,346 | a |
P34 The County's interest in the strip of land, whether an easement or a determinable fee, cannot exceed the interest granted to it by the documents of conveyance. The Railroad or its successors in interest thus retain either a possessory interest encumbered by a servitude or a possibility of reverter, respectively. A statute which acts to destroy that interest would constitute the taking of a property interest without just compensation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | 12,462,346 | b |
P34 The County's interest in the strip of land, whether an easement or a determinable fee, cannot exceed the interest granted to it by the documents of conveyance. The Railroad or its successors in interest thus retain either a possessory interest encumbered by a servitude or a possibility of reverter, respectively. A statute which acts to destroy that interest would constitute the taking of a property interest without just compensation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "107 Wn.2d 444, 457",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | 12,462,346 | a |
P34 The County's interest in the strip of land, whether an easement or a determinable fee, cannot exceed the interest granted to it by the documents of conveyance. The Railroad or its successors in interest thus retain either a possessory interest encumbered by a servitude or a possibility of reverter, respectively. A statute which acts to destroy that interest would constitute the taking of a property interest without just compensation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county",
"sentence": "Cf. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987) (concluding that a statutory scheme requiring property owners to make an easement across their property available to the public on a permanent basis constitutes a taking); see also Lawson v. State, 107 Wn.2d 444, 457, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986) (concluding that the plaintiffs held rever-sionary interests in land over which an easement was granted, requiring the payment of just compensation before the land could be acquired by the county)."
} | 12,462,346 | a |
In light of Ambach, we think that, in September of 1986, it did not violate any clearly established federal constitutional right for an education official to terminate a teacher's employment in conformity with a statute barring aliens from holding teaching positions. While it is at least arguable that the Puerto Rico statute has a somewhat broader reach than its New York counterpart, approved in Ambach, the Court has not hesitated to uphold statutes that barred aliens totally from serving in certain government positions. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "650 F.2d 890, 893-94",
"parenthetical": "holding that a statute prohibiting the Federal Communications Commission from granting commercial radio operators' licenses to aliens did not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cabell, 454 U.S. at 441-42, 102 S.Ct. at 741 (deputy probation officers); Foley, 435 U.S. at 299-300, 98 S.Ct. at 1072-73 (state troopers); see also Cervantes v. Guerra, 651 F.2d 974, 981-82 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that a community action agency’s bylaws excluding aliens from service on the board of directors did not deny equal protection); cf. Campos v. FCC, 650 F.2d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that a statute prohibiting the Federal Communications Commission from granting commercial radio operators’ licenses to aliens did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "651 F.2d 974, 981-82",
"parenthetical": "holding that a community action agency's bylaws excluding aliens from service on the board of directors did not deny equal protection",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Cabell, 454 U.S. at 441-42, 102 S.Ct. at 741 (deputy probation officers); Foley, 435 U.S. at 299-300, 98 S.Ct. at 1072-73 (state troopers); see also Cervantes v. Guerra, 651 F.2d 974, 981-82 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that a community action agency’s bylaws excluding aliens from service on the board of directors did not deny equal protection); cf. Campos v. FCC, 650 F.2d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that a statute prohibiting the Federal Communications Commission from granting commercial radio operators’ licenses to aliens did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause)."
} | 10,514,224 | b |
This is not a new rule. "For more than 35 years, this court has declined to entertain appeals when the appellant does not file a required appendix." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "289 F.2d 382, 384",
"parenthetical": "court has power to dismiss appeal or affirm judgment due to appellant's disregard of appendix rule by failing to delineate relevant portions of district court record from which appeal was taken",
"sentence": "See also Morrison v. Texas Co., 289 F.2d 382, 384 (7th Cir.1961) (court has power to dismiss appeal or affirm judgment due to appellant’s disregard of appendix rule by failing to delineate relevant portions of district court record from which appeal was taken); Potomac Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 281 F.2d 775, 778 (7th Cir.1960) (failure to include in appendix all parts of record and transcript necessary to present any error justifies refusal to consider same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 59, 61",
"parenthetical": "failure to provide district court's explanation for refusal to award attorneys' fees to taxpayer prevented appellate review of that issue, citing numerous decisions, including Gomez and Mortell",
"sentence": "Urso v. United States, 72 F.3d 59, 61 (7th Cir.1995) (failure to provide district court’s explanation for refusal to award attorneys’ fees to taxpayer prevented appellate review of that issue, citing numerous decisions, including Gomez and Mortell)."
} | 9,043,964 | b |
This is not a new rule. "For more than 35 years, this court has declined to entertain appeals when the appellant does not file a required appendix." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "281 F.2d 775, 778",
"parenthetical": "failure to include in appendix all parts of record and transcript necessary to present any error justifies refusal to consider same",
"sentence": "See also Morrison v. Texas Co., 289 F.2d 382, 384 (7th Cir.1961) (court has power to dismiss appeal or affirm judgment due to appellant’s disregard of appendix rule by failing to delineate relevant portions of district court record from which appeal was taken); Potomac Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 281 F.2d 775, 778 (7th Cir.1960) (failure to include in appendix all parts of record and transcript necessary to present any error justifies refusal to consider same)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 F.3d 59, 61",
"parenthetical": "failure to provide district court's explanation for refusal to award attorneys' fees to taxpayer prevented appellate review of that issue, citing numerous decisions, including Gomez and Mortell",
"sentence": "Urso v. United States, 72 F.3d 59, 61 (7th Cir.1995) (failure to provide district court’s explanation for refusal to award attorneys’ fees to taxpayer prevented appellate review of that issue, citing numerous decisions, including Gomez and Mortell)."
} | 9,043,964 | b |
See N.T. Suppression, 12/31/98, at 29. The Commonwealth is not required to do appellant's investigative work for him. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The Commonwealth does not violate the Brady rule when it fails to turn over evidence readily obtainable by, and known to, the defendant.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293, 305 (1999) (“The Commonwealth does not violate the Brady rule when it fails to turn over evidence readily obtainable by, and known to, the defendant.”); see also Jones, 668 A.2d at 513 (“Rule 305 is not a tool to be used by the defense to compel the Commonwealth to obtain evidence to which the defense had equal access.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa.Super. 219, 475 A.2d 765, 771 (1984))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "668 A.2d 513, 513",
"parenthetical": "\"Rule 305 is not a tool to be used by the defense to compel the Commonwealth to obtain evidence to which the defense had equal access.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293, 305 (1999) (“The Commonwealth does not violate the Brady rule when it fails to turn over evidence readily obtainable by, and known to, the defendant.”); see also Jones, 668 A.2d at 513 (“Rule 305 is not a tool to be used by the defense to compel the Commonwealth to obtain evidence to which the defense had equal access.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa.Super. 219, 475 A.2d 765, 771 (1984))."
} | 11,077,691 | a |
See N.T. Suppression, 12/31/98, at 29. The Commonwealth is not required to do appellant's investigative work for him. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "668 A.2d 513, 513",
"parenthetical": "\"Rule 305 is not a tool to be used by the defense to compel the Commonwealth to obtain evidence to which the defense had equal access.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293, 305 (1999) (“The Commonwealth does not violate the Brady rule when it fails to turn over evidence readily obtainable by, and known to, the defendant.”); see also Jones, 668 A.2d at 513 (“Rule 305 is not a tool to be used by the defense to compel the Commonwealth to obtain evidence to which the defense had equal access.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa.Super. 219, 475 A.2d 765, 771 (1984))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "724 A.2d 293, 305",
"parenthetical": "\"The Commonwealth does not violate the Brady rule when it fails to turn over evidence readily obtainable by, and known to, the defendant.\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293, 305 (1999) (“The Commonwealth does not violate the Brady rule when it fails to turn over evidence readily obtainable by, and known to, the defendant.”); see also Jones, 668 A.2d at 513 (“Rule 305 is not a tool to be used by the defense to compel the Commonwealth to obtain evidence to which the defense had equal access.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gelormo, 327 Pa.Super. 219, 475 A.2d 765, 771 (1984))."
} | 11,077,691 | b |
Defendant states that it "does not object to [the] ruling or rationale" but rather asserts an "additional rationale for dismissal" of the case. Def.'s' Obj. at 1. Defendant then purports to argue why the "complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim ....," id. at 3, but it invokes sovereign immunity, see id. at 3-4, which is a jurisdictional basis for dismissal. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "463 U.S. 206, 212",
"parenthetical": "\"It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); see Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S., 569 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 F.3d 506, 512",
"parenthetical": "\"The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); see Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S., 569 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,238,366 | a |
Defendant states that it "does not object to [the] ruling or rationale" but rather asserts an "additional rationale for dismissal" of the case. Def.'s' Obj. at 1. Defendant then purports to argue why the "complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim ....," id. at 3, but it invokes sovereign immunity, see id. at 3-4, which is a jurisdictional basis for dismissal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 F.3d 506, 512",
"parenthetical": "\"The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); see Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S., 569 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); see Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S., 569 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,238,366 | b |
Defendant states that it "does not object to [the] ruling or rationale" but rather asserts an "additional rationale for dismissal" of the case. Def.'s' Obj. at 1. Defendant then purports to argue why the "complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim ....," id. at 3, but it invokes sovereign immunity, see id. at 3-4, which is a jurisdictional basis for dismissal. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); see Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S., 569 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "569 F.3d 506, 512",
"parenthetical": "\"The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”); see Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. U.S., 569 F.3d 506, 512 (D.C.Cir.2009) (“The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.”) (citation omitted)."
} | 4,238,366 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | 512,836 | b |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | 512,836 | b |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client's defense",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client's defense",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client's defense",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | 512,836 | b |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client's defense",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client's defense",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client's defense",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client's defense",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | 512,836 | a |
Applying Iowa law to the allegations of Count II of the counterclaim, we find that Asay was not entitled to an absolute privilege on the basis of the pleadings. In determining whether an occasion is absolutely privileged, the pivotal factor is frequently to whom the matter is published. Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.",
"sentence": "Cf. Chandler v. O’Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045 (10th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964, 92 S.Ct. 1176, 31 L.Ed.2d 241 (1972) (federal judge delivering allegedly libelous statements to a newspaper editor not immune from liability in state libel action.)"
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "attorney's statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client's defense",
"sentence": "Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927 (1977) (statements made at press conference); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718 (1973) (statements made to newspaper and television reporters regarding documents that were filed with the court for the sole purpose of having defamatory statements contained therein disseminated to the media); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962) (attorney’s statement to editor of newspaper regarding his criminal client’s defense)."
} | 512,836 | b |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 847, 862",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | 3,923,045 | a |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 847, 862",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 WL 178421, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | 3,923,045 | a |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | 3,923,045 | b |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 WL 178421, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | 3,923,045 | b |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | 3,923,045 | a |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 WL 178421, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | 3,923,045 | a |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 847, 862",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | 4,189,216 | b |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "486 U.S. 847, 862",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 WL 178421, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | 4,189,216 | a |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | 4,189,216 | a |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 WL 178421, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | 4,189,216 | a |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | 4,189,216 | b |
We find it unnecessary to resolve the recusal question presented here, however, because recusal error, if any occurred, was harmless. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that \"there is surely room for harmless error\" in the recusal context because \"[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of SS 455(a)\"",
"sentence": "Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that “there is surely room for harmless error” in the recusal context because “[tjhere need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a)”). Although we apply the harmless-error doctrine with great caution, we are convinced it applies in this case given the inescapable legal conclusion that the parties reached an enforceable oral settlement agreement."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2000 WL 178421, at *2",
"parenthetical": "holding that district judge's failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was \"patently clear\" and so there was \"no need to vacate the district court's decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination\"",
"sentence": "See Morgan v. Money, No. 99-3251, 210 F.3d 372, 2000 WL 178421, at *2 (6th Cir.2000) (unpublished table decision) (holding that district judge’s failure to re-cuse was harmless error where the underlying question was “patently clear” and so there was “no need to vacate the district court’s decision and to remand to another district court judge to make the same clear determination”)."
} | 4,189,216 | a |
The district court properly dismissed Brown's "denial of self-defense" claims, retaliation claim based on his complaint of excessive force, and due process claims because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "515 U.S. 472, 486",
"parenthetical": "\"[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.\"",
"sentence": "See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 341, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief",
"sentence": "See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | 12,413,542 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Brown's "denial of self-defense" claims, retaliation claim based on his complaint of excessive force, and due process claims because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.\"",
"sentence": "See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 341, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief",
"sentence": "See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | 12,413,542 | b |
The district court properly dismissed Brown's "denial of self-defense" claims, retaliation claim based on his complaint of excessive force, and due process claims because Brown failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.\"",
"sentence": "See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "627 F.3d 341, 341-42",
"parenthetical": "although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief",
"sentence": "See Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“[S]egregated confinement [does] not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of retaliation claim in prisoner context)."
} | 12,413,542 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "890 F.2d 1413, 1416",
"parenthetical": "officer's statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "890 F.2d 1413, 1416",
"parenthetical": "officer's statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officer's statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officer's statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officer's statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "officer's statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117",
"parenthetical": "encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers' questions became \"direct and probably forceful\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117",
"parenthetical": "encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers' questions became \"direct and probably forceful\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "873 F.2d 182, 184-85",
"parenthetical": "consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "873 F.2d 182, 184-85",
"parenthetical": "consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 748, 752",
"parenthetical": "defendant was seized when officer stated that he was \"working narcotics\" and requested to look in her bag",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "842 F.2d 748, 752",
"parenthetical": "defendant was seized when officer stated that he was \"working narcotics\" and requested to look in her bag",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was seized when officer stated that he was \"working narcotics\" and requested to look in her bag",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant was seized when officer stated that he was \"working narcotics\" and requested to look in her bag",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "766 F.2d 304, 311",
"parenthetical": "consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "766 F.2d 304, 311",
"parenthetical": "consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | 10,519,230 | a |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "933 F.2d 1418, 1418",
"parenthetical": "informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 583, 597",
"parenthetical": "officer's intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
More importantly, the officers in Ward asked the defendant "focused, potentially incriminating questions" which would "heighten" the feeling that the person "was the specific object of the officers' inquiry," and lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was less able to terminate the encounter. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "895 F.2d 170, 170-71",
"parenthetical": "defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs",
"sentence": "But see McKines, 933 F.2d at 1418 (informing defendant that he is focus of narcotics investigation does not predict a seizure); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 170-71 (defendant was not seized when approached in airport terminal by officer who requested identification and asked whether he was carrying drugs)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 583, 597",
"parenthetical": "officer's intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention",
"sentence": "Id. at 1532. See also United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1416 (8th Cir.1989) (officer’s statement that defendant exhibited characteristics of drug trafficker could lead defendant to reasonably believe that he was particular focus of narcotics investigation and not free to leave), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990); United States v. Savage, 889 F.2d 1113, 1115, 1117 (D.C.Cir.1989) (encounter in train roomette became seizure when officers’ questions became “direct and probably forceful”); United States v. Nunley, 873 F.2d 182, 184-85 (8th Cir.1989) (consensual encounter became seizure when officer explained that his purpose was to stop the flow of drugs through the airport); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir.1988) (defendant was seized when officer stated that he was “working narcotics” and requested to look in her bag), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.1985) (consensual questioning ripened into investigative stop when agents explained that they suspected defendant of transporting drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (officer’s intimation that investigation had focused on individual could induce reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate would lead to formal detention)."
} | 10,519,230 | b |
To secure a new trial, however, it is not sufficient for the moving party to show that the district court made a mistake in admitting certain testimony or by using improper jury instructions. A motion for a new trial "will not be granted unless the moving party suffered prejudice." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "386 F.3d 729, 736",
"parenthetical": "applying the harmless error standard to the improper admission of evidence",
"sentence": "Field v. Trigg Cnty. Hosp. Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir.2004) (applying the harmless error standard to the improper admission of evidence); see Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556 (2d Cir.1994) (“An erroneous [jury] instruction, unless harmless, requires a new trial.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "17 F.3d 552, 556",
"parenthetical": "\"An erroneous [jury] instruction, unless harmless, requires a new trial.\"",
"sentence": "Field v. Trigg Cnty. Hosp. Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir.2004) (applying the harmless error standard to the improper admission of evidence); see Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556 (2d Cir.1994) (“An erroneous [jury] instruction, unless harmless, requires a new trial.”)."
} | 3,593,921 | a |
For example, if a witness testified in this case that he had seen appellant reach out, grab Autumn's hand, and burn her palm with a lit cigarette two days before the group came to the hospital, this testimony (and any pictures showing Autumn's palm with a cigarette burn) would clearly be relevant as tending to show that it was appellant, not Crystal, who burned Christopher's palm. To prove identity in this context, the two acts must be so distinctively similar as to constitute a "signature" act. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "920 S.W.2d 319, 322",
"parenthetical": "prior murder committed ten days before capital murder was sufficiently similar to be a \"signature crime\"",
"sentence": "See Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711, 740-41 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (noting the defendant's “signature” use of the same weapon, motive, time, and means of disposing of bodies, in two different murders); see also Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (prior murder committed ten days before capital murder was sufficiently similar to be a “signature crime”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "767 S.W.2d 711, 740-41",
"parenthetical": "noting the defendant's \"signature\" use of the same weapon, motive, time, and means of disposing of bodies, in two different murders",
"sentence": "See Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711, 740-41 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (noting the defendant's “signature” use of the same weapon, motive, time, and means of disposing of bodies, in two different murders); see also Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (prior murder committed ten days before capital murder was sufficiently similar to be a “signature crime”)."
} | 9,147,148 | b |
The parties appear to be in agreement and the Court finds that, because Church's is a Texas corporation and the adoption of the poison pill occurred in Texas, Texas law applies to these cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation's directors' adoption of anti-takeover measure",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose\"",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | 7,394,508 | b |
The parties appear to be in agreement and the Court finds that, because Church's is a Texas corporation and the adoption of the poison pill occurred in Texas, Texas law applies to these cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation's directors' adoption of anti-takeover measure",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "309 S.W.2d 227, 230",
"parenthetical": "\"questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose\"",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | 7,394,508 | b |
The parties appear to be in agreement and the Court finds that, because Church's is a Texas corporation and the adoption of the poison pill occurred in Texas, Texas law applies to these cases. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose\"",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation's directors' adoption of anti-takeover measure",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | 7,394,508 | a |
The parties appear to be in agreement and the Court finds that, because Church's is a Texas corporation and the adoption of the poison pill occurred in Texas, Texas law applies to these cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation's directors' adoption of anti-takeover measure",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose\"",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | 7,394,508 | b |
The parties appear to be in agreement and the Court finds that, because Church's is a Texas corporation and the adoption of the poison pill occurred in Texas, Texas law applies to these cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation's directors' adoption of anti-takeover measure",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose\"",
"sentence": "State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967, 78 S.Ct. 1006, 2 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1958) (“questions of substantive law are controlled by the laws of the state where the cause of action arose”); Morris v. LTV Corp., 725 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); see Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1984) (Texas law applied to determination of validity of Texas corporation’s directors’ adoption of anti-takeover measure)."
} | 7,394,508 | b |
Our insistence on a full explanation is not the caprice of one crotchety circuit. See, e.g., M.P.C. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "912 F.2d 883, 888-89",
"parenthetical": "remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board failed to provide requisite analysis",
"sentence": "Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board failed to provide requisite analysis); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156,1159-60 (7th Cir.1990) (remanding where Board failed to explain why traditional remedies would be inadequate); NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49 (1st Cir.1982) (remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely); see also NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 739 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1984) (vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841-42 (4th Cir.1982) (same); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766-70 (5th Cir.1974) (same); T. Kheel, Labor Law § 15.05, at 15.41 n. 14 (1989) (citing additional cases)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "739 F.2d 108, 111-12",
"parenthetical": "vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis",
"sentence": "Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board failed to provide requisite analysis); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156,1159-60 (7th Cir.1990) (remanding where Board failed to explain why traditional remedies would be inadequate); NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49 (1st Cir.1982) (remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely); see also NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 739 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1984) (vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841-42 (4th Cir.1982) (same); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766-70 (5th Cir.1974) (same); T. Kheel, Labor Law § 15.05, at 15.41 n. 14 (1989) (citing additional cases)."
} | 3,490,573 | a |
Our insistence on a full explanation is not the caprice of one crotchety circuit. See, e.g., M.P.C. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 1156, 1159-60",
"parenthetical": "remanding where Board failed to explain why traditional remedies would be inadequate",
"sentence": "Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board failed to provide requisite analysis); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156,1159-60 (7th Cir.1990) (remanding where Board failed to explain why traditional remedies would be inadequate); NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49 (1st Cir.1982) (remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely); see also NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 739 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1984) (vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841-42 (4th Cir.1982) (same); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766-70 (5th Cir.1974) (same); T. Kheel, Labor Law § 15.05, at 15.41 n. 14 (1989) (citing additional cases)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "739 F.2d 108, 111-12",
"parenthetical": "vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis",
"sentence": "Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board failed to provide requisite analysis); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156,1159-60 (7th Cir.1990) (remanding where Board failed to explain why traditional remedies would be inadequate); NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49 (1st Cir.1982) (remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely); see also NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 739 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1984) (vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841-42 (4th Cir.1982) (same); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766-70 (5th Cir.1974) (same); T. Kheel, Labor Law § 15.05, at 15.41 n. 14 (1989) (citing additional cases)."
} | 3,490,573 | a |
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