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Our insistence on a full explanation is not the caprice of one crotchety circuit. See, e.g., M.P.C. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "739 F.2d 108, 111-12",
"parenthetical": "vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis",
"sentence": "Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board failed to provide requisite analysis); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156,1159-60 (7th Cir.1990) (remanding where Board failed to explain why traditional remedies would be inadequate); NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49 (1st Cir.1982) (remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely); see also NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 739 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1984) (vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841-42 (4th Cir.1982) (same); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766-70 (5th Cir.1974) (same); T. Kheel, Labor Law § 15.05, at 15.41 n. 14 (1989) (citing additional cases)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49",
"parenthetical": "remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely",
"sentence": "Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board failed to provide requisite analysis); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156,1159-60 (7th Cir.1990) (remanding where Board failed to explain why traditional remedies would be inadequate); NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49 (1st Cir.1982) (remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely); see also NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 739 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1984) (vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841-42 (4th Cir.1982) (same); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766-70 (5th Cir.1974) (same); T. Kheel, Labor Law § 15.05, at 15.41 n. 14 (1989) (citing additional cases)."
} | 3,490,573 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily); State v. Trihou, 488 A.2d 472 (Me.1985)(al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights); State v. Finson, 447 A.2d 788 (Me.1982)(even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights)."
} | 11,449,434 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily); State v. Trihou, 488 A.2d 472 (Me.1985)(al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights); State v. Finson, 447 A.2d 788 (Me.1982)(even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights)."
} | 11,449,434 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily); State v. Trihou, 488 A.2d 472 (Me.1985)(al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights); State v. Finson, 447 A.2d 788 (Me.1982)(even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights)."
} | 11,449,434 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily); State v. Trihou, 488 A.2d 472 (Me.1985)(al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights); State v. Finson, 447 A.2d 788 (Me.1982)(even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them)."
} | 11,449,434 | a |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily); State v. Trihou, 488 A.2d 472 (Me.1985)(al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights); State v. Finson, 447 A.2d 788 (Me.1982)(even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights)."
} | 11,449,434 | b |
Intoxication is one factor to be considered by the trial court in determining vol-untariness and validity of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, intoxication alone does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them",
"sentence": "Cf. Ballay v. People, 160 Colo. 309, 419 P.2d 446 (1966)(statements were not inadmissible merely because defendant was intoxicated when he made them)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights",
"sentence": "See People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525 (Colo.App.1997)(finding that intoxicated defendant was properly advised of his rights and made statements voluntarily); State v. Trihou, 488 A.2d 472 (Me.1985)(al-though defendant had been drinking and smoking marijuana on day of incident, he was not intoxicated and was able to understand and voluntarily to waive his rights); State v. Finson, 447 A.2d 788 (Me.1982)(even a person heavily intoxicated is not necessarily incapable of waiving constitutional rights)."
} | 11,449,434 | b |
Neither the record nor Mr. Anderson suggests how his purported rebuttal witnesses would have testified or how they could have changed the result in this case. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Mr. Anderson's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call these unnamed witnesses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 643, 650",
"parenthetical": "indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness' testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (collecting cases), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1316, 131 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995); United States v. Ellis, 23 F.3d 1268, 1274 (7th Cir.1994) (same); see also United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir.1991) (indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness’ testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "33 F.3d 866, 875",
"parenthetical": "rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel's failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. SS 2255",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (collecting cases), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1316, 131 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995); United States v. Ellis, 23 F.3d 1268, 1274 (7th Cir.1994) (same); see also United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir.1991) (indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness’ testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim)."
} | 11,322,763 | b |
Neither the record nor Mr. Anderson suggests how his purported rebuttal witnesses would have testified or how they could have changed the result in this case. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Mr. Anderson's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call these unnamed witnesses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel's failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. SS 2255",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (collecting cases), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1316, 131 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995); United States v. Ellis, 23 F.3d 1268, 1274 (7th Cir.1994) (same); see also United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir.1991) (indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness’ testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 643, 650",
"parenthetical": "indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness' testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (collecting cases), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1316, 131 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995); United States v. Ellis, 23 F.3d 1268, 1274 (7th Cir.1994) (same); see also United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir.1991) (indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness’ testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim)."
} | 11,322,763 | a |
Neither the record nor Mr. Anderson suggests how his purported rebuttal witnesses would have testified or how they could have changed the result in this case. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Mr. Anderson's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call these unnamed witnesses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel's failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. SS 2255",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (collecting cases), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1316, 131 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995); United States v. Ellis, 23 F.3d 1268, 1274 (7th Cir.1994) (same); see also United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir.1991) (indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness’ testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 643, 650",
"parenthetical": "indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness' testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (collecting cases), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1316, 131 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995); United States v. Ellis, 23 F.3d 1268, 1274 (7th Cir.1994) (same); see also United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir.1991) (indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness’ testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim)."
} | 11,322,763 | a |
The two should not be equated. Otherwise, a party could always meet this element in a malicious prosecution suit any time an underlying suit is not reinstated before the statute of limitations tolls, an event that has no relation to the merits of the underlying suit or the circumstances surrounding the dismissal itself. A successful claim for malicious prosecution has to require more. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "772 P.2d 699, 699",
"parenthetical": "voluntary dismissal without prejudice in combination with running of statute of limitations did not satisfy requirement of favorable termination as statute-of-limitations bar did not reflect on merits of claim",
"sentence": "See Wong, 772 P.2d at 699 (voluntary dismissal without prejudice in combination with running of statute of limitations did not satisfy requirement of favorable termination as statute-of-limitations bar did not reflect on merits of claim); see also Palmer Dev. Corp. v. Gordon, 723 A.2d 881, 884 (Me. 1999) (dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds does not constitute a favorable termination for purposes of malicious prosecution), and cases cited therein."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "723 A.2d 881, 884",
"parenthetical": "dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds does not constitute a favorable termination for purposes of malicious prosecution",
"sentence": "See Wong, 772 P.2d at 699 (voluntary dismissal without prejudice in combination with running of statute of limitations did not satisfy requirement of favorable termination as statute-of-limitations bar did not reflect on merits of claim); see also Palmer Dev. Corp. v. Gordon, 723 A.2d 881, 884 (Me. 1999) (dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds does not constitute a favorable termination for purposes of malicious prosecution), and cases cited therein."
} | 240,852 | a |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 234, 244",
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 912, 923",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | 8,957,409 | b |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 912, 923",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | 8,957,409 | b |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "231 F.3d 912, 923",
"parenthetical": "\"We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | 8,957,409 | b |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 645, 652",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute's legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 234, 244",
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | 8,957,409 | a |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 645, 652",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute's legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | 8,957,409 | b |
Between 1999 and 2001, four Courts of Appeals sustained the validity of the CPPA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 F.3d 645, 652",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute's legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir.2001) (“We hold that [the CPPA] is not unconstitutionally over-broad.”); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir.2000) (“We hold that the CPPA does not impermissibly regulate protected speech and does not, therefore, offend the First Amendment.”); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir.1999) (“Given the lack of any substantial overbreadth in light of the statute’s legitimate sweep, the CPPA withstands this constitutional challenge.”); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 844, 120 S.Ct. 115, 145 L.Ed.2d 98 (1999) (“We conclude, therefore, that the CPPA.is not unconstitutionally overbroad.”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244,122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002) (“While the Ninth Circuit found the CPPA invalid on its face, four other Courts of Appeals have sustained it.”)."
} | 8,957,409 | b |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | 1,454,787 | a |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | 1,454,787 | b |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "14 O.O.3d 265, 267",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | 1,454,787 | b |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "14 O.O.3d 265, 267",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | 1,454,787 | a |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | 1,454,787 | b |
However, the trial court did not have the authority to modify or change custody of the children based upon appellant's failure to encourage or implement regular visitation. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228",
"parenthetical": "\"the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer\"",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382",
"parenthetical": "court's modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt",
"sentence": "Culberson v. Culberson (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 304, 306, 14 O.O.3d 265, 267, 397 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (“the children of a dissolved marriage are not pawns whose custody may be used for the punishment of a wrongdoer”); cf. Andrulis v. Andrulis (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 164, 166, 26 OBR 383, 384, 498 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-1382 (court’s modification of visitation and support orders exceeded the authority of the court for punishment and contempt)."
} | 1,454,787 | a |
But they are wrong to do so. The District Court indisputably had subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' suit and that suit had not yet been dismissed when the defendants sought to enforce the settlement agreement that they claimed had been reached. Thus, if the District Court correctly concluded that the parties had reached a final, oral settlement agreement, the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce it when it purported to do so. Kokkonen does not block a district court from enforcing a settlement agreement before the underlying suit has been dismissed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "170 F.3d 217, 220",
"parenthetical": "\"If ... the settlement collapses before the original suit is dismissed, the party who seeks to keep the settlement intact may file a motion for enforcement.\"",
"sentence": "See Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir.1999) (“If ... the settlement collapses before the original suit is dismissed, the party who seeks to keep the settlement intact may file a motion for enforcement.”); see also Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Star Equip. Corp., 541 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.2008) (same); Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 51-52 (1st Cir.2003) (concluding district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to enforce an alleged settlement agreement before proceeding to trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "344 F.3d 47, 51-52",
"parenthetical": "concluding district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to enforce an alleged settlement agreement before proceeding to trial",
"sentence": "See Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir.1999) (“If ... the settlement collapses before the original suit is dismissed, the party who seeks to keep the settlement intact may file a motion for enforcement.”); see also Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Star Equip. Corp., 541 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.2008) (same); Bandera v. City of Quincy, 344 F.3d 47, 51-52 (1st Cir.2003) (concluding district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to enforce an alleged settlement agreement before proceeding to trial)."
} | 4,330,394 | a |
P 7 The charging function is inherent in the duties of the district attorney, an elected official, and is governed by the credible facts which, in the judgment of the district attorney, can be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and are consistent with the policies of that office, including relevant standards applicable to the initiation of charges. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 8931, Indictment and information, (d) Duties of prosecuting attorneys; see also ABA Standard for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function Standards, 3-3.9 Discretion in the Charging Decision. It is axiomatic that neither the trial court nor an appellate court may interfere with this function of the prosecution provided the appellant has not established fraud, prejudice or bias in the district attorney's election of the individual charges. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reasoning the district attorney's decision to not prosecute a private complaint, based on policy considerations, will not be disturbed absent a showing of bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (1996) (holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime(s) will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion); cf. In re Private Complaint of Petitioner Donald Adams, Appeal of Donald Adams, 764 A.2d 577 (Pa.Super.2000) (reasoning the district attorney’s decision to not prosecute a private complaint, based on policy considerations, will not be disturbed absent a showing of bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime(s) will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (1996) (holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime(s) will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion); cf. In re Private Complaint of Petitioner Donald Adams, Appeal of Donald Adams, 764 A.2d 577 (Pa.Super.2000) (reasoning the district attorney’s decision to not prosecute a private complaint, based on policy considerations, will not be disturbed absent a showing of bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality)."
} | 9,424,032 | b |
P 7 The charging function is inherent in the duties of the district attorney, an elected official, and is governed by the credible facts which, in the judgment of the district attorney, can be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and are consistent with the policies of that office, including relevant standards applicable to the initiation of charges. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 8931, Indictment and information, (d) Duties of prosecuting attorneys; see also ABA Standard for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function Standards, 3-3.9 Discretion in the Charging Decision. It is axiomatic that neither the trial court nor an appellate court may interfere with this function of the prosecution provided the appellant has not established fraud, prejudice or bias in the district attorney's election of the individual charges. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reasoning the district attorney's decision to not prosecute a private complaint, based on policy considerations, will not be disturbed absent a showing of bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (1996) (holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime(s) will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion); cf. In re Private Complaint of Petitioner Donald Adams, Appeal of Donald Adams, 764 A.2d 577 (Pa.Super.2000) (reasoning the district attorney’s decision to not prosecute a private complaint, based on policy considerations, will not be disturbed absent a showing of bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime(s) will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Larsen, 452 Pa.Super. 508, 682 A.2d 783 (1996) (holding the district attorney is vested with the sole discretion as to what crime(s) will be charged, and that discretion will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion); cf. In re Private Complaint of Petitioner Donald Adams, Appeal of Donald Adams, 764 A.2d 577 (Pa.Super.2000) (reasoning the district attorney’s decision to not prosecute a private complaint, based on policy considerations, will not be disturbed absent a showing of bad faith, fraud or unconstitutionality)."
} | 9,424,032 | b |
Minnesota law rests on a presumption that stability of custody is in a child's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "222 N.W. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing); In re Campbell’s Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 120-21, 11 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1943) (child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody); Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 105-6, 124 N.W. 634, 635 (1910) (same); see also Feeley, 176 Minn, at 197, 222 N.W. at 928 (child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "477 N.W.2d 756, 756-57",
"parenthetical": "teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing); In re Campbell’s Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 120-21, 11 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1943) (child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody); Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 105-6, 124 N.W. 634, 635 (1910) (same); see also Feeley, 176 Minn, at 197, 222 N.W. at 928 (child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years)."
} | 11,887,931 | b |
Minnesota law rests on a presumption that stability of custody is in a child's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "222 N.W. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing); In re Campbell’s Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 120-21, 11 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1943) (child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody); Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 105-6, 124 N.W. 634, 635 (1910) (same); see also Feeley, 176 Minn, at 197, 222 N.W. at 928 (child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "407 N.W.2d 104, 104",
"parenthetical": "same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing); In re Campbell’s Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 120-21, 11 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1943) (child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody); Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 105-6, 124 N.W. 634, 635 (1910) (same); see also Feeley, 176 Minn, at 197, 222 N.W. at 928 (child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years)."
} | 11,887,931 | b |
Minnesota law rests on a presumption that stability of custody is in a child's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "222 N.W. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing); In re Campbell’s Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 120-21, 11 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1943) (child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody); Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 105-6, 124 N.W. 634, 635 (1910) (same); see also Feeley, 176 Minn, at 197, 222 N.W. at 928 (child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "216 Minn. 113, 120-21",
"parenthetical": "child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing); In re Campbell’s Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 120-21, 11 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1943) (child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody); Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 105-6, 124 N.W. 634, 635 (1910) (same); see also Feeley, 176 Minn, at 197, 222 N.W. at 928 (child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years)."
} | 11,887,931 | b |
Minnesota law rests on a presumption that stability of custody is in a child's best interests. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "222 N.W. 928, 928",
"parenthetical": "child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing); In re Campbell’s Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 120-21, 11 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1943) (child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody); Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 105-6, 124 N.W. 634, 635 (1910) (same); see also Feeley, 176 Minn, at 197, 222 N.W. at 928 (child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "11 N.W.2d 786, 790",
"parenthetical": "child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756-57 (teenager had moved in with noncustodial parent before parent sought custody); Edsten, 407 N.W.2d at 104 (same, but remanded for findings of fact following eviden-tiary hearing); In re Campbell’s Guardianship, 216 Minn. 113, 120-21, 11 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1943) (child wished to continue living with unrelated party after several years in their custody); Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 105-6, 124 N.W. 634, 635 (1910) (same); see also Feeley, 176 Minn, at 197, 222 N.W. at 928 (child wished to return to custody of aunt who had raised her for several years)."
} | 11,887,931 | b |
The third and final public interest factor is the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. It is true that Ohio has a local interest in adjudicating this controversy because defendants are headquarter in Ohio and some of the underlying events took place there. See Defs.' Mem. at 18-19. But the Court is not persuaded that these facts warrant transfer because at least some of the events giving rise to plaintiffs claims arose in the District of Columbia, and there is a national interest in the enforcement of federal securities laws. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "104 F.Supp.2d 17, 17-18",
"parenthetical": "denying motion to transfer after determining that the decisions surrounding oil and gas leasing in Alaska were of \"national significance\" and not of local interest",
"sentence": "Sheffer, 873 F.Supp.2d at 381 (“[W]hen national significance attaches to a controversy, local interest can sometimes be diminished.”); see also Babbitt, 104 F.Supp.2d at 17-18 (denying motion to transfer after determining that the decisions surrounding oil and gas leasing in Alaska were of “national significance” and not of local interest)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "873 F.Supp.2d 381, 381",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hen national significance attaches to a controversy, local interest can sometimes be diminished.\"",
"sentence": "Sheffer, 873 F.Supp.2d at 381 (“[W]hen national significance attaches to a controversy, local interest can sometimes be diminished.”); see also Babbitt, 104 F.Supp.2d at 17-18 (denying motion to transfer after determining that the decisions surrounding oil and gas leasing in Alaska were of “national significance” and not of local interest)."
} | 12,270,690 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "debts" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "59 N.J. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 N.J. 105, 117-18",
"parenthetical": "State's obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a \"present debt\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "debts" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 N.J. 105, 117-18",
"parenthetical": "State's obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a \"present debt\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "debts" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "59 N.J. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a \"present debt\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "debts" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a \"present debt\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "debts" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "59 N.J. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a \"debt\" within meaning of debt limitation clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "debts" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a \"debt\" within meaning of debt limitation clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | 307,861 | a |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "debts" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "59 N.J. 71, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a \"debt\" within meaning of debt limitation clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | 307,861 | b |
Thus, the Court noted that the statutes in question were not enforceable appropriations, because they would, if so considered, violate the debt limitations clause. In City of Camden v. Byrne, the Court relied on a number of decisions holding that certain statutory provisions providing for future expenditures were not "debts" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "State's assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a \"debt\" within meaning of debt limitation clause",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bulman v. McCrane, 64 N.J. 105, 117-18, 312 A.2d 857 (1973) (State’s obligation to pay future installments of rent, to be paid out of current revenues as annually appropriated, was not a “present debt”); State v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d 571 (1958) (State’s assurance that it would pay municipalities amounts, inter alia, to replace property taxes lost due to condemnation for reservoir system, did not create a “debt” within meaning of debt limitation clause); cf. Holster v. Board of Trustees, supra, 59 N.J. at 71, 279 A.2d 798 (“a projected or anticipated future legislative appropriation is not a present debt or liability”)."
} | 307,861 | a |
The ruling by Watts establishes that he denied Acosta's appeal based on a clinical determination by the Office of Medical Designation that Acosta did not require surgery. Watts cannot be held liable for a constitutional tort when his administrative decision was grounded in a decision made by medical personnel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "922 F.2d 712, 723",
"parenthetical": "\"We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.\"",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated by settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated by order, 12 F.3d 190 n. * (11th Cir.1994); see also Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1996) (awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could “reasonably rely on” judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth’s surroundings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could \"reasonably rely on\" judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth's surroundings",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated by settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated by order, 12 F.3d 190 n. * (11th Cir.1994); see also Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1996) (awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could “reasonably rely on” judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth’s surroundings)."
} | 5,532,820 | a |
The ruling by Watts establishes that he denied Acosta's appeal based on a clinical determination by the Office of Medical Designation that Acosta did not require surgery. Watts cannot be held liable for a constitutional tort when his administrative decision was grounded in a decision made by medical personnel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could \"reasonably rely on\" judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth's surroundings",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated by settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated by order, 12 F.3d 190 n. * (11th Cir.1994); see also Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1996) (awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could “reasonably rely on” judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth’s surroundings)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.\"",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated by settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated by order, 12 F.3d 190 n. * (11th Cir.1994); see also Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1996) (awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could “reasonably rely on” judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth’s surroundings)."
} | 5,532,820 | b |
The ruling by Watts establishes that he denied Acosta's appeal based on a clinical determination by the Office of Medical Designation that Acosta did not require surgery. Watts cannot be held liable for a constitutional tort when his administrative decision was grounded in a decision made by medical personnel. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.\"",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated by settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated by order, 12 F.3d 190 n. * (11th Cir.1994); see also Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1996) (awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could “reasonably rely on” judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth’s surroundings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55",
"parenthetical": "awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could \"reasonably rely on\" judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth's surroundings",
"sentence": "See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723 (“We do not dispute [the] right to rely on medical professionals for clinical determinations.”), vacated by settlement, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991), reinstated by order, 12 F.3d 190 n. * (11th Cir.1994); see also Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1054-55 (11th Cir.1996) (awarding director of adolescent center summary judgment on section 1983 due process complaint when director could “reasonably rely on” judgment of medical personnel to secure suicidal youth’s surroundings)."
} | 5,532,820 | a |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 205, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 205, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | 12,450,503 | a |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "422 U.S. 205, 216",
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | 12,450,503 | a |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "390 U.S. 644, 644",
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | 12,450,503 | a |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | 12,450,503 | b |
Thus, I can find no meaningful vagueness-related differences between California's law and the New York law upheld in Ginsberg. And if there remain any vagueness problems, the state courts can cure them through interpretation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts\"",
"sentence": "See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) (“state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute",
"sentence": "Cf. Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 644, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (relying on the fact that New York Court of Appeals would read a knowledge requirement into the statute); Berry v. Santa Barbara, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1088-1089, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661, 669 (1995) (reading a knowledge requirement into a statute). Consequently, for purposes of this facial challenge, I would not find the statute unconstitutionally vague."
} | 12,450,503 | a |
Generally, a court "may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, if no appeal has been taken." Included among these exceptional circumstances to Section 5505's jurisdictional time limits is where the court sua sponte corrects an illegal sentence originally imposed, even after the defendant has begun serving the original sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an amended order subject to Section 5505's time limits because it added a penalty that was discretionary, rather than mandatory, under statute",
"sentence": "See also In the Interest of K.R.B., 851 A.2d 914 (Pa.Super.2004) (finding an amended order subject to Section 5505’s time limits because it added a penalty that was discretionary, rather than mandatory, under statute)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing respective challenges of an illegal, patently contradictory, or fraudulently procured sentence as excepted from the jurisdictional time limit imposed by Section 5505",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Santone, 757 A.2d 963 (Pa.Super.2000); Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 433 Pa.Super. 111, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (1994) (recognizing respective challenges of an illegal, patently contradictory, or fraudulently procured sentence as excepted from the jurisdictional time limit imposed by Section 5505)."
} | 8,420,298 | b |
Generally, a court "may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, if no appeal has been taken." Included among these exceptional circumstances to Section 5505's jurisdictional time limits is where the court sua sponte corrects an illegal sentence originally imposed, even after the defendant has begun serving the original sentence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "639 A.2d 1235, 1239",
"parenthetical": "recognizing respective challenges of an illegal, patently contradictory, or fraudulently procured sentence as excepted from the jurisdictional time limit imposed by Section 5505",
"sentence": "Commonwealth v. Santone, 757 A.2d 963 (Pa.Super.2000); Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 433 Pa.Super. 111, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (1994) (recognizing respective challenges of an illegal, patently contradictory, or fraudulently procured sentence as excepted from the jurisdictional time limit imposed by Section 5505)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding an amended order subject to Section 5505's time limits because it added a penalty that was discretionary, rather than mandatory, under statute",
"sentence": "See also In the Interest of K.R.B., 851 A.2d 914 (Pa.Super.2004) (finding an amended order subject to Section 5505’s time limits because it added a penalty that was discretionary, rather than mandatory, under statute)."
} | 8,420,298 | a |
Plaintiff responds to this argument by citing six appellate decisions--each from a different circuit reaching a result contrary to Ballantine--holding, essentially, that the absence of expert testimony or actuarial or mathematical evidence regarding methods for computing the present value of future earnings does not preclude the jury from awarding such damages. While the First Circuit has not ruled on the issue, this Court is satisfied that its instructions were sufficient and appropriate, and that plaintiff's failure to come forth with expert or other evidence regarding methods of present value computation is not fatal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "505 F.2d 665, 669",
"parenthetical": "actuarial and mathematical evidence not prerequisite for recovery of lost future wages",
"sentence": "See Bonura v. Sealand Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir.1974) (actuarial and mathematical evidence not prerequisite for recovery of lost future wages); Duncan v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Company, 480 F.2d 79, 87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859, 94 S.Ct. 69, 38 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973) (same); cf. McDonald v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 724 F.2d 243, 247 (1st Cir.1984) (court’s instruction that jury must reduce future earning award to present value without identifying particular method of present value computation not erroneous)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 243, 247",
"parenthetical": "court's instruction that jury must reduce future earning award to present value without identifying particular method of present value computation not erroneous",
"sentence": "See Bonura v. Sealand Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir.1974) (actuarial and mathematical evidence not prerequisite for recovery of lost future wages); Duncan v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Company, 480 F.2d 79, 87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859, 94 S.Ct. 69, 38 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973) (same); cf. McDonald v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 724 F.2d 243, 247 (1st Cir.1984) (court’s instruction that jury must reduce future earning award to present value without identifying particular method of present value computation not erroneous)."
} | 3,995,124 | a |
Moreover, the parties agree that Stewart's medical condition was known by the prison guards. Our review of the summary judgment evidence indicates that Appellees also intentionally disregarded the established treatment plan for Stewart. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 F.3d 465, 465",
"parenthetical": "holding that summary judgment was improper on qualified immunity grounds when defendant was aware of prisoner's need for medical treatment but failed to provide it",
"sentence": "See Chapman v. Johnson, 339 Fed.Appx. 446, 448 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (stating that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity when the defendant knew of prisoner’s injury and treatment protocol but failed to follow it); see also Easter, 467 F.3d at 465 (holding that summary judgment was improper on qualified immunity grounds when defendant was aware of prisoner’s need for medical treatment but failed to provide it)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "339 Fed.Appx. 446, 448",
"parenthetical": "stating that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity when the defendant knew of prisoner's injury and treatment protocol but failed to follow it",
"sentence": "See Chapman v. Johnson, 339 Fed.Appx. 446, 448 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (stating that a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity when the defendant knew of prisoner’s injury and treatment protocol but failed to follow it); see also Easter, 467 F.3d at 465 (holding that summary judgment was improper on qualified immunity grounds when defendant was aware of prisoner’s need for medical treatment but failed to provide it)."
} | 4,016,777 | b |
Because the parties intended for the covenant to run with the land and because the covenant touches and concerns the land, we conclude that it is a covenant running with the land. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in action by homeowners to reform plat covenants to permit them to elect members to the architectural control committee, court found that covenant designating grantor as sole member of that committee was a personal covenant",
"sentence": "Cf. Julian v. Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 82 S.E.2d 210 (1954) (court construed similar covenant as personal because it was designed merely to satisfy grantor’s aesthetic sense and not intended to benefit successors or purchasers); but see Smith v. First Savings of Louisiana, FSA 575 So.2d 1033 (Ala.1991). (in action by homeowners to reform plat covenants to permit them to elect members to the architectural control committee, court found that covenant designating grantor as sole member of that committee was a personal covenant)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court construed similar covenant as personal because it was designed merely to satisfy grantor's aesthetic sense and not intended to benefit successors or purchasers",
"sentence": "Cf. Julian v. Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 82 S.E.2d 210 (1954) (court construed similar covenant as personal because it was designed merely to satisfy grantor’s aesthetic sense and not intended to benefit successors or purchasers); but see Smith v. First Savings of Louisiana, FSA 575 So.2d 1033 (Ala.1991). (in action by homeowners to reform plat covenants to permit them to elect members to the architectural control committee, court found that covenant designating grantor as sole member of that committee was a personal covenant)."
} | 10,350,157 | b |
Because the parties intended for the covenant to run with the land and because the covenant touches and concerns the land, we conclude that it is a covenant running with the land. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "court construed similar covenant as personal because it was designed merely to satisfy grantor's aesthetic sense and not intended to benefit successors or purchasers",
"sentence": "Cf. Julian v. Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 82 S.E.2d 210 (1954) (court construed similar covenant as personal because it was designed merely to satisfy grantor’s aesthetic sense and not intended to benefit successors or purchasers); but see Smith v. First Savings of Louisiana, FSA 575 So.2d 1033 (Ala.1991). (in action by homeowners to reform plat covenants to permit them to elect members to the architectural control committee, court found that covenant designating grantor as sole member of that committee was a personal covenant)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in action by homeowners to reform plat covenants to permit them to elect members to the architectural control committee, court found that covenant designating grantor as sole member of that committee was a personal covenant",
"sentence": "Cf. Julian v. Lawton, 240 N.C. 436, 82 S.E.2d 210 (1954) (court construed similar covenant as personal because it was designed merely to satisfy grantor’s aesthetic sense and not intended to benefit successors or purchasers); but see Smith v. First Savings of Louisiana, FSA 575 So.2d 1033 (Ala.1991). (in action by homeowners to reform plat covenants to permit them to elect members to the architectural control committee, court found that covenant designating grantor as sole member of that committee was a personal covenant)."
} | 10,350,157 | a |
Iowa Code section 598.21B prohibits a court from considering a variation from the child support guidelines "without a record or written finding, based on stated reasons, that the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate." Iowa Code SS 598.21B(2)(d). We have repeatedly noted that courts must comply with this requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "521 N.W.2d 735, 737",
"parenthetical": "explaining a \"court has no authority to vary from the guidelines without a written finding that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994) (explaining a “court has no authority to vary from the guidelines without a written finding that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate”); Guyer, 522 N.W.2d at 820 n. 1 (noting the requirement and that a decree “fell woefully short of this statutory requirement”); see also In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Iowa 1992) (“Our child support guidelines are to be strictly followed unless their application would lead to an unjust or inappropriate result.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "487 N.W.2d 331, 333",
"parenthetical": "\"Our child support guidelines are to be strictly followed unless their application would lead to an unjust or inappropriate result.\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994) (explaining a “court has no authority to vary from the guidelines without a written finding that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate”); Guyer, 522 N.W.2d at 820 n. 1 (noting the requirement and that a decree “fell woefully short of this statutory requirement”); see also In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Iowa 1992) (“Our child support guidelines are to be strictly followed unless their application would lead to an unjust or inappropriate result.”)."
} | 7,253,510 | a |
Iowa Code section 598.21B prohibits a court from considering a variation from the child support guidelines "without a record or written finding, based on stated reasons, that the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate." Iowa Code SS 598.21B(2)(d). We have repeatedly noted that courts must comply with this requirement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting the requirement and that a decree \"fell woefully short of this statutory requirement\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994) (explaining a “court has no authority to vary from the guidelines without a written finding that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate”); Guyer, 522 N.W.2d at 820 n. 1 (noting the requirement and that a decree “fell woefully short of this statutory requirement”); see also In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Iowa 1992) (“Our child support guidelines are to be strictly followed unless their application would lead to an unjust or inappropriate result.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "487 N.W.2d 331, 333",
"parenthetical": "\"Our child support guidelines are to be strictly followed unless their application would lead to an unjust or inappropriate result.\"",
"sentence": "See State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1994) (explaining a “court has no authority to vary from the guidelines without a written finding that the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate”); Guyer, 522 N.W.2d at 820 n. 1 (noting the requirement and that a decree “fell woefully short of this statutory requirement”); see also In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Iowa 1992) (“Our child support guidelines are to be strictly followed unless their application would lead to an unjust or inappropriate result.”)."
} | 7,253,510 | a |
Although the statutes Dr. Pendergraft is charged with violating may provide penal sanctions, there is no explicit statutory requirement that a licensee be adjudicated guilty of the acts specified in the penal statutes before disciplinary action may be instituted. In fact, both sections 456.072(l)(c) and 458.331(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), allow disciplinary action, regardless of adjudication, for crimes the licensee may have committed in any jurisdiction relating to the practice of, or the ability to practice, medicine. Further, even an acquittal in a criminal prosecution will not bar a license revocation proceeding based upon the same offense as the criminal prosecution. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding revocation of appellant's medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939) (holding revocation of appellant’s medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding); see State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board’s complaint does not bar inquiry into physician’s actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board's complaint does not bar inquiry into physician's actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939) (holding revocation of appellant’s medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding); see State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board’s complaint does not bar inquiry into physician’s actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine)."
} | 7,052,711 | a |
Although the statutes Dr. Pendergraft is charged with violating may provide penal sanctions, there is no explicit statutory requirement that a licensee be adjudicated guilty of the acts specified in the penal statutes before disciplinary action may be instituted. In fact, both sections 456.072(l)(c) and 458.331(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), allow disciplinary action, regardless of adjudication, for crimes the licensee may have committed in any jurisdiction relating to the practice of, or the ability to practice, medicine. Further, even an acquittal in a criminal prosecution will not bar a license revocation proceeding based upon the same offense as the criminal prosecution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "190 So. 59, 61-62",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board's complaint does not bar inquiry into physician's actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939) (holding revocation of appellant’s medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding); see State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board’s complaint does not bar inquiry into physician’s actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding revocation of appellant's medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939) (holding revocation of appellant’s medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding); see State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board’s complaint does not bar inquiry into physician’s actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine)."
} | 7,052,711 | b |
Although the statutes Dr. Pendergraft is charged with violating may provide penal sanctions, there is no explicit statutory requirement that a licensee be adjudicated guilty of the acts specified in the penal statutes before disciplinary action may be instituted. In fact, both sections 456.072(l)(c) and 458.331(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), allow disciplinary action, regardless of adjudication, for crimes the licensee may have committed in any jurisdiction relating to the practice of, or the ability to practice, medicine. Further, even an acquittal in a criminal prosecution will not bar a license revocation proceeding based upon the same offense as the criminal prosecution. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "190 So. 461, 463",
"parenthetical": "holding revocation of appellant's medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939) (holding revocation of appellant’s medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding); see State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board’s complaint does not bar inquiry into physician’s actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board's complaint does not bar inquiry into physician's actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939) (holding revocation of appellant’s medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding); see State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board’s complaint does not bar inquiry into physician’s actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine)."
} | 7,052,711 | a |
Although the statutes Dr. Pendergraft is charged with violating may provide penal sanctions, there is no explicit statutory requirement that a licensee be adjudicated guilty of the acts specified in the penal statutes before disciplinary action may be instituted. In fact, both sections 456.072(l)(c) and 458.331(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), allow disciplinary action, regardless of adjudication, for crimes the licensee may have committed in any jurisdiction relating to the practice of, or the ability to practice, medicine. Further, even an acquittal in a criminal prosecution will not bar a license revocation proceeding based upon the same offense as the criminal prosecution. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "190 So. 461, 463",
"parenthetical": "holding revocation of appellant's medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939) (holding revocation of appellant’s medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding); see State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board’s complaint does not bar inquiry into physician’s actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "190 So. 59, 61-62",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board's complaint does not bar inquiry into physician's actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine",
"sentence": "State ex rel. De Gaetani v. Driskell, 139 Fla. 49, 190 So. 461, 463 (1939) (holding revocation of appellant’s medical license not barred by previous acquittal on charge of criminal abortion, even though criminal charge was basis of license revocation proceeding); see State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 138 Fla. 330, 190 So. 59, 61-62 (1939) (recognizing that acquittal in criminal court on identical charges as those forming basis for medical board’s complaint does not bar inquiry into physician’s actions for purposes of depriving him of right to practice medicine)."
} | 7,052,711 | a |
By looking at each fact in isolation, the Mother improperly focuses on individual trees in a determined effort to avoid seeing the forest. When determining whether a change of circumstance has been established in a custody case, the issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that the circumstances of the parties have changed enough that the best inter ests of the children will be served by changing custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 S.C. 521, 521",
"parenthetical": "\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.”) (emphasis added); see also Aiken v. Nelson, 292 S.C. 400, 403, 356 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1987) (affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 S.C. 400, 403",
"parenthetical": "affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.”) (emphasis added); see also Aiken v. Nelson, 292 S.C. 400, 403, 356 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1987) (affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court”) (emphasis added)."
} | 799,467 | a |
By looking at each fact in isolation, the Mother improperly focuses on individual trees in a determined effort to avoid seeing the forest. When determining whether a change of circumstance has been established in a custody case, the issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that the circumstances of the parties have changed enough that the best inter ests of the children will be served by changing custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "328 S.C. 521, 521",
"parenthetical": "\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.”) (emphasis added); see also Aiken v. Nelson, 292 S.C. 400, 403, 356 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1987) (affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "356 S.E.2d 839, 841",
"parenthetical": "affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.”) (emphasis added); see also Aiken v. Nelson, 292 S.C. 400, 403, 356 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1987) (affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court”) (emphasis added)."
} | 799,467 | a |
By looking at each fact in isolation, the Mother improperly focuses on individual trees in a determined effort to avoid seeing the forest. When determining whether a change of circumstance has been established in a custody case, the issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that the circumstances of the parties have changed enough that the best inter ests of the children will be served by changing custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "492 S.E.2d 420, 420",
"parenthetical": "\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.”) (emphasis added); see also Aiken v. Nelson, 292 S.C. 400, 403, 356 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1987) (affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 S.C. 400, 403",
"parenthetical": "affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.”) (emphasis added); see also Aiken v. Nelson, 292 S.C. 400, 403, 356 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1987) (affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court”) (emphasis added)."
} | 799,467 | a |
By looking at each fact in isolation, the Mother improperly focuses on individual trees in a determined effort to avoid seeing the forest. When determining whether a change of circumstance has been established in a custody case, the issue is whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes that the circumstances of the parties have changed enough that the best inter ests of the children will be served by changing custody. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "492 S.E.2d 420, 420",
"parenthetical": "\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.”) (emphasis added); see also Aiken v. Nelson, 292 S.C. 400, 403, 356 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1987) (affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court”) (emphasis added)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "356 S.E.2d 839, 841",
"parenthetical": "affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court\"",
"sentence": "See Routh, 328 S.C. at 521, 492 S.E.2d at 420 (\"There exist no hard and fast rules for determining when to change custody and the totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed.”) (emphasis added); see also Aiken v. Nelson, 292 S.C. 400, 403, 356 S.E.2d 839, 841 (1987) (affirming change of custody \"[biased upon the totality of the evidence and the broad discretionary powers of the trial court”) (emphasis added)."
} | 799,467 | a |
As to Connecticut's interest, that state is Gilbert's domicile, and, at least as to accidents where the place of the tort is fortuitous, New York has preferred the law of a plaintiffs domicile to the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 1, 12-14",
"parenthetical": "applying New York's choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario); see also Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, 97 F.3d 1, 12-14 (2d Cir.1996) (applying New York’s choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 N.Y.2d 482, 482",
"parenthetical": "applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario); see also Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, 97 F.3d 1, 12-14 (2d Cir.1996) (applying New York’s choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous)."
} | 9,112,875 | b |
As to Connecticut's interest, that state is Gilbert's domicile, and, at least as to accidents where the place of the tort is fortuitous, New York has preferred the law of a plaintiffs domicile to the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "240 N.Y.S.2d 750, 750",
"parenthetical": "applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario); see also Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, 97 F.3d 1, 12-14 (2d Cir.1996) (applying New York’s choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 1, 12-14",
"parenthetical": "applying New York's choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario); see also Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, 97 F.3d 1, 12-14 (2d Cir.1996) (applying New York’s choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous)."
} | 9,112,875 | a |
As to Connecticut's interest, that state is Gilbert's domicile, and, at least as to accidents where the place of the tort is fortuitous, New York has preferred the law of a plaintiffs domicile to the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "97 F.3d 1, 12-14",
"parenthetical": "applying New York's choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario); see also Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, 97 F.3d 1, 12-14 (2d Cir.1996) (applying New York’s choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario",
"sentence": "See Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750, 191 N.E.2d 279 (applying New York law where plaintiff and defendant resided in New York, but accident fortuitously occurred in Ontario); see also Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, 97 F.3d 1, 12-14 (2d Cir.1996) (applying New York’s choice-of-law principles to decide that law of Ohio, which was domicile of plaintiff and decedent, should apply where locus of tort was fortuitous)."
} | 9,112,875 | b |
Ultimately, while acknowledging that it is an extremely close question, the Court concludes that the second element of the Gentry test is met. Consequently, the Court finds that despite the conspicuous opt-out provisions in the 2014 agreements, the Court cannot conclude that the 2014 delegation clauses are without procedural unconscionability altogether; Mohamed's ability to opt-out of the delegation clause was not sufficiently meaningful to eliminate all oppression from the contract. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "42 Cal.4th 451, 451",
"parenthetical": "concluding that arbitration agreement had \"an element of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the opt-out provision\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 451, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (concluding that arbitration agreement had “an element of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the opt-out provision”); see also Duran, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”). And when combined with the substantial amount of “surprise” drivers would face given the highly inconspicuous nature of the delegation clauses specifically, the Court finds that the 2014 agreements’ delegation clauses contain some procedural unconscionability."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1709569, at *5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Gentry held generally that \"even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 451, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (concluding that arbitration agreement had “an element of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the opt-out provision”); see also Duran, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”). And when combined with the substantial amount of “surprise” drivers would face given the highly inconspicuous nature of the delegation clauses specifically, the Court finds that the 2014 agreements’ delegation clauses contain some procedural unconscionability."
} | 4,365,077 | a |
Ultimately, while acknowledging that it is an extremely close question, the Court concludes that the second element of the Gentry test is met. Consequently, the Court finds that despite the conspicuous opt-out provisions in the 2014 agreements, the Court cannot conclude that the 2014 delegation clauses are without procedural unconscionability altogether; Mohamed's ability to opt-out of the delegation clause was not sufficiently meaningful to eliminate all oppression from the contract. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1709569, at *5",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Gentry held generally that \"even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 451, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (concluding that arbitration agreement had “an element of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the opt-out provision”); see also Duran, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”). And when combined with the substantial amount of “surprise” drivers would face given the highly inconspicuous nature of the delegation clauses specifically, the Court finds that the 2014 agreements’ delegation clauses contain some procedural unconscionability."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that arbitration agreement had \"an element of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the opt-out provision\"",
"sentence": "See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 451, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 (concluding that arbitration agreement had “an element of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding the opt-out provision”); see also Duran, 2009 WL 1709569, at *5 (concluding that Gentry held generally that “even a contract with an opt-out provision can be a contract of adhesion”). And when combined with the substantial amount of “surprise” drivers would face given the highly inconspicuous nature of the delegation clauses specifically, the Court finds that the 2014 agreements’ delegation clauses contain some procedural unconscionability."
} | 4,365,077 | b |
The ALJ simply cannot do this. Having rejected the available medical record upon which to base an RFC assessment, the ALJ was then required to call a medical advisor and/or obtain clarification of the record to flesh out what she needed to support her decision. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "867 F.2d 1040, 1043",
"parenthetical": "\"[t]he administrative law judge is entitled to give substantial weight to the testimony of a medical advisor even though the advisor has not examined the claimant personally\"",
"sentence": "See DeFrancesco v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 1989)(“[t]he administrative law judge is entitled to give substantial weight to the testimony of a medical advisor even though the advisor has not examined the claimant personally”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 664, 669",
"parenthetical": "sometimes additional development may provide support for treating source's medical opinion that otherwise appears to be lacking",
"sentence": "See also Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.2004)(sometimes additional development may provide support for treating source’s medical opinion that otherwise appears to be lacking); Wilder v. Chater, 64 F.3d 335, 338 (7th Cir.1995) (ALJ may not rely on a hunch). By failing to do this and relying instead on her own opinion, she impermissibly “played doctor” — something expressly prohibited by the controlling case law."
} | 3,835,448 | a |
A tenant seeking equitable relief from the forfeiture of a lease despite the tenant's breach must generally place the lessor in the position it would have occupied had the breach not occurred. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "380 A.2d 995, 997-98",
"parenthetical": "stressing equitable discretion of court in weighing relief from forfeiture",
"sentence": "See Molyneaux v. Town House, Inc., 195 A.2d 744, 746-47 (D.C.1963); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rosen, 188 N.J.Super. 230, 234, 457 A.2d 52, 54 (App.Div.1983). To invoke that rule, a tenant must at least ordinarily be in possession. Here, by contrast, a dispossessed commercial tenant successfully regained possession despite its inadvertent nonpayment of rent due under a protective order, and we must decide whether the tenant owes rent for the three months it was out of possession. We think the underlying principle of the general rule applies: “if the tenant seeks equity, he must do equity. In other words, a tenant seeking relief from forfeiture must be prepared to square his account with the land-lord_” Molyneaux, 195 A.2d at 747; see also Kaiser v. Rapley, 380 A.2d 995, 997-98 (D.C.1977) (stressing equitable discretion of court in weighing relief from forfeiture); Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144, 148 (D.C.1947) (same); cf. Executive Square Office Bldg. v. O’Connor & Assocs., Inc., 19 B.R. 143 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1981) (discussing application of equitable relief from forfeiture of lease to chapter 11 debtor); In re Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que, Inc., 7 B.R. 92, 94-95 (Bankr.D.D.C.1980) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "discussing application of equitable relief from forfeiture of lease to chapter 11 debtor",
"sentence": "See Molyneaux v. Town House, Inc., 195 A.2d 744, 746-47 (D.C.1963); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rosen, 188 N.J.Super. 230, 234, 457 A.2d 52, 54 (App.Div.1983). To invoke that rule, a tenant must at least ordinarily be in possession. Here, by contrast, a dispossessed commercial tenant successfully regained possession despite its inadvertent nonpayment of rent due under a protective order, and we must decide whether the tenant owes rent for the three months it was out of possession. We think the underlying principle of the general rule applies: “if the tenant seeks equity, he must do equity. In other words, a tenant seeking relief from forfeiture must be prepared to square his account with the land-lord_” Molyneaux, 195 A.2d at 747; see also Kaiser v. Rapley, 380 A.2d 995, 997-98 (D.C.1977) (stressing equitable discretion of court in weighing relief from forfeiture); Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144, 148 (D.C.1947) (same); cf. Executive Square Office Bldg. v. O’Connor & Assocs., Inc., 19 B.R. 143 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1981) (discussing application of equitable relief from forfeiture of lease to chapter 11 debtor); In re Chuck Wagon Bar-B-Que, Inc., 7 B.R. 92, 94-95 (Bankr.D.D.C.1980) (same)."
} | 6,127,434 | a |
Where, as here, a driver raises no issue concerning the scope or duration of a search to which he consented, only the time period between the initial stop and the driver's consent is relevant to our review of the reasonableness of the duration of the traffic stop. Under these circumstances, a period of detention lasting 8 to 10 minutes was not unreasonable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[w]here at its inception a traffic stop is a valid one for a violation of the law, we doubt that a resultant seizure of no more than seventeen minutes can ever be unconstitutional on account of its duration: the detention is too short.\"",
"sentence": "See Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1277-79 (concluding that 14-minute period between the initial traffic stop and the driver’s consent to the search of his car was not unreasonable, where the officer was waiting for the results from a computer background check and had not given the citation to the driver when the driver consented to the search of his vehicle); cf. Hernandez, 418 F.3d at 1212 n. 7 (observing that “[w]here at its inception a traffic stop is a valid one for a violation of the law, we doubt that a resultant seizure of no more than seventeen minutes can ever be unconstitutional on account of its duration: the detention is too short.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "236 F.3d 1277, 1277-79",
"parenthetical": "concluding that 14-minute period between the initial traffic stop and the driver's consent to the search of his car was not unreasonable, where the officer was waiting for the results from a computer background check and had not given the citation to the driver when the driver consented to the search of his vehicle",
"sentence": "See Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1277-79 (concluding that 14-minute period between the initial traffic stop and the driver’s consent to the search of his car was not unreasonable, where the officer was waiting for the results from a computer background check and had not given the citation to the driver when the driver consented to the search of his vehicle); cf. Hernandez, 418 F.3d at 1212 n. 7 (observing that “[w]here at its inception a traffic stop is a valid one for a violation of the law, we doubt that a resultant seizure of no more than seventeen minutes can ever be unconstitutional on account of its duration: the detention is too short.”)."
} | 3,664,365 | b |
As noted above, the panel in Carpenter and the Love concurrence found it absurd to imagine that the discretion provided under SS 401 meant that criminal contempt may be punished in the same manner as terrorists or murders. The response of courts for hundreds of years to the same unbounded discretion has not been to construct an artificial and illusory limit on courts' discretion, but to make sure that the exercise of the courts' discretion is done with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumscription. When a reviewing court determines that a sentencing court has failed in this charge, the sentence is rightfully revised. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "371 F.3d 42, 48-49",
"parenthetical": "reducing contemnor's sentence from twelve months to six because he did not receive a jury trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1977) (fifteen-year sentence reduced to a two-year sentence); United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.1975) (thirty-five year sentence reduced to two years); United States v. Marshall, 371 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir.2004) (reducing contemnor’s sentence from twelve months to six because he did not receive a jury trial); see also United States v. Roach, 108 F.3d 1477, 1484-85 (C.A.D.C.1997) (noting appellate court’s responsibility to review district court’s sentence, but choosing instead to remand for district court to fashion appropriate sentence), vacated on other grounds United States v. Roach, 136 F.3d 794 (C.A.D.C.1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "108 F.3d 1477, 1484-85",
"parenthetical": "noting appellate court's responsibility to review district court's sentence, but choosing instead to remand for district court to fashion appropriate sentence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1977) (fifteen-year sentence reduced to a two-year sentence); United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.1975) (thirty-five year sentence reduced to two years); United States v. Marshall, 371 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir.2004) (reducing contemnor’s sentence from twelve months to six because he did not receive a jury trial); see also United States v. Roach, 108 F.3d 1477, 1484-85 (C.A.D.C.1997) (noting appellate court’s responsibility to review district court’s sentence, but choosing instead to remand for district court to fashion appropriate sentence), vacated on other grounds United States v. Roach, 136 F.3d 794 (C.A.D.C.1998)."
} | 3,387,445 | a |
As noted above, the panel in Carpenter and the Love concurrence found it absurd to imagine that the discretion provided under SS 401 meant that criminal contempt may be punished in the same manner as terrorists or murders. The response of courts for hundreds of years to the same unbounded discretion has not been to construct an artificial and illusory limit on courts' discretion, but to make sure that the exercise of the courts' discretion is done with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumscription. When a reviewing court determines that a sentencing court has failed in this charge, the sentence is rightfully revised. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting appellate court's responsibility to review district court's sentence, but choosing instead to remand for district court to fashion appropriate sentence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1977) (fifteen-year sentence reduced to a two-year sentence); United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.1975) (thirty-five year sentence reduced to two years); United States v. Marshall, 371 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir.2004) (reducing contemnor’s sentence from twelve months to six because he did not receive a jury trial); see also United States v. Roach, 108 F.3d 1477, 1484-85 (C.A.D.C.1997) (noting appellate court’s responsibility to review district court’s sentence, but choosing instead to remand for district court to fashion appropriate sentence), vacated on other grounds United States v. Roach, 136 F.3d 794 (C.A.D.C.1998)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "371 F.3d 42, 48-49",
"parenthetical": "reducing contemnor's sentence from twelve months to six because he did not receive a jury trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir.1977) (fifteen-year sentence reduced to a two-year sentence); United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.1975) (thirty-five year sentence reduced to two years); United States v. Marshall, 371 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir.2004) (reducing contemnor’s sentence from twelve months to six because he did not receive a jury trial); see also United States v. Roach, 108 F.3d 1477, 1484-85 (C.A.D.C.1997) (noting appellate court’s responsibility to review district court’s sentence, but choosing instead to remand for district court to fashion appropriate sentence), vacated on other grounds United States v. Roach, 136 F.3d 794 (C.A.D.C.1998)."
} | 3,387,445 | b |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in administering reasonable parental discipline, the defendant is guilty of no crime; if the defendant is not entitled to rely on the reasonable discipline defense, the homicide does not fall within the "lawful act" predicate of OCGA SS 16-5-3 (b) since, in rejecting the justification claim, the jury has determined that the act was not lawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a \"jelly,\" and resulted in the child's death was an unlawful act",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a “jelly,” and resulted in the child’s death was an unlawful act); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 534 (177 SE2d 840) (1970) (whether the defendant’s conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows) discloses felonious conduct not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act in placing hand over infant's nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act",
"sentence": "See also Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313 (2) (444 SE2d 767) (1994) (trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act in placing hand over infant’s nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act); Harmon v. State, 259 Ga. 846 (4) (388 SE2d 689) (1990) (trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child’s body so as to tear the child’s viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a “lawful act”)."
} | 1,067,683 | a |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in administering reasonable parental discipline, the defendant is guilty of no crime; if the defendant is not entitled to rely on the reasonable discipline defense, the homicide does not fall within the "lawful act" predicate of OCGA SS 16-5-3 (b) since, in rejecting the justification claim, the jury has determined that the act was not lawful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child's body so as to tear the child's viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a \"lawful act\"",
"sentence": "See also Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313 (2) (444 SE2d 767) (1994) (trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act in placing hand over infant’s nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act); Harmon v. State, 259 Ga. 846 (4) (388 SE2d 689) (1990) (trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child’s body so as to tear the child’s viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a “lawful act”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a \"jelly,\" and resulted in the child's death was an unlawful act",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a “jelly,” and resulted in the child’s death was an unlawful act); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 534 (177 SE2d 840) (1970) (whether the defendant’s conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows) discloses felonious conduct not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter)."
} | 1,067,683 | b |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in administering reasonable parental discipline, the defendant is guilty of no crime; if the defendant is not entitled to rely on the reasonable discipline defense, the homicide does not fall within the "lawful act" predicate of OCGA SS 16-5-3 (b) since, in rejecting the justification claim, the jury has determined that the act was not lawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a \"jelly,\" and resulted in the child's death was an unlawful act",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a “jelly,” and resulted in the child’s death was an unlawful act); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 534 (177 SE2d 840) (1970) (whether the defendant’s conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows) discloses felonious conduct not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act in placing hand over infant's nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act",
"sentence": "See also Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313 (2) (444 SE2d 767) (1994) (trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act in placing hand over infant’s nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act); Harmon v. State, 259 Ga. 846 (4) (388 SE2d 689) (1990) (trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child’s body so as to tear the child’s viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a “lawful act”)."
} | 1,067,683 | a |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in administering reasonable parental discipline, the defendant is guilty of no crime; if the defendant is not entitled to rely on the reasonable discipline defense, the homicide does not fall within the "lawful act" predicate of OCGA SS 16-5-3 (b) since, in rejecting the justification claim, the jury has determined that the act was not lawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a \"jelly,\" and resulted in the child's death was an unlawful act",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a “jelly,” and resulted in the child’s death was an unlawful act); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 534 (177 SE2d 840) (1970) (whether the defendant’s conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows) discloses felonious conduct not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child's body so as to tear the child's viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a \"lawful act\"",
"sentence": "See also Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313 (2) (444 SE2d 767) (1994) (trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act in placing hand over infant’s nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act); Harmon v. State, 259 Ga. 846 (4) (388 SE2d 689) (1990) (trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child’s body so as to tear the child’s viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a “lawful act”)."
} | 1,067,683 | a |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in administering reasonable parental discipline, the defendant is guilty of no crime; if the defendant is not entitled to rely on the reasonable discipline defense, the homicide does not fall within the "lawful act" predicate of OCGA SS 16-5-3 (b) since, in rejecting the justification claim, the jury has determined that the act was not lawful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act in placing hand over infant's nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act",
"sentence": "See also Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313 (2) (444 SE2d 767) (1994) (trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act in placing hand over infant’s nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act); Harmon v. State, 259 Ga. 846 (4) (388 SE2d 689) (1990) (trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child’s body so as to tear the child’s viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a “lawful act”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "122 Ga. App. 532, 534",
"parenthetical": "whether the defendant's conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a “jelly,” and resulted in the child’s death was an unlawful act); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 534 (177 SE2d 840) (1970) (whether the defendant’s conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows) discloses felonious conduct not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter)."
} | 1,067,683 | b |
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) The same rationale applies to the homicide defendant who relies on the "parental reasonable discipline" justification defense -- the defendant is not entitled to an additional instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the course of a lawful act because if the defendant is justified in administering reasonable parental discipline, the defendant is guilty of no crime; if the defendant is not entitled to rely on the reasonable discipline defense, the homicide does not fall within the "lawful act" predicate of OCGA SS 16-5-3 (b) since, in rejecting the justification claim, the jury has determined that the act was not lawful. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "122 Ga. App. 532, 534",
"parenthetical": "whether the defendant's conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows",
"sentence": "See Ashford v. State, 144 Ga. 832 (88 SE 205) (1916) (parental beating of a child that removed portions of skin, caused portions of skin to be beaten into a “jelly,” and resulted in the child’s death was an unlawful act); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 534 (177 SE2d 840) (1970) (whether the defendant’s conduct was lawful at the outset, what took place thereafter (15 or more heavy blows) discloses felonious conduct not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant's act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child's body so as to tear the child's viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a \"lawful act\"",
"sentence": "See also Moses v. State, 264 Ga. 313 (2) (444 SE2d 767) (1994) (trial court correctly denied request for charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act in placing hand over infant’s nose and mouth so forcefully as to prevent his breathing for a period of time sufficient to result in brain damage comes so plainly within the definition of the crime of reckless conduct that it cannot qualify as a lawful act); Harmon v. State, 259 Ga. 846 (4) (388 SE2d 689) (1990) (trial court correctly refused to give charge on lawful act-unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter since defendant’s act of administering an enema to a 27-month-old toddler by inserting the tip of a douche bottle into the child’s body so as to tear the child’s viscera is reckless conduct and thus cannot qualify as a “lawful act”)."
} | 1,067,683 | a |
As the trial court found, the statement was made in a hospital -- "the most formal of medical settings" -- after the victim had undergone "diagnostic tests up to and including a CAT scan." In addition, the victim had an existing doctor-patient relationship with Gladstone as she had met with her in Gladstone's medical office on two prior occasions in the previous six months. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "986 N.E.2d 255, 265",
"parenthetical": "holding that there was insufficient evidence that alleged victim made statements to forensic nurse-examiner for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in part because there was no evidence regarding alleged victim's \"past experience with medical facilities or medical providers\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 304 (1999) (noting preexisting relationship between doctor and victim in analysis of whether victim made statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); cf. VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 265 (Ind. 2013) (holding that there was insufficient evidence that alleged victim made statements to forensic nurse-examiner for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in part because there was no evidence regarding alleged victim’s “past experience with medical facilities or medical providers”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "143 N.H. 294, 304",
"parenthetical": "noting preexisting relationship between doctor and victim in analysis of whether victim made statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment",
"sentence": "See State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 304 (1999) (noting preexisting relationship between doctor and victim in analysis of whether victim made statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); cf. VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 265 (Ind. 2013) (holding that there was insufficient evidence that alleged victim made statements to forensic nurse-examiner for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in part because there was no evidence regarding alleged victim’s “past experience with medical facilities or medical providers”)."
} | 12,460,365 | b |
Because this Court held that a defamation claim will not lie against the media defendants, a fortiori that same claim could not lie against the attorneys who advised them. Even if we ignore this court's June 8, 2000 opinion in cause number 14-99-00026-CV, there is simply no basis in law for a suit against the attorneys representing the media defendants for their pre-publication discussions of the allegedly defamatory news reports. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation's employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation’s employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting “squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "838 F.2d 1287, 1302",
"parenthetical": "holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting \"squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn \"",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation’s employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting “squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn ”)."
} | 11,180,095 | a |
Because this Court held that a defamation claim will not lie against the media defendants, a fortiori that same claim could not lie against the attorneys who advised them. Even if we ignore this court's June 8, 2000 opinion in cause number 14-99-00026-CV, there is simply no basis in law for a suit against the attorneys representing the media defendants for their pre-publication discussions of the allegedly defamatory news reports. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "838 F.2d 1287, 1302",
"parenthetical": "holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting \"squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn \"",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation’s employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting “squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation's employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation’s employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting “squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn ”)."
} | 11,180,095 | b |
Because this Court held that a defamation claim will not lie against the media defendants, a fortiori that same claim could not lie against the attorneys who advised them. Even if we ignore this court's June 8, 2000 opinion in cause number 14-99-00026-CV, there is simply no basis in law for a suit against the attorneys representing the media defendants for their pre-publication discussions of the allegedly defamatory news reports. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation's employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation’s employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting “squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn ”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "838 F.2d 1287, 1302",
"parenthetical": "holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting \"squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn \"",
"sentence": "See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (holding communications between corporate counsel and corporation’s employees made for the purpose of rendering legal advice protected by attorney-client privilege); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (holding pre-publication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting “squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in Upjohn ”)."
} | 11,180,095 | a |
Specifically, no charge of CCE murder requires proof that there were other CCE murders, either in the same episode or in a subsequent episode, as required by the "multiple killings" and "killing another after a passage of time" "non-statutory aggravating factors," respectively. Thus, each of these "non-statutory aggravating factors" involves a factual component not required to prove the underlying offenses, considered only after a determination of guilt has been made on the underlying offenses. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "576 F.3d 870, 870",
"parenthetical": "determining that differences in the factual elements or components of the factors and the offense meant that there was no duplication of constitutional dimensions or otherwise",
"sentence": "Williams, 576 F.3d at 870 (determining that differences in the factual elements or components of the factors and the offense meant that there was no duplication of constitutional dimensions or otherwise). It is also reasonable to conclude that-at the very least-the fact that the defendant aided and abetted multiple killings in a single episode and aided and abetted another killing separated in time from an earlier killing or killings would perform the appropriate function of “non-statutory aggravating factors” by allowing for the individualized determination of whether a death sentence is justified, that is, helping to inform the selection decision."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 F.3d 571, 571",
"parenthetical": "considering whether the aggravating factor performed its required function in the penalty process",
"sentence": "See Cox, 133 F.3d at 571 (considering whether the aggravating factor performed its required function in the penalty process); see also Johnson, 900 F.Supp.2d at 958-59, 965-67 (explaining the function of “non-statutory aggravating factors”)."
} | 4,300,614 | a |
On several occasions, our Court has specifically concluded that the protections of Section 9 exceed those in its federal counterpart. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "586 A.2d 898, 898",
"parenthetical": "observing in regard to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that from 1961-1973, this Court \"tended to parallel the cases interpreting the 4th Amendment,\" but \"beginning in 1973, our case-law began to reflect a clear divergence from federal precedent.\"",
"sentence": "Cf. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 898 (observing in regard to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that from 1961-1973, this Court “tended to parallel the cases interpreting the 4th Amendment,” but “beginning in 1973, our case-law began to reflect a clear divergence from federal precedent.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "664 A.2d 969, 969",
"parenthetical": "addressing immunity and opining that \"Article I, Section 9 is, in fact, more expansive than the Fifth Amendment\" but not so much as to require greater protection than that provided by the relevant statute",
"sentence": "Swinehart, 664 A.2d at 969 (addressing immunity and opining that “Article I, Section 9 is, in fact, more expansive than the Fifth Amendment” but not so much as to require greater protection than that provided by the relevant statute); Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 454 A.2d 537 (rejecting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490, and holding that reference to post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence violates Article I, Section 9); Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (plurality) (diverging, under the lead opinion, from Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and concluding that use of suppressed but voluntary statements to impeach a defendant’s testimony violated Article I, Section 9, later abrogated by constitutional amendment)."
} | 4,366,257 | b |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 301, 309",
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed\"",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord's action against U.S. Postal Service",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | 10,542,884 | a |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants' security deposits into tenants' leases with HUD",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "332 U.S. 301, 309",
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed\"",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | 10,542,884 | b |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord's action against U.S. Postal Service",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609",
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed\"",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | 10,542,884 | b |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609",
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed\"",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants' security deposits into tenants' leases with HUD",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | 10,542,884 | a |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord's action against U.S. Postal Service",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed\"",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | 10,542,884 | b |
In the same manner that Congress has not precluded our fashioning of a federal common law rule in this area, it has not precluded our selective incorporation of state laws into that rule to the extent that they can be applied consistently with, or in furtherance of, the underlying purposes of the NHA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants' security deposits into tenants' leases with HUD",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in some situations \"it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed\"",
"sentence": "See supra note 7; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309, 67 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 91 L.Ed. 2067 (1947) (in some situations “it may fairly be taken that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed”); cf. Powers v. United States Postal Service, 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir.1982) (where a federal regulatory scheme was not affected, court applied state landlord-tenant law in landlord’s action against U.S. Postal Service); Merrill Tenant Council v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 638 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.1981) (incorporating Illinois statute requiring landlord to pay interest on tenants’ security deposits into tenants’ leases with HUD)."
} | 10,542,884 | b |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting instruction cannot cure the constitutional problem. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 196",
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 U.S. 136, 136",
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | 4,091,740 | b |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting instruction cannot cure the constitutional problem. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 U.S. 136, 136",
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | 4,091,740 | b |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting instruction cannot cure the constitutional problem. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "391 U.S. 136, 136",
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | 4,091,740 | b |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting instruction cannot cure the constitutional problem. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 185, 196",
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | 4,091,740 | a |
These precedents are premised on the belief that juries follow the instructions they are given. In the Confrontation Clause context, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that the risk of prejudice stemming from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession is so high that, in some circumstances, even a limiting instruction cannot cure the constitutional problem. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which \"obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant\"",
"sentence": "See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (“[Tjhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (holding that a properly instructed jury may not consider the redacted confession of a co-defendant which “obviously referred] directly to someone, often obviously the defendant”)."
} | 4,091,740 | a |
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