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"[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Dudley, 562 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1977) (within six years); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.1976) (five years); United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.) (five years), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 86, 24 L.Ed.2d 82 (1969). But see United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.1978) (prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1972) (en banc) (prior Dyer Act convictions 4 and 15 years old insufficiently relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense",
"sentence": "Engleman, 648 F.2d at 479 (no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense)."
} | 1,854,747 | b |
"[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Dudley, 562 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1977) (within six years); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.1976) (five years); United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.) (five years), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 86, 24 L.Ed.2d 82 (1969). But see United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.1978) (prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1972) (en banc) (prior Dyer Act convictions 4 and 15 years old insufficiently relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense",
"sentence": "Engleman, 648 F.2d at 479 (no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense)."
} | 1,854,747 | b |
"[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Dudley, 562 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1977) (within six years); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.1976) (five years); United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.) (five years), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 86, 24 L.Ed.2d 82 (1969). But see United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.1978) (prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1972) (en banc) (prior Dyer Act convictions 4 and 15 years old insufficiently relevant)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense",
"sentence": "Engleman, 648 F.2d at 479 (no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense)."
} | 1,854,747 | b |
"[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense",
"sentence": "Engleman, 648 F.2d at 479 (no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Dudley, 562 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1977) (within six years); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.1976) (five years); United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.) (five years), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 86, 24 L.Ed.2d 82 (1969). But see United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.1978) (prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1972) (en banc) (prior Dyer Act convictions 4 and 15 years old insufficiently relevant)."
} | 1,854,747 | a |
"[T]here is no absolute rule regarding the number of years that can separate offenses. Rather, the court applies a reasonableness standard and examines the facts and circumstances of each case." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "648 F.2d 479, 479",
"parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense",
"sentence": "Engleman, 648 F.2d at 479 (no abuse of discretion when district court admitted evidence of crime that defendant committed thirteen years before charged offense)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior Dyer Act convictions 4 and 15 years old insufficiently relevant",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Dudley, 562 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1977) (within six years); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.1976) (five years); United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.) (five years), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 86, 24 L.Ed.2d 82 (1969). But see United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir.1978) (prior Dyer Act convictions 14 to 34 years old insufficiently relevant to instant charge); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1972) (en banc) (prior Dyer Act convictions 4 and 15 years old insufficiently relevant)."
} | 1,854,747 | a |
A third possibility, and the one that coincides with the Commissioner's findings and conclusions, is that the jury found the 1992 incident was neither an aggravation nor a recurrence, but rather a new injury distinct from claimant's prior injuries. Where an employee suffers unrelated injuries during different employments, the employer at the time of each accident becomes responsible for the respective workers' compensation benefits. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "450 N.W.2d 296, 298",
"parenthetical": "administrative court did not exceed authority in attributing right-hand and shoulder injuries to first employer and left-hand and wrist injuries to second employer",
"sentence": "Gonzales v. Stanke-Brown & Assocs., 648 P.2d 1192, 1198 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); see Kulp v. Sheraton Ritz Hotel, 450 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Minn. 1990) (administrative court did not exceed authority in attributing right-hand and shoulder injuries to first employer and left-hand and wrist injuries to second employer); cf. Port of Portland, 932 F.2d at 841 (liability will not be imposed on employer who did not contribute to causation of disability)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "932 F.2d 841, 841",
"parenthetical": "liability will not be imposed on employer who did not contribute to causation of disability",
"sentence": "Gonzales v. Stanke-Brown & Assocs., 648 P.2d 1192, 1198 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); see Kulp v. Sheraton Ritz Hotel, 450 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Minn. 1990) (administrative court did not exceed authority in attributing right-hand and shoulder injuries to first employer and left-hand and wrist injuries to second employer); cf. Port of Portland, 932 F.2d at 841 (liability will not be imposed on employer who did not contribute to causation of disability)."
} | 1,549,006 | a |
(See Standard's Surreply 4 (citing common law and First Amendment precedent in same footnote).) Nevertheless, due to the important constitutional principles at stake, the Court construes Standard's argument as a separate assertion of both the common law and the First Amendment presumptions of access with respect to all of the documents. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "377 F.3d 141, 141",
"parenthetical": "recognizing court's role as \"primary representative of the public interest\" and its duty to determine whether confidential treatment over \"records filed wholesale under seal\" is warranted",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gambale, 377 F.3d at 141 (recognizing court’s role as “primary representative of the public interest” and its duty to determine whether confidential treatment over “records filed wholesale under seal” is warranted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124 (“Having concluded that the common law presumption of access exists in this context, we may not avoid the ques tion of whether a First Amendment presumption of access also exists.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "435 F.3d 124, 124",
"parenthetical": "\"Having concluded that the common law presumption of access exists in this context, we may not avoid the ques tion of whether a First Amendment presumption of access also exists.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Gambale, 377 F.3d at 141 (recognizing court’s role as “primary representative of the public interest” and its duty to determine whether confidential treatment over “records filed wholesale under seal” is warranted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124 (“Having concluded that the common law presumption of access exists in this context, we may not avoid the ques tion of whether a First Amendment presumption of access also exists.”)."
} | 4,225,947 | a |
. The plaintiff also appears to claim religious discrimination under Section 1981. Am. Compl. P 2. However, religious discrimination claims are not cognizable under Section 1981, which is limited to the prohibition against racial discrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 604, 609",
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | 5,536,711 | a |
. The plaintiff also appears to claim religious discrimination under Section 1981. Am. Compl. P 2. However, religious discrimination claims are not cognizable under Section 1981, which is limited to the prohibition against racial discrimination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 604, 609",
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | 5,536,711 | b |
. The plaintiff also appears to claim religious discrimination under Section 1981. Am. Compl. P 2. However, religious discrimination claims are not cognizable under Section 1981, which is limited to the prohibition against racial discrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | 5,536,711 | a |
. The plaintiff also appears to claim religious discrimination under Section 1981. Am. Compl. P 2. However, religious discrimination claims are not cognizable under Section 1981, which is limited to the prohibition against racial discrimination. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | 5,536,711 | b |
. The plaintiff also appears to claim religious discrimination under Section 1981. Am. Compl. P 2. However, religious discrimination claims are not cognizable under Section 1981, which is limited to the prohibition against racial discrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | 5,536,711 | a |
. The plaintiff also appears to claim religious discrimination under Section 1981. Am. Compl. P 2. However, religious discrimination claims are not cognizable under Section 1981, which is limited to the prohibition against racial discrimination. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination\"",
"sentence": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (stating that Section 1981 \"forbid[s] all racial discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Estate of Williams-Moore v. Alliance One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 647 n. 4 (M.D.N.C.2004) (stating that \"[S]ection 1981 does not protect against discrimination based on religion”) (citations omitted); Farbstein v. Hicksville Pub. Library, 323 F.Supp.2d 414, 417 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (stating that \"Section 1981 is grounded in racial discrimination and does not apply to actions alleging religious discrimination”) (citation omitted)."
} | 5,536,711 | a |
Any claimed injustice arises from the Defendant's elective choices, and not from the application of collateral estoppel. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "603 F.2d 590, 596",
"parenthetical": "finding that an issue was actually-litigated for collateral estoppel purposes even when a party produces minimal evidence on the issue, because \"[a]ny other result would permit a litigant to avoid the conclusive effect of collateral estoppel, by design or by inadvertence, by denoting as irrelevant an issue clearly raised by his opponent and by refusing to introduce evidence on the issue.\"",
"sentence": "See, Ossman v. Diana Corp., 825 F.Supp. 870, 879 (D.Minn.1993)(the Court found no unfairness in the application of collateral estoppel when the defendant was forced “to abide by consequences they knew might arise out of their prior tactical decisions,” to settle with the plaintiff in the prior action instead of appealing the Court’s ruling.); see also, Continental Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 596 (7th Cir.1979)(finding that an issue was actually-litigated for collateral estoppel purposes even when a party produces minimal evidence on the issue, because “[a]ny other result would permit a litigant to avoid the conclusive effect of collateral estoppel, by design or by inadvertence, by denoting as irrelevant an issue clearly raised by his opponent and by refusing to introduce evidence on the issue.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "825 F.Supp. 870, 879",
"parenthetical": "the Court found no unfairness in the application of collateral estoppel when the defendant was forced \"to abide by consequences they knew might arise out of their prior tactical decisions,\" to settle with the plaintiff in the prior action instead of appealing the Court's ruling.",
"sentence": "See, Ossman v. Diana Corp., 825 F.Supp. 870, 879 (D.Minn.1993)(the Court found no unfairness in the application of collateral estoppel when the defendant was forced “to abide by consequences they knew might arise out of their prior tactical decisions,” to settle with the plaintiff in the prior action instead of appealing the Court’s ruling.); see also, Continental Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 596 (7th Cir.1979)(finding that an issue was actually-litigated for collateral estoppel purposes even when a party produces minimal evidence on the issue, because “[a]ny other result would permit a litigant to avoid the conclusive effect of collateral estoppel, by design or by inadvertence, by denoting as irrelevant an issue clearly raised by his opponent and by refusing to introduce evidence on the issue.”)."
} | 3,791,719 | b |
Instead, the time requirement of 19-1-108(5) is a procedural rule that creates a condition precedent to the party's right to appeal the magistrate's order. Because such procedures can be waived and because the Department failed to raise the requirements of 19 -- 1--108(5) before the district court reviewed C.S.'s petition, the Department has waived any argument under 19-1-108(5). | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "43 P.3d 611, 617-618",
"parenthetical": "holding that Crim. P. 35's requirement that criminal defendants file a motion for relief with the state court before proceeding to habeas corpus implicates the doctrine of exhaustion of legal remedies and not the concept of subject matter jurisdiction, and any argument based on Crim. P. 35 is therefore waivable",
"sentence": "Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 617-618 (Colo.2002)(holding that Crim. P. 35’s requirement that criminal defendants file a motion for relief with the state court before proceeding to habeas corpus implicates the doctrine of exhaustion of legal remedies and not the concept of subject matter jurisdiction, and any argument based on Crim. P. 35 is therefore waivable); see also Ex Parte H.F., 843 So.2d 190, 191-92 (Ala.2002) (holding that the state’s failure to object to a late petition for appeal of a termination order granted by the trial court on the basis of excusable neglect constituted a waiver of the state’s right to contest excusable neglect on appeal to the court of appeals)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "843 So.2d 190, 191-92",
"parenthetical": "holding that the state's failure to object to a late petition for appeal of a termination order granted by the trial court on the basis of excusable neglect constituted a waiver of the state's right to contest excusable neglect on appeal to the court of appeals",
"sentence": "Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 617-618 (Colo.2002)(holding that Crim. P. 35’s requirement that criminal defendants file a motion for relief with the state court before proceeding to habeas corpus implicates the doctrine of exhaustion of legal remedies and not the concept of subject matter jurisdiction, and any argument based on Crim. P. 35 is therefore waivable); see also Ex Parte H.F., 843 So.2d 190, 191-92 (Ala.2002) (holding that the state’s failure to object to a late petition for appeal of a termination order granted by the trial court on the basis of excusable neglect constituted a waiver of the state’s right to contest excusable neglect on appeal to the court of appeals)."
} | 9,295,316 | a |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "318 U.S. 1, 6-7",
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 1, 21",
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | a |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "318 U.S. 1, 6-7",
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | b |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "318 U.S. 1, 6-7",
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | b |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 1, 21",
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | a |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | a |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | a |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "482 U.S. 1, 21",
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | b |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | a |
(See R. 22, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 10-13.) We note, however, that there is little support for this broad argument, aside from the Sixth Circuit case cited in Plaintiff's brief. The Supreme Court has never recognized field preemption in this specific area. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves\"",
"sentence": "See Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.Ct. 420, 87 L.Ed. 571 (1943) (\"the enactment by Congress of the Railway Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves”); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (preemption \"should not be lightly inferred ... since the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the State.”)."
} | 2,887,897 | b |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332",
"parenthetical": "separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | b |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332",
"parenthetical": "separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | a |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332",
"parenthetical": "separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93",
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | a |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | b |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | a |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93",
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | b |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262",
"parenthetical": "kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | a |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262",
"parenthetical": "kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | b |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93",
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262",
"parenthetical": "kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | b |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | a |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | b |
He then took her to the empty apartment on Maple Street or some other location where he raped her. The evidence shows that Davenport was orally, anally, and vaginally raped, and then apparently allowed to dress. Only then did Craig murder her. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93",
"parenthetical": "no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered",
"sentence": "See State v. Hill (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 313, 332, 595 N.E.2d 884 (separate animus for kidnapping where defendant forced a 12-year-old victim from a parking lot to a wooded area where he then raped and murdered him); State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 261-262, 552 N.E.2d 191 (kidnapping upheld as a separate offense where defendant lured a child from her home to a nearby building where he attempted to rape her and then killed her); cf. State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 N.E.2d 29, ¶ 93 (no separate animus since victim not moved from the bedroom where she was raped and murdered)."
} | 5,582,936 | a |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 886, 910",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 U.S. 72, 72-73",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | b |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 U.S. 72, 72-73",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | a |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "379 U.S. 72, 72-73",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "73 L.Ed.2d 1215, 1234",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | a |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 S.Ct. 215, 215",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 886, 910",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | a |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 S.Ct. 215, 215",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | b |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 S.Ct. 215, 215",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "73 L.Ed.2d 1215, 1234",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | a |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "13 L.Ed.2d 132, 132",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "458 U.S. 886, 910",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | a |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "13 L.Ed.2d 132, 132",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | b |
It is not enough to assert that the ordinary purpose of a defamation action is to vindicate and protect a person's common law reputational interest. The First Amendment protects public discourse-- even in the form of withering criticism of a political opponent's past dealings or associations -- unless the lodged attack is clearly shown to be false and made with actual malice. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "73 L.Ed.2d 1215, 1234",
"parenthetical": "\"Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into # action.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "13 L.Ed.2d 132, 132",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.\"",
"sentence": "See Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 274-77, 91 S.Ct. at 626-28, 28 L.Ed.2d at 42-44 (discussing attacks based on private conduct in political campaigns); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215,13 L.Ed.2d at 132 (“[Wjhere the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”); see also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3424, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215,1234 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into ■ action.”). After all, New York Times and its progeny even reach so far as to protect pillorying barbs some may regard as offensive and outrageous."
} | 6,971,304 | b |
. As a general matter, restitution is part of a criminal sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "957 F.2d 703, 706-07",
"parenthetical": "\"Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant's sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Buchey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) (“Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.”); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.\"); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended “to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "810 F.2d 456, 461",
"parenthetical": "\"Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Buchey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) (“Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.”); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.\"); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended “to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence”)."
} | 9,157,178 | b |
. As a general matter, restitution is part of a criminal sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "743 F.2d 827, 837",
"parenthetical": "noting that Congress intended \"to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Buchey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) (“Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.”); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.\"); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended “to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "810 F.2d 456, 461",
"parenthetical": "\"Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Buchey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) (“Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.”); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.\"); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended “to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence”)."
} | 9,157,178 | b |
. As a general matter, restitution is part of a criminal sentence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "957 F.2d 703, 706-07",
"parenthetical": "\"Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant's sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bu-chey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) (\"Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.”); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.”); United States v. Satter-field, 1A3, F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended \"to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "810 F.2d 456, 461",
"parenthetical": "\"Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bu-chey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) (\"Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.”); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (“Restitution imposed as a component of the defendant’s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.”); United States v. Satter-field, 1A3, F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended \"to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence”)."
} | 2,177,985 | b |
While we are not bound by other circuit courts' decisions, we are persuaded by the numerous decisions of other circuit courts that have rejected Bloodsworth or its rationale and have held that Sanders precludes judicial review of an administrative decision not to extend the time limit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "AU's denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | 1,689,641 | b |
While we are not bound by other circuit courts' decisions, we are persuaded by the numerous decisions of other circuit courts that have rejected Bloodsworth or its rationale and have held that Sanders precludes judicial review of an administrative decision not to extend the time limit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "AU's denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Secretary's denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under SS 405(g",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | 1,689,641 | b |
While we are not bound by other circuit courts' decisions, we are persuaded by the numerous decisions of other circuit courts that have rejected Bloodsworth or its rationale and have held that Sanders precludes judicial review of an administrative decision not to extend the time limit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "AU's denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | 1,689,641 | b |
While we are not bound by other circuit courts' decisions, we are persuaded by the numerous decisions of other circuit courts that have rejected Bloodsworth or its rationale and have held that Sanders precludes judicial review of an administrative decision not to extend the time limit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "AU's denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | 1,689,641 | b |
While we are not bound by other circuit courts' decisions, we are persuaded by the numerous decisions of other circuit courts that have rejected Bloodsworth or its rationale and have held that Sanders precludes judicial review of an administrative decision not to extend the time limit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "AU's denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | 1,689,641 | b |
While we are not bound by other circuit courts' decisions, we are persuaded by the numerous decisions of other circuit courts that have rejected Bloodsworth or its rationale and have held that Sanders precludes judicial review of an administrative decision not to extend the time limit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Appeals Council's decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "AU's denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Smith, 761 F.2d at 518-19 (8th Cir.1985) (Appeals Council’s decision not to consider untimely request for review not “final” decision under § 405(g), thus precluding judicial review, explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91 (10th Cir.1984) (denial of extension of time to request AU hearing not subject to judicial review); Penner v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1983) (Secretary’s denial of extension of time to request hearing not subject to judicial review under § 405(g), but holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider due process challenge based on ineffective notice of the Secretary’s determination); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1983) (refusal by Appeals Council to enlarge time for its review not subject to judicial review); Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980) (denial of motion to extend time to request hearing before AU not subject to judicial review); Peterson v. Califano, 631 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.1980) (refusal of Appeals Council to extend 60-day filing period for appeal to district court was not final decision under Sanders, distinguishing Langford); Sheehan v. Secretary of HEW, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979) (Appeals Council’s decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review); see also Sullivan v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 85 (D.Md.1985) (Appeals Council decision denying review of late application not subject to judicial review; explicitly rejecting Bloodsworth); Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371 (N.D.Cal.1983) (AU’s denial of request for extension of time not subject to judicial review)."
} | 1,689,641 | a |
Under the legal principals set forth in II.B supra, the material submitted by the Poradisovs in 2003 was sufficient to meet the Poradisovs' burden on their motion. It certainly warranted more than a perfunctory (and clearly inaccurate) mention by the BIA as being "merely cumulative." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "404 F.3d 295, 304",
"parenthetical": "in denying Zhao's motion to reopen, BIA abused its discretion by disposing, in a single sentence, of new country conditions evidence as \"'largely repeating]' \" the evidence from the original record",
"sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (in denying Zhao’s motion to reopen, BIA abused its discretion by disposing, in a single sentence, of new country conditions evidence as “‘largely repeating]’ ” the evidence from the original record); cf. Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 492 (1st Cir.1994) (vacating and remanding denial of asylum because country conditions evidence was “far too extensive and significant to be dismissed with a general statement”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "40 F.3d 482, 492",
"parenthetical": "vacating and remanding denial of asylum because country conditions evidence was \"far too extensive and significant to be dismissed with a general statement\"",
"sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (in denying Zhao’s motion to reopen, BIA abused its discretion by disposing, in a single sentence, of new country conditions evidence as “‘largely repeating]’ ” the evidence from the original record); cf. Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 492 (1st Cir.1994) (vacating and remanding denial of asylum because country conditions evidence was “far too extensive and significant to be dismissed with a general statement”)."
} | 8,934,190 | a |
But this is not a case where agents, having completed an investigation, and having planned elsewhere to effect an arrest and for no reason other than convenience, created exigent circumstances by going to the suspect's home without a warrant and announcing their presence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 1139, 1145",
"parenthetical": "where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry",
"sentence": "See United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C.Cir.1981) (where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "743 F.2d 1158, 1162",
"parenthetical": "officers met at local coffee shop to \"assess the situation\" before making warrantless home arrest",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir.1984) (officers met at local coffee shop to “assess the situation” before making warrantless home arrest); Segura, supra, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Serna, 625 F.Supp. 548, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (similiar facts to Segura). Given the state of the evidence on Cattouse’s involvement in the earlier buy and the absence of probable cause to believe a crime was committed in the afternoon until the second sale was actually consummated, I find the officer’s conduct in failing to obtain a warrant before the second buy was consummated reasonable."
} | 7,402,631 | b |
But this is not a case where agents, having completed an investigation, and having planned elsewhere to effect an arrest and for no reason other than convenience, created exigent circumstances by going to the suspect's home without a warrant and announcing their presence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir.1984) (officers met at local coffee shop to “assess the situation” before making warrantless home arrest); Segura, supra, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Serna, 625 F.Supp. 548, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (similiar facts to Segura). Given the state of the evidence on Cattouse’s involvement in the earlier buy and the absence of probable cause to believe a crime was committed in the afternoon until the second sale was actually consummated, I find the officer’s conduct in failing to obtain a warrant before the second buy was consummated reasonable."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 1139, 1145",
"parenthetical": "where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry",
"sentence": "See United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C.Cir.1981) (where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry)."
} | 7,402,631 | a |
But this is not a case where agents, having completed an investigation, and having planned elsewhere to effect an arrest and for no reason other than convenience, created exigent circumstances by going to the suspect's home without a warrant and announcing their presence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 1139, 1145",
"parenthetical": "where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry",
"sentence": "See United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C.Cir.1981) (where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir.1984) (officers met at local coffee shop to “assess the situation” before making warrantless home arrest); Segura, supra, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Serna, 625 F.Supp. 548, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (similiar facts to Segura). Given the state of the evidence on Cattouse’s involvement in the earlier buy and the absence of probable cause to believe a crime was committed in the afternoon until the second sale was actually consummated, I find the officer’s conduct in failing to obtain a warrant before the second buy was consummated reasonable."
} | 7,402,631 | b |
But this is not a case where agents, having completed an investigation, and having planned elsewhere to effect an arrest and for no reason other than convenience, created exigent circumstances by going to the suspect's home without a warrant and announcing their presence. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 1139, 1145",
"parenthetical": "where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry",
"sentence": "See United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C.Cir.1981) (where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir.1984) (officers met at local coffee shop to “assess the situation” before making warrantless home arrest); Segura, supra, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Serna, 625 F.Supp. 548, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (similiar facts to Segura). Given the state of the evidence on Cattouse’s involvement in the earlier buy and the absence of probable cause to believe a crime was committed in the afternoon until the second sale was actually consummated, I find the officer’s conduct in failing to obtain a warrant before the second buy was consummated reasonable."
} | 7,402,631 | b |
But this is not a case where agents, having completed an investigation, and having planned elsewhere to effect an arrest and for no reason other than convenience, created exigent circumstances by going to the suspect's home without a warrant and announcing their presence. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door",
"sentence": "Compare United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir.1984) (officers met at local coffee shop to “assess the situation” before making warrantless home arrest); Segura, supra, 663 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.1981), aff'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (warrantless entry for security check of apartment held unjustifiable where agents, despite the absence of reason to believe occupants of apartment were aware of investigation or that there was any urgent need to enter apartment, created their own exigent circumstances by knocking at door); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Serna, 625 F.Supp. 548, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (similiar facts to Segura). Given the state of the evidence on Cattouse’s involvement in the earlier buy and the absence of probable cause to believe a crime was committed in the afternoon until the second sale was actually consummated, I find the officer’s conduct in failing to obtain a warrant before the second buy was consummated reasonable."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "670 F.2d 1139, 1145",
"parenthetical": "where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry",
"sentence": "See United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C.Cir.1981) (where decision not to obtain a warrant during an earlier stage of an investigation was not unreasonable, existence of exigent circumstances determined at the time of warrantless entry)."
} | 7,402,631 | a |
While refusing to identify specific prejudicial attorney behavior, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some attorney errors will have only an "isolated, trivial effect," while others will have a "pervasive effect ... altering the entire evidentiary picture." Numerous lower courts have found prejudice in cases where attorney error resulted in a significantly skewed "evidentiary picture," leaving the defendant with no effective defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "306 F.3d 954, 961, 966",
"parenthetical": "counsel's failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant's alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial",
"sentence": "See Luna v. Cambra^ 306 F.3d 954, 961, 966 (9th Cir.2002), amended by Luna v. Cambra, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant’s alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1998) (missing alibi witness testimony would have “altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present confession of third party “must certainly undermine one’s confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense”); see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030 (7th Cir.2006) (testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was “undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state’s case” against the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030",
"parenthetical": "testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was \"undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state's case\" against the defendant",
"sentence": "See Luna v. Cambra^ 306 F.3d 954, 961, 966 (9th Cir.2002), amended by Luna v. Cambra, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant’s alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1998) (missing alibi witness testimony would have “altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present confession of third party “must certainly undermine one’s confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense”); see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030 (7th Cir.2006) (testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was “undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state’s case” against the defendant)."
} | 4,172,355 | a |
While refusing to identify specific prejudicial attorney behavior, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some attorney errors will have only an "isolated, trivial effect," while others will have a "pervasive effect ... altering the entire evidentiary picture." Numerous lower courts have found prejudice in cases where attorney error resulted in a significantly skewed "evidentiary picture," leaving the defendant with no effective defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "counsel's failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant's alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial",
"sentence": "See Luna v. Cambra^ 306 F.3d 954, 961, 966 (9th Cir.2002), amended by Luna v. Cambra, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant’s alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1998) (missing alibi witness testimony would have “altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present confession of third party “must certainly undermine one’s confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense”); see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030 (7th Cir.2006) (testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was “undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state’s case” against the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030",
"parenthetical": "testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was \"undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state's case\" against the defendant",
"sentence": "See Luna v. Cambra^ 306 F.3d 954, 961, 966 (9th Cir.2002), amended by Luna v. Cambra, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant’s alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1998) (missing alibi witness testimony would have “altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present confession of third party “must certainly undermine one’s confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense”); see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030 (7th Cir.2006) (testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was “undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state’s case” against the defendant)."
} | 4,172,355 | a |
While refusing to identify specific prejudicial attorney behavior, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some attorney errors will have only an "isolated, trivial effect," while others will have a "pervasive effect ... altering the entire evidentiary picture." Numerous lower courts have found prejudice in cases where attorney error resulted in a significantly skewed "evidentiary picture," leaving the defendant with no effective defense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "137 F.3d 1154, 1157",
"parenthetical": "missing alibi witness testimony would have \"altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict\"",
"sentence": "See Luna v. Cambra^ 306 F.3d 954, 961, 966 (9th Cir.2002), amended by Luna v. Cambra, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant’s alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1998) (missing alibi witness testimony would have “altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present confession of third party “must certainly undermine one’s confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense”); see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030 (7th Cir.2006) (testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was “undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state’s case” against the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030",
"parenthetical": "testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was \"undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state's case\" against the defendant",
"sentence": "See Luna v. Cambra^ 306 F.3d 954, 961, 966 (9th Cir.2002), amended by Luna v. Cambra, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant’s alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1998) (missing alibi witness testimony would have “altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present confession of third party “must certainly undermine one’s confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense”); see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030 (7th Cir.2006) (testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was “undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state’s case” against the defendant)."
} | 4,172,355 | a |
While refusing to identify specific prejudicial attorney behavior, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some attorney errors will have only an "isolated, trivial effect," while others will have a "pervasive effect ... altering the entire evidentiary picture." Numerous lower courts have found prejudice in cases where attorney error resulted in a significantly skewed "evidentiary picture," leaving the defendant with no effective defense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030",
"parenthetical": "testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was \"undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state's case\" against the defendant",
"sentence": "See Luna v. Cambra^ 306 F.3d 954, 961, 966 (9th Cir.2002), amended by Luna v. Cambra, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant’s alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1998) (missing alibi witness testimony would have “altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present confession of third party “must certainly undermine one’s confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense”); see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030 (7th Cir.2006) (testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was “undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state’s case” against the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "21 F.3d 1446, 1461",
"parenthetical": "defense counsel's failure to investigate and present confession of third party \"must certainly undermine one's confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense\"",
"sentence": "See Luna v. Cambra^ 306 F.3d 954, 961, 966 (9th Cir.2002), amended by Luna v. Cambra, 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena alibi witnesses left defendant’s alibi uncorroborated, prejudicing the outcome of the trial); Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.1998) (missing alibi witness testimony would have “altered significantly the evidentiary posture of the case ... [and] the jury would have had to balance more evenly divided evidence to reach its verdict”); Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir.1994) (defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present confession of third party “must certainly undermine one’s confidence in the murder conviction ... [and] served to deprive [the defendant] of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense”); see also Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1030 (7th Cir.2006) (testimony from a disinterested eyewitness, who defense counsel failed to subpoena, was “undoubtedly important to creating reasonable doubt in the state’s case” against the defendant)."
} | 4,172,355 | b |
Officials are liable for committing constitutional torts, accordingly, only if they knew, or were unreasonable in not knowing, that their behavior violated the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 3038, 3038",
"parenthetical": "\"[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable ... generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of [his] action\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038 (“[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable ... generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of [his] action”) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738); see also Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 253-54 (D.C.Cir.1987) (summary judgment must be granted unless “the unlawfulness of defendant’s action was so ‘apparent/ that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "830 F.2d 237, 253-54",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment must be granted unless \"the unlawfulness of defendant's action was so 'apparent/ that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038 (“[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable ... generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of [his] action”) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738); see also Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 253-54 (D.C.Cir.1987) (summary judgment must be granted unless “the unlawfulness of defendant’s action was so ‘apparent/ that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions”) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,491,005 | a |
Officials are liable for committing constitutional torts, accordingly, only if they knew, or were unreasonable in not knowing, that their behavior violated the Constitution. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "107 S.Ct. 3038, 3038",
"parenthetical": "\"[Wjhether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable ... generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of [his] action\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038 (“[Wjhether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable ... generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of [his] action”) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738); see also Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 253-54 (D.C.Cir.1987) (summary judgment must be granted unless “the unlawfulness of defendant’s action was so ‘apparent,’ that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "830 F.2d 237, 253-54",
"parenthetical": "summary judgment must be granted unless \"the unlawfulness of defendant's action was so 'apparent,' that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038 (“[Wjhether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable ... generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of [his] action”) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738); see also Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 253-54 (D.C.Cir.1987) (summary judgment must be granted unless “the unlawfulness of defendant’s action was so ‘apparent,’ that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions”) (citation omitted)."
} | 10,541,619 | a |
That holding applies here a fortiori. Here, all of tire documents that defense counsel has provided its witnesses to review in preparation for their depositions already have been produced to Plaintiffs or are otherwise publicly available. Plaintiffs cannot establish that have a "substantial need" to know which documents counsel used to prepare the witnesses, or that identification is "necessary in the interests of justice." Indeed, in the few depositions to this point, Plaintiffs already have marked hundreds of produced 'documents as exhibits. There is no compelling need for them to see which documents defense counsel think are important. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "759 F.2d 318, 318",
"parenthetical": "\"Rule 612 should never implicate an attorney's selection, in preparation for a witness' deposition, of a group of documents that he believes critical to a case,\"",
"sentence": "See Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318 (“Rule 612 should never implicate an attorney’s selection, in preparation for a witness’ deposition, of a group of documents that he believes critical to a case,”); see also Hanover Ins., 304 F.R.D. at 500 (holding that requesting party “ha[d] not met its burden” to prove that justice required disclosure of compilation under Rule 612); af."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "304 F.R.D. 500, 500",
"parenthetical": "holding that requesting party \"ha[d] not met its burden\" to prove that justice required disclosure of compilation under Rule 612",
"sentence": "See Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318 (“Rule 612 should never implicate an attorney’s selection, in preparation for a witness’ deposition, of a group of documents that he believes critical to a case,”); see also Hanover Ins., 304 F.R.D. at 500 (holding that requesting party “ha[d] not met its burden” to prove that justice required disclosure of compilation under Rule 612); af."
} | 4,281,915 | a |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "992 P.2d 332, 343-44",
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | 8,422,857 | a |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | 8,422,857 | a |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | 8,422,857 | a |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "992 P.2d 332, 343-44",
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "992 P.2d 332, 343-44",
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | 8,422,857 | a |
. [1] To find otherwise, would require this Court to make a judicial finding of the factual existence of this aggravating circumstance for the other murder count. Judicial findings of aggravating circumstances are constitutionally prohibited. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice",
"sentence": "Cf. Young v. State, 1998 OK CR 62, 992 P.2d 332, 343-44, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 837, 120 S.Ct. 100, 145 L.Ed.2d 84 (1999)(finding based upon State's closing argument single verdict form supported application of all aggravating circumstances to all murder counts and setting aside one aggravating circumstance due to lack of notice)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (Any fact that increases punishment must be found by a jury after proof beyond a reasonable doubt)."
} | 8,422,857 | b |
Substantial evidence supports the agency's finding that Gomez-Gonzalez failed to establish the harm he suffered or feared was or would be on account of a protected ground. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "555 F.3d 734, 740",
"parenthetical": "the REAL ID Act \"requires that a protected ground represent 'one central reason' for an asylum applicant's persecution\"",
"sentence": "See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (evidence demonstrated former officer was shot at and threatened because he had arrested particular criminal, not on account of his status as a former police officer); see also Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "640 F.3d 1095, 1098",
"parenthetical": "evidence demonstrated former officer was shot at and threatened because he had arrested particular criminal, not on account of his status as a former police officer",
"sentence": "See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (evidence demonstrated former officer was shot at and threatened because he had arrested particular criminal, not on account of his status as a former police officer); see also Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”)."
} | 4,368,880 | b |
Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA's previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "585 Pa. 45, 61",
"parenthetical": "holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they \"may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "597 Pa. 142, 142",
"parenthetical": "\"While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.\" (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | 7,310,321 | a |
Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA's previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "950 A.2d 313, 313-14",
"parenthetical": "\"While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.\" (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "585 Pa. 45, 61",
"parenthetical": "holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they \"may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | 7,310,321 | b |
Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA's previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "585 Pa. 45, 61",
"parenthetical": "holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they \"may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "585 Pa. 60, 60-61",
"parenthetical": "\"While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.\" (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | 7,310,321 | a |
Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA's previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "888 A.2d 573, 573",
"parenthetical": "\"While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.\" (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "585 Pa. 45, 61",
"parenthetical": "holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they \"may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | 7,310,321 | b |
Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA's previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "888 A.2d 564, 573",
"parenthetical": "holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they \"may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "597 Pa. 142, 142",
"parenthetical": "\"While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.\" (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | 7,310,321 | a |
Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA's previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "888 A.2d 564, 573",
"parenthetical": "holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they \"may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "950 A.2d 313, 313-14",
"parenthetical": "\"While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.\" (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | 7,310,321 | a |
Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA's previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "888 A.2d 564, 573",
"parenthetical": "holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they \"may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "585 Pa. 60, 60-61",
"parenthetical": "\"While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.\" (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | 7,310,321 | a |
Neverthe less, they are not subject to the PCRA's previous-litigation bar because they are distinct ineffectiveness claims derivative of the underlying issues. This Court has recognized that, while such ineffectiveness claims may fail for the same reason that the underlying issues faltered on direct review, the Sixth Amendment basis for an allegation of counsel ineffectiveness gives rise to a separate claim for review under the PCRA. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "888 A.2d 573, 573",
"parenthetical": "\"While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.\" (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "888 A.2d 564, 573",
"parenthetical": "holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they \"may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal\"",
"sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 526, 918 A.2d 220, 284 (2006); see also Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 61, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005) (holding that derivative ineffectiveness claims are distinct Sixth Amendment claims, albeit they “may fail on the arguable merit or prejudice prong for the reasons discussed on direct appeal”); cf. Williams, 597 Pa. at 142, 950 A.2d at 313-14 (“While under the Collins decision, layered ineffectiveness claims are distinct from the underlying claims, the underlying claims remain an essential component, and it should now go without saying that those challenging a verdict must attend to all aspects of their claims for relief.” (citing Collins, 585 Pa. at 60-61, 888 A.2d at 573))."
} | 7,310,321 | b |
"[A] number of courts have held that binding administrative regulations, as opposed to those that serve merely as guidelines for discretionary decisionmak-ing, are laws subject to ex post facto analysis." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "276 F.Supp.2d 196, 219",
"parenthetical": "\"The Ex Post Facto Clause simply forbids retroactive application of the BOP policy change to prisoners whose offense conduct predated the change.\"",
"sentence": "See Iacaboni, 251 F.Supp.2d at 1018 (“The Government may not ... instruct judges, defendants and counsel that short terms of imprisonment may ... be served in community confinement, and then, after sentencing, change the basic rules.”); see also Monahan v. Winn, 276 F.Supp.2d 196, 219 (D.Mass.2003) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause simply forbids retroactive application of the BOP policy change to prisoners whose offense conduct predated the change.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1018",
"parenthetical": "\"The Government may not ... instruct judges, defendants and counsel that short terms of imprisonment may ... be served in community confinement, and then, after sentencing, change the basic rules.\"",
"sentence": "See Iacaboni, 251 F.Supp.2d at 1018 (“The Government may not ... instruct judges, defendants and counsel that short terms of imprisonment may ... be served in community confinement, and then, after sentencing, change the basic rules.”); see also Monahan v. Winn, 276 F.Supp.2d 196, 219 (D.Mass.2003) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause simply forbids retroactive application of the BOP policy change to prisoners whose offense conduct predated the change.”)."
} | 9,008,548 | b |
In the absence of any evidence of a contractual relationship, I conclude that BFCU's termination of the Jaspers' membership benefits did not violate the stay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "129 B.R. 75, 78",
"parenthetical": "credit union's policy of revoking membership benefits of members who caused credit union a loss does not violate automatic stay",
"sentence": "See also In re Henry, 129 B.R. 75, 78 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1991) (credit union’s policy of revoking membership benefits of members who caused credit union a loss does not violate automatic stay); cf. In re Bobbitt, 174 B.R. 548, 553-54 (inferring existence of contract between credit union and member that covered maintenance of accounts, despite inadequate evidence of such an agreement presented at trial, court nonetheless holds that credit union’s “cancellation” of services constituted at most a breach of the inferred contract, for which relief from stay would not be required)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "174 B.R. 548, 553-54",
"parenthetical": "inferring existence of contract between credit union and member that covered maintenance of accounts, despite inadequate evidence of such an agreement presented at trial, court nonetheless holds that credit union's \"cancellation\" of services constituted at most a breach of the inferred contract, for which relief from stay would not be required",
"sentence": "See also In re Henry, 129 B.R. 75, 78 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1991) (credit union’s policy of revoking membership benefits of members who caused credit union a loss does not violate automatic stay); cf. In re Bobbitt, 174 B.R. 548, 553-54 (inferring existence of contract between credit union and member that covered maintenance of accounts, despite inadequate evidence of such an agreement presented at trial, court nonetheless holds that credit union’s “cancellation” of services constituted at most a breach of the inferred contract, for which relief from stay would not be required)."
} | 8,951,159 | a |
P 9 Here, in contrast, "the indictment ... made no reference, direct or implied," to facts that necessarily imply Robles could not have committed the charged offense without also having committed the lesser offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 Ariz. 484, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | 5,269,086 | a |
P 9 Here, in contrast, "the indictment ... made no reference, direct or implied," to facts that necessarily imply Robles could not have committed the charged offense without also having committed the lesser offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "610 P.2d 1045, 1048",
"parenthetical": "\"Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | 5,269,086 | a |
P 9 Here, in contrast, "the indictment ... made no reference, direct or implied," to facts that necessarily imply Robles could not have committed the charged offense without also having committed the lesser offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 Ariz. 484, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "986 P.2d 242, 242",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | 5,269,086 | b |
P 9 Here, in contrast, "the indictment ... made no reference, direct or implied," to facts that necessarily imply Robles could not have committed the charged offense without also having committed the lesser offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "986 P.2d 242, 242",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "610 P.2d 1045, 1048",
"parenthetical": "\"Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | 5,269,086 | a |
P 9 Here, in contrast, "the indictment ... made no reference, direct or implied," to facts that necessarily imply Robles could not have committed the charged offense without also having committed the lesser offense. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 Ariz. 277, 279",
"parenthetical": "\"The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 Ariz. 484, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | 5,269,086 | a |
P 9 Here, in contrast, "the indictment ... made no reference, direct or implied," to facts that necessarily imply Robles could not have committed the charged offense without also having committed the lesser offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "610 P.2d 1045, 1048",
"parenthetical": "\"Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 Ariz. 277, 279",
"parenthetical": "\"The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | 5,269,086 | b |
P 9 Here, in contrast, "the indictment ... made no reference, direct or implied," to facts that necessarily imply Robles could not have committed the charged offense without also having committed the lesser offense. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "125 Ariz. 484, 487",
"parenthetical": "\"Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "635 P.2d 870, 872",
"parenthetical": "\"The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.\"",
"sentence": "See Brown, 195 Ariz. 206, ¶ 10, 986 P.2d at 242 (“[I]t is the charging document and not the evidence that determines the issue.”); State v. Teran, 130 Ariz. 277, 279, 635 P.2d 870, 872 (App.1981) (“The test which determines the appropriateness of a lesser included instruction and verdict form by an analysis of the facts of a given case, i.e., the evidentiary test ... is not followed in Arizona.”); see also State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 487, 610 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1980) (“Often facts may support another lesser conviction but if not charged in the indictment, the lesser offense may not be found.”)."
} | 5,269,086 | b |
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