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+{"input": "v. Power Auth. of the State of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 649, 652, 602 N.Y.S.2d 588, 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y.1993) (same). These cases teach that fair market value is not to be determined in a rarefied realm of abstract calculation, but from the perspective of a hypothetical buyer in the real world \u2014 even if her perception of value is based partially on misinformation or (arguably) exaggerated fears about uncertain future events. Other courts, in the same or similar circumstances, have held that the anticipation of increased interference or potential hazards on the land remaining after a taking, which one court has labeled \u201cstigma damages,\u201d can be considered in assessing severance damages. See, e.g., Vector Pipeline, L.P., v. 68.55 Acres of Land, 157 F.Supp.2d 949, 957 (N.D.Ill.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that actual damages under respa included emotional damages 1: holding that increased fear of flooding was a matter that factfinder could properly consider in assessing severance damages 2: holding that local buyers fear of possible knapweed infestation legitimately affected calculation of severance damages 3: recognizing concept of stigma damages as they apply to property which is in fact contaminated 4: holding that stigma damages were properly included in calculation of severance damages where proximity of gas pipeline could trigger fears about possible mishaps", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of \u00a7 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez\u2019s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez\u2019s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455-56, 124 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 1: holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed 2: holding that rules setting forth time limits for a defendants motion for a new trial grounded on a reason other than newly discovered evidence are not jurisdictional but instead are nonjurisdictional claimprocessing rules 3: holding that newly discovered evidence must be that which existed at the time of trial but for an excusable reason was not discoverable until later 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that it did not impact the outcome of the defendant\u2019s case. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); United States v. Edwards, 224 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824). Here, Mr. Salazar's statements to Agents Pettry and Jones regarding the ten pounds of methamphetamine he sold in the preceding two years was merely cumulative to and in addition to the more than 140 grams of methamphetamine found in the automobile at the motel on the day of his arrest. There was more than enough evidence to convict Mr. Salazar on the drug trafficking charges brought against him even without his statements to Agents Pettry and Jones. 2 . See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (<HOLDING>). 3 . At trial, the government elicited Holdings: 0: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease 1: holding defendants rights not scrupulously honored when police officers ignored his attempt to remain silent and continued questioning 2: holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning 3: holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent 4: holding that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored  and upholding officers attempts to resume questioning after defendant invoked right to remain silent because defendant was readvised of his rights sufficient time elapsed between the original invocation and the requestioning and the questioning involved a different crime", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "until April 1998 the deadline for serious and severe nonattainment areas to submit their attainment demonstrations. See 64 Fed.Reg. at 70,398. Because not all SIPs contain MVEBs and because of the delay in the submission and approval of attainment demonstrations that do contain such budgets, it is entirely possible that some nonattainment areas subject to the conformity requirements may not have in place an approved SIP containing a MVEB. While the Clean Air Act generally contemplates that conformity determinations will be made by reference to approved SIPs, the Act simply does not address how conformity determinations should be made in the absence of an approved SIP with an adequate motor vehicle emissions budget. See Environmental Def. Fund v. EPA, 167 F.3d 641, 650 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). It therefore cannot be said that the EPA\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling 1: recognizing that use of the then approved shotgun instruction would be improper if it coerced jury into agreement or unduly hastened their consideration 2: recognizing that language approved by the court may raise questions if incorporated in a jury instruction in a case with different facts 3: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  4: recognizing that section 7506 does not dictate  how conformity should be determined if no approved sip exists or if the approved sip contains no adequate motor vehicle emissions budget", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Phillips, 807 So.2d at 718. Based on Blackshear, the gravity of appellant\u2019s crimes, as well as the treatment of like juveniles, supports the imposition of appellant\u2019s true life sentence premised on a Solem factor analysis. As such, similar to the defendant in Blackshear and based on the particular facts of this case, appellant\u2019s sentence does not violate either the Florida or the United States Constitutions\u2019 ban on cruel and unusual punishment. B. International treaty violation Appellant further asserts the imposition of such a sentence violates the ICCPR, an international treaty ratified by the United States in 1966. Even if appellant has standing to personally invoke the provisions of the ICCPR (compare Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp. 542, 545-47 (D.D.C.1981) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing 1: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants 2: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 3: holding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the death penalty based on the iccpr because treaties apply only to disputes between sovereign governments 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Lopez acknowledges, we have previously determined that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) rejected the argument that a term of life imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir.1992); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (\u201cSevere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense.\u201d). Lopez\u2019s Fifth Amendment argument is similarly without merit. See generally Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); accord United States v. Robinson, 344 Fed.Appx. 936, 940-41 (5th Cir.2009) (per mriam) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we have rejected the argument that a Holdings: 0: holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments 1: holding that exclusion of testimony as collateral and of speculative relevance did not violate defendants sixth and fourteenth amendment rights 2: holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory 3: holding references to a defendants lack of remorse violate the fifth eighth and fourteenth amendments 4: holding that application of statutory mandatory minimum in  841b1a does not violate defendants fifth and fourteenth amendment rights", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Chief Judge. Arnold Ellis, the appellant, is serving a 12-year prison term as a result of his 1983 conviction for drug offenses. As part of his sentence, the court ordered him to pay a \u201cstand committed\u201d fine of $60,000. Such a fine requires him to remain in prison (i.e., \u201cstand committed\u201d) until he pays it. .Ed.2d 130 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that while it is unconstitutional to imprison someone for failure to pay a debt it is constitutional to imprison someone for failure to pay a fine the term debt is to be understood as an obligation arising otherwise than from the sentence of a court for the breach of the public peace or commission of a crime 1: holding that a state cannot imposte a fine as a sentence and then automatically convert it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full 2: holding in a case where the maximum time of imprisonment was extended because an indigent defendant was unable to pay a fine and court costs that a state may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine 3: holding that state may not imprison indigent defendant solely for inability to pay fine 4: holding that due process prohibits a state from denying indigent parties access to its divorce court based on their inability to pay filing fees and costs", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for access services they admitted to ordering and receiving. Plaintiffs now argue that the court erred in finding that \u201cnone of defendants subscribed to plaintiffs\u2019 switched access services by submitting an Access Order as prescribed in the tariffs\u201d and in failing to consider issues of material fact that may establish that TNCI, Global Crossing, and Sprint are liable under the constructive ordering doctrine. The court will consider plaintiffs\u2019 second contention first. STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention motions to reconsider. The Eighth Circuit has instructed courts to consider such motions either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.1988); see also Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Holdings: 0: holding that an argument raised for the first time in a rule 59e motion is waived on appeal 1: recognizing that rule 59e permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order 2: holding that a motion to reconsider a section 2255 ruling is available and that it is to be treated asa rule 59e motion if filed within 10 days of entry of the challenged order 3: holding that the district court cannot extend the time for filing a rule 59e motion by margin order 4: holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "principles that allow for the formation of contracts without the signatures of the parties bound by them. See, eg., I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882, 888 (Colo.1987) (stating that the parties' agreement on essential terms of a contract as required to establish a contract can be inferred from their conduct or oral statements); Smith v. Multi-Financial See. Corp., 171 P.3d 1267, 1272 (Colo.App.2008) (stating that nonsignatories may nonetheless be bound by agreements to arbitrate based on common law contract principles). This reading also abandons the long-standing common law rule that a settlement agreement can be governed by and found enforceable under common law contract principles. See H.W. Houston Constr. Co. v. Dist. Court, 632 P.2d 568, 565 (Colo.1981) (<HOLDING>); Goltl v. Cummings, 152 Colo. 57, 380 P.2d 556 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts denial of appellants motion to enforce settlement agreement constituted an important issue 1: holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it 2: holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(9th Cir.1986)). Notably, in their reply, Petitioners argue that members of their proposed social group are \u201ceasily identified,\u201d but they do not address at all the issue of the breadth of the proposed group. Petitioners\u2019 Reply, pp. 18-19. As for their claim for withholding of removal, to qualify Petitioners must prove it is \u201cmore likely than not\u201d that they will be persecuted on account of a statutorily-protected ground. See Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.2001). As we have already held that the BIA did not err in holding that the particular social group identified by the Petitioners is insufficient to merit asylum protection, we also hold that Petitioners fail to present a prima facie case for withholding of removal. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Petitioners\u2019 motion to reopen Holdings: 0: holding that if an applicant fails to meet the standard for asylum he a fortiori fails to meet the requirements for withholding of removal and relief under the cat 1: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum 2: holding that an applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal 3: recognizing that a withholding of removal claim necessarily fails if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same 4: holding that an alien who has failed the wellfounded fear test for asylum will necessarily fail the more stringent more likely than not test for withholding of removal", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "marshals, and presenting the testimony of Dr. Ketroser. During closing argument, the defense spent substantial time discussing and attacking the reliability of the laboratory test results. The test results became a central and critical focus of the defense, which argued that if the state did not prove that the victim died from carbon-monoxide poisoning, then the jury must find appellant not guilty of felony murder and guilty of some lesser offense. The state argues on appeal that the defense focus on the cause of death was irrelevant because the jury was properly instructed that it need only find that appellant caused the victim\u2019s death while \u201ccommitting or attempting to commit\u201d arson. The state appears to be correct on the law. See State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d 615, 618 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>). But the prosecutor did not present this Holdings: 0: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 1: holding that the crime of rape is a lesser included offense of the crime of felony murder in the perpetration of rape and that since the latter crime included all of the elements of the former consecutive sentences were therefore improper 2: holding that felonymurder rule applies whenever felony and homicide are parts of one continuous transaction and rejecting defendants argument that he should have been acquitted of felony murder because rape was afterthought to homicide and the autopsy did not disclose whether rape took place before or after death 3: holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony 4: holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the veteran \u201cmay win or lose on the facts of her case without regard to the Veterans Court\u2019s interpretation of [statute].... \u201d Myore, 323 F.3d at 1352. That is to say, a failure to present sufficient evidence may have mooted the issue regardless of the Veterans Court\u2019s interpretation of the statute, but that was not enough to establish a substantial risk that the Veterans Court\u2019s interpretation would evade review. However, in both Adams, 256 F.3d at 1321 and Stevens v. Principi, 289 F.3d 814, 817 (Fed.Cir.2002), we held that the third Williams factor was satisfied because \u201cthe question of the authority of the Veterans Court to order a remand might not survive a remand, and, therefore, constituted an appealable final decision.\u201d Myore, 323 F.3d at 1353. See also Winn, 110 F.3d at 57 (<HOLDING>). Put differently, in order to satisfy the Holdings: 0: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 1: holding that a remand need not be ordered despite legal errors if remand would be futile 2: holding that a district courts remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the secretary of health and human services was an immediately appealable order 3: holding that a remand is appealable only when the remand disposes of an important legal issue that would be effectively unreviewable at a later stage of litigation 4: holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "considered by the jury in its sentencing deliberations, this same evidence was also sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstances concerning the commission of rape during the murders. See Berryhill v. State, 249 Ga. 442, 450-451 (11) (291 SE2d 685) (1982) (noting that the jury properly reconsiders all of the evidence from the guilt/innocence phase in the sentencing phase). This same standard, which concerns the sufficiency of the evidence when reviewed on appeal, applies to Martin\u2019s claim here, which is essentially a claim that the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict regarding the statutory aggravating circumstance at issue. See Miller v. State, 270 Ga. 741, 742 (1) (512 SE2d 272) (1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss 1: holding the applicable standard of review in addressing the sufficiency of the evidence is manifest error 2: holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard 3: holding that jackson standard is only standard to use when determining sufficiency of evidence 4: holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "reference the Maersk Sealand Bill of Lading, which is available on Maersk\u2019s website. Upon issuance of an initial receipt or booking document incorporating a bill of lading, the terms of the latter become part of the parties\u2019 contract. See Berkshire Knitting Mills v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 265 F.Supp. 846, 848 (S.D.N.Y.1965); St. Paul & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd., 2001 WL 196754, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.21, 2001). Even were this not so, the Maersk Bill of Lading issued as to the Guatemala Containers would govern any dispute as to those containers and the New Orleans Container as well, because it is Maersk\u2019s standard form bill of lading and would have issued in the normal course of business. See Garnay, Inc. v. M/V LINDO MAERSK, 816 F.Supp. 888, 893-94 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Am. Mills Holdings: 0: holding that bill of lading not charterparty governed contract dispute between carrier and shipper 1: holding that forum selection clause in a bill of lading issued to an nvocc binds the cargo owner because the nvocc acted as the cargo owners agent in accepting the bill of lading 2: holding that bill of lading issued as to two containers was binding as to third container which was stolen and as to which no bill of lading issued provided that the bill of lading in evidence was the standard form bill of lading that carrier always used 3: holding that terms of bill of lading apply to shipper where it brings suit thereunder 4: holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Christi 1995, writ denied); see also Gen. Servs. Comm\u2019n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex.2001) (sovereign immunity does not shield State from action for compensation under takings clause). Rather, \u201c[t]he Constitution itself is ... a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking, damaging or destruction of property for public use.\u201d Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1980). \u201cA physical taking may occur when the government physically appropriates or invades private property, or unreasonably interferes with the landowner\u2019s right to use and enjoy it.\u201d Tarrant Reg\u2019l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tex.2004). If the government uses private property without first paying for it, an owner may recover damages for inverse condemnation. Id. (<HOLDING>); see also Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept. v. Holdings: 0: holding evidence legally insufficient 1: holding evidence legally sufficient 2: holding that evidence was legally sufficient to support finding that government reservoir caused recurrent destructive flooding directly impacting ranch land 3: holding evidence legally sufficient under sections d and e 4: holding that evidence of representations outside the contract was legally sufficient evidence to support a section 1746b12 claim", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "forfeiture and to offer him a fair chance to present his claim of entitlement. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652. Whether the notice actually given is or is not reasonable invariably depends on the circumstances of the individual case. See Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287, 291 (7th Cir.2000); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (explaining that due process \u201ccalls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands\u201d). That said, the precedents shed some light on the government\u2019s obligation to notify parties in interest. For instance, the case law has begun to define what the government must do when it seeks to forfeit property belonging to a prison inmate. See Whiting v. United States, 231 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Giraldo, 45 F.3d at 511 (noting that would-be Holdings: 0: holding sufficient notice by certified mail to both home address and place of immurement 1: holding us mail sufficient to give notice but mail cannot be expected to notify person who is missing or unknown 2: holding rules of civil procedure are appropriate in determining what constitutes proper service by certified mail 3: holding that property owner was not entitled to relief under cafra because he was given sufficient notice of the administrative forfeiture proceeding through certified mail 4: holding that if service done by certified mail action commenced upon receipt of summons and complaint", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Urena, 162 S.W,3d at 551. There may be more than one proximate cause of an occurrence. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 774. Unlike a negligent activity' claim, a premises defect claim is not based on the defendant\u2019s malfeasance, but on its non-feasance. Id. at 776. That is, \u201ca premises defect claim is based on the property itself being unsafe,\u201d not on the defendant\u2019s activity. ShumaJce, 199 S.W.3d at 284 (emphasis added). Negligence in the premises defect context thus means \u201cfailure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition which the owner or occupier [of land] knows about or in the exercise of ordinary care should know about.\u201d Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753 (quoting Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264); see Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 787-88 (<HOLDING>). In such circumstances, the property owner has Holdings: 0: holding the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the premises owner when the evidence showed no one had been injured by the condition in question and the premises owner had received no complaints about the condition in question during a tenyear period 1: holding that premises owner had duty to use degree of care in performing activities that owner of ordinary prudence would use under same or similar circumstances 2: holding that negligence in premises defect context generally means failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate unreasonable risk of harm created by premises condition about which owner or occupier of land is aware 3: holding police officer who was shot by occupier of premises could not recover from premises owner for injuries the officer should have reasonably expected to sustain while engaged in the line of duty 4: holding that a business owner has a duty to use reasonable care to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition for patrons", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "principal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender\u2019s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee\u2019s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender\u2019s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been \u201crenewals and everything had been via telephone. We\u2019d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). We conclude there is no evidence to support Holdings: 0: holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law 1: holding that whether the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation is justified generally raises a question of fact 2: holding as a matter of law no justifiable reliance on statements like the deal is real and we will fund next week also observing statement loan was a done deal not sufficient to support claim for negligent misrepresentation 3: holding standard under section 523a2a is justifiable reliance 4: holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him.' \u201d) (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2104, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974)). 13 . If the government were correct that X-Citement Video announced a new rule, this would provide an additional ground for our conclusion that the cause and prejudice requirement does not apply. We have consistently permitted defendants to challenge their convictions in \u00a7 2255 motions, where there has been an intervening change in the law after the time for direct appeal has run. See, e.g., Sood, 969 F.2d at 775 (defendants pled guilty and did not challenge their convictions until post-conviction collateral proceedings); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 14 .The district court shall enter an order Holdings: 0: holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion 1: holding that the novelty of a petitioners claim can constitute cause for a procedural default 2: holding prosecutorial misconduct claim barred by procedural default 3: holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure 4: holding judicial recusal claim barred because of procedural default", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "460, 463 (8th Cir.2000) (\u201cEquitable tolling is proper only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner\u2019s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.\u201d), petition for cert. filed, \u2014 U.S.L.W. -, \u2014 U.S. -, \u2014 S.Ct. -, \u2014 L.Ed.2d - (U.S. June 11, 2001) (No. 00-10520). Because Hatcher filed his habeas petition over two years past the required date for a timely petition, the appeal is untimely and we are barred from reviewing it on the merits. In addition to being untimely, all of the arguments contained in Hatcher\u2019s appeal (except for the District Court\u2019s denial of an evidentiary hearing) have been defaulted by his failure to raise them on direct appeal or in state post-conviction proceedings. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Hatcher admits that he procedurally defaulted Holdings: 0: holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts 1: holding that federal courts must defer to independent and adequate state procedural bars in reviewing  2254 petitions 2: holding that   15a1419a3 is an independent and adequate state ground for a state courts finding of procedural default 3: holding that rule 322a is an adequate and independent procedural bar 4: holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "States v. Bowman, 634 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir.2011) (published opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cBut because plea agreements\u2019 constitutional and supervisory implications raise concerns over and above those present in the traditional contract context, in interpreting such agreements we hold the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.\u201d Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cAmbiguities in a plea agreement are therefore construed against the government, especially because the government can take steps in drafting a plea agreement to avoid imprecision.\u201d Id. (citing United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir.2002)); see also Gordon, 480 F.3d at 1209-10 (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that Freeman did not waive Holdings: 0: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not 1: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 2: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing 3: holding that as a matter of contract interpretation a plea agreement permitting a court to impose a restitution order beyond that authorized by statute might well be unenforceable on grounds of public policy and that the defendant is entitled to presume when she entered the plea agreement that the judge would order restitution in a legal manner 4: holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the admission of Permanian\u2019s statements violated the holding in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment when his codefendant\u2019s post-arrest confession, which incriminated the defendant, was admitted at their joint trial. In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that there was no recognized exception to the hearsay rule before it. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128 n.3, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 480 n.3, 88 S. Ct. at statements admissible because there was sufficient indicia of reliability). Moreover, defendant was able to confront and cross-examine Rinaldi, who testified about the statements. See Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d at 528 (<HOLDING>); Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d at 284 (same). We Holdings: 0: holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness 1: holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements 2: holding coconspirator hearsay exception does not violate confrontation clause 3: holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of  hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause 4: holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "467 U.S. at 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626. The Court decided, however, that the danger to unsuspecting civilians sufficed to apply the exception. Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626; see also United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir.2008) (applying exception when after defendant was removed from his car, arrested, handcuffed, and put in back of police car, police found an unloaded gun under front seat and then asked whether there was \u201canything else in [the car] we need to know about\u201d); New-some, 475 F.3d at 1225 (determining that exception applied where defendant was handcuffed on floor because \u201cofficers reasonably believed that they were in danger\u201d); Luker, 395 F.3d at 835 (applying exception where defendant had already been arrested, handcuffed, and patted down); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678 (<HOLDING>); Lackey, 334 F.3d at 1225-27 (finding \u201ca real Holdings: 0: holding that exception applies to statement by handcuffed defendant as to location of a gun in an apartment even where most of the other adults in the apartment were handcuffed because even assuming the executing officers believed that the residence was secure  the circumstances were still sufficiently dangerous 1: holding that exception applies to statement by handcuffed parolee concerning whereabouts of a gun in an apartment where parole officers had specific information from a third party that a gun was likely present in the apartment 2: holding that the defendant had a duty to retreat from the doorway between his apartment and the apartment hallway because that area functioned as a hybrid privatepublic space 3: holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the hallway of an apartment building where the building door was unlocked and the hallway was easily accessible to the public 4: holding that public safety issue remained notwithstanding that newton was handcuffed and in hallway outside his apartment because the unlocated gun presented a deadly risk to everyone on the premises", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that defendant did not preserve the question whether the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction and that, if he did, the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing the effect of defendant\u2019s refusal to answer on the state\u2019s right to test defendant\u2019s testimony on cross-examination. We begin with the state\u2019s preservation argument. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (considering preservation first). In Wyatt, the court explained that a party\u2019s \u201cfailure to object to the particular sanction imposed by the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some other sanction, fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the judge erred in failing to consider the availability of a less onerous sanction.\u201d 331 Or at 343 (footnote omitted S Ct 622, 2 L Ed 2d 589 (1957) (<HOLDING>). \u201cFor two centuries past, the policy of the Holdings: 0: recognizing defendants right to confront witnesses with adequate crossexamination 1: recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify 2: recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination 3: holding right to testify was federal constitutional right 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of his bed. 3 . While some of these cases discuss procedural, rather than substantive, due process, they are relevant to the question of when liberty interests arise for incarcerated prisoners. 4 . Grinter offered no allegations or argument in support of his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt. \"[I]t is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.\u201d United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 846 (6th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). Grinter has provided no argument or allegations in support of this argument either in the district court or before this court and has waived it. See also Rogers v. Howes, 64 Fed.Appx. 450, 455 (6th Cir.2003 h Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. at 918-26. 9 . Holdings: 0: holding that where no colorable claim can be construed from a complaint it should be dismissed 1: holding that the plra requires total exhaustion where an entire action should be dismissed if one claim is not properly exhausted 2: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief 3: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 4: holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a newly discovered claim", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "people outside the state may have eaten at the plaintiffs employer was insufficient to prove that the restaurant prepared food for interstate commerce. See Lamont v. Frank Soup Bowl, Inc., 2001 WL 521815, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001) (\u201cWhile it is true that people who live outside of New York may have eaten food prepared at Frank\u2019s, that fact alone cannot serve as evidence that Frank\u2019s prepares the food for interstate commerce.\u201d). For similar reasons, this Court holds that Plaintiffs service of out-of-state patrons does not implicate interstate commerce. It is also clear that communications with vendors and processing of credit card payments do not bring Plaintiffs claim within the ambit of the FLSA. In an opin ion letter, the Dep s Home, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1293 (M.D.Fla.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Plaintiffs handling of produce that Holdings: 0: holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs fraud claim 1: holding that the plaintiffs were not covered by the flsa by virtue of the plaintiffs purchase of items at local stores using their employers credit card 2: holding under flsa 3: holding arbitration clause in credit card agreement unconscionable 4: holding that a class of individuals whose receipts contained more than the last five digits of their credit card number or the expiration date of their credit card number was ascertainable even though these criteria were also elements of the plaintiffs legal claim", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "context, then, it is clear that the Second Circuit\u2019s holding was that the discovery of the cocaine packets provided probable cause to continue holding Valez, even after the arresting officer became aware of the intended suspect's arrest. 26 . With regard to the latter showing, plaintiffs\u2019 \"arrest cannot serve as the predicate deprivation of liberty because it occurred pri- or to his arraignment and without a warrant, and therefore was not 'pursuant to legal process,' \u201d i.e., not one that arose from malicious prosecution as opposed to false arrest. Singer, 63 F.3d at 116. Plaintiffs' release on bail after arraignment might constitute a Fourth Amendment \"seizure,\u201d see id.., but there is no evidence before the court as to whe , 380 U.S. 693, 699, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, Holdings: 0: holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 1: holding discovery rules apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 2: holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings 4: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "officers may be removed before the end of their statutorily defined term. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 339, 32 Ct.Cl. 626, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) (\u201c[W]e must construe this act as providing absolutely for the expiration of the term of office at the end of four years, and not as giving a term that shall last, at all events, for that time .... \u201d); Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 734 (3d Cir.1996) (\u201cIt is a long-standing rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end.\u201d). Furthermore, reading section 581(b) as mandating a five-year term renders section 581(c) meaningless, a construction we will not adopt. See Food & Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 177, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Pac Fung Feather Co. v. United States, 111 Holdings: 0: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts 1: holding that statutes dealing with same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system 2: holding that all parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole    and individual expressions be accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit internal citations omitted 3: holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute 4: holding that the issues specified in the coa may be construed in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7(C) are categorically exempt from disclosure' unless disclosing such information is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in-illegal activity.\u201d See Pinson, 202 F.Supp.3d at 102, ECF No. 306 (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Because Pinson does not allege illegal activity by the BOP, much less present compelling evidence of the same, the names of the co-defendants and third-parties are categorically exempt from disclosure. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 774-75, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (\u201c[I]n none of our cases construing the FOIA have we found it appropriate to order a Government agency to honor a FOIA request for information about a particular private citizen.\u201d); SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206 (<HOLDING>); Pinson, 202 F.Supp.3d at 102 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c  are exempt from disclosure 1: holding that the names of thirdparty inmates within memoranda were categorically exempt from disclosure absent compelling evidence of illegal activity by the bop 2: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure   3: holding that names of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are categorically exempt from disclosure unless disclosing such information is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity 4: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "would be future restrictions on his ability to reenter the United States, nor informed of any right to retain counsel. His counsel stated that the expedited removal order was invalid and improper inasmuch as Shunaula had possessed a valid visa at the time of his 1997 entry. The IJ concluded that he was not in a position to entertain a collateral attack on the 1997 expedited removal order. The IJ ruled that Shunaula was (1) inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), which renders inadmissible any alien who enters the United States illegally after having been ordered removed pursuant to, inter alia, an order of expedited removal; and therefore (2) ineligible for adjustment of status. See IJ Decision at 5-6, Admin. R. 65-66 (citing Delgado v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>)). On appeal to the BIA, Shunaula pressed the Holdings: 0: holding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the apa to review the denial of an aliens application for adjustment of status where the alien is in removal proceedings 1: holding that aliens inadmissible under  1182a 9c i i are ineligible for adjustment of status under  1255f 2: holding that refugees who have already acquired lpr status are ineligible for a  209c waiver in light of the language in that adjustment of status can be granted to an alien who has not acquired permanent resident status 3: holding ineligible for adjustment of status alien who was inadmissible due to reentry after prior removal 4: recognizing that an alien is ineligible for relief under  212c if he was not actually admissible at the time he received an adjustment of status", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "practices. Id. at 260. Accepting the Cities\u2019 claims as true, the Court finds that the Cities have alleged a causal connection between Monsanto\u2019s distribution of PCBs and contamination of the Bay. iii. The Cities may bring public nuisance claims for damages. Monsanto argues that the Cities cannot seek damages based on a public nuisance claim against a product manufacturer. MTD at 23-24. Such claims, Monsanto says, are \u201cstrongly disfavored in California\u201d because courts view them as \u201cimproper end-run[s] around products liability laws.\u201d Id at 24; City of Modesto, 119 Cal.App.4th at 39, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 (\u201cthe law of nuisance is not intended to serve as a surrogate for ordinary products liability\u201d); City of San Diego v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 30 Cal.App.4th 575, 585, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 876 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Public entities generally may not bring Holdings: 0: holding that where a city brought a public nuisance claim based on asbestos in its buildings it had essentially pleaded a products liability action not a nuisance action 1: holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a permanent nuisance action for injury to property because none of the plaintiffs were the owners of the land when the cause of action accrued with the first injury 2: recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law 3: holding that the viability of a negligence action against a municipality under  1147190 determines the success or failure of a nuisance action based upon the same facts 4: recognizing that substantial change is a defense to a products liability claim", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "have no basis for evaluating this claim ... [whether the denial of the permit will] prevent economically viable uses ... or frustrate reasonable investment-backed expectations.\u201d The Court, however, held that the requirement by the Corp of Engineers that the landowner obtain a permit before filling wetlands did not amount to a taking because even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent \u201ceconomically viable\u201d use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 127, 106 S.Ct. at 459. See also Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1174 (Fed.Cir.1991), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014 , 112 S.Ct. 406, 116 L.Ed.2d 354 (<HOLDING>). (Emphasis added, brackets in original.) The Holdings: 0: holding that there was no presumption of a gift where the wifes money was used to make the purchase but title was placed in the name of the husband and finding the facts sufficient to establish a purchase money resulting trust in favor of the wife 1: holding that where a purchase of the parcel to facilitate mining was clearly a part of the investment backing for benefits expectations  and where the diminution in value of whitney coal was total there was a taking 2: holding that there was no evidence of market value where owners testimony affirmatively showed that it was based on personal value 3: holding that where purchaser had taken possession and paid part of the purchase price the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement of a purchase agreement 4: holding there cannot be a complete restoration of the property unless it can be said that there has been no diminution of value after repair of the car and adding that the appropriate and fair measure of damages could be achieved by awarding either the difference between the fair cash value of the car before and after the collision or similarly the cost of repairs plus any diminution in value", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "administrator is not dispositive, it is certainly not irrelevant.\u201d Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir.1984). The court in that case held the defendant, although not formally appointed a trustee, to be a fiduciary where she was \u201crepresented\u201d in various documents as a trustee and took actions in an official capacity as trustee. See id. Defendant asserts that he did not understand \u201cin a technical sense\u201d the meaning of the terms \u201ctrustee\u201d or \u201cplan administrator.\u201d The Fifth Circuit rejected just such an argument in Donovan, supra, at 308 n. 4, noting the \u201clong standing and generally accepted principle of contract law that ... a person who intentionally signs a document is bound by its contents.\u201d See also Miller v. Lay Trucking Company, 606 F.Supp. 1326, 1334-35 (N.D.Ind.1985) (<HOLDING>). This court holds that a person who is Holdings: 0: holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions 1: holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review 2: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 3: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 4: holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, \u201cthe disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.\u201d Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court \u201cmust sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.\u201d Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, Holdings: 0: holding that the moving party bears a heavy burden of proving the facts required for disqualification 1: holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  2: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought 3: holding that the trial court must determine whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis 4: recognizing that trial court has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence and party claiming abuse of that discretion bears a heavy burden", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "advance, and because the notice plaintiff received did not specify that plaintiffs removal as an officer was to be considered, I find that the Code of Regulations has been violated. I do not find, however, that this violation amounts to a breach of the fiduciary duty by the individual defendants. Plaintiff attempts to conflate defendants\u2019 obligations owed to him in his role as a director with defendants\u2019 fiduciary duty toward him as an employee-shareholder. The obligation to comply with the notice requirement arises in plaintiffs role as a director of OIO. The fact that plaintiff was owed this notice as a director does not broaden the fiduciary duty defendants\u2019 owe plaintiff as an employee-shareholder. See Leigh v. Crescent Square, Ltd. 80 Ohio App.3d 231, 239, 608 N.E.2d 1166, (1992) (<HOLDING>).' e. Good Faith and Legitimate Business Reason Holdings: 0: holding that the concept of fiduciary duty did not require general partners to notify ousted partner of his impending ouster and that absent explicit provisions in a partnership agreement requiring advance notice to a party being removed notice hearing or a showing of cause is not implicitly required 1: holding that notice of administrative forfeiture sent to prisoner did not require actual notice to the property owner only notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action 2: holding that the defendant did not require advance notice where he could not show how he was prejudiced by late notice or how he could have been helped by additional notice 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "referrals to specialists\u2014 the discrimination provision is sufficiently clear in apprising physicians that they may not provide firearm-owning patients with less medical care than they would other patients, in any circumstances. Thus, the discrimination provision of the Act is not vague. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the harassment provision of the Act, \u00a7 709.338(6), is vague because the Act does not define \u201cunnecessarily harassing.\u201d Plaintiffs contend that patients may hold diverse views as to what constitutes unnecessary harassment. Plaintiffs argue that what conduct is prohibited thus depends on what a particular patient understands it to be, and that the resulting uncertainty as to what the Act prohibits \u201cis not permissible under the First Amendment.\u201d See Conant, 309 F.3d at 639 (<HOLDING>) (citing Collins, 323 U.S. at 535, 65 S.Ct. at Holdings: 0: holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity 1: holding a statute providing for administrative action against physicians who engage in speech that the patient believes to be a recommendation of marijuana lacks the requisite narrow specificity under the first amendment 2: holding statute criminalizing speech intended to influence a juror did not violate the first amendment 3: holding that first amendment protections apply to compelled speech as well as restrictions on speech 4: holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "failed in determining whether it breached the contract. Because \u201cQuestion 1\u201d submitted only a single theory of liability and the trial court did not otherwise instruct the jury to consider erroneous matters, we conclude that the trial court did not err by submitting an invalid theory of liability in \u201cQuestion 1.\u201d Cf. Bush, 122 S.W.3d at 857-58; Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 211 S.W.3d at 757 (\u201cWhen, as here, the broad-form questions submitted a single liability theory (negligence) to the jury, Casteel\u2019s multiple-liability-theory analysis does not apply.\u201d); Mustafa v. Matrut, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1492419, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010) (mem. op.), supplemented, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1839944 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Kajima Int\u2019l., Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of nonpayment of salary and writing of bad checks did not result in submission of unpled theories of fraud liability where evidence supported pled fraud claim based on nonpayment of loan 1: holding that the submission of false information with regard to loan applications was not the result of spur of the moment conduct 2: holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal 3: holding that defendant was not harmed by submission of invalid fraud claim 4: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "$30,027 instead of the $54,977 it originally found necessary. In the court's explanation of its calculations, it is not clear if this change was intentional. The court stated: \"The court evaluated the evidence, including the photographs of the residence and found Mr. Sparks's evidence 5 (placing property into joint title raises presumption of donative intent, although presumption may be overcome if evidence of different intent at time of placement into joint title is produced). 18 . Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1996). 19 . Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 275 (Alaska 2000). 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 277. 22 . 1 Brett R. TurnEr, Division or Prover Ty \u00a7 5:69, at 664 (3d ed.2005). 23 . Id. at 665. 24 . Id. at 667. 25 . Id. 26 . See Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 481 (Alaska 1994) (<HOLDING>). 27 . 119 P.3d 1005 (Alaska 2005). 28 . Id. at Holdings: 0: holding that it is function of trial court to judge witnesses credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence 1: holding that on a motion for summary judgment it is settled that a trial court is not permitted to weigh material conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses 2: holding that it is trial courts function to evaluate witness credibility and weigh conflicting evidence 3: holding trial court free to evaluate credibility of witnesses 4: holding court does notweigh conflicting evidence or consider witness credibility and witnesses conflicting or differing accounts do not necessarily render the evidence insufficient", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the second controlled drug buy was merely to increase his sentence. Turner\u2019s sentencing entrapment claim is based on his self-proclaimed status as a small-time, \u201cdime-bag\u201d dealer who was not predisposed to sell the quantity of drugs requested by the informant. We dispatch first with Turner\u2019s sentencing manipulation claim. As the district judge acknowledged, our circuit does not recognize the sentencing manipulation doctrine. Id. at 76; see also United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir.2007). Turner concedes this precedent but encourages us to reconsider the court\u2019s position, pointing to other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rizzo, 121 F.3d 794, 801 & Holdings: 0: recognizing a challenge to jurisdiction as a viable claim 1: recognizing sentencing manipulation as a viable defense 2: recognizing primary assumption of risk as a viable doctrine 3: holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an entrapment defense that was legally available and where there was no other viable defense to present 4: holding that such a theory is viable under title vii", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "731-32 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019). We observed in Haverty that a trial court has the discretion under West Virginia Code \u00a7 57-5-2 to determine whether immunity should be extended to a particular witness based on a determination \u201cthat the ends of justice may be promoted by compelling such testimony or evidence.\u201d 165 W.Va. at 172, 267 S.E.2d at 732. In this case, the trial court made the determination required by West Virginia Code \u00a7 57-5-2 that the interests of justice required a grant of immunity to Ms. Day so that she could freely offer her testimony without fear of additional prosecution for any events associated with the murder of the victim. When Ms. Day refused to testify despite a grant of immunity, th 322, 489 S.E.2d 289, 300 (1997) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Holdings: 0: recognizing that  an ordinary witness may decline to answer only after making the requisite showing of the danger of selfincrimination  1: holding that a trial judges decision to close the courtroom during the testimony of a witness without making the requisite casespecific findings of fact was reversible error 2: holding that a trial court errs by exempting a witness from sequestration absent the requisite showing 3: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination 4: holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "finding of fact by the WCJ to sufficiently support the suspension of benefits. Employer claims the Suspension Order is free from error. Under Section 422(a) of the Act, a WCJ must issue a \u201creasoned decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law\u201d which would enable the parties to understand the rationale for the resulting decision and provide a reviewing court a \u201cbasis for meaningful appellate review.\u201d 77 P.S. \u00a7 834. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Daniels, elaborated on this standard and held that the WCJ decision must allow for adequate review by the Board and appellate courts \u201cwithout further elucidation.\u201d Daniels, 574 Pa. at 76, 828 A.2d at 1052. See also O\u2019Donnell v. Workers\u2019 Compensation Appeal Board (United Parcel Service), 831 A.2d 784, 790 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (<HOLDING>). Section 314 of the Act permits an employer to Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence 1: holding the wcjs credibility determinations precluded any meaningful appellate review because the court had to imagine why the wcj made such credibility determinations 2: holding that credibility determinations are for the jury 3: holding that we review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence 4: holding that in determining the propriety of summary judgment credibility determinations may not be made ", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Thus, the question for a jury would be whether the State provided reasonable accommodations resulting in meaningful access for Ms. Jar-amillo, or denied her such access solely on the basis of her disability. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to Ms. Jaramillo\u2019s equal protection claim, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find that the accommodations provided by the State were unreasonable. Ms. Jaramillo had been quite successful in the past with identical accommodations, and several courts have made clear that the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act require only reasonable accommodations, not necessarily the particular accommodations an individual would prefer. See, e.g., Camarillo v. Carrots Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that insurance policy that discriminated against the disabled did not violate the ada but did independently violate the unruh act 1: holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled 2: holding that the ada does not require an employer to hire an assistant to help a disabled employee fulfill his work responsibilities 3: holding that the ada requires fastfood restaurants to implement policies or procedures to effectively train their employees how to deal with disabled individuals but does not require a particular policy or procedure 4: holding that an entity that serves the disabled lacks standing under the ada", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Communications v. Texas Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex.1997). When notice bears an incorrect address, it constitutes error on the face of the record. See Mann, Frankfort, Stein & Lipp, P.C. v. Fleetwood Management. Corp, No. 01-9 ersal Systems, Inc., 961 S.W.2d 418, 419-20 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (the court held there was error on the face of the record indicating Transoceanic did not receive the trial setting notice mailed by the clerk where notice was mailed to Transoceanic\u2019s counsel\u2019s former address and returned undeliverable, and the court noted that whether Transoceanic\u2019s counsel was at fault by failing to provide a current mailing address was not a consideration on appeal by writ of error, a non-equitable proceeding); Fleetwood, 2009 WL 754693, at *4 (<HOLDING>). We sustain Issue One and reverse and remand. Holdings: 0: holding that the court cannot conclude that failure of service resulted from defendants rejection of delivery where letters sent to defendant were returned stating unclaimed and not at this address 1: holding dismissal for want of prosecution improper where notice of hearing was mailed to an address that was different from the most recent filings and the record and envelopes were returned undeliverable and noting that when the notice was returned undeliverable court personnel should have reexamined the file to determine if there was evidence of a more recent address 2: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 3: holding that the trial court erred in failing to mail the notice of intent to dismiss to the more recent address included on the lawyers letterhead instead of to the address listed on the partys live pleading 4: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for the exercise of his judgment or discretion ... unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.\u201d Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quotation omitted). The purpose of the official-immunity doctrine is to protect public officials \u201cfrom the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.\u201d Id. at 678. To determine whether Deputy Sass and Officer Hargrove are protected by official immunity we must therefore identify the specific conduct at issue and then decide whether the conduct is a discretionary or ministerial act. See Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn.2004) (noting importance of identifying spe noka Police Dep\u2019t, 700 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Minn.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 2005); Fedke v. Holdings: 0: holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act 1: recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest 2: holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis 3: holding officer was performing discretionary act in deciding when and how to arrest suspect 4: holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Tucker Act, see Higbie, 778 F.3d at 993. He ins ir. 1999); Harris v. United States, 118 Fed.Cl. 180, 190 (2014) (ruling that claims under the Seventh Amendment are not properly brought in this court because the Seventh Amendment is not money-mandating) (citation omitted), recons, denied, No. 14-229C, 2014 WL 6853273 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 5, 2014); Trafny v. United States, 503 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (providing that the court \u201cdoes not have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Eighth Amendment, as the Eighth Amendment \u2018is not a money-mandating provision.\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted); Fullard v. United States, 78 Fed.Cl. 294, 301 n.12 (2007) (explaining that \u201cthe Eleventh Amendment has no - application in this court\u201d); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed, Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). D. Statutory and Holdings: 0: holding that the due process and equal protection clauses do not trigger tucker act jurisdiction in the courts 1: holding that claims based on the fifth amendments due process and equal protection clauses do not give rise to jurisdiction under the tucker act 2: holding municipalities  are not persons within the meaning of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments 3: holding that due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment are not confined to protection of citizens rather they apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction 4: holding that the equal protection and due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the government", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the other hand, the balance of incidents of ownership tips toward the party designated as lessor, then the document is a true lease.\u201d). Among the factors that courts employing the Multiple-Factor Approach find indicative of a disguised security agreement are \u201cnet lease\u201d terms \u2014 i.e., provisions in the purported lease agreement imposing on the lessee the obligation to bear risks of loss, pay taxes, insurance, and license/registration fees (\u201cNet Lease Provisions\u201d). See, e.g., HPSC, Inc. v. Wakefield (In re Wakefield), 217 B.R. 967, 971 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1998) (concluding that fact that \u201cdebtor bore the risk of loss or damage\u201d and \u201cwas obligated ... to maintain insurance, and to pay all taxes\u201d indicated that \u201cagreement was not a true lease\u201d); In re Maritt, 155 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993) (<HOLDING>). The Multiple-Factor Approach has been Holdings: 0: recognizing a latent ambiguity in a lease agreement 1: recognizing that the burden is on the landlord in a lease dispute to establish that the lease contract had been breached and that such breach entitled the landlord to the possession of the property in question 2: holding that factors cited by the debtor  including the fact that present value of total rental payments exceeds the equipments cost and the agreement contains net lease provisions  do not establish that the lessor relinquished its reversionary interest 3: holding that net lease provisions in agreement together with other factors establish that the transaction is a sale 4: holding that uniteds lease provisions violated  4 of the sherman act", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by certain actions of the defendant. See HRPP Rule 48(c). In the instant case, the circuit court did not calculate excludable periods because, given a starting date of October 28, 1996, any periods excludable under subsection (c) would not have brought the total number of days between arrest and motion to dismiss (444 days) below the 180-day limit. However, since we have concluded that the dates of indictment start the Rule 48 clock running, we must calculate and deduct any excludable periods. Defendant\u2019s October 10, 1997 oral motion to continue, his counsel\u2019s August 18, 1997 motion to withdraw, and the periods of delay they created are per se excludable. HRPP Rule 48(d)(1); see also State v. Sujohn, 64 Haw. 516, 520, 644 P.2d 1326, 1328, reconsideration denied, 64 Haw. 688 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The eight days between the granting of Holdings: 0: holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings 1: holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay 2: holding that the exclusion in rule 48c1 hrpp of periods of delay should be taken from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on or other prompt disposition of the motion citation omitted 3: holding among other things that there should be excluded from computing the time for trial a period from the filing of a motion on september 18 until finai disposition of the motion by the trial court on its own motion on december 28 that is 102 days 4: holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to civil in rem forfeiture matters whenever doing so did: (1) not conflict with any provision of the Forfeiture Act; and (2) facilitated the orderly, fair and efficient course of proceedings and disposition of the matter. In my view, those cases provided a practical approach to disposition, keeping in mind that a civil forfeiture proceeding is much like a trial, the objective of which is to provide the parties with a full and fair opportunity to present evidence in support of their respective positions and, on that evidence, render a just disposition. 2 . For example, trial courts will be left without fair and efficient guidelines and procedures for the exchange of information. See Commonwealth v. $8,006.00 U.S. Currency Seized from Carter, 166 Pa.Cmwlth. 251, 646 A.2d 621 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Trial Courts will be left without guidance as Holdings: 0: holding that civil rules of pleading not criminal rales apply to traffic offenses punishable by civil forfeiture 1: holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 2: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 4: holding discovery rules apply to civil forfeiture proceedings", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "By all accounts, the executed Partnership Agreement was the result of an arm\u2019s length transaction. Also, the Partnership Agreement specifically, allowed for the payment of developer fees, and several other provisions effectively established that Dr. Cravens .knew so. Given Dr. Cravens\u2019s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of the facts and circumstances at or before the time of the alleged misrepresentation, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Dr. Cravens justifiably relied upon any representation that developer fees would not be paid until after a construction loan was secured. See Atlas Props., Inc. v. Republic Waste Servs of Tex., Ltd., No. 02-11-00332-CV, 2012 WL 579442, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>); cf. Gulf Liquids New River Project, LLC v. Holdings: 0: holding that it is unreasonable for plaintiffs to rely on oral representations made before a contract when the contract contained a clause which expressed 1: holding that party could not justifiably rely upon oral representations thatwere directly contradicted by terms of written agreement 2: holding that a person could not reasonably rely on oral representations that contradict a written document 3: holding that the parties agreement was superseded by a subsequent agreement that stated that it comprises the entire agreement and supersedes all prior understandings and representations oral or written between the parties 4: holding that plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on an oral representation that the atwill provision of his employment contract did not apply to him when he entered into the contract that expressly contradicted the oral representations", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Second, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.\u2019 \u201d Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). A copyright owner possesses the exclusive Holdings: 0: holding that copyright protection of computer programs extend beyond the programs literal code to their structure sequence and organization 1: holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply 2: holding that because literary works including compilations and derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright state common law that purported to protect a work for which plaintiffs copyright action was unsuccessful was preempted 3: holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc  1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc  101 et seq 4: recognizing that the copyright act was amended in 1976 to include computer programs in the definition of protectable literary works", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "one must also consider the doctrine set forth in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 118, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) which holds that a complaint alleging a hostile work environment will not be time barred if all acts constituting the claim are part of the same unlawful practice and at least one act falls within the filing period. See Vega v. Hernandez, 381 F.Supp.2d 31, 38 (D.Puerto Rico 2005). A public employer who fails to make an adequate investigation of an employee\u2019s sexual harassment complaint can be held liable under Title VII for hostile work environment created by another of its employees under negligence theory, without regard to effectiveness of employer\u2019s remedial action. See O\u2019Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico claims Holdings: 0: holding that physician was an independent contractor and thus could not sue hospital under title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 1: holding there is no private right of action to enforce disparateimpact regulations brought under title vi of the civil rights act of 1964 in part because of the enforcement scheme congress provided in that statute 2: holding that congress intended for idea to be interpreted consistent with fee provisions of statutes such as title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 3: holding liability for claims under civil rights act of 1964 and remedial administrative procedures which emphasized going through channels providing no mechanism to female firefighter for airing grievances involving conduct of superiors who were in chain of command 4: holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as opposed to a summons, could be issued for the misdemeanor under either of the Rule 7.1(b) exceptions. Clearly, neither of these exceptions existed and the rule was violated. In deciding that Officer Davis could not have acted in good faith, we are guided by the language from our supreme court\u2019s decision in State v. Kelley, 362 Ark. 636, 210 S.W.3d 93 (2005), where the trial court\u2019s decision to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an inventory search of the appellee\u2019s impounded car was upheld. The supreme court wrote: We have long recognized that every person is presumed to know the law, whether civil or criminal. Owens v. State, 354 Ark. 644, 128 S.W.3d 445 (2003); see also Lawrence v. Lawrence, 225 Ark. 500, 283 S.W (2003); Porter v. State, 209 Ga. App. 27, 432 S.E.2d 629 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d. 442 (Fla. 1992) Holdings: 0: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law 1: holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district 2: holding even small amount of drugs may support inference of dealing when combined with other evidence consistent with distribution 3: holding anonymous tip that someone at the residence was dealing drugs did not amount to anything the tip was never substantiated and none of the occupants were ever charged with drug dealing 4: holding that police district attorney and judge are charged with knowledge of law particularly when dealing with constitutional rights", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "executives, they were temporally remote from the decision to discharge Appellants, and completely unrelated to the investigation regarding Appellants\u2019 violation of the EC Policy. Thus, the comments qualify as \u2018stray remarks\u2019 and are entitled to minimal weight.\u201d); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (\u201cStray remarks ... by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision.\u201d). Additionally, under Third Circuit precedent, a plaintiffs uncorroborated testimony about discriminatory treatment cannot \u2014 on its own \u2014 demonstrate invidious intent at the summary judgment stage. See Solomon v. Soc\u2019y of Auto. Eng\u2019rs, 41 Fed.Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Fusco v. Bucks Cnty. of Pa., 2009 WL 4911938, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not independent of the breach of contract claim and summary judgment is warranted on these claims 1: holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession 2: holding summary judgment for the employer was warranted because the only evidence in support of plaintiffs claims was solomons own testimony 3: holding in the alternative that summary judgment was warranted on abuse of process claim because defendants established probable cause to prosecute plaintiffs 4: holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "legal right to possess that property for a set period of time_\u201d); Def.\u2019s Reply Ex. B at 4 (Master Lease art. II \u00b6 1 (providing that Dallas \u201chereby leases and rents to Lessee for Lessee\u2019s exclusive use, and Lessee hereby agrees to hire and take, ... the Premises\u201d)). As the Court of Appeals of Texas further noted, the ownership of a leasehold interest has a measurable fair market value because there are people who are willing to purchase and do purchase that right to possess the property under the terms of the lease. Furthermore, the assignee of the leasehold may in turn convey his or her ownership right to another person and obtain the fair market value existing at that time. Panola County Appraisal Dist., 69 S.W.3d at 284. See generally Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 373, 65 S.Ct. 357(<HOLDING>); see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at Holdings: 0: holding that abandonment requires that tenant vacate the leased premises 1: recognizing when a lease terminates upon condemnation tenant is entitled to no compensation for loss of leasehold interest 2: holding that after township acquired property entered into lease with tenant that was renewable absent notice of termination and terminated lease tenant was not displaced person because tenant will be moving not as a result of the acquisition  of such real property but rather because township having already acquired the property has merely declined to renew the lease quotation omitted 3: recognizing that just compensation was required by the fifth amendment in a ease where the federal government deprived a tenant which held a longterm lease of occupancy of portions of a leased building 4: holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of trust relative to Medicare. Additionally, Garrison did not-hold a position of discretion concerning her crime of false reporting to Medicare, as required for application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement. As her counsel explained at sentencing, Garrison lacked the discretion and ability to conceal the false cost reports submitted for Medicare, reimbursement and relied on others to accomplish this deception. In contrast to Garrison\u2019s lack of discretion and inability to produce the fraudulent Medicare reimbursement requests as section 3B1.3 envisions is a physician who possesses the expertise to create erroneous medical records and, consequently, fraudulent Medicare reports that are difficult to deteet and to question. Cf. United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041, 1064 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), amended on other grounds, 116 F.3d 1270, 1293 Holdings: 0: holding that no physicianpatient relationship between doctor who gave informal opinion over telephone at request of treating physician and minor patient whose case was discussed and thus doctor did not owe duty of care to patient 1: holding that a question of fact existed regarding whether the hospital held the doctor out as its agent if the hospital provided the doctor without explicitly informing the patient that the doctor was not its employee 2: holding that fault may not be assessed against a patient in a medical malpractice action in which a patients negligent conduct provides only the occasion for the medical attention care or treatment which is the basis for the action where the defendant doctor was treating the plaintiff patient for injuries sustained in a car accident negligently caused by the plaintiff who was driving while intoxicated 3: holding that the section 3b13 enhancement was warranted because the ophthalmologist convicted for medicare fraud abused the trust implicit in a in a professional medical practice because of the essential trust between patient and physician  and because the government as insurer depends upon the honesty of the doctor and is easily taken advantage of if the doctor is not honest 4: holding erisa did not apply when doctor was not employee of the medical association of the state of alabama", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "lent for a statutorily-approved purpose. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir.2008). The Fifth Circuit determined that the statute impermissibly burdened the individual\u2019s substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing because an individual is unable to legally purchase a device in Texas. Id. The opinion does not include in its analysis any of the Supreme Court cases holding that the constitutionally-protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one\u2019s home does not give rise to a correlative right to receive the materials or to sell or give it to others. We decline to follow Reliable Consultants because we do not read Lawrence as overruling this line of authority. See Ex parte Dave, 220 S.W.3d at 159 (<HOLDING>). Further, we find that Lawrence is Holdings: 0: holding that citizens united did not implicitly overrule beaumont 1: holding that lawrence did not overrule paris adult theatre i v slaton in which the united states supreme court upheld a georgia statute virtually identical to the texas obscenity statute 2: holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties 3: holding transfer statute constitutional and noting that revised statute gave greater guidance to trial courts in determining whether juvenile should be tried in adult court than statute upheld in doyal 4: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court in Johnson stressed that it must \u201cof course decide appealability for categories of orders rather than individual orders.\u201d Id. at 315, 115 S.Ct. 2151. .Accordingly, we cannot, in each individual case, \u201cengage in ad hoc balancing to decide issues of appealability.\u201d Id. Therefore, even though in this case a holding that we lack jurisdiction may problematically prolong this case, under Johnson that is our only option. However, before this case proceeds further, we would encourage the district court to consider in more detail its reliance on the proffered experts\u2019 opinions. It is unclear from the district court\u2019s opinion if it even applied the Daubert framework. That, of course, is the required starting point. See Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Serv., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, under Johnson, our review of any Holdings: 0: holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  1: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 2: holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony under daubert that was based on inter alia the doctors clinical experience and review of the medical records 3: holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony 4: holding that in reviewing the district courts decision concerning expert testimony we must first determine whether the district court properly followed the framework set forth in daubert", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "fact-finding, the Court will exercise its discretion to examine the claim. Appellants charge that the CFA note and mortgage were criminally usurious under New York Penal Law \u00a7 190.40 and New York General Obligations Law \u00a7\u00a7 5-511, 5-501-1, and 5-501-6-a. (Appellants\u2019 Br. at 8.) Under those statutes, an entity is guilty of criminal usury if it knowingly charges an interest rate on a loan or forbearance in excess of 25%. N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 190.40, 190.42. However, the provisions regulating the maximum rate of interest do not apply to \u201cany loan or forbearance in the amount of two million five hundred thousand dollars or more,\u201d N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law \u00a7 5-501(6)(b), or to interest rates on defaulted obligations, see Manfra, Tordella & Brookes, Inc. v. Bunge, 794 F.2d 61, 63 n. 3 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Appellants\u2019 assertions, the CFA Holdings: 0: holding that the new york usury laws do not apply to interest charged on past due debts 1: holding that new york law applies to this matter 2: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 3: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 4: holding that in the event that parties are from different states and the subject matter is national in scope and where the contract states it shall be deemed to be made under the laws of the state of new york and for all purposes construed in accordance with laws of said state new york law applies as the parties choice of law", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "equitable distribution scheme and residential custody award, finding no abuse of discretion. However, because the final judgment fails to address the issues of alimony and general attorney\u2019s fees and costs, we reverse and direct the court to make those determinations. The parties were married on June 3, 1977. Mrs. Schomburg petitioned for dissolution of marriage in July 2001, and Mr. Schomburg counterpetitioned shortly thereafter. At the time of the filings the parties had been married twenty-four years. Because of the long term of the marriage, there is an initial presumption that permanent alimony is proper. Additionally, the trial court is required to support its alimony decisions with factual findings. \u00a7 61.08(1), Fla. Stat. (2001); Milo v. Milo, 718 So.2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); Perrin v. Perrin, 795 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA Holdings: 0: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 1: recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings 2: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact 3: holding failure to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law did not preclude meaningful appellate review 4: holding that purpose for requiring findings of fact to support an alimony award is to assist appellate court in providing meaningful review", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not a party to these state court eminent domain proceedings, and there is also no indication that he was in privity with any of the property owners involved in those proceedings. Without such a relationship, neither claim nor issue preclusion applies to plaintiffs claims before this court. F. ROOKER-FELDMAN Defendant CCRA also argues that all of plaintiffs claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over the later-filed federal action. See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3rd Cir.2010); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (<HOLDING>); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Holdings: 0: holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court 1: holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court 2: holding that the court of appeals may not reverse a trial courts judgment in the absence of properly assigned error 3: holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed 4: holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Article Two analogue to 9-307.\u201d). In other jurisdictions, then, the present case would likely be resolved in favor of the Hattens and Pralles as buyers in the ordinary course of business, either under section 9-307 or section 2-403. Cases from other states are instructive because the UCC and Minnesota\u2019s car titling act (based on the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act) are uniform laws. See Minn. Stat. \u00a7 645.22 (1992) (\u201cLaws uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.\u201d). In addition, this view does not conflict with our courts\u2019 prior treatment of the state\u2019s motor vehicle titling statute. See Welle v. Prozinski, 258 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Minn.1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Minn. Stat. \u00a7 168A.05, subd. 6 Holdings: 0: recognizing that in 1982 kentucky converted to a new title system for motor vehicles under which the secured creditor must perfect its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title to the motor vehicle 1: holding that normal presumption of ownership in favor of holder of motor vehicle certificate of title may be rebutted despite language of minnstat  168a10 subd 5 providing that the transfer of a motor vehicle is not effective until titling requirements are complied with 2: holding that assault conviction for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury to the person of another with the motor vehicle qualified as a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a 3: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  4: holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "weapon was not recovered, Martin confirmed during the interview that the toolbox police found in Jacey\u2019s vehicle was his, and that he threw the hammer he used to kill Jacey into a river. Thereafter, Martin hid Jacey\u2019s body in the bushes and proceeded to use her vehicle and other belongings until he was apprehended by law enforcement nine days later. Moreover, the trial court found two other aggravators in addition to CCP: (1) commission by a convicted felon and one who is under a sentence of felony probation; and (2) committed during the course of a robbery. This Court has affirmed the imposition of death as a proportionate penalty when a finding of CCP was coupled with other aggravators in addition to multiple mitigating factors. See Mosley v. State, 46 So.3d 510, 527-29 (Fla.2009) (<HOLDING>); Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So.2d 488, 494 Holdings: 0: holding death sentence proportionate where defendant murdered wife and children and trial court found three aggravators previous capital felony ccp and hac and two statutory mitigators extreme disturbance and no prior criminal history 1: holding death penalty proportionate where the trial court found ccp and three other aggravators and twentynine nonstatutory mitigators 2: holding imposition of the death penalty proportionate where the trial court found two aggravating circumstances ccp and contemporaneous murder two statutory mitigating factors and a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors 3: holding death penalty proportionate where there were two aggravating factorsthe murder was committed for pecuniary gain and defendant had been convicted of a prior violent felonyand where there were two statutory and three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances 4: holding death penalty proportionate where there were two aggravating factors  avoiding arrest and commission during course of a burglary  with some nonstatutory mitigation", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "at all. Lanier has- shown no error relating to the EpicEdge question. D. Attorney Disqualification Challenges Generally, the existence of a conflict of interest is a legal question subject to de novo review. See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 2005) (conflict between defendant and own counsel). With respect to criminal matters, the Supreme Court \u201cestablish[ed] a categorical rule against the appointment of an interested prosecutor, adherence to which requires no subtle calculations of judgment,\u201d Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2141, 95 L.Ed,2d 740 (1987). Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo with respect to the legal question of conflict, and reversal is automatic if conflict is found. See id. (<HOLDING>). Prior to trial, the district court rejected Holdings: 0: recognizing that harmlesserror analysis applies to britt violations 1: holding that harmless error analysis is inappropriate in a powers case 2: holding that harmlesserror analysis applies to coerced confessions 3: holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis 4: holding that harmlesserror analysis is inappropriate in reviewing the appointment of an interested prosecutor", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "annuities, see D.C.Code \u00a7 5-716 (2012 Repl.). The linkage between \"performance of duty\u201d in D.C.Code \u00a7 1-612.030 and the Disability Act is further supported by the apparent application of the procedural provision in D.C.Code \u00a7 5-708.01 (addressing \"processing of claims of injuries allegedly sustained within the performance of duty\u201d) to claims for nonchargeable sick leave under D.C.Code \u00a7 1-612.03(j). See, e.g., Smallwood, 956 A.2d at 707-08; Franchak, 932 A.2d at 1089. 15 . By contrast, we held in Smallwood that an off-duty officer who was injured in the course of a shootout with a would-be robber did not suffer injuries in the performance of duty. See 956 A.2d at 709. 16 . See also Beckman v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters\u2019 Ret. & Relief Bd., 810 A.2d 377, 386 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 Holdings: 0: holding that absence of competitive injury was not a defense to prima facie violation of  2e 1: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation without evidence that the decisionmaker knew about plaintiffs protected activity when he made the decision that resulted in the adverse action 2: holding that a secret service agent who alleged that onthejob stress resulted in a psychological injury had made out a prima facie case that he had incurred a performance of duty injury 3: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 4: holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Court argued that the constitutional question was \u201cnot particularly meaningful\u201d on a motion to dismiss, as an order denying the motion would not enter \u201cfinal judgment\u201d and an order granting the motion would be subject to the same de novo standard of review on a bankruptcy appeal as a report and recommendation in a \u201cnon-core\u201d proceeding. See In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011). This reasoning is flawed. It confuses the power to enter final judgment with the right to appeal. If there is no appeal, the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment dismissing the claim and is given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. See Tel-tronics Servs. v. L M Ericsson Tele-comms., Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Corbett v. MacDonald Moving Servs., Inc., 124 Holdings: 0: holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary 1: holding judgment under fed rcivp 12b6 is entitled to res judicata effect 2: holding that dismissal on res judicata grounds is proper under rule 12b6 unless a disputed issue of material fact exists 3: holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity 4: holding that dismissal of case on statute of limitations grounds is final judgment and barring appeal has res judicata effect", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "boat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. \u00a7\u00a7 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. \u00a7 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Defendants claim they objected to the Holdings: 0: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 1: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 2: recognizing that under district of columbia law  what the parties deem to be the material elements of their agreement  either set forth in or absent from those documents is largely a question of fact for the jury  and concluding in that case that whether an enforceable oral contract was created and was subsequently breached is a question of fact for the jury to decide not this court 3: holding it is a question of fact 4: holding under predecessor to 46 usc app  1903a that jurisdictional element of crime is question of fact for jury to decide", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "very matter on which he proposes to give an opinion.\u201d Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex.1998). Paragraph six of Dr. Katz\u2019s affidavit states, in pertinent part, that, when an anesthesiologist renders anesthesia services, whether on call or during the regular workday, \u201cit is our practice to charge for those services.\u201d The testimony in paragraph nine states that Dr. Riddle became responsible for S.D. when he assumed the care of Mrs. Chau. As such, he was entitled to compensation for intubat-ing S.D. after birth. While Dr. Katz purported to have personal knowledge of the facts recited in his affidavit, his statement regarding Dr. Riddle\u2019s entitlement to compensation is a legal conclusion with no supporting facts or rationale. See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 749 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Katz\u2019s affidavit makes no claims that, Holdings: 0: holding there was no general jurisdiction when there was no evidence that defendants advertised or promoted their goods or services in texas solicited business in texas sold their goods or services to a texas entity established a general business office or general business presence in texas or targeted texas markets 1: holding that where patients expert witness did not testify to what degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed by doctors in good standing in little rock or similar locales was patient failed to establish applicable standard of care thereby warranting directed verdict in favor of appellant doctor 2: holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care 3: holding that maryland doctor not qualified to testify about whats ordinarily billed or what the law ordinarily allows people to recover for their medical services in the state of texas 4: holding that plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to instructions consonant with their theory of the case where evidentiary support for the theory exists", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Feirson on an unrelated matter, he denies the existence of an ongoing patient-physician relationship with Sgt. Feirson. See Thorne Reply at 2; see also Browne v. Brooke, 236 F.2d 686, 688 (D.C.Cir.1956) (in finding no patient-physician relationship the court considered statements by doctor that he did not consider his one examination of plaintiff as creating a patient-physician relationship). Dr. Thorne was employed by PFC and assigned to perform examinations of police officers who suffered work related injuries or illness. See PL Opp., Ex. 6. But courts have recognized that the patient-physician relationship does not attach in circumstances where a physician is hired by an employer to conduct examinations of employees. See Betesh v. United States, 400 F.Supp. 238, 246-47 (D.D.C.1974) (<HOLDING>); Gilinsky v. Indelicato, 894 F.Supp. 86 Holdings: 0: holding that screening requirement applied to inmate who paid filing fee to commence action 1: holding that an obligation imposed by statute cannot form the basis for a statutory employer relationship 2: holding that a creamery was not statutory employer of a contractor hired to build a new structure 3: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 4: recognizing no patientphysician relationship for doctor hired by employer to conduct screening examinations of employees", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted): DHS\u2019s policy of considering deterrence has profound and immediate consequences for Central American asylum seekers detained as a result. Relatedly, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiffs have failed to cite any statute, regulation, policy memoranda, or any other document memorializing the policy they challenge. See Def. Opp. & Mot. at 22. Agency action, however, need not be in writing to be final and judicially reviewable. See Venetian Casino Resort LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C.Cir.2008) (concluding that \u201cthe record\u201d as a whole \u201cleaves no doubt\u201d that a policy exists, even though \u201cthe details ... are still unclear\u201d); Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 283 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 (D.N.M.2003) (<HOLDING>). A contrary rule \u201cwould allow an agency to Holdings: 0: holding that pure issue of law is preserved by motion for summary judgment and is reviewable after final judgment 1: holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction 2: holding that both law and logic dictate that an unwritten agency policy is reviewable 3: holding an agency could not use a policy found in a departments employee manual as the rule of law to determine a contested issue because the agency never adopted a rule containing such a policy 4: holding that an arbitration award based on the conclusion that unappended waiver forms are unenforceable pursuant to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because as stated in schultz it is not based on an allegation that a specific provision in an insurance policy contravenes public policy", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "sentences, each of which would not have exceeded 20 years. The Apprendi rule, therefore, would not be implicated. It follows as night the day that any failure of the indictment in this case to allege quantity in the possession counts was immaterial. See Price, 265 F.3d at 1108. C. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, AND PUBLIC REPUTATION Finally, even were we to assume that the error here did affect substantial rights, we would affirm nonetheless because, given the evidence and the record we have referred to, the error did not \u201cseriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. But see United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 403-04 (4th Cir.2001), cert. granted, \u2014 U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 803, 151 L.Ed.2d 689 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Our holding in this regard follows our Holdings: 0: holding that failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment and submit it to the jury seriously affects the fairness integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings so that the court should exerciseits discretion to recognize the error 1: holding that the closure of a courtroom during jury selection a structural error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings 2: holding that a plain error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings even though the error was assumed to have affected substantial rights 3: recognizing that plain error analysis requires 1 error 2 that is plain 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously affects fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings 4: holding that plain error exists when 1 an error was committed 2 that was plain 3 that affected the defendants substantial rights and 4 the error seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "medicine), could not eliminate any of the other potential causes either. All he could do was assess the likelihood it was one cause or another, and he found that the tetanus was least likely to have originated with the wound on May 13th. In fact, Avery said it was less than a hundredth of one percent that Lerma would get tetanus that many days later. Dr. Avery\u2019s conclusion was based on (1) evidence that the tetanus fully developed outside the twenty-one day limitation, and (2) the fact that the caused tetanus versus diabetes or dental problems or any other source is just an inference of causation amounting to no more than conjecture or speculation. See Schaefer, 612 S.W.2d at 204-5. Therefore, we hold his testimo ny presents no evidence as to causation of Lerma\u2019s death. See id. (<HOLDING>). Conclusion In light of the Robinson factors Holdings: 0: holding expert testimony provided no evidence as to causation since testimony was not based upon reasonable medical probability 1: holding that experts medical opinion constituted no evidence because it was based upon speculation and surmise rather than reasonable medical probability 2: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 3: holding that though the government may have failed to disclose exculpatory testimony in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendants involvement in narcotics sales there was no reasonable probability that a defense based upon that testimony would have been successful 4: holding expert testimony was based on reasonable medical probability where there were multiple possible causes and expert testified that one cause was more probable than the others", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "which was believed to be a mitigating factor. The court again asked defendant whether he wished to persist in his plea of guilty or whether he wanted to interpose a defense. Defendant repeatedly answered that he did not want to withdraw his plea, nor was he trying to plead self-defense. At one point during the extended colloquy the defendant made the statement, \u201cI\u2019ve already waived the right for counsel, so I just plead guilty.\u201d The court eventually accepted the plea of guilty and found that it had a factual basis. Defendant subsequently appeared for sentencing on October 21, 1975, indicated h App. 3d 1005; People v. McCaffrey (2d Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 1088, overruling People v. Hinkle (2d Dist. 1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 202; and People v. Bobo (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 274 (<HOLDING>). In Hessenauer this court considered whether Holdings: 0: holding that defendants waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings including sentencing four days later 1: holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open 2: holding that a waiver of counsel once made and not retracted is operative throughout the proceedings 3: holding that defendants statements not admissible once he had invoked right to counsel without proof of waiver 4: holding that once the defendant raises the issue of intelligent and voluntary waiver with respect to prior guilty pleas the burden is on the state to establish a valid waiver", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "error, Mandlbauer argues the trial court erred by not submitting an instruction on sole cause in the jury charge. Sole cause is an inferential rebuttal defense, which may be submitted to the jury only as an instruction. Reid v. Best Waste Systems, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 644, 646 (TexApp. \u2014 Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).... It is the duty of the trial judge to determine whether the doctrine of sole cause has been raised by the evidence. If the evidence supports an instruction, and the instruction has been raised properly by the pleadings, the trial judge has a duty to submit the instruction. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 658 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); See also Cook v. Caterpillar, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.App.\u2014Amarillo 1993, writ denied) (<HOLDING>) National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Holdings: 0: holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that trial court did not commit reversible error when it submitted admissibility of evidence question to jury because the trial court had independently decided the question 2: holding it is reversible error for a trial court to exclude a definition on new and independent cause an inferential rebuttal defense when supported by the evidence 3: holding that if these preservation requirements are met any error in the denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error 4: holding wrongful granting of states challenge for cause reversible error", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to Stephanie's college expenses, at the very least, he should receive a credit against the arrearage for the time Stephanie was away at school. We begin by noting that upon dissolution of marriage, parties are free to draft their own settlement agreements. Niccum v. Niccum, 734 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Such agreements are contractual in nature and become binding upon the parties onee the trial court merges and incorporates such into the divorcee decree. In re Marriage of Loeb, 614 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ind.Ct.App.19983). This court will enforce an agreement concerning the custody and support of children even though the divorcee court would otherwise not have the authority to do as the parties agreed. Id.; see also Schueneman v. Schueneman, 591 N.E.2d 608 (Ind.Ct. App.1992) (<HOLDING>). When interpreting such agreements, we apply Holdings: 0: recognizing that at common law a parents liability to support his child terminated at the parents death the terms of the support order could not be enforced against his estate unless provisions allowing for such enforcement were included in the order 1: holding that although a parents general duty to support his or her child ends when the child reaches twentyone years of age parents are free to enter into binding agreements to do so 2: holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom 3: holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child 4: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "corroborated\u201d by police. Id. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416. Accord Pinkney v. State, 666 So.2d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(anonymous tip requires \u201cdetailed and specific information corroborated by police investigation\u201d since the informant\u2019s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are unknown). In this case, it mous\u201d was that, even considering only the facts known to Officer Hall himself, her identity was readily ascertainable. Officer Hall knew that the informant was a McDonald\u2019s employee, and they acknowledged each other when he arrived at the scene, with Ms. Steele pointing to Defendant\u2019s vehicle. The cases support the proposition that an informant\u2019s actual name need not be known so long as her identity is readily discoverable. See Lachs v. State, 366 So.2d 1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)(<HOLDING>). A \u201ccitizen-informant\u201d Not only was Ms. Steele Holdings: 0: holding that the law in effect at the time a contract is made is as much a part of the contract as if incorporated therein 1: holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination 2: holding as much 3: recognizing that a stay is as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal 4: holding that a tipster fully identified by occupation and address was entitled to as much credibility as  a paid informer or the victims themselves", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the case of an automobile accident that appears partially attributable to the presence of foliage obscuring a stop sign, the settling parties could release the persons responsible for the foliage by including terminology like \u201cand the owners, occupiers, and any other persons responsible for the upkeep or maintenance of the premises on which the shrubs that obscured Releasee\u2019s view of the stop sign were growing.\u201d We recognize that general release clauses without specific identifying terminology have been used extensively and have been relied on as full and final settlement of all claims. Our ruling today shall, therefore, apply only prospectively, except that we will also apply it to this case and to all other cases in which the issue is preserved. Cf. Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364-65 (<HOLDING>). Conclusion. Because of the circumstantially Holdings: 0: holding that terms identifying persons in a manner that the parties to the release would know who was to be benefitted sufficient under specific identity rule 1: recognizing this as the general rule 2: holding that because of widespread use of and reliance on general language specific identity rule would apply prospectively only 3: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 4: recognizing general rule", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "proposed amendment is untimely. It was filed ten months after Plaintiffs original Complaint was filed in this Court, two months after the close of discovery, and one month after Defendant moved for summary judgment. The Plaintiff has presented no explanation as to why the Court should overlook this delay. Though not binding oh this Court, the Court notes that the Seventh Circuit has held that a district court judge has discretion to deny such an amendment: \u201cwhen an amendment to a complaint is proposed after the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff must show that the amendment is supported by \u2018substantial and convincing evidence\u2019.\u201d Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir.1995). See also Parish v. Frazier, 195 F.3d 761, 764 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Amended Complaint does not allege a new Holdings: 0: holding that failure to accurately calculate the thirtyday appeal period is not excusable neglect 1: holding plaintiff bears the burden of showing that delay was due to oversight inadvertence or excusable neglect 2: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought 3: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule 4: holding that the states failure to object to a late petition for appeal of a termination order granted by the trial court on the basis of excusable neglect constituted a waiver of the states right to contest excusable neglect on appeal to the court of appeals", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "profitability of the funds portfolios\u201d such that \u201c[t]o the extent that mispricings improperly inflated the reported value of the portfolios, James River benefitted from and had a direct motive to commit the alleged fraud.\u201d (Appaloosa and Tepper\u2019s Opp. at 10, hereinafter \u201cOpp.\u201d, citing TPC \u00b6\u00b6 16, 17, 43). However, the Second Circuit has held that \u201cthe existence, without more, of executive compensation dependent upon stock value does not give rise to a strong inference of scienter.\u201d Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir.1995). Here, Appaloosa and Tepper\u2019s suggestion that the James River Defendants had a motive to commit the fraud because the better the funds\u2019 perfor 101, 1107 (D.Conn.1991); Duncan v. Pencer, No. 94 Civ. 0321, 1996 WL 19043, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1996) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Second Circuit has made clear Holdings: 0: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 1: holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter 2: holding that access to financial information was reasonably related to a defendants narcotics convictions because financial gain motivated the underlying crimes 3: holding that in pleading scienter arguing that the motive for defrauding investors was to increase the companys profits or to increase officer compensation is not sufficient 4: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "City of Jackson v. Southard, 869 S.W.2d 280, 281-82 (Mo.App.1994); Evans, 779 S.W.2d at 255. As further support for the rule that we lay down here, that no trial de novo lies in a municipal case from a SIS, we would point to the fact that this was the rule when trials de novo to the circuit court were statutorily authorized for misdemeanor convictions before associate circuit judges. Evans, 779 S.W.2d at 255. In the instant case, although there is a multitude of court documents at war with each other as to the actual disposition of the relator\u2019s cases on August 13,1996, the record ultimately reflects that no sentences were imposed on that date by the municipal division that resulted in a judgment of conviction from which a trial de novo could be taken. See Yale, 846 S.W.2d at 195 (<HOLDING>). The question then becomes whether, pursuant Holdings: 0: recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public 1: holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable 2: holding that no sentence is imposed in the case of a sis 3: holding that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction 4: recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of resistance by the victim and the use of physical force by the perpetrator.\u201d Id. at 932 (citing the BIA\u2019s decision). Accordingly, we held that sexual battery is categorically a crime of violence under \u00a7 16(b). In Lisbey, we noted approvingly cases from other circuits which- establish that sexual acts, without the victim\u2019s consent, constitute crimes of violence under \u00a7 16(b). See id. at 933 (citing approvingly Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (lewd or lascivious touching of an adult without his or her consent); Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir.2000) (indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen which requires the victim\u2019s actual non-consent as an element); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>)). These cases, taken together, establish that Holdings: 0: holding that attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a crime of viqlenee 1: holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime 2: recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years 3: holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force 4: holding that a conviction under utah code ann  7654041 for sexual abuse of a child was a crime of violence under  16b based upon a common sense view of the sexual abuse statute in combination with the legal determination that children are incapable of consent which suggests that when an older person attempts to sexually touch a child under the age of fourteen there is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the childs compliance", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "raised the issue of the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. \u00a7 278.03 (2010), which provides for a waiver of the payment of taxes during the pendency of a tax appeal petition upon a showing of hardship in its motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated on October 28, 2009, to transfer the case to the district court for immediate referral back to the tax court pursuant to E\u00f1e Mining Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1984). The district court immediately transferred the case back to the tax court, and the tax court did not rule on the constitutional issue. The Minnesota Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the portion of an appeal that challenges the constitutiona see also Ritchie v. City of Green Bay, 215 Wis. 433, 254 N.W. 113, 115 (1934) (<HOLDING>). But see, e.g., People ex rel. Thompson v. St. Holdings: 0: holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff 1: holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages 2: holding that the deed and not the historical description of the land determines what land constitutes the forfeitable property 3: holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute 4: holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(ruling that a city\u2019s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep\u2019t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state\u2019s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Akron v. Budiani, 52 Ohio Holdings: 0: holding that purchase of search terms is a use in commerce 1: holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision 2: holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty 3: holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional 4: holding the exclusivity element is satisfied by showing that others do not jointly possess or use the land", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of Section 1915(g) if an inmate was allowed to exploit [the procedure of referring prisoner complaints to magistrate judges for initial screening] by filing a meritless action and waiting until after it was reviewed to move for dismissal\u201d). CONCLUSION A district court is not required to give a pro se plaintiff repeated opportunities to amend his complaint or explain the basis of his pleadings. Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 98 n. 5 (5th Cir.1994). Because Plaintiff has been given ample opportunity to amend his pleadings and comply with Rule 8(a) but has failed to do so, his complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Rodriguez v. United States, 66 F.3d at 97-98. See Michaelis v. Nebraska State Bar Ass\u2019n, 717 F.2d 437, 438-39 (8th Cir.1983) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). Further, because Plaintiff will be barred by Holdings: 0: holding that a district court is justified in dismissing a complaint with prejudice if the plaintiff persists in violating rule 8 1: holding that an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is a final appealable order only if no amendment to the complaint could cure the defects in the  case internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 3: holding that court erred in dismissing minors claims with prejudice absent a hearing 4: holding that the district court erred in summarily dismissing a  1983 complaint that should have been brought as a habeas petition", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "learned intermediary defense. If there is no basis in the record for the instruction given, such error may raise a \u201csubstantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations,\u201d and reversal may be required. McElroy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 894 F.2d 1504, 1509 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting National Independent Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Charter Financial Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1396, 1402-03 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056, 105 S.Ct. 2120, 85 L.Ed.2d 484 (1985)). Given the complete lack of evidence in the record to support the inclusion of the reasonable evidence standard in the instruction, we hold that the district court erred by inaccurately charging the jury on Armour\u2019s affirmative defense. Cf. Bank South Leasing, 778 F.2d at 706 (<HOLDING>). In some instances, even an inaccurate Holdings: 0: holding the trial court erred in not charging the jury that a defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense of comparative negligence 1: holding that the trial court plainly erred in failing to provide a specific unanimity instruction to the jury 2: holding that the district court erred in failing to properly charge the jury on defendants affirmative defenses 3: holding that trial court erred in rendering takenothing judgment notwithstanding jurys verdict in favor of plaintiff based on defendants properly preserved charge error and concluding that proper remedy was for trial  court to grant new trial based on the charge error 4: holding that district court erred in failing to consider evidence of secondary considerations", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "medical records \u2014 was that the wear and tear on his discs was the result of his work activities. The dissent dismisses Anderson\u2019s testimony because it was in response to \u201cquestions posed to Anderson ... phrased by Anderson\u2019s employer using a disjunctive clause\u201d \u2014 that is, whether Anderson\u2019s work for Frontier Communications was \u201ccausing\u201d or \u201caggravating\u201d Anderson\u2019s back problems. According to the dissent, \u201cthe fact that [Anderson] acknowledged that work may have aggravated his back pain does not mean that he also acknowledged that work caused his back injury.\u201d But Anderson\u2019s injuries were compensable, whether caused in the first instance by his work or whether his work merely aggravated a preexisting condition. See Gillette v. Harold Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 317, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960) (<HOLDING>). The WCCA further concluded that the Holdings: 0: recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury 1: holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute 2: holding that the employees thirdparty tort claim stemming from the employees occupational disease does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the occupational disease begins to manifest itself 3: recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought 4: recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that, as of the condemnation date, the parcel contained fifteen acres of wetlands that could legally be drained. Specifically, the Department argues that even if the parcel is not subject to regulation under the CWA, it is subject to state regulation by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) as an isolated wetland. We find no reversible error here. In his order, the master held that the issue of \u201cDHEC\u2019s alleged jurisdiction\u201d over the wetlands was no longer before the court because it had previously been decided by Judge Harwell in his October 2004 order. The Department has not challenged the master\u2019s ruling. Therefore, it is the law of the case, regardless of its correctness. See Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 160-61, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, because OCRM is a part of DHEC, Holdings: 0: holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes 1: holding that an exhaustion of appellate remedies is required to make a trial courts ruling the law of the case 2: holding an unappealed ruling is the law of the case and cannot be later challenged 3: holding a trial judges unappealed procedural rulings become the law of the case 4: holding that an unappealed ruling right or wrong is the law of the case", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "The Jerrels proposed tattooing and a plastic tagging method. After seriously considering these alternatives, the hearing officer ultimately rejected them as not sufficiently permanent or visible. The fact that DNR gave the Jerrels two years to come up with an alternative solution \u2014 from 1990 to 1992 \u2014 does not excuse the Jerrels\u2019 complete failure to provide evidence that their horses had been branded. Even after the branding requirement was clarified, the Jerrels were given two more years to comply before the leases were finally terminated in 1994. The court\u2019s opinion notes that DNR believed that the Jerrels worked with it in good faith until 1990. But by failing to consider the Jer-rels\u2019 subsequent four years of promises, delays, and total non-compliance before DNR term (Alaska 1988) (<HOLDING>). 29 . See Op. at 144-145. 30 . See id. 31 Holdings: 0: holding that the circuit court was not authorized to overturn state agencys decision where the sanction was lawful authorized and within the discretion of the agency and it was not shown to be arbitrary or capricious 1: holding that agencys practical method for accomplishing its goal of safe disposal systems was reasonable and not arbitrary 2: holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious 3: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 4: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "have objected to this statement by the prosecutor and to the use of the word \u201cor\u201d in the jury charge on the ground that appellant\u2019s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the information alleged one offense, but the State proved another. It is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive even though the indictment (or information) may allege the differing methods of committing the offense in the conjunctive. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In this connection, alternative theories of committing the same offense are properly submitted to the jury in the disjunctive if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Id; see also Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). This comports with the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding when a statute defines manner or means of committing an offense indictment need not allege matters beyond the language of the statute 1: holding although indictment may allege manner and means of committing offense in the conjunctive jury may be charged in the disjunctive and a conviction on any method alleged will be upheld if the evidence supports it 2: holding that when an indictment charges several acts in the conjunctive  the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged 3: holdingthat an error in instructing the jury that an offense could be committed by a statutory method not charged in the indictment is cured where  the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt  citation omitted 4: holding that for purposes of 18 usc  924c1 the law is well established that where an indictment charges in the conjunctive several means of violating a statute a conviction may be obtained on proof of only one of the means ", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of Canady I Litigation To begin, we reject appellants\u2019 argument that Missouri law, not the federal law of res judicata, should apply in this case because the Saunders cases were originally filed in Missouri state court. We have determined already that the relevant prior judgment was issued in federal court in Canady I, and therefore we apply federal res judicata law because \u201c \u2018it is fundamental that the res judicata effect of the first forum\u2019s judgment is governed by the first forum\u2019s law, not by the law of the second forum.\u2019 \u201d Hillary v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 123 F.3d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir.1997) (Hillary) (citing Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 930 (D.C.Cir.1978)); see also NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1997) (NAACP I) (<HOLDING>) (citing Poe v. John Deere Co., 695 F.2d 1103, Holdings: 0: holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law 1: holding that to determine collateral estoppel effect of a federal civil rights action fjederal law governs the preclusive effect of a claim arising under federal law 2: holding in a res judicata case that fjederal law determines the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment 3: holding that a federal courts dismissal of state claims without prejudice is not res judicata as to adjudication in either state or federal courts 4: holding that federal rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel determine preclusive effect of prior federal ftca judgments even though liability is based on state law", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs here have adduced evidence of a discussion of a continuing investigation, but no evidence that tends to show the authorization, approval, or knowing acquiescence of the supervisory Defendants to any constitutional violations allegedly visited upon Plaintiffs. Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs had established that Defendants Marshall, Freeman, May, Rucker, Reitz, Brink, Gibson and Vander Wissel were aware of the alleged constitutional violations \u2014 which in itself would be quite a stretch for the Court to find, given the state of the record \u2014 and did nothing to stop them, Plaintiffs\u2019 \u00a7 1983 claims against the supervisory Defendants still would not survive summary judgment. See Poe v. Haydon, 863 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence Holdings: 0: holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under  1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action 1: holding that supervisory liability under  1983 requires a showing that the supervisory official at least implicitly authorized or approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate 2: holding supervisory personnel liable for  1983 violations only where evidence establishes that they authorized or approved the unconstitutional conduct 3: holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under  1983 4: holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that the 2013 arbitration provision is \u201cpermeated with unconscionability,\u201d taken together such a conclusion is required. As the California Supreme Court has held, multiple substantively unconscionable terms in or related to an arbitration agreement \u201cindicate a systemic effort to impose arbitration on an employee not simply as an alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works to the employer\u2019s advantage.\u201d Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 124, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745. At bottom, a trial court does not \u201cabuse its discretion in concluding that [an] arbitration agreement is permeated by an unlawful purpose\u201d where the arbitration agreement contains \u201cmultiple unlawful provisions.\u201d Id.; see also Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1005-06 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that the presence of these Holdings: 0: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case 1: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion to sever separate charges of rape committed against the appellants two nieces 2: holding that a 30day limitations provision is substantively unconscionable 3: holding district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever numerous substantively unconscionable terms from arbitration agreement 4: holding that the 9circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion to sever separate charges of rape committed against the appellants two nieces", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the custody arrangement in this matter, and we affirm that order. In addition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found Colleen in contempt and ordered her to pay attorney fees. 1 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). 2 Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987); see also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 740, 856 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1993); Huneycutt, 94 Nev. at 80, 575 P.2d at 585. 3 Rust, 103 Nev. at 688-89, 747 P.2d at 1382. 4 Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 895, 8 P.3d 825, 830 (2000) (citing Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978)). 5 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in child custody matters. See, e.g., Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d 863, 867 n.6 (Okla. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Decker v. Decker, 440 S.E.2d 411, 412 (Va. Holdings: 0: holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period 1: holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody 2: recognizing that an appeal does not divest the lower court from making a provisional or temporary custody order during the appeals pendency 3: holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition 4: holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b ... of this title.\u201d); Martinez v. Mukasey, 508 F.8d 255, 257-58 (5th Cir.2007) (\u201cUnder 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(B)\u00ae, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ\u2019s discretionary decisions under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229b.\u201d). We therefore lack jurisdiction over the petition to the extent Khan challenges the dispositive finding that his removal will not result in an exceptional hardship to his children, see Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir.2007), and dismiss the petition for review to the extent it challenges his removal order. However, we \u201cretain[] jurisdiction over purely legal and nondiscretionary questions.\u201d Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir.2006); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) \u201c[Wjhether an alien satisfies the continuous Holdings: 0: holding that statutes restricting judicial review of discretionary decisions do not preclude review of challenges to the constitutionality of ins regulations but holding that petitioners failure to receive discretionary relief does not rise to a constitutionally protected interest 1: holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions 2: holding that sjeetion 1252a2bii clearly precludes judicial review of decisions under section 1186ac4 because the statute specifies that those decisions are purely discretionary 3: holding that  1252a2bii precludes  review of discretionary decisions  in only the specific circumstances specified in the statute itself 4: holding that  1252a2bs ban on review of judgments regarding the granting of relief precludes review of only discretionary decisions", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Defendants \u2014 making it a likelier reference to the other Defendants who were on trial. The Government notes that the Court in Gray suggested \u201c[m]e and a few other guys [beat the victim]\u201d as an alternative to the improper redaction in the phrase \u201c[m]e, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys [beat the victim].\u201d 523 U.S. at 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151. But the language \u201ca few other guys\u201d is less specific than \u201cothers\u201d as stated at trial, especially when coupled with Alexander\u2019s identification of \u201cthe other individuals\u201d as the four other Defendants just a few minutes earlier in Hodous\u2019s testimony. Another issue implicates the Confrontation Clause. The analyses in Richardson, Gray, and Vasilakos assume the presence of a limiting instruction. See, e.g., Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (<HOLDING>). Here, no limiting instruction was given to Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendants name is replaced with a neutral pronoun as long as identification of the defendant is clear or inculpatory only by reference to evidence other than the redacted confession and a limiting instruction is given to the jury there is no bruton violation 1: holding that when all references to the defendant in a eodefendants statement are replaced with indefinite pronouns or other general terms the confrontation clause is not violated by the redacted statements admission if when viewed together with other evidence the statement does not create an inevitable association with the defendant and a proper limiting instruction is given 2: holding that the clause was not violated by a redacted confession with a proper limiting instruction 3: holding that when all references to the defendant in a codefendants statement are replaced with indefinite pronouns or other general terms the confrontation clause is not violated by the redacted statements admission if when viewed together with other evidence the statement does not create an inevitable association with the defendant and a proper limiting instruction is given 4: holding that the confession did not violate the confrontation clause because it was redacted to eliminate not only the defendants name but any reference to his or her existence", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "had a valid interest in ensuring that the appellant complied with income-reporting requirements after his release from custody. The special condition allows the court, through the probation department, to monitor the appellant\u2019s earnings and identify any potential disparity between his income and his lifestyle. Relatedly, it serves to deter the appellant from engaging in schemes similar to the crimes of conviction once he is released from prison by forcing him to account for his income. We need go no further. The most that can be said for the appellant\u2019s position is that the relatedness of the special condition of supervised release is somewhat attenuated. But the condition is, at the very least, arguably reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 780 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Because the error \u2014 if there is one \u2014 is Holdings: 0: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 1: holding that access to financial information was reasonably related to a defendants narcotics convictions because financial gain motivated the underlying crimes 2: holding that evidence of a defendants financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages 3: holding that representation as to financial solvency of partnership was statement of financial condition because it reflected overall economic condition of partnership 4: holding debt dischargeable since lender did not reasonably rely upon allegedly false financial statement where lender did nothing to verify incomplete financial statement four to six months old", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "this test, the relevant inquiry \u201cis not simply whether a private group is serving a 'public function\u2019, [but] whether the function performed has been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.' \u201d Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842, 102 S.Ct. 2764. Examples of \"traditional exclusive governmental functions\u201d include holding elections and exercising powers of eminent domain. The Supreme Court has rarely found the \"exclusivity\u201d aspect of this test to be met. See Mark, 51 F.3d at 1142. Furthermore, courts have held that the provision of hospital services is not a traditional public function exclusively reserved to the state. See, e.g., Shannon v. Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 547 (7th Cir.1992); Cardio-Medical Assocs., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 536 F.Supp. 1065, 1090-91 (E.D.Pa.1982) (<HOLDING>); Holton v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 419 Holdings: 0: holding that ccmcs activities did not amount to a traditional exclusive public function 1: holding the function of a public utility is controlling not how the term is defined 2: holding that records in the possession of a party with whom an agency has contracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the agency are presumptively public records subject to public access so long as the record a directly relates to the governmental function and b is not exempt under the rtkl 3: recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver 4: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the fault of the person injured. 3 . Morgan also urges us to find that the Marquises\u2019 filing with the trial court of a tendered M.R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment- \u2014 once while their motion for summary judgment was pending and again after she rejected the offer \u2014 was an improper attempt to influence the court. Although we agree with Morgan that such an offer should not be filed with a court unless accepted, there is no indication in the record that the court in this case was influenced in any way by the filings, and Morgan acknowledges that the error is not sufficient standing alone to warrant vacating the summary judgment. 4 . See also Murphy v. Buonato, 42 Conn.App. 239, 679 A.2d 411, 417-18 (1996); Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill.App.3d 892, 228 Ill.Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill.App.3d 541, 124 Holdings: 0: holding that strict compliance is not required 1: holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective 2: holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute 3: recognizing strict product liability actions 4: holding that a tenyearold boy injured by a dog while caring for it was not protected by states strict liability statute", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was in part motivated by her pregnancy. \u201cDirect evidence is that which demonstrates \u2018a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer\u2019s] decision\u2019 to take adverse employment action.\u201d Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat\u2019l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy \u201cwere made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.\u201d Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction 1: holding supervisors reference to plaintiff as that white boy was sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory intent for mixedmotives jury instruction 2: holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent 3: recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent 4: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "See Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 325-26 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). We also infer all implied findings of fact that are necessary to support the trial court\u2019s ruling. See Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex.Crim.App.2010). Appellant testified by affidavit that she had not been advised of her right to an attorney, and that she would have requested an attorney had she been so advised. The trial court was free to disbelieve this testimony, and in its findings of fact, it expressly determined that appellant\u2019s account was not credible. The court did not make a similar finding with respect to the affidavit testimony of appellant\u2019s mother and immigration attorney, but we can infer that this testimony was implicitly rejected. Cf. Olconkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (<HOLDING>). Deferring, as we must, to the trial court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding warrant not undermined and affiant did not act in bad faith where affiant relied upon erroneous statements made by third party 1: holding that it was not erroneous for committing court to refuse to admit an affidavit from a private investigator that provided evidence of a witnesss lack of credibility when the affidavit would not have explained away the witnesss testimony but only challenged its credibility 2: holding that a trial court had implicitly found that an affiant lacked credibility even where the affidavit testimony was uncontroverted 3: holding that a statement that the affiant is senior vicepresident and secretary of a corporation asserting a special appearance is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the corporations contacts with texas 4: holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Winnebago premises, neither did his parents. Appellant\u2019s attorney has argued the existence of a fictitious household which, applying appellant\u2019s own \u201cresidency requirement,\u201d would have no members. Id. at 575. Even if we were to assume that the Moultonborough property is a vacation home and that a person can have more than one residence for insurance purposes when one of the residences is a vacation home, the policy here, like that in Damore, requires that the additional insured be a resident relative of \u201cyour [the named insured\u2019s] household.\u201d To satisfy this requirement of sharing the same household, Matthews also would have to be a resident of his mother\u2019s primary residence in Florida. See id.; see also Still v. Fox, No. C-940954, 1995 WL 596062, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1995) (<HOLDING>). As noted previously, the petitioners do not Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live 1: holding that a defendant who had maintained his fathers gun collection at his home deserved a reduction under ussg  2k21b2 2: holding that adult child who maintained his own residence separate from his fathers household but regularly vacationed and kept gear at his fathers vacation home was not a resident of his fathers household and therefore not an insured under his fathers insurance policy covering the vacation home 3: recognizing that fathers parental rights were terminated based upon his incarceration and his behavior while in prison his history of substance abuse and the fact that his child support payments are in arrears 4: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir.1993). See Opinion 2 (\"The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that 'residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant\u2019s residence.' \u201d (quoting Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583)). In Lalor, we concluded that a search warrant for the defendant\u2019s residence was not supported by probable cause. See 996 F.2d at 1583. In so doing, however, we distinguished Lalor\u2019s case from prior ones, including Suarez and Williams, wherein the nexus between criminal activity and the targeted premises was based on evidence of the suspect\u2019s drug traf ficking activities combined with the reasonable inference that drug-related evidence would be found in the suspect\u2019s home. See id. at 1582-83 (<HOLDING>); id. at 1583 (observing that, in Williams, Holdings: 0: holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence 1: holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop 2: holding that the affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location rendering the officers belief in probable cause based solely on the affidavit objectively unreasonable  3: recognizing that in suarez residential search upheld based on officers reasoned belief that evidence of drug activity would be found at residence 4: holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "resulted from a good-faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103. Therefore, the United States can have no liability to Plaintiffs. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7431(b). As to the second issue, I find and conclude that the United States has returned to Plaintiffs all the property seized. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), I now issue the findings of fact and conclusions of law that have informed my decision. I. A. Procedural History This case has a complex procedural history. A brief description of that history will provide a meaningful context for the discussion to come. When this case was assigned to United States District Judge Warren K. Urbom, he granted a motion to dismiss by private individuals named as defendants and dismissed Counts IV and VI. See Filing 22 (<HOLDING>). Among other things, the result of Judge Holdings: 0: holding that wrongfuldisclosure allegations of count iv did not state a claim against private individuals and further holding that conspiracy allegations of count vi did not state a claim 1: holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim 2: holding that because the allegations purportedly suppressed by the government were not material an evidentiary hearing further exploring the  allegations themselves and the governments knowledge of the allegations is unnecessary 3: holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action  and thus did not count as third strike 4: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "only after a responsible agency official assesses whether \u201cthe public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure\u201d\u2014was met. See Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 144 (quoting Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1307). Next, Kansas contends that the government has not sufficiently \u201cidentified or described\u201d the documents by stating with particularity what information is subject to the privilege. Having reviewed the government\u2019s privilege logs (both initial and supplemental), the Court concludes that the government\u2019s descriptions were sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether the privilege was applicable, and that, in any event, the Court has now conducted an in camera review of the documents withheld. See Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 496, 503 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Holdings: 0: holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated 1: holding that defendants privilege login combination with the in camera review requested by plaintiffsis adequate to determine whether the elements of the privilege have been established 2: recognizing privilege 3: holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege 4: holding that a complete prohibition against an opponents use of in camera review to establish the applicability of the crimefraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege is inconsistent with the policies underlying the privilege", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "10, 2008 temporary orders inappropriately modify the 1996 Oklahoma custody order. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bradshaw to pay the amicus attorney for any work performed pertaining to the habeas corpus matter. We also hold that Judge Rynd did not abuse his discretion by denying Bradshaw\u2019s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for attorney fees related to prosecution of the petition. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Brad ates: Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, the court may render an appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. \u00a7 157.374. 4 . See Brown v. Dixon, 776 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); Lundell v. Clawson, 697 S.W.2d 836, 840 Holdings: 0: holding that court could permit grandparent or other person having substantial past contact with child to intervene in pending sapcr even though original suit requesting possessory conservatorship could not be filed by grandparent or other person and further holding that stepgrandmother had standing to intervene to seek managing conservatorship of child under section 102004b and section 1020039 where natural mother abandoned child after birth parents were divorced natural father remarried father had custody of child after father died child lived first with stepmother then with stepgrandmother and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old 1: holding subjective belief of maternal grandparents and their witnesses that child was better off with them and would be emotionally upset if made to go with father did not raise existence of unexpected crises or dire emergency demanding immediate action to protect child 2: holding that maternal grandmother had standing to intervene in pending sapcr to seek managing conservatorship of child pursuant to former section 102004b and section 102004a where she had substantial past contact with child there was evidence of abuse and neglect of child by mother and mother had been arrested and had subsequently engaged in bizarre and dangerous behavior towards child had attacked grandmother with frying pan and hedge clippers and had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric center all of which established serious and immediate concern for welfare of child 3: holding that a child was not barred by a former statute of limitations applicable to actions to establish the existence of a father and child relationship when the current action was to establish the nonexistence of a father and child relationship and the presumed father no longer persisted in maintaining paternity 4: holding child is entitled to know and be supported financially and emotionally by his or her biological father", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the Lease, if the options were not exercised. Crossland\u2019s right to the payments now at issue thus was contingent upon exercise of the options, exactly as was the case in Plumbing Industry. 8 . In some of the cases, the tenant had an option to extend the lease. In others, there was no such option. But this affected the courts\u2019 analysis not at all. As the decisions made clear, under Florida law, renewal and extension mean the same thing. And this is so whether there is or is not an express option to renew or extend the lease. See, e.g., Strano, 534 So.2d at 1215 n. 2 (addressing lease not containing option); Woodard Tire, 596 So.2d at 1116 & n. 2 (applying same analysis to lease containing option). 9 . See also Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. Williams, 551 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See also supra note 5. 11 . Crossland is Holdings: 0: recognizing that the burden is on the landlord in a lease dispute to establish that the lease contract had been breached and that such breach entitled the landlord to the possession of the property in question 1: holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to present testimony that they were induced to enter an automobile lease by promises that they could disregard terms of the lease 2: holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease 3: holding that jury should have received evidence from parties lease negotiations to determine intended meaning of term bookstore in the lease 4: holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in the definition of \"felony violation\u201d under \u00a7 1028A). 10 . In this regard, Count Two charges defendant with knowingly possessing] and us[ing], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, to wit, a passport bearing the name, birth date, and alien registration receipt number of Sandy Garcia, a native of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, during and in relation to a violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1326(a), to wit, unlawful reentry after deportation. 11 . The Montejo decision is currently on appeal to the Fourth Circuit, with oral argument recently heard on October 28, 2005. See United States v. Montejo, No. 05-4143 (4th Cir.2005). 12 . See United States v. Simmons, 247 F.3d 118, 122 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Horton, 321 F.3d 476, 479 Holdings: 0: recognizing that courts may look beyond the statutory text to determine legislative intent only when the statute is ambiguous 1: recognizing that when interpreting a statute a courts inquiry begins with the text 2: recognizing that the absurdity of the result is a factor to consider when interpreting a statute 3: holding courts must adhere to legislative intent when interpreting a statute 4: holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "held that Prostok\u2019s claims do not collaterally attack the confirmation order because they are based on conduct extrinsic to the confirmation order. 112 S.W.3d 876, 905. This Court has held that when a party does not seek to set aside a prior judgment, but instead brings suit based on extrinsic fraud, the action is not a collateral attack. State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tex.1993) (recognizing, in a suit brought by the state for fraud in obtaining court approval for an oil and gas lease, that the State had not sought to set aside the judgment but had \u201calleged fraud extrinsic to the judgment, and invoke[d] the equity powers of the court to impose a constructive trust\u201d); cf. Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 25 S.W.3d 863, 871 (Tex.App.\u2014 Houston [14th DistJ 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the underlying issues resolved Holdings: 0: holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys 1: holding that extrinsic conduct that formed the basis of claims for attorney malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty were not a collateral attack on trial courts order apportioning attorneys fees 2: holding breach of fiduciary duty claim is essentially a negligence or professional malpractice claim 3: holding that there would be no exception to american rule on attorney fees for legal malpractice claims 4: holding that attorneys fees and costs expended as a result of an attorneys alleged malpractice constitute legallycognizable damages for purposes of stating a claim for such malpractice", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to \u201cplead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged); GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546^17 (observing that where no heightened pleading standard is required, a plaintiff need not plead fraudulent intent with particularity). Under these requirements, Allstate has adequately alleged a violation of \u00a7\u00a7 25400 and 25500. According to Allstate, Stern willfully participated in the conveyance of misleading information to investors through its involvement in investigating, drafting, and reviewing the data set forth in the Official Statements. Given that role, Stern had a duty to disclose any known information necessary to prevent the Official Statements from being false or misleading. See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 (<HOLDING>). Allstate has further alleged that Stern Holdings: 0: holding a defendant may be convicted of mail fraud if he knowingly and willfully participates in a fraudulent scheme created and set in motion by others 1: holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable 2: holding that a person violates the bank fraud statute when he knowingly executes a scheme to obtain money from a financial institution by means of false or fraudulent representations if a defendant knowingly provided materially false information in order to induce the loan the crime is complete and it is irrelevant whether or not he intended to repay or was capable of repaying it 3: holding that a defendant can be held liable when it knowingly participates in the creation of a false or misleading statement 4: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 67 Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 348, 349-50 (2) (541 SE2d 634) (2001); see Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687 (III); Ashmid v. State, 316 Ga. App. 550, 556 (3) (730 SE2d 37) (2012). 68 Chapman, 273 Ga. at 350 (2);see Cammer v. Walker, 290 Ga. 251, 255 (1) (719 SE2d 437) (2011) (\u201cA claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is judged by whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight.\u201d (punctuation omitted)). 69 Sowell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 532, 539 (4) (759 SE2d 602) (2014). 70 Maurer v. State, 320 Ga. App. 585, 595 (6) (g) (740 SE2d 318) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 71 State v. Mobley, 296 Ga. 876, 881 (770 SE2d 1) (2015). 72 Maurer, 320 Ga. App. at 595 (6) (g); see Mobley, 296 Ga. at 881 (<HOLDING>); State v. Reynolds, 332 Ga. App. 818, 822-23 Holdings: 0: holding that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by positing mutual combat defense as an alternative in murder case even if doing so might have impaired principal defense of justification 1: holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that the erroneous omission of a justification defense was harmless where counsel did not invoke the defense during either voir dire or opening statements and where the defense did not appear to be the primary focus of the defensive theory at trial 3: recognizing an innocent possession defense though the defense in that case is more properly considered a justification defense as life and limb were arguably at stake 4: holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to... (F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 157. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York stated that an avoidance proceeding to recover assets of a debtor is within the bankruptcy courts' core jurisdiction. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Transpacific Corp., Ltd. (In re Commodore Int\u2019l, Ltd.), 242 B.R. 243, 261 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1999). See also, Braunstein v. Branch Group, Inc. (In re Mass. Gas & Elec. Light Supply Co., Inc.), 200 B.R. 471, 472 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (finding that an action under Section 549(a) for avoidance of a set-off as an unauthorized post-petition transfer to be core); N. Parent, Inc. v. Cotter & Co. (In re N. Parent, Inc.), 221 B.R. 609, 628 (<HOLDING>). 15 . The United States Court of Appeals for Holdings: 0: holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding 1: holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding 2: holding that an adversary proceeding is a core proceeding under 28 usc  157b2 even though the laundry list of core proceedings under  157b2 does not specifically name this particular circumstance 3: holding that a lawsuit by a third party creditor against the estate is a core proceeding 4: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "itself. We find equally unfounded the argument that any agreements Jones may have had in his Superior Court cases \u201cdon\u2019t have anything to do with this case.\u201d Def.App., Tab E at 42. Defendant\u2019s whole point was that Jones may have planted the gun in this case in order to \u201cwork off\u2019 obligations that arose in those Superior Court cases. Hence, agreements in the other cases have everything to do with this case. Nor does it matter that agreements in other cases may have involved other prosecutors. The United States Attorney\u2019s Office for the District of Columbia prosecutes cases in both the federal District Court and the local Superior Court, and the prosecutor is responsible (at a minimum) for all Brady information in the possession of that office. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (<HOLDING>). For a similar reason, we reject as irrelevant Holdings: 0: holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by  1823e because a promise is not an asset 1: holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the promise was made 2: holding a duty to act is created by reliance not by the person to whom the aid is to be rendered but by another who as a result of the promise refrains from acting on that persons behalf 3: holding that ignorance by one prosecutor of promise made by another is irrelevant since the prosecutors office is an entity and  a promise made by one attorney must be attributed for these purposes to the government 4: recognizing that a unilateral contract can be formed when only one promise is illusory because the nonillusory promise can serve as an offer which the promisor who made the illusory promise can accept by performance", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with disapproval by the Fifth Circuit.\u201d See Wilson v. Hibu Inc., No. 3:13-CV-2012-L, 2013 WL 5803816, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2013) (similarly denying remand where plaintiff pleaded monetary relief below jurisdictional threshold but faile Mktg., Inc., No. EP-12-CV-00340-DCG, 2012 WL 5287043, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2012) (similarly holding that the statements in the plaintiff\u2019s petition and binding stipulation/sworn affidavit attached to her petition asserting that the amount in controversy was less than or equal to $74,999.00 and that the plaintiff would not accept damages greater than $74,999.00 was sufficient to bind her and defeat diversity jurisdiction); Wright v. Normandy Terrace Healthcare and Rehabilitation Ctr., No. SA-12-CA-0622-XR, 2012 WL 2979040, at *2 (W.D.Tex. 2012) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Plaintiffs argue that \"Rule 47, when all Holdings: 0: holding that the stipulation included in the plaintiffs petitionthat the maximum amount of damages sought or that would be accepted wpuld not exceed 75000 exclusive of costs and interest bound the plaintiff and was sufficient to defeat diversity jurisdiction 1: holding that where plaintiff has set forth in the complaint a specific request for damages and attorneys fees that on its face is an amount less than the jurisdictional minimum the defendant must prove to a legal certainty that plaintiffs claim must exceed 75000 2: holding that the district court erred in not determining whether the amount in controversy necessary to create diversity jurisdiction was met at the time of removal 3: holding that defendants claim that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed 75000 was too speculative 4: recognizing that powerex abrogated rogers but ultimately denied remand since the plaintiffs failed to rebut defendants claim that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeded 75000 and also refused to stipulate to a lesser amount of damages", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "gained by looking beyond the allegations of the complaint. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., No. 88-1503, \u2014 F.2d - (10th Cir. March 21, 1991) (Westlaw 35967) (concluding, based on \u201cextensive findings of fact in [an underlying case] indicating that the pollution at issue ... was intended by defendants,\u201d that the pollution was not \u201caccidental\u201d and granting insurer\u2019s motion for summary judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (\u201cUnder New Hampshire law, the complaint and the policy alone may be sufficient for a determination of no coverage. Independent evidence, of course, may be needed if the compl 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or.App. Holdings: 0: holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend 1: holding that under new york law for an insurer to have no duty to defend the court must find as a matter of law that based on the pleadings there was no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held obligated to indemnify the insured 2: holding based on deposition which revealed that defective materials were used and construction was contrary to workmanship standards that insurer had no duty to defend because damages should have been expected by the insured 3: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 4: holding that an insurer had a duty to defend the insured until it could establish that those claims were not supported by the facts", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (\u201d[A]n individual\u2019s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual\u2019s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.\u201d) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]\u201d). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 468 Holdings: 0: holding that even though the defendant had not been given actual notice of his registration obligations under sorna his prosecution under that statute did not violate his due process rights under lambert where he was on notice that state law required sex offenders to register 1: holding failure to give putative father notice of adoption proceedings did not violate due process where he had never established a substantial relationship with his child 2: holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time 3: holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice 4: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "years to life for a first conviction and a penalty of 20 years to life for a second or subsequent conviction\u201d; subsection (b) sets forth what \u201ccould properly [be] characterized as an \u2018aggravated\u2019 continuing criminal enterprise,\u201d carrying a mandatory life term, and requiring additional \u201celements\u201d to be proven. Montalvo argues that his \u201cillegal mandatory life sentence must be corrected to a term authorized by the facts reflected in the basic verdict for a continuing criminal enterprise.\u201d It appears that Montalvo argues that he was convicted of a \u201cbasic\u201d continuing criminal enterprise pursuant to section 848(a), but sentenced for an \u201caggravated\u201d continuing criminal enterprise pursuant to section 848(b). So construed, this argument is cognizable under Rule 35(a). Fowler, 794 F.2d at 1449 (<HOLDING>). However, Montalvo\u2019s challenge fails on the Holdings: 0: holding that rule 35a can be used to challenge sentences that are not authorized by the judgment of conviction 1: holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 2: holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment 3: recognizing that the phrases can be used interchangeably 4: holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "those responses as such, as indicated in his 1999 letter to the president of the University. The fact that he held out hope that the president would intercede on his behalf does not change the accrual date for the statute of limitations because that date is measured by the standard of when a person, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of his injury. See Stewart, 2006 WL 626921, at *4 (statute of limitations under the ADA accrues \u201cwhen the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the basis for his claim.\u201d); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir.2007) (\u201cUnder federal law, the limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of his claim.\u201d); Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff contends Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims 2: holding that under the ada discovery of the original act of discrimination not future confirmation of the injury or determination that the injury is unlawful is when the statute of limitations begins to run 3: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 4: holding that georgias statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied to discrimination claims brought under the rehabilitation act and title ii of the ada", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.\u201d). Policymakers may act with an awareness of race \u2014 unaccompanied by a facial racial classification or a discriminatory purpose \u2014 without thereby subjecting the resultant policies to the rigors of strict constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has specified that \u201crace may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion .... [M]ere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor [to foster diversity and combat racial isolation] at the outset.\u201d Tex. Dep\u2019t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, \u2014 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2525, 192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015); see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789, 127 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant 1: holding that a violation of  1981 requires purposeful race discrimination 2: holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case 3: recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination 4: holding race and gender discrimination claim barred", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that? (Tr. at 152.) Carter argues the quote is a misstatement of the law, and improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case. The State indicates the prosecutor was \"verifying that the jurors could go outside what might be called the typical paradigm of a robbery ease.\" (Appellee's Br. at 11.) As we find the statement extremely difficult to understand, we cannot say it could have improperly persuaded the jury to be receptive to the State's case or otherwise prejudiced the jury against Carter. Even if the statement could be understood to misstate the law, it did not make a fair trial impossible, as the jury was instructed multiple times thereafter regarding the elements of the charges against Carter. See Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. There was no prose-cutorial Holdings: 0: holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard 1: holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction 2: holding an error re garding the element of a crime may be cured through further instruction to the jury 3: holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error 4: holding omission in the jury instruction of element of offense requires a new trial", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by using the policy\u2019s cash value or \u201cpaid up\u201d provisions. The court\u2019s opinion makes no reference to a 31-day grace period as an \u201cextended coverage\u201d for purposes of section 234(1) and we reject plaintiffs assertions that such a conclusion may be inferred from the opinion\u2019s language. Moreover, as defendant notes, the court\u2019s interpretation of section 234(1) was dicta, as the insured in First National Bank died long after the six-month period ended. First National Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 118, 121-22. For these reasons, First National Bank does not govern the facts before us. Indeed, our research has uncovered no case holding that a 31-day grace period operates as an extension of coverage. See generally Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 100, 110 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Hall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Holdings: 0: holding that because a disclaimer relates back to the decedents death the status of parties in the chain of succession are established as of the time of death regardless of when the disclaimer is made 1: holding that decedents overpayment of premiums during the policys first year extended coverage so that the policy would not have lapsed at the time of his death 2: holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage 3: holding that if there are multiple causes of action and one would potentially constitute a claim within the scope of the policys coverage the insurer would have a duty to defend until it could confine the claim to a recovery excluded from the policy internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that policy coverage is triggered in each year that the plaintiff inhaled asbestos", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "proximity to a suspected drug location is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion on the part of police.\u201d), when combined with other factors, the high crime nature of an area may support a stop. See United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d at 149-50. In this ease, the area around Seventh and Jefferson Streets, although considered a high crime area, is also a residential neighborhood. Officer Prado admitted that the area is a residential neighborhood in his testimony. In fact, McCray\u2019s grandmother lived very near the scene of the stop. In addition, although 10:45 p.m. is late, it is not unheard of for neighbors in a community to stand outside and talk late on a summer evening. But see United States v. Dover, Crim A. No. 96-181,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17415, at *11 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 26, 1996) (<HOLDING>). It is certainly not suspicious conduct for Holdings: 0: holding that a group of men standing with known drug traffickers who fled when officers approached established reasonable suspicion 1: holding that an officers observation of a man holding his hand out with a group of other men looking down at his open palm in an high drug trafficking area late at night constituted reasonable suspicion 2: holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am 3: holding that the fact that a group of men surrounding a car parked in a marked bus stop dispersed upon the approach of investigating officers was relevant to a reasonable suspicion determination 4: holding that police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after observing a group of men huddled around a closed store at 2 am", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "rejecting Djigo\u2019s explanations. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.2005). Because the only evidence of a threat to Djigo\u2019s life or freedom depended upon his credibility, his failure to exhaust precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief where all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. 2 . Djigo challenges the IJ's adverse credibility finding in his brief to this Court, but did not do so before the BIA. We nonetheless address the adverse credibility determination because the government does not argue that the issue is unexhausted. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 461 F.3d 101, 119-20 (2d Cir.2006) Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion of issues is waived if not raised by the government 1: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 2: holding that issue exhaustion is not jurisdictional and thus waived if not raised by the government 3: holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived 4: holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "met their burden, and that inquiry into the deliberative process is precluded by Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This Court agrees that the Koenigs waived any claim of juror bias by not advising the Court of these allegations at a time when the Court could have done something about them. This Court conducted voir dire to find out whether any member of the jury panel recognized any of the defendants or had provided goods or services to Coastal. One member of the panel was excused due to his familiarity with the defendants. None of the jurors acknowledged any relationship or familiarity before they were empaneled. Waiver has been found where juror misconduct was only alleged, as in the Koenigs\u2019 case. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 667 F.2d 729, 730, 734 (8th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Waiver has also been found where there was Holdings: 0: holding that where possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judges attention he or she has a duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the sixth amendment 1: holding that it was not constitutionally permissible for the state to respond to defendants invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior to the trial de novo  2: holding that litigants have a duty to disclose their objection to a prospective juror by promptly bringing the matter to the attention of the trial court 3: holding that although this court affords broad discretion to the district court in determining the type of investigation necessary to determine juror bias the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove the same 4: holding that the defendant by not bringing his knowledge of possible juror bias to the attention of the district court prior to verdict waived his right to a new trial", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to alleviate the confusion. 239 Ga. at 128-129. 8 See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246 Ga. 571, 572 (272 SE2d 302) (1980) (distinguishing a continuing, abatable nuisance from a permanent nuisance); Brand v. Montega Corp., 233 Ga. 32, 33 (209 SE2d 581) (1974) (\u201cIn a surface-water invasion case, the continuing invasions amount to a continuing trespass which is the equivalent of a continuing nuisance.\u201d); City of Gainesville v. Waters, 258 Ga. App. 555, 558 (574 SE2d 638) (2002) (\u201cWhere a nuisance is not permanent in its character, but is one which can and should be abated by the person erecting or maintaining it, every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh action will lie.\u201d); City Council of Augusta v. Boyd, 70 Ga. App. 686, 688 (29 SE2d 437) (1944) (<HOLDING>). 9 This Court in Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, a Holdings: 0: recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim 1: holding that it is not 2: holding standing cannot be waived and may thus be raised at any time 3: holding that the nuisance is not permanent because it can be abated at any time 4: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc); Weitzel v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 240 F.3d 871 (10th Cir.2001); Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir.2000); Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603-04 (8th Cir.1999); Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir.1998); Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 137-39 & nn. 5-6 (7th Cir.1995); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15 n. 1 (1st Cir.1992); Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1989); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, 109 S.Ct. 135, 102 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). The Fifth Circuit has provided conflicting opinions on this issue. Compare Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, Holdings: 0: holding no retroactive application 1: holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages 2: holding that because there was no distinction between the damages caused by actions of defendants in a prior case and actions of the defendant in this case the plaintiff suffered a single indivisible injury allowing for one cause of action 3: holding that younger has no application in actions seeking only damages 4: holding that the period for seeking judicial review of denial of con application not expressly ruled upon by the conrb begins to run at the time that application has been denied by operation of law", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "rights of a contracting entity and the United States regarding any contract executed pursuant to Federal reclamation law. The United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 43 U.S.C. \u00a7 390uu. We conclude that this statutory provision waives sovereign immunity in this case, where appellants are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Westlands and San Benito contracts. Accord Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 823 F.Supp. 715, 748 (E.D.Cal.1993) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 673-74 (footnote in original). The Holdings: 0: holding that  390uu waives sovereign immunity from contract claims for injunctive relief and specific performance 1: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 2: holding that immunity from suit precluded claim for breach of contract for sale of county property and request for specific performance of contract 3: holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law 4: holding city waives immunity by entering into contract", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "investigator/handler of an accelerant detection canine was introduced. See id. at 850. The investigator concluded that accelerants had been used \u201cbased on his own personal investigation and observations.\u201d Id. No ac-celerants were found on a sample taken from the fire scene. See id. The court concluded that the testimony was based on \u201cscientific principle ... sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the field of arson investigation.\u201d Id. Thus, the \u201cuse of dogs to detect accelerates [was] not a new or novel scientific principle.\u201d Id. \u00b6 24 Similarly, we conclude that the use of canines to help detect the presence of accelerants as an investigative tool is generally accepted within the fire investigation community. See Fitts v. State, 982 S.W.2d 175, 183 (Tex.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Holdings: 0: holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community 1: holding that expert opinion based on scientific technique is inadmissible unless technique is generally accepted as reliable in relevant scientific community 2: holding that calculations done by applying product rule were generally accepted in relevant scientific community 3: recognizing that training and technique for canine accelerant detection is accepted by arson investigation community 4: holding that ems training lieutenants position met criteria because the lieutenants developed coordinated implemented and conducted ems training programs  prepared lesson plans and training aids supervised delivery of training and tests and evaluated new equipment", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the website looked like Heather. But in analyzing a judicial deception claim, we need not scrutinize police investigative tactics in this fashion. 10 . As discussed above, the materiality of an omission is an issue for the court. 11 . The Ewings quote Shirk's testimony from Prater and Memory's trial, but the officers obviously did not have this information at the time they prepared the warrant affidavit. The Ewings also fault the officers for not asking Shirk more questions, such as whether he had been drinking, how long he looked at the female, whether her helmet face shield was up or down, and what the lighting conditions were. But judicial deception claims do not require an inquiry into the quality of the police investigation. See generally Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (<HOLDING>). 12 . After the Ewings' arrest, Contreras did Holdings: 0: holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 1: holding that the complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 2: holding that the allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 3: recognizing that because affidavits are typically drafted in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation by nonlawyers they must be read with an understanding of that context and accordingly held to a lower standard of scrutiny than that applied to pleadings filed in more formal proceedings 4: holding that affidavits for search warrants must be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion because they are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "treatment that resulted from the injuries and that the charges are reasonable. 136 The Gorostietas claim it was error for the trial court not to allow Marie Gorostieta to read or testify as to the contents of the medical bills she received as evidence of their reasonableness. Parkinson argues that any testimony offered by Marie Gorostieta regarding the medical bills would have been hearsay. We find it unnecessary to address whether this evidence would have been hearsay because this court has already ruled that under the best evidence rule, a witness may not testify as to material contained in exhibits that have been previously denied admission. See Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Utah 1978); see also State v. Ross, 573 P.2d 1288, 1289-90 (Utah 1978) (<HOLDING>). To allow a witness to so testify would Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred in allowing police officer to testify to contents of telephone records that were not introduced into evidence 1: holding that trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of prior dealings with the defendant 2: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 3: holding trial court erred in finding violations based only on officers testimony based on review of probation records where states failure to admit records into evidence rendered officers testimony hearsay 4: holding that the trial court erred in allowing an equitable reduction in the amount required to redeem the subject property", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or by failing to grant his motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for an extension of time. {91} We uphold the constitutionality of the Capital Felony Sentencing Act. The evidence supports the jury\u2019s findings of the aggravating factors charged. The evidence also supports the jury\u2019s findings that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The facts of Clark\u2019s case support the conclusion that the jury did not impose his death sentence under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Taking Clark, the circumstances of the crime, and other similar New Mexico cases into consideration, Clark\u2019s sentence of death was neither excessive nor disproportionate. We affirm Clark\u2019s sentence. Finally, we conclude tha 91) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See State v. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d 1, 838 Holdings: 0: holding the court lacked jurisdiction where the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal on the attorneys fee issue because a supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorneys fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal 1: holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence 2: holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding 3: holding that a capital defendant must receive a meaningful appeal with the benefit of an adversary proceeding with diligent appellate advocacy addressed to both the judgment and the sentence but allowing the defendant to file a pro se supplemental brief setting forth his personal positions and interests with regard to the subject matter of this appeal 4: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with a significant portion of the proceeds from the sale of the Ambassador building. Cox\u2019s and Trahan\u2019s testimony that Thad had check cashing privileges at a casino and that he gambled the day before filing for bankruptcy was merely cumulative evidence of Thad\u2019s gambling proclivities. Given the substantial non-gambling evidence supporting Thad and Theresa\u2019s convictions (discussed below), and the cumulative nature of Cox\u2019s and Trahan\u2019s testimony, there is not a \u201csignificant possibility\u2019 that the evidence had a substantial impact on the jury\u2019s verdict. See Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 210; see also United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.2007) (\u201cThe erroneous introduction of cumulative evidence was harmless error.\u201d); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Any error in admitting Cox\u2019s and Trahan\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 1: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 2: holding that the trial courts erroneous admission of an experts opinion that the defendant was guilty was harmless where the prosecution produced overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that the admission of a family photo was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence in support of the conviction 4: holding that any error in admission of demonstrative aid was harmless because evidence of defendants guilt was overwhelming", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.\u201d Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under \u00a7 1491 to those bidders who have a \u201csubstantial chance\u201d of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not \u201cestablish that it had a \u2018substantial chance\u2019 of receiving the contract\u201d and thus \u201cprove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.\u201d 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In CACI Field Services, Inc. v. United Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 1: holding that a protester must show only that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for that error 2: recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings 3: holding that a contractor failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error 4: holding that a protester is not required to show that but for the alleged error the protester would have been awarded the contract instead a protester must show there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract but for the alleged error", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1988 or 1990, he was pushed and heard shots fired; this is the only harm he endured in Mexico and it does not amount to persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir.2011) (finding no error in BIA\u2019s conclusion that an applicant who was beaten and detained for two days did not establish persecution because the injuries \u201crequired no formal medical attention and had no lasting physical effect\u201d). While Cardonar-Contreras argues that the murders of his father and grandfather contribute to the cumulative harm he suffered, which amounts to persecution, those deaths both occurred before he was born. Accordingly, the murders of his father and grandfather were not acts intended to harm or threaten Cardona-Contreras. Cf. Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of past persecution, to Holdings: 0: recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 1: holding that no wellfounded fear was established where the attacks on family members failed to show a pattern of persecution tied to the petitioners 2: recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident 3: holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic 4: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "treatment program and was specifically told by the trial court that if he failed to admit his offense his probation would be revoked. When he failed to make the required admissions, his probation was revoked. This is precisely the situation proscribed by our supreme court in Morrow and the United States Supreme Court in Murphy. In Morrow, the court noted revocation of probation is a penalty that cannot be imposed for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 590 N.W.2d at 793. Similarly, in Murphy, the Supreme Court acknowledged a state may not revoke probation \u201cbecause a probationer refused to make nonimmunized disclosures concerning his own criminal conduct.\u201d 465 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 1148; see also Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F.Supp. 847, 852 (D.Vt.1991) (<HOLDING>); People v. Elsbach, 934 P.2d 877, 881 Holdings: 0: holding that the state failed to rebut the defendants testimony that he was forced to leave his approved residence and could not reach the probation officer to inform him of his move 1: holding a person in a probation setting can not be forced to incriminate himself without the state granting him immunity first 2: holding that testimony of probation officer that landlord told him probationer moved from approved residence was hearsay and could not support revocation of probation without additional nonhearsay evidence 3: holding that under statutes in effect at the time a court may not by revocation and granting a second period of probation extend the total time on probation beyond five years as the statutes do not speak of terms of probation but speak in plain language of the total time which may be spent on probation for a felony 4: holding that probation is not a sentence", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201d Citing United States v. Johnson, 909 F.2d 1517, 1519 (D.C.Cir. 1990). (Emphasis added.) In United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding heroin possession: \u201c[A]s long as the statute does not graduate the gravity of the crime of possession of heroin by the quantity possessed, we see no indication that Congress intended to permit a multiplication of the offenses of possession at any given time by a defendant upon evidence that the heroin may merely have been separately packaged or stashed. Woods, 568 F.2d at 513 (Emphasis added.). Woods also explains that the sentencing potentialities permit one conviction to accommodate an inclusive possession conviction. See also, United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1973), (<HOLDING>). Further, the cases the majority cites as Holdings: 0: holding that 30 pallets were the cogsa packages where the bill of lading stated that there were 30 packages 1: holding that statutory maximum is twenty years when drug quantity is not charged as element of offense and found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding separate convictions for drug transactions occurring four or five days apart were properly counted as separate convictions 3: holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible 4: holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "employment. Consequently, Miller was required to comply with K.S.A. 12-105b(d)\u2019s notice requirements, which she failed to do, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Flores was dismissed. 916 F. Supp.1101. Garcia raises state law claims against the police department and the officers acting within the scope of their employment. We agree with the district court that Garcia\u2019s claims could give rise to a number of actions whereby the appellees could be hable in Kansas, namely assault, battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and damages for racial profiling. All of these types of claims are covered by K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 12-105b(d)\u2019s notice requirement. See Knorp v. Albert, 29 Kan. App. 2d 509, 513, 28 P.3d 1024, rev. denied 272 Kan. 1418 (2001) (<HOLDING>); King v. Pimentel, 20 Kan. App. 2d 579, Holdings: 0: holding in age discrimination case under adea that same considerations are pertinent when deciding single employer issue for public entities as for private entities and applying nlrb test to resolve the question noting that where government entities are concerned court also must keep constitutional separation of powers issues in mind 1: holding that public entities may be held vicariously hable for the negligent acts of their individual employees 2: holding that notice statute applies to both municipal entities and employees of municipal entities acting within the scope of their employment 3: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom 4: holding that although municipalities are persons within the meaning of 42 usc  1983 no municipal liability lies under that statute unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "concur in the result. Although I agree with much of the substan tive analysis presented by the majority in its treatment of various of Appellant\u2019s claims, I have sufficient differences with various elaborations that I am unable to supply a full joinder. In particular, as pertains to Part II of the majority opinion \u2014 which addresses Appellant\u2019s claim of deficient stewardship by virtue of his attorneys\u2019 failure to seek suppression \u2014 I agree with Appellant that the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that an anonymous 911 report of a domestic disturbance, coupled with a responding officer\u2019s \u201cgut feeling,\u201d meets the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement so as to justify entry by police into a residence. Accord Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 232-36 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The majority references no decision which is Holdings: 0: holding that 911 call reporting domestic dispute and child telling officer that a man with a gun was inside fighting with her mom constituted exigent circumstances that justified warrantless entry into home 1: holding the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest 2: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry 3: holding that a warrantless entry by police into an apartment based on an uncorroborated anonymous 911 report of a mentally ill man  acting crazy and possibly in possession of a gun violated the fourth amendment 4: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "been very emphatic that, except in cases where only one inference can be drawn from the facts, negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability are questions of fact for the jury. See St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 781 P.2d 1043, 1047 (1989); Baker v. City of Garden City, 240 Kan. 554, 731 P.2d 278, 281 (1987); Gard, 400 P.2d at 1000, 1002; Rowell, 176 P.2d at 595. As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment. See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (<HOLDING>); Rowell, 176 P.2d at 597 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury 1: recognizing the cause of action 2: recognizing the availability of a cause of action by manufacturer against supplier under consumer fraud act 3: recognizing cause of action 4: holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "so the fact that the Mossberg shotgun was found in the apartment is not evidence that he participated in the burglary; and (2) the accomplice, Do, testified that it was he who placed the shotgun in Cao\u2019s closet, not Cao himself, and thus the officer\u2019s recovery of the stolen gun from Cao\u2019s closet is insufficient corroboration of Do\u2019s testimony. We disagree. While the recovery of the stolen shotgun in Cao\u2019s apartment standing alone does not establish his guilt, it is evidence that tends to connect Cao to the commission of the Greenside burglary. See, e.g., Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 633 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating that appellant\u2019s possession of stolen property is a factor that connects appellant to offense); Edwards v. State, 106 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Do testified that he and Cao opened Le\u2019s safe Holdings: 0: holding recovery of stolen guns from trunk of accuseds car was insufficient corroboration of testimony of accomplice who lived with accused and used his car 1: holding that recovery of trash containing stolen property from outside appellants apartment is factor that tends to corroborate accomplice testimony 2: holding that the value of property taken includes cash that was stolen but not transferred from stolen car to getaway car because property removed from its rightful owner is properly considered taken even if it is immediately thereafter recovered 3: holding that exclusive possession of recently stolen goods warrants the inference that he stole all of the property for which the defendant is accused of taking provided all the property was stolen at the same time emphasis added 4: holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "protections afforded to the debtors by the Bankruptcy Code and the automatic stay, specifically because the Adversary Proceeding will determine whether the debtors were in default and thus whether Bank of America is entitled to recover from the guarantors. This, the court believes, is precisely what the \"unusual circumstances\u201d exception encompasses. 10 . Bank of America contends that with respect to the \"unusual circumstances\u201d exception, the debtors were required to demonstrate \"unusual circumstances\u201d as well as satisfy the standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the exception in a way that supports Bank of America's position. See Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc. (In re Excel Innovations), 502 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to the Ninth Circuit\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the unusual circumstances exception was not a separate basis for staying nondebtor litigation from the traditional preliminary injunction standard 1: holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success 2: holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified 3: holding that court can consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction 4: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "have a number of tools at their disposal in exercising their Section 8(c) rights to express their views on union organizing efforts. An employer is permitted, for example, to express its views about union representation to masses of employees, in mandatory meetings, on company time, so long as such speech does not occur within 24 hours of an election. See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427, 429 (1953); Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB 400, 409 (1953). Employers may dispatch supervisors to engage in one-on-one discussions during work time with employees about the negative effects of union representation, see, e.g., NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1107-08 (9th Cir.1971), and may disseminate written anti-union materials, Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, Inc., 326 NLRB 335, 336 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Our opinions have faithfully reiterated our Holdings: 0: holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea 1: holding that employees failure to comply with employers rule requiring employees to notify employer when a temporary job placement ended did not constitute gross misconduct because the violation was an isolated incident and employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of employees unavailability 2: holding that the employer did not engage in objectionable conduct when its supervisors handed out flyers even at a time when the employer was enforcing its otherwise valid nodistribution rule against employees 3: holding that the employer had not demonstrated the employee was discharged for gross misconduct because the conduct was an isolated incident and the employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of the employees conduct 4: holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "error in the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion. This assignment of error is without merit. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE JURY WAS SELECTED \u00b6 7. Robinson assigns error to the trial court\u2019s method of jury selection. Robinson\u2019s only claim rests on a vague recitation of Rule 4.05(2) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court without any additional argument or citation to authority in support thereof. Robinson maintains a full panel of accepted jurors was not tendered to him after the State exercised its first round in the jury selection. Robinson is incorrect and misinterprets the selection procedure outlined in URCCC 4.05(2). Under URCCC 4.05(2) a full panel of jurors, meaning twelve, are tendered by the State after electing to exer , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (<HOLDING>), neither of which are applicable to the Holdings: 0: holding that generally an unsworn statement by counsel is not evidence in the context of a batson hearing 1: holding that evidence of the same name and that the former conviction was in same city and same court as the present case and the fact that the defendant did not offer any testimony to rebut the prima facie evidence of identity was sufficient to establish identity 2: holding that probation does not constitute a sentence 3: holding that a defendants confirmation of a psrs findings does not waive a challenge on appeal where there is no conceivable strategic reason for not objecting to a sentence at a higher offense level 4: holding that racial identity between the objecting defendant and the excluded jurors does not constitute a relevant precondition for a batson challenge", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "486, or are acting pursuant to an entity\u2019s policy, id., at 473-474. Meyer also made clear that the threat of suit against an individual\u2019s employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens. See 510 U. S., at 485 (\u201cIf we were to imply a damages action directly against federal agencies ... there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. [T]he deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost\u201d). This case is, in every meaningful sense, the same. For if a corporate defendant is available for suit, claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual directly responsible for the alleged injury. See, e. g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. 443, 464 (1993) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>); id., at 490-492 (O\u2019Con-nor, J., dissenting) Holdings: 0: holding that a rico enterprise may consist of individuals associated in fact with corporations 1: recognizing that corporations fare much worse before juries than do individuals 2: holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities 3: recognizing that diversion of substantial corporate assets to the debtors management or to other corporations owned by management constituted mismanagement at best and fraud or dishonesty at worse 4: recognizing that the confrontation clause may provide greater rights in cases tried before juries than in bench trials", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "work rules, and without proper authorization weighs strongly in favor of finding the UP 9484 was not \u201cin use\u201d at the time of the accident. However, Johnson argues the UP 9484 was nevertheless \u201cin use\u201d for three rea sons. First, the UP 9484 did not have blue flags placed on it, which Johnson argues should be dispositive, applying the Fifth Circuit\u2019s bright-line test from Trinidad, 949 F.2d at 189, yet relying on a different dispositive factor borrowed from Wright, 574 F.3d at 622. Second, Johnson argues the UP 9484 was not located within the diesel shop and was therefore still on its \u201cunitary journey to the point of repair,\u201d citing Brady v. Terminal R.R. Ass\u2019n of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 58 S.Ct. 426, 82 L.Ed. 614 (1938), and misquoting S. Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 375 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1967) (<HOLDING>). Third, Johnson argues his conduct necessarily Holdings: 0: holding a defective railroad vehicle is in use under the saa where hauling  is in progress or in immediate contemplation because the handling of it for that purpose is a part of its unitary journey from the point of discovery of disability to the repair shop 1: holding that there is no unitary business in part because there is no flow of international business 2: holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation 3: holding that the the statement of the purpose of the law in question in the committee report is not conclusive and reiterating that the question is whether the law is reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate police power purpose 4: holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "144 (11th ed.2005) (emphasis added). Here, the song file is never returned because, according to Plaintiff, Pandora deletes the file upon completion of the song. See Compl. \u00b6 20. Moreover, merely alleging that subscribers \u201cborrow\u201d sound recordings does not suffice to identify the particular conduct the subscriber undertakes to use the file. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (\u201c[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere eonclusory statements, do not suffice.\u201d). Plaintiff also fails to confront the fact that Pandora\u2019s Terms of Use, which govern a subscriber\u2019s use of the Pandora internet radio service, foreclose any borrowing or use of any temporary song file supplied by Pandora. Cf. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In particular, the Terms of Use plainly state Holdings: 0: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement 1: holding misuse of copyright because of limitations imposed on licensing agreement 2: recognizing a presumption that the issuance of a permit by the state engineer allowing recognized irrigation water rights to be shifted to other users works as severance of those water rights from the land 3: holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement 4: holding that licensing agreement controlled the scope of the users rights in the software", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "record justifying the increase. Accordingly, the increased sentence violated Church's right to due process. By the Court. \u2014 The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. 1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-1996 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 2 We initially granted the State's petition to review the court of appeals' decision regarding the multiplicity of the two child enticement charges, but later dismissed the petition as improvidently granted after the State changed its position and conceded multiplicity. See State v. Church, 2000 WI 90, 236 Wis. 2d 755, 613 N.W.2d 848. 3 Additional cases in which the North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), presumption has been held not to apply include: Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) (<HOLDING>); and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 Holdings: 0: holding that there is a presumption of vindictiveness when a harsher sentence is imposed after a defendant exercises his right to a de novo review 1: holding that the possibility of vindictiveness does not inhere in a twotier system of appeals with the right to a de novo hearing after conviction in an inferior court 2: holding that presumption of vindictiveness is inapplicable in a system which gave a convicted defendant the right to a trial de novo in another court 3: recognizing de novo standard of review 4: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "California Court of Appeal\u2019s harmless error analysis was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court\u2019s denial of habeas relief. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have addressed Medina's other arguments in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 2 . A \"pedicab\u201d is a bicycle with a passenger compartment attached to the rear. 3 . The Sixth Circuit took the lead by following the first approach in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir.1999); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 718 (6th Cir.2003). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has elected to pursue the second approach. See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.2003); see also Saiz v. Burnett, 296 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have reserved judgment. See, Holdings: 0: holding that when presented with petitioners claim based upon state and federal law and the state court confined its analysis  to state law aedpa deference does not apply 1: holding that if the state court correctly applied chapman federal courts do not apply brecht unless the state courts chapman analysis violated aedpa 2: holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law 3: holding that where state rules of civil procedure apply to courts of the state they do not apply to adjudicatory proceedings before state agencies 4: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "only challenge the \u201ccollateral issue\u201d of the \u201cAttorneys\u2019 Fees Award.\u201d In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants\u2019 appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys\u2019 Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is \u201cin derogation of [Defendants\u2019] sovereign immunity.\u201d See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (<HOLDING>), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 1: holding that rule 60b jurisdiction is lacking for appeals raising issues decided either explicitly or by necessary implication by this court 2: holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa 3: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 4: holding that appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to immediate appellate review", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "this issue. Gogri Decl. \u00b6 11. Such an event would not negate the fact that plaintiff's numerous medical conditions nevertheless constitute a substantial limitation on his ability to walk. See 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1630.2(j) (defining substantial limitation as either a total inability to perform major life activity or a significant restriction on the same). 7 . The Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on this issue, but courts are generally in agreement that whether barrier removal is readily achievable is an affirmative defense. See Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Hermanson Family Ltd. P\u2019ship, 264 F.3d 999, 1002-03 (10th Cir.2001); Gathright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2006). See also Lentini v. Calif. Ctr. for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). In Colorado Cross, the Tenth Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 1: recognizing laches as an affirmative defense 2: holding that whether an accommodation fundamentally alters a service or facility is an affirmative defense 3: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 4: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "mandatory. The trial court further explained its rationale when it denied Defendant\u2019s .request to submit Instruction A: And as the Court indicated, I think the instruction will be knocked down by the Supreme Court at some point because this is argumentative.... The trial court\u2019s basis for refusing Instruction A was not arbitrary or unreasonable, nor does it indicate a lack of careful consideration. See Davis, 203 S.W.3d at 799. Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion because MANOR 3d 310.02 (2016) was discretionary before its effective date of January 1, 2016. Moreover, Defendant, has failed to demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s .refusal to give Instruction- A was arbitrary and unreasonable. See, e.g., State v. Casey, 517 S.W.3d 570, 574-75 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (<HOLDING>). Point II is denied. Point III\u2014The Trial Court Holdings: 0: holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by tracking the statutory language in the instruction 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the date of filing the petition for dissolution as the valuation date for equitable distribution 2: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not submitting jury instruction maicr 3d 31002 2016 prior to its effective date 3: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial 4: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863, 115 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1991); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1990); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 417, 107 L.Ed.2d 382 (1989); and Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1989). 91 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. See also Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d at 76-77, and Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 284-85, (both upholding the dismissal as frivolous of civil rights lawsuits on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity). 92 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; Siglarv. Hightower, 112 F.3d at 193, (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. Gamer, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness 1: holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response 4: holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress and that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 1983 claim to the extent that she alleges a procedural due process violation. Because the Court cannot resolve evidentiary issues in the context of a motion to dismiss, however, Ms. Rhyce will be allowed to amend her complaint, but the Court cautions that she should do so only if there is good cause. c. Substantive Due Process Defendants next attack Ms. Rhyce\u2019s \u00a7 1983 claim that her substantive due process rights were violated. Relying on McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1994), Defendants argue that property interests created by state law, such as a property interest in employment, are not subject to substantive due process protection. It appears that most circuits are now of that view. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, in Schaper v. City of Huntsville, Holdings: 0: holding parents custodial rights are a fundamental interest guaranteed due process protection 1: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 2: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 3: holding a tenured state employee has a property right to continued employment and must be accorded due process before serious disciplinary sanctions 4: holding that plaintiffs tenured public employment is not a fundamental property interest entitled to substantive due process protection  thereby joining the great majority of courts of appeals that have addressed this issue and citing cases", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "squarely stand for the proposition that indictment clause claims are immediately appeal-able because the Court may have assumed that trial would proceed according to the indictment. 4 . See also 420 U.S. at 125 n.26, 95 S.Ct. at 869 n.26 (\u201cBecause the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial.\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1953) (absent arrest, prosecution by information may proceed without oath or affirmation of probable cause); Church v. United States, 412 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (same). But cf. United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 1274, Holdings: 0: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause 1: holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement 2: holding irs need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of a summons   3: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 4: holding that a summons is sufficient restraint to invoke probable cause requirement where failure to appear on summons may result in issuance of warrant", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Officers Gutierrez and Martinez were designees of the school\u2019s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2). A review of the record demonstrates that neither officer testified that he had received either express or implied authorization from the principal to restrict access to school grounds. Although both officers testified to their positions as Miami-Dade County School Police officers and to their jurisdictional assignments, neither officer testified further regarding his duty or authority. The testimony supporting the officers\u2019 designee status in this case is even weaker than the testimony that we held in D.J. II did not support a finding of the warning individual\u2019s designee status. See 67 So.3d at 1035 (<HOLDING>). Because an essential element of the offense Holdings: 0: holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace was competent evidence to support the  finding that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos 1: holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid 2: holding that security guards testimony that her job was to monitor students behavior did not amount to competent substantial evidence to support a finding that the guard was a designee of the schools principal for purposes of section 8100972 3: holding that competent substantial evidence did not support the trial courts conclusory finding that husband had the present ability to pay and noting that the presumption of section 61145a florida statutes is rebuttable 4: holding that transfer rule denying eligibility to students transferring from public to private schools did not violate the students rights to due process or equal protection of the laws as provided by the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of minimal value compared to other medical opinions that squared with treatment records. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Valentine v. Comm\u2019r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir.2009)). The \u201cALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence\u201d such as those in the record here. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir.2008). Nor did the ALJ err in granting only minimal weight to Global Assessment of Functioning (\u201cGAF\u201d) scores. The ALJ is not required to assign GAF scores controlling weight in the face of other conflicting record evidence. The ALJ was likewise justified in affording limited weight to the treating physicians\u2019 medical opinions. See Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The ALJ provided specific, cogent reasons for Holdings: 0: holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record 1: holding that the alj must make findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in order to reject the contradicted opinion of a treating physician 2: holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs 3: holding that a treating physicians opinion may be rejected if it is brief conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence 4: holding that the testimony of a nonexamining medical advisor does not constitute evidence sufficient to override the treating physicians diagnosis", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "A. To begin the analysis of this issue, it is helpful to place the clergy sexual conduct statute in the context of the variety of third-degree criminal sexual conduct crimes described in Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.344 (2006). That section criminalizes sexual penetration that occurs in various defined situations and, most significantly, removes consent as a defense to that penetration in many situations. In this latter respect, section 609.344 is at odds with the general notion in criminal law that consenting adults have a protected right to engage in sexual contact. The United States Supreme Court has held that a state may not generally criminalize sexual contact between consenting adults in the privacy of their home. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Court implied that this general rule may Holdings: 0: holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts 2: holding the right to marry is a central part of the liberty protected by the due process clause 3: holding that private sexual contact between consenting adults is a liberty right protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "n. 5), the Court need not reach this issue. 27 . 11 Del. C. \u00a7 1336(j). Since, as stated above, the Delaware Wiretap Statute is patterned after the federal wiretap statute, it is especially informative to consider the legislative history of t 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169, 194 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 924, 112 S.Ct. 337, 116 L.Ed.2d 277, reh\u2019g denied, 502 U.S. 1009, 112 S.Ct. 650, 116 L.Ed.2d 667 (1991) (reiterating that the statements found in DeLancie and Donaldson that police may monitor conversations of pretrial detainees only to ensure security and the public\u2019s protection, but not to discover information that may be used against such detainees at trial); Donaldson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal.Supr., 35 Cal.3d 24, 196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110, 116 (1983) (<HOLDING>); DeLancie v. Superior Court of San Mateo Holdings: 0: holding that purpose of the amendment was to clarify the definition of the word maintain 1: holding before the advent of the federal rules of evidence that the use of a tax return for the purpose of impeachment was proper 2: holding that effect of suit rather than the purpose for which it was brought is controlling for purposes of the fifth factor 3: holding that title iii only proscribes unlawful interceptions defined as listening or monitoring of telephone conversations not the recording of monitored conversations hence if monitoring is lawful recording is always lawful 4: recognizing that delancie implied that secret monitoring of conversations between detainees and visitors undertaken for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in criminal proceedings rather than to maintain the security of the jail was unlawful", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(\"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.\u201d). 11 . This circuit has already determined that the ninety-day statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be tolled. See Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2002). Accordingly, it is not a jurisdictional limit and should not be raised sua sponte. Other circuits are in accord. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1190-93 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130-34 (2d Cir.2000). My colleagues apparently assume that the filing deadline contained in \u00a7 1229a(c)(6)(B) is similarly not a jurisdictional restriction. Cf. Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 405-06 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that an aliens departure based on an in absentia removal order does not necessarily deprive an ij of jurisdiction to decide a motion to reopen 1: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal 2: holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory 3: holding that the 180day filing deadline applicable to motions to reopen from removal orders filed in absentia is not jurisdictional 4: holding that district court had no authority to reopen appeal period when motion was filed beyond 180day limit", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "only have been escalated by less than three percent per year. Further evidence that the cement contract was not overvalued came from Mr. McCarthy who had offered the contract to a related company who chose not to take it for $1.58 million. Aggregate Industries was in a good position to value this cement in an arm\u2019s length transaction. Plaintiffs have not proved that it was improperly valued at $1.58 million. The court deemed Allen\u2019s valuation not credible. The court determined that his valuation method was \u201chighly flawed\u201d and that Allen arbitrarily increased the value of the cement by six percent. The district court\u2019s findings are based upon the credibility of Allen\u2019s testimony, which we do not reweigh on appeal. See Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 456 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). After carefully reviewing the record, we find Holdings: 0: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 1: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 2: holding that a determination as to a defendants credibility for a safety valve reduction is a factual finding that is reviewed for clear error 3: holding that factual findings underpinning a credibility determination are virtually never clear error 4: holding that factual findings in sentencing context are reviewed for clear error", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for duty exam was indeed job-related and necessary to determine if he could carry out his duties. The reasoning of several of our sister circuits is consistent with our endorsement of the plain language of the EEOC regulations. See Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 676 (1st Cir.1995) (finding that if the plaintiff were \u201ctreated as an existing employee returning from disability leave, ... the employer would be able to demand medical certification of ability to return to work\u201d); Hogan v. Bangor and Aroostook R.R. Co., 61 F.3d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir.1995) (concluding that an employee was entitled to reinstatement after suffering collapsed lung as soon as medical evidence indicated he was fit to return); Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 438 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We concur in the reasoning of these circuits. Holdings: 0: holding that an employee who was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment was required to provide medical certification as to ability to return to work 1: holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  2: holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously 3: holding that an employer need not accommodate with indefinite leave an employee who is unable to return to work in any role 4: holding that a state is required to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Yagman, Thomas\u2019s attorney. See United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 656 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985)). 2. Thomas also contends that the district court erred when it dismissed the FAC, which alleged constitutional claims and civil RICO claims. But, Thomas\u2019s opening brief presented no argument or record citations to support his contention that the court erred when it dismissed his constitutional claims. Therefore, Thomas waived these claims on appeal. See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. La. Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1548 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Ninth Circuit Rule 28\u20141(b); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (<HOLDING>). And, the district court did not err when it Holdings: 0: holding that mere recitation of bare elements of a cause of action is insufficient to survive dismissal 1: holding that the bare assertion that a dismissal without prejudice was favorable to the plaintiff was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss 2: holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra 3: holding that mere continuity of employment  is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action 4: holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "designed to impair their opportunity to seek legal redress. Plaintiffs further claim that the City\u2019s actions were arbitrary and irrational (substantive due process violation). Defendants respond that the City\u2019s decision to grant the special use permit was a rational exercise of its discretion, and plaintiffs were afforded adequate opportunity to be heard. B. Jurisdiction This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. An appellate court reviews a grant of sum mary judgment de novo. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857 (6th Cir.1997). C. Procedural Due Process 1. A person\u2019s right not be deprived of property without due process of law is a fundamental tenet of federal constitutional law. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs allege a number of ways in Holdings: 0: holding that in order to prove a denial of due process a party must show that he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a cognizable property interest rooted in state law 1: holding that privileges licenses certificates and franchises qualify as property interests for purposes of procedural due process but that due process only becomes relevant where such property is deprived 2: holding that an alien is not deprived of due process if he or she receives actual notice of a denial of an application to withhold deportation 3: holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest 4: holding that the root requirement of due process is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Lagunas to at least ten years incarceration.\u201d Lagunas I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 845. Thereafter, the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) issued Amendment 706 which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2Dl.l(c) downward two levels for crack cocaine, effective November 1, 2007, and retroactive as of March 3, 2008. In February 2008, Mr. Lagunas filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3582(c)(2) based on the changes in the Drug Quantity Table and the resulting two-level reduction in offense levels. See Lagunas II, 309 Fed.Appx. at 266. Following appointment of counsel for Mr. Lagunas and pleadings filed by the parties, the district court filed an order denying Mr. Lagunas\u2019s \u00a7 3582(c) mot U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Act directed the Sentencing Holdings: 0: holding the minimum mandatory threemonth custodial sentence for second offenders under former dwi provisions of njsa 39450 reflects the intention to prohibit suspended sentences 1: holding the revised mandatory minimum sentences in the fair sentencing act applied to preaet offenders sentenced after august 3 2010 2: holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory 3: holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies 4: holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum  not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures  and thus them ultimate sentences  were based", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Iowa Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights 1: recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss 2: holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal 3: recognizing that reasonable time limitations may be placed on the exercise of constitutional rights 4: recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "acquittals on others indicate that the jury was not unanimous regarding any of the counts. But even if his speculation is accurate, it-would provide no basis for interviewing the jurors because juror testimony with regard to a verdict\u2019s validity is limited to whether \u201cextraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury\u2019s attention; an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.\u201d Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). K. Kennedy\u2019s theory of a compromise verdict fits none of these exceptions. Rather, it is an allegation of improper \u201cinternal influence,\u201d which this court has held cannot provide a basis for post-verdict juror interrogation. See United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 380-81 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Helm v. Bunch, No. 88-5120, 869 F.2d 1490, Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts in camera interviews were within its discretion because the defendant had waived his right to be present during the juror interviews 1: holding that juror interviews were not permissible where the alleged jury misconduct of premature deliberations constituted internal influence 2: holding that rule 606b precludes any inquiry into the validity of the verdict based on juror testimony regarding racial or ethnic comments made during the course of deliberations but that the rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony in those rare and grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate a defendants right to due process and an impartial jury internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding a new trial required when juror is replaced by an alternate during jury deliberations 4: holding that the district courts dismissal of a juror after five weeks of deliberations violated the defendants right to a unanimous jury because the record evidence suggested the juror found the evidence insufficient for a conviction", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "stage (Pl.\u2019s Class Cert. Mem. at 26). Individual issues, however, would predominate even before the damages stage. Because plaintiff will not be able to prove class-wide, company-wide discrimination with statistical evidence alone, a jury would need to consider each putative class member\u2019s claim individually to determine liability. To prove that an individual plaintiff suffered gender discrimination under disparate impact or disparate treatment theories of Title VII or the Equal Pay Act, an individualized inquiry into each putative plaintiffs circumstances would be necessary to determine whether employment actions taken toward a particular employee were based on gender or instead on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. See Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 629-30 (7th Cir., 2008) (<HOLDING>); Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 672-73 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that same standard applies to equal pay act and title vii wage discrimination claims 1: holding that if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the equal pay act the employer may raise one of four statutory defenses attributing the difference in pay to i a seniority system ii a merit system ni a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or iv a differential based on any other factor other than sex 2: holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge 3: holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal 4: holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "cannot deny authorization of a [nonmember PCP] based on past practices.\u201d Former OAR 436-015-0070(2) (2002). Managed Healthcare does not challenge DCBS\u2019s general authority to adopt the rule at issue. See ORS 656.726(4)(a) (providing that DCBS director may \u201c[m]ake and declare all rules and issue orders which are reasonably required in the performance of the director\u2019s duties\u201d). Neither does Managed Healthcare contend that DCBS adopted the rule without complying with the applicable rulemaking procedures. Instead, and as noted above, Managed Healthcare argues only that DCBS exceeded its statutory authority by adopting an otherwise valid rule that conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 573, 687 P2d 785 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Managed Healthcare relies on several Holdings: 0: holding that ors 30905 did not make ors 12250 applicable to claims brought under that statute because ors 12250 applies only to limitations contained in ors chapter 12 1: recognizing that basis for challenging administrative rule under ors 1834004b 2: recognizing this rule 3: recognizing general rule 4: recognizing rule", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in the corresponding psychiatric evaluation.\u201d McRae I, 139 N.C. App. at 391,394, 533 S.E.2d at 560, 562. In this case, defendant\u2019s competence has never been assessed, let alone at a relevant time. Thus, it is clear that a retrospective determination of defendant\u2019s competence would not be possible here and we do not need to remand for the trial court to make such a determination. Because defendant\u2019s competence to stand trial has never been evaluated and \u201c[g]iven the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a procedure would be adequate here.\u201d Drope, 420 U.S. at 183, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 119-20 (citations omitted); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 4 L.Ed. 2d 824, 825 (1960) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse defendant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that appellant must present some evidence of a subsequent change in competency or some new evidence in a manner analogous to newly discovered evidence in a motion for new trial to complain of a denial of a second competency hearing 1: recognizing the difficulty of retrospectively determining the defendants competency as of more than a year ago and ordering a new trial and hearing as to the defendants present competence 2: holding that competency standard for stand ing trial is same as standard for determining competency to waive right to counsel 3: holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial 4: holding that a trial court must conduct sua sponte a competency hearing when the information known to the trial court at the time of the trial or plea is sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendants competence", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "child who is incapacitated by a disability. See id. at 117; Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (interpreting what is now Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law \u00a7 13-102(b) (1991), which requires parents to support adult children who cannot be self-supporting due to mental or physical infirmity). While parents may be under a legal obligation to support an adult child in some cases, the District of Columbia courts have not addressed the question of postmajority parental recovery of expenses in such a ease, and the plaintiffs have cited no authority from other jurisdictions to support their position. They rely on Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2nd Cir.1984), but that case is inapposite because it concerned the statutory definition of majority. See id. at 754-55 (<HOLDING>). Michael A. Lasley is not a minor under Holdings: 0: holding age discrimination claim barred 1: holding that as 2330155 applies the twentyone day period for payment to ppi payments 2: holding that parental right to recover medical expenses extends beyond age eighteen to age twentyone because parental support obligation continues until twentyone 3: holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference 4: holding that sixth amendment prejudice resulted from an unasserted error that added six to twentyone months to the defendants sentence", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "possessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction-so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there.\u201d Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 508 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 2039 (quoting Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 439, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L.Ed. 640 (1928)). Based on this language in the Indian General Allotment Act, courts have determined that \u201cthe protections of the Nonin-tercourse Act do not apply to land which has been rendered freely alienable by Congress, held by private parties, and subsequently acquired by an Indian tribe.\u201d Cass Cnty., 643 N.W.2d at 696; see also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., Wash., 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Mashpee Tribe v. Watt, 542 F.Supp. 797, 803 Holdings: 0: holding that county law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction to arrest indian at ballpark located on indian trust land 1: holding that the state did not have jurisdiction over crime committed on land held by the bureau of indian affairs for the use and benefit of a discrete indian community 2: holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil action filed by a nonindian against an indian for events that occurred on indian land 3: holding that once congress removes restraints on alienation of indian land the protections of the nonintercourse act no longer apply 4: holding that the arrest of an indian on indian land was illegal because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws  including the execution of a search warrant  unless congress consented to the states jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "unlike in Alvarado, Guinto had no remedy available \u201cas of right\u201d to bring these issues before the BIA. See Alcaraz v. I.N.S., 384 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (discretionary remedies such as motions to reopen or motions to supplement are not remedies available \u201cas of right\u201d). Further, in Alvarado, the allegedly foreclosed legal argument had been available at the very outset of the removal proceedings. See Alvarado, 759 F.3d at 1125, 1127 (noting removal proceedings were instituted in August 2009 whereas the intervening legal authority was decided in January of that year). Here, Descamps was decided over a year after Guinto exercised his last available administrative remedy as of right. Given such circumstances, we hold the issue has been exhausted. See Alcaraz, 384 F.3d at 1158-60 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider Holdings: 0: holding there was no jurisdictional bar under 8 usc  1252d to reviewing legal issues that arose after arguments to the bia were made 1: holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate 2: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia 3: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 4: holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider where the motion merely repeats arguments that the bia has previously rejected", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the state. See 457 U.S. at 842, 102 S.Ct. 2764. The defendants attempt to bolster their argument by analogizing to Rendell-Baker, arguing that the social workers employed by Lutheran, like the school teachers in Rendell-Baker, are not state actors. One court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, however, has recognized that foster care agencies are different from other state contractors and the school teachers in Rendell-Baker because they perform a function that is exclusively the prerogative of the state, namely the removal of children from their homes. See Estate of Earp v. Doud, 1997 WL 255506 *2 (E.D.Pa.1997) In Estate of Earp, the action was brought by the natural parents of Adam Earp, who was involuntarily removed from his mother\u2019 .Ill.1989) (rev\u2019d on other grounds) (<HOLDING>). In reaching the above conclusion, Judge Holdings: 0: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 1: holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child 2: holding that when a state obtains an order to remove a child from his home and takes the child into protective custody it is exercising affirmative state power over the child to the extent that it has a due process obligation to assume responsibility to provide for the childs basic needs 3: holding that a child has a  1983 action against the state while in foster care where the state is deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a foster home is unsafe yet places the child there or allows the child to remain there 4: holding that failing to remove a child from a foster home is not an affirmative act under the statecreated danger exception even where the officials investigation revealed obvious dangers to the childs safety", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Mills was not there. In light of Mills\u2019s continued missed appointments and the officer\u2019s continued inability to locate him, Mills was charged with first-degree escape in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. \u00a7 53a-169(a). On June 2, 1998, he was convicted of this crime. The PSR. relied on this conviction as a predicate violent felony conviction in recommending that Mills be sentenced under the ACCA. At a sentencing hearing held on January 22, 2007, the district court rejected Mills\u2019s objection to the classification of this offense as a violent felony for purposes of sentencing him under the ACCA. Employing the \u201ccategorical approach,\u201d see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and relying on United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), the court concluded that it was required to Holdings: 0: holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca 1: holding that escape from secure custody is a violent felony 2: holding prior to chambers that a walkaway escape is categorically a violent felony 3: holding that attempted burglary as defined by florida law is a violent felony under acca 4: holding fleeing police officers in a vehicle was a violent felony under the acca", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the statutory policy of \u201cfurthering the successful pi-osecution of meritorious claims\u201d was best served by a rule that \u201ccreates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.\u201d Id. at 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Permitting a fee award to a pro se litigant, even one who is a lawyer, would instead \u201ccreate a disincentive to employ counsel.\u201d Id. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that pro se lawyers did not fall within the scope of the fee-shifting provision. Although Kay was decided pursuant to section 1988, its reasoning is not confined to that statute. Indeed, both this Court and other \u201ccourts of appeals have [since Kay] denied attorney\u2019s fees to pro se attorneys under a variety of fee-shifting statutes .... \u201d Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec., 374 F.3d 221, 228-29 (3d Cir.2004); see id. at 229 (<HOLDING>); see also SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances 1: holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action 2: holding that attorney fees awarded under the common fund doctrine do not constitute part of a plaintiffs claim against the defendant and cannot be considered for amountincontroversy purposes 3: holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 4: holding that a shareholderobjector who represents himself as a pro se lawyer is not entitled to attorneys fees under the common fund doctrine", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "cases in this circuit usually receive, at most, forty minutes of oral argument. A very limited number, including en banc cases, receive an hour. This frivolous appeal was the exception and was given about double the customary time. 3 . See R.262 (\u201cTate\u2019s complaint asserts that Tate is not a member of any gang, much less a gang leader. But his complaint, while containing language that it is under oath, is signed not by Tate, but his counsel.... Therefore Tate has failed to provide admissible evidence....\u201d). The majority makes much of the fact that the magistrate judge addressed the evidentiary value of Tate's complaint sua sponte, but he had the authority to do so. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ( F.3d 655, 667 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825, 827 Holdings: 0: holding that a decision is final when it leaves nothing more for the court to do 1: holding attorneys affidavit that does nothing more than assemble properly authenticated evidence is still not admissible because it is not based on personal knowledge 2: holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that it is not", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "has considered personal grooming codes prohibiting men but not women from wearing long hair has found the codes to be non-discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm\u2019t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir.1998); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1996); Barker, 549 F.2d at 401; Earwood v. Cont\u2019l Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir.1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir.1976); Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir.1975); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir.1974); Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337; Fagan v. Nat\u2019l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1126 (D.C.Cir.1973). We agree wit Prac. Dec. (CCH) \u00b6 37,016 (E.D.N.Y.1987) (<HOLDING>); Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 102 Holdings: 0: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 1: holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability 2: holding that title vii prohibits discrimination based on any race including caucasian 3: holding unwritten personal grooming code which allows females to wear earrings but prohibits men from wearing earrings does not constitute a violation of title vii 4: holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "tell the jury to disregard the accomplice\u2019s testimony, See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.18, it does require that corroborating evidence \u201caffirm the truth of the accomplice\u2019s testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree.\u201d Sorg, 275 Minn. at 5, 144 N.W.2d at 786. First, we consider that the requirement for the instruction is based on the fact that the \u201ccredibility of an accomplice in inherently untrustworthy.\u201d Lee, 683 N.W.2d at 316. Chapman agreed to cooperate with officers and do a controlled buy in order to avoid criminal charges and jail. Therefore, it is relevant that Chapman was afforded leniency in exchange for his cooperation because he could have been charged with possession or second-degree manslaughter. See Rodriguez, 2007 WL 1412880, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Second, the prosecutor relied heavily on Holdings: 0: holding that seconddegree manslaughter was not a crime of violence and thus was not an aggravated felony warranting an aliens removal 1: holding on rehearing that the interests of justice would be better served by remanding for new trial on the offenses of seconddegree murder and voluntary manslaughter 2: holding that the lower court properly charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter where defendant testified he was in fear of the threat of physical assault 3: holding that erroneous manslaughter instruction that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim did not constitute fundamental error certifying question  if a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of seconddegree murder in a case where the evidence does not support a theory of culpable negligence does a trial court commit fundamental error by giving a flawed manslaughter by act instruction when it also gives an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence 4: holding that drug user was properly charged with seconddegree manslaughter after he cooked a lethal dose of heroin for the victim", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "96 S.Ct. 984. However, \u201c[a] prosecutor\u2019s administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate\u2019s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.\u201d Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606. A defendant pleading absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that it is justified by the function in question. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). The defendants\u2019 argument that they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity prevails only in part. They are correct that they have absolute immunity for offering the tape recording into evidence at the hearing because in doing so they were functioning as advocates. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984 (<HOLDING>); see also Butz, 438 U.S. at 516-517, 98 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under  1988 in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the states case including deciding which evidence to present 1: holding that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from  1983 suits for initiating a prosecution and presenting the case at trial 2: holding that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution 3: holding prosecutors immune from civil suits for initiating prosecutions and presenting cases 4: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "it did not reach the question of immunity. Given the conclusions we have reached, however, it is necessary for us to do so. Under \u00a7 820.2, a public employee cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from \u201chis act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.\u201d The City correctly asserts that \u00a7 820.2 applies to county social workers engaged in investigating allegations of child abuse, and extends to other public employees whom those social workers \u201creasonably enlist to assist in the investigation.\u201d Newton v. County of Napa, 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 266 Cal.Rptr. 682, 687 (Cal.App.1990); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Cal.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). This immunity provides complete protection Holdings: 0: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 1: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee 2: holding that social workers immunity is designed to protect the continu ing exercise of  discretion in favor of the protection of minor children 3: holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record 4: holding that under mayfield the exercise of discretion based on a mistaken premise of law can be a failure to properly exercise discretion", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "provide just punishment for the offense.... \u201d). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under \u00a7 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson\u2019s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge\u2019s determination that the \u00a7 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We \u201cmust give due deference to the district court\u2019s decision that the \u00a7 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.\u201d Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge\u2019s sentence. See id. (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the sentence handed Holdings: 0: holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence 1: holding that the fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal 2: recognizing that the mere plausibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to justify reversal 3: holding that no court has the authority to substitute a different sentence for that which is required by law 4: holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "at 5. Unlike the cases cited above, the cessation of the \u201ccollection process\u201d here was not conditioned on the full payment of the debt, see Kramsky, 00-CIV-2936 at 5, and there was no demand for immediate payment that contradicted the validation notice. Savino, 164 F.3d at 84. The letter that Trans-Continental sent to plaintiffs contained the required validation notice, and it was not overshadowed by the other language in the notice. The validation notice was printed directly beneath the request for payment in full, in the same font size, and on the same page. Cf. Sokolski, 53 F.Supp.2d at 311 (noting that the validation notice was at the bottom of the page, in single spaced, significantly smaller typeface); Unger v. Nat\u2019l Revenue Group Ltd., No. Civ. A. 99-3087, 2000 WL 1897346, *3 (<HOLDING>). The contested statement also did not indicate Holdings: 0: holding the government was within its rights to garnish wages where there was a minimum monthly payment schedule and restitution was due in full immediately 1: holding that the full payment rule literally requires full not partial payment and rejecting the argument that a partpayment remedy is necessary when a taxpayer is too poor to pay the full amount of the tax 2: holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the court of federal claims 3: holding that the validation notice is overshadowed where a debt collector serves a consumer with process initiating a lawsuit during the validation period without clarifying that commencement of the lawsuit has no effect on the information conveyed in the validation notice 4: holding that the validation notice was overshadowed by language that payment in full is due now that was in larger print", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 67 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)). Similarly, the court can find no such exception with respect to plaintiffs Puerto Rico law claims. Courts will only find that a state has waived its own Eleventh Amendment immunity by legislative fiat where the same is \u201cstated \u2018by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.\u2019 \u201d Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 53 L.Ed. 742 (1909)); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Laws 17 and 69 do include the Commonwealth Holdings: 0: holding that the statute must specify the states intention to subject itself to suit in federal court in order to constitute a waiver 1: holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 2: holding that a states consent to suit in federal court must be unequivocally expressed 3: holding individual defendants subject to suit 4: holding in a patent case that when the plaintiff brought the suit in federal district court it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit including those pertaining to the counterclaim of the defendants", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conduct at issue); Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998) (distinguishing discretionary from ministerial acts). The specific conduct Pahnke complained of is Deputy Sass\u2019s order to leave her apartment immediately despite the fact that Pahnke presented him with notice of what she urges is her statutory right to a 24-hour deadline for removal. The district court found that both Sass and Har-grove served the notice and removed Pahnke from the apartment, and Officer Hargrove does not contend that this finding is erroneous. It is the immediacy of Pahnke\u2019s removal by the offi y requiring officers to use red lights and siren \u201cin a continuous manner\u201d during vehicular pursuit imposed a ministerial duty); Brown v. City of Bloomington, 706 N.W.2d 519, 523-24 (Minn.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006); Hyatt v. Holdings: 0: holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable 1: holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured 2: holding that the public duty doctrine applied to claims against the town and fire chief for negligence in responding to a fire call although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show the special duty exception applied 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that officers decisions to use lesslethal ammunition and to fire more than one round were discretionary but that departments procedure for making transition from lethal to lesslethal shells when loading weapon imposed a ministerial duty", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.\u201d 183 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotations omitted and emphasis added). This includes the time between the filing of Valdez\u2019s legal challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence in the state appellate courts and his factual challenge under Romero in the superior court. See Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.2001) (\u201c[PJost-conviction review is \u2018pending\u2019 \u2014 and thus AEDPA\u2019s statute of limitations is tolled \u2014 from \u2018the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner\u2019s final collateral challenge.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006) (emphasis in original)); Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The order in which Valdez filed his state Holdings: 0: holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending 1: holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations 2: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief 3: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations was tolled for the entire period during which saffold pursued state habeas relief including the time between filings 4: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "period, claimed serious physical injuries to neck, arms, and shoulders). With no additional alleg L 3822220, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (granting summary judgment on tight handcuffing claim where plaintiff experienced 24 hours of swelling and went to hospital but no treatment was provided for wrists); Wang, 2012 WL 119591, at *7 (granting summary judgment where plaintiff was \u201cshrieking in pain\u201d from tight handcuffs but plaintiff, sought no medical attention and there was no evidence that the handcuffing caused actual physical injury); Abdul-Rahman, 2012 WL 1077762, at *7-8 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings where only alleged injury was numbness and marks on wrists); Bender v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3286 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4344203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps., Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours 1: holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force 2: holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required probable cause 3: holding that to state a claim for wage violations under the flsa plaintiffs must provide at least some approximation of the overtime hours that defendants required them to work and a time frame for when those hours were worked 4: holding that seven hours was a reasonable amount of time to deliberate meaningfully about the choice", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is reached, or if the agreement is revoked, rejected by the court, or withdrawn or if the judgment is later vacated or reversed, neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea or judgment, nor statements made at a hearing on the plea, shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding. Both these rules \u201cplainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during \u2018the plea discussion,\u2019 that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.\u201d State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, \u00b6\u00b6 13-14, 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61, 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 14 We agree that because Duran\u2019s statements Holdings: 0: recognizing a presumption that a plea of guilty is final and binding if the plea was made during a properly conducted hearing pursuant to rule 11 of the federal rules of criminal procedure 1: holding that a courts inquiry as to disputed facts in connection with a prior conviction is limited to the terms of the charging document a plea agreement a transcript of the plea colloquy or a comparable judicial record 2: holding defendant could validly waive statute of limitations in effort to prevent being indicted during the completion of plea negotiations with the prosecution 3: holding that the government must be held to a promise made to a defendant during plea negotiations if that promise induced the defendants guilty plea 4: holding rules 410 and 174f preclude impeaching defendant with statements made in the expectation of a plea agreement including document  signed during plea negotiations", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "The warmth of the hood is some evidence that the accident occurred a relatively short time before police arrived on the scene. See Warren v. State, 377 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. refd) (\u201cThe warmth of the hood and cab of the truck is some evidence that the accident occurred a short time before Deputy Drake arrived.\u201d) (citing Rawls, 318 S.W.2d at 663). The facts that appellant smelled of alcohol and failed the field sobriety tests, there were no other pedestrians nearby who could have been involved in the crash, and there were no bars or establishments that sold alcohol in the area likewise support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that appellant was intoxicated at the time he drove his car into the area and crashed on the median. See Weems, 328 S.W.3d at 175-76 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, appellant told police officers Holdings: 0: holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes 1: holding that evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant operated vehicle while intoxicated when vehicle was registered to appellants mother who testified that he had vehicle on night in question appellant was found fourtenths of a mile from accident scene in rural area and police and ems personnel saw no one else in area 2: holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am 3: holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle 4: holding the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the lessee driver of a vehicle had knowingly transported a handgun recovered from the trunk of the vehicle in question", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) lack of a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.\u201d United States v. Moreno, 102 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 964 (9th Cir.1993)). Duenas-Gonzalez was not entitled to a new trial on his claimed Brady violation or on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Contrary to Duenas-Gonzalez\u2019s contention, no Brady violation occurred. The government offered neither false evidence nor perjured testimony. See United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that the prosecution\u2019s inadvertent use of perjured testimony can constitute a Brady violation); Cf. United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Nor did the government withhold evidence Holdings: 0: holding reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 1: holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial 2: holding that there is a presumption that new evidence discovered by criminal defendant after trial is over would not change outcome of trial 3: holding that petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that had his trial counsel interviewed renee and called her as a witness at trial the trial outcome would have been different because renees testimony wholly lacked credibility 4: holding that a reasonable probability is one that in the judgment of the reviewing court is  sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding citation omitted", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2008) (once initial sanction is final, subsequent sanction would violate industrial double jeopardy principles); Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works c. 15.3.F.vii (7th ed. 2012). We do not, however, for the reasons explained below, interpret the award to preclude appropriate remedial action required by statute, including training and coun-selling, to address Ashe\u2019s sexual harassment. General Laws c. 15 IB requires an employer to take some remedial action in cases of confirmed sexual harassment. See College-Town, supra at 162 (employer who is notified of sexual harassment in workplace and fails to take adequate remedial action violates G. L. c. 15IB, \u00a7 4); Modern Continental/Obayashi v. Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination, 445 Mass. 96, 104-108 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Trinh v. Gentle Communications, LLC, 71 Mass. Holdings: 0: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 1: holding school board liable for studentonstudent harassment if school officials knew of harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action 2: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor 3: holding school hable for sexual harassment by its employees only if the district knew or should have known and neghgently failed to take prompt effective remedial action 4: holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cuse of the knife as a weapon\u201d was not justified by his explanation and his \u201cuse of the knife ... was clearly a use of the knife as a potential weapon.\u201d There is evidence to support these findings. [\u00b6 19.] When Amundson opened the door to allow the agents to enter his apartment, he unquestionably possessed a knife. That possession constitutes using the knife as a potential weapon. Amundson attempts to justify his use of the knife, in this manner by asserting that he was uncertain who was at the door and that he was \u201cscared.\u201d However, Amundson had a reasonable alternative to using the knife as a potential weapon. For example, he could have insisted on identification before he opened the door or left the knife in the kitchen. See United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Board\u2019s findings, that Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court was not entitled to impose a threeyear mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where the jury verdict did not specifically find actual possession 1: holding the defendant was a convicted felon within the purview of the federal statute prohibiting the receiving and possession of firearms by a convicted felon where the defendants prior conviction was based on an idaho state probated sentence 2: holding that the enhancement applied where the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with possessing methamphetamine 3: holding that the defendant a convicted felon was not legally justified in possessing a firearm because potentially effective legal options existed 4: holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "stated in Nelson that \"the required showing of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct. For example, a single severe act can be enough to establish a claim[.]\u201d Nelson, 97 Hawai'i at 390, 38 P.3d at 109. 12 . HRS \u00a7 707-733, entitled \"Sexual assault in the fourth degree,\u201d provides in relevant part: (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree if: (a) The person knowingly subjects another person to sexual contact by compulsion or causes another person to have sexual contact with the actor by compulsion^] 13 . However, we recognize that there are situations in which name-calling or other verbal harassment constitutes \"severe or pervasive\u201d harassment. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 14 . We recognize that \"[t]he courts ... must Holdings: 0: holding teasing and offhand comments even if offensive are not actionable harassment 1: holding that supervisors reactions to comments did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination where comments were made six months prior to plaintiffs discharge and were unconnected to the discharge decision 2: holding that a supervisors repeated comments to an employee that the supervisor wanted to have sex with the employees fifteenyearold daughter were extremely severe because the comments were significantly more offensive than the typical crass comments we have found to be insufficient to constitute harassment in other cases 3: holding that the prosecutors repeated comments that the defendant could have denied knowledge of the drugs or rebutted the trafficking charge by testifying were so prejudicial as to constitute plain error 4: holding that in order to raise prejudicial comments of trial court on appeal defendant must object to comments when made and move for a mistrial", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "claim, for chapter 13 plan purposes, i.e. a $73,906.98 general unsecured claim for Advanta for chapter 13 plan purposes, and a $43,339.19 general unsecured claim for Household for chapter 13 plan purposes. Section 524 does not support Debtors\u2019 request that these unsecured claims be valued at zero for chapter 13 plan purposes, due to the prior chapter 7 discharge. V. Conclusion This opinion constitutes this Court\u2019s findings and fact and conclusions of law with respect to this Court\u2019s Order entered this sa s or partnerships) are not eligible to receive any discharge whatsoever in Chapter 7, though corporations and partnerships may be eligible to receive a discharge in Chapter 11. 16 . See supra, footnotes 12 and 13. 17 . Id. See also, In re Thompson, 182 B.R. 140 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1995) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that unless security interest or lien is avoided bankruptcy discharge has little if any impact on creditors ability to proceed in rem against property securing claim 1: holding that a party cannot waive in rem jurisdiction under florida law and a court proceeding pursuant to in rem jurisdiction must actually possess in rem jurisdiction over the property that is the subject of the matter 2: holding that a state tax lien was not judicial lien arising from judgment such that it could be avoided in bankruptcy by a chapter 13 debtor 3: holding that if a debt or had voluntarily granted a security interest that was later avoided the debtor was not entitled to exempt the interest recovered 4: holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "raises issues of bankruptcy law for a debtor in bankruptcy in Rhode Island, this Court has jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs claim. For two reasons, however, the Court has limited jurisdiction over any potential class action. Usually debate about bankruptcy jurisdiction centers on whether ancillary actions impact the bankruptcy estate in such a manner that the bankruptcy court would need to resolve these ancillary actions to resolve the bankruptcy. If they do, jurisdiction is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1334(e) ; Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 244 B.R. 858, 862 (S.D.Ga. 2000) (noting that for jurisdictional purposes bankruptcy class actions differ from other class actions because each has its own bankruptcy estate); McGlynn v. Credit Store, Inc., 234 B.R. 576, 584 (D.R.I.1999) (<HOLDING>). If the additional claims do not stem from the Holdings: 0: holding that where a proposed project does not alter the status quo then it does not have a significant impact 1: holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix 2: holding that preemption under  1144a does not permit removal if the plaintiffs claim does not fall within the scope of  1132a 3: holding that title ii does not apply to the states 4: holding that a claim regarding postdischarge conduct that does not impact the bankruptcy estate in any way does not fall under title lls jurisdictional umbrella", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at the bottom that each of KPMG\u2019s member firms is a \u201cseparate and independent legal entity\u201d and describes itself as such. (Docket No. 174, App. at l). Several courts have declined to treat different firms as a single entity, holding them jointly and severally liable for one another\u2019s acts, simply because they shared an associational name and/or collaborated on certain aspects of the relevant transaction. See In re AM Int\u2019l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F.Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (dismissing complaint against Price Water-house entities outside the United States after rejecting argument that all Price Wa-terhouse affiliates worldwide were \u201cin fact one entity, and acted as agents of one another\u201d); Reingold v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 599 F.Supp. 1241, 1249, 1254 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F.Supp. 298, Holdings: 0: holding where contributions to lobbying organization were generally not tax exempt exception for veterans organization was speakerbased discrimination not aimed at the suppression of ideas and satisfied rational scrutiny 1: holding that imposition of government fees did not violate exempt status of religious organization 2: holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did 3: holding that existence of dh  s international an organization composed of a large number of affiliated accounting firms did not prove dh  s was a single worldwide entity even though some brochures described dh  s us as a single cohesive worldwide organization 4: holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "claims. See 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. (2d ed.) \u00a7 3522 (1984 & Supp.2008); Beneficial Nat\u2019l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (discussing the limited categories of cases where the Supreme Court has found complete preemption). The only circuit court to have considered whether the PMPA triggers the complete preemption doctrine is the Ninth Circuit, which found that it did not. Yorn v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 952 F.2d 408 (tbl.), 1992 WL 2872 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (un-pub.). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that \u201c[wjhile the PMPA may provide Unocal with a viable pre-emption defense to Yorn\u2019s common law claims, it is for the California courts to make this determinatio .D.Pa.1986) (<HOLDING>). Sunoco cites one instance where a federal Holdings: 0: holding that pmpa preempted new york statutory law governing the termination or nonrenewal of franchises but did not preempt state contract claim which did not involve the termination of the franchise relationship 1: holding that fraud claim concerning nonrenewal of franchise agreement was preempted by pmpa 2: holding that pmpa preempted state statute regarding the ter initiation and nonrenewal of franchises and state commonlaw claim 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by pmpa because they sought to impose standards more stringent than the pmpa regarding the termination or nonrenewal of his franchise 4: holding state law claim premised on implied duty of good faith was preempted by the pmpa because it concerned the termination of a petroleum franchise", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that \u201cthe presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.\u201d Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit \u201cthird-party statements contained in a police report\u201d). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201cIn general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.\u201d). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Because the Spa does not contend that the Holdings: 0: holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made 1: holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay 2: holding that factors used in determining whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable to satisfy hearsay exceptions also apply to whether statements have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness under confrontation clause 3: holding that thirdparty statements contained in dcfs caseworker reports constituted hearsay 4: recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 463 A.2d 872 (1983), were the two Court of Appeals cases relied upon in Taylor. In Garrison, the defendant\u2019s husband had possession of 173 glassine bags of heroin and was in the process of discarding the heroin in the toilet. The heroin was not in the plain view of the defendant, who was found in bed, in a bedroom not adjacent to the toilet where the drug was discarded. Garrison, 272 Md. at 126, 321 A.2d 767. In Leach, the defendant, with his brother, had \u201cjoint dominion and control ... over the entire apartment 2d 495 (1972) (evidence insufficient to support conviction when defendant was merely present in an apartment in which a woman\u2019s purse and a cigarette case containing heroin were found); Puckett v. State, 13 Md.App. 584, 587-88, 284 A.2d 252 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Haley v. State, 7 Md.App. 18, 33-34, 253 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a thumbprint on an easily movable cup found beside a tent that was located six to fifteen feet away from marijuana plants was insufficient to prove that the defendant was manufacturing marijuana as there was no evidence suggesting when or where the defendant touched the cup 1: holding evidence of marijuana plants on premises defendant owned with his wife insufficient where marijuana plants were grown in an uncultivated area and there was a total absence of evidence of the defendants involvement 2: holding that guilty plea to indictment charging distribution of 1000 marijuana plants did not establish amount of marijuana involved for sentencing purposes where defendant had specifically reserved the issue on entering his plea 3: holding evidence of presence of marijuana plants on property puckett jointly owned with his wife was not sufficient to create rational inference that puckett was in possession of the marijuana 4: holding evidence insufficient for conviction of possession of marijuana amphetamines and barbiturates when those drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other people on the premises", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "approach to this issue, given the current split among the circuits. As might be expected, two camps have emerged following Salinas. On one side, courts have found that the government need not prove a link exists. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits occupy this camp. See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303 (5th Cir.2002); United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Grossi, 143 F.3d 348 (7th Cir.1998). In these decisions, courts often rely on earlier precedents, which refused to recognize any nexus requirement. Some also infer that because Salinas skirted the issue, rather than impose a requirement when it had the chance, that no requirement is necessary. See, e.g., Dakota, 197 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); Morgan, 230 F.3d at 1067 (Salinas no more Holdings: 0: holding that some federal connection to the misconduct is required 1: holding that no nexus is required in part because salinas left the nature of any necessary connection unanswered 2: holding that no nexus was required in a determination involving a stateless vessel 3: holding the connection is an element 4: holding that no federal nexus is required", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on appeal, therefore, turns on the legal question of the burden of proof. We review questions of law de novo. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Fe cts Liability \u00a7 8.04[7][b], at 8-228-27 (rev. ed.1999): As a practical matter, ... in most strict liability lawsuits, in most jurisdictions, whether or not there was a substantial change in the condition in the product is a non-issue. The product under consideration may be brand new, its very nature will obviate (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the allegedly defective transmission had not been somehow replaced or substantially changed over the life of the automobile); Humphreys v. General Motors Corp., 839 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 & n. 6 (N.D.Fla.1993), aff'd, 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Other courts have held that the defendant has Holdings: 0: holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute 1: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 2: holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her damages or even have suffered all of the damages attributable to his or her attorneys negligence 3: holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change 4: holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a reasonable officer could have concluded that impoundment of the motorcycle was lawful based on the CaLVeh. Code. \u201cIf the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate\u201d. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-57 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects \u201call but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law\u201d)). The only issue that is contested is whether Officer Faulk was acting out of personal animus towards Plaintiff. However, this dispute is over Officer Faulk\u2019s subjective intentions, which is irrelevant in determining whether qualified immunity applies. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The only question the Court must decide is Holdings: 0: holding that the qualified immunity determination does not entail an inquiry into the officers subjective intentions merely his knowledge 1: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 2: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 3: holding that reasonableness for qualified immunity purposes requires an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances 4: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that revenue sharing information was required by ERISA disclosure provisions: The allegedly omitted disclosures are not required by the language of the regulations and would instead require judicial expansion of the detailed disclosure regime crafted by Congress and the Department of Labor pursuant , to its statutory authority. \u25a0Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that receiving this additional non-prescribed information would effectively enhance investment decisions. In assessing the likely return on an investment the fees netted against the return are certainly relevant, but knowing the subsequent distribution of those fees has no impact on the investment\u2019s value. See In re Merrill Lynch Investment Management Funds Securities Litigation, 434 F.Supp.2d 233, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>). In the context of. the disclosure of Holdings: 0: holding inadmissible expert testimony that included statements that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under utah law that the material actually provided to investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the act and that the agreements at issue were securities under utah law 1: holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 2: holding that such information is not material under securities law 3: holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time 4: recognizing a duty of best execution under federal securities law", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cummings touched Adam\u2019s skin and said \u201cooh\u201d is entirely ambiguous and does not plausibly allege intent to intimidate or humiliate Adam. Importantly, neither of these incidents plausibly demonstrates a \u201csignificant negative alteration in [Adam\u2019s] workplace environment.\u201d Adam\u2019s argues that her alleged demotion from \u201cintern\u201d to \u201cvolunteer\u201d damaged to her \u201ccareer prospects.\u201d Although being given a \u201cless distinguished title\u201d can be an adverse action, \u201ca difference in job title alone\u2014where the positions are identical in terms of work, pay and benefits\u2014is not materially adverse.\u201d Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Adam has not alleged that interns had Holdings: 0: holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action 1: holding that a transfer and job title change from assistant vicepresident and manager of one bank branch to a loan officer position at a different branch alone is not enough to constitute a materially adverse employment action 2: holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same  rate of pay and benefits and her duties were not materially modified 3: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 4: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "103 (1981). Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, requires that once a court decides an issue necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of action between the same parties. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). Section 1738 requires application of both doctrines. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). These principles are integral to our judicial system because they \u201crelieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage rebanee on adjudication.\u201d Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Respecting the finality of state court Holdings: 0: holding that in actions brought under 42 usc  1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury 1: holding that qualified immunity under  1983 does not apply to actions brought under  521 2: holding that preclusion rules apply in 1983 actions 3: holding that nonmutual issue preclusion should not apply against the state government 4: holding that the ind trial rules do not apply to actions before the board", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.\u201d); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (\u201cThis accords with the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions, which we have applied in many varying contexts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985) (stating that \u201cthe question is reduced to whether, in light of the competing values at stake, we may rely on the crucial assumption that the jurors followed the instructions given them by the trial judge,\u201d and answering that question in the affirmative) (quotation marks omitted); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1976 n.9, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We have obediently followed and repeated the Holdings: 0: holding that a jury is presumed to follow a judges instructions 1: recognizing the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instructions 2: holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions 3: holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions 4: recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for criminal or otherwise wrongful conduct in benefits programs that it created, it explicitly did so \u2014 strengthening the State\u2019s contention that Congress did not intend to completely occupy the retirement benefits field to the exclusion of state legislation peripherally affecting it. II. Conflict of State Law with FERS Jones\u2019s last argument is that the State \u201ccannot impinge on the federal government\u2019s ability to dictate the terms on which employees seeking retirement will be subjected to criminal sanctions.\u201d The fact that the enforcement of state laws does slightly concern the congressional prerogative to exclusively govern the postal system is not sufficient to support a claim of preemption. See, e.g., State ex rel. Danforth v. Reader\u2019s Digest Ass\u2019n, 527 S.W.2d 355, 362-63 (Mo.1975) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. National Fed\u2019n of the Blind, Holdings: 0: holding the state law claims were not preempted 1: holding state law prohibiting lotteries was not preempted by postal power when lottery was conducted by mail 2: holding that a state law prohibiting a pass through of a gasoline tax to customers was preempted by federal law 3: holding state law regulating solicitation of funds by charitable organization was not preempted by postal clause when solicitation conducted by mail 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "v. Government of the United States Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207 (3d Cir.2002), we rejected the \u201cmanifest error\u201d standard and the proposition that the Ap pellate Division should be treated \u201cas if it were a local appellate or supreme court.\u201d Id. at 211-12; see also Saludes v. Ramos, 744 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting deferential standard of review for Appellate Division decision). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the District Court of the Virgin Islands \u201cis essentially a federal creature, and not an insular appellate court.\u201d BA Properties, 299 F.3d at 212. We also indicated in BA Properties that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, once it was established by the Virgin Islands Legislature, would possess an authoritative voice on matters of Virgin Islands law. Id. (<HOLDING>). We reinforced this position in a subsequent Holdings: 0: recognizing the virgin islands legislature as the sovereign author of local jurisdictional law including section 39c even before passage of the 1984 amendments to the revised organic act sometimes referred to as the virgin islands constitution 1: recognizing that any attributes of sovereignty the virgin islands has derive from the revised organic act 2: recognizing that virgin islands supreme court would essentially have the final word on the interpretation of local virgin islands law 3: holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision 4: holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to credit and what reasonable inferences to draw from that evidence. For example, the panel opinion rejected the reasonable inference that Kotowski\u2019s assailant fled before taking anything of value from the apartment because he heard her upstairs neighbor on the telephone with the police. Instead, the panel held that \u201cno rational juror could conclude that the placement of this phone call frightened him off given the volume and duration of Mrs. Kotowski\u2019s screams.\u201d O\u2019Laughlin III, 568 F.3d at 302. Although it would be entirely permissible for a jury to resist drawing this inference, an appellate court applying the Jackson standard does not have the freedom to pick between competing reasonable inferences in this manner. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 447 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The panel opinion\u2019s method of analysis Holdings: 0: recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt 1: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict 2: holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence 3: holding that in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jurys verdict 4: recognizing that competing inferences are not enough to disturb the jurys verdict even in a case where the evidence of the defendants guilt was entirely circumstantial", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to enhance the sentence of an adult offender. See, e.g., People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 517 (2002) (\u201c[T]he Tighe majority opinion is unpersuasive, and we decline to follow or extend its reasoning in the context of the Three Strikes law.\u201d). But see People v. Smith, 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 901, 907-29 (2003) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Tighe to argue against the use of a prior nonjury juvenile conviction to enhance a defendant\u2019s sentence). Likewise, the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Apprendi \u201cprior conviction\u201d exception includes nonjury juvenile adjudications, which can be used to enhance a defendant\u2019s sentence. United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190-91 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 551, 163 Holdings: 0: holding that a juvenile adjudication could not constitute a conviction for purposes of hawaiis repeat offender provision 1: holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 2: holding that a nonjury juvenile adjudication that  afforded all constitutionallyrequired procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 3: recognizing that an inquiry into the conduct underlying a defendants juvenile adjudication may be admissible under rule 11608b nmra if the prosecution does not specifically question the defendant about the juvenile adjudication and does not otherwise present any evidence regarding the defendants juvenile adjudication 4: holding that juvenile adjudications may not be used for impeachment purposes because the disposition of a juvenile does not constitute a criminal conviction", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 738 (internal citation omitted); see Coldwell Banker & Co. v. Karlock, 686 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir.1982) (finding that \u201c[a] real estate brokerage contract is generally characterized as a contract for personal services rather than a contract conveying an interest in land,\u201d and performing a conflict-of-law analysis by assessing contacts with brokerage arrangements, including, inter alia, the situs of the property); Dorothy K. Winston & Co. v. Town Heights Dev., Inc., 376 F.Supp. 1214, 1218-19 (D.D.C.1974) (concluding that situs rule did not control contacts analysis and Florida broker\u2019s law did not bar commission for a District of Columbia broker who procured a purchaser for property in Florida); see also Scott/Hubbard Co. v. Sika Chem. Co., 694 F.Supp. 1311, 1314-15 (N.D.Ill.1988) (<HOLDING>); Ames v. Ideal Cement Co., 37 Misc.2d 883, 235 Holdings: 0: holding that the situs of an acquired missouri corporation was not determinative of choiceoflaw question as to finders fee contract between a finder and a purchaser both nonmissouri corporations 1: holding that corporate law should apply because key question was legal effect of contracts between corporations 2: holding that securities of other corporations may of course be acquired by a delaware corporation 3: holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations 4: holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) (violation of firearm regulations); City of Ingleside v. Kneuper, 768 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1989, writ denied) (criminal activity in connection with building inspections); Travis County v. Colunga, 753 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1988, writ denied) (misuse of hazardous chemicals); City of Brownsville v. Pena, 716 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex.App. \u2014 Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (misuse of public property and funds). 34 . Fed. Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 405. 35 . City of San Antonio v. Heim, 932 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1996, writ denied) (op. on reh\u2019g). 36 . Bivins, 936 S.W.2d at 421; Colunga, 753 S.W.2d at 718-19. 37 . Stinnett v. Williamson S. 564, 574-75, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1341, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959) Holdings: 0: holding that press release issued by acting director of office of rent stabilization regarding employee termination was within scope of directors official duties and absolutely privileged 1: holding positive press release was not actionable where plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the historical representations in that press release were false 2: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties 3: holding that prosecutors defamatory statements to the press after plaintiff was pardoned were absolutely privileged 4: holding that defamation claim fails because communication by employer to dc office of employment services is absolutely privileged ", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "approached Richard Teng and attempted to ascertain his identity. Id. While Donovan and Quinones were ascertaining Richard Teng\u2019s identity, they were standing in the \u201copen area.\u201d Id. It took \u201ca matter of minutes\u201d to ascertain Richard Teng\u2019s identity. Id. at 176. From the time that Donovan and Quinones entered the warehouse, they passed by a number of rows of stacked boxes and proceeded to have a conversation with a suspected fugitive in an \u201copen area.\u201d Throughout this period, an attack could have been launched from any of the aisles that Donovan and Quinones passed. In most of the published cases that this court has reviewed, the space from which an attack can be immediately launched is a relatively small space. See e.g., United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 213, 216-17 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vargas, 2003 WL 21313721, at Holdings: 0: holding that protective sweep was justified incident to arrest outside residence where officers had reasonable suspicion that dangerous individuals were in apartment 1: holding that protective sweep was permitted of adjacent room of apartment where apartment consisted of two small rooms 2: holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found 3: holding a protective sweep unconstitutional where officers had no information that any other persons were in the apartment 4: holding a landlord liable for injuries sustained in the laundry room of an apartment complex", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "HRS \u00a7 11\u2014 13 that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lanai resident, which is a conclusion of law reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Dupree states that the Board\u2019s determination that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lanai resident is entitled to \u201ca presumption of validity[,\u201d] citing Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997). In Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Int\u2019l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 112 Hawai'i 489, 146 P.3d 1066 (2006), this court identified the applicable standard of review as follows: An agency\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while an agency\u2019s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous stand 0, 179 P.3d 1050, 1053, 1056-57 (2008) (<HOLDING>). B. Jurisdiction \u201cThe existence of Holdings: 0: holding that we consider an agencys expertise or special knowledge when  application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agencys technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that when an administrative agencys decision was a mixed question of fact and law a reviewing court should apply a clearly erroneous standard of review 2: holding that we show  deference to an agencys conclusions in the area of its expertise 3: holding that where both mixed questions of fact and law are presented deference will be given to the agencys expertise and experience in the particular field and the court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the ageneyt and that the chief election officer did not clearly err in rejecting signatures on a petition for inclusion on the presidential ballot citation omitted 4: holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices \u2014 the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases \u2014 do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States\u2019 interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (<HOLDING>); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest 1: recognizing that an exercise of the police power necessary to safeguard the public safety and welfare can justify impairment of contractual rights and obligations 2: holding in a suit by cellphone providers that fjederal telecommunications law implicitly acknowledges the importance of the state interest in enforcing its consumerprotection statutes by leaving states some latitude to protect the public safety and welfare and safeguard the rights of consumers  quoting 47 usc  253b 3: recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers 4: recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the conduct, \u201cif performed in other than legislative lations, they were fulfilling discretionary, policymaking functions implicating State budgetary priorities. As discussed supra, Plaintiffs claim that defendants acts were ultra vires, without authority, and null and void. Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, as the Court must do on a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants were acting beyond the scope of their authority as public officials. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs\u2019 favor, the Court finds that the allegations are sufficiently pled to defeat Defendants\u2019 motion at this stage of the litigation. See Collin Cnty. Tex. v. Homeowners Ass\u2019n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods (HAVEN), 654 F.Supp. 943, 949 (N.D.Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>). At this stage of the litigation, based upon Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity 1: holding that the plaintiffs allegations that the defendants actions were ultra vires in character and that they acted outside of their capacities as public officials arguably deprives the defendants of rule 12b6 dismissal based upon an absolute immunity defense 2: holding that a plaintiffs breach of contract claim failed because he could make no showing that the individual defendants acted in their individual capacities when they signed the contract on behalf of the employer housing authority 3: holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony 4: holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "times \u2014 three times during the first test and four times during the second test. Finally, Silman administered the \u201cwalk and turn\u201d field sobriety test to Bullock twice. During these tests, Bullock started early both times, was unable to keep his bala ouston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (permitting ninety-minute detention because officers did not continue to hold appellant after all legitimate components of investigative detention had been completed). We overrule Bullock\u2019s sole issue. Conclusion We hold that lay while awaiting arrival of rookie officer for on-the-job training in DWI investigation was for legitimate law enforcement purposes); Dickson v. State, No. 03-06-00126-CR, 2006 WL 3523789, at *3-4 (Tex.App.-Austin Dec. 6, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See abo Smith, 2007 WL 700834, at *3-4. 5 Holdings: 0: holding delay in dwi investigation primarily for arrival of rookie officer for purpose of training was reasonable because delay furthered legitimate law enforcement purposes 1: holding fiveto fifteenminute delay in dwi investigation primarily so that another officer could bring a video camera to the scene was reasonable because delay furthered legitimate law enforcement purposes 2: holding that delay while awaiting arrival of dwi enforcement officer even though officer who initiated the stop was qualified to perform dwi investigation was for legitimate law enforcement purposes because dwi officer brought greater expertise to scene and could complete dwi investigation more rapidly 3: holding that legitimate law enforcement interests were served by local police officers delay while waiting for state police officer to arrive to conduct dwi investigation because state officers had more dwi experience and local officers needed to be available to respond to emergencies 4: holding approximately twentyminute delay in dwi investigation primarily to await arrival of dwi enforcement officer was reasonable because delay furthered reasonable law enforcement purposes", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "keep an accurate record of these funds. Due to the nature of the position, the treasurer is in a unique position to monitor the financial affairs of the tribe and is more likely to discover improprieties as they arise. Moreover, as a member of the tribal council, the treasurer is charged with the duty of \u201csafeguarding] and promot[ing] the peace, safety, morals, and general welfare\u201d of the tribe. Informing tribal members of financial matters of tribal concern is consistent with the tribe\u2019s sovereign power and that treasurer\u2019s duty. Because there is no factual issue about the tribe\u2019s duty to safeguard and promote the tribe, we conclude that Johnson had the authority to send the newsletters. See Diver v. Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995) (<HOLDING>). Respondents argue that Johnson had an Holdings: 0: holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court 1: holding that acoma tribal law was the law of the place because the tribal court could have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim 2: holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws 3: holding that tribal attorney acted within the scope of his authority in making comments in newspaper and on television regarding the reasons for terminating tribal employees despite the fact that no lawsuit was currently pending because it was his duty to make public statements on internal tribal affairs 4: holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Ex parte Parker, 730 So.2d 168, 171 (Ala.1999). The Vanns also assert that, like the borrowers in Branch, they lacked bargaining power because they were sent to the defendant by the automobile dealer and because of their limited educations. The Vanns, however, presented no evidence indicating that they were unable to find an alternate lender or that the dealer required them to use First Community. Furthermore, the Vanns\u2019 lack of education does not relieve them of their contractual obligations. \u201c \u2018[A] person who signs an instrument without reading it, when he can read, can not, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, avoid the effect of his signature, because [he is] not informed of its contents....\u2019\u201d Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Beck & Pauli Lithographing Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights 1: holding that the plaintiff could not avoid his contractual obligation because he read at only a sixthgrade level 2: holding plaintiff could not avoid release absent evidence he made reasonable effort to have document read to him 3: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 4: holding that the plaintiff filed suit within the statute of limitations even though he could not prove the time at which he mailed his petition", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "programs therefrom. \u00a7 1053. Establishment of rules and regulations; penalties The Bureau of Correction shall establish rules and regulations for granting and administering release plans and shall determine those inmates who may participate in any plan. 61 P.S. \u00a7\u00a7 1051,1053. As these statutes indicate, the Bureau of Corrections is empowered with discretion to grant release prior to the completion of a state prisoner\u2019s sentence. See also Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138 (3d Cir., 1981) (Pennsylvania statutes governing pre-release programs vest broad discretion in the Board of Corrections with regard to location of pre-release centers, the types of programs available, and the administrative criteria for pre-rel\u00e9ase.); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Cuyler, 447 F.Supp. 540 (E.D.Pa., 1977) (<HOLDING>). No provision is included whereby the Holdings: 0: holding that upon expiration of period of supervised release habeas petitioner was no longer in custody 1: holding that reasonableness review applies to a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release 2: holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court 3: holding that this title and regulations permitting release of state prisoners prior to expiration of their minimum sentence imposed broad discretion upon prison officials 4: holding that state prison officials enjoy wide discretion in regards to a prison boards finding of guilt", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "individuals. See Park, 212 B.R. at 437. 9 . The court did not make clear what choices a nonresidential user had in the disposal of its wastewater. Indeed, the court specifically declined to consider whether nonresidential users had practical alternatives to using the Sanitation District\u2019s sewer system: \"[W]e are not free to consider the practical and economic factors which constrained Lorber to make the choices it did.\u201d Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066. 10 . The conflicting decisions may result from the failure of some courts employing the four-prong Lorber test to address, in addition, the critical question of whether a grant of priority status to a governmental claim meets the purposes and policy undergirding the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Hutchinson, 135 B.R. 890 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1992) (<HOLDING>). 11 . These \"tax characteristics\" may refer to Holdings: 0: holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber 1: holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii 2: holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims 3: holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision 4: holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the ... position with a person significantly younger and/or less qualified than [the] [p]laintiff\u2019); Payne v. Malemathew, No. 09-CV-1634, 2011 WL 3043920, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2011) (dismissing a complaint where the plaintiff \u201cpleaded nothing beyond the fact that he was the oldest employee in his department and was let go[,]\u201d and collecting cases dismissing complaints containing similar barebones allegations); Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep\u2019t, 752 F.Supp.2d 420, 465 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (finding an age-discrimination claim to be \u201cinsufficient as a matter of law\u201d because the complaint \u201cmerely allege[d] that [the] plaintiffs [were] over 40 years of age and were replaced by younger [employees]\u201d); Zucker v. Five Towns Coll., No. 09-CV-4884, 2010 WL 3310698, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Foster v. Humane Soc. of Rochester and Monroe Holdings: 0: holding that a review of an employees 1989 performance was irrelevant to a determination of whether his performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination in august of 1990 1: holding that allegations concerning the plaintiffs satisfactory work performance termination and much younger replacement did not  by themselves  suffice to plead an age discrimination claim 2: holding that a prima facie case for discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that 1 he belongs to the protected age group 2 his job performance was satisfactory 3 adverse employment action was taken against him  in 4  circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination  3: holding age discrimination claim barred 4: holding that being replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the fourth prong because replacement by a substantially younger employee is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Detainer In his next claim, Appellant argues that the Board committed an abuse of its discretion by inquiring into the status of an INS detainer issued against Appellant because, according to Appellant, the Board has consistently used the absence of an updated status report as an arbitrary reason to deny parole. As noted above, however, a majority of this Court specifically held in Coady that \u201cmandamus will not lie where the substance of the Board\u2019s discretionary action is the subject of the challenge.\u201d 770 A.2d at 290. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 490 A.2d 402 (1985) (\u201cWhere the action sought to be compelled is discretionary, mandamus will not lie to control that discretionary act\u201d); Pa. Dental Ass\u2019n v. Com. Ins. Dept., 512 Pa. 217, 516 A.2d 647, 652 (1986) (<HOLDING>). As noted previously, while Appellant\u2019s first Holdings: 0: holding that it may not 1: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 2: holding that while a court may direct that discretion be exercised it may not specify how that discretion is to be exercised nor require the performance of a particular discretionary act 3: holding that peremptory challenges may not be exercised in a discriminatory manner 4: holding that where the statute in question required that the measure of fair market value shall be as determined by the secretary  the court cannot substitute its own discretion for properly exercised administrative discretion", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "United States\u201d of Fla. Stat. \u00a7 95.1 l(2)(a), as the exception to the more general scope of Fla. Stat. \u00a7 95.11(1), which reads: \u201cof a court of record in this state.\u201d Additionally, Kiesel applied (and the Balfour court relied on) the principle of statutory interpretation; which dictates that the latter portions of a statute, if in conflict with earlier portions, shall control. In interpreting Fla. Stat. \u00a7 95.11, the Kiesel (state) and Balfour (federal) courts found that Fla. Stat. \u00a7 95.11(2)(a) controls post-judgment collection proceedings. It is important to note, however, that the holding in Balfour was expressly limited to the facts of that case, which involved a \u201cpost-judgment discovery request,\u201d six years after the initial default judgment was entered. See Balfour, 170 F.3d at 1051 (<HOLDING>). A few years later, in 2001, the Fourth Holdings: 0: holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute 1: holding that when a statute and a guideline conflict the statute controls 2: holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract 3: holding that under such unique circumstances the five 5 year statute of limitations controls 4: recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "remedies before suing the employer.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 236, 20 OBR 290, 485 N.E.2d 757, quoting Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc. (C.A.8, 1984), 727 F.2d 177, 185. The Tenth District noted that retirees come within one of several exceptions to the general rule that employees must attempt to use contract-grievance procedures. The reasons for this exception include that the union does not owe a duty of fair representation to persons who ax*e not members of the collective-bargaining unit and the possibility of potential conflicts of interest between retirees and active employees. Id. {\u00b6 32} Rutledge has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Mar. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-889, 1999 WL 177561, *3 (<HOLDING>). The board contends that these cases are Holdings: 0: holding that trial court properly granted motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust remedies available through exclusive grievance procedure 1: holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time limit for good cause 2: holding that a retired teacher did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies because he was not subject to the grievance procedure in the collectivebargaining agreement 3: holding that plaintiff could not look to the courts for relief because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the adea 4: holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "If the defendant perceives the connection between his crime and his punishment, the retributive goal of the criminal law is satisfied, and only if the defendant is aware that his death is approaching can he prepare himself for his passing. Accordingly, I would hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it. See Garrett v. Collins, 951 F.2d 57, 59 (5th Cir.1992) and Lowenfield v. Butler, 843 F.2d 183, 187 (5th Cir.1988) (both quoting and relying on this excerpt from Justice Powell\u2019s concurrence in Ford, 477 U.S. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (Powell, J., concurring), in denying competency-to-be-executed habeas relief); see also Fearance, 56 F.3d at 640 and Barnard, 13 F.3d at 876 n. 2 (<HOLDING>). Counsel for Panetti suggests this Court Holdings: 0: holding that competency standard for stand ing trial is same as standard for determining competency to waive right to counsel 1: holding that the standard for determining competency to plead guilty is whether the defendant has a rational understanding of the proceedings 2: holding that the fifth circuit has adopted the powell concurrence as the standard for competency to be executed 3: holding that no exception to the invited error doctrine has ever been adopted by this circuit 4: holding competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving right to counsel is same as competency standard for standing trial and disapproving contrary holding of masthers", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "cases, \u201cthe judgment regarding likelihood of injury turns on whether the plaintiffs future conduct will occur in the same location as the third party\u2019s response to the challenged governmental action.\u201d Id. at 12; see also id. at 15. We concluded that plaintiffs must be able to allege a specific site of injury \u2014 \u201cland that they intended to use that has been affected by [the government\u2019s action].\u201d See id. at 15. In this regard, the Federation\u2019s allegations of injury suffice; because the Program acts directly on the land (rather than on third parties), we can be certain that the challenged agency action has affected the land areas that the Federation\u2019s members use and that the anticipated response by third parties will concern those lands. Cf. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89, 93 S.Ct. at 2416 (<HOLDING>). The members\u2019 affidavits make this clear. For Holdings: 0: holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss 1: holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra 2: holding that more attenuated line of causation and more speculative eventual injury sufficed to survive a motion to dismiss 3: holding that making a nonfrivolous allegation is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 4: holding that the bare assertion that a dismissal without prejudice was favorable to the plaintiff was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "explained in Jessup v. Luther, \u201c[r]epresenta-tives of the press and general public must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of ... access to documents.\u201d 227 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 228-29 (entertaining newspaper\u2019s request to see sealed pre-sen-tence report, and analogizing pre-sentence report to grand jury materials). To hold otherwise would raise First Amendment concerns. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that the \u201ccommon law right\u201d of public access to- court records \u201csupports and furthers many of the same interests which underlie those freedoms protected by the constitution\u201d); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 604, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 630, 110 Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable access includes general facility access without notice and patient access with twentyfour hour notice 1: holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case 2: holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports 3: holding first amendment guarantees access to criminal trials and limitations on access are subject to strict scrutiny 4: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). 2 . This Court abrogated relaxed waiver in the PCRA context in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998), and has since reaffirmed that such abrogation applies retroactively. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 580 Pa. 439, 861 A.2d 919, 928 n. 8 (2004); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 725-26 (2000); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293, 303 (1999); Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 Pa. 341, 961 A.2d 786, 834-35 (2008) (Castille, C.J., concurring). This Court later abrogated the relaxed waiver doctrine in the direct capital appeal context in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 827 A.2d 385, 403 (2003). 3 . Commonwealth v. Huffman, 536 Pa. 196, 638 A.2d 961 (1994). 4 . Although there was n 2, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 585 Pa. 144, Holdings: 0: recognizing that within the world community the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved 1: holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the eighth amendment 2: holding the death penalty unconstitutional for mentally retarded defendants 3: holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty 4: holding that juveniles are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is\u2014 (1) a judicial lien ... 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 522(f)(1). Thus, under the statute, a debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien if three requirements are met: (1) there was a fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled; and (3) the lien is a judicial lien. See Culver, LLC v. Chiu, 304 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir.2002). The parties do not dispute that Wilding has met the first and third requirements; Wilding had an interest in his house before the lien attached and the lien was a judicial lien. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Patriot Portfolio LLC v. Weinstein Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of  522f 1: holding that  522f1 requires a debtor to have possessed an interest to which a lien attached before it attached to avoid the fixing of the lien on that interest 2: holding that debtor cannot take advantage of  522f after debtor has transferred his exempt property 3: holding that a debtors ability to utilize  522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge   4: holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, \u00b6 13, 84 P.3d 854 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the trial court did not Holdings: 0: holding that mandate did not preclude the trial court from considering unconscionability argument on remand because that issue had not been decided by the trial court nor considered by this court in the first appeal 1: holding that trial court did not err 2: holding that although the trial court did not specifically refer to the factors in utah code section 7684012 the trial court complied with the statute by relying on presentence reports that included the pertinent information 3: holding that where the government filed an information identifying the conviction relied upon to enhance defendants sentence and counsel told the court that the defendant did not dispute the conviction the trial judges sentencing ritual here complied with the requirements of  851b 4: holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "deemed to be acceptable during the design stage. The state therefore waives immunity in an action to recover for injuries resulting from this failure to maintain. See, e.g., Springer, 13 P.3d at 802 (\"[Tlhe waiver applies if the public entity allowed the condition of the building to fall from the general state of being, repair or efficiency at which the facility was originally built.\"); Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1385; Moldovan, 842 P.2d at 225. On the other hand, the state does not waive immunity for injuries that arise out of a dangerous condition which is inherent in the design of a highway-that is one which is intrinsic to the general state of being, repair, or efficiency of the road as initially constructed. \u00a7 24-10-108(1); Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514, 518 (Colo.1991) (<HOLDING>); Szymanski v. Dep't of Highways, 776 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a contract for the design construction and installation of a water tank was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods under the ucc 1: holding that the plaintiffs claim was moot because the construction project which was the subject of the dispute had been completed 2: holding that whether clause in construction contract providing that no damages would be available for delay was enforceable was a factual question where there was evidence that damages resulted from unreasonable delay beyond the contemplation of the parties 3: holding that the plaintiffs injuries were a result of the states failure to maintain and therefore finding a waiver of immunity under the cgia where the state allowed a rightofway fence adjacent to highway to fall into a state of disrepair thereby enabling a cow to run onto the highway and injure the plaintiff 4: holding that there was no waiver of immunity under the cgia where the plaintiffs injuries resulted from a sharp dip in the roadway that was part of the initial design and construction of the intersection", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "knew it to be false.\u201d Id. at 374. The plaintiff argued that the defendants had relied on this false information resulting in his loss of 60 days statutory good time credit and the withdrawal of his recommended parole release date, which was replaced by \u201ca new date twenty-four months later, in effect delaying his eligibility for parole by two years.\u201d Id. at 373. The Circuit Court \u201cconcluded] that Razzoli\u2019s Privacy Act claim \u2014 not only in regard to the good time decision but also the parole eligibility determination\u2014 [was] not cognizable.\u201d Id. at 376. Rather, the plaintiffs sole recourse was to file a petition for habeas relief, even though his \u201cnon-habeas claim would have [had] a merely probabilistic impact on the duration of [his] custody.\u201d Id. at 373; see also Bourke, 269 F.3d at 1074 (<HOLDING>); Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 809 Holdings: 0: holding that because bops notification to petitioner that he was eligible for a sentence reduction was erroneous his status was not retroactively changed by the application of the new regulation 1: holding that a state prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing he would necessarily prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement 2: holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support 3: holding that prisoner could not file a petition for mandamus challenging the bops determination that he was ineligible to be considered for a reduction in his sentence although bourkes success on this claim would not necessarily result in his being released any earlier it would raise that possibility and thus have a probabilistic impact upon the duration of his custody 4: holding that that if the success of a  1983 damages claim brought by a prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been invalidated", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that he was responsible. Our conclusion that the district judge did not violate Rule 11 and that Lucas\u2019s guilty plea was valid does not dispose of this issue, because Apprendi applies to cases on direct review involving sentences imposed before Apprendi was decided. See United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Apprendi where the district court sentenced the defendant before Apprendi was decided). We must therefore determine whether Lucas\u2019s sentence of 210 months (17.5 years) in prison and a five-year term of supervised release withstands review under Ap-prendi. If Lucas had admitted responsibility for either the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine that the district court attributed to him, or the 54.2 grams that were in Horton\u2019s car when Lucas -52 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). C. Amount of drugs attributable to Lucas Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants sentence did not violate apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties 1: holding that the defendants rights under apprendi were violated where the sentence was at the mandatory minimum for the judgedetermined drug quantity and the judge felt constrained by the statute to impose this sentence 2: holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory 3: holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence 4: holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "434 (9th Cir. 1983). However, exceptions to that rule exist. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 933-34, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (stays leaving plaintiff \u201ceffectively out of court\u201d). In this case, the magistrate was free to recommend to the district court that Reynaga\u2019s action be stayed: if the district court had then adopted the recommendation, we would have jurisdiction over Reynaga\u2019s appeal of the district court\u2019s order because the district court\u2019s action would have \u201cthe practical effect of refusing an injunction,\u201d Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. at 996, and would have left Reynaga \u201ceffectively out of court\u201d. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9-10, 103 S.Ct. at 933-34. See also Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d at 964-66 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, the magistrate did not Holdings: 0: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that appellate jurisdiction exists over district court order staying  1983 action until plaintiff exhausts habeas corpus remedies 2: holding that habeas corpus petitions are premature until administrative remedies have been exhausted 3: holding that a federal district court has jurisdiction to stay an execution prior to the filing of a formal habeas corpus petition 4: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "state actor could be held to violate the right to familial association absent a showing of the actor's specific intent to interfere with the family's relationship. 35 . While decisions by other circuit courts are obviously not binding precedent here, the Supreme Court has instructed that a right may be clearly established even absent \"controlling authority\u201d from the Supreme Court or the governing circuit court if there is or was a \"robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority\u201d from the other circuits establishing the right. Ashc 5 (8th Cir.2006) (\"A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the relationship.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 805 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to allege compliance with these statutes did not bar his claim against members of county board of supervisors as individuals for illegal expenditures of public funds 1: holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law 2: holding that plaintiffs adequately alleged familial association claim with no discussion of specific intent 3: holding that plaintiffs must allege intentional action by the state to interfere with a familial relationship and noting that without adopting specific intent requirements for this claim courts risk constitutionalizing all torts against individuals who happen to have families 4: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "upon him a criminal contempt sanction without the requisite due process protections. To resolve this issue, we must first decide whether the contempt orders were criminal or civil in nature, or both. See Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 896 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that a court may impose both civil and criminal sanctions simultaneously, when it wishes to both compel compliance and punish disobedience). The key distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the court\u2019s purpose underlying its exercise of the contempt power. Berne Corp. v. Gov\u2019t of the V.I., 570 F.3d 130, 139, 51 V.I. 1253 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taberer, 954 F.2d at 896). But see Int\u2019l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1988) (<HOLDING>). If the court seeks to coerce someone to do Holdings: 0: recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative 1: holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291 2: holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss 3: recognizing that an order of restitution  is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions 4: holding that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed absent a finding by the trial court that the eontemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to assert the decedent\u2019s personal injury claim, however, does not change the fact that the decedent has been personally aggrieved and would not, therefore, eliminate the decedent\u2019s justiciable interest in the controversy. Because a decedent\u2019s survival claim becomes part of her estate at death, it follows that the estate retains a justicia-ble interest in the survival action. We therefore hold that, in a survival action, the decedent\u2019s estate has a justiciable interest in the controversy sufficient to confer standing. See Landers, 369 S.W.2d at 35 (noting that a survival action seeks recovery for \u201cdamages sustained by the decedent and his estate as a result of the [wrongful] injuries.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Glickstein v. Sun Bank Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 670 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted). When a decedent has been Holdings: 0: holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 1: holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan 2: recognizing that standing turns on whether the plaintiff can show an injury in fact traceable to the defendants conduct whereas the real party in interest concept entails identification of the person who possesses the particular right soixght to be enforced 3: holding that the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action to be redressable by the court 4: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "court to give the plaintiff the opportunity to amend his pleading particularly in those cases where the new claims warrant development of facts to uncover the merits of the claims or where the claims allege facts which are disputed. See Conti v. Sanko Steamship Co., 912 F.2d 816, 818-819 (5th Cir.1990); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir.1987). However, in this case, the record has been developed extensively and all other claims have been dismissed or decided at trial. Under these circumstances, we think that a remand to the district court simply to consider the merits of these two claims would be a waste of judicial resources because both Halbert\u2019s libel and slander claims fail as a matter of law. Brown v. Texas A & M University, 804 F.2d 327, 334 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Halbert\u2019s libel and slander claims are based Holdings: 0: holding that a remand on a claim that could not be supported by the record would be a waste of judicial resources 1: holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record 2: holding that a remand need not be ordered despite legal errors if remand would be futile 3: holding preponderance of the evidence must be against a claim before the claim can be denied where factual record is insufficient remand required 4: holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by record", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cstrategic\u201d decision entitled to deference is a \u201cconscious, reasonably informed decision made by an attorney with an eye to benefitting his client\u201d). In contrast, there is no allegation in this case that defense counsel failed to investigate the relevant alibi witnesses, or failed to file the required notice of alibi. The fact that defense counsel conducted a mock trial demonstrates that their decision not to call such witnesses was a quintessential strategic decision entitled to the highest level of deference under Strickland. While defense counsel promised alibi evidence during his opening statement, his failure to introduce the wives\u2019 testimony does not, in and of itself, constitute constitutionally deficient performance. See Harrison v. Motley, 478 F.3d 750, 758-59 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, Holdings: 0: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that trial counsels failure to call defendants family members as witnesses during penalty phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsels failure to present the preindictment delay issue was without merit because there was no actual prejudice to the supposed alibi defense as the now unavailable witnesses would not have provided the defendant with an alibi for the time when the murder could have occurred 3: holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that the failure to call certain witnesses was not ineffective assistance because witnesses already presented similar evidence and counsel is not required to present cumulative evidence", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by the statute. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); see Hovenkamp, \u00b6 2362, at 234-35. With respect to the latter requirement, the Supreme Court has held that [a] private plaintiff may not recover damages under \u00a7 4 of the Clayton Act merely by showing \u201cinjury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.\u201d Instead, a plaintiff must prove the existence of \u201cantitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants\u2019 acts unlawful.\u201d Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (quoting Brunswick Corp. 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct. 690 (internal citations omitted)); see also J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923. (<HOLDING>). This requirement applies to all private Holdings: 0: holding that standing to raise a claim under  2a of robinsonpatman act is derived from section 4 of the clayton act 1: holding that to have standing to bring a  2a robinsonpatman claim a private plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent 2: holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts 3: holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit 4: holding that plaintiff seeking injunction under clayton act  16 must allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent ", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "with the Supreme Court\u2019s own characterization of the same language in Burrage. And, by stating that its interpretation is tethered to the \u201cplain language\u201d of the statute, the majority is most assuredly at odds with its decision to.then \u201c[bjroaden [its] analytical lens\u201d and look beyond the statutory language for other signs of Congressional intent. Id. at 615. Generally, speaking, only ambiguity or the possibility of an odd result compels a court to look beyond the language of the statute it is interpreting. E.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep\u2019t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 99, 127 S.Ct. 1534, 167 L.Ed.2d 449 (2007) (concluding that statutory language was susceptible to more than one meaning); Public Citizen v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In looking beyond the statutory' language, Holdings: 0: recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result 1: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning 2: holding that a court can look beyond the statutory language when plain meaning would compel an odd result 3: holding that if statutory language is plain and unambiguous this court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent 4: holding that we may look beyond text of statute or rule where plain language is unambiguous but would lead to an absurd result that drafters cannot have intended", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "does not contend that it is. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 16 .Kazakhstan\u2019s contention that as a civil law jurisdiction it does not recognize common law torts, may be still further evidence that Kazakhstan did not intend to waive immunity for tort claims like those asserted here. See Kazakhstan Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, at 9-10. In light of the significant ambiguities concerning waiver noted in the text, we need not rely on this point to decide this case, and hence need not consider Kazakhstan's representation regarding its legal system. We note, however, that World Wide did not dispute that representation. See World Wide Opp\u2019n to Mot. to Dismiss. 17 . Cf. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423, 116 S.Ct. 981, 985-86, 134 L.Ed.2d 47 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Watters, slip op. at 5-7 (concluding that the Holdings: 0: holding that claims not pursued within two years of their accrual fall outside of the federal tort claims acts limited waiver of sovereign immunity 1: holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law 2: holding in a breach of contract action brought by a government contract surety under the tucker act that the tucker act contains an unequivocal expression waiving sovereign immunity as to claims not particular claimants 3: holding that the tucker acts waiver does not extend to statutory claims 4: holding that rfras waiver of sovereign immunity did not extend to monetary damages the acts reference to appropriate relief was susceptible to more than one interpretation and thus was not an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as to the reliability of the general theory and techniques of DNA profiling are valid under the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Daubert, and hold that in the future courts can take judicial notice of their reliability. If new techniques are offered, however, the district court must hold an in limine hearing under the Daubert standard as set out above. The fact that we have taken judicial notice of the reliability of the technique of DNA profiling does not mean that expert testimony concerning DNA profiling is automatically admissible under Daubert. A number of courts have required that the trial court further inquire into whether the expert properly performed the techniques involved in creating the DNA profiles. See People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup.Ct.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 Holdings: 0: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 1: holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying dna profiling 2: holding that the burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue 4: recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "stated that she informed him that she is unable to lift, push, pull, or carry any weight over 15 lbs. See id. at page 2. 9 . See also Miller v. Ameritech Corp., 214 Fed.Appx. 605, 608-609 (7th Cir.2007) (\"To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide specific facts as to whether he is substantially limited in a major life activity ... conclusory allegations will not do.\u2019\u2019). 10 . See also Burks v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 756 (7th Cir.2006) (\"bald and self-serving assertions in affidavits, unsubstantiated by any documentation or other testimony, are not sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether an impairment has substantially limited a major life activity.\u201d) 11 . See also Soler v. Tyco Electronics, Inc., 268 F.Supp.2d 97, 107 (D.P.R.2003) (<HOLDING>); Ortiz-Molina v. MAI Del Caribe, Inc., 83 Holdings: 0: holding that the ij must make clean determinations of credibility 1: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 2: holding that impairment has not substantially limited the major life activity of lifting where an individual could clean his dishes clean the yard bathe his dog do the groceries take out the garbage and prepare his own meals 3: holding that for a plaintiff to prove that he has a record of impairment under 42 usc  121022b there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities 4: holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The Eighth Circuit, in U.S. v. \u25a0 Ferro, concluded that all other circuits which have considered the issue have specifically held that the statute is mandatory. United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir.2003)(finding that involuntary hospitalization was mandatory where district court had determined that defendant was incompetent); id. at 761 (\u201c[U]pon our own reading of the statute, we conclude that after determining that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, a district court is required to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a reasonable period of time to evaluate whether treatment would allow the trial to proceed.\u201d). See United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Azure, 279 F.Supp.2d 1093, Holdings: 0: holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial 1: holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se 2: holding that the statute is mandatory and that once the district court found that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial it did not have authority to circumvent his commitment to the custody of the united states attorney general for hospitalization until it could be determined whether probability existed that the defendant would regain capacity to be tried 3: holding that it would be improper for a united states district attorney to prosecute a defendant using information the prosecutor had obtained while acting as the accuseds private attorney 4: holding that if the attorney general issues a scope certificate the action must be removed to federal court and the united states must be substituted as the party defendant by the plain language of 28 usc  2679d2 no discretion is given to the district court", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a \u00a7 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna\u2019s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan\u2019s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna\u2019s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, Holdings: 0: holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest 1: holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody 2: holding that grandmother who had intermittent custody of her grandchild had no protected liberty interest in the continued custody of the child 3: holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship 4: recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia following John Doe\u2019s birth.\u201d II [\u00b6 10] The State argues the trial court should not have entertained Stegall\u2019s motion to dismiss. The State contends Stegall unjustly benefitted from absconding and, under the fugitive-dismissal rule, her motion should have been denied. [\u00b6 11] The fugitive-dismissal rule \u201callows courts to dismiss an appeal of a defendant who escapes during the pen-dency of his or her appeal.\u201d State v. Bell, 2000 ND 58, \u00b6 4, 608 N.W.2d 232. We are unable to find any ease law that suggests this rule should be applied to a defendant who absconds during pre-trial or trial proceedings, and we decline to extend its application. [\u00b6 12] A motion to dismiss a criminal information is governed by 1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. J.Z., 228 Wis.2d 468, 596 N.W.2d 490 Holdings: 0: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 1: holding that an unborn child is not a dependent for purposes of the neglect statute 2: holding a mothers ingestion of a controlled substance while pregnant does not constitute child abuse as an unborn child is not a person for purposes of criminal prosecution 3: holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute 4: holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "promises, or agreements, orally or otherwise, respecting the subject matter of the Franchise which is nor embodied herein or set forth in the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular for Prospective franchisees.\u201d Id. 10 . Although such an argument was not explicitly discussed by Defendants in their Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Papa John\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Facts, the Davis court discussed the exception to the general rule that statements of future prediction, such as future profit, cannot be considered fraudulent. No Kentucky cases specifically address the exception to the general rule of future predictions not being actionable, and the Sixth Circuit has not discussed this specific point. See De Roode v. Sheppey, 32 F.2d 634, 638-639 (6th Cir.1929) (<HOLDING>). The exception applies if the party making the Holdings: 0: holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party 1: holding that deflated estimates of value by one having superior knowledge do not constitute misrepresentations when other party is given all information asked 2: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law 3: holding that notice occurs when party charged with having notice has actual knowledge or when from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists 4: recognizing superior court must conduct an  on the record examination to determine defendants voluntariness and knowledge", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1982). Despite the similarity of facts, we decline to adopt the reasoning of either. The Taylorville Eisner court suggests that \"collateral\" transferred under the third sentence of UCC sec. 9-402(7) retains any after-acquired property \"obligation\" under which it was originally secured. Id. at 669. Under this reasoning, any property acquired by the transferee at any time after the initial transfer is \"infected\" with perfection under the financing statement listing the trans-feror as debtor. We reject this reading of sec. 9-402(7) because it ignores the four month limitation of sec. 9-402's second sentence and unreasonably burdens a potential creditor with a duty to inquire as to the source of title of all the transferee's assets. The Sac City court concluded that a s 117 (9th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); and Matter of Lintz West Side Lumber, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors 1: holding a filing under hatfield wayne l sufficient to perfect an interest in the assets of a corporation called hatfield construction company 2: holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation 3: holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation 4: holding that  727a2a does not apply to the transfer of the assets of a corporation in which the debtor is a shareholder", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by the term of the Act. See \u00a7 1415(c)(2)(B) (requiring local school board to respond to the complaint); N.Y. Educ. Law \u00a7 4404.2 (SRO may modify IHO\u2019s IEP for a child and order relevant \u201cboard\u201d [of education] to comply with such modified IEP). As it is the local education agency, not the SRO or State Education Department that is responsible for N.S.\u2019s IEP, it is therefore the School District that is the proper defendant in this action. Adding State Defendants as defendants not only is without support in the \u201ctext and structure\u201d of the Act, Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531, 127 S.Ct. 1994, but disrupts the state\u2019s scheme of imposing primary responsibility for the delivery of special education services upon local school districts, Gulino, 460 F.3d at 366; see also Polera, 288 F.3d at 483-86 (<HOLDING>) (bracketed material added); Adrian, 2001 WL Holdings: 0: holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea 1: holding that the local educational agency is the appropriate target of a suit under the idea and that private entities cannot be held liable under the statute as the idea obligates the statenot the private schoolto ensure that such children are provided special education and related services in accordance with an individualized education program  2: holding that because the idea contemplates a remedy that seeks changes to a students special education program compensatory damages therefore are not available 3: holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages 4: holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "position of Henholder, not owner. Id. (\"The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage\"). Ownership of the property was transferred to Smith upon execution of the land sale contract, and Jackson had no duty at the time of the accident to maintain the tree as provided by the city ordinance. Conclusion The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J.,, concur. RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., concurs. 1 . Dorothy Jackson was not named as a defendant. Ray Scheible, Travis's father, was name .2006) (<HOLDING>); Reed v. Beachy Const. Corp, 781 N.E.2d 1145, Holdings: 0: holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal 1: holding thatit landlords right of entry was not dispositive of control over snow removal 2: recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself 3: holding over 4: holding over of tenant after expiration of term effect of landlords acceptance of rent", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "85 N.C. App. 281, 290, 354 S.E2.d 746, 751 (citing Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 486, 490, 111 S.E. 857, 860 (1922), and Chew v. Leonard, 228 N.C. 181, 185, 44 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1947)), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 107 (1987). As I read the relevant c N.C. App. 402, 406, 626 S.E.2d 755, 758 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 219, 642 S.E.2d 247 (2007), the agreement at issue here provides for a single standard for use in determining the price to be charged for the provision of heat rather than contemplating the use of multiple appraisals without specifying any means for reconciling the inevitable differences between the opinions devel oped by multiple appraisers. In addition, unlike the situation in Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 693, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001) (<HOLDING>), and Rosen v. Rosen, 105 N.C. App. 326, 328, Holdings: 0: holding that an oral compromise and release agreement was unenforceable where there was no written stipulation between the parties 1: holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable 2: holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party 3: holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable 4: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Ass\u2019n of Hawaii, 99 [Hawa recognize a divorce obtained in a foreign country where neither party was a domiciliary of that country: Regardless of its validity in the nation awarding it, the courts of this country will not generally recognize a judgment of divorce rendered by the courts of a foreign nation as valid to terminate the existence of the marriage unless, by the standards of the jurisdiction in which recognition is sought, at least one of the spouses was a good-faith domiciliary in the foreign nation at the time the decree was rendered. R.F. Chase, Annotation, Domestic Recognition of Divorce Decree Obtained in Foreign Country and Attacked for Lack of Domicil or Jurisdiction of Parties, 13 A.L.R.3d 1419, 1425 (1967). See e.g., Carr v. Carr, 724 So.2d 937, 940 (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Bruneau v. Bruneau, 3 Conn.App. 453, 489 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a husband unlawfully attempted to name a beneficiary other than his daughter who was the irrevocable beneficiary pursuant to a separation agreement in a divorce decree 1: holding that the jurisdiction of the divorce court with regard to support and maintenance is statutorily determined unless otherwise provided by agreement incorporated into the divorce decree 2: holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce 3: holding that dominican court had insufficient jurisdiction to issue divorce decree to two persons domiciled in north carolina and citing to annot 13 alr3d 1419 stating that the great weight of authority in this country is that divorces granted in foreign countries to persons who are domiciliaries of the united states are not valid and enforceable 4: holding that for mississippi court to recognize validity of divorce decree husband obtained in dominican republic husband would have to demonstrate he traveled to dominican republic with intent to remain there and not solely for purpose of securing a divorce", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and the restrictions and limitations that he believed should be placed on Myers\u2019 ability to work. ECF No. 27-2 at PagelD #: 302 (A.R. 151). There is no other medial opinion in the record from a treating physician that speaks to whether any restrictions on Myers\u2019 ability to work are warranted. Significantly, this evidence was submitted in response to the initial denial that only imposed restrictions and limitations from the last day worked through four weeks for mononucleosis; and from, .the last day worked through six weeks post-operative of a March 29, 2013 surgery \u2014 neither of which were due to Lyme disease. Dr. Joseph\u2019s summary letter contradicts this limited finding of limitation and restriction, yet United\u2019s second denial letter does not address it. See Conger, 474 F.3d at 268 (<HOLDING>); Houston, 246 Fed.Appx. at 301 (finding that Holdings: 0: holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation 1: holding that the plan administrator abused its discretion when it ignored contrary evidence without explanation 2: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 3: holding that a plan administrator must address any reliable contrary evidence 4: holding that plan administrator abused its discretion when it interpreted plan as giving it the right to subrogation with respect to all claims and not just those claims for medical expenses", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of each of the burglaries. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (permitted uses of other-bad-acts evidence). His presence near eight burglaries over 5 months, where each burglary was characterized by substantially similar circumstances pointing to a common culprit or culprits, is powerful identity evidence. With regard to whether the evidence from the different burglaries was capable of separation by the jury, and whether Appellant was unduly prejudiced by the decision not to sever the cases, the trial court notes that the verdict speaks for itself: Appellant was acquitted of several burglaries and conspiracy counts, indicating that the jury clearly was able to parse the evidence involved in each individual case. See TOO at 11. We agree. See Commonwealth v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 903 (Pa. Super. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that each defendants actions in a  1983 case must be considered individually 1: holding that the jury found the ajppellant not guilty of all charges in one case and not guilty of three out of four charges in a second case demonstrating the jury considered each case and each charge separately and did not cumulate the evidence 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants request for severance because the district court nullified any prejudicial error when it repeatedly admonished the jury throughout the trial to consider the evidence only against the defendant to whom it related and at the end of trial gave the jury instructions that admonished the jury to consider separately each offense and evidence in support of each offense 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge 4: holding that an exception to the charges having to do with contributory negligence  charges two three and four was insufficient to preserve issue for appeal", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "knew or should have known that Flores was a foreign national. As a foreign national of Mexico, the Vienna Convention applies to Flores. \u00b6 17 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal statutes and treaties are the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Acts of Congress are on full parity with treaties. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998). However, rights under a treaty and rights under a federal statute are not the equivalent of constitutional rights. Id.; see also, Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (C.A.4),cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1144, 118 S.Ct. 26, 138 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1997); Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (C.A.2, 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994)(<HOLDING>). \u00b6 18 In order to gain relief from a violation Holdings: 0: holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area 1: holding that patria potestas rights under mexican law are custody rights under the hague convention 2: recognizing us obligations under article 22 of the vienna convention 3: holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel 4: holding right to be fundamental", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "guard against later, frivolous claims of ineffective assistance, trial courts could adopt certain measures to ensure that defendants are fully informed, such as by documenting the terms of the negotiation process, by requiring that all plea offers be in writing, and by making any formal offers part of the record. See Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1408-09. Here, however, defense counsel had already indicated on the record that he had fully discussed the plea offer with Hemp-hill. The district court\u2019s comments then went much farther than documenting the plea offer or informing Hemphill of its terms, as contemplated in Frye. The district court clearly implied that a plea would be preferred, and it twice specifically stated that it would approve the Government\u2019s plea deal. See Miles, 10 F.3d at 1139 (<HOLDING>). Hemphill\u2019s case is similar to United States Holdings: 0: holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process 1: holding that identical all agreements language  this policy contains all of the agreements between the parties  is an integration clause 2: holding that the statements by the court went well beyond a mere rejection of the agreements and explanation for it they suggested at the very least the agreements that would be acceptable 3: holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements 4: holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "includes the concomitantrightto waive counsel\u2019s assistance and proceed to represent oneself at criminal proceedings. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Commonwealth v. El, 602 Pa. 126, 134, 977 A.2d 1158, 1162 (2009). The right to appear pro se is guaranteed as long as the defendant understands the nature of his choice. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. In Pennsylvania, Rule of Criminal Procedure 121 sets out a framework for inquiry into a defendant\u2019s request for self-representation. Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. Where a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently seeks to waive his right to counsel, the trial court must allow the individual to proceed pro se. See, El, supra; Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1335 (1995) (<HOLDING>). To ensure that a waiver of counsel is Holdings: 0: holding that record did not establish knowing waiver 1: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 2: holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver 3: holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent 4: recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "appeal the decision of the contracting officer \u201cto an agency board of contract appeals.\u201d Section 609 provides that \u201cin lieu of appealing the decision of the contracting officer ... to an agency board, a contractor may bring an action directly on the claim in the United States Court of Federal Claims.... \u201d An aggrieved contractor must first submit his claim to the contracting officer and receive a decision before a suit can be commenced in the Court of Federal Claims because, as the Court of Federal Claims noted, \u201ccompletion of these steps is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a complaint relative to the claim in this court.\u201d Christian Appalachian Project, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 595, 587 (1986). See also Thoen v. United States, 765 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim 1: holding with respect to a certified claim that congress has determined that submission of a  claim to the contracting officer in the first instance is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit in the claims court 2: holding that this court has discretion to hear arguments presented to it in the first instance provided that it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim 3: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim  4: holding that the united states court of federal claims does not have jurisdiction over a new claim or a claim of different scope that was not previously presented and certified to the contracting officer for decision", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and had two students with Florida addresses enrolled in its online classes; the court concluded that the record evidence was insufficient to establish the \u201ccontinuous and systematic general business contacts\u201d required to confer general jurisdiction. Id. With regard to Columbia\u2019s website, the court observed that the mere existence of a website does not-tend to show that a defendant is directing its business activi risdiction was established pursuant to section 48.193(l)(a)(l). We disagree. Specific jurisdiction requires a connection or \u201cconnexity\u201d- between the enumerated activity in Florida and the cause of action. Schwartzberg v. Knobloch, 98 So.3d 173, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). ' In the instant case, Gilbert alleged that Aegis solicit K-BMK, 2012 WL 1606068 (D. Haw. May 8, 2012) (<HOLDING>). Because Gilbert failed to allege sufficient Holdings: 0: holding that requirements of apprendi were not met where facts on which sentence enhancement was based were not charged and submitted to the jury 1: holding that where hawaii residents submitted online job application to nonresident defendants submitted to preemployment screening and training in texas worked in iraq and signed employment contracts in texas and iraq claims for illegal disparate treatment during employment did not arise out of defendants purported solicitation activities in hawaii particularly where solicitation activities were not directed to hawaii residents 2: holding an ordinance regulating doortodoor solicitation unconstitutional in part because there was no evidence of a special crime problem related to doortodoor solicitation in the record 3: holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process 4: holding party that filed motions for summary judgment directed verdict and jnov preserved complaint drat issue should not have been submitted to jury even though party submitted jury questions on same issue", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the appeal). 40 . 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 77k(e). 41 . Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 624 (2d Cir.1991) (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (May 12, 1934) (explanatory memorandum of Senator Fletcher, sponsor of proposed section 11(e))). 42 . Cf. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 505 (\"the Copyright Act\u201d) (\"In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party ... the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs \u201d) (emphasis added); Adsani, 139 F.3d at 75 (finding the Copyright Act a fee-shifting statute for purposes of a Rule 7 bond). 43 . See P. Mem. at 8-9 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). 44 . Cf In re Air Cargo, 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (<HOLDING>); In re AOL Time Warner, 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 Holdings: 0: holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed 1: holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed 2: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute 3: holding delay damages cannot be included in an appeal bond because the underlying statute did not provide for the inclusion of such costs 4: holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "government has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a \u201cmeeting of the minds.\u201d Restatement (Second) Of Contracts \u00a7 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36 Holdings: 0: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement 1: holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim 2: holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement 3: holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute 4: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "nervousness to the calculus, the government has not surmounted the reasonable suspicion hurdle. Because the detention was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, anything resulting from it is excludable as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 88 S.Ct. 407. D. Sugar\u2019s Standing The government concedes Stark\u2019s standing because he knew where the key to the closet was, but argues that Sugar has no standing to contest the seizure because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the locked closet in which the drugs were found. See United States v. Soule, 908 F.2d 1032, 1034 (1st Cir.1990). The \u201cperson who claims [Fourth Amendment] protection\u201d must have a \u201clegitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.\u201d Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421 (<HOLDING>). While defendants acknowledge that they did Holdings: 0: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search 1: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle 2: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 3: holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop 4: holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1183, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1013 (1995). Lawyers who are preparing to leave a law firm face a dilemma, caught between the fiduciary obligations they owe the other members of their firm, on one hand, and the duty of being able to adequately represent clients who choose to follow them to their new place of employment, on the other hand. As a practical matter, then, cases have recognized that some preliminary preparations by lawyers who are leaving a firm must be allowed, and that it is appropriate for lawyers in these circumstances to make arrangements, prior to their departure, to obtain new office space, equipment, and other materials necessary for the practice of law. Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency \u00a7 393, Comment e (1958) (<HOLDING>). Discussing a similar question, the Supreme Holdings: 0: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 1: holding that plea agreement with drug enforcement agency agent not enforceable when agent was not authorized by united states attorney to enter agreement 2: holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 3: recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim 4: recognizing that agent may make certain preparations for own venture prior to termination of agency", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Tex. Const, art. V, \u00a7 8; see Dubai Petrol. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). Thus, the real question presented by these motions to dismiss is not Lapi-ner\u2019s \u201cstanding\u201d in the jurisdictional sense of that term. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160-61, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (explaining that the term \u201cjurisdictional\u201d properly applies only to prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and persons (personal jurisdiction) that implicate a court\u2019s adjudicatory authority). Instead, as the plurality opinion and many other courts recognize, the question before us is whether Lapiner should be treated as a party for purposes of appeal. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (<HOLDING>); City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Holdings: 0: holding question whether unnamed class member has standing to appeal does not implicate courts subjectmatter jurisdiction but instead whether he should be considered a party for purposes of appealing the trial courts approval of the settlement over his objection 1: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 2: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case 3: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile.\u201d Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In a 2006 publication, the United States Department of Justice reported that 6,000 police officers are assaulted each year, and ten are killed. United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 349 (D.C.Cir.2007). 6 . See, e.g., State v. Abner, 889 So.2d 52, 53-54 (Ala.Crim.App.2004); People v. Super. Ct. (Galbreath), 104 Cal.App.3d 988, 164 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117 (1980); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 547 A.2d 10, 22-23 (1988); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 646 (2006); State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 367 (Minn.2004); State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 527 (2001); Commonwealth v. Reppert, 2002 PA S 3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, Holdings: 0: holding that questions on transportation of contraband must be justified by reasonable suspicion even when they do not extend the duration of the stop 1: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 2: holding that the delay of approximately two minutes that occurred prior to the police officer developing reasonable suspicion to further investigate the defendants identity was de minimis and did not unreasonably extend the duration of the traffic stop 3: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 4: holding that even a de minimis extension of a traffic stop is unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the victim had no further contact with the defendant. I The defendant\u2019s first claim is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process\u2019 when it declined to instruct the jury regarding \u201cconstancy of denial.\u201d 1 At the center of the defendant\u2019s argument is his contention that the constancy of accusation doctrine is unconstitutional and unfair. The defendant, therefore, contends that the constancy of denial instruction is constitutionally required to offset the harmful impact of the constancy of accusation instruction. We disagree. It is well settled that the doctrine of constancy of accusation does not violate an accused\u2019s right to confrontation, equal protection or due process. See State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290-91, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Kelley, 229 Conn. 557, 563-67, 643 Holdings: 0: holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation 1: holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause 2: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 3: holding coconspirator hearsay exception does not violate confrontation clause 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the injury and the disability. The injury by itself does not fulfill the statutory requirement; rather, the resultant loss and disability are the key. As the Appellate Division stated in this case, a plaintiff must show that \u201cthe injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life.\u201d 250 N.J.Super. at 470, 595 A.2d 522. That requirement seems to comport with the New York cases. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Tracey, supra, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (requiring plaintiff to establish \u201c \u2018permanent loss\u2019 \u201d or \u201c \u2018permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member\u2019 \u201d by \u201ccompetent medical proof\u201d). The same case holds that \u201csubjective complaints unsupported by credible medical evidence do not suffice.\u201d Ibid.; accord Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788, 512 N.E.2d 309 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Compare Waldman v. Dong Kook Chang, 175 Holdings: 0: recognizing that pain is a completely subjective phenomenon and that secretary must consider all available evidence in assessing complaints of pain 1: holding threshold not met by subjective complaints of transitory pain unsupported by objective evidence 2: holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain 3: holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record 4: holding that alj should have included complaints of pain in hypothetical question", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was purely functional and was not intended to warn boaters of the sill\u2019s existence. Further, the district court found that the sill continued to perform its function in its current completely submerged condition. Because we conclude that the district court\u2019s negligence finding based on the failure to place a warning sign at the sill\u2019s location was not clearly erroneous, appellants\u2019 argument that the failure to maintain the sill was not within the discretionary function exception is irrelevant. Throughout the proceeding appellants asserted that the United States was negligent for failing to maintain the sill in its original condition. Indeed, the district court found that as originally designed the sill extended across the entire width of the cut and the edge 467, 473 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), appeal after remand, 897 F.2d 795 (5th Holdings: 0: recognizing that initial decision to place buoy 60 from wreck was a protected discretionary function but moving the buoy another 250 away from the wreck without notifying the public was a negligent act not within the discretionary function exception 1: recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver 2: holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  3: holding that decision to establish recreational swimming area was discretionary but failure to replace buoy secured by an anchor that injured a swimmer was not within discretionary function exception 4: holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "use of Stitt\u2019s name and likeness on its own album covers. While the album cover itself is arguably misleading in some respect, Sun Trading has presented no concrete evidence of the likelihood of or actual consumer confusion. \u201cLikelihood of injury ... will not be presumed, but must be demonstrated,\u201d Johnson & Johnson, 631 F.2d at 190, and, here, Sun Trading has offered nothing more than its mere \u201csubjective belief\u2019 that it has been, or is likely to be, injured. See id. at 189. It has conducted no consumer surveys tending to demonstrate confusion, nor has it presented any circumstantial evidence of confusion, such as proof that Evidence\u2019s release of the \u201cSax Storm\u201d album has caused Evidence to realize an increase in sales to the detriment of Sun Trading\u2019s own sales. Of id. at 190-91 (<HOLDING>). Without some evidence that the repackaged Holdings: 0: holding that proof of phenomenal sales success substantial advertising expenditures unsolicited media coverage requests from third parties to license the use of plaintiffs design and defendants deliberate attempt to imitate plaintiffs trade dress sufficed to create serious questions going to the merits even in the absence of consumer surveys 1: holding that plaintiffs proof of increase in defendants sales and a corresponding decrease in plaintiffs sales testimony from a consumer witness that she changed products based on defendants false advertising and survey evidence of consumer confusion was enough to prove a likelihood of competitive injury resulting from the defendants advertising 2: holding that defendants conduct amounted to substantial and nonisolated activity within florida for purposes of general jurisdiction where its advertising strategy was designed to generate product sales in florida and its dollar volume of sales was substantial 3: holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury 4: holding that defendants advertising campaign help to alleviate confusion", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1307 (4th Cir.1986)). In making this decision, the district court must draw all reasonable inferences arising from the proof, and resolve all factual disputes, in favor of the plaintiff. Id. For actions removed to federal court from the state courts of North Carolina, the personal jurisdiction inquiry requires the court to ask whether its exercise of jurisdiction over an individual interferes with that individual\u2019s Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interests. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int\u2019l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1065 (4th Cir.1982) (the two-step personal jurisdiction analysis is collapsed into a single question of due process in actions removed to federal court from North Carolina) (citing Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977) (<HOLDING>)) One surviving claim against the Individual Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute 1: holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts 2: holding that proof of fraud necessarily establishes a violation of north carolinas unfair and deceptive trade practices statute nc gemstat  7511 3: holding that north carolinas longarm statute extends to the limits of due process 4: recognizing that the ohio longarm statute does not extend to the limits of due process and focusing the inquiry on whether defendant established sufficient business contacts with ohio", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for Sixth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the \u201cSixth Amendment protections can be bypassed[ ][i]f the defendant ... admits the fact otherwise committed to the jury.\u201d Id. at 387. A defendant may admit facts through \u201cguilty pleas and stipulations, a defendant\u2019s own statements in open court, and representations by counsel.\u201d United States v. Revels, 455 F.3d 448, 450 (4th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). \u201cAny admission of fact must, of course, be of sufficient clarity and kind to justify taking the fact from the jury.\u201d Milam, 443 F.3d at 387. Whether a defendant has admitted a fact for Booker purposes depends upon where a defendant\u2019s \u201cverbalizations ... fall along a spectrum\u201d from silence to \u201cstatements such as T admit,\u2019 or the functional equivalent thereof.\u201d Revels, 455 F.3d at 450 (<HOLDING>). Here, the presentence report attributed to Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing court may not adopt facts from codefendants presentence report that was not disclosed to defendant 1: holding that defendant did not admit facts supporting sentencing enhancement where he lodged blakely objection and replied no sir to courts inquiry as to whether he had objections to anything contained or omitted from the presentence report 2: holding that appellant properly preserved booker claim by citing blakely in his written objections to the psi and reminding the court at sentencing of his blakely objection 3: holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report 4: holding that sentencing upon general remand is to be de novo requiring the district court to consider new objections to the presentence report", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 501-02 (7th Cir.2005). An applicant seeking withholding of removal \u201cbears the burden of demonstrating that loss of life or freedom is more likely than not\u201d if she returned to her home country, Kobugabe, 440 F.3d at 901, but an applicant\u2019s credible testimony can sustain this burden of proof without corroboration, 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.16(b). On the other hand, an IJ may find an applicant\u2019s testimony incredible if she \u201cfails to present certain foundational evidence.\u201d Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir.2004). While these two concepts can become easily conflated, they are distinct. Essentially, an IJ may disbelieve an applicant because she fails to provide corroborating evidence, and subsequently deny her claim. See id.; Zaid 630 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Though the IJ may have implicitly found that Holdings: 0: holding that where the ij finds the petitioner to be credible his testimony must be accepted 1: holding an ij must to address a petitioners explanation for inconsistencies to rely upon them as the basis for an adverse credibility finding 2: holding that an ij failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he disbelieved applicants testimony 3: holding substantial evidence supported the denial of cat relief where the petitioners cat claim was based on the same testimony the ij found not credible and the petitioner pointed to no other evidence that the ij should have considered 4: holding that an ij made an explicit credibility when the ij found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "automatically discoverable information does exist in their files.\u201d); see also State v. Silva, 2012 ME 120, \u00b6 10, 56 A.3d 1230 (concluding that no discovery sanction on the State was necessary given the disclosure of the evidence as soon as it was available; the State\u2019s own inability to use that evidence in preparing for trial; the probable inadmissibility of the evidence; and the possibility that the evidence inculpated, rather than exculpated, the defendant). [\u00b6 11] Next, we review de novo Carr\u2019s contention that the court denied Juror # 75 his equal protection right to sit on a jury by making him an alternate given his inability to deliberate past 5:08 p.m. for religious reasons. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, \u00a7 1; Me. Const. art. I, \u00a7 6-A; State v. Poole, 2012 ME 92, \u00b6\u00b6 5, 8, 46 A.3d 1129 (<HOLDING>). Assuming, without deciding, that Carr has Holdings: 0: holding that to assert a viable equal protection claim plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them 1: holding equal protection under the federal constitution applies to similarly situated persons 2: holding that the equal protection clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike 3: holding members of two distinct pension plans were not similarly situated for equal protection analysis 4: holding that an equal protection violation may occur when similarly situated persons are not treated equally under the law quotation marks omitted", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "his sentence. Hanson advised appellate counsel that he would like to contest the application of \u00a7 4B1.4 to his case, which resulted in a higher offense level and longer sentence because Hanson was classified as an armed career criminal. Hanson forfeited this objection by not raising it in the district court, and so we would review the court\u2019s determination only for plain error. United States v. Williams, 258 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir.2001). We could find no error here, plain or otherwise, because Harris has two convictions for burglary, and convictions for sexual intercourse without consent and for escape. Counsel is correct that these convictions qualify as violent felonies under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(e)(1). See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 273 F.3d 747, 750 Holdings: 0: holding a burglary must be of a building or structure in order to qualify as a violent felony for acca purposes 1: holding that attempted burglary as defined by florida law is a violent felony under acca 2: holding that burglary is violent felony 3: holding that escape from secure custody is a violent felony 4: holding that coerced sex is violent felony", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "opportunity to respond to his allegation that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA\u2019s order in this court. We review \u201cthe BIA\u2019s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.\u201d Abdi v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). Our review \u201cis limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.\u201d Id. (quotation omitted). Petitioner\u2019s brief to this court contains no argument concerning the BIA\u2019s denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore, he has abandoned the issue. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>)). Instead of addressing the BIA\u2019s denial of Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant abandoned an issue to which he only made passing references 1: holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned 2: holding that issues are deemed abandoned when the brief only makes a passing references to an issue 3: holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned 4: holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Co., 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 98 (1977). Moreover, if the promisee bargains with the promisor to render a performance directly to a third party, in nearly every case the promisee will have intended to benefit that third party. Fox Lake, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Here, Advanced clearly stands to benefit from the contract between McCormick and Berbee. Thus, this court must determine from the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties whether the benefit to Advanced is direct or incidental. Although the intent of the parties must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the cases cited by the parties to this appeal provide examples on both sides of this issue. Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (<HOLDING>); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining Holdings: 0: holding prior to gonzaga that medicaid provision requiring nursing facilities to provide certain services was intended for the benefit of the recipients and not for the benefit of the facilities 1: holding that the parties purchase agreement did not require a showing of prejudice for plaintiff to assert that defendant waived its claim for indemnification 2: holding that where purchaser had taken possession and paid part of the purchase price the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement of a purchase agreement 3: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods 4: holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "opinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists\u201d and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 21 . We expressly decline to adopt, as a Holdings: 0: holding that there was no interrogation where the police asked only routine booking questions that did not relate even tangentially to criminal activity moreover there is no evidence that the defendant was particularly susceptible to these questions or that police somehow used the questions to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant 1: holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation 2: recognizing routine booking question exception observing that the underlying rationale for the exception is that routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation because they do not normally elicit incriminating responses and holding that where questions regarding normally routine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating information the questioning constitutes interrogation subject to the strictures of miranda   citations omitted 3: holding that questions regarding a defendants name address height weight eye color birth date and current age constituted custodial interrogation but fell within the  routine booking question exception which exempts from mirandas coverage questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services but observing that that the exception would not apply to questions posed during the booking process that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions citations and internal quotation signals omitted 4: holding that questions concerning the place and date of birth fall within the routine booking question exception to miranda", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded''). GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, concurring: We have held that actions based upon denial of security clearance do not merely fail to state a claim, but are beyond the reach of judicial review. See Bennett, 425 F.3d at 1001 (\u201cBecause the authority to issue a security clearance is a discretionary function of the Executive Branch and involves the complex area of foreign relations and national security, employment actions based on denial of security clearance are not subject to judicial review\u201d); Ryan, 168 F.3d at 524 (<HOLDING>); Krc, 905 F.2d at 395. That a plaintiff makes Holdings: 0: holding that denial of the opportunity to work overtime is an adverse employment action sufficient to make out a prima facie case under title vii 1: holding an adverse employment action based on denial or revocation of a security clearance is not actionable under title vii 2: holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action 3: holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii 4: holding that termination is an adverse employment action", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "accounts steadily shrank during the marriage, as husband regularly invaded it for various purposes, including paying obligations to his former spouse, supporting the parties\u2019 lifestyle and, after their separation, acquiring the Johnson Road property for himself and his new partner. The parties agreed that the total value of those accounts at the time of trial was $135,893. As husband sees things, the trial court awarded wife an equal interest in both the retirement accounts and the Johnson road property as a sanction for perceived discovery violations. According to husband, he did not violate any discovery orders and, thus, the trial court abused its discretion in equally dividing those assets. See, e.g., Stronach v. Ellingsen, 108 Or App 37, 40, 814 P2d 175, rev den, 312 Or 151 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Wife differs in her understanding of the Holdings: 0: holding that generally speaking discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion 1: holding that denial of joinder motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion 2: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion 3: holding that the dismissal of a frivolous action reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: holding that denial of discovery in habeas proceedings is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of his actual innocence. Accordingly, the court will deny claim six as procedurally barred. F. Claim Seven: Post-conviction Proceedings Violated Petitioner\u2019s Due Process And Equal Protection Rights In his seventh claim, petitioner contends that the Delaware Supreme Court\u2019s summary affirmance of his post-conviction appeal violated his right to equal protection and due process. He complains that the State Supreme Court failed to give a thorough and comprehensive review and analysis of his Massiah claims. The court concludes that this claim alleges a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas relief, because petitioner\u2019s ultimate criticism is with the Delaware State Courts\u2019 analysis in a state collateral proceeding. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>)(emphasis in original); see also Lambert v. Holdings: 0: holding habeas petitioners may show cause for such default in specific circumstances in states that require petitioners to raise iatc claims in initial state habeas proceedings rather than on direct appeal 1: holding that the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioners conviction what occurred in the petitioners collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas proceeding 2: holding federal habeas proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies when petitioners direct appeal from resentencing was still pending in state court at the time he sought habeas relief 3: holding that once federal jurisdiction has attached it is not defeated by the petitioners release prior to completion of the proceedings on his habeas application 4: holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "explanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected. Moreover, in Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 415 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), this Court opined that \u201cthe broad language of Section' 8371 was designed to remedy all instances of bad faith conduct 'by an insurer\u2019s, whether occurring before, during or after litigation. Therefore, we acknowledge ... that [a]n action for bad faith may also extend to the insurer\u2019s investigative practices[.]\u201d (quoting O\u2019Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.1999)). Implicit in Hollock\u2019s holdings is the requirement that the insurer properly investigate claims prior to refusing to pay the proceeds of the policy to its insured. See Condio v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 899 A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2006) (<HOLDING>). Bombar v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 92-93 Holdings: 0: holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint 1: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith 2: holding that use of plaintiffs mark is in good faith even though other aspects of defendants behavior may have evidenced bad faith 3: holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule 4: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "have dismissed tortious interference claims as preempted by ERISA, those cases typically involve a situation in which an entity seeks to utilize the interference claim to duplicate relief available under ERISA. For example, when a participant or assignee argues that,' with respect to a particular claim for payment, the claims administrator (or some affiliate thereof) \u201cinterfered\u201d with payment under the plan by unfairly denying the claim, courts have found that the interference claim is preempted. See, e.g., Adkins v. Unum Provident Corp., 191 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (M.D.Tenn.2002); Steele v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1041 (E.D.Tenn.2007); Ctr. for Special Procedures v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 09-6566(MLC), 2010 WL 5068164, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2010) (<HOLDING>). Here, the interference claim does not relate Holdings: 0: holding that insurer could not tortiously interfere with its own insurance plan 1: holding only that although a party cannot interfere with its own contract a supervisor who is not an officer of a plaintiffs employer is not a party to the plaintiffs employment contract and therefore can interfere with it 2: holding that state malpractice claims against insurer for negligently failing to obtain replacement insurance plan was not preempted 3: holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents 4: holding that insurance certificate holder could not maintain negligence action against insurer when certificate holder was not insurers customer did not discuss insurance coverage with insurer and did not make any specific request to procure insurance coverage", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and a Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Contract. That letter stated that the MHFA was \"constrained to vigorously enforce\u201d the state notice provisions for the benefit of low income tenants and that the agency would \"employ the courts to compel compliance by HUD with the terms of the Contract,\u201d if necessary. (Appellant's Add. at AD-15-16.) We conclude that the prior, thr\u00e9\u00e1t of a court action against HUD in the context of a Section 8 housing contract and a different property does not justify a preenforcement suit by Forest Park II in this Section 236 loan prepayment context, where no threat of enforcement action was made and no First Amendment or other constitutional rights are at issue. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988) Holdings: 0: recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury 1: recognizing the cause of action 2: holding that to bring a  1983 cause of action there must be some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action and that a preenforcement suit is justified where there exists a wellfounded fear of enforcement that would infringe upon the exercise of first amendment rights 3: holding that not all adverse action taken against a public employee in retaliation for exercising first amendment rights is sufficient to support a cause of action under  1983 4: holding that to bring a cause of action in federal court requires that plaintiffs establish at an irreducible minimum an injury in fact that is there must be some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "regarding issue one and will remand to Commerce on this issue. The Final Results are otherwise affirmed in all respects. Commerce shall have until October 15, 2012 to complete and file its remand redetermination. Plaintiff shall have until October 29, 2012 to file comments. Defendant shall have until November 9, 2012 to file any reply. It is SO ORDERED. 1 . Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,955 (Dep' rmal value contribute to the calculation of the dumping margin. In contrast, when using offsetting, \"sales made at less than fair value are offset by those made above fair value. This means that some of the dumping margins used to calculate a weighted-average dumping margin will be negative.\u201d U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351 at 1355 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Further citations to the Tariff Act of Holdings: 0: holding that 19 usc  167735a is ambiguous and that offsetting is also a reasonable interpretation 1: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 2: holding that 19 usc  167735 is ambiguous and that zeroing is a reasonable interpretation 3: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation 4: holding that when relevant contract language is ambiguous interpretation is turned over to the factfinder", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in a way that is \u2018illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.\u2019 \u201d United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 280, 178 L.Ed.2d 184, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 281, 178 L.Ed.2d 184, and - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 488, 178 L.Ed.2d 309 (2010). DISCUSSION I. Conviction Fasthorse was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2242(2)(B), which prohibits \u201cknowingly ... engaging] in a sexual act\u201d with a person who is \u201cphysically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act.\u201d See also id. \u00a7 2246(2) (defining \u201csexual act\u201d). Fasthorse contends that there was 68 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 89 F.3d 165, 168 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant must show that the victim had previously been exposed to a sexual act and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge 1: holding that a court must first determine whether the intent of congress is clear or instead the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue 2: holding that evidence was insufficient where the record was silent with respect to the hourandahalf period in which the sexual act occurred 3: holding that where the record is insufficient to show that the alleged error occurred the presumption that the trial court acted without error must prevail 4: holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of stock \u2014 that occurred at the time of the purchase or sale of stock would be deemed to arise from that purchase or sale. Put differently, in claimants\u2019 submission, a claim must be predicated on illegality in the stock\u2019s issuance to be subordinated under \u00a7 510(b). Since the actionable conduct in this case (Telegroup\u2019s breach of contract) occurred after claimants\u2019 purchase of Telegroup\u2019s stock, claimants contend that the District Court erred in subordinating their claims. Telegroup would read \u00a7 510(b) more broadly, so that claims for breach of a stock purchase agreement, which would not have arisen but for the purchase of Telegroup\u2019s stock, may arise from that purchase, even though the actionable conduct occurred after the transaction was completed. Telegroup further argu .E.D.Mo.1990) (<HOLDING>). Telegroup contends that appellants\u2019 claims Holdings: 0: holding that claims for erisa violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtors securities 1: holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtors securities 2: holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtors securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities 3: holding that claims for breach of the debtors agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities for purposes of  510b 4: holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtors securities", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of law or unwarranted inferences cast in the form of factual allegations. See Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir.2000). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide the grounds of the entitlement to relief, which requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, \u2014, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). That is,\u201c[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).\u201d Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the claims set forth in a Holdings: 0: holding that a charge of discrimination must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests quoting conley v gibson 355 us 41 47 78 sct 99 2 led2d 80 1957 1: holding that laches dismissal is on the merits under federal rule 41 2: holding uncharged acts of violence evidence of  the background of the charges the parties familiarity with one another and their concert of action  quoting united states v oleary 739 f2d 135 136 3d cir1984 cert denied 469 us 1107 105 sct 782 83 led2d 776 1985 cert denied 493 us 821 110 sct 78 107 led2d 44 1989 3: holding that the ninth circuit erred in granting habeas relief because the state courts decision was not an unreasonable application of strickland v washington 466 us 668 104 sct 2052 80 led2d 674 1984 4: recognizing that the supreme court disavowed the oftquoted rule 12b6 standard of conley v gibson 355 us 41 4546 78 sct 99 2 led2d 80 1957", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the plaintiff was financially able to retain an attorney this was a \"special circumstance\u201d that would allow the court to deny it an award of attorney\u2019s fees. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with some instructions. On remand the Chancery Court determined that the ability to pay attorney\u2019s fees was not an appropriate special circumstance; thus, Wilmington Materials was entitled to and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to \u00a7 1988. 17 .2000 WL 1724326, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 168. 18 . The court determined that Wilmington Materials had a vested right to utilize the property because it had \"incurred expenses in reasonable reliance of its belief that the Code permitted its intended use.\u201d Wilmington Materials I, 1993 WL 280411 at *2, 1993 Del. Ch. Lexis 145. 19 . Id. 20 . Id. (<HOLDING>); and Wilmington Materials II, 1994 WL 384458, Holdings: 0: holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency 1: holding that although plaintiff was entitled to fees under  1988 there were special circumstances which allowed the chancellor in his discretion to deny an award 2: holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 3: holding that under 42 usc  1988 which allows the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights action under  1983 a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorneys fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust  quoting srep no 941011 p 4 1976 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\"hopelessly entangled\u201d resulting in significant harm to numerous claimants; (2) the claimants were enticed into investing in a fraudulent Ponzi scheme, and Bonham used investment funds to pay other investors and for personal benefit, and (3) Bonham, WPI and APFC should be treated as alter egos because insufficient funds were available to cover all of the creditors\u2019 claims. See id. at 96-97. 7 . This court has previously discussed the doctrine, but never considered a direct challenge to the bankruptcy court's power to employ it. See Gill v. Sierra Pacific Constr., Inc. (In re Parkway Calabasas), 89 B.R. 832 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1988), aff\u2019d, 949 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Alaska Nat\u2019l Bank of the North (In re Walsh Construction, Inc.), 669 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Anaconda Building Materials Co. v. Newland, Holdings: 0: recognizing that uniting power to prosecute and power to sentence in executive would raise constitutional concerns 1: recognizing such limitations in dicta 2: holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted 3: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power 4: recognizing in dicta power to substantively consolidate entities but noting that power to be used sparingly", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "prior breaches of the Agreement. Since each of these three changes were material and implemented over Mar-schuetz\u2019s objection without his written approval, we conclude that Supermarket committed a prior breach of the employment Agreement. Accordingly, we hold that Supermarket is barred from enforcing the restrictive covenant in this Agreement. Point granted. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court granting Appellant Supermarket\u2019s petition for a permanent injunction against Marschuetz is reversed. In addition, the circuit court\u2019s order that court costs are taxed against Marschuetz is hereby reversed, and costs are taxed to Supermarket. GARY M. GAERTNER, SR., P.J., and GEORGE W. DRAPER III, J\u201e concur. 1 . See generally Forms Mfg., Inc., 705 S.W.2d at 70 Holdings: 0: recognizing a right to contribution 1: holding that no modification of the original employment contract occurred when the employer unilaterally issued a new handbook 2: holding that an agreement to arbitrate is illusory if as here the employer can unilaterally modify the contract 3: holding that employer may use afteracquired evidence of resume fraud to avoid liability for breach of an employment contract if it can show that it had the power to void the contract due to reliance on material misrepresentations even where the employer was unaware of that power when the breach occurred 4: holding that an employer committed a material breach of an employment agreement where it unilaterally changed salesmans compensation structure to require a monthly minimum contribution not originally bargained for", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in order to get the merger done. Other employees stated that the iPCS network was too \u201cimmature\u201d and that management at AirGate was aware of this problem. Id., \u00b6 60. Plaintiffs aver that AirGate\u2019s statements were misleading and \u201cuntrue when made because, according to numerous confidential sources cited, iPCS\u2019s physical infrastructure and network was outdated, inadequate and would take years to upgrade and complete.\u201d Id., \u00b6 102. The court finds that the statements about the network buildout could come within the PSLRA\u2019s safe harbor for forward-looking statements because they contain both current fact and future prediction. See Ehlert, 245 F.3d at 1317 (court considered registration statement in its en tirety to determine whether statements were forward looking); Harris, 182 F.3d at 806 (<HOLDING>). However, unlike the other statements raised Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to anticipate future events did not constitute securities fraud 1: recognizing that missouri courts have often held that regulations may establish the appropriate standard of care in a negligence case 2: recognizing that forward looking conclusions often rest on both historic observations and assumptions about future events 3: recognizing that harassment often lacks the permanence that discriminatory actions have 4: recognizing that observations made during a psychiatric examination contain a subjective element", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Attorney General intended to restrict the authority of the FBI to promise an informant immunity, he could and would have said so plainly. For example, on January 10, 1975, the Attorney General issued an Order, available to members of the public, that expressly stated that \u201cInvestigative Agents and Attorneys are not Authorized to make representations to witnesses regarding funding, protection, or relocation.\u201d Department of Justice Order OBD 2110.2, P 7(d) (Jan. 10, 1975) (emphasis in original). The Order also provided that such promises could be made \u201cby authorized representatives of the U.S. Marshals Service only.\u201d Id. This legal limitation on the authority of prosecutors and investigators was recognized and respected by the courts. Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the United States Attorneys Manual Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on an oral representation that the atwill provision of his employment contract did not apply to him when he entered into the contract that expressly contradicted the oral representations 1: holding that trial court properly barred certain questions about witness who was in federal witness protection program 2: holding service of process defective when the receipt card was signed by someone who was not the registered agent 3: holding that oral representations of a strike force attorney and dea agent did not commit the marshals service with regard to placing someone in the witness protection program 4: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of months from filing to trial for civil cases.\u201d AL & PO Corp. v. Am. Healthcare Capital, Inc., No. 14 C 1905, 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The defendant notes that the time to disposition, in shorter'in this district than in Minnesota, while the time to trial is quick er in Minnesota- than in Illinois. Where the two statistical measures point in different directions, some courts have held that they cancel one another out. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm\u2019n v. RPM Int\u2019l, Inc., 223 F.Supp.3d 110, 117-18 (D.D.C. 2016) (\u201cBecause these statistics essentially cancel one another out, this factor is neutral.\u201d). Other courts, however, have held that the time to disposition is the more important metric. See, e.g., AL & PO Corp., 2015 WL 738694, at *5 (<HOLDING>); Fernandes v. Deutsche Bank Nat\u2019l Trust Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 1: holding that the time to disposition is more important than time to trial 2: holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal 3: holding that appellate courts analyze plain error by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided rather than the extant law at the time of the disputed trial court ruling 4: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for each form of relief sought\u201d). 1. Injury The injury must be an \u201cinjury in fact,\u201d meaning \u201can invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) \u2018actual or imminent, not- \u201cconjectural\u201d or \u201chypothetical.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983))). There is no \u201clegally protected interest\u201d in maintaining the privacy of one\u2019s bank records from government access. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party 1: holding bank clients had no legitimate expectation of privacy in banking information revealed to a third party 2: holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed 3: holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank 4: holding that the defendant cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the governments acquisition of his subscriber information including his ip address and name because it had been revealed to a third party internal quotation marks omitted", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "lieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute\u2019s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), \u00a7 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent\u2019s or spouse\u2019s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in addition to any order that the Holdings: 0: holding that individual debtors may use chapter 11 to save the family home from foreclosure 1: holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home 2: holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees 3: recognizing that reciprocal obligations of parent and child are essentials of the family relationship 4: holding that wife was entitled to prejudgment interest on alimony and child support arrearages from the date those payments were due", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for the foreseeable future whatever shortage now exists. The second purpose identified by the City is to protect the investment that the tenants make in their mobile homes. Although the park owners agree that the tenants do make an investment in their homes, they dispute that that investment needs protection, pointing to the escalating prices that the tenants have been receiving upon the sale of their coaches. The evidence is uncontro-verted that sales prices for coaches in the parks consistently increased during the years prior to the imposition of rent control. Nevertheless, if the City reasonably determined that the possibility existed that the tenants\u2019 investments were threatened, it might be justified in taking steps to protect them. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 12-13, 108 S.Ct. at 857-58 (<HOLDING>). The dynamic relationship between the sales Holdings: 0: holding that a consumer reporting agency which gives a consumer report to the attorney representing the agency is not subject to the fcra because the attorney is not a traditional third party 1: holding that the government has standing to appeal a district courts dismissal of an fca qui tam action over the governments objection even though the government did not formally intervene in the action 2: holding that order denying representation to class of future claimants in bankruptcy proceeding is equivalent to denial of request to intervene and order denying right to intervene is appealable final order 3: holding that noerrpennington extends to situations where the government enters into a contractual relationship with a private entity at least in situations where the government engages in a policy decision and at the same time acts as a participant in the marketplace  4: holding that the government may intervene in the marketplace to protect consumer welfare", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "October 1. 6 . On appeal, appellee questions whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear this case because Congress has not provided for judicial review of the denial of Medicare Part B claims. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, -n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 2018 n. 4, 80 L.Ed.2d 622, 632 n. 4 (1984); United States v. Erika, 456 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 1650, 72 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982). As appel-lee concedes, however, the broad jurisdictional bar recognized in Ringer does not preclude a party from raisi n. 11 (E.D.Tex.1985) (\"[Cjonstitutional challenges are cognizable if they are aimed at the Medicare Act itself. Such claims arise solely under the Constitution, and therefore escape section 405(h)\u2019s grasp.\u201d). Cf. Johnson v. Robi-son, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Because appellants Holdings: 0: holding that veterans suit is not barred by 38 usc  211a because ajppellees constitutional challenge is not to any such decision of the administrator but rather to a decison of congress to create a statutory class entitled to benefits that does not include 10 conscientious objectors who performed alternative civilian service 1: holding that where the board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 usc  7104e the period within which to appeal to the court of appeals for veterans claims did not commence to run 2: holding that a class plaintiff who seeks to assert statutory rights to protect a class of which he is a member is not asserting rights antagonistic to any members of that class 3: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 4: holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "official conduct. The Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges does not alter applicable law. \u2014 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Whatever ramifications Obergefell may have for sexual relations beyond the approval of same-sex marriage are unstated at best, but Obergefell is expressly premised on the unique and special bond created by the formal marital relationship and children of that relationship. Id. at 2594-95. Obergefell does not create \u201crights\u201d based on relationships that mock marriage, and no court has so held. The district court\u2019s judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 . The alleged fact dispute does not exist, nor would it be material if it did. While Coker and Golden maintain they were ordered to \"cease all contact\u201d with the other (10th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Of course, even if such rights existed Holdings: 0: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 1: holding that baltimore city cannot be liable for police officers alleged tortious conduct where the officer was acting in a governmental capacity 2: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 3: holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague 4: holding that governmental actions restricting police officers sexual conduct of an extramarital affair were reasonable", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Jersey Racing Comm\u2019n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1997) (\u201cIn order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to termination of a specific employment position, a plaintiff must first establish a property interest in the employment.\u201d) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). \u201cTo have a property interest in a job or job benefit, an employee must have a legitimate claim of entitlement, not just a unilateral expectation.\u201d Latessa, 113 F.3d at 1318 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). \u201cCognizable property interests can be created by sources such as state law and implied or express contracts.\u201d Miller v. Twp. of Readington, 39 Fed. Appx. 774, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2002) 1987) (<HOLDING>). The burden thus shifts to Davis to show that Holdings: 0: holding that court erred as matter of law in failing to enter judgment for employer at close of plaintiffs implied employment contract action 1: holding that once the plaintiffs fixed term of employment expired he had no property interest as a matter of law 2: holding that plaintiffs had no vested interest in former interpretation of state law 3: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 4: holding that an assistant professor hired for a fixed term of one academic year had no property interest in his job because the terms of his employment allowed that his contract not be renewed", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Kennedy). The judgment of conviction having been vacated, the present defendant is treated as a charged, not as a convicted child pornographer. The question now posed is whether the pretrial condition of curfew with electronic monitoring mandated by the Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied in view of this court\u2019s finding that electronic monitoring is not needed to avoid flight or any danger to children or to society. The answer: The Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant under present circumstances. B. Constitutionality The Eighth Amendment provides \u201cexcessive bail shall not be required.\u201d U.S. amend. VII. This limit of federal authority applies to the states. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 601 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Crowell, Nos. 06-M1095, Holdings: 0: holding that adam walsh act violates fifth amendments guarantee of procedural due process 1: holding that adam walsh act does not violate procedural due process require excessive bail or violate separation of powers 2: holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing 3: holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment 4: holding that adam walsh act does not prohibit inspection by defense expert", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the guideline imprisonment range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a)(1), (4), and (6). In considering the \u00a7 3553(a) factors and explaining the reasoning behind its choice of sentence, this Court has held that the district court need not discuss, or state that it has explicitly considered, each factor of \u00a7 3553(a). Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Instead, this Court has held that an explicit acknowledgment that the district court has considered the defendant\u2019s arguments and the \u00a7 3553(a) factors will suffice. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2005); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2469, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, the district court imposed a Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole 1: holding that the defendants sentence was reasonable when the district court considered the parties arguments and provided a reasoned basis for its choice of sentence 2: holding that a sentencing judge who had listened to the defendants arguments in support of a belowguidelines sentence provided sufficient explanation for rejecting those arguments when he found that the defendants circumstances were insufficient to warrant a sentence lower than the guidelines range 3: holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable 4: holding that the district court which had considered the guidelines but found an upward variant sentence necessary given the defendants previous violations did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a 24month sentence instead of a guidelines range sentence of 3 to 9 months incarceration", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a cleareut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We detect no indication in this language that the Court intended to distinguish between individuals based on occupation or training in determining when Miranda warnings are required. Indeed, subsequent cases have so held. See, e.g., Desire v. Attorney General of California, 969 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Longbehn, 850 F.2d 450, 453 Holdings: 0: holding that although miranda warnings were not given to defendant police officers they had no cause of action under 42 usc  1983 because they were never prosecuted 1: holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda 2: holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible 3: holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights 4: holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction may close the case for failure to respond after receipt of the [SOC], but questions as to timeliness or adequacy of response shall be determined by the Board of Veterans\u2019 Appeals.\u201d Id. The Secretary, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7105, promulgated regulations at 38 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 20.300, 20.302(b), which govern the filing of Substantive Appeals. These provisions mirror those set forth in the statute. Whether the statutory deadline for filing a Substantive Appeal is subject to equitable tolling is a question of law that the Court reviews de novo. 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7261(a)(1); see Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet.App. 227, 230 (2000) (stating that the Court reviews questions of law de novo without any deference to the Board\u2019s conclusions); cf. Bailey v. Principi 351 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Based on the following, we conclude that Holdings: 0: holding that equitable estoppel and equitable tolling cannot apply to extend the 120day noa filing period set forth in 38 usc  7266a 1: holding statute of limitations period defined in 28 usc  2244d is subject to equitable tolling 2: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling 3: holding that issue of whether the 120day judicialappeal period prescribed by 38 usc  7266a for seeking judicial review of a board decision is subject to equitable tolling is a legal question 4: holding that the 120day judicial appeal period is not subject to waiver or forfeiture by the secretary", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "find the conditions of [his] employment altered for the worse.\u201d Feingold, 366 F.3d at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the original). Leifer presents evidence of six interactions with his supervisors over a three-year period which implicate his religion. Viewing Leif-er\u2019s evidence in the light most favorable to him, a reasonable jury could find the interactions to be sufficiently hostile to have altered his employment conditions for the worse. To support their argument to the contrary, defendants cite two cases in which this Court affirmed a district court\u2019s award of summary judgment on the grounds that the harassment was not frequent or severe enough to constitute sufficient proof of a hostile work environment. See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 380 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rochester Holdings: 0: holding that five alleged incidents in four years were too few too separate in time and too mild  to create an abusive working environment 1: holding that the settlement was not fair adequate or reasonable since it was agreed upon too quickly with too little development on the merits 2: holding sanctions order was too general to support award 3: holding that collateral crime that occurred twelve years prior to charged offense not too remote in time 4: holding that a dozen racial incidents over a two and one half year period were too few to constitute a custom with the force of law", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "him from practicing his religion in other ways. See docket entries # 77 and # 78 (emphasis added). Under Gladson and Murphy, Plaintiff is not required to make such an allegation in order to state a valid free exercise claim. See Gladson, 551 F.3d at 831-32; Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988. Instead, as previously explained, he is only required to allege that Defendants prevented him from practicing a central tenet of his faith, which in this case, appears to be regularly reading his Bible. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held, in several cases, that prisoners state viable free exercise claims when they allege that prison officials have limited their access to religious reading materials. See Roddy v. Banks, Case No. OS-3735, 2005 WL 433404 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Brimeyer, 116 F.3d 351, 354-55 Holdings: 0: holding a muslim prisoners free exercise claim failed because even though the prison did not provide him with halal meat he could comply with his religious requirements by simply eating a vegetarian meal and therefore the disputed policy did not force the prisoner to violate his religion 1: holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation 2: recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion 3: holding that a prisoner stated a valid free exercise of religion claim where he alleged that prison officials refused to allow him to receive certain religious books 4: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "requires Educators to bargain directly with Savage. This statutory provision, together with the structurally inclusive nature of workers\u2019 compensation insurance, creates a relationship of trust and reliance between injured employees and workers\u2019 compensation insurers. I would hold, as have several other courts, that this relationship places a tort-based duty on insurers to deal in good faith with injured employees. See Savio, 706 P.2d at 1272-74 (nature of workers\u2019 compensation insurance, combined with section of workers\u2019 compensation statute requiring that insurance policies contain clause making insurer primarily liable to employee, creates tort duty on part of insurer to deal in good faith with employee); see also Case v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing workers compensation insurance carrier owes employee duty of good faith and fair dealing in processing compensation claims 1: holding that as 2330012 prohibits setting aside workers compensation c  r based on mistake 2: holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty 3: holding that claims for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against workers compensation insurance carrier did not  arise under the state workers compensation statutes but are at most related to those statutes and thus do not come within the ambit of the nonremovability provision of  1445c good faith and fair dealing claims were created by texas common law not by the compensation statute 4: recognizing duty to deal in good faith in workers compensation setting", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "show that (1) trial counsel\u2019s representation was so deficient that it fell below the objective standard of professional norms and (2) but for counsel\u2019s error, th ceedings would have been different if counsel would have objected to the jury charge and the trial court had given the reasonable-doubt instruction for extraneous offenses. exual assault of a child case. Since Dowthitt, two unpublished appellate court opinions regarding sexual assault of a child relied on Dowthitt to admit videotaped testimony as prior consistent statements under rule 801(e)(1)(B), when the child-victim testified at trial and the videotaped statement was offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication 1569537 at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Nov.20, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). 8 . During the closing argument at Holdings: 0: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 1: holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt 2: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that trial courts error in failing to sua sponte give instruction was harmless because state did not emphasize this evidence in closing argument and evidence of appellants guilt was otherwise overwhelming 4: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to raise the defense in a timely manner can result in a waiver); United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1986) (aligning itself with the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits in holding that \u201cthe running of the statute of limitations does not defeat jurisdiction and that the failure to assert the defense will constitute a waiver,\u201d and noting that the view expressed by the Tenth Circuit in Waters is contrary to that articulated by a majority of the circuit courts of appeals); United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 855 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296, 299 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Akmakjian, 647 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>). The Sixth Circuit was, for some time, the Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense that is waived if not raised in the trial court 1: holding that the statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional and defendant expressly waived it observing in dicta that a statute of limitations defense should be raised no later than the trial 2: recognizing such limitations in dicta 3: holding that the statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment it is one which can be waived 4: holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Amtrak because it has failed to plead a valid contract. While Virginia law recognizes a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Company-Connecticut, 156 F.3d 535, 542 (4th Cir.1998), a breach of that duty only creates a claim for breach of contract. Joyce v. Lincoln Nat\u2019l Life Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp. 353, 355 (E.D.Va.1993) (stating that there is no independent cause of action for breach of implied covenant). Where, as here, there is no allegation of a valid contract betwee ence with prospective business advantage fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a valid business expectancy. Krantz v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 245 Va. 202, 205-06, 427 S.E.2d 326 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff admits in its Amended Complaint Holdings: 0: holding that with respect to tortious interference recognized standards of business ethics and business customs and practices are pertinent 1: recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage 2: holding that the first element in a prima facie case of tortious interference with prospective business advantage is the existence of business expectancy 3: holding that the first element in a prima facie case of tortious interference with contract is the existence of a valid contractual relationship 4: recognizing action for tortious interference with prospective advantage", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App. 1987). In this case, Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to exclude the assailant from being considered a concurrent tortfeasor. The motion cited Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Gorp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995), the same authority Plaintiff relies on in this appeal. Plaintiff thus fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on this issue and preserved it for appeal. See id. (explaining liabilities of concurrent and successive tortfeasors). {36} We are unpersuaded by Defendants\u2019 argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue by failing to object to the trial court\u2019s jury instructions on comparative negligence. In so contending, Defendants rely on Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 729, 688 P.2d 333, 339 (Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>), and Romero v. Mervyn\u2019s, 109 N.M. 249, 253 n. Holdings: 0: holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds 1: holding that party waived an objection to choice of law 2: holding defendant waived complaint 3: holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration 4: holding that party waived complaint regarding instruction where it did not raise specific objection", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s dismissal for mootness de novo\u201d). [\u00b6 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case \u201chas lost its character as edication). [\u00b6 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, \u201cis to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.\u201d Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, \u201cthe intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested\u201d); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). [\u00b6 16] A common-law dedication must be proven Holdings: 0: holding that intent need not be express and in fact need not actually exist in the owners mind but may be implied from acts and conduct of the owner which are unequivocally and convincingly indicative of a dedication and upon which the public has a right to and does rely 1: holding the effect of a commonlaw dedication is to create only such an estate or right in the public as is necessary to enable it to enjoy the uses for which the dedication is made and to reserve the fee to the dedicator 2: holding that predicate acts need not be in furtherance of the enterprise 3: holding because dedication is a theory premised on estoppel  the owner can be precluded from resuming rights over the property if the public acts upon the owners manifestations 4: holding deceptive acts which were not disclosed to the investing public are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance because a plaintiff cannot rely on acts of which it is unaware", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir.2001); United States v. Medina, 90 F.3d 459, 464 (11th Cir.1996). 17 . Although vessel status is a substantive issue in that it relates to \u201cthe reach and application\u201d of the statute, Gonz\u00e1lez, 311 F.3d at 443, it is not an element of the offense. See 46 U.S.C. \u00a7 70504(a); United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir.2008). 18 . Other judge-determined issues are subject to higher and lower standards of proof. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690, 108 S.Ct 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (noting that a court resolves a question of relevancy conditioned on fact by deciding \u201cwhether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact\u201d); United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 691-93 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 19 . The MDLEA provides that \"[a] failure to Holdings: 0: holding that facts justifying forced administration of antipsychotic medication must be established by clear and convincing evidence 1: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 2: holding that in reviewing a defendants motion for judgment of acquittal based on insanity which the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the court must determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find that the defendants criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence 3: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence 4: holding that an award for punitive damages must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "none of the worldly experiences that this defendant would have, of course Melvin Boone would respect a man like this. [A476J Hakim argues that these references have no relation to the crime with which he was being charged: bank robbery. Boone was brought to the stand to identify Hakim as the second robber in the surveillance photograph. As such, Hakim maintains that the prosecution had only to establish that Boone was able to identify Hakim; testimony that he had known Hakim for 10 years would have been sufficient. Hakim therefore contends that the government elicited the testimony about his faith in an attempt to peg him as a potential terrorist in the minds of the jurors and that such use of race or ethnicity is improper. See, e.g., Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 113 (3d Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>). As noted above, because Hakim\u2019s lawyer did Holdings: 0: holding that summary judg ment was not appropriate where the agency limited its search to one record system without making clear that the single system was the only possible place that responsive records are likely to be located and stating that at the very least the agency was required to explain in its affidavit that no other record system was likely to produce responsive documents 1: holding the evidence supported the inference that the victim was not released in a safe place where the victim overpowered the defendants and effected his own escape 2: holding relevance of evidence is established by any showing however slight that the evidence makes it more or less likely that the defendant committed the crime in question 3: holding that the victims statement was inadmissible when made two to three hours after victim was allegedly raped because the victims testimony supported the conclusion that her statement was made with conscious reflection 4: holding that where the prosecutor suggested that the fact that the black defendant was married to a white woman allegedly showing his preference for white women made it more likely he had raped the white victim racially or ethnically based prosecutorial arguments have no place in our system of justice", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "pet.). The Bisby Court held that a defendant\u2019s attempt to introduce evidence at the punishment phase of the trial that he was not the person who shot complainant was irrelevant because it concerned his guilt or innocence, not the proper punishment. Bisby, 907 S.W.2d at 959-60. Likewise, the Garcia Court upheld the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the defendant\u2019s attempt to introduce impeachment evidence that the State\u2019s witnesses had consumed more alcohol at the time of the incident than they had admitted to because \u201c[s]uch impeachment evidence might be collateral testimony regarding appellant\u2019s guilt, but would be of no import in determining punishment so as to require reversal.\u201d Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 499; see also Oregon v. Guzek, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1228, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006) (<HOLDING>). We hold that, in a case like this where there Holdings: 0: holding that trial court abused its discretion to admit at the punishment phase of the defendants capital murder trial a photograph of the murder victim and her unborn child lying in a casket 1: holding that there is no eighth of fourteenth amendment rights to present alibi evidence at punishment phase of capital murder trial 2: holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the eighth amendments guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment 3: holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial 4: holding that because pretrial detainees fourteenth amendment rights are comparable to prisoners eighth amendment rights the same standards apply", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "requirements\u201d, (id. at \u00b6\u00b6 129 & 130), as well as a statement in the First Quarter 10-Q that \u201c[w]e continuously monitor our liquidity requirements and believe that our facilities and access to the capital markets provide sufficient liquidity to meet our business requirements.\u201d (Id. at \u00b6 145.) Further alleged are statements in the registration statement and prospectus that: (1) the \u201crisks [of counterparty relationships] are enhanced during periods of commodity price fluctuations. Defaults by suppliers and other counterparties may adversely affect Constellation Energy\u2019s financial results\u201d; and (2) \u201c[a] downgrade in Constellation Energy\u2019s credit ratings could negatively affect its ability to s in original); Hillson Partners Ltd. P\u2019ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Holdings: 0: holding that mere statements of opinion or prediction such as future profits or how well a business will do in a particular market may not be a basis for a fraud or misrepresentation action because predictions are not past or present material facts 1: holding that statements that 1992 will produce excellent results for adage and adage is on target toward achieving the most profitable year in its history were predictions as to future events not statements as to present facts let alone guarantees and were therefore immaterial as a matter of law 2: holding that in texas future predictions and opinions especially those regarding the future profitability of a business cannot as a matter of law form a basis for fraud 3: holding that vague on schedule and on track statements were immaterial misrepresentations 4: holding that future predictions and opinions especially those regarding future profitability of business cannot form basis for fraud as matter of law", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that [i]t is common knowledge that unlawful street drugs do not come with warranties of purity or quality associated with lawfully acquired drugs such as alcohol. Thus, unlike alcohol, unlawful street drugs are frequently not the substance they purport to be or are contaminated with other substances not apparent to the naked eye. 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 221 Cal.Rptr. 631, 637 (1985); see Minn.Stat. \u00a7 152.01, subd. 9a (2006) (defining a controlled-substanee \u201cmixture\u201d as \u201ca preparation, compound, mixture, or substance containing a controlled substance, regardless of purity\u201d). Appellant cites several cases from other state and federal jurisdictions, arguing the availability of such a defense. See, e.g., People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill.App.3d 107, 28 Ill.Dec. 422, 390 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (1979) (<HOLDING>); but cf. People v. Hari, 218 Ill.2d 275, 300 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense 1: holding that defendants constitutional right to travel was not abridged when he was ordered not to make contact with the victim he attempted to rape 2: holding that the defendant had abandoned any possessory or privacy interest in bags found in the truck he was driving where he stated that he did not own the bags did not know who did and did not know what was in them 3: holding district court erroneously preclud ed evidence of involuntary intoxication as a defense to charge of rape based on defendants offer of proof that he smoked marijuana which he did not know contained angel dust and voluntarily drank alcohol the combined effect of which led to the defendants involuntary acts 4: holding that defense counsels failure to present voluntary intoxication as a defense in a capitalmurder prosecution was not beyond the range of reasonable professional judgment and thus did not amount to ineffective assistance in view of inconsistency of intoxication defense with deliberateness of the defendants actions during the shootings", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "W. Reginald Rose, Jr., and Laura J. Rose appeal pro se from the district court\u2019s order dismissing their civil rights complaint for failing to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the Roses\u2019 complaint without prejudice and granted leave to amend. Rather than filing an amended complaint or obtaining a final order of dismissal from the district court, the Roses filed a notice of appeal. We therefore lack jurisdiction. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). DISMISSED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order 1: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order 2: holding that a district courts dismissal that expressly grants leave to amend is not final and that a final judgment must be obtained before such a case becomes appealable 3: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence 4: holding that when a district court expressly grants leave to amend it is plain that the order is not final", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "they pay for the kits. In evaluating these arguments, two things must be kept in mind. First, while in-person telemarketing calls may be harassing to the consumer, they do not violate the TCPA. It is only when the calls are \u201crobo-calls\u201d or are made to persons on the do-not-call list that the calls violate the Act. Accordingly, assisting a party in setting up telemarketing centers or providing scripts for in-person calls is not evidence of agency. Second, \u201ca distributor of goods for resale is normally not treated as an agent of the manufacturer. Restatement of the Law of Agency, 2d \u00a7 14J (1957) (\u2018One who receives goods from another for resale to a third person is not thereby the other\u2019s agent in the transaction.\u2019); Stansifer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 487 F.2d 59, 64-65 (9th Cir. 1973) (<HOLDING>).\u201d Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 Holdings: 0: holding that plea agreement with drug enforcement agency agent not enforceable when agent was not authorized by united states attorney to enter agreement 1: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent 2: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 3: holding that nonexclusive distributor was not agent of manufacturer where distributorship agreement expressly stated distributor is not an agent 4: holding that a spouse is not necessarily an agent of the debtor", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was decided only under MCR 2.116(0(10). See Cuddington v United Health Servs, Inc, 298 Mich App 264, 270; 826 NW2d 519 (2012) (concluding that if a party moved for summary disposition under multiple subrules and the trial court ruled on the motion without specifying the subrule under which it decided an issue, and the court considered documentary evidence beyond the pleadings, this Court reviews the decision as if it were based on MCR 2.116(0(10)). 3 Plaintiff\u2019s hostile work environment claim is based on alleged discrimination based on sex, not on allegations of sexual harassment. In this case, we assume that a hostile environment claim may be maintained on the basis of conduct involving plaintiff\u2019s gender. See Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 368 & n 6; 547 NW2d 314 (1996) (<HOLDING>). RIORDAN, J. (concurring in part and Holdings: 0: holding that denial of vsf benefits to disabled retirees does not violate the ada the rehabilitation act 29 usc  791 et seq or the age discrimination in employment act of 1967 29 usc  621 et seq and that plaintiffs due process and first amendment claims were frivolous 1: holding that discharged black employe had right of action under title vii of civil rights act of 1964 42 usc  2000e et seq to assert discrimination claim notwithstanding arbitrators finding pursuant to collective bargaining agreement that employe was discharged for cause 2: recognizing that federal courts have held that harassing behavior based on ethnicity and age is violative of title vii 42 usc 2000e et seq and assuming without deciding   that a hostile environment claim may be maintained on conduct involving a plaintiffs gender age or national origin 3: holding that the same standard applies to claims of discrimination based upon gender and age 4: recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "be improper and (2) prejudicially affect the defendant\u2019s substantial rights. United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir.2006). \u201cA defendant\u2019s substantial rights are prejudicially affected when a reasonable probability arises that, but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). In recognizing the government\u2019s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we have recognized that a prosecutor\u2019s comment may be so prejudicial as to shift the burden of proof. United States v. Simon, 964 F.2d 1082, 1086 (11th Cir. 1992). However, the prejudice from a prosecutor\u2019s comments that may result in burden-shifting can be cured by a court\u2019s instructions regarding the burden of proof. Id. at 1087; see also Hernandez, 145 F.3d at 1439 (<HOLDING>). Here, the prosecutor\u2019s statements did not Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 1: holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify 2: holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge 3: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 4: recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "support his claim with respect to Caine, defendant attaches Caine\u2019s original and amended motions to suppress. These motions allege that Caine was not informed of his Miranda rights, that the police officers promised him leniency, that the police officers struck him in the head and kicked him in the stomach, and that he was intoxi cated when he gave his statement. The motions, however, do not identify any of the officers involved or describe with any particularity misconduct similar to what defendant suffered. Without some evidence indicating that the same officers or supervisors were involved or that the same type of misconduct was involved, we have no basis upon which to conclude that this evidence was relevant to defendant\u2019s claims. See People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 312 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Rowland\u2019s affidavit alleges that the officers Holdings: 0: holding that because the allegations purportedly suppressed by the government were not material an evidentiary hearing further exploring the  allegations themselves and the governments knowledge of the allegations is unnecessary 1: holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim 2: holding that plaintiffs allegations of abuse did not amount to the allegations of torture required by  1605a7 to survive a motion to dismiss 3: holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false 4: holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "agents in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Finding no error, we affirm. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when the Government \u201cdeliberately elicit[s]\u201d incriminating statements from a criminal defendant after he has been indicted and outside the presence of counsel. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); see United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 604 (4th Cir.1998). However, this right is \u201cnot violated whenever \u2014 by luck or happenstance \u2014 the [Government] obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached.\u201d Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Here, the district court found no evidence Holdings: 0: holding that merely because questioning was designed to produce incriminating responses took place at the police station and occurred only after the defendant was identified as a suspect did not trigger miranda 1: recognizing routine booking question exception observing that the underlying rationale for the exception is that routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation because they do not normally elicit incriminating responses and holding that where questions regarding normally routine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating information the questioning constitutes interrogation subject to the strictures of miranda   citations omitted 2: holding that an interrogation occurs when there is express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the police other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect 3: holding that a comment made by one police officer to another in the presence of the accused expressing concern that handicapped children might come across a shotgun is not a statement designed to elicit an incriminating response 4: holding that defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action beyond merely listening that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (\u201cThe bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in Federal courts extends to States and state officials in appropriate circumstances ... but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.\u201d). The only Eleventh Amendment question here is whether the Holmes County Court, which is responsible for the policies of its Clerk\u2019s Office and Judge Irving, should be considered an \u201carm of the state\u201d and thus vested with sovereign immunity. We do not write on a blank slate. Several years ago, we held that an Ohio court of common pleas was an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914, 118 S.Ct. 298, 139 L.Ed.2d 229 (1997); see also Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). This case is factually very similar to Holdings: 0: holding that because a county is not a person for purposes of a section 1983 claim it cannot be sued where the remedy sought is monetary damages 1: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 2: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 3: holding state university is not a person under  1983 4: holding that an ohio municipal court could not be sued under  1983 because it was not a person as  1983 uses that term", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "clause is an essential constitutional restriction on the power of the legislature to enact laws. To disallow a citizen legal redress to contest a law on the grounds that it violates the single-subject clause is a clear threat to the essential nature of the operation of the legislative branch of state government as guaranteed by the constitution. The joinder of two or more unconnected matters in a bill is no mere irregularity. The single-subject clause goes to the heart of the legislative process mandated by the people of the State of Iowa when they adopted our constitution. Therefore, I would apply the doctrine of great public importance, waive the requirement of standing, and allow Godfrey\u2019s challenge to proceed. See Sloan v. Wilkins, 362 S.C. 430, 608 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, I would reverse the judgment of Holdings: 0: holding the doctrine of great public importance allows a citizen to challenge a bill under the singlesubject clause of the south carolina constitution 1: holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery 2: holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution 3: recognizing south carolina as a jurisdiction where service on statutory agent is exclusive 4: recognizing south carolina as the governing law and finding no south carolina cases directly on point the court referred to applicable law from other jurisdictions", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "creating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the [constitutionally proscribable] purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim\u201d), 374 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that the First Amendment prohibits the conviction of a person for cross burning without the intent to intimidate, but concluding that the number of such convictions likely to occur under the Virginia statute was too small to render the statute facially overbroad). 20 Pet. for Review, State v. Schaler, No. 81864-9, at 13 (Wash. Aug. 19, 2008) (conceding that \u201c[t]he true threat test is determined under an objective standard that focuses on the speaker\u201d (citing Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 44)). 21 Majority at 900. 22 United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 976-82 (10th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, Holdings: 0: holding after long discussion of the various opinions in black that that case established that a defendant can be constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened 1: holding that the district courts finding that an allegedly coercive threat did not specifically motivate the defendants confession where 1 there was no evidence that the threat was repeated at the police station 2 defendant offered no admissible evidence that the threat was the crucial factor motivating his confession and 3 he confessed immediately after the officer threatened to administer a gun residue test as opposed to confessing immediately after the allegedly coercive threat was made thus the gunresidue test was just as plausible a motivating factor for the confession as was the threat 2: holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm 3: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death 4: holding that threat occurring 36 days before possession of firearm not present threat", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "FDC Corporation was not final, but merely pending. Appellee argues that NMSA 1978, Section 53-16-11 (Repl.Pamp.1983), the statute addressing a corporation\u2019s distribution of assets upon dissolution, can be read to require payment by the corporation of all final debts before making any provisions for any pending claims. However, nothing in that statute or in the New Mexico Business Corporation Act suggests that the legislature intended that final claims have priority over contingent claims. At the time FDC\u2019s assets were distributed, Smith had a contingent claim with no precise amount owing. Nonetheless, it is clear that appellee Cox had knowledge of the lawsuit and knew that the corporation would have no assets to pay any ensuing judgment amount. See Robar Dev. Corp., 408 A.2d at 853 (<HOLDING>). Smith\u2019s pending lawsuit did constitute a Holdings: 0: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 1: holding that when one corporation transfers its assets to another the receiving corporation is not responsible for debts of transferor unless it agrees to assume these debts 2: holding that a corporation could not dissolve and distribute its assets without providing for contingent claims 3: holding that disaffiliated church had de facto dissolved when last vote of its full membership was to dissolve and to transfer assets to mother church 4: holding that a lawsuit against a corporation that purchased assets from a bankrupt is not a claim against the debtor", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "matter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie\u2019s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (<HOLDING>). As did the Florida Supreme Court in Delap v. Holdings: 0: holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire 1: holding that when the purpose of the request is to compare the testimony of jurors but no such comparison was made at the trial level a court need not provide a free voir dire transcript 2: holding that trial minutes were not sufficient substitute for transcript of voir dire and could not afford meaningful review when both sides exercised peremptory challenges 3: holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial 4: holding that missing portions of transcript of voir dire did not entitle the defendant to a new trial for murder because the alleged errors in jury selection were harmless as a matter of law", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "criticizes Winchester for dispensing \u201cvague instructions [that] provided little guidance to other courts or future litigants on how to determine from \u2018the circumstances\u2019 whether a claimant satisfies the situs test.\u201d Op. at 390. However, in the thirty-three years since it was passed, Winchester has not proven to be overly vague or unworkable. Indeed, the standard is clear enough that since 1980, there have been only nine cases in this circuit where the meaning of \u201cadjoining area\u201d was contested. Moreover, few of these cases challenged the application of Winchester to land-based operations. Coastal Prod. Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 555 F.3d 426 (5th Cir.2009) (deciding that fixed loading platform was a maritime situs); Thibodeaux v. Grasso Prod. Mgmt. Inc., 370 F.3d 486 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Boomtown Belle Casino v. Bazor, 313 F.3d 300 Holdings: 0: holding employer satisfied its burden of production 1: holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs 2: holding that a fixed oil production platform was not a covered situs 3: holding injury at premises adjacent to the houston ship channel occurred on a covered situs 4: holding that floating casino was not a covered situs", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "also cite In re Jartran, Inc., 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.1989), but that case is distinguishable as it deals with administrative expense priority, not post-confirmation assets or claims. We find, moreover, that the trustee is the proper party to bring this action. The Donaldsons admit that the creditors would have standing to bring this claim. Br. at 22. The trustee, as the appointed representative of the creditors, is empowered by the bankruptcy court to represent their interests. \u201cProperty of the bankrupt remains in custodia legis in the bankruptcy court during the period ... after the discharge of the trustee ... remaining] dormant, in the estate, until the bankruptcy court again appoints a trustee as enforcing guardian.\u201d Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885, 893 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). D. Res Judicata The Donaldsons contend that Holdings: 0: holding that a debtor must make a specific and unequivocal reservation of claims that would effectively put its creditors on notice of any claim it wishes to pursue after confirmation 1: holding that controlling shareholder of postconfirmation debtor could not pursue unlisted preconfirmation claim on behalf of creditors 2: holding that the creditors committee could not sue third party aidersandabettors because the participation of the sole shareholder and decisionmaker of the debtor rendered the debtor a participant 3: holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor 4: holding that sole shareholder could recover on behalf of company but not in individual capacity for former shareholder and officers misappropriation of corporate assets", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that will reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant as required and the safety of any other person in the community are set forth in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3142(g). They include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or a federal crime of terrorism, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the history and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed if the defendant is released. A danger to the eom- munity does not only include physical harm or violent behavior. The concept of \u201csafety\u201d may include non-physical harm. United States v. Giampa, 904 F.Supp. 235, 358 (D.N.J.1995); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d. Holdings: 0: holding that preventative detention under bail reform act justified by the need to prevent danger to the community was regulatory and preventative rather than punitive 1: holding that a defendants propensity to commit crime generally even if the resulting harm would be not solely physical may constitute sufficient risk of danger to come within contemplation of the bail reform act 2: holding that to come under the act the harm must be caused by a failure of something a worker is using to support himself 3: holding that nursing home owed duty not to subject resident to unreasonable risk of harm at hands of coresident with known propensity for violence 4: holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for determining whether a war-rantless search of a probationer is reasonable is whether the police or probation officer has a well-founded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred. The determination of whether a probationer\u2019s right to privacy has been violated is dependent, then, on the nature of the search conducted and is not dependent on the nature of the proceeding in which the fruits of the search are to be admitted. Id. at 1095 (emphasis original, internal footnotes and citations omitted). Appellant also cites Mason v. State, 838 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that \u201c[ejvidence that is obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible over objection in a probation revocation hearing\u201d), and State v. Dodd, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982) (<HOLDING>). The Commonwealth, in its brief, cites a Holdings: 0: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 1: holding that the exclusionary rule embodied in the search and seizure provision of the state constitution applies in probation revocation proceedings 2: holding that probation and parole revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings such that the state exclusionary rule applies but noting that police misconduct which shocks the conscience may lead to invocation of the exclusionary rule 3: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 4: holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "allowed to represent himself at trial requires answers to two principal questions: whether the defendant is competent to represent himself at trial, see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170, 177-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379, [2387-88], 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), ... and whether the request to proceed pro se is genuine, see, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817, 95 S.Ct. [at 2532] (it is the defendant's \"basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so\u201d (emphasis added)). U.S. v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261, 270 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 917, 184 L.Ed.2d 704 (2013). 57 . A similar argument was made and rejected in Hacker v. Herbert, 825 F.Supp. 1143, 1148-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 58 . Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.11, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1873 n.11, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ir. 1973) (<HOLDING>). 64 . Birdwell, 10 S.W.3d at 77. 65 . Holdings: 0: holding moving to proceed pro se after jury was impaneled but before it was sworn was timely as a matter of law 1: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se 2: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial 3: holding no presumption of acquiescence because defendant was never allowed to proceed pro se 4: holding that a rule 121 colloquy is required only in response to a timely and unequivocal invocation of the right to proceed pro se", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a non-decision-maker\u2019s discriminatory motives \u201csomehow influenced\u201d or \u201caffected\u201d the decision-maker. Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992) (affirming summary judgment for employer because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that his supervisor\u2019s racial animus had somehow influenced or affected the decision of two other managers to terminate him; the managers\u2019 decision was based on an independent investigation of the plaintiffs conduct); see also Dey, supra, 28 F.3d at 1459 (\u201cSummary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.\u201d) (citations omitted); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). There is no question that there was Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false 1: holding that summary judgment was improper even though the committee that formally terminated the plaintiff harbored no discriminatory animus the plaintiffs manager who harbored animus had tainted the committees decision by characterizing the plaintiff as a poor performer thereby rendering the committee a conduit of his prejudice 2: holding that the determinative question is whether the plaintiff has submitted evidence that a supervisors  animus was a cause of the termination 3: holding that cbs could raise the faragherellerth defense because even though the plaintiff was sexually harassed and terminated the evidence showed that plaintiff was terminated for leaving his camera during a live broadcast 4: holding that the plaintiff further must demonstrate that the conspiracy was motivated by a class based animus such as race", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may not be unreasonable for counsel to decide to proceed with a late filing in order to preserve WRIA\u2019s action in court. The question, however, is whether counsel\u2019s arguments justifying his non-compliance with the statutory filing requirement are \u201cwarranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.\u201d USCIT R. 11. (a) Argument under existing law: It is well established under Georgetown Steel that a civil action under 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1516a(a)(2) must be commenced by two steps specified in that section: the filing of a summons within 30 days of the date of publication of the determination in the Federal Register; and the filing of a complaint within 30 days thereafter. Georgetown Steel, 4 Fed. Cir. (T) at 146-49, 801 F.2d at 1311-13 (<HOLDING>); Pistachio Group of Ass\u2019n of Food Indus., Inc. Holdings: 0: holding that tenant had received more than 30 days to correct violations of the lease when the notice was served on february 27 and the complaint was filed on april 4 1: holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment 2: holding that prejudgment interest should accrue 30 days after fee petition was filed 3: holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction 4: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "apparent on the statute\u2019s face and the question of their enforcement duties, if any, was not considered in the decision declaring the statutes unconstitutional, nor were the merits of the proposition otherwise litigated. Moreover, where, as here, the state defendants include members of the judiciary who \u201cenjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial eapaeitie[s],\u201d Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 735, 100 S.Ct. at 1976, it is particularly important to give careful consideration as to whether liability is properly based upon the exercise of their enforcement authority since imposition of a fees award might be erroneously premised upon acts or omissions as to which the defendants are immune. See id. at 738, 100 S.Ct. at 1977 (<HOLDING>). Unquestionably, with respect to the Holdings: 0: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees 1: holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal 2: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees 3: holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency 4: holding district jourts award of attorneys fees was erroneous since court relied upon a theory of liability under which defendants had immunity", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "499 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014El Paso 1973, no writ) (inadvertence by secretary in failing to note on calendar date answer was due); Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 469 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.Civ. App.\u2014Tyler 1971, no writ) (attorney forgot to prepare answer when his secretary placed the file with his general files rather than his active files); and Reynolds v. Looney, 389 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1965, writ ref\u2019d n.r.e.) (the citation was mislaid in insurance company\u2019s office). 3 . The willingness of a party to go to trial immediately and pay the expenses of the default judgment are important factors for the court to look to in determining whether it should grant a new trial. They are not dispositive of whether the motion should be granted. See Cliff, 724 S.W.2d at 779 (<HOLDING>); Angelo, 713 S.W.2d at 98 (noting that courts Holdings: 0: holding that motion for a new trial whether for guilt or punishment requires a valid legal claim a court cannot grant a new trial unless the defendant shows that he is entitled to one under the law 1: holding that an offer to reimburse plaintiff for costs is not a precondition but an important factor for trial court to look at in determining whether it should grant a new trial 2: holding that the trial court can and should grant a new trial if the manifest weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict 3: holding that court should not use ending date of indictment as determination of when continuing violation ended but should look at the evidence introduced at trial 4: recognizing that an appellate court reviews a trial courts decision whether or not to grant equitable relief only for an abuse of discretion", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "standard for searches of the two. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court\u2019s findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013). All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case, the government. Id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees: \u201cThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment\u2019s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to probationers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, -11 (11th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carter, 566 F.3d 970, 973-75 Holdings: 0: holding that a probationers challenge to a condition of his probation was moot in light of the supreme courts reversal of the underlying conviction and the probationers apparent completion of probation  1: holding search provision in probation order constitute a reasonable and necessary element of the courts regulation of probationers which did not require the defendants consent 2: holding search of probationers computer by probation officers was reasonable even in absence of a search provision when conditions on probationers computer use reduced his expectation of privacy in his computer 3: holding that a roommate with shared access to anothers computer has common authority over the computer and can grant consent to search 4: holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "prosecutor began his rebuttal direct examination by asking Sergeant DeGraff whether Turbe had asked him to call the F.B.I., and whether Turbe had called the F.B.I. himself. The prosecutor properly posed these questions in order to disprove Turbe\u2019s statement that he had asked the police to call the F.B.I. for him after he was arrested. See United States v. Chrzanowski, 502 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1974) (\u201cThe proper function and purpose of rebuttal testimony is to explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence of the adverse party.\u201d). Sergeant DeGraff responded to both questions in the negative. Without any further questioning by the for the prosecutor to question Turbe regarding the prior seizure of weapons from his house. See United States v. Jackson, 339 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vallie, 284 F.3d 917, 921-22 Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecutors question to the defendant about a prior unrelated offense was improper 1: holding prosecutors reference in closing argument to defendants prior conviction constituted an introduction of evidence so extremely unfair as to violate fundamental conceptions of justice and thus a deprivation of defendants right to due process 2: holding that the prosecutors indirect reference to a defendants prior conviction was improper 3: holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error 4: holding that the prosecutors reference to the nonexistence of mitigating evidence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that duty being to exercise reasonable care for the invitee's protection while she is on the premises. Id. Landowners owe a licensee the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring her or acting in a manner to increase her peril. Id. This includes the duty to warn a licensee of any latent danger on the premises of which the landowner has knowledge. Id. Finally, the duty owed to a trespasser is the duty merely to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring her after discovering her presence. Id. However, even when dealing with an invitee, the landowner's duty of care is not limitless. The most common example of the limitation is when an invitee exceeds the scope of invitation, she loses her status. See Markle v. Hacienda Mexican Rest., 570 N.E.2d 969, 974 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Further, a landowner is not liable if the Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired 1: holding that even though the declarant was not in danger she was experiencing an ongoing emergency because she did not know where her children were and she feared for their safety 2: holding that the district court did not err in failing to address the defendant personally to determine whether she understood the rights she was waiving by admitting that she violated the conditions of her probation 3: holding that even though a visitor may be an invitee when she first enters the premises her status may change to licensee while she is there if the use to which she puts the property is not within the scope of the invitation 4: holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "respondent mother made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to counsel before permitting her to do so and to proceed pro se, the trial court erred. See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581, 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (\u201cBefore a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied.\u201d (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107, 132 L. Ed. 2d 263, 115 S. Ct. 2256 (1995); State v. McLeod, 197 N.C. App. 707, 715, 682 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2009) (\u201cN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 makes it clear that the defendant must be advised of the aforementioned inquiries before being allowed to proceed pro se.\u201d (emphasis added)). See also State v. Moore, 362 N.C. 319, 326, 661 S.E.2d 722, 726-27 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the TPR order must be vacated. Holdings: 0: holding courts inquiry into probationers expressed desire to proceed pro se did not satisfy nc gen stat  15a1242 when court merely ascertained that probationer did not have counsel did not desire counsel and understood that he could have had counsel appointed court failed to inquire as to whether probationer understood and appreciated consequences of his decision and court failed to ascertain whether probationer comprehended nature of charges and proceedings and range of permissible punishments that he faced 1: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se 2: holding that a defendants decision to proceed pro se was voluntary despite having to choose between that course and proceeding with counsel with whom he had expressed dissatisfaction because the defendant had not shown good cause for substitution of counsel 3: holding that later colloquy that took place between defendant and trial court concerning defendants decision to waive counsel did not cure earlier failure by court to fulfill requirements of nc gen stat  15a1242 because it did not take place until first day of defendants sentencing proceeding more than five months after defendant was permitted to proceed without assistance of counsel and approximately two months after defendant proceeding pro se pleaded guilty to murder 4: holding new trial was warranted where trial court did not make adequate determination pursuant to nc gen stat  15a1242 whether defendants decision to proceed pro se was knowingly intelligently and voluntarily made", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The Brecht rule applies even when the \u201cfederal habeas court is the first to review for harmless error.\u201d Gilliam v. Mitchell, 179 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir.1999). Under Brecht, a Doyle error only warrants reversal if the mistake \u201chad substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637,113 S.Ct. 1710. A \u201creasonable possibility\u201d that the error influenced the outcome is not enough to warrant relief. Id. Rather, the defendant must show a \u201creasonable probability\u201d that the error af fected the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The present case is not distinguishable on its facts from Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (<HOLDING>). There is no reasonable probability that Holdings: 0: holding that an error must have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict to entitle a petitioner to habeas relief 1: holding that states improper use of defendants postmiranda silence was error but did not warrant habeas relief unless error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jurys verdict 2: holding that nonconstitutional error is harmless if it did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict 3: holding that a substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict 4: holding that the states improper use of the defendants postmiranda silence to impeach the defendants claim that shooting was accidental did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining jurys verdict and thus was harmless error", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "customers were common in the industry, and pointed out that plaintiffs had not pleaded specifically how the individual defendants had acted fraudulently by counting such customers in a manner common to the industry. Id. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs have added \u00b6 45(a), in which they allege that although Heartland represented in the press release that soft disconnects were common in the industry, \u201cthe counting of soft disconnects as \u2018active\u2019 subscribers is not, and to so count them was materially misleading.\u201d Am.Compl. \u00b6 45(a). Plaintiffs offer no facts to support their conclusory assertion that it was not customary in the industry to count soft disconnects as active subscribers. This allegation is insufficient as a matter of law to plead scienter. See Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1020 (<HOLDING>). Nor do they address the other defects that Holdings: 0: holding that bare allegations about industry custom are inadequate to plead scienter 1: holding that the nonmoving party may not defeat a summary judgment motion by standing on the bare allegations in the pleadings 2: holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract 3: holding that plaintiffs bare allegations of malice do not suffice particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs own claims that defendants actions were financially motivated 4: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court\u2019s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (<HOLDING>); Kirschberg v. Lowe, 974 S.W.2d 844, 847-48 Holdings: 0: holding that a timely filed motion for sanctions which specifically requested modification of judgment extended trial courts plenary power 1: holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency 2: recognizing that the idea bars an award of attorneys fees for work performed subsequent to a settlement offer of all requested relief 3: holding that timely filed motion for sanctions which requested an award of over 40000 in attorneys fees requested a substantial change in the judgment 4: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "385 (1991). Insofar as Bowling may be claiming that this alleged state-law error violated due process, we believe that any potential error was not so fundamentally unfair as to violate Bowling\u2019s due-process rights. Insofar as Bowling may be claiming that this alleged error entitled him to an evidentiary hearing in federal court, we have considered and rejected this claim immediately above. 10 . There is a violation of state law here, however, because during the period between Caldwell and Dugger (and before the trial in this case), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the word \"recommend,\u201d while technically accurate, improperly suggested to the jury that they were \"merely one step in a long process.\u201d Tamme v. Commonwealth, 759 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Ky.1988); cf. Kordenbrock, 919 F.2d at 1101 (<HOLDING>). We do not believe this violation of state law Holdings: 0: holding that appeal from a decision of the attorney general denying legal representation was before the appellate division as of right to review the final decision of a state officer 1: holding that there was no violation of state law because the trial and appeal in the case at bar happened before the decision in tamme and the decision in tamme was not retroactive 2: holding that the court of appeals in applying state law on appeal of a diversity action must apply law of the state as it existed at the time of its decision rather than as it stood at the time the case was decided in district court 3: holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case 4: holding that even when there is a conflict of evidence before the commission and the evidence was such that the commission could have reasonably reached a contrary decision the commissions decision was not arbitrary and capricious", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Service; that Zou insufficiently explained material omissions in his earliest affidavit; and that Zou\u2019s version of events was not consistent with the documentary evidence he submitted. We agree that there is substantial evidence in the record for the IJ\u2019s adverse credibility determination against Zou and for the IJ\u2019s decision to deny Zou asylum. We have carefully considered all of Zou\u2019s arguments and find them to be without merit. Those arguments and supporting materials raised for the first time in this court without being properly presented to the IJ or the BIA cannot be considered; our jurisdiction is limited to the evidence in the record. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1105a(a)(4)(1994); 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(4)(A)(2000); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons set forth above, the decision Holdings: 0: holding that the decision of the bia will not be affirmed by this court unless the reasons for such a finding are made clear 1: holding that the court of appeals committed clear error and seriously disregarded the agencys legally mandated role when it based its decision on information that had not been presented to the bia 2: holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where  it appears that the  court of appeals itself would not follow that decision 3: holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte 4: holding that under the arbitrary and capricious standard this court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cagencies do not waive a defense of untimely exhaustion merely by accepting and investigating a discrimination complaint.\u201d Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn order to waive a timeliness objection, the agency must make a specific finding that the claimant\u2019s submission was timely.\u201d). We now adopt this rule as well. Indeed, were we to do otherwise we would \u201cvitiate any incentive for [government] agencies to investigate and voluntarily remedy\u201d instances of discrimination, lest the agencies risk forfeiting a valid defense to a potential suit. Bruno v. Brady, Civ. No. 91-2605, 1992 WL 57920, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 16, 1992) (<HOLDING>). Because Belgrave failed to present the Holdings: 0: holding that 28 usc  1331 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity 1: holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver 2: holding an employees investigation of nothing more than his employers noncompliance with federal or state regulations does not state a whistleblower claim 3: holding that the ada does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity and thus does not apply to the federal government 4: holding that acceptance and investigation of a federal employees complaint does not constitute waiver", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), because it is \"inadequate\u201d); State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549 n.2 (Tenn.1979) (\"Where, ... as in the particular phase of search and seizure law under consideration, there has been a settled development of state constitutional law which does not contravene the federal, we are not inclined to overrule earlier decisions unless they are demonstrably erroneous.\u201d). While we recognize the rationale underlying the majority rule, we see no reason to depart from the standards of community care-taking that have developed in our state, particularly because neither party has articulated a persuasive basis for recognizing this as yet another exception to the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Lakin, 588 S.W.2d. at 549 (<HOLDING>). The Defendant has argued strongly against Holdings: 0: recognizing our jurisprudence in this area has been somewhat inconsistent and confusing 1: recognizing that in the context of the open fields doctrine ajlthough the decisions in this state may be somewhat more restrictive than those in other states or than federal decisions no compelling reason has been demonstrated in this case for modifying or overruling them 2: holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions 3: holding federal district courts do not have jurisdiction  over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state courts action was unconstitutional review of those decisions may be had only in this united states supreme court 4: holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Rule 404(b) prohibits introducing \u201c[e]vi-dence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person\u2019s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.\u201d Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). But the Government may offer otherwise inadmissible evidence to \u201cexplain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party.\u201d United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 329 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court appropriately permitted the Government to introduce the challenged evidence because Crow opened the door to such evidence. Crow\u2019s contention that he opened the door as to testimony from one witness, but not another, is at odds with this Court\u2019s precedent. See Higgs, 353 F.3d at 329-30 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, this claim lacks merit. We next Holdings: 0: holding that a threemember panel consisting of prison officials and potentially inmates is sufficiently impartial to adjudicate major infractions insofar as knowledge of the conditions of the prison environment is important to an understanding of the significance of events which occur therein prison officials and offenders theoretically comprise an ideal disciplinary hearing committee 1: holding that government was entitled to present rebuttal evidence of accuseds disciplinary infractions where accused presented testimony that he was avoiding trouble in prison 2: holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity 3: holding that the disclosure of proper rebuttal witness was not required 4: holding that police failure to inform the accused of his attorneys attempts to contact him and misstatements to the attorney as to whether the accused was at the police station did not violate the accuseds due process rights", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the \u201cresidual function\u201d test used in Social Security Act cases). Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in DePaoli that the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs disability claim was \u201cpremature\u201d because the plaintiff presented evidence that she was \u201cprecluded from more than merely the Abbott production line job.\u201d Id. at 673. In sum, because working is generally accepted as a major life activity, and be cause the determination whether a claimant is disabled depends on an individualized inquiry, the district court did not err in concluding that Burns was disabled because his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50% of the jobs previously available to him. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Burns\u2019s Status as a \u201cQualified Individual Holdings: 0: holding that it was proper for court to rely on affidavits of defendants representatives in negotiations because their personal knowledge and competence to testify are reasonably inferred from their positions and the nature of their participation in the matters to which they swore 1: holding that a reasonable jury could find the video clips were intended to be lascivious because the video camera involved in the production of the images was angled and zoomed such that the frame encompassed their nude bodies from their shoulders to below their knees 2: recognizing strong preference that children live in their own homes with their own families 3: holding that a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that the substantial percentage reductions 35  89 in the broad range of jobs available to the plaintiffs coupled with their own testimony about the effects of their disabilities on their work as production associates substantially limited them in the major life activity of working 4: holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim and they did so at their own risk", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is essentially the same discretionary issue originally decided\u201d by the BIA, we cannot review the decision because 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars jurisdiction. Id. A BIA ruling denying a motion to reopen because there is no prima facie case for relief under the hardship exception is such an instance of discretion. Id. In Fernandez, however, we reached the merits of due process claims stemming from the same discretionary denial. Id. at 603-04. To the extent the Cisneroses had colorable constitutional claims, we would have jurisdiction to adjudicate them under Fernandez. Id. Because direct appeal was available in this court, no Suspension Clause problem arises from the district court\u2019s lack of jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act. See Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The Suspension Clause does not require habeas Holdings: 0: holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record 1: holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts 2: holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available 3: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 4: holding that appellate review of an administrative agencys factual determinations is circumscribed", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "claiming that the district court failed to consider the effect that one of section 9(l)\u2019s three factors \u2014 the \u201cseriousness of the [defendant\u2019s] offense\u201d \u2014 had on its decision to dismiss without, as opposed to with, prejudice. Id. \u00a7 9(1). We find no abuse of discretion in the district court\u2019s dismissal of the indictment without prejudice. United States v. Kurt, 945 F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir.1991). The district court discussed section 9(l)\u2019s three-factor standard in its June 7, 2002 Order setting Smith\u2019s motion for hearing, and the Government argued the seriousness of Smith\u2019s offense at the hearing. Though the district court did not make an express finding to the effect, Smith\u2019s offense was, in fact, quite serious. See, e.g., United States v. Tummolo, 822 F.Supp. 1561, 1565 (S.D.Fla.1993) (<HOLDING>). Coupled with the district court\u2019s findings on Holdings: 0: holding that armed robbery suspect was entitled to bail hearing even though armed robbery was considered capital offense under mississippi law because maximum sentence was life imprisonment 1: holding the imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment was not excessive for conviction of possession of cocaine where defendant was adjudged to be a fourth felony offender with prior convictions for manslaughter two prior convictions for possession of cocaine and numerous arrests for drug offenses possession of a firearm by a felon aggravated battery and armed robbery 2: holding that possession of a firearm by a felon is a serious offense for  3162a2 purposes 3: holding that armed robbery and being a felon in possession are serious offenses for section 91 purposes 4: holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "counters that the Country Club was not a party, and if it was, it was no more than an affiliated successor-in-interest or surrogate of Catalina and had no independent right to excuse the district judge. We resolve the issue in favor of the City though on different grounds. {94} The right of peremptory excusal under Rule 1-088.1 is party specific. That is, each party has a separate right of excusal which cannot be affected by the actions of other parties in a case. Thus, in JMB Retail Props., Co. v. Eastburn, 114 N.M. 115, 118, 835 P.2d 831, 834 (1992) our Supreme Court clarified that only that party who requests a discretionary act of the judge will thereafter be precluded from later exercising a peremptory challenge. Saavedra v. Thomson, 114 N.M. 718, 719, 845 P.2d 812, 813 (1992) (<HOLDING>). {95} Here, the right of peremptory challenge Holdings: 0: holding improper counsels argument that opposing counsel knew why plaintiff delayed in bringing action where opposing counsels knowledge was not in evidence 1: holding that hearsay evidence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion 2: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 3: holding that not opposing a motion is not an affirmative act requesting discretionary action 4: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "United States Industries, 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1991). It may be argued that this principle does not apply where a non-moving party's testimony changes over a very brief period of time. Here, Mullins's testimony changed overnight. In any event, the disputes in the record are not material and this is dispositive. 20 . It is worth noting that in adopting this position to avoid the consequences of Maryland law, Mullins is taking a position inconsistent with her original contention that she was terminated in Maryland on March 26. 21 . See Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 82 Md.App. 577, 585, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990). 22 . See Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 49, 537 Holdings: 0: recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act 1: holding a claim for patronage dismissal was legally cognizable 2: recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge 3: holding that accountant terminated for refusing to violate professional codes stated cognizable claim for wrongful discharge 4: holding no legally cognizable claim for wrongful discharge where employee was terminated after seeking legal redress against a coworker for assault and battery", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to it, Massachusetts law does not provide for prejudgment interest to be included in uninsured motorist arbitration awards. However, as mentioned above, we have specifically held that arbitrators have the authority to award prejudgment interest in excess of policy limits and \u201cthat; arbitrators should add prejudgment interest to their awards unless the parties specifically provide otherwise by agreement.\u201d Sentry, 556 A.2d at 1000 (quoting Paola, 461 A.2d at 937) (emphasis added). Thus, we hold that defendant\u2019s argument that the arbitrator- awarded on a matter not submitted to him has no merit. Furthermore, we hold that any argument that defendant makes pursuant to the application of Massachusetts law was waived because it was not submitted to the arbitrator. See Aponik, 844 A.2d at 706 (<HOLDING>). The defendant admitted in the trial court and Holdings: 0: holding defendant liable for attorneys fees when the guaranty contract at issue provided for the payment of collection costs and expenses 1: recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs 2: holding that the failure to request attorneys fees and costs during arbitration waived any rights provided by the mechanics lien statute 3: holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable 4: holding that oncors request for the trial judge rather than the jury to determine the reasonableness of its attorneys fees and the failure to submit the question of attorneys fees to the jury resulted in a waiver of oncors claim for the recovery of attorneys fees", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "apartment # 3 constituted an illegal search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and the fruit of that search, which was the information that Jackson\u2019s key fit the lock, was used to obtain the search warrant for apartment # 3. Thus, Taylor argues that the corrected search warrant for apartment # 3 was tainted and invalid because it was fruit of the poisonous tree. The Eighth Circuit has not decided whether trying a key in a lock constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Dickson, 58 F.3d 1258, 1264 (8th Cir.), superseded on other grounds, 64 F.3d 409 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 747, 133 L.Ed.2d 695 (1996). The federal courts of appeals are split on this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 212-13 Holdings: 0: holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury 1: holding that although the owner of a lock has enough privacy interest in a keyhole to make the inspection of that lock a search the privacyinterest is so small that no probable cause is needed to inspect it 2: holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause 3: holding that the subjective intent of the officer is no longer determinative wjhen applying the objective test generally the only determination to be made is whether probable cause existed for the stop in question and that per whren a violation of traffic law provided sufficient probable cause to make the subsequent search and seizure reasonable 4: recognizing that a greater expectation of privacy exists in property that is carried on ones person so that probable cause is required", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "would even affect the payment of the JT & T parties\u2019 claim. The JT & T parties have not provided this court with any description of their claim or the assets out of which that claim could potentially be paid, much less pointed to evidence in the record to substantiate any such allegations. Without this kind of evidence, it is impossible to ascertain whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the JT & T parties would actually be harmed in their capacity as creditors by the grant of derivative standing. If, for example, the estate contains little of value aside from the fraudulent conveyance claims and the JT & T parties\u2019 claim is unsecured and subordinate to those of all other creditors, it is very possible that the JT & T p 94-1109, 1995 WL 66622, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.16, 1995) (<HOLDING>); Chemlen v. Bank of Ir. First Holdings, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that beneficiaries of an estate lacked standing under rico to sue for an injury derivative of the estates injury 1: holding that the debtors had standing to challenge the settlement of the estates right to sue various entities because the outcome of this litigation could potentially have a huge effect on the liabilities of the debtors and could give them a substantial surplus upon emerging from bankruptcy 2: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate 3: holding that debtors lacked appellate standing because they had not provided information regarding the estates other assets and liabilities the cost of litigation or other factors regarding the litigations impact on the estate 4: holding that the debtors false statements about the location of assets of the estate were material to the proceedings", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "may well be, as I have argued elsewhere, that there is something intrinsically immoral about condemning a man as a criminal while telling oneself, \"I believe that there is a chance of one in twenty that this defendant is innocent, but a 1/20 risk of sacrificing him erroneously is one I am willing to run in the interest of the public\u2019s \u2014 and my own\u2014 safety.\u201d 84 Harv.L.Rev. at 1372. 17 . As the majority points out, Judge Kennedy sat for twenty days, heard testimony from eight expert witnesses, admitted over 110 exhibits, and received over 1,300 pages of briefs. I want to go on record with a commendation for all counsel. 18 . Presumably the testimony of the complainant in this case will not need corroboration. 19 . See State v. Vandebogart, \u2014 N.H. \u2014, - \u2014, 616 A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H.1992) (<HOLDING>). 20 . The Committee has voiced serious concern Holdings: 0: holding that after review the minutes were unambiguous and the trial judge erred in admitting parol evidence 1: holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community 2: holding that trial court erred in admitting population frequency estimates used by fbi since such statistical techniques are not generally accepted among population geneticists because of the debate regarding population substructure 3: holding that determining corporate value may be done by including proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court 4: holding that no serious dispute exists as to whether the techniques involved in rflp analysis are generally accepted", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Weintraub and Resnick, Freezing, the Debtor\u2019s Account: A Banker\u2019s Dilemma Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100 Banking Law Journal 316, 321-22 (1983); Groschadl, \u201cFreezing\u201d the Debtor\u2019s Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic Stay?, 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 75, 77 (1983); Freeman, Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 Banking Law Journal 484, 506 (1980). Unquestionably, if the funds in the bank accounts are indeed cash collateral, that is, if the bank has a valid claim within 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 506(a), subject to a setoff not defeated by the exceptions in 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 553(a), then the debtor in possession must obtain the Court\u2019s authorization or the bank\u2019s consent before drawing on the funds, 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 363(c)(2). See Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. at 812 (<HOLDING>). Since, if the bank is right about the status Holdings: 0: holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13 1: holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case 2: holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power 3: recognizing the requirement of  363 to obtain approval or consent in a chapter 13 case 4: holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury\u2019 \u201d (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to \u201cprovide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants\u2019 CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants\u2019 motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), with Seri v. Town of Newtown, 573 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement 1: holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 2: holding five complaints of excessive force over twentytwomonth period sufficient to sustain jury verdict 3: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim 4: holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "968, 971 (1949) (\u201c[A] party having an option to declare a note due and payable cannot simply by his own secret intention, never disclosed by act or word, claim that he declared the note due and payable. The addition of the words \u2018without demand or notice\u2019 does not alter the requirement of an affirmative act of the holder of the note for the valid exercise of the option.\u201d); see also United States v. Rollinson, 866 F.2d 1463, 1467 (D.C.Cir.1989) (following precedent holding that, \u201cbecause acceleration was optional on the part of the holder, affirmative action ... must be taken to make it known to the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate\u201d) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alterations in original); United States v. Feterl, 849 F.2d 354, 357 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); United States v. Hosko, Holdings: 0: holding that as a general rule  affirmative action by the creditor must be taken to make it known to the debtor that the creditor has exercised his option to accelerate 1: recognizing need to balance interests of debt or and creditor in determining nature of protection to be afforded creditor 2: holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed 3: recognizing that when a creditor does not receive adequate notice the creditor is not bound by the confirmation order 4: holding that the creditor must prove the elements of actual fraud", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 183-210 (1984) [hereinafter 1983 Policy Statement with page references to Deception: FTC Oversight ]. The total impression test still forms the basis of the deception standard, id. at 184 n. 4 (discussing the \u201coverall impression\u201d created by a representation), but the FTC supplemented the test with additional requirements. Under the standard elucidated in 1983, deception requires not only a representation or omission that is likely to mislead, but also that: (1) the practice is likely to mislead the consumer who is acting reasonably in the circumstances; and (2) the representation or omission is material, that is, the consumer is likely to have chosen differently but for the deception. Id. at 184-86; see also FTC v. Wilcox, 926 F.Supp. 1091, 1098 (S.D.Fla.1995) (<HOLDING>). B. Unfairness The FTC standard on Holdings: 0: holding that a deceptive practice consists of a material representation or omission that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances 1: holding that a promissory statement of future intent which does not come to fruition is not an unfair or deceptive practice 2: recognizing purpose of ccpa as protection of consumers from unfair illegal or deceptive acts 3: holding in preemption case involving car manufacturer that material omission claims were preempted but that false representation claims survived 4: holding that treble damages are appropriate under ohio law when the seller engages in an unconscionable practice or deceptive act", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "672 (10th Cir. 1999). If it were otherwise, a party could just attach all of his evidence to a motion for dismissal and thereby vitiate the critical distinction between dismissal proceedings, which are supposed to challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and summary judgment proceedings, which properly encompass opposing evidence. As for substance, defendant\u2019s affidavit, indicating that the treatment recommended in 2007 was no longer appropriate in October 2008, does not demonstrate a difference of opinion as to the initial recommendation. And, of course, as Mr. Arocho has consistently claimed, the failure to treat his disease for such an interval itself may give rise to cognizable harm. See generally Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 92, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) Holdings: 0: holding potential damage to reputation to constitute irreparable harm 1: holding that temporaryinjunction orders simple recitation of conclusory statement that plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy does not satisfy rule 683s requirement that a temporary injunction order specify reasons why plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law 2: holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief 3: recognizing sufficiency of claim that prisoner will suffer irreparable damage if his hepatitis c disease goes untreated 4: holding the district courts of appeal have the ability to review a pretrial evidentiary order where the state would suffer irreparable harm if the order were not reviewed", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "its discretion in finding the former wife in contempt with regard to that provision of the agreement. The former wife also argues that the trial court erred by finding her in contempt for taking out a second mortgage on the marital residence because, she says, she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. We note, however, that the trial court could have disbelieved the former wife\u2019s testimony that she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. Clemons, 627 So.2d at 434. By taking out a second mortgage, the former wife made it impossible to comply with the agreement by giving the former husband a second mortgage. Thus, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s finding her in contempt as to this issue. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 494 So.2d 664, 666 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). V. Former Husband\u2019s Equity in the Marital Holdings: 0: holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce 1: holding that contempt finding was proper where the former wife attempted to directly thwart the divorce judgment and cloud the title to certain marital property by transferring her interest by deed to her sister 2: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney 3: holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property 4: holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "addressed the applicability of the Boren Amendment in that opinion: With the repeal of the Boren Amendment nothing remains that remotely resembles a federal right to reasonable and adequate rates. There is no federal statutory rate language to parse. There is only a state standard. It follows that there can be no prospective relief under \u00a7 1396(a)(13) and that the court must dismiss Heritage\u2019s reimbursement claim for lack of federal jurisdiction. 26 F.Supp.2d at 880. If the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary, HCMF should take that up in an appeal, not in a motion to amend. HCMF\u2019s motion to amend does not assert any new legal theory and, therefore, is futile. Thus, HCMF\u2019s motion to amend is denied. See Shafer v. Preston Mem\u2019l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int\u2019l Union, Holdings: 0: holding that amendment is futile if the proposed amended complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted 1: holding district court properly denied leave to amend where application was four months late and appeared to be futile 2: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile 3: holding that upon conclusion that plaintiffs proposed amendment was futile district court correctly denied plaintiffs motion to amend 4: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "after Atkins received the promotion. According to Akouri\u2019s testimony, when he asked why Atkins had been chosen for the promotion, Blanchard responded that \u201cthe people working in the crew are not the same that are working in the office. There is no black or Hispanic [employees] in the back. There is always \u2014 they are all white and they are not going to take orders from you, especially if you have an accent, and something like that.\u201d We deem this language direct evidence of discrimination. There is no mere suggestion or need for inferences because the statement relates directly to the DOT\u2019s decision to promote Atkins over Akouri as Assistant Maintenance Engineer and blatantly states that the reason he was passed over for the promotion was his ethnicity. See Carter, 132 F.3d at 642 (<HOLDING>). The statement itself clearly established that Holdings: 0: holding that direct evidence of a fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient but may also be more certain satisfying and persuasive 1: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence 2: holding that direct evidence by definition is evidence that does not require an inferential leap between fact and conclusion 3: holding that direct evidence of retaliation is lacking where the evidence if believed  would not require the conclusion that defendant unlawfully retaliated against plaintiff emphasis in original 4: holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "70 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (8th Cir.1995). 9 . It is undisputed that, under the City Personnel Rules, an employee can be disciplined for violating any order or direction when the violation amounts to either insubordination or a serious breach of proper discipline, for making false statements of material facts, or for attempting to practice any deception on the City. 10 . The defendants additionally argue that Burrell is no longer legally viable in light of Foy, 94 F.3d at 1528, and Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir.1995). This argument effectively asks us to hold that two subsequent panel opinions can implicitly overrule a prior panel opinion. Such a holding would run contrary to Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209-10 (11th Cir.1981)(en Holdings: 0: holding that precedent set by our panels binds all subsequent panels 1: recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels 2: holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels 3: holding that decisions by prior panels are binding 4: recognizing that our decision in cabello binds all subsequent panels of this court as to aiding and abetting liability", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "for a combination of the two methods, permitting enhanced lost-earnings estimates that include expected gains from experience, skill, and industry-wide productivity improvements, while prohibiting any discounting of that larger estimate. See id. at 579, 421 A.2d at 1036. What Kaczkowski failed to realize is that, because safe investments tend to offer a real interest rate that, while low, is above zero, the prospect of having a lump-sum award grow in real terms would approximately compensate for the victim\u2019s lost opportunity to benefit from these other factors \u2014 i.e., his increasing value to his employer due to skill and experience, as well as industry-wide productivity gains, presumably due to improved technology and business methods. Accord Pfeifer, 462 U.S. at 549, 103 S.Ct. at 2557 (<HOLDING>). Thus, from a theoretical standpoint, the Holdings: 0: recognizing that these two factors trigger similar concerns 1: holding that disparities in compensation were due to a number of permissible factors including seniority experience and performance 2: recognizing a sound economic argument for the totaloffset rule as applied to estimates that exclude these latter factors while only including individual seniority and promotion gains 3: recognizing these five factors 4: recognizing same factors", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is a schedule I controlled substance. Minn.Stat. \u00a7 152.02, subd. 2(6) (2006). Possession crimes require proof that the defendant \u201chad actual knowledge of the nature of the substance\u201d in his possession. 455 (1996) (\u201c[T]he only knowledge [required] in a possession of a controlled substance case is the defendant\u2019s knowledge or belief that the substance was a controlled or prohibited substance. The State is not required to prove the defendant knew the exact nature or precise chemical name of the substance.\u201d); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 415 Mass. 447, 614 N.E.2d 649, 653 (1993) (\u201cProof that the defendant knew the exact nature of the controlled substance is not an element of the crime [of trafficking].\u201d); People v. Bolden, 62 Ill.App.3d 1009, 20 Ill.Dec. 79, 379 N.E.2d 912, 916 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with this precedent from other Holdings: 0: holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance 1: holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance 2: holding that apprendi does not require the government to prove that defendant knew type and amount of controlled substance 3: holding that apprendi does not change the long established rule that the government need only show that the defendant knew he imported or possessed some controlled substance 4: holding that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the controlled substance he was convicted of delivering when evidence established that he knew it was a controlled substance", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in Alabama. This Court has consistently refused to allow a person to prosecute an action in a state court while another action on the same cause and against the same parties is pending in a federal court in this State.\u2019 \u201d Ex parte University of South Alabama Found., 788 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.2000) (quoting Weaver v. Hood, 577 So.2d 440, 442 (Ala. 1991) (citations in Weaver omitted in University of South Alabama)). Additionally, a compulsory counterclaim is considered an \u201caction\u201d for purposes of \u00a7 6-5-440. Penick v. Cado Sys. of Cent. Alabama, Inc., 628 So.2d 598, 599 (Ala.1993). As this Court has noted: \u201cThis Court has held that the obligation ... to assert compulsory counter claims, when read in conjunction with \u00a7 6-5-440, Ala.Code 1975, which prohi tr. Corp., 658 So.2d 414 (Ala.1995) (<HOLDING>). The petitioners argue that the claims alleged Holdings: 0: holding that new claims for damages could arise from actions that occurred subsequent to the judgment in the original action 1: holding that the prosecution in a subsequent action of claims that had been compulsory counterclaims in a previously filed declaratoryjudgment action violated  65440 2: holding that a party in an action pending in a federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus violated  65440 by commencing another action in a state court 3: holding a declaratoryjudgment action was proper to construe compulsory school attendance law and did not implicate governmental immunity 4: holding that a declaratoryjudgment action against the state that would affect property in which the state had an interest was barred by  14", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "because Cok failed to claim any exception or exemption from attachment under federal or state law. Regarding Cok\u2019s other contentions, Peterson suggests that because there were no funds in the registry of court, the court\u2019s order granting the motion to release such funds became moot. Therefore, he contends, Cok\u2019s motion to vacate that order was also moot. Peterson also suggests that there was no basis for Cok\u2019s new trial motion. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Peterson. With respect to the denial of Cok\u2019s motion to vacate, the motion justice did not abuse his discretion because \u2014 given the absence of such funds in the registry \u2014 the order granting the release of such funds became moot. Cf. Crystal Restaurant Management Corp. v. Calcagni, 732 A.2d 706, 710 (R.I.1999) (<HOLDING>). Once it became apparent that the court Holdings: 0: holding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and grant trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the supreme court will not upset the courts ruling unless there is a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion 1: holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court 2: holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court 3: holding that motions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of trial justice 4: holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court   citations omitted", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "determining the reasonableness of small business bids.\u201d 49 Comp.Gen. at 743. While noting that the provisions of the Small Business Act authorize the award of contracts to small businesses at prices higher than those obtainable by unrestricted competition, the GAO found no valid basis for concluding that the Act \u201cwas intended to require the award of contracts to small business concerns at prices considered unreasonable\u201d by the procurement officers. Id. at 742-43; see also No. B-149889 (November 2, 1962). The GAO held that the regulations \u201cproperly permit the withdrawal of a set-aside, based on a valid determination that bid prices received from small business concerns are unreasonable.\u201d Id. at 743. See also Boog-Allen Applied Research, No. B-179085 (November 5, 1973), 53 Comp.Gen. 307 (<HOLDING>); Society Brand, Inc.; Waldman Manufacturing Holdings: 0: recognizing that officers are permitted though not required to compare small business bids and large business bids from previous competitions in establishing the competitive range of acceptability 1: recognizing that pursuant to the business judgment rule the decisions of business professionals on the board of directors should be presumed valid 2: recognizing the wide range of competitive results in oligopolistic markets 3: holding that documents that were not created by but that were received maintained and relied upon by a business are business records under  8036 4: holding plaintiff lacked standing to challenge small business status of awardee because plaintiff was not a small business", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the full force, meaning and effect of the following words, and shall be applied and construed accordingly: \u201cThe mort gagor ... covenants with the mortgagee ... that he is lawfully seized in fee simple of the granted premises; that they are free from all encumbrances; that the mortgagor has good right to sell and convey the same; and that he will ... warrant and defend the same to the mortgagee .... \u201d M.G.L. ch. 183, \u00a7 19 (2000). The Mortgage now before the Court contains words of grant and the term \u201cwith mortgage covenants.\u201d Mortgage executed between the parties October 6, 2000, p. 1. As such, it served the statutory purpose of \u201cconveying the property\u201d for purposes of triggering the release provision of \u00a7 7. See Milton Sav. Bank v. U.S., 345 Mass. 302, 305, 187 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1963) (<HOLDING>); Harlow Realty Co. v. Cotter, 284 Mass. 68, Holdings: 0: holding that extinguishment of the debt entitles the mortgagor to a surrender of the note and a discharge of the mortgage 1: holding that a mortgagor in possession is not a fiduciary of the mortgagee within the meaning of the bankruptcy act even though the mortgagor has obligated himself to keep the security intact 2: holding creditors who obtained judgment subsequent to corporations execution of mortgage had no right to challenge mortgages execution 3: holding that upon execution of the mortgage the mortgagor retains only an equity of redemption accompanied by a right to possession 4: holding that the right of redemption is treated the same whether in a mortgage or security deed", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the facts are called adjudicative facts. 2 Kenneth S. Brown, et al., McCormick on Evidence at 385. The Railroad Commission conducted a five day hearing where the parties were represented by counsel and witnesses testified to the circumstances concerning Heritage\u2019s application to drill the 22-3 well. After the contested evidentiary proceeding, the Commission made its findings of fact and conclusions of law and executed a final order prohibiting the drilling of the 22-3 well. The final order and its accompanying PFD were duly published and are matters of public record. As such, the trial court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the published order and PFD of the Railroad Commission. See Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm\u2019n of Texas, 878 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex.1994)(<HOLDING>) . However, because of the cumulative nature of Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket 1: holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order 2: holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to take judicial notice of readily determinable facts contained in a published puc order 3: holding that cjourts may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute 4: holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the crime for which the sentence is being imposed. I think that is different. I think that is different in its thrust and effect; and accordingly, it is not to be applied in this case because to do so would be increasing the punishment for a crime in violation of the ex post facto prohibition in the Constitution. Neither the government nor Mr. Nichols has directly taken issue with this ruling, but it has been raised in the brief of the amici who were present at and took part in the sentencing proceedings. Amici argue that MVRA is not punitive in nature and therefore does not implicate the ex post facto prohibition. The government also suggests we can apply the MVRA, but Mr. Nichols takes the opposite view relying on United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing holdings or dicta of the Second, Holdings: 0: holding that retroactive application of mvra does not violate the ex post facto clause because restitution is not a criminal punishment 1: holding that the ex post facto clause prohibited retroactive application of the mvra because before the mvra became effective the victim and witness protection act authorized but did not compel district courts to order restitution 2: holding that application of guidelines did not violate the ex post facto clause because rico offense was a straddle crime that continued before and after the effective date of the guidelines 3: holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute 4: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "demonstrate a violation of an individual\u2019s bodily integrity sufficient to support a constitutional violation. Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc) (discussing the severity of conduct necessary to establish a violation). For instance, in Reeve v. Oliver, our court refused to find a substantive due process violation when a state actor touched and rubbed a woman\u2019s back while staring at her chest. 41 F.3d 381, 382-83 (8th Cir.1994). Similarly, in Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir.1996), the Sixth Circuit held that a teacher\u2019s act of rubbing a student\u2019s stomach while he made suggestive remarks to her did not violate the student\u2019s right to bodily integrity. See also Petrone v. Cleveland State Univ., 993 F.Supp. 1119, 1126 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (<HOLDING>), disapproved of on other grounds in Kovacevich Holdings: 0: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 1: holding that a seventeenyearold student lacked the capacity to consent to engage in sexual conduct with a teacher and consequently her allegations of a seeminglyconsensual sexual relationship with the teacher were sufficient to state a  1983 claim based on a violation of substantive due process 2: holding that allegations of a supervisors sexual advances including one where the supervisor slid his hand along a womans leg toward her pelvic area did not state a substantive due process claim 3: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 4: holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "emotional distress at the hands of Defendants. Although Defendants questioned Geraldine and Laurie Cornish, Defendants did not deprive them of food, drink, or treat them harshly in any manner. Even though Anthony Cornish was detained, he was not subjected to extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendants. Defendants had probable cause to arrest Anthony, and they did not detain him any longer than necessary under the circumstances. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated: It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by \u201cmalice,\u201d or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plainti , 97 S.Ct. 711, 713-14, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 1: holding that where an individual voluntarily goes to the police station to discuss the commission of a crime that person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 2: holding neither a phone call by the police requesting an arrestee to come to the station for questioning nor the questioning of an arrestee at the station was a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 3: holding that unless the law enforcement officers show of authority succeeds in restraining a person the person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 4: holding that a dog that was destroyed by the police department was obviously  seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "she was compensated less than each of these male employees in at least one year, (see Clark Decl. Ex. 80), and a reasonable jury could conclude that Huerta and Rizzo, as heads of regional teams, held substantially identical positions as Garcia, (Defs.\u2019 56.1 \u00b6\u00b6 230, 233). Even if I assumed that all seven of Garcia\u2019s alleged comparators held a position that v^as substantially equivalent to Garcia\u2019s position, Garcia\u2019s claims under the EPA and NYLL still fail because Barclays has proven an applicable affirmative defense\u2014that it relied on factors other than sex in determining Garcia\u2019s compensation and had legitimate business reasons for implementing those factors. See Forden v. Bristol Myers Squibb, 63 Fed.Appx. 14 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 63 Fed.Appx. 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (<HOLDING>). As set forth in detail above, (see supra Holdings: 0: holding that disparities in compensation were due to a number of permissible factors including seniority experience and performance 1: recognizing same factors 2: holding that the admissibility of lay witness identification testimony turns on a number of factors 3: holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria 4: recognizing a sound economic argument for the totaloffset rule as applied to estimates that exclude these latter factors while only including individual seniority and promotion gains", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "see also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser\u2019s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant\u2019s failure to lock gate and defendant\u2019s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Hickert v. Wright, 182 Kan. 100, 319 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion 1: holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to designate evidence that demonstrates that the defendant abused the qualified privilege 2: holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court 3: holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was proper where students injuries were the result of an unforeseeable attack by other students before school 4: holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the case was set to go to trial the following month. He attempts to contradict this testimony with an affidavit in response to the motion for summary judgment in which he avers he did not know he was not a party plaintiff or entitled to any of the lawsuit proceeds until after the case went to trial. He further states in that affidavit that Smithee did not inform him that he was not included in the lawsuit. However, an affidavit which conflicts with deposition testimony may not be used to raise a fact issue with respect to a motion for summary judgment without an explanation. Farroux v. Denny\u2019s Restaurants, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.); but see Thompson v. City of Corsicana Housing Authority, 57 S.W.3d 547, 557 (Tex.App.Waco 2001, no pet. h.) (<HOLDING>). The trial court sustained the objections of Holdings: 0: holding that an eeoc reasonable cause determination letter did not constitute evidence precluding summary judgment when the other evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 1: holding that the issue of inconsistencies in witness statements are properly reserved for the eventual trial in mexico 2: holding that inconsistencies in the summary judgment evidence of a single witness create a fact issue 3: holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment 4: holding that a plaintiff cannot create an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment through an affidavit that contradicts prior testimony", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to prohibit arbitration in one type of contract, this is a determination by the Mississippi legislature to control the risks and harms caused by uninsured and underinsured motorists, see Id. We agree with the district court that \u00a7 83-11-109 has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder\u2019s risk and therefore the first Pireno factor weighs in favor of concluding \u00a7 83-11-109 regulates the business of insurance. American Bankers also argues that \u00a7 83-11-109 is not an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship and thus fails to meet the second Pireno factor. On the contrary, \u00a7 83-11-109 is an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship because it controls how disputes regarding uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage will be resolved. See West, 267 F.3d at 823 (<HOLDING>); accord McKnight, 358 F.3d at 858; Mut. Holdings: 0: holding that a missouri state law excepting insurance contracts from an arbitration law regulated the business of insurance because it applied to the processing of disputed claims and had a substantial effect on the insureiinsured relationship 1: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 2: holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law 3: holding that erisa preempted state law claim brought by employer against insurance company for wrongful claims processing 4: recognizing that the duty arises not from the terms of the insurance contract but from an obligation imposed in law as a result of the special relationship", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a \"jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-hy-case inquiry,\u201d that the defendant's particular offense \"affects interstate commerce.\u201d Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; see also United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1997). The conclusion that Lopez does not require an individualized finding of \"substantial effect\" to sustain a conviction under \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s second prong is consistent with the holdings of several other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the contention that Lopez requires the government to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce for purposes of \u00a7 844(i)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1581, 140 L.Ed.2d 795 (1998); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, U.S. , 117 S.Ct. 2425, 138 Holdings: 0: holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce 1: recognizing power of states to engage in some regulation of interstate commerce 2: holding that the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce was much more direct than in wang because at the time of the robbery the victim in walker was selling illegal drugs that had traveled through interstate commerce 3: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce 4: holding that  844i requires the government only to establish a minimal connection between the property at issue and some aspect of interstate commerce", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Ark. 644, 863 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 61.30(ll)(b) (West 1997 & 1998 Supp.); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 750, para. 5/505(a)(2)(a) (1993 & 1998 Supp.); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 403.211(3)(d) (Michie 1984 & 1996 Supp.); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 9:315.7 (West 1991 & 1997 Supp.); Me.Rev.Stat, Ann. tit. 19, \u00a7 2007.3.D (West 1998); Michigan Child Support Formula Manual 4 (1998); Minn.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 518.551(c)(2) (West 1990 & 1998 Supp.); Miss.Code Ann. \u00a7 43-19-103(b) (1993); Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1543(l)(m); N.J. Ct. R., Appx. IX.21G); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act \u00a7 413.1(f)(1) (McKinney 1998); Tex. Fam.Code Ann. \u00a7 154.123(b)(3) (West 1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, \u00a7 659(a)(1) (1989 & 1997 Supp.); Va.Code Ann. \u00a7 20-108.1.B.9 (Michie 1995 & 1998 Supp.); Wa. Rev.Code \u00a7 26.19.075(vii) (1994). Cf Idaho R 2) (<HOLDING>); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907 Holdings: 0: holding noncustodial parent not entitled to an automatic credit and court could order child support in addition to social security disability dependency benefits 1: holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability 2: holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation 3: holding that credit for social security old age and survivor benefits does not also include credit for federal disability benefits 4: holding parent has right to credit for social security retirement payments made for child", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the Bakers\u2019 forestry practices was legally impermissible, defendants abandoned their effort to obtain an EIR or any further review. Given this evidence and Natural Heritage\u2019s role as an advocacy organization, there is no evidence that defendants\u2019 concern for the vitality of the heronry was a pretext. As compared to plaintiff\u2019s contentions \u2014 that defendants were motivated by Mr. Baker\u2019s dated and somewhat elusive opposition to unrealized legislation and by Mr. Baker\u2019s suit against Dr. Parsons, threatened after defendants had already expressed opposition to the proposed pier \u2014 defendants\u2019 explanation \u201cseems both the most logical inference and one that is wholly consistent with the alleged [delays and] irregularities\u201d in defendants\u2019 review process. Custodio, 964 F.2d at 39, 43 (<HOLDING>); see also Cloutier, 714 F.2d at 1192 (\u201cIt is Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 1: holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation 2: holding that plaintiff had stated a claim for violation of his first amendment right to intimate association where he alleged that his employer harassed him in retaliation for his fathers political activities 3: holding that although plaintiffs claims for disability discrimination and hostile work environment were rejected by the jury and plaintiff only prevailed on his first amendment retaliation claim no reduction in requested fees was warranted on partial success grounds because the issue of plaintiffs transfer was inextricably intertwined with his retaliation claim 4: holding that the plaintiffs first amendment retaliation claim regarding a waste disposal permit failfed for lack of evidence that whatever shortcomings and irregularities occurred were in retaliation for his personal political views", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.\u201d Id. at 610. (In the present case the limitation period began to run in September 2005, Standard completed its administrative review on January 19, 2007, and Wilson did not file her lawsuit until July 28, 2011.) 2 . By the time it reached the Supreme Court, equitable tolling was not at issue in the Heimeshoff case. See 134 S.Ct. at 615 n. 6. (\"Whether the Court of Appeals properly declined to apply those [equitable] doctrines in this case is not before us.\u201d). Even so, we are paying attention to the dicta about the possibility of equitable tolling. See Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The Sixth Circuit has held that 29 C.F.R. Holdings: 0: holding that there was no violation in a joint navycoast guard drug interdiction operation on the high seas and inferring in dicta that there is now no such need to deter future violations of 10 usc  375 based on the absence of any ninth circuit case applying the exclusionary rule to such violations 1: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 2: recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct 3: recognizing in dicta that where there is a general duty it may be considered as insistent both where the actor is and the subject is  as in the case of the duty of a father to support his children and if the duty hals criminal sanetion it may be enforced in either place 4: recognizing that there is dicta and then there is dicta and then there is supreme court dicta", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "addressed herein provide adequate support for Plaintiffs\u2019 claims. \u2019 61 . See JIC Ad.Op. 00-763 at 2. 62 . Id. 63 . See ASB Ad.Op. at 2. 64 . Id. 65 . Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 2A (Commentary). 66 . See Frederic William Maitland, Survey of the Century, In III The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland 439 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1911). 67 . This Order and ruling, granting the preliminary injunction, is a very narrowly tailored determination which applies to the candidates for judicial office in the State of Alabama\u2019s November 7, 2000, general election. 68 . Pursuant to England v. Louisiana State Bd. Of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964) and Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) and Government and Civic Employees Organizing Holdings: 0: holding that state court judgment settling shareholders state and federal claims had preclusive effect in federal court even though shareholders could not have pressed their federal claims in state court 1: recognizing that pleadings filed in federal court while the federal court has jurisdiction become part of the state court record on remand 2: holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state 3: holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court 4: holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with the debtor refused to pay the purchase price. The debtor sued on the contract claim in the bankruptcy court. The defendant corporation objected to the bankruptcy court\u2019s jurisdiction on the ground that the debtor\u2019s claim was a state contract action thereby making the proceeding non-core. The defendant asked the bankruptcy court to abstain, forcing the debtor to sue in state court and permitting the defendant to insist on a jury trial. Although the bankruptcy court agreed that the proceeding was non-core, it declined to abstain. See In re Arnold Print Works, Inc., 54 B.R. 562, 569 (Bankr.D.Mass.1985) (citing Mohawk Industries, supra). The defendant corporation then appealed the jurisdictional issue. The district court also concluded that the proceeding was n 6 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1985) (<HOLDING>); See also In re Epi-Scan, Inc., 71 B.R. 975 Holdings: 0: holding an action to recover a postpetition account receivable to be core 1: holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent 2: holding that a postpetition claim under section 1305 is a liability that arises postpetition and relates only to postpetition activity 3: holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding 4: holding that debt from debtor to bank in the form of chargebacks to the debtors account for credit card transaction rescissions was prepetition debt even though customers rescinded transactions postpetition and the bank therefore chargedback postpetition because a customers right to rescind and thereby the banks right to chargeback accrued at the time the customer made a purchase even though such customer exercised his right to rescind postpetition", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction over individual partners depends on a partner\u2019s contacts with the forum and the forum\u2019s laws dictating the agency relationship among partners. For example, in Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1366 (9th Cir.1990), the court held that there was personal jurisdiction over a partnership, but no such jurisdiction over the partnership\u2019s individual partners. The court determined that based on Rush, an evaluation of each partner\u2019s contacts with the state showed that they had not availed themselves of the forum\u2019s protections. Id. at 1365. The court noted that although California law permitted a partner\u2019s actions to be imputed to the partnership, the reverse was not true. Id. at 1366; see also SBKC Serv. Corp. v. 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P., 969 F.Supp. 1254, 1259 (D.Kan.1997) (<HOLDING>); Guy v. Layman, 932 F.Supp. 180, 183 Holdings: 0: holding over 1: holding that personal jurisdiction over partner did not follow from jurisdiction over partnership citing sher 2: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction 3: holding no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor 4: holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "... if committed while the person is on probation for a conviction of a felony offense or parole, work furlough or any other release or escape from confinement for conviction of a felony offense shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and is not eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon, parole, work furlough or release from confinement on any other basis ... until the person has served not less than twenty-five years. 2 . A.R.S. \u00a7 13-604(1) provides, in part, that: \u201cA person who has been convicted in any court outside the jurisdiction of this state of an offense which if committed within this state would be punishable as a felony or misdemean- or is subject to the provisions of this section.\u201d See also State v. Decker, 172 Ariz. 33, 833 P.2d 704 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 3 . A.R.S. \u00a7 13-702(D)(11) states that prior Holdings: 0: holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense 1: holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction 2: holding that felony conviction for which imposition of sentence was stayed could be counted as prior felony conviction under sentencing guidelines 3: holding that proof of an agreement to commit a felony is not a necessary element in a conviction for the commission of the felony 4: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "stipulations in a trial brief may be treated as \u201cjudicial admissions.\u201d American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226-27 (9th Cir.1988). Such admissions, which \u201chave the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact,\u201d are binding on both the parties and the court, including this court. Id. at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the government does not argue here, and we find no reason to suppose, that Davis\u2019 bag was not closed. The fact that Davis stored his bag under a bed, even though the bed was not exclusively under his control, strongly supports our conclusion that his expectation of privacy in the bag was reasonable. See United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154\u2014 55 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had expectation of privacy in a briefcase placed beneath the bed even though he had overstayed his lease 1: holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party 2: holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in gambling records stored under his parents bed although he did not reside regularly at his parents home he kept clothing there and had occasionally remained overnight 3: holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hosts home 4: holding that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of stored email", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "cause to believe there is contraband somewhere in the car, but he does not know exactly where, he may search the entire car as well as any containers found therein\"). When the officer found the open container and removed it from the console, he was lawfully positioned to observe the methamphetamine, pipe, and digital scale when they came into plain view with removal of the bottle that had been sitting on top of them. The drug-related items were found in plain view during a valid warrantless search. They were lawfully seized. Cf. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 286, 88 S.Ct. 992, 998, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968)(finding that once door to vehicle had been lawfully opened, registration card in plain view was legally seized); State v. Baxter, 1974 OK CR 198, 15, 528 P.2d 347, 349 (<HOLDING>). B. Exigent Circumstances T9 We now turn to Holdings: 0: holding that a vehicle may be seized without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that it is subject to forfeiture 1: holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime 2: holding that officer lawfully in any place may without obtaining warrant seize from motor vehicle any item which he observes in plain or open view if he has probable cause to believe item is contraband or evidence of crime 3: holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol 4: holding that when a police officer observes something from an area where the officer is lawfully entitled to be anything that is in open view may be observed without having to obtain a search warrant because making such open view observations does not constitute a search in the constitutional sense", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "preserved her objections with regard to termination of the Lease. Tenant argues on appeal that it was error for the metropolitan court to terminate the Lease without finding a material violation of the Lease. Tenant further argues that it was error for the metropolitan court to consider Tenant\u2019s non-payment of June rent as part of the basis for terminating the Lease. Tenant appealed both of these issues to the district court, and the district court held that neither issue was preserved for review. As such, Tenant asks this Court to review her claim for fundamental error. Landlord responds that the doctrine of fundamental error is inapplicable to Tenant\u2019s appeal and argues that this Court should not consider the merits of Tenant\u2019s unpreserved appellate argumen 232, 236-37 (1905) (<HOLDING>), aff\u2019d, 204 U.S. 647 (1907). Tenant has the Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and persuasion as to the existence of standing 1: recognizing thatthe plaintiff bears the initial burden of proof to establish the existence of a contract and the terms to be enforced under it 2: holding that the trustee bears the burden of proof with respect to the issue of insolvency under ohio law 3: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all elements of section 523a15 4: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "defendant nor CMR has presented any evidence that calls into question BBSSI\u2019s diligence in asserting its rights. According to BBSSI, ten weeks, standing alone, is not an unreasonable amount of time to file a bid protest at the Court of Federal Claims, see Oral Argument at 3:37:15-25, and the court agrees. There exists no firm line of demarcation separating a reasonable delay from an unreasonable delay, see A.C. Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1032, and courts are cognizant of the realities presented by litigation. To that end, negotiations between the parties, as well as the composition of briefs and assembly of supporting documentation, have been recognized as legitimate excuses for a delay in filing suit. See, e.g., Global Computer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 88 Fed.Cl. 350, 423 (2009) (<HOLDING>); LaForge & Budd Constr. Co. v. United States, Holdings: 0: recognizing that voluminous filings cannot be drafted and assembled overnight 1: holding that courts may take judicial notice of sec filings that are matters of public record 2: recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court  to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings 3: holding that a written report drafted by a person who is not properly qualified as an expert may not be considered as summary judgment evidence 4: recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "abusive manner\u201d in which the discrimination is accomplished rather than a function of the actual discrimination itself. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305, 97 S.Ct. 1056. Thomas has not met either of these requirements. Therefore, because Thomas\u2019s wrongful discharge and civil conspiracy claims amount to a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation and a Farmer exception to preemption does not apply, Thomas\u2019s claims are preempted by federal labor law. Because Thomas did not bring a federal claim within the applicable six-month statute of limitations for claims asserting a violation of the duty of fair representation, such a federal claim is now barred as untimely. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100 F.3d 857, Holdings: 0: holding that the otca limitations period applied to a claim alleging a breach of the fair labor standards act by the state 1: holding that sixmonth duty of fair representation statute of limitations applicable to claim alleging breach of union contract 2: holding that state law fraud claims are preempted by the federal labor law duty of fair representation 3: holding that sixmonth limitations period established in delcostello applies to a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation brought only against a union 4: holding that sixmonth statute of limitations period for filing unfair labor practice charges applies to employees action for breach of the duty of fair representation", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "c. 279, \u00a7 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, \u00a7 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The defendant received a probation revocation Holdings: 0: holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable 1: holding the tenday requirement was ministerial and the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay 2: holding defendant did not demonstrate that commonwealth failed to act diligently in commencing revocation hearing or that defendant prejudiced by delay 3: holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance due to the alleged conflict of interest because the defendant failed to demonstrate a conflict as nothing was presented to refute the attorneys testimony that his loyalty was to his clients 4: holding that no prejudice to the defendant arose from a delay in holding his parole revocation hearing twentyfour hours beyond the ninetyday limit", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "disagree. The Confrontation Clause provides that \u201c[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. VI. This Court in Globe v. State, 877 So.2d 663 (Fla.2004), addressed a Confrontation Clause issue and held that the clause was not implicated where Globe and his codefendant, Busby, speaking together to a law enforcement officer, gave a joint taped statement in which they admitted killing a fellow inmate and where the tape was played at trial. The Court reasoned thusly: We have previously recognized that admissions by acquiescence or silence do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237 (Fla.1999); see also United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 590-91 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1048, 123 S.Ct. 2112, Holdings: 0: holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made 1: holding that an absent witnesss statements are admissible under the confrontation clause only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant   had a prior opportunity to crossexamine 2: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 3: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 4: holding that the confrontation clause did not guarantee the defendant the right to crossexamine a speaker whose statements were imputed to the defendant as adoptive admissions of a party opponent", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of analysis. If the mistake involved a discretionary act, the appellate court will review for an abuse of discretion. See Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753 (decision whether verdict is against weight of evidence is discretionary). If the mistake concerned an error of law, the court will scrutinize for legal error. See Morrison, 646 A.2d at 571 n. 8 (propriety of jury instructions entails question of law). If there were no mistakes at trial, the appellate court must reverse a decision by the trial court to grant a new trial because the trial court cannot order a new trial where no error of law or abuse of discretion occurred. See Von der Heide v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., 553 Pa. 120, 718 A.2d 286, 290 (1998); Atene, 318 A.2d at 697; Kralik, 258 A.2d at 656; see also Riccio, 705 A.2d at 427 (<HOLDING>). If the appellate court agrees with the Holdings: 0: holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded 1: holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith 2: holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant 3: holding that because judge who was substituted for posttrial motions erred in finding that trial court judge made mistake of law grant of new trial was error 4: holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "surely not what the Legislature intends. The dissenting opinion contends that the literal wording of the statute unambiguously provides a strategic tool to the accused. We disagree. Nowhere in the statute are the words \"strategic tool\u201d used, and this interpretation is contradicted by the fact that only one shuffle is authorized and it can be effected by either the defendant or the State. The dissent further contends that we recognized in Wilkerson v. State, 681 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) that providing such a strategic tool was \"the very intent behind the passage of the statute.\u201d However, the case actually said that the legislative intent would be thwarted if a trial court's sua sponte shuffle foreclosed the State or a defendant from effecting one. Id. at 30. There are no spec 2002)(<HOLDING>); Ex parte McCain, 67 S.W.3d 204 Holdings: 0: holding that accused must competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel 1: holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel 2: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 3: holding that a death row inmates statutory right to competent counsel does not really mean counsel that performs competently 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "omitted). Illustrative cases upholding convictions under this part of subsection (1) are State v. Tornee, 20 Conn.App. 75, 564 A.2d 330 (defendant\u2019s physically abusing a child), cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 794 (1989); State v. Tucker, 50 Conn.App. 506, 718 A.2d 979 (defendant\u2019s grabbing an 11-year old, lying on top of her, while holding his hand over her mouth, during his repeated attempts to force his tongue into her mouth violated the risk of injury statute), cert. granted in part, 247 Conn. 928, 719 A.2d 1172 (1998), review dismissed as improvidently granted, 248 Conn. 668, 728 A.2d 1097 (1999); State v. McClary, 207 Conn. 233, 234-39, 541 A.2d 96 (1988)(defendant\u2019s severely beating a two-year-old girl with a belt); and State v. Pickering, 180 Conn. 54, 428 A.2d 322 (1980)(<HOLDING>). c. \u201cContact with the Intimate Parts of a Holdings: 0: holding that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the physical endangerment portion of the statute when the defendant was charged only with the risk of injury to a child by doing an act likely to impair the morals of a child under the age of sixteen 1: holding that attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a crime of viqlenee 2: holding that the deliberate touching of the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner was conduct proscribed by the second prong of subsection 1 3: holding that the florida offense of attempted lewd assault on a child under the age of sixteen is a crime of violence even though the offense might be accomplished without use of physical force 4: holding that a petitioners conviction for indecent assault and battery under massachusetts law constituted a crime of violence because any offense under the state statute was by definition nonconsensual and thus any violation of the statute by its nature presents a substantial risk that force may be used to overcome the victims lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "order, or other order....\u201d Thus, I find no authority which would permit an award of damages to the plaintiff, or require that a jury trial be held, under Title III of the ADA. As stated in Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 157 F.Supp.2d 729, 733 (E.D.Mich.2001): Title III of the ADA does not provide for monetary damages or, concomitantly, a jury trial, when the action is brought by a \u201cperson who is being subjected to discrimination.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12188(a)(2). [FN4] See also Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir.2000) (Gilman, J\u201e dissenting) (stating that it \u201cappears doubtful\u201d that Title III plaintiffs are entitled to jury trial as Title III permits only injunctive relief) (citing cases); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Fischer v. SJB P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to  706 of title vii 42 usc  2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc  1981 2: holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states 3: holding that principles of comity bar challenges to state tax law which seek money damages under 42 usc  1983 4: recognizing that title iii enforcement statute 42 usc  12188 which incorporates the remedies of 42 usc  2000a3a does not include money damages", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not determinative of the outcome of the case, we will use the earlier date of June 2012 as the date of filing the petition. 4 . The effective date provision of Minn.Stat. \u00a7 590.01, subd. 4, allowed a \"person whose conviction became final ... to file a petition for postconviction relief.\u201d Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, \u00a7 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1097-98. 5 . Moreover, federal courts have held that a voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal brings the direct appeal to an end. See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 631 (2d Cir.2002) (explaining that \"withdrawal of an appeal is an expression of the intent of the parties (principally, of course, the appellant) not to pursue the appeal any further and brings the appeal to an end\u201d); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Specifically, subdivision 4(b) permits a Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 1: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 2: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional 3: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final 4: holding that the oneyear period begins to run when the mandate of the court of appeals issues", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201cproper when the attorney\u2019s actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay.\u201d State Street Bank, 374 F.3d at 180. Sanctions under Section 1927 against FKSA are not warranted because Cintas has not pointed to conduct by plaintiffs\u2019 counsel that \u201cunreasonably and vexatiously\u201d multiplied the proceedings in this action. The defendant essentially complains that the plaintiff pursued a meritless lawsuit, one that had no \u201clegitimate factual or legal basis for the claim,\u201d not that plaintiffs counsel litigated the action in a way that multiplied or delayed the proceedings. See United States v. Int\u2019l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Since Unite voluntarily discontinued the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the colorado river doctrine is necessary to ensure judicial economy and deter abusive reactive litigation 1: holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior 2: holding that the purpose of section 1927 is to deter unnecessary delays in litigation 3: recognizing that purpose of a 1980 amendment to the statute was to deter unnecessary delays in litigation 4: holding that in the absence of demonstrated prejudice remand is unnecessary", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "contest the adoption, nor did he have any right to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the adoption was in the best interest of the child. IV. JURISDICTION \u00b6 29 Finally, C.F. contends that Utah has no jurisdiction over him, and thus he is not subject to Utah law. Specifically he asserts that he is a Washington State resident, has neither been to Utah nor conducted business here, and that Utah courts have never had subject matter or personal jurisdiction over him. C.F. errs in this assertion. He voluntarily invoked and submitted to the jurisdiction of Utah, its laws, and its court system when he intervened in the adoption proceeding. See Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987); Rawlings v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Marriage of Rizzo, 237 Holdings: 0: holding that another states reservation of personal jurisdiction over a florida resident for the purpose of modifying its decree may last as long as the effectiveness of the decree and that no dueprocess violation occurs by the entry of a default modification against the florida resident if the florida resident was afforded proper notice 1: holding that venue in a legal malpractice action was proper in utah where the plaintiff resided despite the fact that the attorneys were located in california because the plaintiff had telephone conversations and corresponded with each of the defendants from utah and therefore the attorneys had purposefully and regularly directed their contacts toward a utah resident when they were retained and throughout their handling of the infringement action 2: holding that trial court had jurisdiction to consider custody dispute before a divorce or separation action had commenced 3: holding that utah jurisdiction was proper over washington state resident who commenced proceedings in utah to enforce visitation and custody provisions of divorce decree 4: holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "October 3, 2002 judgment of the Swisher County Court seeking to quash that judgment as of no effect and seeking that Saddlehorn Investments, Inc., although not named as a party, be enjoined from trespassing on the real estate or interfering with their farming operations. They also sought a claim for damages. After considering the motions for summary judgment of Stewart and Self, the court rendered judgment denying all relief sought by the Gardners. Initially, we note that even though they are proceeding pro se, the Gardners are held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and must comply with the applicable laws and rules of procedure. See Greenstreet v. Heiskell, 940 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>). Before we consider the Gardners\u2019 sole issue, Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 1: holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules 2: holding that contingency fee contracts are voidable where attorneys fail to comply with disciplinary rules 3: holding that pro se litigants must follow the kentucky rules of civil procedure 4: holding litigants who represent themselves must comply with the procedures established by the rules notwithstanding the fact they are not licensed attorneys", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2314. His contention is that Palmyra Island is not a possession of the United States within the meaning of the relevant statutes. We disagree and affirm the district court\u2019s denial of his petition. One of the elements of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2314 is that the stolen property was transported in \u201cinterstate commerce.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 10 defines \u201cinterstate commerce\u201d as \u201ccommerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.\u201d Palmyra Island is a possession of the United States. See 48 U.S.C. \u00a7 644a (placing Palmyra and seven other American Pacific Islands under the jurisdiction of the District of Hawaii); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 67 S.Ct. 1287, 91 L.Ed. 1474 (1947) (<HOLDING>); cf. Yandell v. Trans-ocean Air Lines, 253 Holdings: 0: holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states 1: recognizing that palmyra is under united states sovereignty 2: holding that tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only the federal government not the states 3: holding that the united states has not recognized the sovereignty of the moorish nation thus precluding sovereign immunity claims 4: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "based on her testimony. The opinion about the family life of a witness had no bearing on the outcome of the case, unlike in the present case, where the jurors\u2019 opinions about Detective Smith\u2019s testimony could suggest that they had formed an opinion about Dillard\u2019s guilt and Detective Smith\u2019s credibility. Once the parties raise the issue of juror-witness contact, and facts show that the jurors intentionally made contact with a key prosecution witness and that the contact may have been about the substance of his testimony, and that the jurors may have discussed and formed an opinion on the ultimate question of the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence, the trial judge must conduct a meaningful inquiry that will resolve the factual questions raised by the contact. The contact 46, 250 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the trial judge could Holdings: 0: holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire 1: holding that the defendant must renew a motion for a change of venue after voir dire to preserve the issue for appeal 2: holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice 3: holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated 4: holding that the court has a duty to resolve the issue of prejudice arising out of jury misconduct even though the defense could have requested a voir dire examination of the juror in its motion to disqualify", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "convicted and bore no relationship to any other pertinent matter. That being said, I would caution that the fact that witness Berry saw defendant in the area may have been relevant evidence. However, I address only the propriety of the admission into evidence of witness Berry\u2019s reiteration of the woman\u2019s statements, as opposed to witness Berry\u2019s testimony that she saw defendant in the area. While defendant\u2019s presence may have been relevant, the statements of Ms. Love, who did not testify at trial and who made no comment incriminating defendant with respect to the charged crimes was not relevant evidence. 2 While no Michigan case has addressed this issue, I note the following federal cases in support of my position: Krulewitch v United States, 336 US 440; 69 S Ct 716; 93 L Ed 790 (1949) (<HOLDING>); United States v Reynolds, 715 F2d 99, 103 (CA Holdings: 0: holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay 1: holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof 2: holding where neither defense counsel nor the trial court explained to the defendant that intent to cause death was an element of seconddegree murder and there was no factual statement or admission implying intent the plea was involuntary 3: holding that the outofcourt statement by the victims mother which was admitted when the mother refused to testify at trial was inadmissible under residual hearsay exception in mil revid 804b5 because a much of her statement was double or triple hearsay that was most unreliable and b the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement were not supported by any particularized guarantees of trustworthiness 4: holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conduct proximately caused his injuries. Mellen v. Lane, 377 S.C. 261, 280, 659 S.E.2d 236, 246 (Ct.App.2008). \u201cFor an intervening act to break the causal link and insulate the tortfeasor from further liability, the intervening act must be unforeseeable.\u201d Dixon v. Besco Eng\u2019g, Inc., 320 S.C. 174, 180, 463 S.E.2d 636, 640 (Ct.App. 1995). Ordinarily, proximate cause is a question for the jury, but when the evidence is susceptible to only one inference, it becomes a matter of law for the court. Platt, 379 S.C. at 266, 665 S.E.2d at 640. Although we did not find and the parties did not provide any South Carolina cases directly on point, other jurisdictions have contemplated situations similar to the one at hand. See, e.g., Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Darren v. Safier, 207 A.D.2d 473, 615 Holdings: 0: holding that a tortfeasor is required to pay the expenses of over treatment or unnecessary medical treatment unless such treatment was incurred by the victim in bad faith  1: holding that conduct by the plaintiff contributing to his illness or medical condition and furnishing the occasion for medical treatment is not a defense to medical malpractice where a doctor negligently treated a man who had attempted to commit suicide 2: holding when the decedent committed suicide more than one month after his last visit to the hospital and received treatment from two other hospitals during that onemonth period the plaintiffs could not prove damages because of the time lapse and intervening medical treatment 3: holding that under title vii the ultimate issue is the reason for the individual plaintiffs treatment not the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace 4: holding that a two month period might be enough  to prove the causation prong", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Department, and went on to hold that the Department\u2019s seizure of the vessel violated state law but that it was immune from damages. In no place in the opinion did the court discuss the award of attorneys\u2019 fees or intimate that such fees had ever been awarded. It was simply silent on the issue. Because no separate judgment has been \u201centered\u201d under Rule 58, the time for filing a notice of appeal has not yet begun to run. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7) (providing that a judgment or order is \u201centered ... when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58\u201d). Given that the district court treated the order allowing attorneys\u2019 fees as an appealable order and that the parties do not object to treating it as such, we find no reason to remand for formal compliance with Rule 58. Domegan, 972 F.2d 401 (<HOLDING>), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 956, 113 Holdings: 0: holding that there was appellate jurisdiction under principle that a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice 1: holding that court had jurisdiction where no separate judgment had been entered even though notice of appeal was not timely filed as measured from the final decision 2: holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court 3: holding that lack of a separate judgment does not preclude the taking of an appeal from a district courts final decision because the parties may waive the separate judgment requirement where one has accidentally not been entered 4: holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the changes, he has accepted the changes as a matter of law.\u201d Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986). {15} It appears that the district court assumed, without deciding, that under Texas law Flemma would be deemed to have accepted the terms of the Program. We agree with Defendants that, under Texas law, mutual assent and acceptance of the Program and hence an agreement to arbitrate existed between Halliburton and Flemma. Flemma does not argue otherwise. {16} Asa Halliburton employee living and working in T exas when notice of the Program was initially sent to his address, Flemma\u2019s continued employment constituted acceptance of the terms of the Program, including the arbitration requirement under Texas law. See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 568-69 (<HOLDING>). Halliburton subsequently reaffirmed the offer Holdings: 0: holding the employee had 180 days to file a claim from the date the employee received final definitive and unequivocal notice of an adverse employment action 1: holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law 2: holding that an employee accepted as a matter of law changes to an employment agreement by continuing employment with the company after he received notice of the changes 3: holding covenant in an employment agreement executed some 12 years after the initial taking of employment was not incident to the taking of employment 4: holding that reassignments without salary or work changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Estate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court\u2019s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker\u2019s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (<HOLDING>). In Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., supra, the Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent 1: holding that under the applicable statutory provisions a person need not be impoverished or devoid of all assets to qualify as an indigent sick person but only that the person be unable to pay for necessary medical care 2: holding that burglary may qualify as offense against person if as committed it is in fact a crime against a person 3: holding that a person is seized for purposes of article i section 7 of the hawaii constitution when a police officer approaches that person for the express or implied purpose of investigating him or her for possible criminal violations and begins to ask for information 4: holding that the person who travels as an agent of person defrauded is a victim", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 185.] For example, Senator Williams, a sponsor of ERISA, emphasized that the civil enforcement section would enable participants and beneficiaries to bring suit to recover benefits denied contrary to the terms of the plan and that when they did so \u201c[i]t is intended that such actions will be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in a similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.\u201d Id. In accord with the guidance set forth in Metropolitan Life, courts have found that the complete preemption doctrine\u2014 i.e. preemption under \u00a7 502(a) \u2014 permits removal of state law causes of action in a multitude of different ERISA-related circumstances. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that  1132a is the exclusive vehicle for actions by erisaplan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits 1: holding negligent misrepresentation claim was not preempted because it neither sought benefits under plan nor alleged improper processing of benefits 2: holding a state court complaint alleging a common law breach of contract action to be in fact a claim under erisa and thus removable as a federal question 3: holding that state common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan are removable to federal court 4: holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1978, no writ), the court rejected testimony that two or three tracks that had been made through a syrupy or jelly-like substance on which plaintiff slipped tended to show that the substance had been there long enough to charge the store with constructive notice. The court explained, \u201cIt is just as likely that the tracks were made by customers traversing the aisle only minutes or even seconds before plaintiffs fall.\u201d Id. at 590; see also Robledo v. Kroger Co., 597 S.W.2d 560, 560-61 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (recognizing that cart tracks through dirty water was no evidence of constructive notice because they could have been made by another customer minutes before the fall); Kimbell, Inc. v. Blount, 562 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Austin 1978, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The testimony that the macaroni salad \u201cseemed Holdings: 0: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge 1: holding that drying footprints and tracks leading away from puddle of liquid was no evidence that the puddle had been there long enough to put the store on constructive notice 2: holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there 3: holding that testimony that the grape on which plaintiff slipped was squashed and muddy that the floor was dirty and that pieces of paper were strewn around nearby was no evidence that the grape had been on the floor long enough to charge the store with notice 4: holding that plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of a puddle of water that had accumulated on a bank floor on a rainy day 20 minutes after the bank opened", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.\u201d See State v. Telthorster (1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456; Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753, 764-765, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235. {\u00b6 12} Though Officer Bininger testified that in his experience, the type of container that fell from Suter\u2019s pants is often used to transport narcotics, the court does not find the container to be a rare, single-purpose container. Notably, Officer Bininger did not say that drugs were always found in this type of container or that the contents of the container were immediately apparent to him. Cases discussing single-purpose containers bolster this court\u2019s conclusion. Compare State v. Telthorster (Dec. 24, 1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456 (<HOLDING>) with State v. Patrick (Jan. 12, 2001), Licking Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic bags placed in or near his open garbage cans and that the police did not violate his fourth amendment rights in seizing and searching the bags where they were able to do so without trespassing on the defendants property 1: holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells 2: holding that car passenger who left her purse in her boyfriends car had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse indeed a purse is a type of container in which a person possesses the highest expectations of privacy 3: holding that a person does not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in a tiedoff piece of opaque plastic because its contents can be inferred from its appearance and based in part on officers testimony that he had never seen such a container used to transport anything other than drugs 4: holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "approved by Congress, via the IRC, to adjust the bare minimum exemption amount of $2,000 for inflation. A reasonable person of ordinary intelligence, if he did not want to avail himself of the IRS documents and notices publishing the applicable exemption amounts, would consult the CPI and make the necessary calculations to determine his gross income for tax purposes. See Pond v. Comm\u2019r, 211 Fed.Appx. 749, 752 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (explaining that the IRC\u2019s provision of a specific number, $2000, and a statutory formula for adjusting that number, adequately defines the exemption amount and permits a taxpayer to be penalized for noncompliance); see also United States v. Priest, Nos. 06-10438, 06-10447, 06-10448, 2007 WL 1961885, at *2 (9th Cir. July 5, 2007) (unpublished mem.) (<HOLDING>). B. ' Whether the Denial of the Defense\u2019s Jury Holdings: 0: holding that tax exemption for church property does not violate establishment clause 1: holding that the alleged imprecision caused by incorporating the cpi in determining a statutorily provided exemption does not void as a matter of law the obligation to file a tax return 2: holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 3: holding that the offense requires that the return be false as to a material matter 4: holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or threatened, the purposes and policies of the Act are far broader than simply providing for the conservation of individual species or individual members of listed species.\u201d)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (noting that the plain intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost); Catron County Bd. of Com\u2019rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir.1996) (identifying ESA\u2019s core purpose as prevention of the extinction of species by preserving and protecting the habitat upon which they depend from the intrusive activities of humans); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 233 (D.C.Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). One of the purposes of the Endangered Species Holdings: 0: recognizing an intermediate level of scrutiny in which the governmental objective must be important and the challenged law must be substantially related to that objective 1: recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials 2: recognizing subsection e as the sole exception to the boardcertification requirement 3: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 4: recognizing environmental protection as the sole objective of the endangered species act", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to this litigation, and the instant motion to stay the trial of their claims would not have been ripe. (Chase Reply Mem. at 9-10.) A party may waive its right to arbitration by expressly indicating that it wishes to resolve its claims in court. Gilmore v. Shearson/Amer. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir.1987), overruling on other grounds recognized by McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761, 763-64 (2d Cir.1988). Alternately, a party may impliedly waive its right to enforce a contractual arbitration clause when it \u201cengages in protracted litigation that results in prejudice to the opposing party.\u201d S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted); Manos v. Geissler, BRG, 321 F.Supp.2d 588, 593 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a party that engages in protracted litigation waives his right to arbitrate when an order compelling arbitration would result in prejudice to the party opposing arbitration 1: holding that a party waives its right to arbitration when it engages in protracted litigation that prejudices the opposing party emphasis added 2: holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court 3: holding that the party demanding arbitration had waived its right to arbitrate by filing eight months earlier a complaint against the other party to the arbitration agreement 4: holding that purpose of stay pending arbitration is twofold it relieves the party entitled to arbitrate of the burden of continuing to litigate the issue while the arbitration process is ongoing and it entitles that party to proceed immediately to arbitration without the delay that would be occasioned by an appeal of the district courts order to arbitrate", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "N.E. 696 (1911); Justice v. Justice, 108 N.E.2d 874, 876 (Ohio Comm. Pl. 1952). Other cases reject the theory, taking the position that an alimony decree is not revived by a second separation following the reconciliation, and that a new application to the court is necessary. Brown v. Brown, 210 Ga. 233, 78 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1953); Moody v. Moody, 227 La. 134, 78 So.2d 536, 537 (1955); Hester v. Hester, 239 N.C. 97, 100, 79 S.E.2d 248 (1953); O\u2019Hara v. O\u2019Hara, 46 N.C. App. 819, 266 S.E.2d 59 (1980); Tiffin v. Tiffin, 2 Binn. 202 (Pa. 1809); M\u2019Karracher v. M\u2019Karracher, supra, 3 Yeates 56; Hill v. Hill, 62 Pa. Super. 439 (1916); Lund v. Lund, 6 Utah 2d 425, 315 P.2d 856, 858 (1957); Patterson v. Patterson, 4 D.L.R. 793 (Ont. 1928). See also Hawn v. Hawn, 505 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Mo. App. 1974) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the petition for a writ Holdings: 0: holding that there was no abuse of discretion for denying the motion to change venue because although there had been some publicity surrounding the murder an independent review of the record demonstrates that there was no difficulty in seating the jury 1: holding on the facts that there was no reconciliation but only an attempted reconciliation and reserving the question of revival of the alimony award if there had been a bona fide reconciliation 2: holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there 3: holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force 4: holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(3) all of the person\u2019s estate that is not devised by the will vests immediately in the person\u2019s heirs at law. (b) Subject to Section 101.051, the estate of a person who dies intestate vests immediately in the person\u2019s heirs at law. See Tex. Estate Code \u00a7 101.001(a)-(b) (emphasis added); see also Tex. Estate Code \u00a7 101.003 (governing an executor\u2019s or administrator\u2019s right to possession) . The Texas Supreme Court has also expounded on the passage of an estate upon a decedent\u2019s death in Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist., stating that, \u201c[wjhenever a person dies intestate, all of his estate shall vest immediately in his heirs at law, but.. .shall still be liable and subject in their hands to payment of the debts of the intestate.\u201d 862 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. 1993) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>); see Woodward v. Jaster, 933 S.W.2d 777, 780 Holdings: 0: holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover 1: holding that taxes were a claim against the estate that had to be filed in probate court thus reversing an order requiring heirs to pay taxes on estate property because the district court did not have jurisdiction 2: holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan 3: holding that a claim for breach of contract against a lawyer regarding estate taxes arose no later than the date on which the estate tax return was filed not when the alleged error was discovered 4: holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "review de novo a frivolousness determination that turns on an issue of law. Id. \u201cDismissal for frivolousness is only appropriate for a claim based on ah indisputably meritless legal theory.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Claims should not be dismissed with prejudice unless \u201camendment would necessarily be futile.\u201d Id. \u201cIn determining whether dismissal is proper, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe those allegations and any reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to [Mr. Tennyson].\u201d French v. Adams Cnty. Detention Ctr., 379 F.3d 1158, 1159 (10th Cir.2004). Because Mr. Tennyson is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe both his amended complaint and his arguments on appeal. See Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that allegations of pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 1: holding that the allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 2: holding that pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers 3: recognizing pro se litigants pleadings are held to a less stringent standard 4: holding pro se litigants to less stringent standards than parties with the aid of counsel", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987) (\u201cThe existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.\u201d). Moreover, the claim, which is based on the contention that plaintiffs were not aware of the risks involved in the transaction so that when the baht was pulled from the currency basket, Morgan realized an unbargained-for windfall, cannot be sustained. As already discussed, the risk involved in the transaction was patent, and a claim for unjust enrichment cannot be premised on a known risk. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. 58 W. 72nd St. Realty Assocs., No. 91 Civ. 3299, 1992 WL 183741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1992) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs\u2019 claims based on theories of Holdings: 0: holding that a claim for unjust enrichment should not be dismissed because the court may find that the express contract was no longer in force 1: holding that where a prior agreement fixed the salary of the plaintiff plaintiff could not seek to recover for his services on a theory of unjust enrichment 2: holding a claim for unjust enrichment could not be sustained where known risk would merely prevent the partys business expenditures from generating the return on investment which had been hoped for 3: holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment 4: holding that unjust enrichment claim could prevail contrary to the ucc priority system", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "arbitration made under Section 2(b); (3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (4) An order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or (6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this act. (b) An appeal under this section shall be taken as from an order or a judgment in a civil action. 26 . HRS \u00a7 658A-28 is adopted verbatim from the RUAA. The RUAA section governing appeals provides as follows: \u00a7 28 Appeals. (\u0430) An appeal may be taken from: (1) An order denying a [motion] to compel arbitration; (2) An order granting a [motion] to stay arbitration; (3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (4) An order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An o o.2d 147, 148-49 (Fla.App.1973) (<HOLDING>); Fayette Cnty. Farm Bureau Fed'n. v. Martin, Holdings: 0: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable because it is not final and because it is not listed in the uaa appeals provision 1: holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award 2: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order 3: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final 4: holding that orders compelling arbitration are not appealable not because of the uaa appeals provision but because it has been definitely settled by the supreme court of this state that an order compelling arbitration is not final and therefore is not appealable", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "orders in Feathers v. Gansheimer and Feathers v. Wilson reflect that those cases were dismissed sua sponte and in their entirety for failure to satisfy this court\u2019s now-abrogated requirement that prisoners specifically plead exhaustion of their administrative remedies. The dismissals of those complaints therefore were not dismissals on the grounds that the cases were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.1999) (concluding that failure to state a claim as used in \u00a7 1997e(c) and \u00a7 1915(g) does not include failure to exhaust administrative remedies \u2014 at least absent a finding that the failure to exhaust permanently bars the suit); see also Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 409 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Finding that at least two of the four prior Holdings: 0: holding that claims not presented to the ij and bia should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 1: holding that plaintiff could not look to the courts for relief because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the adea 2: holding that a routine dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not count as a strike under  1915g 3: holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim 4: holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action  and thus did not count as third strike", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "See, e.g., In re Tri-State Crematory Lit., 215 F.R.D. 660, 692 (N.D.Ga.2003) (finding predominance requirement satisfied with respect to breach of contract claim); Winkler v. DTE, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 235, 243 (D.Ariz.2001) (rejecting argument that individual issues would predominate breach of contract claim where standard form contracts were at issue); Heartland Communications, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., 161 F.R.D. 111, 117-18 (D.Kan.1995) (finding individual issues would predominate breach of contract claim). This is especially true in light of the fact that the proof will overlap somewhat on plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust conspiracy claim and their breach of contract claim. See, e.g., George Lussier Enters. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., No. 99-109-B, 2001 WL 920060, at *19-*20 (D.N.H. Aug.3, 2001) (<HOLDING>). 3. Superiority The requirement that a class Holdings: 0: holding the predominance requirement for breach of contract claim was met in part because a certifiable antitrust claim involved the same facts 1: holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was properly a statutory claim under the personnel management act 2: holding that a breach of contract claim against one defendant related back to interference with contract claim against that defendant and breach of contract claim against second defendant because it was based on same set of operative facts 3: holding that breach of contract claim related back to misrepresentation claim because operative facts upon which the breach of contract claim was based were contained in the misrepresentation counts of the original complaint 4: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "same counsel during his trial proceedings and on his direct appeals. Moreover, he had the benefit of two attorneys\u2019 thoughts concerning the post-conviction petitions. We note parenthetically that the attorney who initially drafted one of the petitions, and reviewed the record in Stewart II, did not choose to raise any claim regarding Mr. Pumilia\u2019s alleged incompetency. More significantly, defendant did not even raise this issue in his briefs filed with this court appealing the denial of his post-conviction petitions. Our Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) provides that points not asserted in an appellant\u2019s brief are waived and shall not be raised for the first time, as defendant did here, during oral argument. 107 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Lewis (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 226, 249-50 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, defendant claims that Mr. Holdings: 0: holding argument is waived when raised for first time in reply brief 1: holding that defendant waived review of an issue which he raised for the first time during oral argument 2: holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived 3: holding that an argument raised for the first time in a rule 59e motion is waived on appeal 4: holding that argument raised at oral argument that was not included in brief is waived", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "provides: Rather, upon a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepre-sentation in the jury pool or the venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant\u2019s relevant requests for information designed to verify the existence of such underrepre-sentation and document its nature and extent. Gause I, supra, 959 A.2d at 685 (quoting People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268 (1996)). In our view, this \"reasonable belief\u201d standard raises a whole host of questions but supplies very few answers. And, to add yet another layer of complexity, the division majority appeared to somehow qualify its endorsement of California\u2019s already confu 23 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shapiro, 994 F.Supp. 146, Holdings: 0: holding that defendants right to discovery was satisfied by inspection of master lists and the relevant demographic data about the general pool from which the grand jurors were selected and thus defendants were not entitled to the names addresses and demographics of the individual grand jurors who returned indictments against them 1: holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose 2: holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings 3: holding that the prosecuting attorneys failure to instruct grand jurors on the record of the elements of the relevant criminal offenses warranted dismissal of the indictment without a showing of prejudice 4: holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 \u00b6\u00b6 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, \u201cis not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.\u201d Id. at \u00b6 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a \u201cduty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence\u201d in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 \u00b6 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (<HOLDING>)). Like the courts in the legal malpractice Holdings: 0: recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts 1: holding that a private right of action exists 2: holding that no private right of action exists 3: holding no duty and noting that foreseeability bears on the scope of a duty and not whether it exists in the first place 4: holding that such a duty exists", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "improper. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages are not available under the Act, and we emphasize that the trial court should have made clear to the jury that it could not award punitive damages based upon a violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The trial court\u2019s omission certainly leaves open the possibility that the jury wrongly awarded punitive damages in conjunction with the Consumer Protection Act rather than in connection with a common law claim for recovery. Although we cannot assume that the jury understood the relevant law, since it was not properly instructed, we decline to assume the inverse, as did the Court of Appeals, that the jury found only a violation of the .C.App. 237, 446 S.E.2d 100, 105 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Some courts merely state that the higher Holdings: 0: holding that where a plaintiff is entitled to treble damages under its state unfair trade practices act and to punitive damages under common law claims of fraud trial court should have submitted each theory of recovery to the jury and then allowed plaintiff to elect between the awards with duplicative elements 1: holding that even if the trial court had erred in denying the defendants motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages the error was harmless because the jury found in favor of the defendant and never reached the punitive damages claims 2: holding that the trial court erred by denying plaintiffs request to instruct the jury on all its claims and to submit a special verdict form and by instead requiring the plaintiff to elect between its statutory antitrust claim and its common law tort claims to be submitted to the jury 3: holding that trial court erred by requiring plaintiff to select which remedy to submit to the jury because plaintiff was allowed to elect its remedy between punitive damages and statutory treble after the jurys verdict on all claims was rendered 4: holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "it is moot and we cannot address the merits of the claim at this time. 1 .The first case in which the Special Court investigated the relationship between CERCLA and the Rail Act is Penn Central Corporation v. United States, 862 F.Supp. 437 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A.1994). 2 . 45 U.S.C. \u00a7 719 et seq. 3 . 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9601 et seq. 4 . Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 111, 95 S.Ct. 335, 343, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974). 5 . 45 U.S.C. \u00a7 801 et seq. 6 . For a discussion of the ownership and operational history of the Paoli Yard, see In the Matter o Blanchette, 448 F.Supp. 279, 282-285 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A. 1978) (determining the effect of a conveyance order and documents); Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Company, 459 F.Supp. 1013, 1017 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A.1978) (<HOLDING>). 16 . 459 F.Supp. 1013 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A.1978). Holdings: 0: holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders 1: holding that the interpretation of both conveyance orders and documents is within the jurisdictional grant of  209e2 2: holding that the court had jurisdiction to decide issues relating to the fsp conveyance orders and an agreement entered pursuant to the conveyance orders 3: recognizing that a court granted jurisdiction by statute to review the legality of administrative orders is also empowered to examine the constitutionality of the statute by virtue of which such orders were entered 4: holding that the value of stolen blank money orders may be established by circumstantial evidence showing the market value for filled in money orders and the fact that the defendants had the necessary equipment to fill in the money orders and to make the completed orders appear valid", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Thompson v. Tormike, Inc. (1st Dist. 1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 674, 469 N.E.2d 453, 82 Ill. Dec. 919 (rejecting implied private action under City nuisance ordinance); Rhoades v. Mill Race Inn, Inc. (2d Dist. 1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 467 N.E.2d 915, 81 Ill. Dec. 793 (rejecting implied private action under the Safety Glazing Materials Act); Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1st Dist. 1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79, 75 Ill. Dec. 911 (rejecting implied additional private action under the Insurance Code). We do not suggest by omission that post-Sawyer appellate decisions have consistently rejected implied statutory torts. To the contrary, see, e.g., Noyola o. Board of Education of City of Chicago (1st Dist. 1996), 284 Ill. App. 3d 128, 671 N.E.2d 802, 219 Ill. Dec. 635 (<HOLDING>); Witt v. Forest Hospital, Inc. (1st Dist. Holdings: 0: recognizing implied private action under the plat act rejecting implied private action under the national flood insurance act of 1968 1: recognizing implied private action against employer under election code timeofftovote provision 2: recognizing implied private action under the collection agency act 3: recognizing implied private action under the school code as to chapter 1 funds 4: recognizing private right of action", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "error due to Apprendi would have been considered harmless because Concepcion was subject to a sentence of life imprisonment for more than one of his convictions. Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 234-236. Accordingly, Concepcion was properly sentenced to life in prison. Furthermore, the Supreme Court\u2019s recent holdings in Blakely and Crawford are not applicable to Concepcion\u2019s case. This case is distinguishable from Crawford in that the statements to which Concepcion refers were sufficiently redacted and thus, properly admitted at trial. See Concepcion, 181 F.Supp.2d at 222-223 and \u201cAppendix A.\u201d With regard to Concepcion\u2019s argument that Blakely applies retroactively to his motion, the Court disagrees. See Garcia v. United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 WL 1752588 at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.4, 2004) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not, as yet, ruled that Holdings: 0: holding that booker does not apply retroactively to collateral proceedings under  2255 1: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively to claims raised in a  2255 motion 2: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively to initial section 2255 motions for habeas relief 3: holding that because apprendi does not apply retroactively neither does blakely 4: holding that blakely does not apply retroactively to  2255 motions", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "[the compensation claim], state the reason in detail.\u201d (Emphasis added). This question should have indicated to Rhodes that there is a separate government entity responsible for adjudicating disputes over compensation claims that arise between workers and their employing agencies. Thus, Rhodes reasonably should have understood that this entity, rather than her employing agency, would receive her completed form. Thus, the workers\u2019 compensation form itself put Rhodes on notice that it would be sent to the Department of Labor. Because Rhodes could not reasonably have expected that her form would be hand-carried to that agency, a reasonably jury could conclude that Rhodes should have known that her form would be sent by mail. See United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). III. We turn finally to Rhodes\u2019 contention Holdings: 0: holding that notice and a hearing were required before the commissioner of insurance could require an insurance company to change its definition of at fault in order to secure approval of an increase in insurance rates 1: holding that defendant reasonably could have foreseen use of the mails because he had completed insurance forms that required verification from his doctor and the insurance company and his doctor did not share the same location 2: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 3: holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract 4: holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the evidence of childhood abuse could have easily raised inferences that evoked sympathy for the eighteen-year-old Cox. Such evidence could have explained why Cox ended up in a gang and how Cox ended up in a position where he was aiding Williams in the perpetration of the murders. Indeed, one of Cox\u2019s attorneys acknowledged that the omitted childhood abuse' evidence \u201cwould have been helpful to [the] defense\u201d and \u201cconsistent with the themes that [they] presented in mitigation.\u201d Where, as here, \u201ccounsel offers no strategic reason for failing to perform what would otherwise constitute the duty of a reasonably competent counsel, we may not invent such a strategy by engaging in a \u2018post hoc rationalization of counsel\u2019s conduct\u2019.\u201d See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence 1: holding that counsels strategic decisions were hard to attack 2: holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy 3: holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy 4: holding that counsels failure to consult blood experts was not a strategic choice because counsel offered no reasoned explanation for the failure", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "supplying supporting arguments or facts.\u2019 \u201d BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d at 33). III. Discussion A. Employment Discrimination 1. Legal Standard Claims for employment discrimination based on race, age, and disability brought pursuant to \u00a7 1983 or pursuant to Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA are analyzed under the three-step, burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir.2009) (applying McDonnell Douglas to claim brought under the ADA); Kearney v. Cnty. of Rockland ex rel. Vanderhoef, 185 Fed.Appx. 68, 70 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); D\u2019Cunha v. Genovese/Eckerd Corp., 479 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that adea and phra claims proceed under the mcdonnell douglas framework 1: holding that the threestep mcdonnell douglas burdenshifting analysis applies to  1983 claims 2: holding that plaintiffs equal protection claim pursuant to 42 usc  1983 for agebased employment discrimination fails for the same reasons that her adea and nyshrl claims fail under mcdonnell douglas analysis 3: holding that mcdonnell douglas burdenshifting approach applies to claims brought under the adea 4: holding that claims under the adea and the nyshrl are subject to the same analysis", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 & n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Plaintiffs in a procedural standing case need not establish that, were the government to follow the proper procedures, its ultimate action would be different. Instead, plaintiffs in a procedural standing case need demonstrate only that the factors the government failed to consider could have an influence on the ultimate outcome. Laub, 342 F.3d at 1087; Hall, 266 F.3d nd Viceroy Gold on this point, but it is not material to the \"genuine obstacle\u201d analysis in this case. 8 . Defendant argues that there is no evidence (outside of plaintiffs' affidavits) of the existence of this organization, in that there is no record of its registration with the California Secretary of State or the Attorney General. However, a d 793, 801 n. 14 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Helene Curtis, Inc. v. Assessment Appeals Holdings: 0: holding that as a matter of state law nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the state 1: holding that nonmutual issue preclusion should not apply against the state government 2: holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies in removal proceedings 3: holding that preclusion rules apply in 1983 actions 4: holding that preclusion rules apply in section 1983 actions", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "after the 30-day limit in \u00a7 1446(b) to remedy a substantive defect in the petition\u201d); Wright v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 959 F.Supp. 356, 359 (N.D.Miss.1997) (\u201cIf a defendant seeks to amend the notice of removal at any time thereafter, he may only do so to clarify the jurisdictional grounds for removal, which were unartfully stated in the original notice. He may not allege new jurisdictional grounds for removal.\u201d); Spillers v. Tillman, 959 F.Supp. 364, 372 (S.D.Miss.1997) (\u201cAlthough a defendant is free to amend a notice of removal within the 30-day period set forth in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1446(b), once the 30-day period has expired, amendment is not available to cure a substantive defect in removal proceedings.\u201d); Lowes v. Cal Dive Int\u2019l, Inc., No. 97-407, 1997 WL 178825 (E.D.La.1997) (<HOLDING>); Iwag v. Geisel Compania Maritima, 882 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that the thirty day removal period runs from the date of fdics plea in intervention and notice of substitution 1: holding that the laterserved defendants  had thirty days from the date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the unanimous consent of their codefendants even though the firstserved codefendants did not file a notice of removal within thirty days of service 2: recognizing that while defendants may freely amend their notice of removal within thirty days of service they may not add new grounds for removal after the thirty day period has expired 3: holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal 4: holding that the absence in the notice of removal of copies of the summonses served on the defendants uncorrected until after the thirty 30 day removal period had expired violates 28 usc  1446a and bars removal", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest \u2014 one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against \u2014 without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Jurden\u2019s two convictions for Holdings: 0: recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check 1: holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank 2: holding judge in bank robbery prosecution did not abuse discretion in refusing to excuse juror whose wife was bank employee or juror whose daughter had been victim of bank robbery 3: holding that escape driver with no prior knowledge that robbery would be armed is aider and abettor of aimed bank robbery if he knowingly and willfully joins in the escape phase of an armed bank robbery knowing that an accomplice has a gun 4: holding that an africanamerican investment advisor who accompanied two clients into a bank could assert a  51 claim alleging discrimination against the bank even though his clients were the actual customers of the bank", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "formal enrolled status. We therefore conclude there was no deficiency of proof on the Indian status element. 2. Counsel\u2019s failure to dispute Smith\u2019s Indian status. Smith contends trial counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he is an Indian. We disagree. Smith was tried before Bruce, Cruz and Maggi were decided, and pre-Bruce authority gave counsel little indication that a challenge to the evidence of Indian status might prove successful. See Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 (affirming an Indian status finding without extensive discussion). Counsel\u2019s failure to raise a legal argument that lacked obvious merit did not constitute ineffective assistance. See United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 3. Counsel\u2019s failure to request a clarifying Holdings: 0: recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense 1: holding that the failure to recognize every possible legal argument did not render counsels performance constitutionally deficient 2: holding that counsel could have reasonably determined that the trial court would not sustain a rule 403 objection therefore counsels failure to object to this evidence was not deficient performance 3: holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel 4: holding counsels failure to investigate alibi witness and eyewitnesses to the crime amounted to constitutionally deficient performance", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "received in the future); Garrett, 683 P.2d at 1170 (rejecting the husband\u2019s contention that the value of the community labor expended to fulfill a contingency agreement should be based upon a reasonable hourly rate because \u201c[t]his overlooks the very nature of the contract\u2014an all or nothing proposition. It is as unfair to require the attorney/spouse to pay the other spouse for reasonable services rendered when ultimately no fee is earned because the litigation was lost as it would be to require the non-attorney/spouse to accept a sum based upon an hourly fee when the attorney/spouse receives compensation far exceeding that amount.... In this regard, we approve of the trial court\u2019s continuing jurisdiction over this matter to monitor the value of the services.\u201d); Weiss, 365 N.W.2d at 613 (<HOLDING>). The Minnesota court of appeals took a Holdings: 0: holding where the defendant knows as well as anyone the value of the assets he concealed the intended loss calculation may properly be based upon the value of the assets concealed 1: holding that sale was appropriate where dividing the property among six parties was difficult because the nature of the land made it impossible to divide it into six equal parcels and the land likely had more value sold as a whole 2: holding that even though it is impossible to establish a present value for contingentfee receivables on the day of divorce such assets should not be ignored one method of determining the appropriate division is to divide the asset upon receipt of payment of the contingent fee receivables 3: holding that contingent fees are an asset of the partnership in which the estate of a deceased partner is entitled to participate 4: holding that aln attorney who is employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged pri or to the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services rendered to the client and may not recover the full amount of the agreed contingent fee", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to the issues presented in the original federal litigation. Upon careful review of the complaints submitted in the Saunders cases with the original Canady I complaint, we find no perceivable difference in the issues presented. Each petition alleges that appellants, as a class, identified by the same definition, were harmed by the same redlining practices employed by the homeowners\u2019 insurance industry. Appellants may not file what is essentially the same action, albeit under different legal theories, in state court merely to obtain a more favorable result than the one already obtained in their first choice of forum. See Kansas Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Roger Assocs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1063, 1070 (8th Cir.) (reasoning that a federal injunction 1326, 1334 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). As stated above, this case was brought Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court may not consider an issue not presented to the trial judge on appeal from final judgment on the merits 1: holding that although a district courts standing determination conclusively resolves a disputed question and settles an important issue separate from the merits of the case courts have recognized that the issue of standing is not effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment 2: holding that lack of a separate judgment does not preclude the taking of an appeal from a district courts final decision because the parties may waive the separate judgment requirement where one has accidentally not been entered 3: holding the issue of standing is waived if not asserted at the district court level 4: holding individual standing issue waived", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for the prosecution to point out inconsistencies in Edwards\u2019 defense strategy. (c) Edwards argues the State improperly commented on his objection to the admission of the cocaine into evidence. At the outset, we reject the State\u2019s contention that Edwards failed to preserve this objection because the transcript shows defense counsel objected. See Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 881 (350 SE2d 801) (1986). However, even assuming the State\u2019s comment was improper, we cannot say it is highly probable that the improper remark contributed to the verdict. Id. at 885. Thus, even if we were to determine the State\u2019s argument was improper and inflammatory, such argument did not likely affect the verdict and Edwards\u2019 conviction must be affirmed. Miles v. State, 183 Ga. App. 346 (358 SE2d 904) (1987) (<HOLDING>). (d) Next we address Edwards\u2019 contention that Holdings: 0: recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed 1: holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument 2: holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence 3: holding that although states argument was improper and inflammatory conviction was affirmed because it probably did not affect the verdict 4: holding prosecutors statement that defendants testimony was outandout lies not improper because not excessive or inflammatory", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and perhaps the nature of the risk\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). As a result, the Court holds that Santana deserves no relief under section 1132 for denial of benefits because Deluxe did not violate 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1022. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Deluxe on Counts Two, Three, and Eight. Consequently, the Court denies Santana\u2019s motion on those counts. C. Contract Claim On Count Four, Deluxe moves for summary judgment by arguing that Santana\u2019s common law contract action is preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1144(a).' Recognizing the expansive sweep of ERISA\u2019s preemption provision, the Court will grant summary judgment on this Count. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that state law relates to an employee benefit plan and is therefore preempted by erisa if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan 1: holding breach of contract claim not preempted as a straightforward breach of contract action as it alleged violation of specific covenant 2: holding breach of contract claim not preempted under hola 3: holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action 4: holding that state breach of contract action preempted because it relates to employee benefit plan", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "unless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to \u2018long established legal principles.\u2019 Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court\u2019s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.\u201d (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). \u201cBy necessary implication,\u201d HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, \u00a7\u00a7 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (<HOLDING>), on which Justice Acoba relies, see concurring Holdings: 0: holding that rule 11 does not require court to ensure that defendant understands consequences of nolo contendere plea on parole eligibility in sexual assault case 1: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 2: holding that the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea 3: holding that conviction based on plea of nolo contendere bars subsequent  1983 claim because even though such a plea does not involve admission of guilt it does communicate acceptance of conviction and sentence 4: holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "isolated incidents within the requisite level. They were neither frequent, severe nor physically threatening. Similarly, none of the other allegedly harassing conduct relied on by plaintiff was sufficiently severe and pervasive to be actionable. According to plaintiff, she spends between 70% to 75% of her time away from the office. Her deposition testimony establishes that during the limited time that she was in her office, she was not required to work with or around Brown and that she could have easily avoided contact with Brown in most instances by using a different entrance. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have found her work environment hostile or abusive. Cf. Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 737 F.Supp. 1070, 1082-83 (E.D.Mo.1990) (<HOLDING>). As a result, plaintiff has failed to Holdings: 0: holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment 1: holding that harassing conduct not sufficiently severe and pervasive where conduct would not have affected the work environment of a reasonable person 2: holding that plaintiffs work environment was not affected by comments and conduct of which she was not aware 3: holding that a claim of constructive discharge requires a showing of harassment that is more severe and pervasive than that required to show a hostile work environment 4: holding that plaintiff did not establish a severe or pervasive hostile work environment where the complained of conduct was episodic but not so frequent as to become pervasive was never severe was never physically threatening though occasionally discomforting or mildly humiliating and significantly was never according to the record an impediment to the plaintiffs work performance", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "equally unavailing. Accordingly, we hold that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance so that he might have time to obtain a valid license. The defendant also argues that the trial justice erred when he denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. He says that the trial justice denied the motion based \u201con an opinion not fact.\u201d Kowal has offered only a vague religiously oriented argument about why the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over him. He has directed us to no legal authority that supports his position. In the furtherance of public safety, \u00a7 31-11-18 equally applies to defendant as it does to all other motor-vehicle operators in Rhode Island. See State v. Garvin, 945 A.2d 821, 824 (R.I.2008) (<HOLDING>). We are satisfied that the trial justice\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that  311118 applied to the defendant regardless of his unwillingness to recognize the federal government 1: recognizing that stateimposed restrictions upon property may be attributed to the federal government for purposes of a takings analysis where the state officials acted as agents of the federal government or pursuant to federal authority 2: holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government 3: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel 4: holding that without such a showing the government may only charge the defendant with one violation of  922g1  regardless of the actual quantity of firearms involved", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "weighed against a finding of good cause. Furthermore, Ms. Wright did not provide any evidence that she acted diligently in the thirteen year interim. She also did not identify any circumstances beyond her control that prevented her from appealing at any point during the thirteen years. Thus, we affirm the Board\u2019s holding that Ms. Wright did not show good cause for her delay in filing her appeal. Costs Each party shall bear its own costs. AFFIRMED. 1 . Even if Ms. Wright was found credible, and the November 2009 date claimed in her initial appeal or the June 2009 date claimed in her petition for review was the first time she received notice of her termination, her October 2010 appeal would still be untimely. See Gordy v. Merit. Sys. Prot. Bd., 736 F.2d 1505, 1508 (Fed.Cir.1984) Holdings: 0: holding that where employee was aware of dissolution abatement of claims provision applied even in absence of written notice because employee had actual notice 1: holding that when an employee is not provided with notice of termination and appeal rights by an employing agency a dismissal based on untimeliness may be proper if the employee fails to act promptly and within the allowable time limits after he or she becomes aware of those rights 2: holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously 3: holding that a notice recommending termination of an employee to the board without notice to the employee of employees right to attend and dispute the claims violated due process 4: holding that rights accrue only when an employee vests", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "no more speech than.necessary to serve a significant government interest.\u201d Madsen v. Women\u2019s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Although this standard is very close to strict scrutiny, it does not require that the prior restraint serve a \u201ccompelling state' interest,\u201d but merely a significant one. Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (reciting the strict scrutiny standard). This standard is the minimum scrutiny applied to all prior restraints; if the content of the restriction \u2014 not m\u00e9rely its manner of enforcement as a prior restraint \u2014 itself triggers strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny applies. See Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (<HOLDING>). Holding otherwise would result in the Holdings: 0: recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to facial discrimination against a suspect class 1: holding that strict scrutiny applies 2: holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech 3: holding that prior restraint analysis applies to commercial speech but that the general health claim regulation 21 cfr  10114 was sufficiently welldefined to survive prior restraint analysis 4: holding that strict scrutiny applies to a prior restraint enforcing a contentbased restriction on speech in a traditional public forum", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the Court deems the \u00a7 523(a)(9) claim to have been tried by the consent of parties, and the Court will therefore consider whether this debt should be excepted from discharge under either \u00a7\u00a7 523(a)(6) or (a)(9). Wood also cited \u00a7 523(a)(2) in her complaint, however, Wood has never argued this theory applied under these facts. The Court considers any claim by Wood under this Code section to have been abandoned by Wood. 8 . Assuming a picture can indeed be worth a thousand words, and to give additional context and flavor to this discussion, a photo of the subject truck, admitted in evidence in this action, is appended to this decision. 9 . In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the use of an objective test. Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) 10 . Recall, Jury Instruction No. 16 provides: Holdings: 0: holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6 1: holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury 2: holding that either objective substantial certainty or subjective motive meets the supreme courts definition of willful  injury in  523a6 3: holding that  523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury 4: holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc  523a6", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "On the one hand are Securities and Exchange Commission v. Washington Co. Utility District, 676 F.2d at 224 (manager of public utility district had duty to disclose kickback from underwriter of bond); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir.1979) (\u201cwhere brokers are obligated to investigate, the failure to do so subjects them to a holding that they acted wilfully\u201d); Klein v. Computer Devices, 591 F.Supp. at 280 (duty was breached where aider \u201cparticipated in the preparation and review of the allegedly defective prospectus and ... actively promoted the sale of shares ... by, for example, orchestrating the entire transaction, placing advertisements and processing purchase orders\u201d); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793 (<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan 1: holding title company liable for bad faith 2: holding bank liable for making loan to company and then demanding continuation of program where employees without any financial information traded earnings for unregistered subordinated promissory notes 3: holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company 4: holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the court may consider \u201cwhether revocation of the order of confirmation can or would lead to an outcome that is more equitable than leaving the order intact.\u201d 8 Collier on Bankruptcy \u00b6 1144.03[4] at 1144-5 (15th ed. rev.2006). In contrast with this discretionary language stands the statutory command that any order revoking a confirmation order \u201cshall \u2014 (1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation.... \u201d The use of the imperative \u201cshall\u201d leaves no room for discretion. All orders revoking orders of confirmation must protect innocent parties. Under this statutory scheme, if a court cannot fashion a revocation order that protects innocent parties who acquired rights in relian 923 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (<HOLDING>). The policy consideration of finality for a Holdings: 0: holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond 1: holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction 2: holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer 3: holding  under section 1144s predecessor statute  that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period 4: holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction and rejecting a continuing violation theory", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "generally been hesitant to award injunctive relief based on assertions about lost opportunities and market share\u201d). Barton v. District of Columbia, 131 F.Supp.2d 236, 247 (D.D.C.2001). Indeed, \u201cfinancial harm alone cannot constitute irreparable injury unless it threatens the very existence of the movant\u2019s business.\u201d Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 193 F.Supp.2d 6, 14 (D.D.C.2001); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Energy, 514 F.Supp. 1019, 1026 (D.D.C.1981) (noting that to constitute irreparable harm, allegations of lost sales \u201cmust be sufficiently large holding that a drug manufacturer failed to establish irreparable harm because it \u201call but conceded\u201d that its estimated lost revenues would not cause serious damage to the company); Bristol-Myers, 923 F.Supp. at 221 (<HOLDING>). Nor has the plaintiff indicated why it will Holdings: 0: holding that changes in the baseball card market between 1965 and 1980 foreclosed any argument that a definition of the relevant market by the federal trade commission could preclude relitigation of the market definition issue 1: holding that an allegation of a 65 market share could be the basis for inferring market power and thus defeated a 12b6 motion to dismiss 2: holding 12year statute of limitations violated state guarantee of open courts when it would have barred right of actions against manufacturer of drug before they ever existed as it was not discovered until 20 years after drug was administered that the drug caused cancer 3: holding a branded drug and its generic version to be a plausible relevant market 4: holding that a drug manufacturer failed to establish irreparable harm because its claim that it would lose between fifty and seventy percent of its market share upon the introduction of the competing drug on the market was based on mere speculation", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or Collateral Estoppel in Federal Court Action, 19 A.L.R. Fed. 709 \u00a7 4 (1974 & Supp.1995). Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979) (federal common law governing contractual liens arising from federal loan program incorporated state common law). The only exception to this doctrine occurs where the statute on which the federal cause of action is based constitutes an express or implied repeal of \u00a7 1738. We find no evidence of such a repeal in ERISA. Though we are not required to do so by the text of \u00a7 1738, federal common law requires us to give preclusive effect to the determinations of a state administrative agency acting in a judicial capacity. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Nelson v. Jefferson County, Ky., 863 F.2d 18, Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law 1: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law 2: holding that federal courts must utilize the same preclusion doctrine as would be applied by a state court to administrative determinations by that state 3: holding the federal and state tests to be the same 4: holding that in a diversityjurisdiction case involving only state claims the primaryjurisdiction doctrine does not apply in favor of a state agency as compared to a federal agency and holding that even if the doctrine were to apply a federal district court sitting in diversity would defer to a state agencys primary jurisdiction only if state courts would so defer", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "lot of progress, and she- deserved the nomination.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 108.) Moreover, \u25a0 Garcia acknowledges that she was the only candidate Gold nominated for promotion in 2010. (See id. \u00b6 13.) Construing the inconsistencies and facts in Garcia\u2019s favor, I find that Garcia\u2019s assertion that Gold essentially did not work hard enough on her nomination is unpersuasive. In addition, there is also no basis to conclude that the committee\u2019s stated reason not to promote Garcia in 2010 was a pretext for discrimination. In support, Garcia merely states that the committee was composed of almost entirely white men; however, this fact alone does not establish pretext. See Holdmeyer v. Veneman, 321 F.Supp.2d 374, 382 (D. Conn. 2004), aff'd sub nom., Holdmeyer v. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 146 Fed.Appx. 535 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the committee promoted at least one Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to gender discrimination and retaliation claims where she had only asserted discrimination based on race and disability in her eeoc complaint 1: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 2: holding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination 3: recognizing that stray remarks are insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination and concluding that a comment by the decisionmaker that he selected a candidate for a promotion because the candidate was a bright intelligent knowledgeable young man was a stray remark that did not raise an inference of age discrimination 4: holding plaintiff failed to raise inference of discrimination where only evidence plaintiff adduced was fact that decisionmaker was different race", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Quinn, 204 F.Supp.2d at 163. We agree that stare decisis governs. The last time around, we addressed this aspect of the standard for measuring compliance head-on and held that the proper data are the \u201ccontemporaneous population figures [for] ... \u2018the percentage of minorities within the community.\u2019 \u201d Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 (quoting the Beecher decree). At that time, we considered the very authorities upon which the Candidates now rely and specifically repudiated the notion that the pertinent language of the decree was overbroad. Id. at 1277-78. Thus, principles of stare decisis required the district court to -reject the Candidates\u2019 version of how the second variable should be constructed. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (<HOLDING>). If more were needed \u2014 and we do not think Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of stare decisis is most frequently applied in cases affecting real property 1: recognizing that the doctrine of stare decisis embodies the obligation to follow precedent 2: holding that decision by panel of this court is established precedent under rules of stare decisis 3: holding that stare decisis is not applicable unless the issue was squarely addressed in a prior decision 4: holding that the doctrine of stare decisis applies to the issue of reliability of new scientific techniques the intoxilyzer in that case", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "his request for a jury shuffle. Appellant contends his substantial rights have been affected and that he is entitled to a new trial. A defendant has an absolute right to a shuffle of the jury panel. Tex. Code CRIm. PRoc. Ann. art. 35.11 (Vernon Supp.2002); Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 146, 147 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). The motion for a jury shuffle must be made before voir dire begins. Williams v. State, 719 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (en banc). Voir dire generally begins when the trial court recognizes the State as having started the examination. Id., In Davis, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals modified Williams in holding that in capital felony cases, voir dire begins when the trial court begins its examination of the panel. Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Davis court, while recognizing the role Holdings: 0: holding that the extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judges discretion 1: holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire 2: holding that the legislature intended the trial court to be more involved in the voir dire procedure in capital felony cases 3: holding that appellant failed to meet his burden of showing that the trial court violated his right to a public trial by sealing jury questionnaires used in open court during voir dire 4: holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "759 N.E.2d at 518; Saje Ventures II, 748 P.2d at 814. 9 See, e.g., Trustees of Cent. States v. LaSalle Nat., 542 N.E.2d 30, 31-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); see generally Smith v. District Court, 63 Nev. 249, 256-57, 167 P.2d 648, 651 (1946) (explaining that void judgments are always subject to collateral attack), overruled on other grounds by Poirier v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 81 Nev. 384, 404 P.2d 1 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners, 116 Nev. 646 to involuntary dismissal under NRCP 41(e), the jurisdictional implications of an NRCP 41(e) violation recognized above closely accord with the collateral effects of a voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). See Marques v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 286 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 1: holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits 2: holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief 3: recognizing that a judgment on the merits entered after a plaintiff has filed a proper fed r civ r 41a1 notice of dismissal is void 4: holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377, 381-83 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 544 (6th Cir.2002). Thus, in the present case, where petitioner\u2019s 70-month concurrent sentences fall well below the twenty-year maximum sentence authorized for each bank robbery count by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2113(a), and, in pleading guilty, petitioner admitted to the factual allegations used to calculate his sentence, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel falls short under the first prong of the Strickland standard. Moreover, as the government notes, petitioner does not otherwise claim that in pleading guilty, he did not understand his appeal rights, and nowhere in his petition does he argue or demonstrate that he directed counsel to pursue an appeal. See Regalado, 334 F.3d at 525 (<HOLDING>). The self-serving affidavit filed by Hicks\u2019 Holdings: 0: recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense 1: holding that counsels failure to object to use of an inapplicable controlled substance conviction tb enhance a sentence under  4b11 is deficient performance under  strickland 2: holding that criminal defense counsels failure to file notice of appeal when requested to do so is per se ineffective assistance 3: holding that counsels failure to file appeal was not deficient performance under strickland where the petitioner in  2255 action did not direct counsel to file an appeal and acquiesced in counsels decision to pursue as an alternative a reduction in sentence 4: holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "seek unnecessary. See ch.2002-240, \u00a7 2, at 1782, Laws of Fla. (deleting authorization for arbitration). WOLF, C.J., Concurring. I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority. Section 627.062(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that \u201c[t]he department and insurer must treat the decision of the arbitrators as the final approval of a rate filing.\u201d The majority determines that the statute may not be enforced as written because it conflicts with the Florida Windstorm Underwriters Association Plan of Operation. That plan was adopted by rule by the Department of Insurance. Fundamental administrative law dictates that an administrative rule may not conflict with the unambiguous dictates of a statute. See Cleveland v. Fla. Dep\u2019t of Children & Families, 868 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). The majority\u2019s determination that the plan Holdings: 0: holding that 9 usc  1 conflicts with the inclusive language of the convention and thus may not restrict its scope 1: holding that confirmation of a chapter 11 plan creates a binding contract which may be enforced in state courts 2: holding that a rule that conflicts with a subsequent adopted statutory amendment may not be enforced 3: holding that property settlement agreements may be specifically enforced 4: holding that this boilerplate language conflicts with the regulations and rulings", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "preserved error on the issue of the admissibility of Bolt\u2019s testimony, we first must determine the intent of the district court ruling on Kircher\u2019s motion in limine. Kircher\u2019s motion in limine sought to prohibit Bolt from giving testimony concerning the standards of care applicable to certified public accountants, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, as well as any perceived errors in the audit\u2019s work papers. In ruling on the motion, the district court concluded Bolt was not qualified to testify as to whether Kireher performed the audit pursuant to generally accepted auditing standards. The court then ruled, \u201cYour motion is granted as to Bolt.\u201d Subsequently, QCBT inquired whether the c eption to the general rule applies. See, e.g., Alberts, 722 N.W.2d at 407 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court\u2019s ruling had the Holdings: 0: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception 1: recognizing general rule 2: holding that the exception to the general rule applied even though the court did not specifically rule the evidence was inadmissible because the ruling was definitive and reached the ultimate issue of admissibility 3: holding that an exception to the general rule applied when counsel asked the court whether its ruling was the final order of the court and the court responded yes 4: holding that rule 413b only requires disclosure of the evidence itself fifteen days prior to trial and the rule does not impose  on the government a separate obligation to specifically disclose or declare the intention to rely upon rule 413 for admissibility", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). DAVIS, POLSTON, and THOMAS, JJ., Holdings: 0: holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed 1: holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings 2: holding that pleadings filed by a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel are generally treated as a nullity 3: holding that pro se pleadings from defendants who are represented by counsel in the pending criminal proceedings are unauthorized 4: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "civil courts\u2019 should refrain from asserting jurisdiction and substituting [their] judgment for that of the military courts.\u201d). Dr. Klingenschmitt\u2019s second contention is that the court-martial proceedings were fundamentally unfair because they were tainted by impermissible \u201ccommand influence.\u201d PL\u2019s Mot. 33. Of the several examples of alleged improper command influence set forth in his brief, however, only one \u2014 the allegation that the convening authority of the court-martial, Admiral Ruehe, Commander Navy Religion Mid-Atlantic, was an accuser \u2014 was raised before the court-martial. PL\u2019s Mot. 35 (citing AR 1152-71). The other objections based on allegedly improper command influence were not raised and are therefore waived. See Martinez v. United States, 914 F.2d 1486, 1488 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Dr. Klingenschmitt argues that improper Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to raise his constitutional claims in the military court system bars him from raising them in federal court 1: holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court 2: holding that a defendants failure to object or join in a codefendants objection to an issue bars the defendant from raising the issue on appeal 3: holding that failure to raise issue at district court forecloses party from raising same issue on appeal 4: holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "but instead to his \u201cirresponsibility.\u201d Id at 18. Findings of the District Court Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), trial courts should and must \u201cstate legal and factual conclusions sufficient to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the grounds of its decision.\u201d White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 845 F.2d 1497, 1499 (8th Cir.1988). If an appellate court does not know what facts the trial court took into consideration in drawing its conclusions, its findings become suspect. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1479 (Fed.Cir.1993) (remanding because the district court\u2019s findings were \u201ctoo conclusory and sparse\u201d to provide a factual basis for appellate review); EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat\u2019l, 555 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). The only critical fact the district court Holdings: 0: holding that it is the commissioners findings of fact to the extent they modify or replace the administrative law judges findings that are relevant on appeal 1: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence 2: holding that appellate review is precluded when the trial court provides only conclusory findings illuminated by no subsidiary findings or reasoning on all the relevant facts 3: holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts 4: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "quotation marks omitted) (quoting Poelstra v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 545 N.W.2d 823, 825 (S.D.1996)). \u201cAs a general rule, the possessor of land owes an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for the benefit of the invitee\u2019s safety, and the possessor is liable for the breach of such duty,\u201d W. at 501 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D.1986)). \u201cA business invitee is a business visitor who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of land.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ms. Larmon qualifies as a business invitee in this case. See Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199 (S.D.1989) (<HOLDING>). A possessor of land in South Dakota \u201cowes a Holdings: 0: holding that an employee qualified as a business visitor which the janis court subsequently defined as a business invitee 1: holding that monitoring telephone calls is in the ordinary course of business where the employer has reason to suspect an employee of disclosing confidential information to business competitor 2: recognizing duty of care owed by business invitor to invitee 3: holding that the innkeeperguest special relationship simply is not applicable to the potential duty of care owed to a business invitee 4: recognizing that pursuant to the business judgment rule the decisions of business professionals on the board of directors should be presumed valid", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation\u201d). That goal would not be achieved by requiring a plaintiff who no longer is part of the prison population to return to the institution to partake of an internal administrative dispute mechanism. Other courts have reached the opposite view. See, e.g., Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985, 991-92 (D.Ariz.2003); Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F.Supp. 1318, 1327 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.1997); Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F.Supp. 354, 361-62 (E.D.Wis.1997). However, those decisions appear to constitute a minority position, as several other courts have held that the PLRA applies only to inmates confined at the time the lawsuit is commenced. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that the ideas exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserted under  1983 1: holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted 2: recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different 3: holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims 4: holding that the exhaustion requirement applies only to individuals who at the time they seek to file their civil actions are detained as a result of being accused of convicted of or sentenced for criminal offenses", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "application signed by defendant, relating to matters of a general nature unrelated to the applicant\u2019s medical history, was approved by the Acting Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York on March 27,1990. (Exh. Y annexed to Pl.\u2019s Summary Judgment Motion). With regard to the second part of NML\u2019s form of disability insurance application, relating specifically to an applicant\u2019s medical history, NML\u2019s form of medical questionnaire which it submitted to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York was approved on January 13, 1986. (Exh. Z annexed to Pl.\u2019s Summary Judgment Motion). NML\u2019s form was entitled, \u201cNonmedical Applications Only.\u201d Id. The form entitled, \u201cNonmedical Applications Only\u201d is exactly the same .Y.S.2d 500, 502, 107 A.D.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Dep\u2019t) (<HOLDING>), aff'd 65 N.Y.2d 993, 494 N.Y.S.2d 299, 484 Holdings: 0: holding that where employer paid benefits under group disability policy to employee under mistaken belief that his condition resulted from illness rather than injury arising out of and in course of employment employees acceptance of such benefits did not bar him from benefits to which he was entitled under workers compensation law and employer was properly allowed credit for payments made under disability policy 1: holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued 2: recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing 3: holding fact that prototype group disability policy submitted to insurance department for approval contained blanks and that therefore policy actually issued with blanks filled in may have been unapproved in violation of insurance statutes did not warrant voiding of nonduplication of benefits clause in group disability policy 4: holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Mr. Belcher testified that he was able to remove the radio from the van. R.59, Ex. 2 at 50. 6 . Indiana courts have defined false imprisonment as \"the unlawful restraint upon one's freedom of movement or the deprivation of one\u2019s liberty without consent.\u201d Miller v. City of Anderson, 777 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Indiana courts have stated also that \"[a] defendant may be liable for false arrest when he or she arrests the plaintiff[s] in the absence of probable cause to do so.\u201d Id. The circumstances of this procedural due process claim do not involve false arrest or false imprisonment under Indiana tort law. Therefore, these exceptions to the law enforcement immunity provision do not apply. 7 . See, e.g., East Chicago Police Dep\u2019t v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>); City of Hammond v. Reffitt, 789 N.E.2d 998, Holdings: 0: holding police officers were entitled to immunity where the officers decided not to arrest an intoxicated driver who subsequently died of hypothermia in his vehicle 1: holding that police officers were not entitled to immunity under the itca law enforcement immunity provision where the officers violated their statutory duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all individuals while acting within the scope of their employment 2: holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity 3: holding that even if the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action under the virginia wrongful death act against the city police officers the police officers would be entitled to sovereign immunity 4: holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "merits. Id. at 1163. Given that the Court denied Mr. Henry\u2019s emergency motion on the merits three days after it was filed, that Mr. Henry had requested expedited consideration, and that the 30-day timeframe was not at issue in the case, it is safe to say that anything Henry said about the 30-day timeframe was dicta, not holding. See Kaley, 579 F.3d at 1253 n. 10. IV. For all of these reasons, we hold Mr. Johnson\u2019s application in abeyance, pending the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Welch. APPLICATION HELD IN ABEYANCE. 1 . See Rodriguez v. Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 272 (1st Cir.1998); Word v. Lord, 648 F.3d 129, 129 n. 1 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam) C'[W]here an issue requires a published opinion that cannot reasonably be prepared in [ ] time [ ] we may e 04, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 121 S.Ct. 2478, Holdings: 0: holding that the rule announced in padilla v kentucky 559 us 356 130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 1: holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 2: holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 3: holding that the rule announced in ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 4: recognizing that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 that the eighth amendment prohibits any barrier to the sentencers consideration of mitigating evidence was not a watershed procedural rule falling within the second teague exception", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the case being reviewed: 1. \"the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the statute\"; 2. the agency's interpretation is one of longstanding; 3. \"the agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation\"; and 4. the agency's interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in applying the statute. Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 660. Only due weight deference may be required, however, if all four of the above standards are not met. Id. at 660 n.4. A reviewing court under due weight deference \"need not defer to an agency's interpretation which while reasonable, is not the interpretation which the court considers best and most reasonable.\" Id.; see also Margoles v. LIRC, 221 Wis. 2d 260, 265 n.3, 585 N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1998) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 10. Cudahy argues that LIRC's decision in Holdings: 0: holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation 1: holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation 2: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 3: holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 4: holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 402 (D.C.Cir.1974) (finding jurisdiction to review an FCC order denying reconsideration of a notice of apparent liability, even though licensee had paid the proposed forfeiture upon receipt of the notice, so that no further administrative proceedings were necessary and no district court action filed). In the absence of direct support, the FCC calls our attention to rulings in cases involving other statutes, with varying purposes and enforcement provisions. Because these cases generally recount the clear and convincing evidence of Congressional intent to exclude review, we are not persuaded that they are germane to the instant ease. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207-12, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Solar Turbines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, Holdings: 0: holding judicial review of a preenforcement ruling precluded by the federal mine safety and health amendments act of 1977 where the aggrieved mine owner could initiate an administrative challenge and the legislative history demonstrates a recognition that prompt abatement of violations was essential to avoid fjrequent and tragic mining disas ters 1: holding that case law from other circuits squarely precluded jurisdiction over preenforcement ruling under the clean air act 2: holding that section 9613h precluded preenforcement judicial review of plaintiffs constitutional challenge cercla 3: holding where challenge was waived that appellate review is precluded 4: holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to avail themselves of existing procedures that has foreclosed their claims presented here. Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that availing themselves of the existing procedures would have been futile because, once the government initiates the eminent domain process, Connecticut law does not allow for a valuation of the property that includes a decline in property value occasioned by pre-eminent domain activities of the government. (See Dkt. #22 at 3-4.) This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, plaintiffs do not present facts indicating that they even attempted to raise the issue during the eminent domain process. Second, plaintiffs interpretation of Connecticut law has recently been disavowed. See Albahary v. City of Bristol, 276 Conn. 426, 436, 886 A.2d 802 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, there is no basis to conclude Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court 1: holding before huffman was decided that younger abstention was inapplicable to an eminent domain proceeding 2: holding that the appellate court properly determined that generally under principles of inverse condemnation a property owner may seek compensation in an eminent domain proceeding for pretaking damages caused by the condemnor 3: holding that an eminent domain action that ended with a stipulated final judgment was not a supplemental proceeding 4: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "be sufficient, provided it is \u201ca written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.\u201d Id. at \u00a7 1601.12(b). Mr. Jones\u2019s intake questionnaire clearly satisfies these minimum requirements for the content of a charge, in addition to meeting the EEOC\u2019s formal requirements that a charge be written, signed, and verified, id. \u00a7 1601.9. Moreover, the record supports the District Court\u2019s finding that Mr. Jones intended the questionnaire to serve as a charge. In addition to asking whether a document meets the EEOC\u2019s requirements for a charge, other circuits ask whether the charging party manifested an intent to activate the administrative process. See Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 Holdings: 0: holding in accordance with other circuits that an intake questionnaire may serve as a charge of discrimination if the circumstances of the case demonstrate that the charging party manifested the intent to activate the administrative process 1: holding that the timely filing of an administrative charge of discrimination is a prerequisite to bringing suit 2: holding that plaintiffs filing with the eeoc constituted a formal charge because the plaintiff attached a statement to the filed intake questionnaire that included a request for the agency to act 3: holding that based on plain language in box 2 plaintiffs intake questionnaire could not be construed as timely eeoc charge 4: holding an intake questionnaire to constitute a charge under the adea upon application of the manifestation of intent test although the eeoc did not consider the questionnaire to be a charge and the aggrieved person subsequently filed a formal charge", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Hernandez, but a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found appellant could not go after Hernandez because he was busy subduing Vasquez. Appellant\u2019s own statement that he did not conspire to rob Vasquez does not render the evidence to the contrary insufficient. Accordingly, we hold there was sufficient evidence of appellant\u2019s involvement in a conspiracy to rob Vasquez. B. Evidence that the murder should have been anticipated Appellant also asserts there is no evidence that he should reasonably have anticipated the possibility of a murder occurring in the course of the robbery because there is no evidence he knew or had reason to believe that Levy had a gun with him that night. Fur 13); Turner v. State, 414 S.W.3d 791, 798-99 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2013, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We conclude the cumulative effect of the Holdings: 0: holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded 1: holding evidence showed appellant knew gun was brought when coconspirator removed something wrapped in white towel from truck during criminal transaction 2: holding evidence sufficient that appellant should have anticipated murder when he knew coconspirator had a gun and appellant stated he first saw the gun on the night of the offense when coconspirator showed it to victim 3: holding a consent voluntary when a defendant who had been warned of his rights and knew police were investigating murders turned his gun over to a policeman who suggested that he could sell the gun for the defendant 4: holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not be sued without consent in its own courts . . . .\u201d). 8 Dempsey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 256 Ga. App. 291, 292 (568 SE2d 154) (2002) (punctuation omitted). 9 It appears from the correspondence that Shuford mailed a check to Walker in November 2009 to cover the repair and diminished value of Walker\u2019s motorcycle. We reject Walker\u2019s argument that this in any way waived sovereign immunity or estopped the State from invoking same because \u201ca government official may not waive or be estopped from invoking statutory notice requirements.\u201d Dempsey, 256 Ga. App. at 294; see also State of Ga. v. Haynes, 285 Ga. App. 637, 640 (647 SE2d 331) (2007) (\u201c[T]he government may not waive or be estopped from invoking statutory notice requirements.\u201d). 10 See Welch, 276 Ga. App. at 665 (<HOLDING>); Shelnutt v. Ga. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 272 Ga. Holdings: 0: holding that because the plaintiffs did not strictly comply with the statutory provisions for sending ante litem notice the trial court had no subj ect matter jurisdiction over the suit punctuation omitted 1: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 2: holding that failure of the property appraiser to strictly comply with statutory notice provisions tolls the running of the sixtyday period within which to bring an action contesting a tax assessment 3: holding that a superior court could not exercise its original jurisdiction under article iv section 6 over a challenge to a tax decision where the party failed to strictly or substantially comply with statutory procedural requirements 4: holding a trial court lacks jurisdiction when a party fails to strictly comply with the statutes regarding service", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "see id. at 74-75, 21 L.Ed. 394. The former include only rights the Federal Constitution grants or the national government enables, but not those preexisting rights the Bill of Rights merely protects from federal invasion. Id. at 76-80, 21 L.Ed. 394. The Second Amendment protects a right that predates the Constitution; therefore, the Constitution did not grant it. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2797 (\u201c[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.\u201d). It necessarily follows that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect the right to keep and bear arms because it was not a right of citizens of the United States. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; cf. Presser, 116 U.S. at 266-67, 6 S.Ct. 580 (<HOLDING>). 3 The final avenue for incorporation is that Holdings: 0: recognizing a right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political social economic educational religious and cultural ends 1: holding that the right to associate with others as a military company is not a privilege of citizens of the united states 2: recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another 3: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 4: holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "statements made to investment analysts. Defendants confuse the test under which they can be held indirectly liable for misleading opinions or statements by analysts or other third parties with the test under which they can be held directly liable for their own misleading statements to analysts. Defendants \u201ccannot escape liability simply because [they] carried out [their] alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties.\u201d Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.1996). See also McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821 (9th Cir.1996) (finding accountant liable for providing fraudulent audit report to corporation where accounting firm knew report would be incorporated in 10-K and distributed to investors); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Alfus v. Pyramid Technology Corp., 764 Holdings: 0: holding government could be liable for breach of a contractual obligation to purchase insurance for plaintiff 1: holding that attempted firstdegree murder may be committed knowingly or intentionally 2: holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute 3: holding management could be liable for intentionally misstating material facts to analysts 4: holding that evidence submitted for a motion to reopen must be material and state new facts that rebut the underlying finding", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "anatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one\u2019s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one\u2019s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>); Minnesota v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 Holdings: 0: holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person 1: holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment 2: holding that search of appellants suitcase found on the floor next to the couch on which he was sleeping was an unconstitutional search of his person and was not authorized by a search of the residence 3: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 4: holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by the district court as the appropriate term of imprisonment\u201d), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1023, 123 S.Ct. 534, 154 L.Ed.2d 434 (2002); United States v. Kings, 981 F.2d 790, 797-98 (5th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (affirming sentence of 150 months under \u00a7 5G1.2(d) where guideline range was 120 to 150 months, and where one count carried a 120-month statutory maximum and another count carried a 36-month statutory maximum); United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 918-19 (7th Cir.2001) (vacating and remanding sentence due to district court\u2019s failure to order consecutive sentences, but citing Joetzki in holding that, pursuant to \u00a7 5G1.2(d), the district court could have sentenced defendant \"to 66 months (and a great deal more)\u201d); United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1045-46 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nelson, 54 F.3d 1540, 1547 Holdings: 0: holding that consideration by a sentencing court of acquitted conduct was appropriate in establishing the applicable guideline range or in determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range 1: holding that the maximum revocation sentence is the top of the guidelines range 2: holding that total punishment is the precise sentence determined by the sentencing judge from within the appropriate guidelines range and affirming a 63month sentence where a jury convicted defendant of five counts each with a 60month statutory maximum where the guideline range was 51 to 63 months 3: holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum 4: holding that a sentence of 71 months is proper under  5g12d where guideline range was 57 to 71 months and where each of eight counts of conviction carried 60month statutory maximum", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to FCCS once the court has placed the juvenile in the custody of FCCS. {\u00b6 14} In response to FCCS\u2019s argument, the state relies on the statutory authority for the court to \u201c[m]ake any further disposition that the court finds proper.\u201d The state contends that R.C. 2152.19(A)(8) is so broadly worded that it grants the juvenile court considerable discretionary authority to fashion delinquency dispositions that are not specifically enumerated in the juvenile code, as long as the dispositions further the purposes of the juvenile statutes. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851, 856 N.E.2d 921, \u00b6 6 (recognizing the juvenile court\u2019s \u201cbroad discretion to craft an appropriate disposition for a child adjudicated delinquent\u201d); In re Caldwell (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 666 N.E.2d 1367 (<HOLDING>); In re Walker, Franklin App. No. 02AP-421, Holdings: 0: holding the courts consecutive sentences at the statutory maximum on each count were reasonable because of the gravity of the offense 1: holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences 2: holding that because the general assembly included a catchall provision which it did not have to do the juvenile court had authority to impose consecutive commitments to dys based on each delinquent act even though consecutive commitments were not specifically enumerated in the statutes at that time 3: holding apprendi does not apply to consecutive sentencing 4: holding to read words and concepts into our statutes that the general assembly did not write shows disrespect both for the general assembly and the common law which the legislature has the power expressly to displace", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Carolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof of the happening of an act or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not unconscionable. Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 123 N.C. App. 511, 513, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996). \u201cOur courts do not look with favor on lease forfeitures.\u201d Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 535, 539, 369 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1988). \u201cWhen termination of a lease depends upon notice, the notice must be given in strict compliance with the contract as to both time and contents.\u201d Id. (<HOLDING>). Here, the relevant portion of the governing Holdings: 0: recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election 1: holding that when notice to vacate was insufficient to comply with the terms of the lease lease was not properly terminated before commencement of summary ejectment action 2: holding that the plaintiff could not complain that it was unable to comply with the trial courts order to respect the defendants easement because of its lease with a third party where plaintiff had entered into lease knowing that property was subject to an easement 3: holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term 4: holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as an injunction is set forth in Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 85, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and it requires a litigant requesting appeal to show: (1) that the order has the practical effect of an injunction; and (2) that the order might have \u201cserious, perhaps irreparable eonsequence[s].\u201d As demonstrated in our discussion of the third Cohen factor, supra, this is not a situation where Landise will suffer irreparable consequences. However, we need not reach the Carson test because this court has held that prejudgment security devices \u201cgenerally have been expressly excluded from the definition of an injunction for appeal purposes and thus are subject to appeal only to the extent they fall within the Cohen collateral order doctrine.\u201d McQueen, 547 A.2d at 177 (<HOLDING>). Cf. Cohen v. Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Holdings: 0: holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse 1: holding that protective orders in the landlord and tenant branch are distinguishable from ordinary prejudgment security devices because protective orders are not statutory creations and because a tenant who fails to pay a protective order may suffer the irreparable consequence of losing possession of the property 2: holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations 3: holding that trial courts denial of defendants motion seeking a qualified protective order allowing defendants to question the patientplaintiffs health care providers about any and all medical care she received during a threemonth period was not an abuse of discretion because the qualified protective order was not sufficiently tailored to limit the defendants to discussing only the medical conditions at issue in the litigation when the plaintiffs complaint involved only the cause extent treatment and consequences of the patients wound 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "he is removed; his appointment is voidable, not void.\u201d). CONCLUSION \u00b6 21 For these reasons, we vacate the superior court\u2019s order granting Progressive\u2019s motion and dismissing the complaint. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge and PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge. 1 . The complaint names George Pop as the defendant. Duncan has not amended the complaint to substitute the Estate of George Pop for George Pop. Progressive, however, has not contested the propriety of the complaint and it has proceeded as though the Estate of Pop is a named defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we assume that the complaint is sufficient as against Pop's estate. See Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 575, \u00b64, 96 P.3d 571, 573 (App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 25(a) (allowing substitution Holdings: 0: holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint 1: holding that when a plaintiff mistakenly sues a decedent and not the decedents estate and seeks to recover only against insurance proceeds if the decedents insurer had notice of the action and knowledge of the plaintiffs mistake within the period specified by rule 15c an amended complaint will relate back to the date of the original complaint absent any prejudice to the insurer and the estate and assuming the other requirements of rule 15c are met 2: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations 3: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate 4: holding that plaintiffs amended complaint could not relate back because there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had notice of the suit within the 120 day period required by rule 4m", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "28 (2d Cir.1991). A. The Civil Rights Claims Legal Aid argues that plaintiffs allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights by Legal Aid should be dismissed on the ground that Legal Aid has not acted under color of state law, as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff pleading a claim under \u00a7 1983 need allege only that \u201csome person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.\u201d Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir.1983) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that although legal aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume it is a private institution in no manner under state or city supervision or control 1: holding that state action is present when the state exercises coercive power over is entwined in the management or control of or provides significant encouragement either overt or covert to a private actor 2: holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued 3: holding that there is no private right of action against a state governmental entity for violations of the texas constitution 4: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on this point, that portion of Hilson\u2019s sentence is vacated and the case remanded to the district court only for its consideration as to whether Hilson should be resen-tenced to a lesser term of supervision. See 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(b)(1)(C) (allowing sentencing judge to impose supervised release term of at least three years for possession crimes where defendant had less than 28 grams of cocaine base). 3. Apprendi Error Hilson argues that, insofar as the district court found him to have trafficked in more than 28 grams of crack, the amount necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum under the FSA, it violated his Sixth Amendment rights as construed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. See Alleyne v. United States, \u2014 U.S.\u2014, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Because Hilson failed to raise any such Holdings: 0: holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt 1: holding any fact other than prior conviction that increases statutory mandatory minimum is element of offense that must be submitted to jury and found beyond reasonable doubt 2: holding that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that any fact that increases mandatory minimum is element that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt 4: holding any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to the jury", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "samples, an alteration in the RCD limit initially proposed of 1.0 mg/m3 limit to the 1.5 mg/m3 limit actually adopted, and the introduction of \u201cexcessive concentration values\u201d or ECVs. There remains, no doubt, a difference of opinion between the industry and MSHA about the costs associated with making the adjustments necessary to remedy violations, especially those that require the repair or replacement of faulty equipment. But such differences of opinion are hardly fatal to the Rule. As long as MSHA considers, as it has, the concerns of the industry and has supplied a reasoned view as to why it prefers the view of its own experts, we cannot hold that its decision is arbitrary and capricious. See Fla. Manufactured Hous. Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1580 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Here, MSHA has reasoned that most such Holdings: 0: recognizing that a district courts review is limited to the agency record submitted and that no de novo evidentiary hearing is permitted 1: holding that an agency is entitled to rely on the cost estimates calculated by its own engineering staff rather than the figures submitted by the industrys trade association where our review of the record does not indicate that the agencys projections are either flawed or unreasonable 2: holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that internal agency memoranda are presumptively part of the record on review subject to any privilege the agency might claim one of which is of course that which protects internal memoranda embodying the deliberative processes of the agency and its staff", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the government. Thus, impugning the integrity of the Prince is the same as impugning the integrity ons grounded in personal disputes because \u201cwithout a firm footing in one of the five protected bases, asylum law offers no succor.\u201d Marquez, 105 F.3d at 380-81 (concluding that a commercial dispute with a Philippine military officer was \u201capolitical\u201d); see also Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2005) (rejecting an asylum claim based on the applicant\u2019s whistle-blowing against a corrupt employer as \u201cessentially a personal dispute\u201d); Marku v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir.2004) (\u201cEvidence must be presented which suggests that the applicant was persecuted on account of or because of the political opinion.\u201d (emphasis in original)); Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d 995, 1000 Holdings: 0: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 1: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent 2: holding that a clerical employee was not an agent authorized to accept service of process for the corporation 3: holding that a dispute with a bulgarian secret service agent over employment was personal not political 4: holding that rule 45b does not require personal service", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "should receive the death penalty, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) further provides: \u201cIn determining the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question \u2018no\u2019 if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant\u2019s character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.\u201d The testimony offered by defendant in this case cannot be said to relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus, in order to be relevant, the evidence must be relevant to \u201cany aspect of the defendant\u2019s character or background * * * that one or more * * * jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.\u201d See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Stevens, 319 Or at 579 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding defense counsel was ineffective at sentencing when he failed to make a significant effort based on reasonable investigation and logical argument to ably present the defendants fate to the jury and to focus the attention of the jury on any mitigating factors 1: holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded 2: holding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence 3: holding that focus of ors 1631501bd is on mitigating evidence 4: holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a particular mitigating factor where despite a reasonable investigation by counsel counsel was not put on notice of any such mitigating evidence", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the defendant was less culpable than most other participants in [his] relevant conduct. Id. The district court did not clearly err in denying Lopez-Moreno a role reduc tion because (1) he was only held accountable for the quantity of drugs related to his role in the offense, (2) the quantity of drugs involved supported the court\u2019s finding that he was not a minor participant, and (3) he failed to produce any evidence in support of his mitigating role. See De Varon, 175 F.3d at 939, 941, 943. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue. IV. Booker Reasonableness (Arias only) We review sentences imposed under the post-Booker advisory Guideline scheme for reasonableness. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.2005); Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-63, 125 S.Ct. at 765-66 (<HOLDING>). Following the Booker decision, we have held Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court review sentences for unreasonableness in light of the  3553a factors 1: holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors 2: recognizing that many of the  3553a factors are already incorporated into any guidelines determination and the  3553a factors can themselves overlap 3: holding that sentence is reasonable when the district court properly addresses sentencing factors of  3553a 4: holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "153, 156 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.], writ denied); Terra Int'l Inc., 829 S.W.2d at 273; Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 28 . 852 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.App.\u2014Dallas 1993, writ denied). 29 . Id. at 256. 30 . Id. at 254. 31 . To the extent that the Dallas Court\u2019s analysis of \"property damage\u201d does relate to the misrepresentation claims, we disagree with it. Also, while we do not address the issue, we note that the Ninth Circuit has held that an insured's policy provides no coverage even if tort claims are alleged, as long as the claims, as here, are based on a contract. Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir.1991). 32 . See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Brewer, 914 F.Supp. 140, 142-43 (S.D.Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 806 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations 1: holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage 2: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 3: holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed 4: holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "In contrast to the previous category, the Court\u2019s conclusion follows not from Weintraub \u2019s holding, but rather from its rationale. Many of the complaints in this category were explicitly lodged by plaintiffs (sometimes with others) as committee members. Moreover, all of the complaints contended that McDuffie was undermining the committee process. These facts demonstrate that plaintiffs\u2019 complaints were \u201cundertaken in the course of performing\u201d their responsibilities as committee members; that is, they were \u201cpart-and-parcel\u201d of plaintiffs\u2019 concerns about their ability to properly execute their duties as faculty members elected to, and serving on, various committee. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 203; accord Ezuma v. City Univ. of N.Y., 665 F.Supp.2d 116, 129-30 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (Co gan, J.) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 367 Fed.Appx. 178, 2010 WL 605732 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that restatement  2191 is inapplicable to alleged sexual harassment by a supervisor was sexual harassment within the scope of antonis employment of course not 1: holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases 2: holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment 3: holding that professors reports of sexual harassment were wholly referable to the performance of his official functions as department chair 4: holding that sexual harassment is a personal injury tort", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974) (classifying contempt to determine whether the contemnor enjoyed the right to a jury trial). In such cases, the Supreme Court has noted that \u201cthe severity of the penalty actually imposed is the best indication of the seriousness of a particular offense.\u201d Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). The Court notes that the actual sentence imposed and the final guideline range are not the same; however, in this unusual context, the final guideline range is a closer benchmark to the sentence imposed than the offense guideline without the applicable adjustments. Cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (<HOLDING>). If the Court adopts the latter approach of Holdings: 0: holding that a court of appeals may afford a presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence 1: holding a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines 2: holding that district court may not presume reasonableness of guidelines sentencing range in particular case 3: holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range 4: holding that a court of appeals may presume reasonable a district courts proper application of the sentencing guidelines", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "memorandum, at 4-5 n. 5 (Pa.Super. filed October 17, 2007) (\u201cReed II\u201d). This Court has explained that \u201c[w]here a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid, none may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum.\u201d Commonwealth v. Swing, 409 Pa. 241, 245, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (1962). In the instant case, while the Superior Court in Reed I determined that Reed\u2019s claims were waived, it also determined that even if the claims had not been waived, they were without merit, and the court explained the basis for its conclusions. Thus, the Superior Court\u2019s holding in Reed I that Reed\u2019s claim regarding the admission of prior bad acts testimony was meritless was a valid holding that constitutes the law of the case, see Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 578, 664 A.2d 1326, 1333 (1995) (<HOLDING>), constraining the Court in Reed II. However, Holdings: 0: holding law of case doctrine is not absolute rule that must be inexorably followed in every case 1: holding that the law of the case doctrine is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case 2: holding law of case doctrine is procedural and does not go to jurisdiction of court 3: holding that the coordinate jurisdiction rule and all its attendant meanings and limitations expressed in previous case law would be assumed into law of the case doctrine 4: holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "matter of state law. And because \u201cthe highest state court is the final authority on state law,\u201d Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because \u201cno federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court\u2019s [ruling on an issue],\u201d this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court \u201crepeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law\u201d); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen\u2019s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). In Ahmed, the plaintiff was hired to work as Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law 1: holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law 2: holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution 3: recognizing that federal courts are bound by pronouncements of the california supreme court on applicable state law 4: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "affirmed by the district court and by this Court with specific reference to the fact that the settlement would not be permitted to extinguish Aetna\u2019s rights. Under the circumstances, we understand the acceptance of the settlement to constitute the requisite \u201cfull payment\u201d of the DOL claims within the meaning of \u00a7 509(c). D. The Government\u2019s Argument on Appeal In its brief to this Court, the government\u2014essentially agreeing with our finding that a common law right of setoff exists\u2014 \u201cconcluded that the basis upon which the district court reached its decision in this case ... was incorrect.\u201d Nonetheless, the government urges us to affirm the decision of the district court on an alternative basis. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citation Holdings: 0: holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports 1: holding that an appellate court may affirm the result reached by a district court on alternative grounds 2: holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds 3: holding that despite a trial courts failure to make specific factual findings an appellate court is free to affirm on any grounds for which there is sufficient record to permit conclusions of law 4: holding that an appellate court can affirm a district courts order on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law including grounds upon which the district court did not rely", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "inherent power \u201cto curb abuses and promote a fair process.\u201d Richardson, 76 Hawai'i at 507, 880 P.2d at 182. Accordingly, we reverse the ICA\u2019s ruling that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the instruction. B. Ford\u2019s Supplemental Document Productions Ford also challenges the ICA\u2019s reversal of the trial court\u2019s partial denial of plaintiffs\u2019 motion to exclude Ford\u2019s supplemental production of documents. Preliminarily, plaintiffs styled their request as a \u201cmotion in limine,\u201d but based it on the rules of discovery. We thus construe the motion as a request for discovery sanctions, the denial of which we review under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kawamata Farms, 86 Hawai'i at 241, 948 P.2d at 1082. See also Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). In their motion, plaintiffs cited HRCP Rule Holdings: 0: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard 1: holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard 2: holding that the less deferential skidmore standard was a more appropriate standard to be applied to an agencys unpublished opinion 3: recognizing that the interaction of general constitutional rules governing pretrial identification procedures and the deferential standard of habeas review affords significant discretion to the state court 4: recognizing the rock solid basis for such a deferential standard of review", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "process, they had \u201cat most, a generalized grievance shared by all Michigan residents alike,\u201d and thus lacked the s tute, the Supreme. Court has held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury requirement of standing by alleging \u201can intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.\u201d Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (<HOLDING>). The mere possibility of prosecution, however Holdings: 0: holding that law firm who was plaintiffs adversary in foreclosure proceeding owed no duty to plaintiffs as law firm could not have expected that plaintiffs would rely on law firms representations about payoff amounts 1: holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that when plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to a law it must be established that there are no set of circumstances under which the law would be valid 4: holding that one of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a discriminatory zoning law where an injunction against the law would have produced at least a substantial probability warth 422 us at 504 95 sct 2197 that the plaintiffs desired housing project would materialize", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment offered as a link in the chain of title in a suit to try the title to property. See In re A.L.H.C., 49 S.W.3d 911, 917 (Tex.App.Dallas 2001, pet. denied). SOS Alliance argues that its attempt to set aside the 2004 judgment can be considered a collateral attack on the judgment. We disagree. This proceeding was instituted for the sole purpose of declaring the 2004 judgment void, and in the same district court in which exas Supreme Court\u2019s holding with respect to what constitutes a collateral attack. See Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 345-46 (defining collateral attack as made in \u201ca proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment\u201d); see also Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Tex.1985) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). In accordance with supreme court precedent, Holdings: 0: holding that bill of review is exclusive remedy on direct attack where court had jurisdictional power even if judgment void 1: holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered 2: holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions 3: recognizing collateral attack on void order 4: holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "As the only entity with power to enforce the remedy, the Panel concluded that the SEC had standing as a creditor in the bankruptcy case to request a dischargeability determination because that agency was the only entity that could enforce the right to payment. Cross, 218 B.R. at 79. Based upon the Court\u2019s research, it seems fair to observe that \u201c[m]ost courts that have addressed the issue ... [conclude] that any time a governmental entity has a right of action against a debtor, the governmental entity is a creditor as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.\u201d AARP v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 269 B.R. 428, 435 (C.D.Cal.2001) (citing additional authority). See also Nathanson v. Nat\u2019l Labor Relations Bd., 344 U.S. 25, 27, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952) (<HOLDING>). This Court concurs in this approach. If, in Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act 1: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 2: holding that unemployment compensation should not be deducted from a back pay award under the national labor relations act because failing to deduct unemployment payments does not make the employee more than whole 3: holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act 4: holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "plaintiffs did not know definitively whether MidAtlantic would actually operate as a division of U.S. Airways when the December 2002 agreement was executed, they did know or reasonably should have known that the terms of employment provided therein were negotiated irrespective of MidAtlantic\u2019s corporate form. In other words, the agreement provided plaintiffs actual notice that defendants had rendered a significant bargaining point as to the corporate form as irrelevant and that AFA had taken a negotiating position adverse to their interests. See Palancia v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 549, 553 (E.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir.1983) (\u201c[U]nion members are charged with knowledge of the contents of their collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 278 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs essentially ask the court to toll Holdings: 0: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 1: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 2: holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation 3: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 4: recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "serving for the April 1986 conviction. Little\u2019s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See United States v. Wingate, 854 F.2d 1318, 1988 WL 83334 (4th Cir. Aug.4, 1988) (unpublished). Since then, Little has filed numerous motions seeking post-conviction relief. Although an extensive review of Little\u2019s endeavors is unnecessary, it suffices to note that the district court found the Rule 35(a) motion giving rise to this appeal, filed on June 17, 2002, was Little\u2019s seventh attempt at post-conviction relief. Little\u2019s Rule 35(a) motion alleged (1) that his convictions and sentences for both Count One and Count Forty in 1987 were \u201cillegal\u201d within the meaning of Rule 35(a) in light of Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 307, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (<HOLDING>); and (2) that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Holdings: 0: holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc  848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc  848c 1: holding that conspiracy is lesserincluded offense of cce 2: holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy 3: holding that double jeopardy precluded conviction for both conspiracy and engaging in a cce when the conspiracy was used to prove the cce 4: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in Mem\u2019l Hosp.-West Volusia, Inc. v. News-Journal Corp., 729 So. 2d 373, 379 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court held that a lessee running a hospital on behalf of a public authority responsible for public services was a public agency under Florida law. The court agreed with the Florida district court of appeal that the totality of factors test mandated by Schwab indicated that when the government transferred the responsibilities of a public health authority to a private entity, the state\u2019s sunshine requirements should continue to apply to that entity and that, therefore, open government mandates dictated that reporters must be allowed to attend hospital meetings. Id. at 379-82; see B & S Utils., Inc. v. Baskerville-Donovan, Inc., 988 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Dade Aviation Consultants v. Knight Ridder, Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that the city had delegated its municipal engineering functions to a private entity was dispositive in establishing that documents generated by the private entity were public records 1: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 2: holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program 3: holding that land dedicated for a public street may not be leased to a private entity for private use 4: holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "precise issue has held likewise. The Eighth Circuit, in In re Kline, 65 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1995), specifically considered whether holdings under the prior Act remained vital under the Code. The Kline court held that \u201cthe statute continues to except from discharge attorney fees, even if payable to an attorney rather than to a former spouse, if su 3), the Fifth Circuit considered the dischargeability of a child\u2019s guardian ad litem fees and an ex-spouse\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees in a custody proceeding following a divorce. Noting that the hearing for which the fees were incurred was \u201cclearly for [the child]\u2019s benefit and support,\u201d the court held that a court-ordered obligation to pay the fees was non-dischargeable under \u00a7 523(a)(5). Id.; see also In re Hudson, 107 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit, the first to consider Holdings: 0: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 1: holding that in a chapter 7 case postpetition interest on a nondischargeable tax claim is also nondischargeable 2: holding that  4314123 specifically allows for attorney fees in paternity and child support cases 3: holding that a debt for attorney fees incurred by an exspouse in a postjudgment divorce contempt proceeding was nondischargeable 4: holding nondischargeable attor neys fees owed directly to an attorney from a paternity suit", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "State v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E. 2d 27, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 238, 42 L.Ed.2d 188 (1974); State v. Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 203 S.E.2d 429 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 3204, 41 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1974); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3217, 41 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1974) (semble) (may have been applying pre-Miller construction); State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis.2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973). 16 . Commonwealth v. Winkleman, 230 Pa.Super. 265, 326 A.2d 496 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The statute held unconstitutional in Holdings: 0: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect 1: holding that although probation statute was repealed by sentencing reform act old provision continued to apply to offenses which occurred before effective date of act nov 1 1987 2: holding that 1972 amendments had no effect on persons not covered by the act 3: holding that section 211a of the act commonly known as the parole act act of august 6 1941 added by section 5 of the act of august 24 1951 pl 1401 as amended formerly 61 ps  33121aa repealed by the act of august 11 2009 pl 147 providing that a convicted parole violator forfeits all the time spent at liberty on parole similar language can be found at section 6138 of the prisons and parole code 61 pa cs 6138a2 was not subject to the rule of lenity because that section did not define elements of a crime but defines the ramifications when an individual who was on parole from a prior crime is convicted of committing a new crime 4: holding unconstitutional act of june 24 1939 pl 872  528 as amended formerly codified as 18 ps  4528 repealed by act of december 6 1972 pl 1605 no 334  5", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "from trying to steal a march on each other, In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir.1982), and the automatic stay is essential to accomplishing this purpose. There is, in contrast, no policy of preventing persons whom the bankrupt has sued from protecting their legal rights. True, the bankrupt\u2019s cause of action is an asset of the estate; but as the defendant in the bankrupt\u2019s suit is not by opposing that suit, seeking to take possession of it, subsection (a)(3) is no more applicable that (a)(1) is. Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n., 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989). Accord, United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1473 (D.C.Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048, 112 S.Ct. 913, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992); Merchants & Farmers Bank of 10, 522-523 (Bankr.D.S.C.2014) (<HOLDING>). The Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss Holdings: 0: holding that a state is immune by virtue of 11 usc  106c from money damages for violating the automatic stay provision of 11 usc  362a 1: holding that the plaintiffs  5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc  362a 2: holding that the protections of the automatic stay apply only to actions against the debtor 3: holding that debtor did not prove that defendant creditors violated automatic stay under 11 usc  362a with respect to their actions in a state court lawsuit because the creditors actions involved a counterclaim that debtor asserted and were in response to that counterclaim 4: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), the Court considered a cell search challenged by a pretrial detainee. While Hudson does not mention Bell\u2019s Fourth Amendment assumption, Block specifically affirms it with regard to pretrial detainee cell searches. Block, 468 U.S. at 586, 104 5.Ct. 8227 (upholding Bell\u2019s conclusion that prison cell searches do not violate pretrial detainees\u2019 presumed Fourth Amendment rights). The majority of circuit courts that have considered the relationship between Hudson and Bell have limited Hudson to cell searches and have held, either explicitly or implicitly, that Hudson did not disturb Bell\u2019s Fourth Amendment approach to analyzing the constitutionality of strip searches conducted in custodial settings. See Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 191 n. 3 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Watsy v. Ames, No. 87-1660, 1988 WL 24978, at Holdings: 0: holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 1: holding that a reasonable suspicion requirement for searches and seizures on the high seas survives fourth amendment scrutiny 2: holding that inmates fourth amendment protection from unreasonable strip searches survives hudson 3: holding strip searches conducted in the station house without reasonable suspicion that minor offenders had possession of contraband are unreasonable and violate the fourth amendment 4: holding that policy requiring strip searches of prisoners prior to transfer did not violate fourth amendment", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "who are alleged to be vicariously liable. The plaintiffs point out, if the first sentence of the exclusion is interpreted to be all-inclusive, the second sentence is superfluous. In light of the insurer\u2019s duty to define \u201cexclusionary clauses in clear and explicit terms,\u201d Homick, 511 N.W.2d at 374, we doubt that the clarifying language of the second sentence could properly be considered superfluous. In any event, notwithstanding our desire to interpret a policy so as not to render any part superfluous, \u201cwe will not do so when that [interpretation] is inconsistent with the structure and format of the [provision] and' when that [interpretation] is otherwise unreasonable.\u201d Kibbee, 525 N.W.2d at 869. In the named driver exclusion, the fi ion does not create an ambiguity. See id. at 1234 (<HOLDING>). To the contrary, the second sentence confirms Holdings: 0: holding exclusion was not ambiguous 1: holding exclusion was harmless error 2: holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage 3: holding similar regulatory exclusion is not ambiguous and rejecting secondary suit construction 4: holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Rossi\u2019s affidavit would be admissible at trial and whether Mr. Rossi would be competent to testify about it. For all the Court knows from Mr. Rossi\u2019s affidavit, the information contained in it is based upon rank speculation and fourth-hand hearsay. While Mr. Rossi\u2019s counsel contended at oral argument that in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Rossi had no burden to show that the information contained in his affidavit would be admissible at trial, Mr. Rossi\u2019s counsel is plainly wrong. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 219 (\u201cRule 56(e)\u2019s requirement ... means that an affidavit\u2019s hearsay assertion that would not be admis sible at trial if testified to by the affiant is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.\u201d); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.Bd 155, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that hearsay statement did not constitute competent evidence and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment 1: holding that a signed but unsworn letter which is not otherwise authenticated is hearsay and should not be considered as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 2: recognizing motion to strike as proper vehicle for evaluating objectionable hearsay evidence in opposition papers to summary judgment motion 3: holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived 4: holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to treat Kyler as a boy precisely because of his gender non-conformance. In fact, the Complaint alleges that one RCHSD employee told him, \u201cHoney, I would call you \u2018he,\u2019 but you\u2019re such a pretty girl.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 44.) Accord ingly, Ms. Prescott\u2019s claim on behalf of Kyler survives under the ACA . it Standing RCHSD argues that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert a section 1557 claim on her own behalf because she is not an aggrieved party. However, as Ms. Prescott has noted, she is not bringing the claim on her behalf, but instead on behalf of Kyler. While Ms. Prescott is unable to bring a claim as an individual, she certainly can bring the claim on behalf of Kyler within her representative capacity. See Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1114-1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (<HOLDING>). Hi. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under Holdings: 0: holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child 1: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 2: holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim 3: holding that a claim for damages exists in an action to enforce title ix 4: holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "disclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public\u2019s interest.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cSpeech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.\u201d Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton\u2019s motive was to regain his job\u2014not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton\u2019s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (<HOLDING>). Association Claim The gravamen of this claim Holdings: 0: holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech 1: holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern 2: holding that an employee engages in protected activity under the first amendment when he threatens to file a lawsuit on a matter of public concern 3: holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation 4: holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to render an informed decision on the claim\u201d); see also Cullens, 14 Vet.App. at 237 (noting burden on Secretary to prove substantial justification in administrative and litigation positions); Evans v. West, 12 Vet.App. 22, 31 (1998) (Court will give no consideration to a \u201cvague assertion\u201d or an \u201cunsupported contention\u201d). Moreover, as noted by Mrs. Padgett, the Secretary failed to take any position on the Court\u2019s \u201ccleai'ly erroneous\u201d standard of review at the administrative stage of the proceedings, but rather the Secretary only took such a position on the issue after the Board rendered its decision and Mr. Pad-gett had filed his initial appeal to the Court. See generally Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm\u2019n, 499 U.S. 144, 146, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Based on the totality of the circumstances, Holdings: 0: holding that agency litigating positions are not entitled to judicial deference when they are merely posthoc rationalizations for agency action and are advanced for the first time on appeal 1: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 2: holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was no longer entitled to chevron deference given that the agency had changed its position on the issue 3: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law 4: holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "parents. See Carol Amadio & Stuart L. Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to \u201cStay in Touch\u201d with Blood Relatives, 22 J.Fam.L. 59, 60 (1983-84); see also B. Lee Phillips, Note, Open Adoption: A New Look at Adoption Practice and Policy in Texas, 43 Baylor L.Rev. 407, 409 (noting that open-adoption policy of Texas is not \u201clegally sanctioned process\u201d). See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Postadoption Visitation by Natural Parents, 78 A.L.R. 4th 219 (1990 & Supp.1993) (reviewing post-adoption visitation cases). A few New Jersey courts have considered post-adoption visitation in adoption agreements between a biological parent and another biological parent, step-parent, or grandparent. See, e.g., Kattermann v. DiPiazza, 151 N.J.Super. 209, 376 A.2d 955 (App. Div.1977) (<HOLDING>); F., supra, 170 N.J.Super. at 425, 406 A.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that postadoption visitation limited to when adoptive parents are grandparents siblings or foster parents 1: holding that postadoption visitation of child who was adopted by grandparents on basis of biological parents unconditional consent was required to promote childs best interests 2: holding that biological grandparents were statutory strangers to children following their adoption by stepfather statute authorizing grandparent visitation violated parents constitutional right to privacy 3: holding that publicagency adoption termination of mentallyill biological parents rights that mandated visitation between biological parent and child inappropriate because applicable termination statutes spoke in absolute terms noting however that continued contact between biological parent and child possible on voluntary basis without court order 4: holding that requiring a petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best interests of the child would provide effective protection for a parents choice except where the choice is plainly contrary to a childs best interests", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "intervene. See Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1977). If the appellants\u2019 only interest in the present case was to ensure that the MTCA would have sufficient resources to satisfy any judgment they may be able to obtain in the territorial court action, the district court\u2019s reasoning and conclusion would be sound. The district court\u2019s holding, however, does not recognize that the appellants claim an interest in a specific fund being held in the district court\u2019s registry. While a mere economic interest may be insufficient to support the right to intervene, an intervenor\u2019s interest in a specific fund is sufficient to entitle intervention in a case affecting that fund. See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); Hardy-Latham v. Wellons, 415 F.2d 674 (4th Holdings: 0: holding contingency fee cases commenced prior to dissolution are assets of the firm 1: holding that insurance defense law firm did not have nearpermanent relationship with its clients 2: holding that law firm was liable for restitution of contingency fee but not of other noncontingent fees following vacatur of judgment 3: holding that workers compensation insurer was required to intervene in injured employees tort action to protect and enforce its subrogation lien and could not file a separate action 4: holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "229 S.W.3d 415, 434 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). To prevail in a forc ible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. However, where the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, a justice court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Id. Accordingly, a justice court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of a title dispute; it is deprived of jurisdiction only if resolution of a title dispute is a prerequisite to determination of the right to immediate possession. See id.', cf. Dass, Inc. v. Smith, 206 S.W.3d 197, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). It has been long settled in Texas Holdings: 0: holding that some special relationship between the parties is required to recover under the theory of negligent misrepresentation 1: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties 2: holding that where relationship between parties was one of buyerseller rather than lessorlessee determination of right to immediate possession of property necessarily required resolution of title dispute and jurisdiction lay in district court 3: holding where the commonwealth is not in possession of property in question petition for return of property is moot 4: holding that immediate right to appeal lies from denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "reach retirement age and payments to survivors upon the death of the insured. This was the original name for the retirement and death benefits established by the Social Security Act of 1935. As the scope of these benefits expanded, the name changed to Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and then to Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI). Today, the system is most often referred to as Social Security. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1260 (10th ed.2014). Moreover, since its enactment, we have consistently construed the offset provision to refer to federal social security benefits. In Telle v. Northfield Iron Co., we allowed an offset for federal social security retirement benefits, but not disability benefits. 278 Minn. 129, 132, 158 N.W.2d 270, 272 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Since Telle, apart from increasing the Holdings: 0: holding that credit for social security old age and survivor benefits does not also include credit for federal disability benefits 1: holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits 2: holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits 3: holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability 4: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Machete\u2019s suit without specifying the jurisdictional ground on which it relied. Machete then perfected this appeal. DISCUSSION In its first issue, Machete advanc\u00e9s three arguments to support its assertion that sovereign immunity did not bar its suit. First, Machete asserts that it alleged valid ultra vires claims against Page and Abbott and, as a consequence, sovereign immunity did not apply to those claims. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-80 (Tex.2009) (explaining ultra vires exception to sovereign immuhity). Next, Machete contends that it asserted valid constitutional claims under the UDJA that are not barred by sovereign immunity. See Texas Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Holdings: 0: recognizing that udja waives sovereign immunity in suit challenging validity of statute 1: holding that when state voluntarily submits a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding the state waives its sovereign immunity 2: recognizing that section 252061 waives immunity 3: holding that  390uu waives sovereign immunity from contract claims for injunctive relief and specific performance 4: holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an unrecorded mortgage using the Bankruptcy Code\u2019s \u201cstrong arm\u201d powers. In this case, Cerrato has not claimed that BAC\u2019s lien on the Property was unrecorded or improperly recorded, nor would it matter since BAC\u2019s lien had already been reduced to judgment before the filing of Cerrato\u2019s bankruptcy. B. The Unpaid Transfer Tax New York imposes a transfer tax on the sale of real estate. See N.Y. Tax \u00a7\u00a7 1400-1421. The transfer tax applies to a sale pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure. See N.Y. Tax \u00a7 1405 (listing exemptions to the real estate transfer tax, which do not include foreclosure sales). The obligation to pay the real estate transfer tax falls on the grantor. See N.Y. Tax \u00a7 1404. Where the grantor fails to pay the tax, the duty to pay s , 274, 654 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (<HOLDING>); Katzeff v. Cohn, 139 Misc.2d 1076, 529 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff lacked standing after foreclosure sale to set aside the sale arid reinstate her right to redeem property based upon arguments that events surrounding the closing of the sale were improper 1: holding that plaintiffmortgagor lacked standing to enforce the terms of a foreclosure sale since there was no statutory authority allowing a mortgagor to enforce the provisions of a sale agreement when a foreclosure purchaser is in default 2: holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale 3: holding that a properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale quiets title in the purchaser 4: holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of this case and the record do not support a stay of adjudication. First, it is clear the district court\u2019s decision to stay adjudication is within the court\u2019s \u201cinherent judicial power\u201d when the decision is supported by \u201cspecial circumstances.\u201d Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 254-55. A clear-abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of stays of adjudication. Angotti, 633 N.W.2d at 556. Here, the district court stayed adjudication based on the fact that respondent would lose his job as a slots manager if a felony conviction were entered. We can understand the district court\u2019s motive, but it is not at all clear that the potential loss of employment is sufficient, by itself, to support a stay of adjudication on a felony. See State v. Twiss, 570 N.W.2d 487, 487 (Minn.1997) (<HOLDING>). Importantly, the record indicates that Holdings: 0: holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits 1: holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction 2: holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss 3: holding that possibility of loss of employment due to gross misdemeanor conviction was not a special circumstance supporting stay of adjudication 4: holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "future flow of capital gains taxes. Whether the record supports other estimates of the value of Johnco stock is unclear. Because the Tax Court clearly erred in its approach to the discount of capital gains taxes on the Timber Property, this issue must be remanded for further consideration. B. The Family Settlement Agreement. The Estate argues that the Tax Court clearly erred in disregarding the share value set forth in Andrew and Dinah\u2019s Family Settlement Agreement. It notes that even the Tax Court recognized that the two negotiated at arm\u2019s length. The Estate asserts that Estate of Warren v. Comm\u2019r, 981 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.1993), controls. \u201cIn general, comparable sales constitute the best evidence of market value.\u201d United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 798 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The more comparable a sale is in Holdings: 0: holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3 1: holding that courts should liberally admit evidence of comparable sales and allow the factfinder to evaluate them 2: holding that election laws should be liberally interpreted so as to allow the candidate to stand for election 3: holding that coas should be construed liberally 4: holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ada and the wlad", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "we need not address whether the district court could have applied a lower standard of proof in this context. 13 . See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir.2002) (\"It is also a basic principle of criminal law that foreseeable negligent acts of a third party do not sever the chain of causation.\u201d); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law \u00a7 3.12, at 408-09 (1986) (same); see also United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir.1976) (\"Where such intervening events [as negligent medical treatment] are foreseeable and naturally result from a perpetrator's criminal conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the perpetrator criminally responsible for the resulting harm.\u201d). 14 . Cf. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d at 952 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, Holdings: 0: holding  841b1c which covers drug offenses is an exception to 18 usc  3583b 1: holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841 2: holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc  848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc  848c 3: holding that a failure to obtain prompt medical treatment for overdosing heroin user did not break the chain of legal causation under 21 usc  841b1c 4: holding that a defendant convicted of distributing heroin failed to satisfy  3553f5 when he refused to provide complete information regarding the immediate chain of distribution", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the number of officers present. Huether also has prior experience with law enforcement \u2014 he was arrested after being questioned by law enforcement in Montana. At a minimum, these factors sh cord here supports the district court\u2019s decision declining to suppress the evidence. Moreover, the record shows Huether, without hesitation, answered the questions relating to the materials in his computer. B. Confrontation Clause Huether contends the district court erred in admitting testimony from Agent Erickson, which repeated the conclusions of a report prepared by those at NCMEC, and testimony from Agent Helderop concerning the hard drives\u2019 and compact discs\u2019 origin. Huether did not raise this issue in the district court; accordingly, we re , 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (<HOLDING>). According to Huether, Agents Erickson\u2019s and Holdings: 0: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 1: holding forensic laboratory experts statement that substance was cocaine is testimonial for sixth amendment confrontation clause purposes 2: holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay 3: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 4: holding that bureau of criminal apprehension bca laboratory report identifying a substance as cocaine was testimonial and implicated defendants right to confrontation", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "regarding the plaintiffs ability to meet even the very general exertional requirements for sedentary work. Id. Moreover, Social Security Ruling 96-8p provides that, \u201c[t]he RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g. laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).\u201d SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7, (S.S.A.). In the instant case, the ALJ failed to provide any explanation or narrative discussion as to how she determined the plaintiff retains the RFC for sedentary work. Such a finding, absent any analysis, makes it impossible for this Court to apply the substantial evidence test. Arnold v. Sec\u2019y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 567 F.2d 258, 259 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). The ALJ provides a detailed summary of the Holdings: 0: holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies 1: holding the record must demonstrate that the alj considered all of the evidence and the alj must discuss  the evidence supporting his decision  the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon and significantly probative evidence he rejects 2: holding it is impossible to apply the substantial evidence test where the alj has failed to sufficiently explain his decision 3: holding the alj does not have to specifically refer to every piece of evidence so long as the decision is not a broad rejection that is insufficient to permit a court to conclude that the alj considered the claimants medical condition as a whole 4: holding that the substantial compliance doctrine did not apply when a fiduciary failed to issue a timely decision on claimants appeal", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Although we do not view each contact in isolation, occasional travel to Texas is insufficient by itself to establish general jurisdiction. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d 387, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1874, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). Even before, the applicable- standard was clarified by the Goodyear Dunlop and Daimler cases, numerous trips to the forum state were considered inadequate to establish general jurisdiction when the trips did'not enhance the nature of the defendant\u2019s contacts with' the-state. Helicopteros,* 466 U.S. at 418, 104 S.Ct. at 1874; accord DENSO Corp. v. Hall, 396 S.W.3d 681, 693 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2013, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The appellants did not make any allegation Holdings: 0: holding that thirteen business trips of short duration over eighteen months was not continuous and systematic solicitation of business in the state to justify general jurisdiction 1: holding there was no general jurisdiction when there was no evidence that defendants advertised or promoted their goods or services in texas solicited business in texas sold their goods or services to a texas entity established a general business office or general business presence in texas or targeted texas markets 2: holding that isolated trips to texas more than 1500000 in purchases from texas vendors and two contracts with texas entities were not substantial enough to support general jurisdiction 3: holding sending two employees to work in texas and using an office in texas for limited purposes did not support finding of general jurisdiction 4: holding that 155 trips to texas by foreign corporation personnel over a tenyear period did not support general jurisdiction because evidence did not establish a general business presence", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "received from the account. b. If the applicant is not able to provide the amount of taxes that are due, the value shall be determined by deducting 20% from the gross value of the account. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, \u00a7 8.110.51(C); Aple. Supp. App. at 33. 3 . Although the MCCA provides for a hearing by parties challenging an eligibility determination, the Sellers did not ask for a hearing. This fact, however, is not fatal to their \u00a7 1983 claim. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (\"plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in court\u201d); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 496 U.S. 498, 521-22, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990)(<HOLDING>). 4 . The amended complaint asserted nine Holdings: 0: holding that  1396aa8 is enforceable by medicaid recipients under  1983 1: holding the medicaid act permits enforcement under  1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures 2: holding no exhaustion requirement in  1983 suit alleging violations of the medicaid act 3: holding that there is an exhaustion requirement in  1983 suits asserting violations of the medicaid act 4: holding that patient could sue state agency under  1983 for breaching its obligation under the balance billing provision of the medicaid statute", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at 158. In other words, while the Constitution does grant a privilege of confronting ones accusers, that privilege is lost if the accuser causes the witness's unavailability at trial. \u00b6 40. Since the Reynolds decision, the Court has continued to acknowledge the concept that a defendant can forfeit through misconduct his or her confrontation rights. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1912) (<HOLDING>); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 Holdings: 0: holding that a hearsay statement can itself be considered in first determining if a conspiracy existed when the statement was made 1: holding that defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection to admission of another part of same statement 2: holding that a defendant waives right to object to a hearsay statement on confrontation grounds when he or she offers the statement 3: holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay 4: holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "after learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the \u201ccritical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee\u2019s request to take time off for a serious health condition.\u201d Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) Although \u201c[t]he employee need not assert his Holdings: 0: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work 1: holding that an employee requesting unforeseeable medical leave is not required to even mention the fmla when requesting leave for a serious health condition 2: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 3: holding that an employee gives his employer sufficient notice that he is requesting leave for an fmlaqualifying condition when he gives the employer enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude that an event described in 29 usc  2612a1 has occurred 4: holding that an employer may deny restoration when it can show that it would have discharged the employee in any event regardless of the leave", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. Id. at 1669 (citation omitted). To determine whether Plaintiffs have displaced the presumption against extraterritoriality, we first consider the threshold inquiry of whether the presumption is \u201cself-evidently dispositive\u201d or whether \u201cits application requires further analysis.\u201d Morrison v. Nat\u2019l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010); see also Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182. That is, when a complaint alleges no contact \u201cbetween the injuries alleged and the territory of the United States,\u201d the presumption against extraterritoriality is not displaced and the inquiry, in all likelihood, ends there. Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182-83; Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). The Kiobel complaint, which contained no Holdings: 0: holding defendant failed to rebut statutory presumption where evidence was not particular to the facts and circumstances of the case 1: holding plaintiffs claims did not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality set forth in kiobel ii because the plaintiffs have failed to allege that any relevant conduct occurred in the united states emphasis added 2: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 3: holding that because a judgment was awarded the plaintiffs against the united states no judgment will be announced against the government employee 4: holding that despite plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy they did not suggest that any of the acts committed by individual defendants occurred in the united states", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the alleged offense was against person or property.\u201d Id. \u00a7 54.02(f)(1). Here, the alleged offense was the murder of Adriana Terry, a first-degree felony. At the crime scene, prior to any questions asked by the officer, Rodriguez told Officer Martin, \u201cI did it.\u201d Officer Martin explained that he understood Rodriguez to be saying he caused Terry\u2019s injuries. We note Rodriguez volunteered this information prior to being identified as a suspect and while staring at .the front door of Terry\u2019s home in the midst of the crime scene investigation. After Rodriguez was magistrated, Rodriguez requested to speak to Officer Bow en and Rodriguez again made the statement, \u201cI did it.\u201d Officer Bowen confirmed Rodriguez was confessing to the injuries suffered by Terry. See Gonzales, 467 S.W.3d at 600 (<HOLDING>); see also Bleys v. State, 319 S.W.3d 857, 860 Holdings: 0: holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed 1: holding defendants confession to murder met factor 5402f1 2: holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  3: holding that later declarations during defendants confession leading officers to evidence of the crime constituted part of one continuous confession that began at the police station 4: holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "manslaughter conviction where teenager died in an automobile accident after leaving an underage drinking party that the defendant knowingly permitted her minor daughter to host); Commonwealth v. Keysock, 236 Pa.Super. 474, 345 A.2d 767, 773-74 (1975) (upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction for driver after vehicle on which he put bald tires killed another driver after a traffic accident). It was reasonable for the jury to infer that, had Appellant properly performed his duties, the accident would not have occurred. The cases relied upon by Appellant in support of his sufficiency challenge are inapposite, as they involve factual circumstances where the defendant\u2019s conduct was more remote and attenuated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moyer, 436 Pa.Super. 442, 648 A.2d 42, 46 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Colvin, 340 Pa.Super. 278, Holdings: 0: holding commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case of involuntary manslaughter after a jet ski crashed into defendants boat because there was no evidence that the defendant could have avoided the accident 1: holding that the plaintiff made a prima facie case even though there was no evidence of causal connection other than the fact that the plaintiff was fired after bringing a lawsuit 2: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position 3: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 4: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "provisions are mandatory, exclusive, and require compliance in all respects, otherwise the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dubai Petroleum Company v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75-77 (Tex.2000). Though the Kazi court indicated a general preference by the high court to follow the modern trend of minimizing the number of defects that deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Kazi court did not state or even suggest that no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite would henceforth be a jurisdictional defect. See Kazi, 12 S.W.3d at 74\u201477. Indeed, on various occasions since it decided Kazi, the high court has held that a failure to follow a statutory prerequisite is a jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442-43 (Tex.2013) (<HOLDING>); In re John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Holdings: 0: holding that the signature requirement was an indispensable condition precedent and the failure to comply with it deprived the town of jurisdiction to annex 1: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction 2: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case 3: holding that failure to comply with statutory prerequisite deprived the courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding appealable district courts order dismissing for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction due to determination of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "adjudication of the controversy.\u201d Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). When making the determination of predominance and superiority, a court must consider, among other things: \u201c(A) the class members\u2019 interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In this case, plaintiff fails both the predominance and superiority requirements. 1. \u201cThe Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficien Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Such an inquiry would involve different Holdings: 0: holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea 1: holding that in title vii disparate impact case an employer may rebut prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employment policy at issue is related to the employees job performance and justified by business necessity 2: recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact 3: holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea 4: holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "counsel is Respondent\u2019s attempt to \u201cexplain away\u201d the evidence of probable cause against him. Evidence that tends to establish an alibi is evidence \u201cthat the [accused] was not present at the time or at the place where the [accused] is alleged to have committed the offense charged.... \u201d United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir.1995); see Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 84 (9th ed. 2009) (an alibi is a \u201cdefense based on the physical impossibility of a defendant\u2019s guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time\u201d). Definitive evidence of an alibi conclusively placing Respondent in a location other than Las Botellas bar at the time the crime occurred could be sufficient to obliterate probable cause. See Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 738^1 (<HOLDING>). Here, however, the evidence merely shows what Holdings: 0: holding that respondents had presented credible and persuasive alibi evidence that they were elsewhere on the date of the robbery and could not have perpetrated this crime and that such evidence is admissible when it negates the existence of probable cause 1: holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendants credibility and not for determining guilt 2: holding that defendants prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt and is therefore admissible 3: holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision 4: holding that the date of the offense was material to the defense where defendant could not have anticipated from the date specified in the indictment that the state would present evidence that the crime occurred nearly two months later", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "policy commenced South Norwalk had not yet been found liable, nor had the amount of damages been established. South Norwalk was thus aware of potential likely losses, but not actual losses. This distinction is significant, particularly as South Norwalk was one of three defendants named in Peck\u2019s suit with potential liability and Peck\u2019s injury was of an ongoing, recurring nature.\u201d). Thus, absent an undisputed, discrete loss occurring before insurance incepts, the application of the known loss doctrine will depend on when an ongoing loss occurred such that it was an \u201cactual\u201d loss and the extent of the insured\u2019s knowledge of that loss. Compare Peck, 363 F.Supp.2d 137, with Travelers Property Cas. v. H.A.R.T., Inc., No. CV980485730S, 2001 WL 649616, at *6-7 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 18, 2001) (<HOLDING>). In this case, it is uncertain from the record Holdings: 0: holding that an automobile dealers liability insurer was not liable for any damage allegedly caused by the negligence of the dealer and sustained in an accident involving an automobile purchased from the dealer or to defend the dealer in the negligence action where the injury occurred outside of the policy period and occurrence was defined in the policy as an accident including injurious exposure to conditions which results during the policy period in bodily injury or property damages   1: holding that where an insured made misrepresentations and concealed the existence of a fatal automobile accident in an attempt to reinstate a cancelled policy the loss was uninsurable as a known loss 2: holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand 3: holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss 4: holding where the defendant knows as well as anyone the value of the assets he concealed the intended loss calculation may properly be based upon the value of the assets concealed", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "we hold that Appellants had adequate notice of the acts required of them should they decide to continue operating prior to a final trial on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Appellants also argue that the temporary injunction is void because it refers to the NRA Range Manual. As we noted above, the temporary injunction may not describe the activities to be enjoined merely by referencing the complaint or other documents. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 683. So long as the injunction reasonably describes the activities to be enjoined, it may refer to such items as laws or ordinances. See Maloy v. City of Lewisville, Tex., 848 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ), disapproved of on other grounds, Schleuter v. City of Fort Worth, 947 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). As we have explained, the order here states Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecutors indirect reference to a defendants prior conviction was improper 1: holding that if property description is to be supplied by writing to which reference is made in deed reference must be adequate to identify writing 2: holding that a single implicit reference to the email in which the complaint makes no explicit reference to nor does it quote at all from is insufficient to establish that the email was incorporated by reference into the complaint 3: holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct 4: holding that whether error is apparent is determined by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "between the two concepts. See, e.g., Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (2005) (\u201c[W]e need not resolve the question of the district court\u2019s subject-matter jurisdiction ... before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question\u201d); Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1347 (2007) (noting \u201ca federal court may, in appropriate circumstances, dismiss a case on prudential grounds prior to establishing its jurisdiction\u201d and applying the enrolled bill rule); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C.Cir.1998) (\u201c[Although subject-matter jurisdiction is special for many purposes ... a court [may instead] dismiss[ ] on other non-merits grounds such as forum non conveniens\u201d); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). That the court Holdings: 0: recognizing doctrine 1: holding the totten rule requiring dismissal on the ground of public policy like the abstention doctrine  or the prudential standing doctrine represents the sort of threshold question we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction 2: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law 3: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 4: holding that the law of the case doctrine is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Docket No. 137 at 20. \u25a0 Defendants further argue that the patent specifications similarly fail to identify any corresponding structure for these terms. Id. at 21. \u201cProcessing device\u201d is readily recognized by those skilled in the art as a processor, thereby evidencing corresponding structure. Accordingly, \u201cprocessing device\u201d is not a means-plus-function term, and because it is easily understood by a jury, needs no further construction. However, \u201cmodule\u201d is not as readily recognized in the art. While \u201cmodule\u201d has sometimes avoided means-plus-function construction in specific contexts, module has also been considered a nonce word and subject to \u00a7 112, \u00b6 6. Compare, e.g., Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-263, 2010 WL 1441779, at *16 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) (<HOLDING>); PalmTop Productions, Inc. v. Lo-Q PLC, 450 Holdings: 0: holding that  112  6 did not apply when construing a term including module in the context of a software system 1: holding that claim limitation using the term means for and not reciting any structure presumptively falls within the scope of  112  6 2: holding that person as defined in njsa 112 does not include the state based on the fact that 1 the definition of person indicates that such term includes the state when it is used to designate the owner of property which may be the subject of an offense and 2 state and municipality are separately defined in njsa 112 3: recognizing that the term including is somewhat ambiguous 4: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "met to define the transaction as a security.\" In response to the State's question as to whether promissory notes, in general, can be securities, Hines explained that \"notes that are issued for investment purposes and are not collateralized are\" recognized in the industry as securities while \"[nlotes that are issued in which there is collateral attached ... [are] less likely a security.\" Hines explained in broad terms how those in the industry may characterize a transaction that is not clearly enumerated in the Securities Act as a security. Hines did not tell the jury that the transaction at issue was a security, couch his opinion specifically in terms of what is required under Utah law, or otherwise tell the jury what conclusion to reach. Compare, e.g., Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 & n. 10 (<HOLDING>), with Davis, 2007 UT App 18, \u00b617, 155 P.3d 909 Holdings: 0: holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff 1: holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify 3: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 4: holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "juvenile probation. Based upon this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the punishment and programming available in the juvenile justice system is adequate to overcome the presumption of certification. While the testimony of the evaluators focused upon the rehabilitation of appellant through juvenile programming in EJJ, none of the evaluators were able to address the issue of public safety should such programming fail and such failure becomes evident after appellant is released from probation at age 21. Yet, all agreed that if appellant continues with his long-time association with the gang upon his discharge from probation, he would be extremely dangerous. See P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d at 686 (<HOLDING>). In upholding the district court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that where failure at rehabilitation will create an extreme risk to public safety the heavier weight given by the statute to the first and third factors evidences our legislatures recognition that the risk is too great to justify an attempt to modify this offenders behavior in the juvenile system 1: holding that the risk of convicting an innocent accused is too great when the evidence is entirely based on hearsay 2: holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk 3: holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court 4: holding that regardless of the risk of discriminatory enforcement a court may not hold that this risk invalidates the statute in a preenforcement facial attack", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(N. D.Cal.2000) (citing Argument in Favor of Proposition 4 by Earl Warren, District Attorney of Alameda County, 1934 General Election Ballot Pamphlet). 5 . The Tenth Circuit has also addressed the authority of the states to execute search warrants and to arrest individuals on reservations. In United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir.1990), state authorities executed a search warrant on a tribal reservation. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the search warrant was invalid, and therefore the evidence should have been suppressed, because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws \u2014 including the execution of a search warrant \u2014 unless Congress consented to the state's jurisdiction. Id. at 1147. See also Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Our conclusion that the Tribe may bring a Holdings: 0: holding that the state did not have jurisdiction over crime committed on land held by the bureau of indian affairs for the use and benefit of a discrete indian community 1: holding that the arrest of an indian on indian land was illegal because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws  including the execution of a search warrant  unless congress consented to the states jurisdiction 2: holding that oklahoma police officer was without jurisdiction to arrest indian inside indian reservation when the state has neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction over indian country 3: holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation 4: holding that the state has no jurisdiction to pursue an indian onto an indian reservation for criminal offenses committed off the reservation", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the federal officer removal statute. When the Second Circuit held that removal was improper under section 1442, it necessarily held that this Court lacked jurisdiction because there is no independent statute that gives original subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over cases involving federal officers. \"Federal jurisdiction rests on a \u2018federal interest in the matter,\u2019 the very basic interest in the enforcement of federal law through federal officials.\u201d Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969) (quoting Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir.1962)). 24 . PL Mem. at 5. 25 . 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1452 (emphasis added). 26 . 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1334(a) & (b). 27 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fullington v. Parkway Hosp., Inc., 351 B.R. 280 (E.D.N.Y2006) (<HOLDING>). 28 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 101(27). The statute states Holdings: 0: recognizing the indicia of authority from a governmental unit to the authorized person to pursue some endeavor as common in the enumerated items 1: holding that while qui tam actions by private parties could be on behalf of or for a governmental unit they are not actions by a governmental unit as required by the bankruptcy code 2: holding that recovery against an individual employee is barred and may be sought against the governmental unit only  when suit is filed against both the governmental unit and its employee id  101106e 3: holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary 4: recognizing utswmc as a governmental unit under the act", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "possession. It is. As part of the conspiracy to advertise child pornography, all defendants are accountable for the images depicting child pornography on the KOFD board. United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (defendant \u201cpled guilty to participating in a conspiracy[,] and the reasonably foreseeable actions taken by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy\u201d were properly attributed to him). B. Total amount of the victim\u2019s los 7 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). The disaggregation of costs is not necessarily a brightline however, and the continued harm and abuse arising out of the viewing of child pornography images may be part of a continuing, concerted harm. Compare United States v. Sanders, 52 F.Supp.3d, 1329, 1338-39, 2014 WL 5033280, at *8 (N.DiGa. Oct. 9, 2014) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Galan, 2014 WL 3474901, Holdings: 0: holding that the psychological injuries related to the initial abuse were not sufficiently disaggregated from those arising from the viewing of the images because the counselors report did not show the victim suffered any harm from the continued viewing andor spread of the images 1: holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution 2: holding that pornographic videos and images were properly authenticated where the government presented detailed evidence as to the chain of custody specifically how the images were retrieved from the defendants computers 3: holding that general losses must be sufficiently disaggregated from losses caused by the initial abuser when determining those losses caused by the continuing traffic of the images 4: holding that government must introduce relevant evidence in addition to the alleged pornographic images to prove that images depict real child", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, contrary to Norris's assertion, Holdings: 0: holding that a magistrate had a substantial basis to support a finding of probable cause because the affidavit recounted the alleged criminal activity in detail 1: holding that magistrate must have substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists 2: holding that the defendant who filed a timely motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged fourth amendment violation in the district court but failed particularly to argue that the detectives affidavit was inadequate to provide the magistrate judge with probable cause waived his affidavit argument on appeal pursuant to fedrcrimp 12e 3: holding that a magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed where the supporting affidavit elaborated on the crime in detail 4: holding that the affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location rendering the officers belief in probable cause based solely on the affidavit objectively unreasonable ", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "failed to exhaust administrative remedies on their claim that the Forest Service failed to properly monitor the population of MIS. I address only the Forest Service\u2019s exhaustion claim as I conclude it is dispositive. The APA requires plaintiffs to exhaust' available administrative remedies before bringing their grievances to federal court. 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 704 (setting forth the APA\u2019s exhaustion requirement); see also 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 6912(e) (requiring that plaintiffs \u201cexhaust all administrative appeal procedures\u201d before bringing an action against the Department of Agriculture); 36 C.F.R. Part 215 (establishing appeal procedures in cases involving Forest Service and requiring exhaustion prior to judicial review); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The doctrine of exhaustion \u201ccuts down on the Holdings: 0: holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record 1: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to  1983 2: holding that under the apa exhaustion is a prerequisite to judicial review when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review so long as the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review 3: holding that a courts authority to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in actions brought under the apa is limited when neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review 4: holding that judicial review under the apa is precluded when a remedy is available under a citizen suit provision of an environmental statute citations omitted", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 1983.\u201d Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 121, 125 S.Ct. 1453. But Congress did not provide a means of private redress here. And private enforcement of \u00a7 1396a(a)(23) in suits under \u00a7 1983 in no way interferes with the Secretary\u2019s prerogative to enforce compliance using her administrative authority. Indeed, addressing a different subsection of \u00a7 1396a(a), the Supreme Court has held that the Medicaid Act\u2019s \u201cadministrative scheme cannot be considered sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional intent to withdraw the private remedy of \u00a7 1983.\u201d Wilder, 496 U.S. at 522, 110 S.Ct. 2510. Wilder held that the Boren Amendment, which established a standard for Medicaid reimbursement of hospitals, nursing homes, and intermediate-care facilities, is enforceable under \u00a7 1983. Id. (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion finds support in decisions Holdings: 0: holding that 42 usc  1396aa13a which requires states to make reasonable reimbursement to providers was enforceable by the providers pursuant to section 1983 1: holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states 2: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that 42 usc  1396aa13a is enforceable in a suit under  1983 4: holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "superfluous subsection (C)\u2019s careful limitation to the Secretary\u2019s failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under 16 U.S.C. \u00a7 1533, id. at 172, 117 S.Ct. 1154. Here, Claim V does not allege that the Service committed any act prohibited under \u00a7 1538 (\u201cProhibited Acts\u201d). Rather, plaintiffs allege that the Service \u201cviolated\u201d several aspirational provisions that govern how the Service implements the ESA and, by extension, CITES. See Am. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 181-87. These are precisely the sort of \u201cmaladministration\u201d claims that cannot be enforced through the ESA\u2019s citizen-suit provision. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 1154. This Court and others have recently applied Bennett to foreclose private enforcement of similar claims. See Marcum, 810 F.Supp.2d at 69-70, 2011 WL 3805666, at *11 (<HOLDING>); Conservation Force v. Salazar, 753 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the caption is entitled to considerable weight when determining who the plaintiffs to a suit are since plaintiffs draft complaints 1: holding unconscionable arbitration provision that applied to all claims brought by borrower in reverse mortgage contract but not claims brought by the drafting party the lender 2: holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity 3: holding that plaintiffs complaints about wrongful permit denials could not be brought via the esas citizensuit provision 4: holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the United States. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6330(d). The implementing regulations to the above Section note that a reviewing court may only address matters on appeal of a Notice of Determination that were raised by the taxpayer at the collection due process hearing. 26 C.F.R. \u00a7 301.6380-1(f)(2) Q-F5/A-F5 (stating that \u201cthe taxpayer can only ask the court to consider an issue that was raised in the taxpayer\u2019s CDP hearing\u201d). Courts interpreting these provisions have determined that actions brought pursuant to \u00a7 6330(d) are actions for administrative review and, thus, the reviewing district court is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery or jury trial. See e.g. Community Residential Services, Inc. v. U.S., 2003 WL 21033239 at * 1 (M.D.N.C. May 7, 2003) (<HOLDING>); Carroll v. United States, 217 F.Supp.2d 852, Holdings: 0: holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record 1: holding appeal of termination is limited to information that is part of the record 2: holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts 3: holding that the district courts review of a partial and truncated record was error and remanding the case for review on the entire administrative record 4: holding that a district courts review of a  6330d appeal is limited to the administrative record and the parties are not entitled to discovery", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "also said, \u201cthe child might go back to New Jersey and flourish just as well.\u201d What was needed, in his opinion, was \u201ca permanent arrangement where this child can have access to both parents given the geographic distance.\u201d The court modified its extant order to award custody to the plaintiff until the end of the school year in June; during the summer Carly was to be returned to the defendant in New Jersey. The court left open what the custody arrangements would be thereafter, though its order recited custody would remain in the plaintiff until further order of the court. Instead of appearing at Dr. Barrett\u2019s office on August 31, the defendant had taken Carly and returned to New Jersey. She claims that she took this action on the advice of her counsel. After the court\u2019s de d.2d 240 (1962) (<HOLDING>). See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 Holdings: 0: holding south carolina not bound by virginia courts order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody because virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children 1: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law 2: holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period 3: holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts 4: holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(U.S.A.) Inc. v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 612 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Government-published shipper's guide); Nehus v. Alaska Marine Towing, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 328 (W.D.Wash.1981) (United States Pilot publication); Asg Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 82 Cust.Ct. 1, 467 F.Supp. 1187 (Cust.Ct.1979) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce report). Finally, State Department Country Reports concerning the fairness of a foreign country's judicial system are not excludable as hearsay; they are admissible as \u201creports ... of public ... agencies setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report ... unless ... circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.\u201d Fed. R. Ev. 803(8). See also Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2nd Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 25 . Garro Depo. (Apr. 7, 2002), 137. 26 . Holdings: 0: holding state department country report on fairness of liberian judicial system admissible 1: holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible 2: recognizing that a report from the state department is usually the best available source of information on country conditions 3: holding that the state department country report constituted substantial evidence to support the agencys finding of changed country conditions in guatemala 4: holding that for purposes of claim 4 another country means a country other than the first and second country explicitly rejecting tpllcs proposed construction", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the job. 26 . See Dickerson v. United States, 280 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir.2002); Lebron v. United States, 279 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir.2002); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir.2000). Those cases rely entirely on duPont, and they neither discuss the potential impact of Crawford Pitting on duPont nor address the issues raised in today's opinion. 27 . Any doubt concerning that result is removed by the subsequent statement, in W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991), that in Crawford Fitting the Court \"held that [\u00a7\u00a7 1920 and 1821] define the full extent of a federal court's power to shift litigation costs absent express statutory authority to go further.\u201d 28 . See also Brisco-Wade v. Carnahan, 297 F.3d 781, 782 (8th Cir.2002) Holdings: 0: recognizing the supreme courts precept that district courts may decline to tax costs enumerated in  1920 but cannot award costs not enumerated under  1920 citing crawford fitting 482 us at 44245107 sct 2494 1: holding that  1920 does not authorize taxing mediation fees as costs 2: holding attorney fees not allowable as costs 3: holding private process server fees may be taxed under  1920 4: holding that mediation costs are not compensable", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on some unspecified, but earlier date. See id. The Court notes that Plaintiffs do not cite to authority for their proposition that a defendant must \u201cexercise ... ordinary diligence\u201d in determining that a case is removable. See id. Nor has the Court been able to find support for Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that section 1446 requires defendants to exercise ordinary diligence in ferreting out grounds for removal. Rather, a defendant must remove within thirty days from the date on which he \u201creceives actual notice that the case has become removable, which may be communicated in a formal or informal manner.\u201d 14A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, \u00a7\u00a7 3732, at 520 (emphasis added). See also Bosky v. Kroger Tex., LP, 288 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Court therefore finds that the only Holdings: 0: holding that the one year limit applies only to removals based on something other than the initial pleading  that is only to removals pursuant to the second paragraph of 28 usc  1446b 1: holding that a writ of summons alone can no longer be the initial pleading that triggers the 30day period for removal under the first paragraph of 28 usc  1446b 2: holding other paper must be unequivocally clear and certain to start the time limit running for a notice of removal under the second paragraph of section 1446b 3: holding that the information supporting removal in a copy of an amended pleading  must be unequivocally clear and certain to start the time limit running for a notice of removal internal quotation omitted 4: holding that removal under the second paragraph of  1446b did not apply and defendants therefore had removed outside of the thirty day time period triggered at the time of service of the complaint", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "represented by counsel, has now filed a pro se motion for class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. Defendant has objected. Discussion Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that parties seeking class certification demonstrate: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all parties is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims and defenses of the representative parties are typical of those of the class; and (4) the representative party or parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Individuals appearing pro se may not adequately represent and protect the interests of a class. See Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>); McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 Holdings: 0: holding a person who is not a member of the bar of any court  may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in the district court or in this court as counsel for others 1: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 2: holding that a corporation cannot appear pro se even when the person seeking to represent it is the president and major stockholder 3: holding that a nonattorney may not appear pro se on behalf of a corporation 4: holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "hearing shall apply\"); People v. Allen, 978 P.2d 620, 622 (Colo.1999). Section 16-11-206, which governs the procedures at a revocation hearing, provides for certain advisements at revocation hearings: (1) At the first appearance of the probationer in court or at the commencement of the hearing, whichever is first in time, the court shall advise the probationer as provided in section 16-7-206 insofar as such matters are applicable .... (2) At or prior to the commencement of the hearing, the court shall advise the probationer of the charges against him and the possible penalties therefor and shall require the probationer to plead guilty or not guilty. \u00a7 16-11-206(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 116 Counsel may waive a defendant's statutory rights. See In re Lynch, 788 P.2d 848, 858 (Colo.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Baird, 66 P.3d 183, 189 Holdings: 0: recognizing counsels ability to waive statutory right to a mental health hearing 1: recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records 2: recognizing the roots of the right to privacy in mental health records 3: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 4: holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Keller 737 A.2d 279, 283 (Pa.Super.1999). With regard to specific personal jurisdiction, our focus is narrow in scope; we examine the particular events that gave rise to the underlying claim. Id. at 281. \u00b6 6 Appellants urge this Court to adopt the sliding scale test, as pronounced in Efford, to assess specific jurisdiction. We decline to do so; the facts of this case are not such that the underlying cause of action arose from appellants\u2019 use of appel-lee\u2019s website. Appellants\u2019 arguments premised on Efford are more specifically aimed to a general jurisdiction attack. Specific jurisdiction \u00b6 7 Generally our specific jurisdiction inquiry focuses on the party\u2019s course of dealing and the known benefits incurred by contracting with a party from the forum state. See, e.g., Keller at 282, (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 8 Here, appellee\u2019s web site and brochures Holdings: 0: holding that to the extent simple assault under pennsylvania law is committed intentionally or knowingly it is by definition purposeful 1: holding that a nonresident defendants contract in this case a guaranty with a pennsylvania business entity alone cannot automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts 2: holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims 3: holding that a criminal defendants right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article 1 section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution 4: holding that a party contracting with a resident of pennsylvania despite not physically signing the contract in pennsylvania was sufficient to determine purposeful availment and vest pennsylvania with jurisdiction given that the party mailed the contract to pennsylvania directed payments to pennsylvania and conducted business with the same pennsylvania company repeatedly", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "character, reasonably be found to have placed a \u201csubstantial burden\u201d on plaintiffs exercise of his faith. See generally Reeder v. Hogan, 2012 WL 4107822, at *20, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134710 at *58 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (conclusory claims of food deprivation, based on plaintiffs unsubstantiated belief that corrections officers tampered with his meals and rendered them inedible, are insufficient to survive summary judgment). Nonetheless, recognizing that it is the sincerity of plaintiffs beliefs and not their objective reasonableness that is relevant to an establishment clause claim, the Court will assume arguendo that plaintiffs religious exercise was substantially burdened by the SHU\u2019s policy of inspecting meals for dangerous items. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying Holdings: 0: holding rluipa claim requires prisoner to show he wishes to engage in 1 a religious exercise 2 motivated by a sincerely held belief which exercise 3 is subject to a substantial burden imposed by the government 1: recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion 2: holding that an individual claiming violation of free exercise rights need only demonstrate that the beliefs professed are sincerely held and in the individuals own scheme of things religious regardless of whether the belief is unorthodox irrational or even demonstrably false 3: holding that when an inmates religious views requiring a vegetarian diet are sincerely held prison policy may violate his free exercise rights even though vegetarianism is only a recommended not a required element of plaintiffs religion seventhday adventism 4: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Nicholson alleges that defendants Doherty and Damiani required him to plead and stand trial when the mandatory probable cause hearing had not been held and when there was insufficient cause to support the charges against him. In addition, he alleges that defendant Damiani improperly ordered the information amended after trial. These actions are taken in a judge\u2019s judicial capacity and are within the judge\u2019s jurisdiction. Thus, defendants Damiani and Doherty are protected from suit for damages by a p.2d 602, 626-27 (D.Md.1999) (citing cases for the proposition that municipal departments, including the police department, are not persons within the meaning of section 1983); Gaines v. University of Pennsylvania Police Dep\u2019t, No. 97-3381, 1997 WL 624281, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 7, 1997) (<HOLDING>); PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep\u2019t, Holdings: 0: holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 1: holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under  1983 2: holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 3: holding that an ohio municipal court could not be sued under  1983 because it was not a person as  1983 uses that term 4: holding as a matter of law that police departments are purely instrumentalities of the municipality with no separate identity thus they are not persons for purposes of  1983 and not capable of being sued under  1983", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "And under today\u2019s decision, States may of course collect the sales tax from cigarette wholesalers, either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, or by assessing wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores. States may also enter into agreements with the tribes to adopt a mutually satisfactory regime for the collection of this sort of tax. And if Oklahoma and other States similarly situated find that none of these alternatives produce the revenues to which they are entitled, they may of course seek appropriate legislation from Congress. Id. at 514, 111 S.Ct. at at states possess criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian reservations by non-Indians against non-Indians. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624, 26 L.Ed. 869 (1881) (<HOLDING>); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, Holdings: 0: holding that the arrest of an indian on indian land was illegal because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws  including the execution of a search warrant  unless congress consented to the states jurisdiction 1: holding that colorado by its admission into the united states acquired criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens and other white persons through the whole territory within its limits including any indian reservations 2: holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states 3: holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens 4: holding that united states jurisdiction embraces offenses having an effect within its sovereign territory even though the acts constituting the offense occur outside the territory", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not persuaded that the [employer\u2019s] failure to post such a notice justifies invocation of the tolling doctrine.\u201d), McClinton v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 743 F.2d 1483, 1486 n. 5 (\u201cAlthough the failure of the employer to display the poster may toll the 180-day notification period, it will not normally toll the two-year statute of limitations for bringing the action in court, which continues to run from the date of the alleged wrongful act.\u201d) (citing Kazanzas v. Walt Disney World Co., 704 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir.1983)), and Ramirez v. CSJ & Co., No. 06 Civ. 13677(LAK), 2007 WL 1040363, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2007) (refusing to pronounce that the failure to post a notice, in and of itself, warrants equitable tolling), with Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations 1: holding that failure to post the required notice will toll the running of the 180day statute of limitations   2: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 3: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations 4: holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "regarding the admissibility of the confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins is that Polk\u2019s meeting with Howard, in which Howard initially confessed constituted a \u201cpolice-initiated custodial interrogation\u201d in violation of Edwards, ie., a poisonous tree, and that the resulting confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins were inadmissible \u201ctainted fruit.\u201d Assuming, without deciding, that Polk\u2019s actions were on behalf of law enforcement and that his questioning of Howard while he was in custody constituted a \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d under Miranda, we nevertheless reject Howard\u2019s claim. Howard invoked his Fifth Amendment right t\u00f3 counsel prior to his. interview with Polk, thereby triggering the protections of Edwards. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (<HOLDING>). Howard claims that Polk initiated the Holdings: 0: holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 1: holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 2: holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications 3: holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 4: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "about preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA\u2019s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott\u2019s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (<HOLDING>). Although there have been a limited number of Holdings: 0: holding that wyeth failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for itto comply with both federal and state requirements and reasoning that it offered no such evidence and never argued that it attempted to give a warning but was prohibited from doing so by the fda 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that because the repose period in question was eliminated before it expired it never operated to insulate defendants from liability and never vested defendants with any substantive rights 3: holding that it may not 4: holding insurers uim offer was ineffectual when it offered no premium price and was on a form that failed to comply with department of insurance guidelines", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is an essential element of a strongly-endorsed and well-articulated policy to eliminate drunk driving by affording offenders \u201czero tolerance\u201d in the prosecution of their offenses. This Court has a commitment to eliminating intoxicated drivers from our highways and has supported that commitment with a ban on plea bargaining in drunk-driving cases. The aims of this broad policy can be accomplished only through consistent, uniform, and vigorous enforcement of the ban. To carve out from that ban an exception in cases of \u201cpermitting an intoxicated person to drive\u201d undermines the important policy behind the prohibition. The person who allows an intoxicated person to drive may be as, or even more, culpable than the driver. See, e.g., Lee v. Kiku Restaurant, 127 N.J. 170, 603 A.2d 503 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 Holdings: 0: holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident 1: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  2: holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest 3: holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer 4: holding a social host liable for serving a visibly intoxicated guest who foreseeably becomes involved in motor vehicle accident", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of abstention are therefore, applicable. 59 . Additionally, in Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 306-312, 99 S.Ct. 2301, the Supreme Court ordered a district court to abstain where certain provisions of a state statute challenged on First Amendment grounds were found to be susceptible to constitutional construction; the court also recognized the possibility of granting interim relief against enforcement of the challenged statute in order to mitigate the impact of abstention on their pursuit of constitutionally protected activities. 60 . Because this Court finds \u201cfair grounds for litigation\u201d in three (3) of the fifteen (15) questions, it is not necessary to reach any discussion as to the remaining twelve (12) questions, as the mm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 77 S.Ct. 838, .1 L.Ed.2d 894 (1957) (<HOLDING>), as this preliminary injunction grants interim Holdings: 0: holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court 1: holding that a federal district court should retain jurisdiction until all efforts to obtain adjudication on constitutional questions have been exhausted in the state courts 2: holding that district courts dismissal of state law claims was proper where the district court had properly dismissed all of the federal questions that gave it original jurisdiction 3: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 4: holding that where federal claims were patently meritless and insubstantial district court did not have jurisdiction to retain state claims", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "does not seek to arrest state tax collection, comity is no bar to such a result. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (citing Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) as a case where the Court acted without regard to the TIA (or related comity concerns) since, when the Court was \u201cfaced with unconstitutional closure of county public schools and tuition grants and tax credits for contributions to private segregated schools,\u201d it concluded that the \u201cDistrict Court could require county to levy taxes to fund nondiscriminatory public schools\u201d (emphasis added)). This conclusion means that our decision in U.S. Brewers is no longer good law, which we are not bound to follow. United States v. Rodr\u00edguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In sum, Hibbs effected a change in the law Holdings: 0: recognizing an exception to stare decisis where  an existing panel decision is undermined by controlling authority subsequently announced such as an opinion of the supreme court  quoting williams v ashland engg co 45 f3d 588 592 1st cir1995 1: holding stare decisis applies when one court of appeals panel is faced with previous decision of different panel 2: holding that stare decisis is not applicable unless the issue was squarely addressed in a prior decision 3: recognizing such an exception 4: holding that decision by panel of this court is established precedent under rules of stare decisis", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.2011). \u201cTo determine whether a state conviction is a [CIMT], we ordinarily employ the categorical approach.\u201d Id. Under that approach, \u201cthis court looks only to the statutory definition of the offense and not to the underlying facts of the conviction to determine whether the offense involves moral turpitude.\u201d Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921 (10th Cir.2011). \u201cMoral tur 3) (\u201c[T]he conducting of a brothel is a form of commercial vice involving the practice of immorality for hire, which is accompanied by an evil intent and involves moral turpitude.\u201d); Matter of W\u2014 , 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951) (\u201cIt is well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral turpitude.\u201d); Matter of S\u2014L\u2014, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 397, 398 (BIA 1948) (<HOLDING>); Matter of P\u2014, 3 I. & N. Dec. 20, 22 (BIA Holdings: 0: holding that procuring a female inmate for a house of prostitution involves moral turpitude because 1 it is a crime in which assistance and aid is given to the carrying on of the business of prostitution and 2 it is so far contrary to moral law as interpreted by the general moral sense of the community that the offender is brought to public disgrace is no longer generally respected and is deprived of social recognition by the community 1: holding that an intentional battery that involves the use of a deadly weapon constitutes a crime of moral turpitude 2: holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude 3: recognizing the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude 4: holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "plainly stated that, \u201c[i]n exchange for the benefits offered by Amtrak, [CO] agrees ... not to seek employment with Amtrak in the future.\u201d (Ford Deck, Ex. 46 at 2.) Plaintiff was not similarly situated to CO in all material respects. Accordingly, because plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Amtrak treated similarly situated employees in a more favorable manner upon termination, her evidence regarding her severance package does not demonstrate that defendants\u2019 proffered explanation for her termination is mere pretext for racial or gender discrimination. 7. Disparate duties and opportunities Plaintiff claims she was fired because Porter set her up to fail. While this allegation is conclusory and speculative and does not create a genuine issue of mater 3, 408 (N.D.Ga.1989) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Porter and Green\u2019s contention Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 1: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 2: holding that in a  1981 case it not controlling that  a black person is suing a black person 3: holding that burglary may qualify as offense against person if as committed it is in fact a crime against a person 4: holding that the person who travels as an agent of person defrauded is a victim", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Court also found that the cause of the delay was the government\u2019s failure to follow up on its proposed plea offers and Holub\u2019s failure to communicate his rejections of the offers to the government. Ibid. The Court further found that Holub had not been prejudiced by the delay and that the government had no history of delaying trials in that area. Id. at 30. For those reasons, the Court held that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. Its holding is not an abuse of discretion. VII. Next, the defendants challenge their sentences on various grounds. One of Wiley\u2019s contentions\u2014that hearsay introduced at the sentencing hearing violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment\u2014 was disposed of by our decision in United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1592, 123 Holdings: 0: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 1: holding that confrontation clause protections do not extend to sentencing hearings 2: holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings 3: holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing 4: holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "DSA in the state general fund among the several county school districts on a quarterly basis, starting on or before August 1, November 1, February 1, and May 1 of each year. The DSA must be funded for the current biennium for this to occur. 9 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003) (noting that simple direction of education authorities to follow the New York State Constitution is problematic in terms of effecting compliance and in terms of providing adequate judicial redress for a constitutionally infirm education funding system). 10 Nev. Const. art. 4, \u00a7 1; see generally Nev. Const, art. 19. 11 R.T.K., Annotation, Mandamus to Members or Officer of Legislature, 136 A.L.R. 677, 677 (1942); e.g., Wells v. Purcell, 592 S.W.2d 100 (Ark. 1979) (<HOLDING>); Limits v. President of the Senate, 604 N.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 1: holding that sovereign immunity does not bar a mandamus action against the governor and the department of transportation to compel their performanee in accordance with constitutional and legislative mandates 2: holding that a writ of mandamus could not be issued to compel legislative officers to adjourn or attempt to adjourn the legislature or to obtain an adjournment from the governor 3: holding a claim not previously raised or ruled on by the circuit court was waived in an appeal from the denial of a writ of mandamus 4: recognizing petitioner for writ of mandamus must demonstrate clear legal right to the act sought to be compelled and no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law and stating mandamus may not be issued to compel an officials discretionary acts", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "reaffirm the reach of the filed rate doctrine\u2019s formidable barrier to suit in cases involving California\u2019s wholesale electricity market. See, e.g., Wah Chang v. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., LLC, 507 F.3d 1222, 1225-27 (9th Cir. 2007); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty. v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756, 760-62 (9th Cir. 2004); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor Cty. Wash. v. IDA-CORP Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 650-52 (9th Cir. 2004); California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2004); Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 918, 929-33 (9th Cir. 2002). In our most recent foray in this area, we held that the doctrine barred a claim virtually identical to the one asserted by Plaintiffs. See Wah Chang, 507 F.3d at 1225-27 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the filed Holdings: 0: holding that the filed rate doctrine barred private right of action for consumer fraud 1: holding that the filed rate doctrine barred a retail electricity consumers civil rico claim seeking damages for increased electricity costs allegedly caused by defendants fraudulent manipulation of wholesale electricity rates 2: holding that the filed rate doctrine barred request for damages but did not preclude request for injunction and civil penalties 3: holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insureds fraudulent inducement claim 4: holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Re-Insurance Co., 492 F.Supp. 1115, 1122 (S.D.N.Y.1980); Sarnoff v. American Home Products Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir.1986). Therefore, the only bar to applying the employee choice doctrine here would be if Martson had been involuntarily terminated from his job at IBM. There seems to be little doubt that he resigned his position after lining up a lucrative new job with another major player in the burgeoning personal computer industry. However, reading his seventh affirmative defense liberally (extremely liberally), one could conclude that Martson was really alleging, not unclean hands, but constructive discharge by IBM. Of course, constructive discharge is very difficult to prove; the Seco ); Sanderson v. City of New York, No. 96 Civ. 3368, 1998 WL 187834, *5 (April 21, 1998)(<HOLDING>). However, at this point in the proceeding, I Holdings: 0: holding that a low performance rating does not constitute constructive discharge 1: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 2: holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor 3: holding that retaliatory discharge demotion or other adverse employment claims state a cause of action under  1981 4: holding defendants perceived demotion from change of duties does not constitute constructive discharge as a matter of law", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "who \u201cmultiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927. Like an award made pursuant to the court\u2019s inherent power, an award under \u00a7 1927 is proper when the attorney\u2019s actions are so plainly without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (police photographs of client taken an hour after incident in which police officers allegedly employed excessive force in taking client into custody did not constitute such clear evidence of absence of excessive force to render client\u2019s attorney liable for his adversary\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees as a result of bad faith); Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[T]he only meaningful difference between an Holdings: 0: holding that evidence submitted for a motion to reopen must be material and state new facts that rebut the underlying finding 1: holding that there was no new and material evidence to reopen claim where newly presented evidence was not accompanied by any medical evidence indicating a nexus to service 2: holding petition seeking review of motion to reopen deportation hearing in the absence of new evidence as without merit under  1927 since petitioner was not entitled to reopen except on showing of significant new evidence 3: holding that a motion to reopen seeking only to apply for a form of relief which was unavailable to the movant at the time of the hearing  is subject to the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen 4: holding that a properly filed motion to reopen is a prerequisite to the filing of a new asylum application when the petitioner is under a final removal order", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "hurt. But these types of dangerous conditions fall well short of establishing a condition that is certain to cause injury. III. Plaintiff alternatively relies on the principle that a \u201ccontinuously operative dan gerous condition\u201d may form the basis for a claim under the Act\u2019s intentional-tort exception. The Michigan Supreme Court has observed that \u201c[a] continuously operative dangerous condition may form the basis of a claim under the intentional tort exception only if the employer knows the condition will cause an injury and refrains from informing the employee about it.\u201d Giles v. Ameritech, 468 Mich. 897, 660 N.W.2d 72, 73 (2003) (emphasis added) (citing Travis, 551 N.W.2d at 145); Alexander, 660 N.W.2d 67; Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). The key is that the employee is left in the Holdings: 0: recognizing that georgia did not adopt  115 but even if it did finding that plaintiff did not consider removal of asbestos to be immediately necessary where there was an undisputed delay between plaintiffs discovery of the hazard and beginning of removal 1: holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody 2: holding that the workers disability compensation acts intentionaltort exception did not apply where plaintiffs suffered injury after being instructed to remove carpet under which there was asbestos because the plaintiffs had shown only that the defendants knew of the general dangers of asbestos and did not provide proper training or safety equipment 3: holding that new statute which required proof that asbestos exposure was substantial contributing factor to claimants medical condition could be applied to pending cases and did not abrogate claimants vested right because she was still able to pursue her cause of action and recover for injury caused by her husbands exposure to asbestos statute merely affected methods and procedure by which that action was recognized protected and enforced not the cause of action itself 4: holding under facts presented that new statute could be applied to plaintiffs case because she was still able to pursue cause of action for injury caused by husbands exposure to asbestos", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Appellant Kevin Shea (\u201cShea\u201d), a firefighter with the San Francisco Fire Department (\u201cDepartment\u201d), appeals the district court\u2019s summary judgment in favor of the Department on his Americans with Disabilities Act (\u201cADA\u201d) and California Fair Employment and Housing Act (\u201cFEHA\u201d) disability discrimination claims. We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. I. Shea alleged in his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\u201cEEOC\u201d) and California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (\u201cDFEH\u201d) charges that Chief Gamble discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in ear h 798, 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 87, 29 P.3d 175, 190 (Cal.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, Shea\u2019s charges that he was Holdings: 0: recognizing similar analysis applies to discrimination and retaliation claims 1: holding that even though  24 only refers to actions in state court it applies to state claims brought in federal court 2: holding that the continuing violations doctrine applies to disability discrimination claims brought under feha only if the employers unlawful actions are similar in kind have occurred with reasonable frequency and have not acquired a degree of permanence 3: holding in the discrimination context that a plaintiff may challenge incidents which occurred outside the statute of limitations period if the various acts of discrimination constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination 4: holding that the doctrine may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the issue to the arbitrator to determine his authority.\u201d John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 561 (8th Cir.1990) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, Henderson strayed beyond the issues submitted by the NFLPA and in doing so exceeded his authority. As a result, vacatur is warranted on this basis as well. Because the court finds that the arbitration award must be vacated on the grounds set forth above, it need not decide whether Henderson was evidently partial or whether the award violates fundamental fairness. The court will remand the matter for further proceedings before the arbitrator as permitted by the CBA. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 907 F.Supp.2d 986, 995 (D.Minn.2012) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Holdings: 0: holding that remand is appropriate in part where the court determines that further evidence is necessary to develop the facts of the case fully 1: holding that vacatur of predicate conviction was fact necessary for filing  2255 motion based on such vacatur 2: holding that the appropriate remedy on vacatur is to remand the case for further arbitration proceedings consistent with the cba 3: holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where inter alia the board has incorrectly applied the law 4: holding that the district courts decision whether to remand for further proceedings or payment of benefits is discretionary and is subject to review for abuse of discretion", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "VII because the action of the Sheriff\u2019s Office interfered with his employment opportunities with third party employers. Because defendants moved for summary judgment only on the question of the employment relationship between plaintiff and defendants, it is not necessary for us to decide the viability of this theory. We note, however, that the Fifth Circuit apparently has not resolved the question of whether an \u201cemployer\u201d as defined by Title VII, can be liable under Title VII for interference with a plaintiff's employment opportunities with a third party. See Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1988); Daniels v. Allied Elec. Contractors Inc., 847 F.Supp. 514 (E.D.Tex.1994). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The instant motion was based solely on Holdings: 0: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 1: holding that such a theory is viable under title vii 2: holding the title vii mixedmotive theory does not apply to adea claims 3: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 4: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "899 P.2d 1004. \u201cA claim becomes liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which it is due are fixed and certain, or when the same becomes definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation.\u201d Kilner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Kan. 675, 686, 847 P.2d 1292 (1993). Prejudgment interest is not recoverable when damages \u201care not ascertainable by computation, based on some fixed standard of measurement.\u201d Foster v. City of Augusta, 174 Kan. 324, 332, 256 P.2d 121 (1953). In most tort cases, prejudgment interest is not appropriate under K.S.A. \u00a7 16-201 because the amount of damages due a plaintiff are not \u201cfixed and certain\u201d until a jury resolves questions of fact and the court enters judgment. See, e.g., Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 838 F.Supp. 519, 519 (D.Kan.1993) (<HOLDING>); Torre v. Federated Mutual Ins. Co., 906 Holdings: 0: holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award 1: holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict 2: holding that the amount of damages in a sex discrimination case was in dispute until the court entered judgment on the jury verdict the sum was not liquidated for ksa  16 201 purposes 3: holding that where the amount of damages was the primary issue in dispute the plaintiffs claim for damages was not liquidated until the date the jury returned its verdict and the plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest under ksa  16 201 4: holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "home, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley\u2019s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant\u2019s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth\u2019s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant\u2019s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court found that the Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant may be convicted of theft twice on the basis of intentional possession at one time of stolen property if the property forming the basis of the one conviction was stolen at different times and places from different owners than the property forming the basis of the second conviction 1: holding that the officers examination revealed that there was probable cause to believe that the property was stolen 2: holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft 3: holding that exclusive possession of recently stolen goods warrants the inference that he stole all of the property for which the defendant is accused of taking provided all the property was stolen at the same time emphasis added 4: recognizing that defendants intent to return stolen items to their rightful owner is a valid defense to charge of receiving stolen property", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to creditors seeking to enforce money judgments.\u201d Id. Accordingly, the court held that the money fraudulently transferred into the CREF account was not protected by \u00a7 9. Id. at 479. Goioin stands for the proposition that \u00a7 9 is premised on the assumption that the CREF benefits in question are derived from \u201clegitimate\u201d contributions \u2014 i.e., contributions which are not subject to invalidation pursuant to some other statutory provision. This ruling is certainly defensible, harmonizing as it does \u00a7 9 with New York statutes relating to fraudulent transfers. And as Goioin indicates, there is reason to believe that the New York Court of Appeals would adopt the same reasoning. See Planned Consumer Mktg. v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 442, 454-55, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185, 522 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>); Gowin, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (positing that the Holdings: 0: holding that money fraudulently transferred into a profitsharing plan was subject to a turnover order notwithstanding the plans erisamandated antialienation provision 1: holding that erisa medical benefits plans subrogation provision gave plan first priority claim to any recovery 2: holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets 3: holding that money received by plan participant pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy was within scope of plans subrogation provisions 4: holding that a plan provision stating that the summary plan description and summaries of material modifications  are hereby incorporated by reference and constitute a part of the plan acted to incorporate into the plan a limitations provision found only in the summary plan description", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the divorce judgment, i.e., that a jurisdictional defect appeared on the face of the record. See Walker, supra. Thus, we reject any contention that the trial court lacked any evidence on which to base its finding that the father had failed to properly register the divorce judgment. The father next argues that the trial court, for a variety of reasons, erred in setting aside the 2006 modification judgment; however, the father appealed only the March 28, 2011, judgment, which dismissed only the petition for a rule nisi and the petition to modify the divorce judgment filed on August 6, 2009. We, therefore, cannot consider any arguments addressed toward the propriety of the judgment setting aside the 2006 modification judgment. See Landry v. Landry, 42 So.Sd 755, 757-58 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, because the trial court relied Holdings: 0: holding that the appellate court should have construed the notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment as an attempt to appeal from the underlying judgment 1: holding that notice indicating the appeal was from summary judgment order was insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction to reach appellants challenge to earlier order compelling arbitration 2: recognizing that an appellants failure to properly file a notice of appeal as to a particular judgment prevents an appellate court from obtaining jurisdiction to review that judgment 3: holding that when an appeal is properly taken from an underlying judgment the court of appeals has discretion to review a subsequent order denying a motion to vacate 4: holding the trial court was without authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to attorneys at lower rates were \u201cgeneral assertions of superiority rather than factual misrepresentations.\u201d Id. at 246; see also United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 329 (9th Cir.1992) (\u201c \u2018Puffing\u2019 concerns expressions of opinion, as opposed to the knowingly false statements of fact which the law proscribes.\u201d). The statements Marin complains of here are, likewise, vague, highly generalized and subjective statements regarding Deloitte\u2019s abilities to implement the RFP. See, e.g., Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir.2008) (claims that company would deliver \u201cflexibility\u201d in their contracts and would lower copying costs for consumers is not a \u201cquantifiable claim\u201d but \u201cclassic puffery\u201d); Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1111 (11th Holdings: 0: holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over rico claims and that plaintiffs federal rico claim was barred by res judicata since he failed to bring his rico claim along with his state fraud claims in prior state court action 1: holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim 2: holding that sales puffery cannot constitute mail fraud to support rico claim 3: holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert rico claim for mail fraud based on misrepresentations made to third parties 4: holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "sentence. Specifically, Olmos-Esparza argues that the government\u2019s use of a certificate of nonexistence of record (\u201cCNR\u201d) and a warrant of deportation as evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The introduction of a CNR to prove that a defendant did not seek admission from the Attorney General to re-enter the United States does not constitute testimonial hearsay evidence prohibited by Crawford. Rather, it is properly admitted as a nontestimonial public record. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, \u2014, \u2014 (9th Cir.2005). Similarly, introduction of a warrant of deportation does not violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding that letters addressing dispute that was subject of litigation and that were written in anticipation of litigation did not fall under business record exception under rule 8036 of the federal rules of evidence and noting that it is wellestablished that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of business 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation 3: holding that driving record is nontestimonial as it is not accusatory and does not describe specific criminal wrongdoing of the defendant it contains no expression of opinion or conclusion requiring the exercise of discretion and it merely represents the objective result of a public records search 4: holding a warrant of deportation nontestimonial because it was not made in anticipation of litigation and because it is simply a routine objective cataloging of an unambiguous factual matter", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the forum state.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir.1991)). It is important to note, however, that the Calder test does not displace the five-factor personal jurisdiction test set forth above, see supra p. 987; rather, it \u201crequires the consideration of additional factors when an intentional tort is alleged.\u201d Dakota Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d at 1391 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, even assuming that the Calder effects test is satisfied in this case, \u201cabsent additional contacts, mere ef fects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.\u201d Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797 (internal citation omitted); accord AmerUs Group Co. v. Ameris Bancorp, No 4:06-cv-00110, 2006 WL 1452808, at *6 (S.D.Iowa May 22, 2006) (<HOLDING>). This is fatal to First American\u2019s case Holdings: 0: holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant 1: holding that the effects of a tortious act cannot subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum where no other contacts exist 2: holding that specific jurisdiction requires plaintiff to show that defendants forum contacts be related directly to the subject of the lawsuit 3: holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas 4: holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of paternity against a man other than the one signing the paternity acknowledgment. Such distinction is of critical importance to the analysis of the applicability of principles of res judicata since the preclu-sive effect of res judicata attaches only to parties to the original action. In Michael George, once the action was initiated Wyatt, 475 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (finding that child not party to first action not barred by res judicata because child and mother are not in privity due to divergent interests); In re M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 130 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982) (finding res judicata inapplicable to child support petition of child because earlier action was not filed by or in the name of the child); Baker by Williams v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 254-55 (Miss.1987) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the difference in result between the Holdings: 0: holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce 1: holding that adjudication of paternity in divorce decree is not binding on the child 2: recognizing a divorce decree which incorporates a property settlement agreement is a final and conclusive adjudication   3: holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits 4: holding that a paternity determination in which the child is not made a party and is not represented by a guardian ad litem is not binding on the child", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or belief that Arredondo abandoned his offspring and failed to adequately support or care for them prior to incarceration, and that after his release from SAFP, he failed to take any steps to regain custody of them, visit them, or support them. Furthermore, he voluntarily committed acts which caused his probation to be revoked, thereby resulting in his re-incarceration. Although Arredondo professed a desire to be a part of his children\u2019s lives and may be currently attending substance abuse counseling, the jury could reasonably believe that appellant\u2019s actions when he was not subject to a restricted regimen within the confines of prison walls spoke more convincingly of his abandonment of his children. See In Interest of B.T., 954 S.W.2d 44, 49-50 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Edwards v. Dept, of Protective & Regulatory Holdings: 0: holding that a hospital employee could not be convicted of terroristic threats after he told one of his supervisors that he wanted a transfer because he felt like killing another supervisor and wrote a letter to human resources to that effect because he went out of his way to avoid contact with the supervisor he disliked and clearly did not intend for the letter to be delivered to her 1: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 2: holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail 3: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live 4: holding that defendants constitutional right to travel was not abridged when he was ordered not to make contact with the victim he attempted to rape", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "... as moot.\u201d Doc. 28 at 7. This appeal followed. Discussion We construe the district court\u2019s order as dismissing Mr. Matelsky\u2019s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(e)(2)(B), and review solely for an abuse of discretion. McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574-75 (10th Cir.1997). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Upon consideration, we agree with the district court\u2019s conclusion that each of Mr. Matelsky\u2019s four claims was frivolous. Because Mr. Matelsky has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in participating in the voluntary TC Program, his due process claim must fail. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Matelsky\u2019s exclusion from the Program has Holdings: 0: holding that liberty interests implicating the due process clause are generally limited to freedom from restraint which  imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life 1: holding that administrative punishment does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the fifth amendment unless the punishment imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life quoting sandin v conner 515 us 472 484 115 sct 2293 132 led2d 418 1995 2: holding that liberty interests that are protected by procedural due process are generally limited to freedom from restraint 3: holding that inmates protected liberty interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the due process clause of its own force nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life 4: holding that a statecreated liberty interest in ones classification may exist where classification imposes atypical and significant hardship", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "biological parent of a child obtained from Iran, and holding that \u201c[i]n its role as parens patriae, it is the duty of a court to consider the child\u2019s best interest. In the ease at hand, it is obviously not in [the child\u2019s] best interest to relieve appellee from his obligation to support him. Rather, it is in [the child\u2019s] best interest to be supported by those who were permitted to bring him to the United States from the Republic of Iran, after promising the Republic of Iran to support and care for him.\u201d). {32} The facts in the present case are not in dispute and the issue of whether the district court erred in applying the doctrine of equitable adoption is an issue of law which we review de novo. See N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, \u00b6 5, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450 (<HOLDING>). In our view, the district court extended the Holdings: 0: holding that the threshold question of whether to adopt a doctrine is reviewed de novo 1: holding the ultimate question of probable cause should be reviewed de novo 2: holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo 3: holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo 4: holding that whether consent was valid under the fourth amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "observed that, \u201c[a]t the time of al-Kidd\u2019s arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.\u201d Id. Furthermore, the Court\u2019s decisions as a whole had emphasized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is \u201cpredominantly an objective inquiry,\u201d id. at 2080 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking \u201cwhether \u2018the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,\u2019 \u201d id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2 , 129 S.Ct. 2431, 174 L.Ed.2d 226 (2009); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In Hydrick, for example, we held that court Holdings: 0: holding that pretrial detainees can bring substantive due process claim 1: holding in light of the supreme courts observation that the due process rights of pretrial detainees are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner  that the eighth amendment provides a minimum standard of care for determining the rights of pretrial detainees quoting revere 463 us at 244 103 sct 2979 2: holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the fourteenth amendment as posttrial detainees have under the eighth amendment 3: holding that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner 4: holding that because pretrial detainees fourteenth amendment rights are comparable to prisoners eighth amendment rights the same standards apply", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ease \u2014 at least not in the first instance. It is up to the Board, not ' the courts, to make labor policy. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1566 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1984) (\u201cBecause requiring unions ... to have full time organizers present during each labor campaign raises serious questions of labor policy, it is an issue for the Board, not the courts, to settle.\u201d). Moreover, it is irrelevant that the court agrees with the Board\u2019s decision: \u201cWe emphasize that we harbor no disagreement with the Board\u2019s policy choices. We ask only for a clear statement of what those choices and the reasons for them are.\u201d Sullivan Industries, 957 F.2d at 905 n. 12; cf. Securities & Exchange Comm\u2019n. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 462-63, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we remand this ease to the Board Holdings: 0: holding that court can affirm administrative order only on grounds on which agency relied and noting that the orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained 1: recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice 2: holding that a motion for administrative reconsideration which congress did not order the agency to entertain which the agency dismissed in relevant part on procedural grounds and which the petitioner filed over sixty days after the agency acted cannot effectively extend  retroactively the thirtyday period congress specified for judicial review petitions 3: holding we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even those not relied upon by the district court 4: holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "upon a general remand for resentencing. We, therefore, reserve the issue. 3 . Even the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, which adopt a more lenient view of the scope of remand than does the Seventh Circuit, do not interpret Pepper as eliminating waiver. See United States v. West, 646 F.3d 745, 749 (10th Cir.2011) (favoring, in a post -Pepper regime, a rule whereby a district court \"do[es] not make inquiry into whether the issue presented is antecedent to or arises out of the correction on appeal. Instead the district court is to look to the mandate for any limitations on the scope of the remand and, in the absence of such limitations, exercise discretion in determining the appropriate scope\") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Garcia-Robles, 640 F.3d 159, 166 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis Holdings: 0: holding the district court need not provide de novo review where the objections are frivolous conclusive or too general because the burden is on the parties to pinpoint those portions of the magistrates report that the district court must specifically consider 1: holding that a district court is not to consider evidence of postconviction rehabilitation in deciding whether to resentence under crosby 2: holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law 3: holding in a postpepper regime that a general remand allows the district court to resentence the defendant de novo which means that the district court may  consider new evidence and issues quoting united states v moore 131 f3d 595 59798 6th cir1997 4: holding that sentencing upon general remand is to be de novo requiring the district court to consider new objections to the presentence report", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The continuing violation doctrine \u201cextends the limitations period for all claims of discriminatory acts committed under an ongoing policy of discrimination even if those acts, standing alone, would have been barred by the statute of limitations.\u201d Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d. Cir.1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In this regard, a claim for hostile work environment, \u201cwill not be time barred if all acts constituting the claim are part of the same unlawful practice and at least one act falls within the filing period.\u201d Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106, at. Acts occurring outside the limitations period that are significantly far apart from each other are \u201cfatal\u201d to a continuing violation argument. See Quinn, 159 F.3d at 766 (<HOLDING>). In addition, it is well-settled in the Second Holdings: 0: holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable 1: holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation 2: holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation 3: holding that there was no ex post facto violation when california changed frequency of reconsideration for parole from every year to up to every three years for prisoners convicted of more than one homicide 4: holding that the plaintiff could not assert a continuing violation when there was a three year gap in time from one allegation to the next", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "opportunity to submit its views on fuel switching to EPA during the rulemaking proceedings. And it did. See Julander Comments Aug. 4, 2011. It could also have sought permission to appear as amicus in this court, which it did not. Absent any reason to conclude that it is an \u201cunusually suitable champion[]\u201d of Congress\u2019 goals in the CAA, we hold, consistent with this court\u2019s precedent, that Julander\u2019s interest in increasing the regulatory burden on others falls outside the zone of interests protected by the CAA and 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (\u201cThe plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost.\u201d); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-58, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Lead Indus. Ass\u2019n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 Holdings: 0: holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims 1: holding that epa may not consider claims of economic infeasibility in evaluating a state requirement that primary ambient air quality standards be met by a certain deadline 2: holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract 3: holding that certain claims could not be a class issue in part because the complaint did not mention the claims 4: holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "are accustomed to using paragraph P as a basis to search parolees, either without suspicion or suspicion based on the high-crime nature of the area. The officer then contacts the front desk attendant of the motel to ascertain whether the parolee is checked into the motel and, if so, to obtain the room number. At approximately 8:30 a.m. on May 25, 2009, Officer Dennis Tripp followed this protocol during his patrol of the Traveler Motel. The license plate check of a 1996 Oldsmobile showed it was registered to Bald\u00f3n. Upon learning this, Officer Tripp called the shift commander, Sergeant Piazza, and asked him to contact parole officer Kevin Peterson. Pursuant to the protocol, Sergeant Piazza informed Peterson that Bald\u00f3n was at the motel. He also asked Peterson for pe 757, 762 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 548 Pa. Holdings: 0: holding parolee consented to search of his email based on the parole agreement 1: holding parolee waives constitutional searchandseizure rights by voluntarily signing parole agreement 2: holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee 3: holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission 4: holding that notwithstanding an agreement the state still must have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of parole or committed a crime", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because \u201cHispanics are frequently identified as \u2018nonwhites,\u2019 \u201d); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff\u2019d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (<HOLDING>); Enriquez v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F.Supp. 901, Holdings: 0: holding that for today at least persons of hispanic origin must be accorded the protections of section 1981 1: holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 2: holding that plaintiffs complaint which included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination was sufficient to provide notice of plaintiffs age and national origin discrimination claims 3: holding that white persons may state a claim under section 1981 and noting  the racial character of the rights being protected  4: holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and in general, \u201ca reviewing court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.\u201d See In re Cannon, 277 F.3d 838, 848 (6th Cir.2002). In any case, the record indicates that Matthews and Owens in fact received notice \u201creasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.\u201d See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Here, Matthews and Owens received actual notice by mail \u2014 as they admit \u2014 which set forth the claim deadline in bold lettering and unambiguously warned them of the ramifications of inaction. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170-73, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (<HOLDING>). That Matthews and Owens filed a petition in Holdings: 0: holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner 1: holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action 2: holding notice of impending tax sale of property was not reasonably calculated to reach property owner when notice sent via certified letter by state was returned unclaimed and state did not take additional reasonable steps to ensure notice was provided 3: holding that notice of administrative forfeiture sent to prisoner did not require actual notice to the property owner only notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action 4: holding that actual receipt of notice is not necessary to satisfy  1607 or due process the government need only make an effort that is  reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the pendency of the action", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Court within thirty days after publication in the Federal Register of certain decisions by Commerce. 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1516a(a)(2)(A). Second, within thirty days of filing a summons, the party also must file a complaint. 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1516a(a)(2)(A). Only after both a summons and complaint are filed does the Court\u2019s jurisdiction attach. See Georgetown Steel v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.1986). See also Wire Rope Importers\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. United States, 17 CIT 1092 (1993). It is firmly established that both thirty day periods are conditions of the United States\u2019 waiver of sovereign immunity; and thus, jurisdictional prerequisites. See NEC Corp. v. United States, 9 CIT 557, 622 F.Supp. 1086 (1985), reh\u2019g denied, 10 CIT 15, 628 F.Supp. 976 (1986), aff'd, 806 F.2d 247 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Georgetown Steel, 801 F.2d 1308 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that failure to serve debtors with filed complaint and issued summons rendered default judgment void 1: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons 2: holding that to be timely the notice of a charging lien must be filed before the lawsuit has been reduced to judgment 3: holding that a summons must have sufficient postage affixed to be timely filed 4: holding that transmitting legal documents by facsimile machine does not reheve the attorney of his duty to ensure that documents which must be timely filed have been timely received", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Here, however, CNI did not make that choice. CNI\u2019s charter requires board approval to waive sovereign immunity. The charter provides: To sue in its corporate name and, notwithstanding the immunity possessed by the Corporation as a wholly owned corporation of the Chickasaw Nation, to permit by written resolution of the board of directors enforcement of leases, contracts, agreements and mortgage instruments to which the Corporation is a party, against the Corporation in tribal court, or any court of competent jurisdiction by agreement of the board of directors.... MBF argues that CNI\u2019s charter has a sue- and-be sued clause, which expressly waives immunity. Some courts have held that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause does waive trib ain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407-08 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that CNI\u2019s charter Holdings: 0: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 1: holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization 2: holding that a tribes agent who has apparent authority may waive immunity without board approval 3: holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity 4: holding that tribes did not waive their immunity by intervening in  administrative proceedings because any waiver must be unequivocal and may not be implied", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "2012, no pet.); Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 governs questions regarding joinder. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 39; Brooks v. Northglen Ass\u2019n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.2004). Rule 39(a) concerns the joinder of \u201cpersons needed for just adjudication\u201d and provides: A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 234-35 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Vines, 459 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding trial court has discretion to require joinder of royalty interest owners whose interests will be directly and possibly adversely affected by decree in trespass to try title action 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to require joinder of owners of nonpossessory royalty interests and possibilities of reverter in partition suit between owners of mineral leasehold estate although it would be wise to join them 2: holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name 3: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the energy company defendants lessors the owners of royalty interests in the property at issue and the owners of the mineral estate in unleased part of the 9200 acres should be joined as parties if feasible 4: holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement to obtain joinder of other royalty owners in a pooled unit on grounds that the presence of the other royalty owners was not necessary to determine whether sabre pooled in bad faith and breached the terms of the lease", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 705(20). RECAP\u2019s clients fall into the first two categories. In the first category, an individual 82 (3d Cir.1987) (\u201cCase law establishes that alcoholics are handicapped within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act].\u201d). Legislative history also supports this conclusion. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (noting that \u201cphysical or mental impairment\u201d includes \u201cdrug addiction and alcoholism\u201d) (internal punctuation omitted). RECAP\u2019s clients therefore meet the first part of the definition of a disability. But mere status as an alcoholic or substance abuser does not necessarily imply a \u201climitation\u201d under the second part of that definition. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084, 118 S.Ct. 871, Holdings: 0: holding that alcoholism is not a per se disability under the ada and evidence that alcoholics in general are impaired is inadequate to show the substantial limitation of one or more major life activities 1: holding that reproduction is not a major life activity 2: holding that disqualification from an especially traumatic occupation does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working 3: holding that whether depression gives rise to a substantial limitation on a major life activity for purposes of ada depends on its severity 4: holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "626 (8th Cir.2000) (finding that employee\u2019s \u201cfrustrating work situation\u201d characterized by her being excluded from the decision-making process, treated with disrespect, subjected to false complaints, and curtailed in her supervisory duties did not amount to hostile work environment), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43, 1058; Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding that unfair criticism and being yelled at did not amount to actionable harassment); see also Martinelli v. Penn Miller Ins. Co., 269 Fed.Appx. 226, 228 (3d Cir.2008) (finding that employer\u2019s scrutiny of employee\u2019s work, \u201cwhile unpleasant and annoying\u201d did not amount to hostile work environment); Harbuck v. Teets, 152 Fed.Appx. 846, 847-48 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Here, based on the evidence in the record, Holdings: 0: holding that employers conduct including keeping workplace too cold subjecting employee to heightened scrutiny and disclosing information from plaintiffs prior lawsuit to her coworkers did not constitute a hostile work environment 1: holding that coworkers cartoon ridiculing plaintiffs depression does not support a hostile work environment claim 2: holding that plaintiffs allegation that her professor gave her a brief bear hug was insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment 3: holding that a plaintiffs psychological distress was not vicarious in a hostile work environment case where she experienced her workplace as hostile by reason of the alleged harassment of other women out of her presence 4: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 58, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). Further, Lewis failed to adduce evidence suggesting the falsity of defendants\u2019 nondiscriminatory rationale and non-retaliatory rationale for rotating her off the Allentown detail on the same basis as her coworkers. See Holt v. KMI-Cont\u2019l, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 130-31 (2d Cir.1996) (upholding summary judgment where Title VII plaintiff put forth no evidence showing that proffered non-retaliatory reasons were pretextual). Finally, as to the misconduct complaints, the district court correctly concluded that the two complaints dismissed without investigation or discipline could not demonstrate a materially adverse employment action. See Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d 217, 226 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As to the remaining two complaints, Lewis Holdings: 0: holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation 1: holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis  2: holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis 3: holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard 4: holding that the prison litigation reform act requires a prior showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis ", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of appeals\u2019 contrary decision. IV. Remedy. Because the State does not dispute that the defendant\u2019s prior convictions do not support a finding that the defendant is a habitual offender, we must vacate the defendant\u2019s sentence and remand for re-sentencing. The parties disagree, however, upon the scope of this remand. The State asks that upon remand it be allowed to amend the trial information to allege other prior felony convictions of the defendant, thus permitting proof of these convictions at a new hearing. Relying on the fact that the habitual-offender charge is not a substantive offense, but merely a sentencing enhancement, it argues that double-jeopardy principles do not apply. Assuming the State is correct in its assertion that the Double Jeopardy Clau N.W.2d 408, 416 (Iowa 1982) (<HOLDING>). This case is remanded for resen-tencing on Holdings: 0: holding party should not rely on courts power to remand for new trial under iowa rule of appellate procedure 26 now rule 626 as a substitute for careful trial preparation and presentation of evidence 1: holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b 2: holding that appellate court in affirming trial courts decision may rely in part on a ground not presented to trial court 3: holding that remand for new trial is remedy for factual insufficiency of evidence 4: holding that courts must consider any adverse effect that the prosecutors failure to disclose might have had on not only the presentation of the defense at trial but the preparation of the defense as well", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "provision to state common-law claims. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.2000) (r 0 F.3d 1027, 1030-31 (9th Cir.2010) (same); Polinovsky v. British Airways, PLC, 2012 WL 1506052, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 30, 2012) (sam\u00e9)). Just as Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on Giannopoulos and Polinovsky v. Deutsche Lufthansa was misplaced, so too is Delta\u2019s reliance on the contract cases it cites. The common denominator requiring a finding of preemption in those cases was not the need to apply and enforce foreign law; the contract claims would just as easily have been preempted if the courts would have had to interpret domestic law, as in two other cases that Delta cites. See Def.\u2019s Br. at 8 (citing Buck v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 36-37 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding segregation was necessary because breachofcontract claim required proof of different elements than other claims 1: holding breachofcontract claim preempted because the plaintiff tried to enlarge the federal rights that were incorporated into the contract 2: holding breachofcontract claim was preempted 3: holding that if the usps abridged the plaintiffs contract rights the proper recourse would be a breachofcontract claim not a takings claim 4: holding breachofcontract claim preempted because contract did not explicitly incorporate a federallaw provision", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "probation. A special condition of the probation was jail time equal to the amount of time he had already served in this case. This meant, in effect, that his sentence was complete upon the court\u2019s acceptance of the plea and entry of the judgment and sentence. Because Petitioner had already completed the incarceration which was a special condition of his probation, the trial court \u201cterminated\u201d Petitioner\u2019s probation following acceptance of the plea. The court then discharged the $5000 bond Petitioner had previously posted. The court\u2019s plea offer was made over the objection of the State. The sentence departed below the sentencing guidelines, and the trial court did not provide written reasons for the departure. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11) and Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). At the time of the plea, the State indicated Holdings: 0: recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient 1: holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure 2: holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure 3: holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure 4: holding same rule applied and required resentencing within the guidelines when trial judge failed to supply written reasons for downward departure", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of statements is unnecessary when the fraud allegations arise from misstatements or omissions in group-published documents, such as Annual Reports, prospectuses, registration statements, press releases, or other \u2018group published information\u2019 that presumably constitute the collective actions of those individuals involved in the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. Although the Third Circuit has not ruled on whether the group pleading doctrine has survived the enactment of the PSLRA, the district courts in this Circuit favor the conclusion that it has not. See In re American Bus. Fin. Serv., Inc. Sec. Litig., at *13; see also Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 2004 WL 2203709, at *6; But see In re U.S. Interactive, Inc. Class Action Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1971252, *5 (E.D.Pa. Aug.23, 2002)(<HOLDING>). Lead Plaintiff claims that it does not rely Holdings: 0: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown 1: holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy 2: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint 3: holding that failure to identify the defendant in the information is an omission of an essential element because the primary purpose of the charging document is to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusations brought against him 4: holding that the group pleading doctrine is valid when applied to officers where it is almost certain that given the highlevel position of the officer within the company and the nature of the published writing that he would have been involved directly with writing the document or approving its content and that the officer was privy to information concerning the accuracy of the statements within the document", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a gun in defendant's back pocket). 30 . Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979) (Fourth Amendment violated by sweeping search of \"adult\u201d bookstore; officers viewed films \u201cwithout the payment a member of the public would be required to make,\u201d and viewed magazines and books \"not ... as a customer would ordinarily see them\u201d by removing cellophane wrappers). 31 . 1 LaFave, supra note 20 \u00a7 2.4(b) at 630. Courts have held that searches of private offices, airline baggage rooms, employee break rooms, employee locker rooms, private dressing rooms of entertainers, etc. are not sustainable on the theory of \"store premises open to the public.\u201d Id. (collecting cases). 32 . Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (<HOLDING>); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, Holdings: 0: holding that a canine sniff of an automobile need not be justified by reasonable articulable suspicion of drug activity 1: holding that an officer does not need reasonable articulable suspicion of drugrelated criminal activity prior to subjecting defendants car to a dog sniff subsequent to a lawful traffic stop 2: holding a canine sniff on a legitimately detained automobile is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment 3: holding that a canine sniff is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment 4: holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in isolation from each other does not take into account the \u2018totality of the circumstances,\u2019 as our cases have understood that phrase. The court appeared to believe that each observation by [the arresting officer] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to \u2018no weight.\u2019 See [United States v. Arvizu,] 232 F.3d [1241] at 1249-1251 [ (9th Cir.2000) ]. Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis. The officer in Terry observed the petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store window, and confer with one another. Although each of the series of acts was \u2018perhaps innocent in itself,\u2019 we held that, taken together, they \u2018warranted further investigation.\u2019 392 U.S., at 22. See also Sokolow, supra, at 9 (<HOLDING>).\u201d United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, Holdings: 0: holding that while each separate item standing alone did not provide reasonable suspicion a combination of factors clearly satisfied the reasonable suspicion requirement 1: holding that factors that ordinarily constitute innocent behavior may provide a composite picture sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion 2: holding that contradictory or implausible travel plans can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity 3: holding innocent facts when considered together can give rise to reasonable suspicion 4: holding that factors which by themselves were quite consistent with innocent travel collectively amounted to reasonable suspicion", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Class may lack standing to bring this claim. See infra \u00a7 VI(C). 12 . Because the court is dismissing the Transferee Class\u2019s claim on other grounds, it need not decide a question that the Fifth Circuit has not yet resolved: whether \"the scope of \u00a7 510 is limited to acts that affect the employer-employee relationship; in other words, [whether] plan amendments by themselves cannot be actionable under \u00a7 510.\u201d Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 210 n. 5 (5th Cir.1995). The court also need not reach whether \u00a7 510 claims are limited to interference with the attainment of a right, as opposed to interference with an existing, vested right. See generally Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass\u2019n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516-17, 117 S.Ct. 1513, 137 L.Ed.2d 763 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1140 (making it unlawful Holdings: 0: recognizing issue but reserving decision because not properly presented 1: holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court 2: holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court  cannot be raised  for the first time on appeal 3: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 4: recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Administrative Code states: Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors ... is generally subject to tax. Further: [Sjales of materials and supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. Utah AdmimCode R865-19-58S (1990). A final consumer is one who \u201cconverts the personal property into real property ... since he is the last one to own it as personal property.\u201d Id. The contractor is taxed as the ultimate consumer because real property sales are not taxable and thus the sale of raw materials would escape taxation upon being converted into real property if the ultimate consumer were not taxed. See Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. State Tax Comm\u2019n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah App.1993), cert. den. 870 P.2d 957 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that forfeiture of real property may be adjudicated before the seizure occurs because real property cannot abscond 1: holding contractor ultimate consumer because real property sale not taxed thus contractor taxed to avoid stream of products incorporated into real property from escaping sales tax altogether 2: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 3: holding utpa does not apply to real property sales 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson\u2019s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson\u2019s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson\u2019s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson\u2019s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson\u2019s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, because Nicholson did not move in Holdings: 0: holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control 1: holding sworn statements made during a codefendants plea colloquy were properly received as substantive evidence pursuant to fedrevid 801d1a 2: holding that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by statements made under oath during his plea colloquy 3: holding that a defendant is bound by representations made during a guilty plea absent a valid reason for controverting those statements 4: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(1974); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (allowing jurisdiction for suits seeking prospective injunctive relief or to protect against continuing violations of federal rights). Moreover, the defendants were properly dismissed from Hogg\u2019s\u2019 suit because New Jersey, its Department of Labor and that Department\u2019s Division of Workers\u2019 Compensation are not recognized as \u201cpersons\u201d under \u00a7 1983. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (\u201cEvery person who ... causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Will v. Mich. Dep\u2019t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Foreman v. State of Holdings: 0: holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under  1983 1: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 2: holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983 3: holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under  1983 4: holding that the eleventh amendment protects both states and state officials acting in their official capacity from suits brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)), and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed Moore\u2019s action because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Lewis v. Casey, 618 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 136 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires showing that the defendant\u2019s conduct caused actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 535, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Idaho Code \u00a7 6-901 (Idaho Tort Holdings: 0: holding that meaningful postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to remedy unauthorized intentional deprivations of inmates property 1: holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies 2: holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists 3: holding that due process is not violated when a state employee intentionally deprives an individual of property or liberty so long as the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy such as an article 78 proceeding 4: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "plaintiffs [are] competitors.\u201d C&W counters that CBS alleges no facts even hinting that C&W might itself be a competitor of CBS except for C&W\u2019s 27% investment in CCC, and that as a matter of law such an investment alone cannot vicariously make C&W a compet 8 WL 32012 (Del.Super.1988) (citing cases holding day-today control required before court will pierce corporate veil or find parent liable); Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 n. 21 (Del.Super.1996) (noting test for parent\u2019s liability for act of subsidiary is whether parent had \u201cexclusive domination and control to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or independent significance of its own\u201d); cf. Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Phone Directories Co. v. Contel Corp., 786 Holdings: 0: holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary 1: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 2: holding that in order to prevent parent from carrying out anticompetitive activity through subsidiary test for venue is whether parents control over subsidiary caused parent to transact business in state within venue provision of clayton act 3: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations 4: holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "may be taken into account at sentencing, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct, and the sentencing court finds the same, by a preponderance of the evidence, and as long as the sentence falls within the prescribed statutory maximum. Because the sentenc ing judge in the instant case did find by a preponderance of the evidence that Poyato did in fact possess a firearm in connection with the offense, the district judge erred in concluding that he was precluded from denying the safety valve; the district court\u2019s finding rendered Poyato ineligible for the safety valve. Accordingly, Poyato\u2019s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2420, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The jury verdict in the instant case Holdings: 0: holding it permissible to increase a mandatory minimum sentence based solely on facts found by the sentencing judge 1: holding that the analysis in meritor sav bank fsb v vinson 477 us 57 64 106 sct 2399 2404 91 led2d 49 1986 applies to claims of sexual harassment under title ix 2: holding that an increase in the mandatory minimum sentence based on judicial factfinding does not evade the requirements of the fifth and sixth amendments and reaffirming mcmillan v pennsylvania 477 us 79 106 sct 2411 91 led2d 67 1986 3: holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review 4: holding on the authority of celotex v catrett 477 us 317 106 sct 2548 91 led2d 265 1986 that hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment may be considered if the outofcourt declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony ie in a form that would be admissible at trial ", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(emphasis added). The GTLA declares as well that \u201c[w]hen immunity is removed by this chapter [the GTLA] any claim for damages must be brought in strict compliance with the terms of this chapter [the GTLA].\u201d Id. \u00a7 29-20-201(c) (2012) (emphasis added). Both the history and the text of the GTLA demonstrate that, as to tort actions against local governmental entities, the Legislature intended it to be a comprehensive statutory scheme. Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496. However, the GTLA does not control every single action against a governmental entity. See id.; Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tenn.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 81-83; J.S. Haren Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2002-01327-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21276662, at *5 (Tenn.Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Only those claims which are \u201cbrought under\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs 1: holding that the remedy provided by a statute independent of the gtla was not subject to the gtla 2: holding that the phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute 3: holding that georgia refund statute signifies state waiver of immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of the statute 4: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "consolidation should not defeat the mutuality defense preserved here. III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court. 1 . On the date of confirmation, Ferguson's claim for damages against Garden Ridge Management, Inc., and his loan with Garden Ridge, L.P., were at issue between the parties. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case turns on the meaning of substantive consolidation, a topic we addressed in In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.2005). Unlike Owens Coming, here we are not confronted with a dispute over whether such a strong equitable remedy for a reorganization is appropriate, as neither side wants to undo the deemed consolidation contained in the debtors\u2019 Plan of Reorganization. See id. at 211 (<HOLDING>). The only question is whether Ferguson is Holdings: 0: recognizing that there is no litmuspaper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from a  seizure 1: recognizing that deemed consolidation is consensual 2: holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed 3: holding that a statute violated the federal constitutional right of privacy when applied to heterosexual nonviolent consensual activity between adults in private and pointing out that twentytwo states have decriminalized private consensual sodomy between adults 4: recognizing that consensual policecitizen encounters do not implicate constitutional protections", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not under Rule 21 but Rule 42(b) and effects merely a \u201cseparation of claims in an action in which multiple parties have been joined.\u201d) (emphasis omitted). The confusion that can arise from loose talk of \u201cseverance\u201d where in fact only a separation of claims has occurred, together with the impact the distinction can have on appellate jurisdiction, occasionally has provoked judicial frustration. See Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Pfizer, 498 F.2d 358, 359 (2 d Cir.1974) (speaking of the \u201ctangle of Rules 21, 42(b) [and] 54(b)\u201d). In the context of removal to federal court in diversity jurisdiction, the mere fact that an order of a state court purports to have \u201csevered\u201d claims generally is insufficient to make a case removable. See Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Unijax, Inc., 625 F.2d 54, 56 Holdings: 0: holding that diversitydefeating parties were not severed from a case so as to permit removal to federal court where article 1038 of the louisiana code of civil procedure pursuant to which the severance was made authorizes separate trials rather than a true severance 1: holding the lumpsum payment of a severance benefit to be evidence of lack of an administrative scheme 2: holding that a plan providing severance pay for reduction in work force simply did not contemplate the effect of a sale of a business on the availability of severance pay 3: holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract 4: holding that death qualification of jury is not of itself grounds for severance of a noncapital defendant", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Report of CS in October 2013 by TFO Travis Chavez regarding Erik Parra and Greg Cotinola Request 2: Copy of Handwritten and/or Audio Notes Regarding Debriefing of the CS in October 2013 by TFO Travis Chavez regarding Erik Parra and Greg Cotinola The Defendant has failed to show why he is entitled to either of these items. To begin, the \u201cDebriefing Report\u201d and the \u201cHandwritten and/or Audio Notes\u201d fall within the exceptions articulated in Rule 16(a)(2). These \u201chandwritten notes regarding the CS debriefing\u201d and any report produced therefrom [Doc. 64 at 4] plainly are encompassed within the ambit of \u201creports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by a government attorney or agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case.\u201d Lujan, 530 F.Supp.2d at 1265 (<HOLDING>). See also United States v. Weaver, 992 Holdings: 0: holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence 1: holding that the governments late disclosure of a statement by a government witness did not require reversal under the jencks act where the defendants were allowed a second chance to crossexamine the witness 2: holding that agents rough notes were not statements under the jencks act where notes were scattered and all the information contained in them was available to the defendant in other forms 3: holding that while brady and the jencks act might demand disclosure of rough interview notes in certain instances rule 16 did not 4: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by tennessee rule of criminal procedure 16", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.\u201d See id. The Forest Service contends that Phase 1 and Phase 2 are not connected, but rather are complementary actions with \u201cindependent utility.\u201d See Def. Reply at 19. The Court agrees. While Phase 1 and Phase 2 are both part of the \u201coverall strategy to protect communities from wildfires and extended exposure to smoke and to restore affected watersheds,\u201d (see AR 258), the record demonstrates that Phase 1 and Phase 2 apply to different parts of the forest and could each be implemented independently. See (Woltering Decl. \u00b68; AR 258.) The Court concludes, therefore, that the Phase 1 and Phase 2 project are not connected actions. See Western Radio v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). b. Cumulative Actions Plaintiffs assert that Holdings: 0: holding road was still a public highway although fifty years had passed since the road was used by the public 1: holding that a road not open to the public at all times was not a highway 2: holding tower and access road for tower not connected actions where tower could function independently of road 3: holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system 4: holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by  recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is required\u201d). Conduct is actionable if it is either \u201csufficiently severe or pervasive.\u201d Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a \u201cdiscriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment\u2019 \u201d when the incident is \u201cextremely serious.\u201d Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. at 1510, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (citation omitted). Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that \u201ceven a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim\u2019s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability\u201d); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 Holdings: 0: holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive 1: holding that a single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create hostile environment 2: holding in a 42 usc  1981 and 1983 context that although a single incident ordinarily will not give rise to a cognizable claim for hostile work environment  where the plaintiff was subjected to a physical assault in which he was punched in the ribs and  temporarily blinded by having mace sprayed in his eyes we cannot say that as a matter of law such an incident is not sufficiently severe in all the circumstances to create a hostile work environment 3: holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment 4: holding that plaintiffs allegation of one incident where supervisor wrapped his arms around her and made sexually explicit statements was not sufficient to establish a claim of a hostile working environment absent the most stringent circumstances courts have refused to hold that one incident in itself was so severe as to create a hostile work environment", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "into the bathroom. Thus, Jackson remembered the details of the events before and after the murder, suggesting he had control of his mental faculties, had coherent decision-making ability, and was not in a state of intoxication such that his judgment was impaired. Jackson asserts the OCCA\u2019s dissent correctly decided this case. The dissent criticized the majority for (1) failing to find sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of intoxication; (2) weighing the evidence; and (3) using an incorrect test by reciting that Jackson had not proved his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 964 P.2d at 902-03 (Lane, J., dissenting). The first criticism is addressed by the prior discussion. Contrary to the dissent\u2019s assertion, the majority did not weigh the evidence. See id. at 892 (<HOLDING>). Nor did the majority require Jackson to prove Holdings: 0: recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence 1: holding that on a motion for summary judgment it is settled that a trial court is not permitted to weigh material conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses 2: holding that it is function of trial court to judge witnesses credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence 3: holding that in resolving sufficiency of evidence appeals court does not weigh evidence or review credibility of witnesses 4: holding that it is trial courts function to evaluate witness credibility and weigh conflicting evidence", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "In district court, a codefendant had objected to the instructions but the defendant declined to challenge them, telling the district court \"I don\u2019t have any objections to the charge.\u201d We then held that the defendant had not preserved the issue for appeal and thus only examined the instruction for plain error. If the defendant states that he will not object to something and then, on appeal, reverses course and raises such an objection, this court should generally apply a plain error standard. Id. at 1472. There may be times, however, as recognized by this court in Love and White where the failure to join a codefendant's objection may nevertheless preserve the issue for appeal. 3 . When the district court declares a mistrial and one of the parties files a certain kind of Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829, 114 S.Ct. 97, 126 Holdings: 0: holding that informal methods of granting continuances are inconsistent with the requirements of the iad 1: holding that the ijs or bias credibility determinations are not questioned if they are substantially reasonable 2: holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words 3: holding that openended continuances to serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in length 4: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in 1990. 9 . One of Hartman's daughters suffers from sickle-cell anemia and her mother testified that \"she can barely care for\u201d her without Hartman's assistance. Pet. at Ex. C. Further, according to Hartman\u2019s mother, Hartman would face discrimination in Guyana because \"his father was born in the United States.\u201d Id. In addition, the IJ noted \u201cthe hardship and stress that [his deportation] would cause his mother who has already suffered two heart attacks.\u201d Id. 10 . The Court notes that it does not have habe-as jurisdiction to review the IJ's discretionary decision to award Hartman \u00a7 212(c) relief. See Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 132-133 (3d Cir.2001) (limiting habeas review of removal orders to statutory or constitutional challenges); Sol v. INS, 274 F.3d 648, 651 (2d Cir.2001) Holdings: 0: holding that the ij and bia lack authority to review discretionary decisions regarding when and whether to initiate removal proceedings 1: holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction 2: holding that federal jurisdiction over  2241 petitions does not extend to review of discretionary determinations by the ij and the bia 3: holding that apprendi does not retroactively apply to  2241 petitions 4: holding that the real id act does not restore jurisdiction over discretionary determinations", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "error. Finally counsel points out that the court failed explicitly to tell Hanson that he was waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(F) (formerly Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(4)). The court misspoke and asked Hanson if he understood that he would be entitled to a jury trial if he had continued to plead guilty, rather than not guilty. This misstatement could not be plain error, however, because it is clear from the rest of the plea colloquy that Hanson understood that he was waiving his right to a trial by pleading guilty. See Maeder, 326 F.3d at 893. For these reasons we agree with counsel that the contemplated challenges to Hanson\u2019s plea under Rule 11 would be frivolous. Counsel next addresses whether Hanson could make a nonfrivolous challenge t Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Franklin, 302 F.3d 722 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca 1: holding that thirddegree burglary is a violent felony 2: holding that escape from secure custody is a violent felony 3: holding that burglary is violent felony 4: holding that coerced sex is violent felony", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "incorporating Stevo\u2019s marks \u2014 conduct at the heart of initial interest confusion on the internet. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) (discussing how use of metadata can create initial interest confusion); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (9th Cir.2004) (discussing how the purchase of trademarked keywords can create initial interest confusion). In short, Plaintiffs have alleged nothing to show that SBR created the type of confusion needed to defeat application of the first native fair use \u2014 \u201cdid not intend [it] to constitute an affirmative defense.\u201d 6 McCarthy, supra, \u00a7 31:156.50; see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Instead, \u201cnominative fair use\u201d names a use of Holdings: 0: holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense 1: recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement 2: holding that an assertion of nominative use gives rise to a modified likelihood of confusion analysis 3: holding that the nominative fair use factors replace the traditional sleekcraft factors for likelihood of confusion where nominative fair use is at issue 4: recognizing the underlying principles of nominative fair use", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Baty further stated that Booth\u2019s representation to Baty was the reason that a warranty and representation to that effect was expressly included in the sale agreements. Howard & Howard communicated its representations via telephone calls and emails. Although the two paragraphs cobble together a few details, they fail to give even one date on which an alleged misrepresentation occurred. That alone dooms ABI\u2019s ability to allege fraud with particularity. See Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 393 (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity because she \u201cd[id] not include [in her affidavit] the date she received the allegedly fraudulent email from the defendants.\u201d); see also United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Hirt v. Walgreen Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions 1: holding that defendants failed to carry burden of proof to show that plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages when among other things they offered no evidence contradicting the plaintiffs evidence 2: holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements 3: holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination 4: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of law. Thus we review the district court\u2019s determination de novo. See Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 865 (10th Cir.1993); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986). In our judgment, Driver was the \u201cprevailing party\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 3629(B). Although CUIC\u2019s interpretations of \u00a7 3629(B) have some appeal, the language of that statute counsels a different construction. Section 3629(B) expressly requires a \u201cwritten\u201d offer of settlement. It twice refers to the type of offer in question and twice qualifies it as \u201cwritten.\u201d And it expressly requires that a covered offer be \u201csubmit[ted]\u201d to the insured, which provision seems to us to contemplate that a qualifying offer be in writing. See Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to CUIC\u2019s claim, the decision of the Holdings: 0: holding that while rule 68 does not explicitly require that an offer of settlement under that rule be made in writing its requirement that the offer be served upon the adverse party implies as much 1: recognizing further that the offer of proof allows the aggrieved party to present a proper record for review on appeal and in the absence of such an offer error may not be preserved 2: holding an unaccepted rule 68 offer does not moot a claim 3: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell 4: holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of Mr. Boggess, Detective Burke did nothing more than identify the person depicted in the photographs, the car shown in the photographs, and the place where the photographs were taken. Further, Mr. Boggess testified that the photographs showed him partially undressing after being baptized. We simply cannot find any prejudicial impact from the manner in which the photographs were introduced, nor the substantive content of what the photographs depicted. Consequently, the erroneous admission of the photographs has been shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. IV. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of Mr. Flippo\u2019s motion for a new trial. Affirmed. 1 . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The medication and clothing were Holdings: 0: recognizing that any witness has the right to refuse to be interviewed if he so desires and is not under or subject to legal process 1: holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning 2: holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed 3: holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent 4: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Inc., Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc., Fujitsu Computer Systems Corporation, Hewlett Packard Company, International Business Machines Corporation and Leno-va (United States)). In light of the fact that four of the defendants (Fujitsu, Hewlett Packard, IBM and Lenova) have been dismissed with prejudice at various times and the stipulations incorporating the dismissals stated explicitly that the parties to the stipulations were to pay their own fees and costs, dkt. ## 68, 69, 94 and 95, I assume that counsel\u2019s reference to \u201call defendants\u201d includes only the four listed in the caption above. Defendants\u2019 motion was filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment in this case and is therefore timely. See IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Defendants contend that the court can find by Holdings: 0: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 1: holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment 2: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 3: holding that correct way to perfect claim for attorney fees under  285 is through compliance with fedrcivp 54d2b which requires motions for attorney fees to be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment 4: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "456 F.Supp. 355, 358 (N.D.Ga.1978) (O\u2019Kelley, J.) When the initial pleading provides at least a clue as to the plaintiffs citizenship, the burden is on the defendant to file the petition for removal within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading. Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 602 F.Supp. 798, 801 (N.D.Ill.1985); Richman v. Zimmer, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.Fla.1986); Kaneshiro v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 496 F.Supp. 452, 462 (D.Haw.1980). An overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered this matter have concluded that the plaintiffs failure to allege a party\u2019s citizenship in the initial pleading does not prevent the thirty day removal period from commencing. See e.g., Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 9, 11 (E.D.Pa.1983) (<HOLDING>) and cases cited therein. Moreover, several Holdings: 0: holding that failure to allege plaintiffs citizenship in notice of removal amounted to defect in removal procedure under former version of 28 usc  1447c 1: holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect 2: holding that plaintiffs failure to allege citizenship of first defendant did not constitute good cause for second defendants failure to timely join in removal petition 3: holding that a party fraudulently joined to defeat removal need not join in a removal petition and is disregarded in determining diversity of citizenship 4: holding that the failure of all defendant to join in the petition for removal mandated remand to state court", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Texas Supreme Court would allow the filing of an Anders brief derived from this right in the parental-rights termination context. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has extended Anders to juvenile-delinquency proceedings based, in part, on the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex.1998). Although it has not yet considered application of Anders procedures to parental-rights termination appeals, it has recognized that the state\u2019s interest in protecting the best interests of children through judicial economy, certainty, and finality are not outweighed by a parent\u2019s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 354 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Dossey v. Tex. Dep\u2019t of Holdings: 0: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights 1: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 2: holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim 3: holding that the due process clause of the alaska constitution guarantees the right to effective counsel in proceedings for the termination of parental rights 4: holding due process does not mandate that appellate courts review unpreserved complaints of charge error in parental rights termination", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Co., 618 So.2d 874, 879 (La.1993) (concluding that damages may include cost of restoration of the property to its original condition or, if that is economically wasteful, the difference in value of the property before and after the harm). Orion asserts that Syracuse\u2019s claim for damages resulting from the removal of the tags must be denied because Syracuse failed to mitigate those damages. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party \u201cmust make reasonable efforts to mitigate\u201d damages caused by another\u2019s breach of contract). See also Elliott v. Normand, 976 So.2d 738, 745 (La.Ct.App.2008) (denying storage charges for boat where party failed to mitigate its damages by not acting promptly to get boat repaired). Cf. Rogers v. Nelson Dodge, Inc., 407 So.2d 443, 447 (La.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>). After Syracuse complained to Orion about the Holdings: 0: holding lien claimant could not recover for trackiron furnished for use in repairing mine but not actually used 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that party did not fail to mitigate his damages by not repairing motor home because evidence proved it could not be repaired 3: holding that the challenged evidence the government introduced in rebuttal was substantive evidence and not  relevant for impeachment purposes because it was not offered to show that the witness was not a credible person but to show that she was not at the defendants home during the relevant time making her testimony that she did not see any drugrelated activity while at the defendants home irrelevant 4: holding that it may not", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "relevant post-judgment period from $12,000 to $14,000 per month. We find no merit in this contention, as the trial court did indeed make such a determination as expressly set forth in the final judgment\u2014a determination which Futer-nick and Beber did not contest in their first appeal. 2 . On appeal, Trushina contends that Futer-nick and Beber are not legally entitled to any post-judgment interest. While such a contention may indeed be valid and supported by the Richardson analysis, Tmshina took the position in the trial court that Futemick and Beber were entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 1.49%. The trial court agreed with Tmshina, and therefore Trushina could not properly cross-appeal that portion of the trial court\u2019s order. Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>) (citing Behar v. Southeast Banks Trust Co., Holdings: 0: holding that defendant may not complain of error he invited and further holding that reversal cannot be based on such error 1: holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal 2: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 3: holding a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal 4: holding that a party failing to make a timely objection to evidence at trial cannot as a matter of law be heard to complain on appeal that its admission is error constituting an irregularity in the proceeding", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "law. For example, in Pace v. Insurance Company of North America, 838 F.2d 572, 578-79 (1st Cir.1988), we held that maritime law did not preempt a Rhode Island cause of action allowing recovery of damages and attorney\u2019s fees for an insurer\u2019s bad faith refusal to pay or settle claims; the refusal to settle [insurance] claims is normally left untouched by maritime law. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Thus, the cases relied upon by Kenealy do not support the Kenealy court\u2019s proposition that they reached the same conclusion as Inger-soll. In addition, Underwriters does not provide any reason, nor have we found one, to require a unitary and uniform federal rule respecting attorney\u2019s fees in maritime in surance litigation. See INA, 800 F.2d at 1381; see also Coastal Fuels, 207 F.3d at 1251 (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, we hold that a district court Holdings: 0: holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award 1: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 2: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 3: holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages 4: holding that no reason existed to create a uniform national rule in admiralty where the case concerned attorneys fees and whether the contractual provision which provided for attorneys fees should allow a party to recover attorneys fees where it succeeded on all but one minor issue", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at 57 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code \u00a7 26.10.160(3) (1994)). Describing the statute as \u201cbreathtakingly broad,\u201d the Court faulted the law, not only for its nearly unlimited scope, but for its failure to accord any preference to the historical presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Id. at 68-69, 120 S.Ct. at 2061-62, 147 L.Ed.2d at 58-59. It found the Washington statute exceeded the bounds interest at stake in Troxel this way: In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first i .Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the Iowa statute before us, we Holdings: 0: holding troxel not controlling where states supreme court previously held rational basis review sufficient based on minimal intrusion of grandparent visitation and other parental protections afforded by visitation statute 1: holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decisionmaking forcing parents to prove visitation not in childs best interest 2: holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody 3: holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation  award 4: holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "case. Reilly\u2019s defense depends, in part, on Riggs\u2019 performance under the agreement. Indeed, Riggs\u2019 execution of the terms of the Trust Agreement has already been placed in issue by the parties. TRST has claimed Riggs expressly or implicitly waived Article X, Section 10.02 of the Trust Agreement. Thus, in deciding this case, the Court could determine Riggs breached the Trust Agreement or was negligent in signing or performing the contract and absolve Reilly of liability. Such a finding could be unfairly detrimental to Riggs. Although there is no danger of issue preclusion in the case pending in Washington, D.C., a negative precedent could impair Riggs in that litigation; that is, assuming this case is decided first. See Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). In addition, if the D.C. Court acknowledged Holdings: 0: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice 1: holding that a finding of no plain error on direct appeal precludes a finding of prejudice under strickland 2: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 3: holding nonagency defendants were properly joined as indispensable parties under rule 19 but recognizing no apa cause of action could stand against them 4: holding that a negative precedent can cause enough prejudice to an absentee for a finding of indispensability under rule 19", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "however, between the public interest asserted here and the public interest present in Dep\u2019t of Navy. In Dep\u2019t of Navy, this court held that collective bargaining was in the public interest, and the union, as the chosen bargaining representative, was the party specifically designated by Congress to further that public interest. In this case, by contrast, Congress has authorized the contracting federal agency and the Department of Labor to safeguard the public interest embodied in the Davis-Bacon Act by giving them the power to enforce the statute. Although we do not decide the issue, it is likely that the Union has no private cause of action against the employer for Davis-Bacon Act violations. Cf. Weber v. Heat Control Co., 579 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). But the mere fact that federal agencies are Holdings: 0: holding that the employees of government contractors do not have a cause of action for back pay against employers who violate the davisbacon act 1: holding in fca suit regarding contractors classification of employees for purposes of the davisbacon act that deferral to the department of labor was proper only with respect to the resolution of how particular types of work should be classified but not with respect to whether the contractors misclassified their employees 2: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court 3: holding that court would not imply a statutory cause of action for employers interference in employees assertion of claim for compensation 4: recognizing the cause of action", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(quoting Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d at 1372). To the extent plaintiff alleges that a violation of due pr Federal Claims has never been granted general authority to issue declaratory judgments, and to hold that the Court of Federal Claims may issue a declaratory judgme Act that did not involve a pre-award protest, once the Court of Federal Claims determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear a plaintiffs claims for money damages, it necessarily followed that the court did not have authority to hear that plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief. See Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 645 (Fed.Cir.1994); see also Taylor v. United S tates, 88 Fed.Cl. 759, 762. appeal dismissed, 375 Fed.Appx. 4 (Fed.Cir.2009); Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed.Cl. 696, 702 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 274, Holdings: 0: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims 1: holding that because it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the united states court of international trade the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over a matter that was protested or protestable 2: holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident 3: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 4: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "must provide it with clear notice that it is subject to suit here. AMAF, 428 A.2d at 851-852; see also Trerotola v. Cotter, 601 A.2d 60, 64 (D.C.1991); Ross v. Product Development Corp., 736 F.Supp. 285, 290 (D.D.C.1989). Appellant relies on D.C.Code \u00a7 13-334(a) as a basis for her claim that the trial court had general jurisdiction over IDE-SA. As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the defendant was properly served under \u00a7 13-334(a), i.e., whether IDESA was personally served in the District of Columbia. In this case, that did not happen; by her own admission, appellant served IDESA in Mexico. As a consequence, appellant has \u201cfailed to comply with the statute\u2019s mandate, and [is] thus foreclosed from benefiting from its jurisdictional protection.\u201d Everett, 628 A.2d at 108 (<HOLDING>). We therefore have no occasion to consider or Holdings: 0: holding that by serving defendant in california appellant did not comply with section 13334a 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 2: holding plaintiffs failure to comply with section 2622 requires dismissal in federal court 3: holding failure to comply with  851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with  851c procedures for challenging prior convictions 4: holding that plan did not comply", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the right to appear personally at sentencing and testify. Section 557.041.2 states: At the time of sentencing of any person who has pled guilty or been found guilty of a felony offense, the victim of such offense may appear before the court personally or by counsel for the purpose of making a statement or may submit a written statement. The statement shall relate solely to the facts of the case and any personal injuries or financial loss incurred by the victim. A member of the immediate family of the victim may appear personally or by counsel to make a statement if the victim has died or is otherwise unable W.D.1993)(fmding no error in allowing representative of Mothers Against Drunk Driving to testify at the sentencing hearing); Edwards v. State, 794 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Mo.App. W.D.1990)(<HOLDING>). The statute does not restrict or modify the Holdings: 0: holding that a prosecutors questions eliciting testimony from a victim as to issue of virginity prior to the assault did not violate colorados rape shield statute because that statute does not specifically prohibit a victim from testifying as to a lack of prior sexual activity id at 1020 1: holding admissible testimony of the victims daughter regarding a telephone call from the defendant to the victim hours before the victims death and the victims emotions following the telephone call where defendant claimed accident 2: holding that a victim impact aggravator was not unconstitutionally vague because it directed the jury to consider inter alia the effect of the crime on the victims family 3: holding statute does not preclude victims family from testifying as to the difficulties encountered by victim following accident 4: holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Minnesota Power contends that it was improper, as a matter of law, for the Commission to consider the factors that it did because those factors are not cost based. The dissent's contention is therefore not at issue in this case. 8 . The dissent nevertheless contends that the Commission's adoption of an interim rate at 60 percent of Minnesota Power's final rate request should be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. The Commission explained that its decision to set the rate at 60 percent, \"an amount slightly in excess of any final revenue requirement found in previous Company rate cases in the last 22 years,\u201d was based on its \"balanc[ing] the potential burdens faced by the Company and its ratepayers in light of [the] exigent diyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 836 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>); Wajda v. City of Minneapolis, 310 Minn. 339, Holdings: 0: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision 1: holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable 2: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 3: holding that the citys decision was arbitrary and capricious when it was contrary to the evidence and based solely on speculation arising from prior unrelated acts 4: holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "evidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.\u2019\u201d (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat\u2019l Cremation Soc\u2019y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium\u2019s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased\u2019s widow another person\u2019s ashes and scattered deceased\u2019s ashes at sea against his wishes; \u201cit [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium\u2019s] conduct was extreme and outrageous\u201d); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). D. Punitive damages The Hospital argues that Holdings: 0: holding unreasonable an extraordinary variance based on factors such as the defendants lack of criminal history his health conditions and the lack of improper interactive behavior with children 1: holding that 21 years of crimefree violencefree behavior twelve years of good behavior in prison and other meaningful productive activities were not sufficient to outweigh the states evidence in support of the death penalty 2: holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized 3: holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension 4: recognizing that our society  shows a particular solicitude for the emotional vulnerability of survivors regarding improper behavior toward their dead loved one and that in such cases behavior which in other circumstances might be merely insulting frivolous or careless becomes indecent outrageous and intolerable", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for out of state medical treatment is as follows: 4. Prior authorization must be obtained from the payer for referral to out-of-state providers. The documentation must include the following: a. Name and location of out-of-state provider b. Justification for out-of-state provider, including qualifications of the provider and description of services being requested. \u00b6 30. Henderson, by his own admission, neither attempted to obtain prior approval from Fleming or from the Commission nor did he provide the required documentation before receiving medical services and supplies from Dr. Whitecloud, an out of state provider. Henderson, admittedly without any notice to Fleming or the Commission sought and received medical treatment from Dr. Whitecloud. Henderson argue o.2d 320 (Miss.1969) (<HOLDING>); Roberts v. Junior Food Mart, 308 So.2d 232 Holdings: 0: holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation 1: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 2: holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness 3: holding that employee who resigned left voluntarily where employer accepted resignation told employee not to come to work anymore and paid employee through end of notice period 4: holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). Moreover, the plaintiffs' \"obligation to provide the \u2018grounds\u2019 of their entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of action.\u201d Id. at 527. \"To state a valid claim, a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.\u201d Id. 5 . A party may recover damages in equity if there exists a contract implied in law, see Paschall's, 407 S.W.2d at 153; however, equitable relief is not available if there exists a contract implied in fact. See Ridgelake v. Harpeth Valley Utilities Dist. of Davidson and Williamson Counties, 2005 WL 831594, at *8 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also, Daugherty v. Sony Elecs., Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 1: holding that ajctions brought upon theories of unjust enrichment quasi contract contracts implied in law and quantum meruit are essentially the same courts frequently employ the various terminology interchangeably to describe that class of implied obligations where on the basis of justice and equity the law will impose a contractual relationship between parties regardless of their assent thereto 2: holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in some commercial contracts does not extend to atwill employment contracts 3: holding  he who seeks equity must do equity  4: holding only contracts implied in law are creatures of equity", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.\u201d); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009) (\u201cThe substantial evidence standard of review applies, and we uphold the IJ\u2019s factual findings if they are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Although we generally afford particular deference to an IJ\u2019s assessment of an applicant\u2019s demeanor, Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir.2005), we have never held that a demeanor finding alone is substantial evidence sufficient to support an adverse credibility determination, see Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that this court can be more confident in its review of observations about an applicants demeanor where  they are supported by specific examples of inconsistent testimony 1: holding that the agency may rely on a lack of corroborative evidence where an applicants testimony is not otherwise credible 2: holding that an ij may not use general information contained in a state department report to discredit specific testimony regarding an applicants personal experience 3: holding that conviction can be supported solely by circumstantial evidence 4: holding that an adverse credibility determination cannot be based on trial testimony that is more detailed than the applicants initial statements at the airport", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "case as well over the plaintiffs claim under section 1132(a). In its reply brief, Farm Bureau slipped in an additional jurisdictional argument: that because the plaintiff admitted that its recovery in her uninsured motorist state court case is \u201cpotential,\u201d the present declaratory judgment action is not ripe. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not favored. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 773 (6th Cir.2012) (\u201cIssues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court\u201d (quoting United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993))). Nonetheless, ripeness is an essential feature of Article III jurisdiction, so the Court will address it. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Article III of the Constitution permits Holdings: 0: holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention 1: holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter 2: holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists 3: holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction 4: holding that the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims violated article iii without deciding the claims", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to use the private roads in St. Lucie West were designed to control access to the dedicated utility easements. Accordingly, White\u2019s allowing FP & L and Southern Bell access to St. Lucie West's private roads while prohibiting Centel access to those roads is a private agreement in violation of the Cable Act. B. Constitutionality of the Cable Act White also argues that the Cable Act, as interpreted by the Admiral\u2019s Cove Court, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. White argues that under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), Congress\u2019s providing cable companies with a right of action to install cables in White\u2019s \u201cprivate\u201d easements is a per se violation of the Takings Clause. See id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171 (<HOLDING>). Admiral\u2019s Cove, however, rejected this Holdings: 0: holding takings clause protections did not apply to an innocent owners interest in a car seized under a state forfeiture statute 1: holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force 2: holding state statute forcing landlords to allow installation of cable television cables for nominal charge violates the takings clause 3: holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the takings clause 4: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to counsel. Of course, it could be said that Clark can hardly complain about the district court\u2019s grant of his own motion. But, because the court\u2019s discretion to deny a request for self-representation requires the court to consider the defendant\u2019s interest, I would conclude that a defendant who makes such a motion, against the advice of or without the support of his appointed counsel ke a searching inquiry of Clark\u2019s reasons for wanting to dismiss his present counsel. , On their face, Clark\u2019s claims that counsel had not visited him in jail, had not discussed the case with him, would not seek out suggested witnesses, and would not have the gun checked for fingerprints, raised serious questions that required inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1972) (<HOLDING>). The majority suggests that Clark\u2019s claims do Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty  and threatened him if he did not take the plea 1: holding even when a request for an attorney is ambiguous it is incumbent upon law enforcement to seek clarification of the ambiguity before denying the statutory right to counsel 2: holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance 3: holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel 4: holding that a defendants claim that his attorney did not meet with him or seek out witnesses required a searching inquiry before denying the request for new counsel", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "alleges COLT\u2019s liability arises solely from \u201cdesignating routes and loading and unloading zones\u201d for the bus. The McKinney car would have inflicted the same unfortunate injuries upon minor [appellant] had it pushed her into any static object \u2014 a lamppost, a brick wall or a fire hydrant. The car happened to thrust minor [appellant] into a large metal object mounted on tires, called a bus. [Appellant] has not alleged a.Super. 362, 621 A.2d 158 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 285 (1993) (minor was \u201coccupant\u201d of friend\u2019s truck while minor was unloading hunting rifle in front of truck in preparation to enter truck and was struck by oncoming vehicle); McGilley v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 369 Pa.Super. 547, 535 A.2d 1070 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 601, 553 A.2d 964 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In reversing, we find it unnecessary to Holdings: 0: holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his fourth amendment rights by requiring him to get back in his car before questioning him 1: holding motorist struck by drunk driver had the crime of dui  committed against him regardless of defendants intent 2: holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car 3: holding location of car off highway position of driver slumped over steering wheel and keys in ignition provided reasonable grounds to require breathalyzer test 4: holding taxi cab driver was not occupying his cab when cab driver had parked at cab stand behind several cabs in front of warwick hotel turned off ignition as well as cabs dome light took keys exited cab and walked to cab in front of him to bum a cigarette when he was struck by septa bus", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(\u201c[T]he officer\u2019s suspicions need not be inconsistent with a hypothesis of innocence. Rather, they need to be based only on rational inferences, from articulable facts, which reasonably suggest criminal activity.\u201d). Florida courts have emphasized that no single factor is dispositive to establish that an officer\u2019s suspicion leading to a Terry-stop is reasonable. Instead, the circumstances, as they are known to the officer at the time of the investigative stop, are viewed in their totality. Hernandez, 784 So.2d at 1128. Additionally, the officer\u2019s training and experience is taken into consideration to determine whether anything incongruous or unusual reasonably triggered the officer\u2019s suspicion to conduct a stop. Id. at 1126; see also May v. State, 77 So.3d 831, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>); Jenkins v. State, 524 So.2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that officers may consistent with the fourth amendment conduct a brief investigatory stop when they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot 1: recognizing that officers are entitled to rely on training and experience in forming belief that drug transaction has occurred 2: holding that notwithstanding the officers testimony that he had no suspicion of criminality the officer was aware of facts that would give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer 3: holding that while some conduct consistent with drug activity may not arouse suspicion in an average citizen an officers training and experience of how drug crimes are committed may provide the officer with a different perspective and should factor into the rubric when determining the reasonableness of the officers suspicion 4: holding the location of an investigative stop is a factor that contributes to an officers reasonable suspicion", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who does not receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person\u2019s interest in the property.,. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 983 (emphasis added). This \u201cexclusive remedy\u201d is only extended to property owners who are \u201centitled to written notice,\u201d but \u201cdo[] not receive such notice.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 983(e)(1), (5). Matthews and Owens, to the contrary, actually received notice within weeks of the adoption. The DEA sent three letters to Matthews and four letters to Owens via registered mail (signed and certified return receipts are in the record), and the DEA posted notice of the forfeiture online for 30 days. See, e.g., In re $20,000 in U.S. Currency, 523 Fed.Appx. 322, 323 (6th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. King, 442 Fed.Appx. 212, 213 Holdings: 0: holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief 1: holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial 2: holding that property owner was not entitled to relief under cafra because he was given sufficient notice of the administrative forfeiture proceeding through certified mail 3: holding that property owner was not entitled to relief under cafra because he received notice and failed to properly file a claim 4: holding that the biological father was not entitled to notice of adoption proceeding where he failed to properly legitimate his child", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "wearing apparel comports with the statute\u2019s goal of allowing the debtor to \u201csustain a minimum standard of living\u201d and of providing an \u201copportunity for the rehabilitation of the debtor\u201d while also \u201cpreventing] a creditor from levying on property which has little or no resale value.\u201d There is no evidence that the watch was purchased for \u201cinvestment purposes,\u201d and it appears to be \u201cactually worn\u201d by the debtor on a daily basis. Finally, any potential for mischief \u2014 by attempting to claim a \u201cluxury\u201d watch as exempt \u2014 is limited by the $1,000 ceiling set by statute. See In re Miller, 101 B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr.E.D.Okl.1989) (stating that any danger of abuse was curtailed by the legislature limiting the value of items that may be exempted as \u201cwearing apparel\u201d to $4,000); Leva, 96 B.R. at 731 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the court will allow the Holdings: 0: recognizing the same rule in texas courts 1: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 2: recognizing this texas rule 3: recognizing the ceiling present in the analogous texas statute 4: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "intimidate[ ], or interfere[ ] ... with any person,\u201d (3) \u201cbecause that person [the victim] is ... obtaining or providing reproductive health services.\u201d Act, \u00a7 3(a). The government\u2019s first defense is that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all; rather, it regulates conduct that is outside the First Amendment. According to the government, the Act leaves plaintiffs free to engage in any form of protected speech they choose. In many respects the government is correct. The Access Act does not prohibit protestors from prayin S.Ct. 2538, 2546-47, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Finally, certain physical obstructions, such as a blockade of pedestrian traffic, are not protected by the First Amendment. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Act does target unprotected Holdings: 0: holding that under  521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied 1: holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association 2: holding that shortterm and sporadic interference with free exercise rights does not violate the first amendment 3: holding that to the extent compliance with the flsa interferes with the state budgetary process that interference is caused by state law not federal law 4: holding that a statute which prohibited unreasonable interference with access to a courthouse was a valid law  and the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "thereto.\u201d); Jordan v. SEI Corp., No. Civ.A.96-1616, 1996 WL 296540, at *6 (E.D.Pa. June 4, 1996) (\u201cForum selection clauses bind nonsignatories that are closely related to the contractual relationship or that should have foreseen governance by the clause.\u201d). \u201cThird parties that \u2018should have foreseen governance by the clause\u2019 may also be bound by it.\u201d University Painters, 2012 WL 1150131, at *3 (quoting Donachy v. Intrawest U.S. Holdings, Inc., No. Civ.A. 10-4038, 2011 WL 2973543, at *2 (D.N.J. July 21, 2011)). Courts have deemed a third party\u2019s conduct to be \u201cclosely related\u201d to a contractual relationship or dispute \u2014 and thus bound the third parties to forum selection clauses \u2014 in a wide variety of situations. See, e.g., Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd\u2019s, 999 F.2d 206, 209-10 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); LaRoss Partners, LLC v. Contact 911, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract 1: holding that a forum selection clause should not be enforced where a consumer is told by a corporate agent to ignore boilerplate contract language containing a forum selection clause where there is a material difference in bargaining power and where the forum designated by the contract has little to do with the transaction and is gravely inconvenient for the parties and witnesses 2: holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum 3: holding that corporations owned and controlled by the party signing the contract containing the forum selection clause may be bound by the clause 4: holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "mechanisms of the subpoena. Accordingly, we determine that appellants have not waived the opportunity to make an in camera proffer of allegedly privileged information to the bankruptcy court on remand. See Order Denying Motion to Quash (contemplating in camera examination). 4. Subpoenas Not Facially Invalid We next consider whether the challenged subpoenas are facially invalid because they reach too broadly, require disclosure of privileged information, or otherwise compel appellants to breach ethical obligations. As noted above, a determination of the existence of privileged material requires the development of a clear and concise record of questions posed and testimony and documents sought for the court\u2019s review. See United States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Because no such record exists, a Holdings: 0: recognizing privilege 1: holding that court must review  assertions of the privilege on a questionbyquestion basis 2: holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege 3: holding that to establish an attorneyclient privilege a corporate officer must make it clear that he is consulting the inhouse counsel on a personal basis and the counsel must accept the representation 4: holding that for purposes of certiorari review court of appeals must identify the basis for refusing to treat an issue", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Jessica Carolina Lopez-Castro, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge\u2019s decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252. We review questions of law de novo, see, e.g., Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.2008), except to the extent that 9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>)). We also reject Lopez-Castro\u2019s contention Holdings: 0: holding that former gang members do not comprise a particular social group 1: holding that persecution of a woman because of her government job or her husbands position as a police officer was not on account of a particular social group 2: holding that government material witnesses do not constitute a particular social group 3: holding that poor yemeni muslims are not a particular social group because group posseses broadlybased characteristics 4: holding that government informants are not members of a particular social group", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a). 2 . Lopez-Herrera raises no challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, and accordingly, he has waived any claim in this respect. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n. 8 (11th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned 1: holding that issues raised but not supported by argument are deemed abandoned 2: holding that issues not argued in initial brief are deemed waived 3: holding that issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned 4: holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11\u201d and to \"submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,\u201d subject to de novo review. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 157(c); In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95. 41 . In re Querner, 7 F.3d at 1201. 42 . In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93. 43 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 541(a)(1). 44 . Id. \u00a7 541(a)(6). 45 . Id. \u00a7 541(a)(7). 46 . In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. 628, 633 (8th Cir. BAP 2013). 47 . In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795 & n. 12 (5th Cir.1997); In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R. at 633. 48 . See In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d 255, 262 (5th Cir.2012) (noting that, under Texas law, \"control over funds in an account is the predominant factor in determining an account\u2019s ownership\u201d); see also In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546, 551-53 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am., Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property 1: holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property 2: holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate 3: holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property 4: recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an application of state sovereign immunity would in any event eviscerate \u00a7 1983 . as it applies to municipal and county officers. Second, the fact that plaintiffs did not join Cignature Hospitality as a defendant in this suit is irrelevant. Plaintiffs already engaged in several other lawsuits which, as noted above, already have settled. Cignature is not an indispensable party to this action. 17 . After the deadline for the filing of summary judgment motions passed, plaintiffs' counsel expr olding that official capacity claims \u201cgenerally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent\u201d). The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 19 .Government officials are accorded Holdings: 0: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 1: holding that officials in their individual capacities may  be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits 2: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 3: holding officials in their individual capacities may  be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits 4: holding that government entities may not assert qualified immunity", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "7 37 Ga. App. 299 (139 SE 828) (1927). 8 See id. at 300. 9 Id. 10 See id. 11 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robinson, 268 Ga. at 744 (2) (a). 12 See Yasinac v. Colonial Oil Properties, 246 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) (541 SE2d 109) (2000) (\u201cthe distraction doctrine does not apply where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard before the alleged distraction occurred\u201d); Means v. Marshalls of Ma., 243 Ga. App. 419, 420, 421 (2) (532 SE2d 740) (2000) (physical precedent only) (the plaintiff\u2019s actual knowledge of the debris on the floor barred her recovery for her fall even though she claimed to have been distracted by attempting to prevent a dressing room door from hitting a child); McCoy v. West Bldg. Materials of Ga., 232 Ga. App. 620, 622 (502 SE2d559) (1998) (<HOLDING>). 13 For example, the type of distractions Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs claim of being startled by a child on a slide did not prevent summary judgment in her case because  t he simple fact wa s that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard which caused her fall prior to encountering it 1: holding that to defeat summary judgment plaintiff was obliged to offer evidence indicating that persons who actually participated in her termination decision had  knowledge of her protected characteristics 2: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment 3: holding that opinion that fuel oil on her shoes caused her to fall is one which a normal person would form on the basis of observed facts 4: holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the amount recovered begins only after entry of judgment.\u201d Accordingly, the trial court App. 1981) (same); Joyce D. Palomar, 1 Title Ins. Law \u00a7 10:16 (2013-14 ed.); Christopher B. Frantze, Equity Income Partners LP v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. and Recovery Under a Lender\u2019s Title Insurance Policy in a Falling Real Estate Market, 48 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L. J. 391, 396 (2013). 8 First Am. Bank, 759 F3d at 432 (III); see also Marble Bank, 914 FSupp. at 1254 (\u201cIn the court\u2019s view, plaintiff did not suffer a loss until it foreclosed on the project. Since a lender suffers loss only if the note is not repaid, the discovery of an insured-against lien does not trigger recognition cker Constr., Inc., 285 Ga. App. 844,848-50 (2) (648 SE2d 170) (2007) (same). Cf. Hutsell, 164 Ga. App. at 446 (1) (<HOLDING>). 36 Hall v. Prosero, Inc., 333 Ga. App. 454, Holdings: 0: holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict 1: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 2: holding that whether title policy covered damages of diminished value caused by survey defect was jury issue and thus trial court did not err in denying insurers motion for directed verdict 3: holding that some evidence was presented to support the jurys verdict that defendant breached contract and therefore trial court did not err in denying defendants motion for directed verdict or jnov 4: holding that trial court did not err", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "medical and non-medical evidence. Such evidence includes: the use and effects of medications, the claimant\u2019s ability to perform daily activities, the consistency of the claimant's allegations, and the extent to which the impairment can reasonably be expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges she suffers. SSR 96-7p. Where the ALJ makes a determination regarding a claimant\u2019s credibility, the ALJ must adequately explain the reasons for the finding about the credibility of the individual's statements in the disability determination or decision. SSR 96-7p. If the ALJ points to substantial evidence in support of his decision and adequately explains the reasons for his finding on the claimant's credibility, the court must uphold the ALJ's determination. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d at 176 Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations are for the jury 1: holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency 2: holding that a court is not empowered to substitute its judgement for that of the agency 3: holding that a court may not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the secretary 4: holding that the court is not to undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence make credibility determinations or substitute its judgment for that of the agency", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the relevant factors. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir.2007). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, \u201c[t]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.\u201d Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. With respect to the procedural reasonableness of his sentences, Portney contends that the Guidelines relating to U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2G2.2 should be given little weight because they were developed based on Congressional mandate, not empirical data. We have already rejected a similar argument challenging \u00a7 2G2.2. See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1201 n. 15. Thus, Portney\u2019s argument is foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the substantive reasonable of Holdings: 0: holding that precedent set by our panels binds all subsequent panels 1: holding that decisions by prior panels are binding 2: holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels 3: recognizing that a prior panels holding is binding on all subsequent panels 4: holding that where a statement is merely a prelude to another legal issue that commands the panels full attention it is not binding on later panels", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "misconduct based on the patentee\u2019s destruction of relevant documents and lodging of incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence. 653 F.3d at 1324-25. This court also concluded that the record supported the district court\u2019s finding that the patentee acted in subjective bad faith \u201cby exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.\u201d Id. at 1327. We held that the district court properly considered the patentee\u2019s \u201cability to impose high costs to defend against its meritless claims,\u201d and inducement of settlement payments by proposing low settlemept offers of \u201cless than ten percent of the cost that [the accused infringer] expended to defend suit.\u201d Id. at 1327; see Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in MarcTec, we affirmed the Holdings: 0: holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith 1: holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith 2: holding that evidence of counsels bad faith constituted unusual circumstances 3: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims 4: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "AR016969. For each of these forms of take, NMFS set limits for that take and metrics designed to measure the take. AR016969-71. STANDARDS Summary judgment is appropriate if the \u201cmovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). \u25a0 All of plaintiffs\u2019 claims at issue in the present motions are gov n Kraayenbrink, the APA\u2019s standard of review will be applied to plaintiffs\u2019 claim and plaintiffs must prove that NMFS\u2019 failure to reinitiate consultation was \u201carbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.\u201d 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)(A) (emphasis added); 632 F.3d at 481 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, if plaintiffs \u25a0 prove that the Holdings: 0: holding that courts should review claims brought under the esa under the citizensuit provision of the esa or when the citizensuit provision is unavailable under the apa 1: holding that courts of appeals should review the facts necessary to determine whether an exemption to the flsa applies in a particular under the clearly erroneous standard 2: holding that judicial review under the apa is precluded when a remedy is available under a citizen suit provision of an environmental statute citations omitted 3: holding that when considering an agency action as to which the statute does not specify the standard of review the courts of appeals must proceed pursuant to the apas general standard of review for agency actions in 5 usc  7062a 4: holding that irrespective of whether an esa claim is brought under the apa or the citizensuit provision the apas standard of review applies", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for failure to pay a sanction, which more directly reflects misconduct by the party involved. Such misconduct itself might warrant dismissal if a plaintiff's financial circumstances eliminate the effectiveness of sanctions as a remedy or as a deterrent. See Herring v. City of Whitehall, 804 F.2d 464, 468 (8th Cir.1986) (\"If the party is not capable of [paying discovery sanctions], the district court should then consider other sanctions. The ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice should only be used when lesser sanctions prove futile.\u201d). Nevertheless, where dismissal is predicated on the nonpayment itself, as opposed to the underlying misconduct, the degree of that misconduct does not alter our analysis with respect to the significance of a party's inability to pay. See id. Holdings: 0: holding that district court abused its discretion by dismissing for nonpayment without inquiring into partys asserted inability to pay 1: holding that the decision whether to apply the exhaustion requirement in an erisa case is committed to the district courts sound discretion but that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 2: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact 3: holding that the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing all 26 grounds in a  2255 motion where only certain claims were vague and conclusory 4: holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . Plaintiffs have abandoned on appeal their claim that a July 1, 2002, letter signed by plaintiffs themselves, rather than their attorney, was a qualified written request. 2 . Plaintiffs\u2019 attorney characterizes himself'as the appellant in this appeal, but he does not have standing to appeal the attorney-fee award. Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir.2000). We construe the attorney-fee appeal as part of the merits appeal brought by plaintiffs since they are patties to the appeal. Cf. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction. 3 . Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 1: holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal 2: holding that attorney fees must be awarded where plaintiffs section 1983 claim was unreasonable and groundless 3: holding that chanenge to the amount of attorney fees was not preserved for appeal where appellants objection challenged only the entitlement to fees 4: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, the plaintiffs argue that they are \u201cconsumers\u201d of a \u201csale of services\u201d contract concerning the management, marketing, and breeding of Ready\u2019s Image as a stud, and that \u201cWalmac Farm marketed itself as the stud farm at which Ready\u2019s Image should be boarded and should stand stud.\u201d [Record No. 110, p. 25] The transactions at the heart of this dispute, however, do not involve simple purchases. An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved. See, e.g., Princeton Healthcare Sys., 422 N.J.Super. at 473-74, 29 A.3d 361 (<HOLDING>); BOC Grp. v. Lummus Crest, 251 N.J.Super. 271, Holdings: 0: holding that a contract for the installation and implementation of a complex computer system did not constitute a consumer purchase covered by the njcfa and noting that the contract did not provide for simply the installation of a standardized computer software program but rather the design of a custommade program to satisfy the plaintiffs unique needs and the defendants active participation in implementation of this program 1: holding that a contract for the design manufacture and installation of two furnaces was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods and therefore subject to the uccs fouryear statute of limitations 2: holding that the implementation of a training program as opposed to the adoption of the program is not a discretionary function under the state tort liability act 3: holding that a contract for the design construction and installation of a water tank was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods under the ucc 4: holding that the ucc applies to a computer software license with an additional obligation to provide incidental services where the predominant thrust of the contract was the sale and support of the software", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "by the Holubs and HTC to the 1996 abstract\u2019s and lien\u2019s validity came in their traditional summary-judgment motion, on which the trial court never ruled. Indeed, that traditional summary-judgment motion was superseded during abatement by the Holubs\u2019 and HTC\u2019s filing of what was in effect an amended, traditional summary-judgment motion on the same issue. See Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Finlan, 27 S.W.3d 220, 231 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied) (indicating, with respect to motion second summary-judgment motion that did not include word \u201camended\u201d in title, that \u201c[a] substituted or amended motion for summary judgment supercedes and supplants the previous motion....\u201d); State v. Seventeen Thousand & No/100 Dollars U.S. Currency, 809 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the trial court never ruled on the Holdings: 0: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  1: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing 2: holding that a court must construe whether a motion however styled is appropriate for the relief requested 3: holding same with respect to motion styled simply second motion for summary judgment without containing amended in title 4: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "trial court is statutorily mandated to order the payment of restitution unless the court finds that restitution is inappropriate.\" Snyder, 747 P.2d at 420; see also Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 76-3-201(4) (1999). It \u00b6 8 Under both the United States and the Utah State Constitutions, due process requires criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and reasonably reliable information. See State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1994). Thus, \"[fJlundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing require that a defendant have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which his sentence is based.\" Id. at 855. However, procedural fairness in sentencing is satisfied when \"[djefendant had a full opportunity ... t .1998) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 10 Defendant did not object, question, or Holdings: 0: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 1: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing 2: holding defendant entitled to full restitution hearing where he requested it at sentencing 3: holding trial court without jurisdiction to impose additional restitution because more than 60 days had passed between the sentencing hearing and the second restitution hearing 4: holding defendant may appeal order stemming from full restitution hearing even though motion for hearing filed ten days after sentencing", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the court sufficiently stated on the record the reasons for the sentences it was imposing.\u201d). Accordingly, we hold that the district court\u2019s failure to comply with the \u201cwritten\u201d statement requirement of \u00a7 3553(c)(2) does not render Williams\u2019s sentence procedurally unreasonable. c. Williams also argues that the district court committed procedural error by selecting his sentence based upon the allegedly erroneous and conflicting factual finding that he intended to distribute crack cocaine to his girlfriend. Because Williams failed to raise this issue when the district court asked, \u201cDoes either party have any objection to the sentence just pronounced that\u2019s not been previously raised?,\u201d we review the claim for plain error. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). To demonstrate plain error, Williams must Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court 1: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 2: holding that we review for plain error whether the government breached its plea obligations when the defendant fails to object at sentencing 3: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 4: holding that plain error review applies to objections that were not raised when the district court asked the appropriate question at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "292 Ga. at 452 (\u201cThe purpose of an indictment is to inform the accused of the charges against him and to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.\u201d). 34 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 478. 35 Id. at 478-79 (punctuation omitted). 36 See former OCGA \u00a7 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2006). 37 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (punctuation omitted); see also State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (759 SE2d 500) (2014) (noting that \u201can indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer\u201d (punctuation omitted)). 38 See OCGA \u00a7 16-5-20 (a). 39 Chase v. State, Til Ga. 636, 638 (1) (592 SE2d 656) (2004); accord Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 261 (2) (a). 40 Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 434 (687 SE2d 833) (2010); see Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (<HOLDING>). 41 OCGA \u00a7 17-8-58 (a). 42 OCGA \u00a7 17-8-58 (b); Holdings: 0: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 1: holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance 2: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 3: holding that knowledge that a substance is a controlled substance is an element of  952 4: holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "we hold that it is not subject to an assertion of equitable estop-pel. As its name implies, equitable es-toppel embraces the notion that a party should not be permitted to profit by asserting rights against another when that party\u2019s own inequitable conduct has lulled the other into action or inaction detrimental to its position. See Fla. Dep\u2019t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. S.A.P., 835 So.2d 1091, 1096-97 (Fla.2002) (citing State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 48 So.2d 84, 87-88 (Fla.1950)). The doctrine has been most commonly held to preclude a defendant from raising a statute of limitations defense when the defendant\u2019s false representations mislead the plaintiff into failing to file suit within the limitations period. See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1076 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>); Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat'l Holdings: 0: holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the equal employment opportunity commission is a requirement like a statute of limitations that is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 1: recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa 2: holding that defendants may be estopped from raising defense of statute of limitations even though equitable estoppel is not listed in fla stat  95051 3: holding that equitable estoppel may bar a partys assertion of a statute of limitations 4: holding an evidentiary hearing on the applicability of equitable estoppel", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "many seemingly anomalous situations. For example, mandatory withdrawal would be required whenever there is a challenge to the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction under \u00a7 1334. 196 B.R. 791 (N.D.Ind.1995). In re Rimsat, Our conclusion that the' Tucker Act does not regulate \u201corganizations or activities affecting interstate commerce\u201d within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 157(d) is in harmony with other decisions involving federal laws of a jurisdictional nature. See In re CIS Corp., 140 B.R. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y.1992)(jurisdietional issue of whether plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies provided by the Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) does not mandate withdrawal of the reference); In re Rimsat, Ltd. v. Russian Space Agency, 196 B.R. 791 (N.D.Ind.1995) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we conclude that the Holdings: 0: holding that the laws of the transferee district are applicable in a case transferred pursuant to 28 usc  1406a 1: holding that where jurisdiction was based on 28 usc  2201 venue was determined as per 28 usc  1391 2: holding that 28 usc  1331 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity 3: holding that removal by a foreign sovereign is explicitly authorized by 28 usc 1441d and clearly cannot constitute waiver 4: holding that the provisions of title 28 in general and the foreign sovereign immunities act in particular are not laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce as contemplated by 28 usc  157d", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "statements about \u2018possible\u2019 effects and \u2018some risk\u2019 do not constitute a \u2018hard look\u2019 absent a justification regarding why more definitive information could not be provided.\u201d Id. at 1380. In the present case, plaintiffs allege that insofar as they relate to red-shouldered hawk, goshawk and marten, the cumulative impacts analyses are inadequate because they consist only of unsubstantiated generalizations and vague references. The Forest Service responds that the amount of detail required by NEPA varies according to the amount of harm that a proposed project may cause. Thus, the Forest Service argues that, in the present case, the EIS did not have to contain a high level of detail because the Northwest Howell project will not cause severe environmental harm. See Block, 690 F.2d at 761 (<HOLDING>); Nucleus of Chi. Homeowners Ass\u2019n v. Lynn, 524 Holdings: 0: holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred 1: holding that nsf must comply with procedural requirements of nepa when considering incineration of food waste in antarctica because 1 the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply because nepa is designed to regulate conduct occurring within the territory of the united states 2 the united states exercises legislative control over antarctica 3 any concerns about nepa interference with foreign policy were overstated because when foreign policy interests outweighed benefits of nepa compliance nepas requirements must yield and 4 broad language of the statute supports broad application of nepa requirements 2: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 3: holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action 4: holding that the detail that nepa requires in an eis depends upon the nature and scope of the proposed action", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was relevant to establishing Joshua\u2019s motive, intent, or identity, on appeal the Government only contends the evidence is relevant to establishing Joshua\u2019s motive. Evidence is relevant to motive if it helps establish why the defendant committed the offense. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The majority holds Joshua\u2019s prior possession helps establish why he committed the charged offense without explaining how. The cases the majority cites in support of the relevancy of Joshua\u2019s prior possession, United States v. Bitterman, 320 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.2003) and United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.2003), are readily distin ways: (1) the extrinsic act can cause the mental state, see e.g., United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), or (2) the extrinsic act may be a consequence Holdings: 0: holding evidence of prior conviction of manslaughter admissible to show vengeful motive for sending threatening letters to witnesses 1: holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators 2: holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial 3: holding that evidence of defendants threatening behavior toward a witness was admissible 4: holding that evidence of other crimes though generally inadmissible to show character is admissible to show for instance proof of motive or plan", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and he paid premiums for his policy,\u201d reasoning that the statute already provides an offset for premiums). Respondent also argues that treating the UIM payments as collateral-source payments under the statute would result in a windfall to tortfeasors. The appropriate allocation of a potential windfall underlies both the common-law collateral-source rule and Minn.Stat. \u00a7 548.251, subd. 1(2). The common-law rule sought to prevent tort-feasors from obtaining windfalls due to the injured claimant\u2019s receipt of compensation from collateral sources. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858. Under the statute, by contrast, the evident concern is to preclude double recoveries by injured plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331; Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). By directly abrogating the common-law rule Holdings: 0: holding that the collateralsource statute requires a reduction of the judgment only for payments made prior to the verdict 1: holding a provision criminalizing loitering which is defined as to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose void for vagueness where the provision was infierently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is apparent to the officer on the scene 2: recognizing that the collateralsource statute has the apparent purpose of preventing windfalls by plaintiffs at the expense of the defendants 3: recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers 4: holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trafficking is the offense, but previous sexual abuse or exploitation creates the enhancement. The requisite pattern for enhancement is a \u201cpattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of .a minor,\u201d not, as Olfano seems to argue, a pattern of activity similar to the incident in question. We have not expressly addressed the difference-in-kind argument, aside from our holding in Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 794-95, that trafficking in child pornography is not sexual exploitation of a minor. Although we have yet to interpret section 2G2.2 in light of the 1996 amendments, several other courts of appeals have recognized that remote or unrelated instances of sexual misconduct can support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gawthrop, 310 F.3d at 414 (upholding a Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err 1: holding that an 80year sentence for production of child pornography was not disproportionate to the crime be cause of the devastating consequences of sexual abuse of children 2: holding that the district court did not err in using a previous conviction for gross sexual imposition to enhance a sentence for receiving child pornography 3: holding that mailing child pornography to another in the expectation of receiving similar materials in return constituted distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 4: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which was decided a few days before Wade\u2019s guilty plea, prevented the district court from enhancing her sentence based on facts not found by a jury. The district court overruled the objection, calculated a sentencing range of 18 to 24 months based on the total loss amount, recognized the advisory nature of the Guidelines, and sentenced Wade to 18 months imprisonment. Wade appeals, arguing that the district court violated the \u201cconstitutional\u201d holding of Booker and violated her right to due process by treating the Guidelines as advisory in sentencing her for conduct that occurred pre-Booker. We review Wade\u2019s constitutional challenges to her sentence de novo. See United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). If the sentence passes those challenges, we Holdings: 0: holding that confrontation clause claims are reviewed de novo 1: holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo 2: holding that a circuit courts entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo 3: holding that legal challenges to a district courts sentence continue to be reviewed de novo postbooker 4: holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "from the designation of the adults who will influence the child in school. Even a State\u2019s considered judgment about the preferable political and religious character of schoolteachers is not entitled to prevail over a parent\u2019s choice of private school.... It would be anomalous, then, to subject a parent to any individual judge\u2019s choice of a child\u2019s associates from out of the general population merely because the judge might think himself more enlightened that the child\u2019s parent. To say the least ..., parental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule in the absence of either governmental choice or the government\u2019s designation of an official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.\u201d 530 U.S. at 78-79, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Souter, J., con S.Ct. 625 (<HOLDING>); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at Holdings: 0: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 1: recognizing liberty of parents  to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control as against law compelling publicschool attendance 2: recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 3: holding that liberty includes the right of parents to establish a home and bring up children and to control the education of their own 4: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "presence of criminal activity at Pruett\u2019s residence, but we nonetheless conclude that the executing officers did not act entirely without reason in relying on the magistrate\u2019s determination that evidence of &\u25a0 crime would be found in the residence. Although our Circuit has not adopted a per se rule that evidence of a defendant\u2019s drug trafficking establishes an inference that further evidence of drug trafficking will be found in the defendant\u2019s residence, we have held that in applying the Leon exception, such evidence of a defendant\u2019s drug trafficking indicated that officers acted reasonably in relying on a search warrant issued for the defendant\u2019s residence. See United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Pruett attacks the warrant Holdings: 0: holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on warrant 1: holding that executing officers reasonably relied on judges determination that there was probable cause to search motel room for evidence of drug activity even though search warrant affidavit failed to mention a connection between motel room and criminal activity 2: holding that a defendants prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance and felon in possession of a firearm helped support probable cause to search his motel room for evidence of burglary 3: holding warrantless search of motel room after occupant was arrested outside room for drug possession could not be justified as search incident to arrest absent other exigent circumstances 4: holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.\u201d). Although responsibility for maintaining this trust relationship with Indian tribes has historically been the exclusive prerogative of the federal government, the Supreme Court has recognized states may exercise the federal trust authority when specifically authorized to do so by a federal statute. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740, 768 (1979) (<HOLDING>). There are generally two situations in which Holdings: 0: holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes 1: recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians 2: holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization 3: holding states in exercising the federal trust power over indian tribes pursuant to a federal statute authorizing them to do so may enact legislation that would be an otherwise unconstitutional exercise of state power 4: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "cross the double-yellow center line two to three times, cross the fog line on the right-hand side of the roadway, and make an overly tight turn. He activated his blue lights in Orleans, but the defendant did not come to a stop until four-tenths of one mile into Brewster, as soon as was safe to pull over. At the suppression hearing, Officer Davis testified that when he activated his blue lights, he did not believe the defendant had committed any arrestable offenses. The evidence of the defendant\u2019s erratic driving was objectively sufficient to give a reasonable officer in Officer Davis\u2019s position reason to believe the defendant had committed the arrestable offense of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Commonwealth v. O\u2019Hara, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 610 (1991) (<HOLDING>) ; Commonwealth v. Trudel, 42 Mass. App. Ct. Holdings: 0: holding among other things that the officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance without more did not establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime 1: holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol 2: holding that the defendants speeds and marked lane violations at 300 am were sufficient to give officer reason to believe the defendant was operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor 3: holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am 4: holding inter alia that experienced officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of either methamphetamine or cocaine did not by itself establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the debtors filed the functional equiv alent of a monthly net income statement in the form of Schedule J. This is too little and too late. Schedule J deals with a debtor\u2019s current expenditures. In the process, it responds to a different filing requirement, contained in 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 521(a)(l)(B)(ii). Although line 20 of Schedule J is called a \u201cStatement of Monthly Net Income\u201d and the advisory committee note to the official bankruptcy forms states that this line was added to Schedule J in 2005 \u201cas required by \u00a7 521(a)(l)(B)(v),\u201d there is no reason to think that Schedule J is a proxy for the statement of current monthly income required by section 521(a)(l)(B)(v). In fact, the case law suggests the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr.D.Colo.2008) (<HOLDING>). We need not probe this point too deeply. Holdings: 0: holding debtors who devoted twothirds of their net disposable income to housing expenses did not propose a chapter 13 plan in good faith 1: holding that the statement of current monthly income was the presumptive amount of projected disposable income but presumption could be rebutted by the debt or upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances 2: holding that net farm income when applied to a producer in the fishing industry means net income from all fishing activity not just that income from a particular commodity and further providing that the regulations make it reasonably clear that the determination of   net fishing income is not to be made solely on the basis of tax return information if other information is relevant to determining the producers net income from all   fishing sources 3: holding that a chapter 7 debtors duty to file a section 521albv statement of monthly net income can only be fulfilled by filing form b22a 4: holding in prebapcpa case that chapter 7 filing was not a substantial abuse simply because debtors made unwise financial decisions that increased their monthly living expenses", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "agrees the claimant may enter judgment against him or her for a sum collectible only from the insurance policy. The settlement must be reasonable to be binding on the insurer if policy coverage is found to exist. See Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729, 735 (Minn.1982). 3 . The dissent at the court of appeals labeled the majority's analysis \"hypertechnical.\u201d Metropolitan, 1998 WL 157358, at *4. 4 . The court of appeals reasoned that because Metropolitan chose not to include the phrase \"arising out of\u201d or \u201cresulting from\u201d as part of its exclusionary language, it was obligated to defend and indemnify Jennifer Miller. See Metropolitan, 1998 WL 157358, at *2 (citing Redeemer Covenant Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 71, 76-78 (Minn.App.1997), rev. denied (Minn., Oct. 2, 1997)) (<HOLDING>); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear 1: holding that insurance company had duty to provide coverage for churchs negligent supervision of pastor under professional liability policy because policy did not contain clause excluding coverage for actions arising out of a criminal act or licentious immoral or sexual behavior 2: holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage 3: holding that a professional liability policy provided primary coverage over a general liability policy for acts committed by a pastor during counseling sessions 4: holding that a legal malpractice insurance policy that limited coverage to suits seeking damages and defined damages as excluding sanctions did not provide coverage for a sanctions motion against the insured", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Neesen ed., 1995)(stating that \u201c\u2019particular part\u2019 exclusion operates to preclude coverage for the damage to real property which occurs while the insured is performing his work on it\u201d). Consequently, the instant exclusion applies if Schauf was accomplishing work on the Sodaros\u2019 house when he started the fire. At the time Schauf started the fire, he was in the Sodaros\u2019 dining room finishing his cleaning of the spray equipment that he used to apply lacquer to the Sodaros\u2019 kitchen cabinets thirty minutes earlier. When Schauf was cleaning his equipment, he was performing operations on real property within the meaning of this exclusion because he was performing part of his contract to paint the Sodaros\u2019 house. See Goldsberry Operating Co. v. Cassity, Inc., 367 So.2d 133, 135 (La.Ct.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). As Schauf stated in his deposition, he Holdings: 0: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 1: holding that predecessor particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage to a switchboard upon which insured was adding circuit breakers 2: holding that particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage to entire apartment insured was renovating even though insured was working only on one part of apartment at time of damage 3: holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party 4: holding that predecessor particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage insured caused to well as it was lowering gun to depth at which insured was to use gun to perforate well", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Local 246 Utility Workers Union v. Southern California Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 297 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that the FLSA's \"minimum wage and overtime provisions are guarantees to individual workers that may not be waived through collective bargaining\u201d). 6 . 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 255(a); Maj. op. at 545. 7 . McLaughlin v. Richmond Shoe, 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988); Maj. op. at 545. 8 . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(c) (\"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.\u201d); Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714, 106 S.Ct. 1527, 89 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See McLaughlin v. Richmond Shoe, 486 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that courts of appeals should review the facts necessary to determine whether an exemption to the flsa applies in a particular under the clearly erroneous standard 1: holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies to  3bllc determinations 2: holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard 3: holding that clearly erroneous standard applies to review district courts determination of dangerousness under 18 usc  4246 4: holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies unless judgment is entered on the basis of documentary evidence alone", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "nominal owner. This claim may be cognizable under New York rulings that have recognized ownership in persons other than owners of record. For example, in Ryen v. Terry (In re Terry), 56 B.R. 713 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1986), a bankruptcy trustee sued to recover a disability payment of $19,000 that the debtor had deposited in her mother's bank account. Although the mother had sole legal title to the funds, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for turnover, holding that a bailment had been created by the debtor's deposit of funds into her mother's account, and that \u201c[ujnder the bailment, the debtor did not transfer her equitable nor beneficial interests in those funds to her mother.\u201d Id. at 715. See also Herzfeld & Stern v. Freidus, 69 Misc.2d 578, 330 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1971) (<HOLDING>); Bottiglieri v. Berman, 55 Misc.2d 263, 284 Holdings: 0: holding that where both vessels had the same owner it was not an abuse of discretion to give 75 of the salvage award to the owner 1: recognizing a cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination 2: holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner 3: holding that stock in a housing cooperative that entitled the owner to the use of an apartment but not to any cash return was not a security 4: holding stock dividend payable to actual owner not owner of record", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(citations omitted); Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985) (adopting the RestaTEmENT (SEconp) or Torts \u00a7 46(1) (1965) in defining a claim for IIED). 49 . Id. at 1289. 50 . Id. Compare Lybrand v. Trask, 31 P.3d 801, 802-05 (Alaska 2001) (affirming superior court's dismissal of IIED claim because neighbor's conduct in painting biblical slogans on roof was not \"outrageous\") and Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 209 (Alaska 1995) (affirming trial court's directed verdict based on conclusion that physician's alleged misdiagnosis of patient as HIV positive was nol outrageous conduct even when doctor failed to warn patient that screening test upon which diagnosis was based was unconfirmed) with Teamsters Local 959 v. Wells, 749 P.2d 349, 358 (Alaska 1988) (<HOLDING>). Considered in isolation, Leykis's derogatory Holdings: 0: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 1: holding that threatening union members life if he did not convince his supervisorspouse to quit during strike was outrageous conduct as matter of law 2: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 3: recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members 4: holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "addition, AmMed Surgical shall provide this court with a copy of the bankruptcy court\u2019s order. Order to show cause discharged. ALTENBERND and BLACK, JJ., Concur. 1 . Although it was the defendant/debtor that filed the notice of appeal, the appeal is considered to be the continuation of a proceeding \"against the debtor,\u201d under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 362(a)(1). See, e.g., Crowe Grp., Inc. v. Garner, 691 So.2d 1089, 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Miller Mining Co., 817 F.2d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir.1987), 2 . U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. 3 .The same is true of rule 9.110(b), which also sets the notice-of-appeal deadline for final orders at thirty days from rendition. See, e.g., First Nat\u2019l Bank in Fort Myers v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm\u2019n, 461 So.2d 208, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) Holdings: 0: holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal 1: holding that the 30day deadline to file a notice of appeal with the bia was not jurisdictional 2: holding 30day limit to be mandatory and jurisdictional 3: holding that in the appeal of a final order the fjailure to file any notice within the 30day period constitutes an irremediable jurisdictional defect 4: holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a multidistrict litigation (\u201cMDL\u201d) proceeding for the purpose of conducting coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings in cases involving injuries allegedly caused by Ortho Evra. With respect to the removing Defendants\u2019 request for a stay, it generally is not the Court\u2019s practice to allow cases in which the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is seriously at issue to remain pending long in federal court. The legal questions presented by the instant motion for remand are hardly novel ones for the Court, and they are quite as susceptible of resolution here as they are in the MDL court. See Weese v. Union Carbide Corp., Civil No. 07-581-GPM, 2007 WL 2908014, at *1 (S.D.Ill. Oct.3, 2007) (quoting Conroy v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 325 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1054 (N.D.Cal.2004)) (<HOLDING>). Turning then to the merits of Plaintiffs\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding that filing of appeal to federal circuit divests this court of jurisdiction to consider motion to stay court order pending appeal 1: recognizing that pleadings filed in federal court while the federal court has jurisdiction become part of the state court record on remand 2: holding that it would be judicially inefficient to stay proceedings so that a motion for remand could be resolved by a transferee court given that tjhis court is as qualified to evaluate the factors establishing federal jurisdiction as any other federal court 3: holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction 4: holding that a transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "motion for summary judgment and determined that the instant lawsuit and the two preceding lawsuits, in 2 ent allegations \u2014 that she was improperly evicted, that Lennar filed a fraudulent IRS form 1099, and that the clerk of the court made an erroneous docket entry \u2014 either were raised and decided on the merits, or could have been raised, in one of the four previous actions. For res judicata purposes, identity of the thing sued for and identity of the cause of action are present because the relief requested and the theories of action m each of Jenkins lawsuits are indistinguishable. Because Universal is a subsidiary of Lennar, they are privies, and thus, the parties to each of the previous lawsuits are identical. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246, 1259 (Fla.2006) (<HOLDING>). Finally, because the defendants were sued in Holdings: 0: holding that cr 60b applies to criminal as well as civil judgments 1: holding that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action 2: holding that judgments on the merits in former proceedings are binding on the original parties as well as their privies 3: holding agreed judgments are treated as contract beiween parties 4: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (\"Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes. Only where incident to a valid arrest, or in 'exceptional circumstances,\u2019 may an exemption lie, and then the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.\" (citations omitted)). 3 . See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (\"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.\u201d); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 4 . See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12, 88 S.Ct. a 878 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nickerson, 606 F.2d 156, 158 Holdings: 0: holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present 1: holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded 2: holding that identical error did not prejudice defendant because by giving the instruction the judge merely gave the jury the opportunity to overturn his own ruling 3: holding that district court did not err in giving an instruction identical to that proposed by jenkins 4: holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "would certainly fall within the statute; however, at a minimum a physician, dentist, or hospital must have made use of that corporation or person in the physician\u2019s, dentist\u2019s, or hospital\u2019s delivery of health-care services to the plaintiff-patient.\u201d Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Ala.2007) (emphasis omitted). We are not asked in this case to revisit those cases in which this Court has held that the requirement that a person or corporation be \u201cemployed by\u201d a physician, dentist, or hospital does not require an employment or equivalent contractual relationship, but requires only that the physician (or dentist or hospital) \u201cmake use of\u2019 the person (or corporation) in question. See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 324-25 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 Holdings: 0: holding that a pharmacists filling of a doctors prescription for a patient is part of the physicians treatment of his or her patient so that the pharmacist was included within the amla definition of other health care provider 1: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave 2: holding that under nebraskas physicians lien statute a physicians lien could not exceed the amount the health care provider agreed to accept for the services rendered to a patient even if the usual and customary charge for such services is greater than that sum because the statute extends such lien only to the amount due or debt of the patient to the hospital 3: holding that sanction of removal for nursing home attendant who was found to have hit patient suffering from dementia should be reduced to penalty of sixmonth suspension because act of hitting patient was isolated instance in which patient was aggressor 4: holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "they \u201cprovide fellowship, care, and protection\u201d for Mr. Salyer, who, \u201cbecause of ... physical ... infirmity, cannot care for his own needs.\u201d Because those services \u201cmay include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar services,\u201d we find the regulation to be directly on point. Furthermore, we cannot say that this regulatory definition of \u201ccompanionship services\u201d is either \u201carbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute\u201d that it elucidates. Thus, we must give it \u201ccontrolling weight.\u201d Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The handful of cases that have considered the \u201ccompanionship ser 1988) (<HOLDING>). The Cox court relied, in part, on McCune v. Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff analogous to ms salyer who did not work in private homes did not fall within the companionship services exemption 1: recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case 2: holding that plaintiff who provided similar services which were arguably attendant care services under state law fell within the exemption 3: holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 4: holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, to the extent there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their truth and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. \u201cDetermining whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.\u201d Id. \u201cWhere the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the -mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged \u2014 but it has not \u2018show[n]\u2019 \u2014 \u2018that the pleader is entitled to re or agency contracts like the one between the parties here. See, e.g., Scheerer v. Fisher, 202 N.C.App. 99, 103, 688 S.E.2d 472, 474 (2010) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the letter agreement does not Holdings: 0: holding agreement to compensate an agent or broker for services in the buying or selling of real estate need not be in writing 1: holding that if property description is to be supplied by writing to which reference is made in deed reference must be adequate to identify writing 2: holding insurers oral promise to settle a claim was an original undertaking and need not be in writing 3: holding that appellate court need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument issue or claim raised and properly before us on appeal 4: holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer an impermissible \u2018speaking demurrer.\u2019\u201d). However, pursuant to section 6107 of the Judicial Code, an exception exists by permitting a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. In pertinent part, section 6107 states: \u00a7 6107. Judicial notice of certain local government ordinances. (a) General rule. \u2014 The ordinances of municipal corporations of this Commonwealth shall be judicially noticed. (b) Manner of proving ordinances. \u2014 The tribunal may inform itself of such ordinances in such manner as it may deem proper and the tribunal may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information. 42 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 6107(a), (b). See McClimans v. Board of Supervisors, Shenango Township, 107 Pa.Cmwlth. 542, 529 A.2d 562, 565-66 (1987) (<HOLDING>). If this Court can take judicial notice of and Holdings: 0: holding that order mandating disclosure of classified information to habeas petitioners counsel was an important issue entirely separate from the merits of this case 1: holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel 2: holding that this court has explicit authority under section 6107 to contact counsel in order to obtain information regarding an ordinance 3: holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court 4: holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "its boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government.\u201d Id. at 626-27, 73 S.Ct. at 467 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the sovereign rights in the dual relationship between the United States and Kentucky were not antagonistic in that instance, so that it is \u201cfriction, not fiction, which we must give heed.\u201d Id. at 627, 73 S.Ct. at 467; see also Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 423, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 1755, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970) (rejecting notion of non-residency in state for voting in Maryland elections by those residing in a federal enclave and noting that \u201cthe relationship between federal enclaves and the [sjtate in which they are located has changed considerably\u201d); M.R.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1999) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161, Holdings: 0: recognizing howard holding that fiction of a state within a state has no validity to prevent exercise of power by state over federal area within its boundaries so long as there is no interference with federal jurisdiction 1: recognizing the uncertain state of federal law in this area 2: holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state 3: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law 4: recognizing federal enclave remains within geographic boundaries of state", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and as Next Friend of Jonathan Espeche, a minor, take nothing by reason of her suit....\u201d Because Espeche\u2019s live pleading at the time judgment was signed, November 5, contained a claim on behalf of Jonathan, the record demonstrates the trial court considered Espeche's second amended original petition. 7 . In addition, there is a practical reason why Ritzell\u2019s amended motion was not properly before the court. Had the trial court actually granted Ritzell leave to file the amended motion so close to the date of the hearing, Es-peche would have been entitled, pursuant to Rule 166a(c), to a period of time in which to file a response to the new ground presented in the amended motion. See, e.g., Sams v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 735 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) Holdings: 0: holding that in a traditional motion for summary judgment the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue after the movant has facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law 1: holding that summary judgment was appropriate when no reasonable factfinder could have found for the nonmovant 2: holding nonmovant was entitled to the mandatory 21 day notice period when movant adds additional grounds for summary judgment 3: holding that if the movant cannot demonstrate conclusively that the nonmovant cannot prevail summary judgment is precluded 4: holding that once movant established right to summary judgment burden shifts to nonmovant to demonstrate otherwise", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was lengthy discourse between the parties prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff suggests that all documents prepared prior to this date were created in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of litigation, and the burden rests on Defendant to show otherwise. Based on this record, Defendant has not provided this Court with sufficient information to determine which documents dated prior to May 28, 2002 that were identified in its Privilege Log are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendant failed to provide this Court with evidentiary proof of objective facts, via affidavits or deposition testimony, that documents before May 28, 2002, the date coverage was expressly denied, were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Totaltape, 135 F.R.D. at 201 (<HOLDING>). The Court will, therefore, find that no Holdings: 0: holding declaration or affidavit must support work product claim for documents listed solely as work product on privilege log 1: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation 2: holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5 3: holding that a party failed in meeting its burden that documents were work product because the party resisting discovery failed to present affidavits or other evidentiary support for its contention that the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation 4: holding that the moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other evidence if the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "regarding an alien\u2019s eligibility for \u00a7 1229b relief. See, e.g., Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 895 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir.2005) (\u201cAlthough the decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the Attorney General that we may not review, ... we may consider the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining an individual\u2019s eligibility to be considered for the relief.\u201d (internal citations omitted)); Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir.2005) (\u201cThe denial of relief based on the ground that the alien has failed to demonstrate a continuous physical presence ... is a non-diseretionary factual determination and properly subject to appellate review.\u201d); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, Holdings: 0: holding that whether an alien satisfies the continuous presence requirement of 8 usc  1229b is a nondiscretionary determination because it involves straightforward statutory interpretation and application of law to fact and is therefore reviewable 1: holding that an aliens continuous physical presence is broken if the alien was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw an application for admission 2: holding that the decision whether an alien meets the hardship requirement in 8 usc  1229b is  a discretionary judgment 3: holding that a determination regarding whether an alien met the continual physical presence requirement of  1229b was nondiscretionary and thus reviewable 4: holding that boards ruling that aliens continuous physical presence terminated when he voluntarily departed country was a reasonable interpretation of 8 usc  1229b 2012", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "plaintiff] preemptively brought this action for declaratory judgment, seeking to avoid indemnity liability, does not alter the structural essence of the case.\u201d); Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414, 424 n. 19 (1991) (\u201cBecause this is a declaratory judgment action and the plaintiff insurer is invoking [issue preclusion] to avoid providing coverage, the [issue preclusion] invoked here is a hybrid form of offensive [issue preclusion].\u201d); Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth v. Samani, 757 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) (\u201cOffensive collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may be utilized, as was done herein, by an action for declaratory relief.\u201d (Footnote omitted.)); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 250 Ill.Dec. 682, 739 N.E.2d 445, 452 (2000) (<HOLDING>); cf. Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 501 n. 3 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable but is determined by the nature of underlying issue 1: holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act 2: recognizing that issue preclusion brought by a plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action is technically offensive   3: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 4: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and to have that determination declared presumptive evidence of disability and inability to work, subject only to rebuttal by the defense. We begin our analysis with the Rules of Evidence and the principle that \u201chearsay statements that do not conform to the exceptions specifically enumerated in the Rules of Evidence are not admissible.\u201d State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 175, 19 A.3d 985 (2011). It is clear that the SSA determination is hearsay and was proffered explicitly for the truth of the finding therein. \u201c \u2018Hearsay\u2019 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.J.R.E. 801(c). See Muench v. Twp. of Haddon, 255 N.J.Super. 288, 305-06, 605 A.2d 242 (App.Div.1992) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 107 Holdings: 0: holding that a report of findings by the new jersey division of civil rights did not qualify for any hearsay exception in a discrimination case brought under the lad 1: holding that a determination of a new jersey spill compensation fund arbitrator is reviewable by the appellate division 2: recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller 3: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey 4: holding that claims based on asserted violations of the lad and  1983 are not subject to the new jersey tort claims act", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "3 . In Oregon, the Circuit Court serves as the state trial court of general jurisdiction. Circuit Courts also review petitions for post-conviction review. Bailey\u2019s Motion for a New Trial and petition for state post-conviction relief were therefore both heard at the Circuit Court level, albeit in different judicial districts. 4 . Although Strickler had not been decided at the time of the State court's judgment, that case simply articulated principles that were well established at the time the state court reviewed Bailey's Brady claim. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (review ing the requirements and discussing the materiality standard at length); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392 Holdings: 0: holding that material favorable to the accused must be either evidence which serves to impeach a government witness credibility or evidence which is directly exculpatory of the defendant  emphasis added 1: holding that the reference to any court encompasses both state and federal courts 2: holding that favorable evidence encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence and articulating the materiality standard 3: holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury 4: holding impeachment evidence falls within the brady rule", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the drainage easement is being taken for the private use of Developer and, as such, it is not authorized by the Pennsylvania Constitution or the Eminent Domain Code, and is affirmatively prohibited by PRPA. See Brief for Appellants at 12. Appellants acknowledge that a \u201ctaking does not lose its public character merely because there may exist in the operation some feature of private gain.\u201d Appeal of Washington Park, Inc., 425 Pa. 349, 353, 229 A.2d 1, 3 (1967). They proffer, however, that, for the taking to be valid, the public must be the primary and paramount beneficiary, and the public entity involved must assume ownership and maintenance of the condemned lands and any improvements installed thereon. See Ormsby Land Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 276 Pa. 68, 70, 119 A. 730, 730 (Pa.1923) (<HOLDING>). Appellants assert that RAWA will not assume Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: holding that the fact that the city had delegated its municipal engineering functions to a private entity was dispositive in establishing that documents generated by the private entity were public records 2: holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program 3: holding that plaintiffs claims against private fiscal intermediary were subject to exhaustion requirement and that plaintiff may not circumvent the terms of section 405h simply because a private entity the defendant serves a public function 4: holding that land dedicated for a public street may not be leased to a private entity for private use", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Area School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir.1989) \u201cstate officials may [not] escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates\u201d. 882 F.2d at 725. In addition, we noted that a municipality may be liable under \u00a7 1983 \u201cwhere its policymakers made a \u2018deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives\u2019.\u201d Id. (Citations omitted.) Here, the deliberate choice made by the Freeholders could be considered that of doing nothing. The district court found that Ryan possessed a third right of being housed in a \u201creasonably safe prison environment.\u201d Ryan III, 708 F.Supp. at 626. The court based this right on our decision in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 856 F.2d 594, n. 14 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), vacated sub. nom. Smith v. Stoneking, \u2014 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding a business owner must protect invitees against injury caused by third persons 1: recognizing that by 1979 state officials had duty to protect institutionalized persons from selfinjury or assault 2: holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons 3: holding that walmart was not under a duty to protect a patron from a criminal assault absent prior similar incidents at their facility or in the general area 4: holding that a school had no duty to protect pedestrian from student", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Br. of Resp\u2019t at 41. But because Mudarri is not similarly situated to the Tribe, he has not shown any unlawful discrimination or violation of his equal protection rights. |49 Mudarri bears the burden of proving that the challenged statute and its application are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 115 Wn.2d 556, 563, 800 P.2d 367 (1990). Amendment XIV, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, \u201cNo State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.\u201d Thus, our federal constitution guarantees equal rights among individuals and classes of individuals. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, \u00a7 1; State v. Shawn R, 122 Wn.2d 553, 559-60, 859 P.2d 1220 (1993) (<HOLDING>). To prevail, Mudarri must prove that the Holdings: 0: holding members of two distinct pension plans were not similarly situated for equal protection analysis 1: holding equal protection under the federal constitution applies to similarly situated persons 2: holding that an equal protection violation may occur when similarly situated persons are not treated equally under the law quotation marks omitted 3: holding that a presentence defendant is not similarly situated with a postsentence convict and denial of sentence credit does not violate equal protection 4: holding that the equal protection clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "plaintiffs may have a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to require some form of prior notice, particularly if New York confers upon them the legal right to remain until they are afforded such notice. Compare State v. Dias, 62 Haw. 52, 609 P.2d 637, 639-40 (1980) (landowner\u2019s long-term acquiescence to a trespasser\u2019s presence can give the trespasser a cognizable privacy interest) with Amezquita, 518 F.2d at 11 (rejecting Fourth Amendment claim of squatters where \u201cnothing in the record suggests that the squatters\u2019 entry upon the land was sanctioned in any way by the Commonwealth\u201d). While the Fourth Amendment normally requires little more notice than a knock on the door prior to a forced entry, see Wilson v. Arkansas, \u2014 U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) (<HOLDING>), the process required by the Fourth Amendment Holdings: 0: recognizing principle 1: holding that the common law knockandannounce principle forms a part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry 2: holding that commonlaw knock and announce rule is part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry 3: holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure 4: holding that commonlaw knock and announce principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the fourth amendment", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "unskilled labor to local companies for short-term assistance.\u201d Smith v. Employers\u2019 Overload Co., 314 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Minn.1981). Courts rely on contract principles to determine the nature of the employment relationship. Id. at 222-23. The duration of employment depends on the parties\u2019 intent. Id. at 223. When addressing qualification for unemployment benefits, courts have applied these principles and distinguished between persons who complete assignments but do not seek new assignments and persons who accept but refuse to complete ongoing assignments. An employee who has completed an assignment but refuses to accept further assignments is not disqualified from unemployment benefits because the employment relationship has ended and the refusal does not constitute a quit. See id. (<HOLDING>); Mbong v. New Horizons Nursing, 608 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding  1001 prosecution for false statements in unemployment benefits not precluded by unemployment benefits statute specifically addressing topic 1: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits 2: holding that employees who completed four separate oneday assignments intended only oneday employment contracts and qualified for unemployment benefits 3: holding that an employers interest in presence at and participation in a hearing on her former employees claim for unemployment benefits did not render the employer a party to that proceeding 4: holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Gillie. On February 19, 1987, Mr. Gillie executed a note in the amount of $5,498.40, including interest at 12.51% per annum, payable to the Bank in 60 monthly installments of $91.64 each. The amount financed included credit life and credit health and accident premiums in the amount of $338.27. The note recited that it was secured by the June 19, 1985 security agreement and Table, Chairs and Entertainment Center. It also recited \u201cRenew: 3245 1\u201d, but there is no number 3245 1 on either of the previous notes. Again, Mr. Gillie signed no Security Agreement or Financing Statement. The note of April 21, 1986 was stamped \u201cPaid by Renewal.\u201d The parties stipulated that all three notes related to the same transaction and that the Bank advanced no new funds and added no new collateral when 85) (<HOLDING>); Booker v. Commercial Credit Corp. (In re Holdings: 0: holding that a creditors refinancing by renewal does not destroy a pmsi to the extent that the balance remaining on the original loan is transferred to the renewal note 1: holding that under north dakota law consolidation of a note secured by a pmsi in farm machinery with other goods resulted in a novation destroying the creditors pmsi 2: holding that under michigan law when debtors paid off the initial loan with the proceeds of refinancing the creditors pmsi in stereo expired 3: holding that under georgia law a creditors refinancing of a promissory note destroyed the purchase money nature of the creditors security interest in a wall unit which served as collateral 4: holding that under colorado law refinancing of a purchase money loan whereby an old note and security agreement were canceled and replaced by a new note and security agreement did not automatically extinguish the creditors pmsi in the debtors furniture the parties did not intend the new note to extinguish the original debt and security interest in that identical collateral remained almost no new money was advanced and the document specifically stated an intent to continue the pmsi", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. A \u201cnecessary\u201d party must be joined if feasible \u2014 if they are \u201csubject to service of process\u201d and would \u201cnot deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.\u201d Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a). If a court determines that a party is not \u201cnecessary\u201d under Rule 19(a), \u201cjoinder, as well as further analysis, is unnecessary.\u201d Local 670, et al. v. Int\u2019l Union, et al., 822 F.2d 613, 618 (6th Cir.1987). The burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for purposes of Rule 19(a). Marshall v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 606, 611 (E.D.Mich.1996); 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 1359 (3d ed.2013) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThe moving party may satisfy this burden Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties 1: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction 2: recognizing burden 3: recognizing that the burden is on a party making a rule 12b7 motion to establish that missing parties are necessary or indispensable to the action 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999)). If a plaintiff has alleged these three elements, the public employer may still avoid liability if it shows that the plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government\u2019s activities to an extent that outweighs First Amendment value of the speech. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (explaining that court must balance the interests of the employee \u201cas a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees\u201d); Cobb, 363 F.3d at 102. Alterna 46 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Because all the speech for which Anemone Holdings: 0: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern 1: holding public employees conduct and expression in internal investigation of employees at county prosecutors office to expose potential wrongdoing constituted matter of public concern 2: holding that employees allegation of corrupt and wasteful practices at municipal hospital obviously involved matter of public concern 3: holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern 4: holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "proceedings the Petitioner [former wife] seeks to modify the same Final Judgment which was the subject of the 2 prior contempt proceedings in Duval County and a 3rd was filed shortly after the Petitioner\u2019s Petition for Modification. The 3rd Contempt Motion is presently pending.\u201d The former wife contends that the trial court erred by granting the former husband\u2019s Motion to Dismiss where there were no proceedings pending in the Duval Circuit Court when she filed her Complaint in Miami-Dade County. We agree. The former husband acknowledges that the trial court erred by relying on his third motion for contempt when granting the Motion to Dismiss because this motion for contempt was filed after the former wife filed her Complaint in the Miami-Dade Circuit Court. See Amir, 896 So.2d at 794 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). The former husband, Holdings: 0: holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county 1: recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue 2: holding that tr 76a required that the trial court grant the motion for change of venue from laporte county where laporte county was a party to the action despite the fact that it was also a preferred venue 3: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings 4: holding that venue was improper in the county of death because no other event occurred there", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "jurisprudence in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s recent decisions in Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Sys., Inc., \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1744, 188 L.Ed.2d 829 (2014) and Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1749, 188 L.Ed.2d 816 (2014). Those decisions call into ques tion our two-part test for determining willfulness, In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed.Cir.2007) (en banc), and our de novo standard for reviewing the district court\u2019s willfulness determination, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006-07 (Fed.Cir.2012) (Bard II). See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2014) (O\u2019Malley, J., concurring). This case demonstrates why de no t. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (<HOLDING>). It would also be consistent with the standard Holdings: 0: holding habeas corpus is not a civil action for purposes of the equal access to justice act provision for award of attorney fees to prevailing party 1: holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing determinations of whether a litigants position is substantially justified for purposes of feeshifting under the equal access to justice act although the determination frequently turns on a purely legal issue 2: holding that the standard of review under rule 60 is abuse of discretion 3: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 4: holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "assumption is in error. On April 30, 1993, the court dismissed all the charges against Woodland without prejudice. In October of 1993, new charges were filed. During the approximately seven months separating the dismissal and the reinstatement of charges, Woodland was confined in a mental institution. This period of confinement involved no formal charges. Woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. This period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>). The State filed new charges against Woodland Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial includes the right to a reasonably prompt sentencing 1: holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy 2: holding that ajppellant can not complain of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of his confinement in a state mental institution after dismissal of the former indictment 3: holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial 4: holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Commc\u2019ns, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2013). \u201cDue process prevents government actors from depriving persons of liberty or property interests without providing certain safeguards.\u201d Id., citing Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Due process calls only for \u201cprotections as the particular situation demands.\u201d Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893. Due process does not always require \u201ca hearing closely approximating a judicial trial____\u201d Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893. This is not a case where \u201cthe evidence consists of testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.\u201d Business Commc\u2019ns, 739 F.3d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Rather, to reach its conclusion, NIGC relied Holdings: 0: holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony 1: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 2: holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination 3: recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required 4: holding that it was permissible for the state to test the credibility of appellants trial testimony by crossexamination", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of Captain Davison\u2019s efforts, Chief Forte repeatedly had to address with the public, and once with Councilman Benson, accusations about the Plan\u2019s impact on public safety and the likelihood of more deaths like Gallagher\u2019s. Evidence in the record also indicates that Captain Davi-son\u2019s relentless public opposition on behalf of the Union delayed implementation of Chief Forte\u2019s Plan. From all of this evidence, we believe a jury could infer that Chief Forte\u2019s repeated decisions not to promote Captain Davison were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 797 (\u201ca plaintiff must prove an employer\u2019s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Ark. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 959-60 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In addition, temporal proximity between Holdings: 0: holding that evidence that the defendants believed that the plaintiffs general outspokenness on security and corruption encouraged media criticism of the defendants was sufficient for a jury to infer causation in the retaliation claim 1: holding that because evidence was sufficient to support defendants  1962c convictions and jury could infer from evidence that defendants each manifested an agreement to participate in enterprises affairs evidence was sufficient to support defendants  1962d convictions for rico conspiracy 2: recognizing that jury may infer from the evidence that defendants money came from drug sales 3: holding that the plaintiffs argument rebutting the defendants legitimate nondiscriminatory reason on the plaintiffs discrimination claim also rebutted the defendants reason on the plaintiffs retaliation claim because they were the same 4: holding that the plaintiffs claim that city encouraged private individuals to trespass on the plaintiffs land was properly a fourth amendment rather than a substantive due process claim", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (stating that as the drafters of the Code used the term \"allowed claims\u201d where they saw fit and, as Sections 1141(d)(2) and 523(a) do not limit their exceptions from discharge to \"allowed claims\u201d only, 502(b)(2) should not be read as a limitation on the exceptions from discharge). 2 . In re Harris, 16 B.R. 371 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982) (agreeing with a series of cases holding that relief from the automatic stay should be granted if the debtor does not propose to pay the full amount of the claim, including post-petition interest but denying relief because the debtor in the case proposed to pay 100% of the claim, including post-petition interest); International Harvester Employee Credit Union, Inc. v. Daniel, 13 B.R. 555 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) . 357 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981) (<HOLDING>); Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Holdings: 0: holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations 1: holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which  it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court 2: holding that a banks claim of irreparable harm through delay of postpetition interest payments was insufficient to lift the automatic stay under the provisions of section 1301 as the debtor proposed to pay 100 of the plan including postpetition interest 3: holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor 4: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "an objection during the hearing that her condition precluded her from accepting a settlement agreement orally. In an affidavit prepared more than a year after the October 26, 1994, administrative hearing, the plaintiff claims that her attorney withheld information from her during settlement negotiations and that he prompted her to accept. Opponent\u2019s Amended, Responsive Submission in Response to Exhibit D of the Court\u2019s Order, at 6. However, apart from her bare allegations she offers no substantive evidence that her attorney\u2019s behavior prohibited her from knowingly and voluntarily entering into a settlement. The plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient evidence that she lacked the capacity to enter into a valid settlement agreement. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513 (<HOLDING>). V. Conclusion The defendant\u2019s motion for Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage 1: holding that unverified complaints cannot be considered as evidence at the summary judgment stage 2: holding at summary judgment that the plaintiff had to show a reasonable jury could find the defendants allegedly anticompetitive conduct was a material cause of plaintiffs injury 3: holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff 4: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "relief,\u201d on breach of fiduciary duty and equitable estoppel theories for making affirmative misrepresentations with knowledge beneficiary would be misled thereby, and stating that to \u201csucceed under this [equitable es- toppel] theory of relief, an ERISA plaintiff must establish (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the representation, and (3) extraordinary circumstances.\u201d The Court of Appeals concluded employer breached its fiduciary duties, affirmatively misled the beneficiary and her participating spouse, and awarded the beneficiary an additional $150,000 on a supplemental accidental death and dismemberment policy that the participant spouse would have opted to purchase had he known all of the material facts); Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1301-03 (<HOLDING>); Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 1: recognizing a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide relevant information under section 502a3 of erisa where the fiduciary had knowledge that its failure to provide the participant andor his beneficiaries with complete and accurate information would mislead them as to the coverages in effect 2: recognizing the right of a creditor to sue a corporate director for breach of fiduciary duty 3: holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties 4: recognizing that when a beneficiary requests information from an erisa fiduciary who is aware of the beneficiarys status and situation the fiduciary has an obligation to convey complete and accurate information material to the beneficiarys circumstance even if that requires conveying information about which the beneficiary did not specifically inquire", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Trustees should not subsequently reopen the sale to receive additional bids on the property, even if it would result in a higher selling price. Talbert, 210 Md. at 45, 122 A.2d at 474 (asserting that \u201c[o]nce having accepted a bid, the trustee should not reopen the sale merely to let in disappointed bidders\u201d (citation omitted)); Gilden, 197 Md. at 42, 78 A.2d at 171. Subject to the review of the court, trustees perform various functions in connection with judicial sales for which they exercise personal discretion and judgment. In general, \u201ctrustees have \u2018discretion to outline the manner and terms of the s\u00e1le[.]\u2019 \u201d Fagnani, 418 Md. at 385, 15 A.3d at 290 (quoting Simard, 383 Md. at 312, 859 A.2d at 200). In Jackson v. Townshend, 249 Md. 8, 238 A.2d 81 (1968), we noted: Unless th t 446 (<HOLDING>). A trustee is also entitled to exercise Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court has never held that a petitioner is limited to the exact contours of his or her argument to the agency 1: holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force 2: holding a substantially similar probation condition overbroad 3: holding that there has not been a misdescription of the property if the advertisement accords substantially with the exact situation and condition 4: holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of success on the merits, the \u201csine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry.\u201d New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. 287 F.3d at 9. Diaz does not argue that the Legislature lacked the power to abolish his Advocate position. Instead, he disputes the existence of that historical fact. Specifically, he claims that the legislative history does not evince an intent to eliminate Diaz\u2019s Advocate position and that Law 78 does not explicitly provide for his removal. While perhaps accurate, this argument misses the point. Article 75, after providing numerous reasons for doing so, unambiguously repealed the very Reorganization Plan which created Diaz\u2019s job. In so doing, the Legislature abolished the position of Advocate. See Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 144, 37 S.Ct. 570, 61 L.Ed. 1039 (1917) (<HOLDING>); Brame v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 252, 255 Holdings: 0: holding that the prohibition of section 35 article iii against the increase or diminution of compensation for public officers applied to the treasurer of calvert county and therefore even though the legislature retained the power to alter or abolish the office it could not change the treasurers salary while in office 1: recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole 2: holding that congressional repeal of an act creating an office had the effect to abolish it 3: holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement 4: holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "title theory. In sum, the Debtors describe the decision in Atlantic Savings as judicially unsound and at odds w the Court, \u201cguided by the language of the statutes and by decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreting the homestead statutes, must predict what the Supreme Judicial Court would do if confronted with the issue.\u201d In re Garran, 274 B.R. 570, 574-75 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002). Though the SJC has not directly ruled on the issue at bar, this Court is satisfied that there exist sufficient signposts to enable this Court to fairly anticipate the outcome. The SJC has recently and repeatedly held Massachusetts to be a title theory state under common law. See J &W Wall Systems, Inc. v. Shawmut First Bank & Trust Company et al., 413 Mass. 42, 44, 594 N.E.2d 859, 860 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Murphy v. Charlestown Sav. Bank, 380 Mass. Holdings: 0: holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title 1: holding the title vii mixedmotive theory does not apply to adea claims 2: holding that massachusetts is a title theory state 3: holding that the state police is a state agency 4: holding that such a theory is viable under title vii", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "shall not be held out or used by me in any manner nor for any purpose whatsoever. 3. I have destroyed the original of said document, and turned over all copies thereof for destruction. We therefore affirm the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the appellees\u2019 complaint as moot. As to the attorney\u2019s fees and costs awarded to the appellees as the prevailing parties, we also affirm. Section 709.08(11), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that the prevailing party in power of attorney litigation is entitled to attorney\u2019s fees and costs. The determination of the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney\u2019s fees and costs is based on whether the party seeking fees succeeded on any significant issue(s) in the litigation. See Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So.2d 807, 810 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>); Boxer Max Corp. v. Cane A. Sucre, Inc., 905 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea 1: holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation 2: holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action 3: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 4: holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Mountain Hosp. & Med. Services Co., 754 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Colo.App.1988); St. Francis Regional Med. Center v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, 810 F.Supp. 1209 (D.Kan.1992); Institute of Living v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. CV-90-0382398S, 1991 WL 223871 (Conn.Super.Ct. Oct. 4, 1991); Kent General Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Delaware, Inc., 442 A.2d 1368 (Del.1982); Augusta Medical Complex, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Kansas, Inc., 230 Kan. 361, 634 P.2d 1123 (1981); Obstetricians-Gynecologists, P.C. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Nebraska, Inc., 219 Neb. 199, 361 N.W.2d 550 (1985); Riddle Memorial Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 63 Del.Cty. Rep. 361 (Pa.Common Pleas 1976); cf. Davidowitz v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc., 946 F.2d 1476, 1478-81 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Washington Hosp. Center Corp. v. Group Holdings: 0: holding that the employer intended to create a new employee welfare benefit plan 1: holding that disability provision in comprehensive retirement plan constituted a welfare plan 2: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan 3: holding that erisa welfare payments are not assignable in the face of a nonassignment clause in the health benefit plan 4: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201cI guess so.\u201d In light of the \u201chigh degree of deference\u201d that we must give to the factual determinations of the IJ, the inconsistencies in Kostic\u2019s testimony and written sub missions leave us with little choice but to uphold the adverse credibility determination. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding an IJ\u2019s adverse credibility determination where an asylum applicant submitted an inconsistent document without explanation). Because Kostic cannot overcome the IJ\u2019s finding regarding his lack of credibility, he cannot prove that he is eligible for asylum. This also means that he cannot meet the more stringent standards required to qualify for withholding of removal. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (<HOLDING>). D. Changed country conditions The IJ and the Holdings: 0: holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 1: holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 2: holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution 3: holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal 4: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "appellant\u2019s allegation, our supreme court has held that \u2018\u2018[c]ounsel clearly cannot be faulted for failing to raise a Batson objection at trial because Batson did not yet exist. See, e.g., [Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 464 (2004) ] (\u2018Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict developments or changes in the law.\u2019)..\u201d Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2006). 10 . Then-District Attorney Rendell served as Philadelphia County District Attorney from 1978 through 1985. He subsequently served as Governor of the Commonwealth, therefore, he will be referred to hereinafter as \u201cGovernor Rendell.\u201d 11 . Appellant\u2019s direct appeal was decided pri- or to our supreme court\u2019s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002) (<HOLDING>), therefore, at the time of appellant\u2019s direct Holdings: 0: holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to pcra review trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon postverdict motions and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal 1: holding that as a general rule a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review 2: holding that a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review 3: holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo 4: holding that review of counsel ineffectiveness claims should be deferred until collateral review", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or unnecessary will not be counted____ That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law\u2019s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.\u201d (citations omitted)). The existence of \u201csome alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]\u201d Id. Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Riley & Ephriam Constr. Co., Inc., Holdings: 0: holding the moving party must meet its burden by showingthat is pointing out to the trial courtthat there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case 1: holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response 2: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case 3: holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial  citation omitted 4: recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "addition, while detaining a vehicle at a traffic safety checkpoint constitutes a \u201cseizure,\u201d where the checkpoint serves the public interest and does not impose an unreasonable restriction on one\u2019s liberty, it does not violate Fourth Amendment proscriptions. Mich. Dep\u2019t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); State v. Vickery, 399 S.C. 507, 732 S.E.2d 218 (Ct.App.2012). McHam did not challenge the propriety of his initial stop, so the sole focus of our inquiry is on the validity of the officer\u2019s opening of the passenger\u2019s side door of the vehicle McHam was driving. The parties agree that an officer may order the driver and any passengers to exit a detained vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330 (<HOLDING>); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15, 117 Holdings: 0: holding that officer may order driver out of vehicle once lawfully detained for traffic violation 1: holding that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the fourth amendments proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures 2: holding that once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped an officer may order the driver out of the vehicle without violating the fourth amendment 3: holding once a driver has been lawfully detained the police may order the driver to exit the vehicle even in the absence of unusual or suspicious behavior without violating the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures the court stated we think it too plain for argument that the states proffered justificationthe safety of the officeris both legitimate and weighty and it specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile 4: holding that a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "absolutely immune from damages liability under \u00a71983 for this conduct. Relying on its decision in Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F. 2d 374 (CA6 1989), the Court of Appeals affirmed. I would grant certiorari to address petitioner\u2019s challenge to that ruling. In Salyer, the Sixth Circuit held that, \u201cdue to their quasiprosecutorial function in the initiation of child abuse proceedings,\u201d social workers are absolutely immune from liability for filing juvenile abuse petitions. Id., at 378. Other courts addressing the question have agreed that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity under \u00a7 1983 in some instances, depending on their conduct and the terms of the state laws pursuant to which they acted. See, e. g., Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Social Servs., 812 F. 2d 1154, 1157 (CA9) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 829 (1987); Vosburg Holdings: 0: holding that social services attorneys were entitled to absolute immunity for actions related to the prosecution of child neglect and delinquency proceedings 1: holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when prosecuting child delinquency petitions 2: holding that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution 3: holding that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasiprosecutorial functions connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings 4: holding that child social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions on behalf of the state in preparing for initiating and prosecuting dependency hearings as well as the formulation and presentation of recommendations to the court in the course of such proceedings", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "concern is more fundamental: We believe that the commentary is, for the most part, inconsistent with the guideline itself, which unequivocally states that the \u201cthreat of death\u201d must be \u201cexpress.\u201d The Eleventh Circuit has already come to this conclusion, as well as Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 999-1000 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (8th Cir.1995)(per curiam) (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 733 (1996). In United States v. Tuck, 964 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir.1992), the Eleventh Circuit observed that \u00a7 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) predicates the application of the enhancement on two factors. First, the threat must be express 1th Cir.1993)(per curiam)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, Judge Easterbrook, dissenting in Holdings: 0: holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm 1: holding that the phrase i have a gun constitutes a threat of death under  2b31b2f 2: holding that threat i have a gun and nothing to lose was not an express threat of death because there was not express mention of death and could also be interpreted to mean that robber was desperate and willing to turn alleged gun on himself 3: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death 4: holding that i have a gun give me money may imply threat to use gun but was not an express threat of death", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of sentencing would, in effect, permit the Rule to read: \u201ca determination that no such finding was necessary because the matter controverted was not taken into account in sentencing.\u201d We reject such a reading of the Rule. II We next address what the Rule requires when a district court complies with the substantive requirements of the Rule, but fails to append to the presentence report the appropriate findings or determinations resolving the controverted matters. We hold that such a technical violation of the Rule is a ministerial error which does not require resentencing. The technical error must, however, be corrected by ordering the district court to append to the pre-sentence report the required findings or determinations. United States v. Knockum, 881 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Gattas, 862 F.2d 1432, 1435; (10 Holdings: 0: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition 1: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition 2: holding that a courts failure to provide a defendant with any portion of a habeas transcript was error 3: holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record 4: holding that ministerial error of failing to append rule 32 findings or determinations will not permit habeas relief because the error may be remedied by ordering the district court to attach the sentencing transcript", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the tests was supported by reasonable suspicion, Jones claims, Amundsen has failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. Amundsen concedes that the stop was initially justified due to her improper lane change, but does not appear to concede that her driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. She argues that the roadside sobriety tests fell outside the proper scope of the stop. We review the permissibility of a traffic stop \u201cunder the principles pertaining to investigatory detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio.\u201d United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2005) (citing 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). That is, we first consider \u201cwhether the officer\u2019s action was just 5 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an officers observations of a vehicle weaving between the center line and the shoulder line four to five times over a distance of approximately five miles created reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence 1: holding officers observations of a vehicle crossing the center double yellow line of a twolane highway four times by less than one half of her car  once causing a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic to shift right within his lane but without the need for drastic evasive action  and crossing the fog line four times over a distance of at least 16 miles established probable cause for a traffic stop 2: holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence 3: holding that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because a vehicles one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence 4: holding alj correctly held that officer had reasonable suspicion to make stop based on observation that driver crossed over shoulder stripe and was weaving within his traveling lane", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for purposes of appeal. Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011). The facts presented here are taken from the operative complaint or are otherwise uncontested. 2 . The operative complaint makes clear that the Chairperson is sued in an official capacity only. 3 . The parties use terms such as \"tribal immunity,\u201d \u201ctribal sovereign immunity,\u201d and \"the Tribe\u2019s sovereign immunity\u201d interchangeably in their briefing, as do we herein. 4 . The district court did, however, dismiss all claims against the Health Program because Bodi failed to controvert evidence that the entity had no legal existence independent of the Tribe and the Health Board. That ruling has not been appealed. 5 . Compare Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 F.Supp.2d 953, 961 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (<HOLDING>), and Sonoma Falls Developers, LLC v. Dry Creek Holdings: 0: holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity 1: holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar rico suit only after concluding that sue and be sued clause in tribal ordinance unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity 2: holding that a controllers signature on a contract containing a forum selection clause was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity in part because the right to waive immunity was reserved to the tribal council 3: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 4: holding that the ats does not waive the united states sovereign immunity", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Agreement as he had promised; instead, Husband retained the document for nearly six months, during which time the parties were attempting to reconcile their marriage, and produced it for enforcement when Wife finally sought a divorce. This evidence \u2014 the prolonged retention of the Agreement that Husband promised to destroy as soon as Wife signed it, coupled with the subsequent attempt to enforce it \u2014 though slight, is sufficient to establish the existence of fraud, especially here, in light of the relationship between the parties and the nature of the Agreement. OCGA \u00a7 23-2-57 (\u201cFraud may not be presumed but, being in itself subtle, slight circumstances may be sufficient to carry conviction of its existence.\u201d). Cf. Horton v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 338, 346-347 (1) (15 SE2d 605) (1941) (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, the trial court did Holdings: 0: holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract 1: holding that the burden is on defendant as the party invoking removal jurisdiction to establish the existence of a sufficient amount in controversy 2: holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case 3: recognizing that slight evidence of fraud is sufficient to establish its existence particularly involving family transactions 4: holding that evidence must be sufficient to establish elements of professional negligence particularly causation and damages arising from attorneys claimed failure to properly defend plaintiff", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the burden to seek review, on which the employee evidently acted on a writ of certiorari. Respondent suggests that the parties in this case should have similar powers and burdens. But the circumstances here are much different from those in Boe, which had continued effect when the employer refuses to submit a matter for independent review. Although respondent expressly declared to the employee that it was \u201creserving\u201d the issue of jurisdiction for determination, it chose nevertheless to join with the employee in submitting the grievance question for independent review. Under these circum stances, in spite of its assertion of reserved powers, the county elected the process for determining the dispute. See Helmerichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Trust Co., 349 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn.App.1984) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1984). Holdings: 0: holding that a credit card company could not introduce an alternative dispute resolution provision through a bill stuffer where nothing in the original agreement mentioned dispute resolution 1: holding that voluntary participant in arbitration process is estopped from objecting to this resolution of dispute citing twomey v durkee 291 nw2d 696 minn1980 2: holding that judicial is review available in the absence of an agreement for arbitration or some other form of final resolution of a dispute 3: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added 4: holding that because appraisal is analogous to arbitration the court would apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26-27, 32 S.Ct. 2, 56 L.Ed. 72 (1911) (upholding amendment to Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U.S. Comp. Stat.1901, p. 3174, 32 Stat. at L. 943, chap. 976, U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp.1909, p. 1143, which provided for all locomotives, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railway engaged in interstate commerce to be equipped with certain designated safety appliances, regardless of whether the vehicles were used in moving intrastate or interstate traffic); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-156, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (\u201c[F]or example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 32), or ... thefts from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 659)\u201d); see also United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319, 321 & n. 2 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). This underlying purpose, however, is not Holdings: 0: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute 1: holding that an amendment to a policy in existence prior to the effective date of a statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage which substituted insured automobiles did not incorporate the new statute because to do so would be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of the contract 2: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute 3: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 4: recognizing that the federal carjacking statute fell within lopez s second category because the statute regulated harm to automobiles", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.\u201d United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir.2000). \u201cThe proper inquiry is not simply whether [Mr. Scott\u2019s] will was overborne by the agents\u2019 illegal entry, but also whether his consent was a \u201cproduct\u201d of that illegality.\u201d Id. Considering these factors, we conclude that Mr. Scott\u2019s consent was not tainted by the illegal protective sweep of his home. To be sure, Mr. Scott\u2019s consent was obtained minutes after the illegal protective sweep was completed. And we recognize that the fact that Mr. Scott was apprised of his right to refuse the search does not constitute an intervening factor sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep. Id. at 678 (<HOLDING>). However, the officers\u2019 conduct in this case, Holdings: 0: recognizing that unconstitutionally obtained evidence can become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint 1: holding that the reading of miranda warnings and the signing of a waiver of fourth and fifth amendment rights are not sufficient intervening factors sufficient to dissipate the taint of an unlawful entry into a home 2: holding that consent to search did not purge the taint of an unlawful detention when no intervening circumstances sufficiently separated the consent from the unlawful detention 3: holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid 4: holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "when working a case. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (\"Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.\"). As such, \"[Where law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation, ... the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all.\" Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 77l n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 LEd.2d 1003 (1983). In some situations, however, the police expand the scope of their investigation to include other officers not currently on seene. In those scenarios, the fellow officer rule operates to integrate those outside officers and make them part of the coordinated investigation. See Arias, 159 P.8d at 189-40 (<HOLDING>). 115 Specifically, we have previously held Holdings: 0: recognizing general rule 1: recognizing that the fellow officer rule functions to include officers outside the common investigation 2: holding that a mayor although the executive officer may still have legislative functions 3: recognizing rule 4: recognizing this rule", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the judgment and sentence \u2018set[s] forth the statutory maximum and clearly indicated] that the term of community [custody] does not extend the total sentence beyond that maximum.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 566 (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Hibdon, 140 Wn. App. 534, 538, 166 P.3d 826 (2007)). While the court did not address Zavala-Reynoso, it did rely in part on Sloan to conclude that a remand to the trial court for clarification was the proper remedy. Torngren, 147 Wn. App. at 566. Although the Torngren court found that an amended sentence was the appropriate remedy in that case, Division Three has also indicated that either an amended sentence or a vacation and remand for resentencing are equally appropriate remedies in these circumstances. Hibdon, 140 Wn. App. at 538 (<HOLDING>). Does the sentence exceed the statutory Holdings: 0: holding that a remand need not be ordered despite legal errors if remand would be futile 1: holding remand order reviewable because crowded docket not ground for remand under  1447c 2: holding that in addition to a remand for clarification another option in these circumstances is to remand for resentencing 3: holding that on direct appeal appellate court may remand for resentencing of all counts 4: holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "work commenced before the effective date of its registration; or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless the registration is made within three months after first publication of the work.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 412. On October 17, 2006, OxBlue first published the OxBlue Specification. The Ox-Blue Specification was not registered with the Copyright Office until March 13, 2012. OxBlue is not entitled to statutory damages and attorneys\u2019 fees because the Ox-Blue Specification was not registered at the time the alleged infringement occurred, or within the 3-month safe harbor period between publication and registration. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). OxBlue does not dispute that it is not Holdings: 0: holding that where the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim was without a reasonable legal basis an award of attorneys fees to the defendants was a proper exercise of judicial discretion 1: holding that attorneys fees and statutory damages were unavailable because the copyright was not registered at the time the alleged infringement occurred 2: holding that lanham act claim was not prohibited due to fact that author had not registered copyright 3: holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation 4: holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not contest Alaimalo\u2019s actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo\u2019s actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first \u00a7 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider \u201c(1) wheth er the legal basis for petitioner\u2019s claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first \u00a7 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner\u2019s claim after that first \u00a7 2255 motion.\u201d Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must \u201ceffect a material change in the applicable law\u201d to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review 1: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 2: holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense 3: holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review 4: holding that the supreme courts decision in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that accessibility of a firearm was enough to support an inference that a firearm was used in a drug crime whereas bailey required active employment of the firearm", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(2007) from this constitutional definition. 6 . None of the parties allege that Hoffman\u2019s inaccurate oath was a product of fraud. 7 . Compare this unambiguous language with the broader authority given to the Secretary of State in the context of reviewing referendum petitions, 21-A M.R.S. \u00a7 905(1) (2007) which provides in part: \"The Secretary of State shall determine the validity of the petition.\u201d 8 . The second sentence of 21-A M.R.S. \u00a7 354(9) provides \"If a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or printing the voter\u2019s name and address, that voter\u2019s name may not be counted, but the petition is otherwise valid.\u201d 9 . See also, Citizens Comm, for the D.C. Video Lottery Terminal Initiative v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 860 A.2d 813, 816-17 (D.C.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Montanans for Justice v. State, 334 Mont. Holdings: 0: holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested 1: holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board 2: holding that actions of arbitrators in gathering evidence outside the scheduled hearings and without notice to the parties constituted misconduct sufficient to vacate the award 3: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 4: holding board had authority to exclude entire petitions where evidence showed pervasive pattern of fraud forgery and other improprieties permeated the circulation process that a particular group gathering signatures used", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "predicate to enhance his sentence as a second-offense habitual offender. While defendant objects to this, he offers no statutory or legal analysis to support the contention that his claimed double enhancement is inappropriate. The critical point from Bewersdorf is that the OUIL provisions increased the punishment for each repeated offense, just as the SORA provisions do in the present case. In fact, defendant concedes that there is no error in enhancing a SORA-2 sentence under the habitual-offender provisions as long as the habitual-offender enhancement is based on a felony other than a SORA violation. Thus, to this extent, defendant agrees with our conclusion that MCL 28.729(1) sets forth separate, elevated offenses. 51 E.g., People v Eilola, 179 Mich App 315, 325; 445 NW2d 490 (1989) (<HOLDING>); People v Brown, 186 Mich App 350, 357; 463 Holdings: 0: holding that the habitualoffender provisions could be used to enhance a sentence for a conviction that constituted firstdegree retail fraud because of a prior conviction mcl 750356c2 as added by 1988 pa 20 1: holding an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid because no prison term was imposed and the conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense 2: holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 3: holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and hac 4: holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "for the writ of mandamus. C. Violation of Due Process Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in finding that his due process rights had not been violated. The trial court stated that \" [procedural due process constrains government decisions which deprive an individual of some 'property' or 'liberty' interest. . .. petitioner has neither shown the existence of a property interest nor that his property has been taken.\" Order Den. Mot. for Recons, at 2 (Trial Div. Aug. 25, 1993). Appellant claims that his property interest lies in the 2% annual income tax he pays as an employee of the government. Appellant's argument is wrongly constructed, however. He does not challenge the ability of the Legislature to tax him and spend the money as part of the general fund. Ra 1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the mere fact that Appellant has Holdings: 0: holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims 1: holding that unilateral expectation of continued service at a particular stateoperated leprosy hospital did not give rise to a due process claim 2: holding that a property interest sufficient to support a due process claim requires a binding assurance and not a mere unilateral expectation 3: holding such service satisfies due process 4: holding that a state agencys violations of its own internal regulations did not establish a due process violation or otherwise give rise to a constitutional claim", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "right to possession of real property either by an unlawful act or a lawful act performed in an unlawful manner.\u201d N.Y. State Nat. Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990) (finding summary judgment on a trespass claim to be appropriate against anti-abortion groups protesting on an abortion clinic\u2019s property), citing Ivancic v. Olmstead, 66 N.Y.2d 349, 352, 497 N.Y.S.2d 326, 488 N.E.2d 72, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117, 106 S.Ct. 1975, 90 L.Ed.2d 658 (1986); see also Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 331, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954). To succeed in an action for trespass, Plaintiff must prove that there was a wrongful or unjustifiable entry upon his land. Scribner v. Summers, 84 F.3d 554, 557 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As explained above, the barges at issue are Holdings: 0: holding that under new york law trespass is the intentional invasion of anothers property 1: holding that new york law applies to this matter 2: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 3: holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action 4: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and respect for the D.C. Court of Appeals.\u201d). The Supreme Court held in Salve Regina College v. Russell,. 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217,113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), that \u201ca court of appeals should review de novo a district court\u2019s determination of state law.\u201d Id. 499 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at 1221. The D.C. Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the question whether bad faith denial of an insurance claim constitutes an independent tort under D.C. law. The district court has considered the issue in two separate reported cases, but these cases are directly in conflict. Compare GEICO, 769 F.Supp. at 387 (\u201cDistrict of Columbia law does not recognize the tort of bad faith denial' of an insurance claim.\u201d) with Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 517, 520 (D.D.C.1984) (<HOLDING>). We find it unnecessary to divine whether the Holdings: 0: holding that the district of columbia is among the many jurisdictions that have recognized a cause of action in tort for the bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay 1: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith 2: holding that no cause of action for bad faith exists when insurer has reasonable grounds to contest liability 3: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 4: holding that an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant is an element of a bad faith refusal claim", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "act, not within the scope of the common purpose, but growpng] out of the individual malice of the perpetrator. 1 Wharton Crim.Law, \u00a7 397.\u201d Keller v. State, 380 So.2d 926, 935 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 938 (Ala.1980). The capital offense of which this defendant was convicted, see \u00a7 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala.Code 1975, requires (1) proof of an intentional murder and (2) proof that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for hire. Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 24 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). We agree with the defendant that his intent that Pope kill Elmer Woodall pursuant to a contract could not supply the intent necessary to convict the defendant for the capital murder-for-hire of Clemer Woodall. Cf. Tomlin v. State, 591 So.2d 550 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Rather, in order to convict the defendant of Holdings: 0: holding that general verdicts failed to reveal whether defendant was convicted on accomplice liability theory and that evidence supported accomplice liability theory 1: holding that under the accomplice liability doctrine a nontriggerman accomplice may be convicted of double murder a capital offense under  13a540a10 alacode 1975 only if he had the particularized intent that both victims be killed 2: holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony 3: holding that in order to convict a defendant of firstdegree murder on a theory of accomplice liability proof of his own premeditation is required 4: holding that alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that to be convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in context, and because it was unable to do so, afforded them no weight. We agree with the trial court\u2019s ruling and thus deny relief on this issue. Psychological Mitigation Evidence In Spann v. State, this Court held: Mitigating evidence must be considered and weighed when it is contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is uncontroverted and believable. This requirement applies with equal force when the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence .... (Citation omitted.) The sentencing court must \u201cexpressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.\u201d 857 So.2d 845, 857 (Fla.2003) (quoting Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 995 (Fla.2001)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Where a trial court Holdings: 0: holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence 1: holding that defendants relatively minor participation in the crime is a mitigating factor that sentencer must consider 2: holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer  not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death 3: holding for a unanimous court that sentencer in capital case must consider an extensive list of nonstatutory mitigating factors 4: holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "under Rule 60(b) to vacate a judgment directly with the district court, \u25a0without seeking prior leave from the Court of Appeals. 601 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir.1979). The district courts are required \u201cto review any such motions expeditiously, within a few days of their filing....\u201d Id. at 42. Where the district court considers a motion to have merit, it issues a memorandum so that the movant may petition this Court to remand the case to the district court for the judgment to be vacated. Id.; see also United States v. 6 Fox St., 480 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir.2007). Otherwise, a litigant may not request on appeal that this Court remand a case to a district court for it to consider an argument that the litigant waived before that court. Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 386-87 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In any event, Rosaura\u2019s attempt is likely Holdings: 0: holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within  1141a 1: recognizing such an exception 2: holding that plaintiff must present such evidence 3: holding that a litigant who receives ex parte assurances of success from a judge is a state actor under  1983 4: holding that a litigant must follow colocotroni in such scenarios", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is not successive merely because it follows an earlier application. In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.1998); Magwood v. Patterson, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 2805, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010) (\u201csecond or successive [does] not refer to all \u00a7 2254 applications filed second or successively in time, but [is] rather a term-of-art that takes its full meaning from our case law, including decisions predating the enactment of AED-PA.\u201d) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A \u00a7 2254 application filed after an earlier application that was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies is not a second or successive application. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); In re Gasery, 116 F.3d 1051, 1052 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Under Lundy district courts should dismiss Holdings: 0: holding that declaratory judgment was inappropriate where after exhausting administrative remedies a contractor would have to bring separate actions against the state and other parties in state court 1: holding petitioner seeking to refile habeas application after prior dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies is not required to comply with  2244b3a when he returns to federal court after exhausting those claims 2: holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice 3: holding federal habeas proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies when petitioners direct appeal from resentencing was still pending in state court at the time he sought habeas relief 4: holding that a prisoners failure to pursue an appeal in state court is a procedural bar to federal habeas relief unless the petitioner shows both cause for failing to bring the state claim  and actual prejudice from the failure to consider his federal claims", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that when the government undertakes to perform services, which in the absence of specific legislation would not be required, it will, nevertheless, be liable if these activities are performed negligently.\u201d). In aviation cases, courts have held that an FAA controller owes a duty of reasonable care to an aircraft, passengers, crews, and cargoes in the performance of the controller\u2019s duties; these duties are concurrent with an airplane pilot\u2019s duty of due care. Davis v. United States, 824 F.2d 549, 550 (7th Cir.1987) (\u201cWhile general negligence law applies to airplane tort cases, ... the standard of due care is concurrent, resting upon both the airplane pilot and ground personnel.\u201d) (quoting Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir.1972)); see also Freeman, 509 F.2d at 629 (<HOLDING>); Somlo v. United States, 416 F.2d 640, 647 Holdings: 0: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties 1: holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty 2: holding that police officers have no affirmative duty to search out favorable evidence for the defendant 3: holding that certain fiduciary duty claims did not arise out of the underlying contractual provisions 4: holding that a controllers duty extended to parachutists jumping out of the plane", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Beatty next contends that the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines by relying on the specific offense characteristic, \u201cmore than minimal planning,\u201d as the basis for both a two level upward adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2Fl.l(b)(2)(A) and as one of its stated reasons for upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5K2.0, p.s. Beatty does not contend that \u201cmore than minimal planning\u201d was not present in his offense conduct. He merely contends that the district court engaged in an improper form of \u201cdouble-counting\u201d when it used the same factor to increase his punishment under two separate and different provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. We disagree. Double-counting is permitted in some circumstances. Compare United States v. Burnett, 952 F.2d 187, 188-90 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 12, Holdings: 0: holding that district court may consider defendants underlying conviction under both  2j16a and  4alla  d when sentencing him for failure to appear to serve his sentence 1: holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless 2: holding that where a furlough and an enhanced sentence for failure to appear in court at a later time are part of the plea agreement a court is justified in imposing the enhanced sentence after the defendant fails to appear in court without giving him an opportunity to withdrawhis plea 3: holding that district court may consider defendants underlying conviction under both  2p11a1 and  4alld  e when sentencing him for escape 4: holding that sentencing court is permitted to consider evidence of both uncharged acts and evidence underlying counts on which the defendant has been acquitted", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "damage to the front end, and a broken steering wheel. Is this the damage which Dr. Brown says is essential to his opinion? What of damage to the frame and understructure of the car? If speed is to be based partially on the damage done to the vehicles, that damage must be ascertained by something more than looking at a picture of the exterior of the automobile. No case has been cited to us which is factually similar to the one now before us. However we find substantial support for the views here expressed in Twidwell v. Davidson, 54 Wash.2d 75, 338 P.2d 326, 329-332; Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560, 561; Kale v. Douthitt, 4 Cir., 274 F.2d 476, 480-483 (dealing particularly with evidence as to the angle of impact); Levine v. Remolif, 80 Nev. 168, 390 P.2d 718, 719-721 (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Broome, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding trial court properly excluded testimony concerning speed of vehicle where witness observed vehicle travel on a diagonal for thirtyfive 35 feet on poorly lit road estimate of speed may not be predicated on such a slender data base   1: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion 2: holding that rules of evidence do not permit an expert to give opinion or state legal conclusions regarding a question of law 3: holding that a picture of a damaged vehicle was insufficient to permit an opinion of speed based on damage to the vehicles 4: recognizing that a common illustration of an admissible opinion under rule 701 is an expression of opinion by a lay observer of a cars speed", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "presence did not mean the wife got a fraction of both the community and the husband\u2019s separate-property portions of those benefits. We presume the trial judge knew of Cearley and Taggart and constructed his decree accordingly. See Patino, 687 S.W.2d at 802. We find this intent clear from the language used, even if the judge did not also recite a \u201cTaggart-type\u201d fraction for Gloria\u2019s 50 percent community-property interest. To conclude otherwise, we would have to find the trial judge intended to divide this asset contrary to four-year-old Supreme Court decisions and to violate the constitutional and statutory provisions already interpreted to prohibit awards of separate property and to allow division of community property only. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex.1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Tex. Const, art. XVI, \u00a7 15 Holdings: 0: recognizing division of separate property to be contrary to statute and constitution 1: recognizing exception under state constitution 2: holding that reviewing court may not reverse trial courts judgment on property division unless trial court has clearly abused its discretion or has made inequitable division 3: holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement 4: holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "can be sufficient evidence that \u201ctends to connect the accused to the alleged offense even if none of the circumstances would be sufficient individually.\u201d Brown, 159 S.W.3d at 708; Cantelon, 85 S.W.3d at 460-61. \u201cAll the law requires is that there be some [corroborating] evidence from which rational jurors could conclude that this [other] evidence sufficiently tended to connect Appellant to the offense.\u201d Jefferson, 99 S.W.3d at 793 (quoting Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173, 179 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). When corroborating evidence required for a conviction is lacking, the defendant will be entitled to a verdict of acquittal. Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 38.17 (Vernon 2005); see Ex parte Reynolds, 588 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 1284 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Fare v. State, 1 S.W.3d 928, 930 Holdings: 0: holding jury cannot return any verdict except acquittal when evidence is insufficient to corroborate accomplice witness 1: recognizing distinction made in maynard that one accomplices outofcourt statement may corroborate the incourt testimony of another accomplice but outofcourt testimony of a testifying accomplice cannot be used to corroborate his own testimony 2: holding suspicion that some combination of individuals participated in five robberies was insufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony 3: holding possession alone cannot sufficiently corroborate the testimony of an accomplice when the stolen property was not sufficiently identified at trial 4: holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to establish its consideration of a legal issue\u201d). Like the Eighth Circuit, we do not believe that a district court errs when it fails \u201cto explain a revocation sentence that is consistent with all applicable policy statements.\u201d United States v. Caves, 73 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir.1996). IV. In addition to imposing eleven months confinement, the district court\u2019s revocation order in CR-29 stated that the unpaid portions of Johnson\u2019s fine and reimbursement costs for his court appointed counsel \u201cremain in effect.\u201d Johnson argues that the district court could not reimpose those obligations in the written judgment order revoking Johnson\u2019s supervised release when it failed to reimpose them in open court in the revocation hearing. See United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d 105, 108 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). We find that those obligations existed Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable 1: holding that sentence is imposed when the district court orally pronounces it 2: holding that a court is free to change an orally pronounced sentence until a written judgment is filed 3: recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed 4: recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED PETITION WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAMUEL P. KING, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On January 7, 1999, Petitioner Michael Kent Poland (\u201cPetitioner\u201d or \u201cPoland\u201d) filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254, amending a habeas petition filed on- October 20, 1998. Poland seeks, among other things, an evidentiary hearing on a claim that he is currently incompetent to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Respondent Terry Stewart, Director of the Holdings: 0: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 1: holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane 2: holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the punishment of death for a defendant convicting of raping a child 3: holding that the eighth amendment prohibits execution of persons whose mental illness prevents them from comprehending the reasons for the penalty and its implications 4: recognizing that the eighth amendment protects individuals from a lingering death", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The State argued that it was within prosecutorial discretion to choose which offense to charge the defendant with, but the court concluded that skilled prosecutors would usually seek the more severe sentence and thus the charge of aggravated kidnapping would effectively be nullified. \"Since the elements which constitute aggravated kidnapping and armed violence are identical, common sense and sound logic would seemingly dictate that their penalties be identical.\" Id. at 774. 4 . Certainly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Morris intended to leave the J.C. Penney store with the garbage bag containing unpurchased clothes, thus depriving J.C. Penney of the use and value of the merchandise. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 413 N.E.2d 335, 336 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the State is not barred by double Holdings: 0: holding that where store employee discovered defendant exiting fitting room with merchandise in her own tote bag evidence was sufficient to support inference that defendant had requisite intent to deprive store of merchandise 1: holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 2: holding a store vicariously liable for wrongful death when its employee shot and killed a customer 3: holding that where a defendant abandoned a vehicle in a subdivision near where the victims body was found there was sufficient evidence of intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle 4: holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "negative and conclude that Merrill Lynch\u2019s disclosure of the reports to Deloitte & Touche did not constitute a waiver of the applicable work product protection. In a frequently cited case, In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., Judge Buchwald held that Pfizer\u2019s disclosure of documents to its independent auditor, KPMG Peat Marwick (\u201cPeat Marwick\u201d), did not waive its work product privilege. 1993 WL 561125, at *6. Judge Buchwald\u2019s decision was based on her observation that \u201cPfizer and Peat Marwick obviously shared common interests in the information, and Peat Marwick is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary.\u201d Id. Other courts have adopted precisely this analysis. E.g., Gutter v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 95 Civ. 2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *5 (S.D.Fla. May 18, 1998) (<HOLDING>); Gramm v. Horsehead Indus., Inc., No. 87 Civ. Holdings: 0: holding that accountants worksheets did not contain privileged communications 1: holding that disclosure to outside accountants did not waive the work product privilege since the accountants are not considered a conduit to a potential adversary 2: holding that when a party discloses an item to an adversary even in the context of settlement a waiver of the work product privilege is effected 3: recognizing that the duty has been applied to accountants 4: holding that the attorneyclient privilege applied to communications with accountants where defendants  demonstrated the necessity of the accountants services by showing that the accountants provided services that were beyond  counsels resources and abilities but were uniquely within the accountants qualifications", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "construction would have the \u201canomalous effect\u201d of undermining the purposes of FIRREA. Specifically, Motorcity\u2019s interpretation seeks to take advantage of oral agreements, evading the statute and D\u2019Oench merely because Motorcity has paid off its loan. Such an interpretation would undermine the core purpose of both the D\u2019Oench doctrine and its statutory cousins, i.e., allowing the FDIC to make its necessary decisions and evaluations, which sometimes must be made with lightning speed, by relying on the written bank records. For the foregoing reasons, we therefore hold that neither FIRREA, nor the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, preempted the federal common law D\u2019Oench doctrine. B. Can Motorcity Avoid the D\u2019Oench Doctrine if it Repaid its Loans to Southeast Prior to B Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773, 776-77 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that ignorance by one prosecutor of promise made by another is irrelevant since the prosecutors office is an entity and  a promise made by one attorney must be attributed for these purposes to the government 1: holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary 2: holding that a promise to make a loan is not covered by  1823e because a promise is not an asset 3: recognizing that a unilateral contract can be formed when only one promise is illusory because the nonillusory promise can serve as an offer which the promisor who made the illusory promise can accept by performance 4: holding that the failure to carry out an oral promise to convey land standing by itself is not fraud", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "size of the burns in making the adverse credibility determination. Sixth, the IJ commented that it was \u201cnoteworthy\u201d that Suntharalinkam had testified during the hearing that he was hospitalized for some ten days following his release from detention, whereas his asylum application did not mention hospitalization and instead only referred to medical treatment that he received at that time. The IJ\u2019s concern is unfounded, as in fact there is no \u201cdiscrepancy\u201d between the application and Suntharalinkam\u2019s testimony that can legally form the basis of an adverse credibility decision. An adverse credibility finding cannot be based on petitioner providing testimony that is more detailed than the information presented in the asylum application. See Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no contradiction between the Holdings: 0: holding that a failure to corroborate ones testimony with supporting evidence cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility determination 1: holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum 2: holding that an adverse credibility finding can be based on materially different asylum claims in an airport interview and petitioners subsequent testimony before the ij 3: holding that an adverse credibility determination cannot be based on trial testimony that is more detailed than the applicants initial statements at the airport 4: holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "ill.... \u201c[CJaring for the mentally ill\u201d requires an actual medical diagnosis that the patient is mentally sick or deficient. (Id.) In light of this advice, it would have been reasonable for CGS, when developing a program in 2002 designed to \u201cdeliver[ ] the equivalent of the hospital\u2019s comprehensive services directly to the adolescent\u201d (ACT Staff Manual), to take steps to \u201cascertain what the Act requires\u201d at that time, Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d at 19; see also SNET, 121 F.3d at 72 (finding that even though the employer took some efforts to ascertain its obligations under the Act because it sought advice from the DOL, the resulting opinion letter revealed that the employer \u201cfailed to ask the appropriate question\u201d and did not compel a finding of good faith); Debejian, 64 F.Supp.2d at 91 (<HOLDING>). Defendant\u2019s fourth and fifth arguments, Holdings: 0: holding that burden of demonstrating coverage rests with the insured 1: holding that regardless of insurers good faith denial of coverage plaintiff is entitled to recover interest to put it in position it would have been in if coverage had not been denied 2: holding claimant has burden of demonstrating a good faith work search 3: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith 4: holding that where employer did not show it furnished counsel with the specific information necessary to determine coverage it had not met its onerous burden of demonstrating good faith", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Florida Action The majority opinion holds that for an insurer to be bound by a judgment in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist, all that is required is that the insurer be served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and that it is not necessary for the insurer to be a party to the action. In construing a statute, this Court is required to look at the entire statute, and construe it in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions contained in the statute. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004) (noting that \u201cthis Court does not read segments of a statute in isolation. Rather, we construe statutes in pari materia giving effect, if possible, to every provision.\u201d); State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 739, 392 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The second sentence of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding that statutes dealing with same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system 1: holding the same 2: holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute 3: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts 4: holding that all parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole    and individual expressions be accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit internal citations omitted", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "matter \u2014 makes for an admirable floor, but it is certainly not a ceiling. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 961-63 (Fla.1992). With this background in mind, we proceed with what we now recognize as the Tonn-Ochoa analysis. IV. Discussion. It is well-settled that warrantless searches are virtually \u201c \u2018per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.\u2019\u201d Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)); accord State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). One recognized exception to the warrant requirement of our constitution is consent. State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 464- 288-89 (1980) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bollinger, 169 N.J.Super. 553, 405 Holdings: 0: holding that mailing element was satisfied where the defendants sent letters to fraud victims in an attempt to convince them that the promised services would be performed even though mailings were sent after victims money had been obtained 1: holding defendants agreement to consentsearch provision not coerced merely because it was one of two undesirable options 2: holding that consentsearch provision of a probation agreement was voluntary even though defendant would have been sent to prison if he rejected it 3: holding probationer voluntarily accepted consentsearch provision by accepting probation 4: holding consentsearch provision in parole agreement was coerced and involuntary", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "equal, pro rata basis.\u201d Id. at 153. The Court recognized that there are limited exceptions to the trustee\u2019s exclusive avoidance powers under Section 522, which is intended to \u201cgive limited protection to a debtor\u2019s exemptions.\u201d Id. The Court examined specifically Section 522(h), which provides in pertinent part: The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempt \u201cno specific statutory provision\u201d authorizes Chapter 13 debtors to \u201cexercise trustees\u2019 avoidance powers\u201d); LaBarge v. Benda (In re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 364 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (noting lack of a comparable provision applicable Chapter 13 debtors as 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1107(a), 1203); Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1987) (<HOLDING>); Montoya v. Boyd (In re Montoya), 285 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case 1: holding that section 1303 does not authorize the chapter 13 debtor to exercise the avoiding powers of a trustee 2: holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13 3: holding that funds held by chapter 13 trustee become property of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion not subject to exemption 4: holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "B, 8 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 215, 220 (2000) [hereinafter \u201cDilorenzo Article\u201d] (stating the rationale behind not allowing Regulation B as an affirmative defense). As a result, while these courts recognize a plaintiff can offensively assert an ECOA violation as a civil action to recover damages against a creditor, they refuse to recognize an ECOA violation asserted as an affirmative defense. 2. Position #2: A debtor can assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense in the nature of recoupment. Many federal and state jurisdictions have allowed a plaintiff to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense, even after the two-year statute of limitations has run for an offensive ECOA claim, by way of recoupment. See, e.g., Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, Holdings: 0: holding the recoupment doctrine could allow a spouse to assert an ecoa affirmative defense against a creditor even after the statute of limitations had run 1: holding even though an affirmative action for damages is barred the debtor may assert an ecoa violation defensively in the nature of recoupment 2: holding defendant was entitled to assert an ecoa violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be to enforce conduct that is forbidden by the ecoa 3: holding a plaintiff cannot assert a violation of the ecoa as an affirmative defense 4: holding that ecoa violation cannot be asserted as affirmative defense", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "from the ballot without reference to the candidates\u2019 support in the electoral process. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835, 115 S.Ct. 1842 (emphasis supplied). The State has not demonstrated that \u00a7 l-4-802(l)(g) protects the integrity or regularity of the election process and, as demonstrated above, the statute does involve measures that unjustly exclude various segments of the population from the ballot. We hold that the statute imposes additional qualifications to the exclusive qualifications set forth in the Constitution, and hence is impermissible. 3. Procedural Requirement The State, relying heavily on voter registration cases, also attempts to characterize voter registration as a simple procedure, or mechanical adjunct, that is authorized under Thornton. Id. at 832, .2d 484, 486 (1950) (<HOLDING>). We agree with Mr. Campbell\u2019s assertions. We Holdings: 0: recognizing that the government carved out a portion of a larger conspiracy and alleged it as a separate conspiracy 1: holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy 2: holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed 3: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 4: holding that state cannot render person convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the government ineligible for congress", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "district court\u2019s denial of a motion to amend a complaint is abuse of discretion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Shipner v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 407 (11th Cir.1989). After a responsive pleading has been filed, subsequent amendments are permissible only with leave of court, which \u201cshall be freely given when justice so requires.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). This liberal policy of allowing amendments under Rule 15(a) \u201ccircumscribes the exercise of the district court\u2019s discretion; thus, unless a substantial reason exists to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial.\u201d Shipner, 868 F.2d at 407; see also Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1131 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). In this case, the district Holdings: 0: holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order 1: holding that denial of leave to amend is error in the absence of justifying reasons 2: holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights 3: holding that a justifying reason must be apparent for denial of a motion to amend 4: holding that though the court did not expressly state its reason for denying leave to amend it was apparent what delay and prejudice would be caused by plaintiffs motion which sought to add four new individual defendants as well as additional counts under two federal statutes and a statelaw claim", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "gesture, understood and agreed to cooperate to achieve the objective of the conspiracy. Id. at 145-46, 767 A.2d 844. In Heckstall v. State, 120 Md.App. 621, 626, 707 A.2d 953 (1998), we concluded that, \u201cstanding alone, a single buyer-seller transaction ordinarily does not constitute a conspiracy,\u201d and we held that, because the evidence at Heckstall\u2019s trial was limited to a single sale of a small amount of heroin, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction of conspiracy. Appellants acknowledge that our holding in Heck-stall was narrow and based on the facts of that case. They urge us nonetheless to recognize a \u201csomewhat broader \u2018buyer-seller\u2019 doctrine[,]\u201d and then find reversible error L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 481-82 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Starnes, 109 F.3d 648, 651 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not entitled to buyerseller instruction in drug conspiracy prosecution given evidence that defendant played numerous roles in the conspiracy and that massive amounts of cocaine were involved 1: holding that defendant was not entitled to buyerseller instruction despite defendants contention that buyerseller transactions were the only contacts between defendant and alleged coconspirator because the government adduced far more evidence than the prior drug purchases to establish the conspiracy and instructions as a whole did not allow jury to convict on mere buyerseller theory 2: holding that defendant charged with conspiracy to manufacture marijuana and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute was not entitled to specific buyerseller instruction even though support for such instruction existed because court gave a complete instruction reciting all the elements of conspiracy 3: holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct 4: holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Accordingly, appellants have failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination as to all appellants. 2. Appellants\u2019 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 Retaliation Claims The district court granted summary judgment on appellants\u2019 \u00a7 1981 retaliation claims for two reasons: 1) appellants failed to state a plausible claim for relief as to retaliation in their Third Amended Complaint; and 2) appellants failed to advance competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating they had engaged in protected activity. Appellants\u2019 address the merits of this claim only in their reply brief. Accordingly, any claimed error as to the grant of summary judgment on appellants\u2019 \u00a7 1981 retaliation claims has been waived. See Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 3. Appellants\u2019 Hostile Work Environment and Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief 1: holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief 2: holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief 3: holding that a party abandoned an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief 4: holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is controlling. 6 As noted above, knowledge of the \"facts\" comprising a cause of action for attorney malpractice is to be distinguished from knowledge that such conduct constitutes malpractice. As noted in Gevaart, the discovery rule does not require that the plaintiff know of the negligent character of the conduct alleged as the cause of his or her injury. See Gevaart, 111 Wn.2d at 502. 7 We note that a limited number of jurisdictions have adopted the position that a judgment of a trial court does not become final and, hence, a party to such action does not incur any injury as a result of negligent representation at such proceeding, until a court of appeals affirms the decision of the trial court and/or the time to appeal has expired. See Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1987) (<HOLDING>). Such an approach may be appropriate where the Holdings: 0: holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict 1: holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due 2: holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective 3: holding that the date of injury for purposes of attorney malpractice does not occur until the last possible date when the attorneys negligence becomes irreversible 4: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "John Shannon, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court\u2019s judgment for the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action alleging prison officials violated his constitutional rights by, inter alia, withholding his personal property. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. We review de novo, Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 50,124 S.Ct. 50, 157 L.Ed.2d 23 (2003), and we affirm. The district court properly dismissed as untimely Shannon\u2019s claim concerning unlawful withholding of his magazines because he filed his action more than two years after the claim accrued. See Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983 1: holding that civil rights claims at least those arising under 42 usc  1983 were subject to the applicable states personal injury statute of limitations 2: holding that in actions brought under 42 usc  1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury 3: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims 4: holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(2) and (3) of 9006(b) set forth certain exceptions. Paragraph 2 enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement is not permitted and paragraph 3, which includes Rule 4007(c), enumerates the bankruptcy rules for which enlargement of time is limited to the \u201cextent and under the conditions stated in those rules.\u201d Fed. R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(3). Although Rule 4007(c) permits a court to extend the time to file a complaint under \u00a7 523(c), the motion to extend must be filed before the time has expired. Accordingly, the Court does not have the discretion to allow an untimely complaint under any of the sections set forth in \u00a7 523(c) on the basis of excusable neglect. See In re Tucker, 263 B.R. 632, 636-637 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2001). See also Byrd v. Alton, 837 F.2d 457, 459 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Courts may nonetheless permit a late filed Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties 1: holding creditors actual notice of chapter 7 case in ample time to prepare and timely file the necessary request for determination of dischargeability bars them from challenging the dischargeability of their claim 15 months after bar date 2: holding that the district court cannot extend the time for filing a rule 59e motion by margin order 3: holding that motion to extend time period for filing dischargeability complaint must be made before the running of that period and that court lacks discretion to grant late filed motion to extend time to file dischargeability complaint 4: holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Judges System 21 (1995) (\"The Senate report [regarding the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act] noted that without the assistance furnished by magistrates in handling a 09 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (finding that the Federal Magistrates Act's \"additional duties\u201d clause did not permit magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials without consent and explaining that \"the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases [subject to special assignment, consent of the parties, and judicial review] should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to preside at a felony trial. The legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable distr 984) (<HOLDING>). Yet the majority opinion gives this caselaw Holdings: 0: holding that the ninth circuits decision exceeded the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 usc  2254d 1: holding that it is unconstitutional for a us magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  636c over a  2255 motion 2: holding that referrals of civil matters to magistrates pursuant to 28 usc  636c are constitutional for essentially the reasons stated by our sister circuits 3: holding that equitable tolling is available for petitions filed pursuant to 28 usc  2255 4: holding that pursuant to 28 usc  2254d1 if  the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(\u201cNew Jersey courts have applied the Cooper prejudice rule in various other contexts,\u201d including in cases \u201cinvolving both excess insurance and reinsurance despite the fact that reinsurance agreements are not contracts of adhesion.\u201d). The Cooper decision rejected prior case law that did not require that an insurer show appreciable prejudice when an insured breached a condition precedent to insurance coverage: Cf. Whittle v. Associated Indem. Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866, 868 (N.J.Err. & App.1943) (finding the insurance policy notice and cooperation provisions to be conditions precedent to coverage, and that the insured breach of those provisions permitted the insurer to disclaim coverage); Ebert v. Balter, 74 N.J.Super. 466, 181 A.2d 532, 535 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1962) (<HOLDING>). State National argues that the County\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that an insurer can deny benefits based on late notice by the insured only when the insurer is prejudiced by the delay 1: holding that the insureds liability has been established by the settlement and the insurer may not later relitigate the issue 2: holding that a condition subsequent presupposes an existing obligation that is to be defeated or forfeited if the condition is not fulfilled 3: holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances 4: holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "no Connecticut court appears to have addressed the reach of Conn. Gen. Reg. \u00a7 42-110b-18(g), that regulation, on its face, concerns conduct involving the advertising of products and services, not the settlement of claims. Thus, the reasoning of Webster Bank regarding the scope of \u00a7 38a-816(2) would appear to apply to \u00a7 42-110b-l 8(g) with equal force, as it is undisputed that any alleged representations by Allstate were not an attempt to induce Hipsky into entering into a contract for insurance with Allstate. 15 . See also fn. 14, supra. fore not subject to the holding of Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 663, 509 A.2d 11 (1986), that CUTPA provides a private right of action for violations of CUIPA. But see Rivera v. Pereira, No. CV010382813S, 2002 WL 377517, *3 (Conn.Super. Jan. 25, 2002) (<HOLDING>) (unpublished opinion). At any rate, the Court Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: recognizing cause of action 2: holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights 3: holding that cutpa provides private cause of action for violation of  83a832 4: recognizing the cause of action", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "law does not occupy the field governing private corrections employees\u2019 actions. The government contractor defense is not likely to apply because there is no indication that the United States directed the GEO employees\u2019 treatment of Pollard. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 515 (noting that \u201c[t]he record here would provide no basis for such a defense,\u201d which is available when \u201cthe government has directed a contractor to do the very thing that is the subject of the claim\u201d). Because the conduct at issu recognizing that a police officer fails to act with due care if the officer confines a prisoner in an unfit and unsanitary place); Richardson, 176 P. at 208 (stating that the keeper of a jail has a common law duty to keep the jail warm and sanitary); Dabney, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 256 (<HOLDING>); see generally M.L. Schellenger, Annotation, Holdings: 0: recognizing that new mexico has adopted the common law unless otherwise abrogated by specific statutory provisions and that the power of a trial court to change venue on its own motion if necessary to assure the defendant a fair trial is part of that common law 1: holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest 2: holding that new york law has no common law right of privacy embracmg such claims as false light as any such privacy right is purely statutory 3: holding that under the common law a claim for personal injuries died with the victim 4: holding that under common law a jailor has a duty to provide a prisoner with necessary supplies such as fuel for heat and bed covering", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u25a0wrists. Doc. 54-2 at 32, pp. 122-23; Doc. 59 at \u00b6 17. Once Anderson was in the sheriff officers\u2019 custody, Moussa left the parking lot, entering the courthous 7th Cir. 1985) (same). \u201cTo ascertain when an employee\u2019s conduct is within the scope of employment, the Illinois Supreme Gourt has adopted \u00a7 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.\u201d Copeland v. Cnty. of Macon, 403 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill.2d 351, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308-09 (1989)). Section 228 provides: Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and place limits; (c) it is- actuated, at least in part, by a p 1, 6-7 (N.D. Ill, Mar. 25, 2014) (<HOLDING>); Coles v. City of Chicago, 361 F.Supp.2d 740, Holdings: 0: holding that an offduty officers assertion to bystanders that he was on the job  at the scene of a car accident did not place him within the scope of employment 1: holding that a suspended chicago police officer was not acting within his scope of employment when discharging his weapon in the neighboring municipality of cicero 2: holding that the officer acted within the scope of his authority in requiring the defendant stopped in middle lane of traffic to exit his vehicle 3: holding that a reasonable jury could find that an offduty chicago police officer acted within the scope of his employment during a roadside altercation on interstate 55 near the damen street exit which is in chicago 4: holding that scope of employment was an issue for the jury where a chicago police officer was off duty but within the city limits when he shot the plaintiff", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "offer, the [right of first refusal] ripens into an option, governed, by the terms set gut in the initial agreement. Sager v. Rogers, 1987 WL 6718, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (emphasis added) (citing Sports Premiums, Inc. v. Kaemmer, 595 P.2d 696 (Colo.App.1979); Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714, 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd 43 N.Y.2d 748, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977)). Thus, Tennessee law governing the exercise of options is applicable to the present case. Defendant Bruno\u2019s is correct in pointing out that, absent any agreement to the contrary, Tennessee law requires the strict matching of terms in order to exercise an option. Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc, 255 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 (M.D.Tenn.1964). See also Pinney v. Tarpley, 686 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Horner, 36 Tenn.App. 657, 260 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms 1: holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal 2: holding that acceptance of an option must be unqualified absolute unconditional unequivocal unambiguous positive without reservation and according to the terms of the option 3: holding that under oregon law an acceptance of an offer must be positive unconditional unequivocal and unambiguous 4: holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Because the hearing examiner had the jurisdiction and authority to reduce Leal\u2019s indefinite suspension to a 644-day temporary suspension without pay, we reverse the trial court\u2019s summary judgment in Leal\u2019s favor in Cause No.2003-CVQ-001720-D2 and render judgment reinstating the hearing examiner\u2019s decision. And, because Dovalina established his qualified immunity from Leal\u2019s procedural and substantive due process claims, we reverse the trial court\u2019s summary judgment in favor of Leal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765-D2 and render judgment in Dovalina\u2019s favor. However., we do not have jurisdiction over the City of Laredo\u2019s appeal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765~D2 and therefore dismiss the City\u2019s appeal. See Bexar County v. Giroux-Daniel, 956 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Leal\u2019s substantive and procedural due process Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over statelaw tort claims on an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity 1: holding that local school boards were not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity even though entitled to sovereign immunity in the same degree as the state itself from tort suits 2: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 3: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 4: holding a local government sued under  1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity and the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over the local governments interlocutory appeal", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201c[G]iven a widely-recognized looseness in usage of the language\u201d regarding severance, the court held, \u201c[u]se of the word \u2018severed\u2019 is insufficient, in itself, to establish a Rule 21 severance.\u201d Id. at 625. Because it was not clear that the plaintiffs claims against the diversity-defeating party were not a part of the case, the court remanded the case to state court. See id. at 626. As Caldwell illustrates, \u201c[federal district courts have ... held that a defendant does not carry the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction where jurisdiction is predicated on a state court order that merely states .that plaintiffs claims are to be \u2018severed\u2019 from claims against non-diverse defendants.\u201d Grefer v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-0253, 2003 WL 22717716, at *4 (E.D.La. Nov. 18, 2003.) (<HOLDING>). In Johnson v. Snapper Division of Fuqua Holdings: 0: holding that a statecourt order providing for severance and separate trials of claims against a diverse defendant and a nondiverse defendant did not permit removal of a plaintiffs claim against the diverse defendant where the claims had not been separately docketed in state court and the plaintiffs claim against the nondiverse defendant had been removed together with the claim against the diverse defendant 1: holding that because there was complete diversity when the action commenced diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse plaintiff which was not indispensable 2: holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined 3: holding that plaintiffs had not fraudulently joined nondiverse defendants where the plaintiffs claims were based on respondeat superior if no cause of action can be stated against the nondiverse defendants for their alleged torts no case exists against defendant new england for example if a statute of limitation has run on a claim against a nondiverse defendant it necessarily has run for new england accordingly the arguments offered by new england to prove fraudulent joinder simultaneously show that no case can be made against the diverse defendant 4: holding that diversity jurisdiction was not established by a statecourt order that provided only that the plaintiffs claims against a nondiverse defendant be and hereby are severed from this action", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "In support of his argument, Mattingly relies solely upon a statement in Johnson that, generally, a taking involves \"an actual interference with, or disturbance of property rights, which are not merely consequential, or incidental injuries to property or property rights....\" Id. at 804 (quoting School Town of Andrews v. Heiney, 178 Ind. 1, 7, 98 N.E. 628, 630 (1912)). Johnson does not stand for the proposition that a taking occurs each time a party asserts its property rights. Johnson dealt with the creation of a regulated drain, and we held that the establishment of such worked no additional taking of property \"save that incidentally required by the county to enter upon the land to repair and maintain the drain.\" Id.; see Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 182 Ind. 36, 105 N.E. 496 (1914) (<HOLDING>). No unconstitutional taking occurred when the Holdings: 0: recognizing that reasonable time limitations may be placed on the exercise of constitutional rights 1: holding that a preexisting but nondisabling condition does not bar recovery of compensation if a jobrelated injury causes the condition to escalate to the level of disability 2: holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendants fourth amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation 3: holding that practice which discourages exercise of fifth or sixth amendment rights by penalizing through enhanced sentencing the exercise of those rights is unconstitutional 4: holding that compensation need not be made as condition to exercise of drainage law rights", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it were armed and dangerous, the use of a shotgun to penetrate the iron gate or security door that was protecting the front entrance of the residence was not unreasonable. We further conclude that the Nevada \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute, NRS 179.055, was not violated. Several of the officers at the scene testified that they announced their presence by yelling something to the effect of \u201cPolice officer. Search warrant,\u201d prior to penetrating the premises. Immediately thereafter, shots were fired from the interior of the residence. We therefore hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the officers substantially complied with NRS 179.055 and properly entered the apartment under exigent circumstances to execute the warrant. See United States v. Fox, 790 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Nev. 1992) (<HOLDING>). 6. King contends that the State failed to Holdings: 0: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 1: holding fourth amendment not violated by failure to announce where compliance would have increased officers peril 2: holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable 3: holding that compliance with an officers orders is a material fact when deciding whether the officers use of force was reasonable 4: holding that noncompliance with nrs 179055 was justified where compliance with statute would have placed officers in great physical peril", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "if \u00a7 1141 were to take precedence over \u00a7 553, then set off would only be allowed if written into the plan and \u00a7 553 would be rendered meaningless. Id. at 1277. If the court denied set off, the creditor would be required to fully pay its debt to the debtor while only receiving a fraction of the money it is owed. Id. Since the De Laurentiis decision, a majority of courts considering the issue have extended its reasoning to the chapter 13 context and have held that a creditor\u2019s right to set off is not extinguished by confirmation of the plan under \u00a7 1327. See In re Whitaker, 173 B.R. 359, 362-63 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1994); In re Womack, 188 B.R. 259, 261-62 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1995); In re Orlinski, 140 B.R. 600, 603-4 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1991). See also, In re Wiegand, 199 B.R. 639, 641 (W.D.Mich.1996)(<HOLDING>). As in the De Laurentiis case, set off rights Holdings: 0: holding a party who survives summary judgment should not be subject to sanctions for asserting frivolous claims 1: recognizing that a critical safeguard set forth in miranda is a persons right to cut off questioning 2: holding that the creditors right to equitable relief constituted a dischargeable claim 3: holding that a creditors right to set off survives a final discharge ofdebt 4: holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of an abuse of process claim, but does not state that 134 . For the purpose of an abuse of criminal process claim, an arrest may be considered as \"regularly issued process.\u201d See Widget, 2013 WL 1104273, at *8 (citing Cook, 41 F.3d at 80; TADCO Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 700 F.Supp.2d 253, 272 (E.D.N.Y.2010)). I also note that the fact that Pinter\u2019s arrest may not have been based on probable cause, and thus could be considered \u201cirregular\u201d criminal process, is not fatal to Pinter\u2019s claim. Cook illustrates that irregular process \u2014 in that case, an arraignment known to be based on an arrest lacking probable cause \u2014 can constitute abuse of criminal process. See Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. 135 . See Ketchuck v. Boyer, No. 10 Civ. 870, 2011 WL 5080404, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (<HOLDING>). 136 . See Def. Mem. at 16, n. 3. 137 . N.Y. Holdings: 0: recognizing that an arrest based on probable cause cannot be the basis of a claim for false arrestimprisonment 1: holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest 2: holding that arguable probable cause provides an objectively reasonable justification for issuing process and thus gives rise to qualified immunity against an abuse of process claim no less than against a false arrest claim 3: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 4: holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is void. See Zanger, 548 So.2d at 748. The information in this case did not contain the exact judicial circuits involved but stated that the crimes occurred in two or more judicial circuits and were part of a related conspiracy. In Nuckolls the court considered a similar argument that the information failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the court because it did not properly allege facts to show the jurisdiction of the OSP to file the charges. The court rejected the challenge, finding that the information contained the general statutory language which was sufficient to fulfill the jurisdictional requirements. That language is identical to the language in the information in this case. See Nuckolls, 677 So.2d at 15; see also Winter v. State, 781 So.2d at 1116-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). Although in 2009 the Legislature amended Holdings: 0: holding that allegation of cipa violation is sufficient to confer standing 1: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 2: holding that similar language provided a sufficient general jurisdiction allegation 3: holding similar language to be a valid disclaimer 4: holding that the language was intended as guidance for the attorney general", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "viewpoint or race. It is important to examine the proffered justifications for a college\u2019s selective denial of recognition to an organization. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 184-85, 92 S.Ct. at 2347-48. Mere disagreement with the group\u2019s philosophy is not an adequate ground for denial of First Amendment rights because a state college cannot \u201crestrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent.\u201d Id. at 187-88, 92 S.Ct. at 2349. \u201c \u2018[T]he freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 188, 92 S.Ct. at 2349 (quoting Communist Party of the United Stat 737 F.2d 1317, 1333 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1001, 105 S.Ct. 1860, Holdings: 0: holding that where university has opened its forum to other similar student groups its denial of recognition to homosexual student group was the sort of viewpoint based discrimination forbidden by perry and was invalid under the first amendment unless the university could support this discrimination by providing a compelling reason for its actions 1: holding that a university creates a public forum when it makes its facilities generally available to registered student groups 2: holding that communications between the university of colorados counsel and former employees of the university concerning activities during their period of employment may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege under the rationale presented in upjohn but holding that the university waived the privilege by disclosing the documents 3: holding that public school violated homosexual students first amendment right to speech and expression when it banned him from bringing a samesex date to the prom notwithstanding that the student and another homosexual student had previously been assaulted by other students and that the school was forced to provide additional security and escorts 4: holding that university violated first amendment by expelling student for printing indecent newspaper despite student code prohibiting indecent conduct or speech", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "expert witness, testified that the existence of an annual renewable employment agreement between the Foundation and D\u2019Unger was consistent with generally accepted accounting practices and corporate governance standards regarding how corporate officers are employed and compensated. The Foundation\u2019s by-laws provide that \u201c[ejection or appointment of an officer or agent shall not of itself create contract rights.\u201d In light of that evidence, D\u2019Un-ger\u2019s testimony about his understanding of the one-year, renewable term of his employment with the Foundation, standing alone, will not support a finding that the Foundation agreed to an employment contract that limited its right to terminate D\u2019Unger. See Williams v. First Tenn. Nat\u2019l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 804 (Tex.App.Dallas 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). D\u2019Unger was required to present probative Holdings: 0: holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill  was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law 1: holding where employee handbook and employment offer letter disclaimed creation of employment contract that employees testimony of his understanding of terms of agreement did not raise fact issue of specific express and clear agreement contradicting the express provisions of the personnel manual and the employment offer letter 2: holding offer of continued atwill employment did not constitute consideration for the arbitration agreement 3: holding that under arkansas law employment is atwill unless personnel manual or employment agreement contains express provision that employee shall not be discharged except for cause 4: holding that whether a personnel policy manual modifies an employment contract is a question of fact", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the violation as well as restore and compensate the employee. Id. Again, because these remedies adequately promoted the relevant public policy, the Cudney court was unwilling to recognize a common law tort remedy. See 172 Wn.2d at 536, 538. \u00b615 In Cudney, our Supreme Court additionally held law enforcement action available under Washington statutes criminalizing drunk driving adequately protected the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. There, the employee reported to his private employer that his supervisor drove a company vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 527-28. But the employee did not inform l court issued another opinion applying Korslund and Cudney, and our Supreme Court denied review of that case despite Piel. See Weiss v. Lonnquist, 173 Wn. App. 344, 353-60, 293 P.3d 1264 (<HOLDING>), review denied, 178 Wn.2d 1025 (2013). \u00b618 Our Holdings: 0: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 1: holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 2: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 3: holding that where the conviction was final the disciplinary commission was not authorized to assume the roles of both an accusatory tribunal and the ultimate determiner of guilt and that the separation of responsibility between the disciplinary board and the disciplinary commission provides constitutional due process 4: holding the misconduct reporting and disciplinary process prescribed by the washington rules of professional conduct rpc 33 and 83 adequately promoted attorney candor toward the tribunal", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "DiGiacinto also reviewed Molina\u2019s 1999 MRI and concluded that her bulging discs were not caused by the accident but were instead degenerative. Her examining physician, Jacobson, testified that Molina should have been able to perform her normal daily functions within a week following the accident. Sosina, the most recent doctor to examine Molina, also concluded that there was no objective evidence of a relevant limitation. Molina has failed to sufficiently counter this evidence. The evidence of Molina\u2019s bulging discs is inadmissible because it is based solely upon an unsworn report from a doctor who has not submitted a sworn affidavit or otherwise participated in this litigation. See, e.g., Friedman v. U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 A.D.2d 266, 627 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (App. Div.2d Dep\u2019t 1995) (<HOLDING>). In any event, even assuming the admissibility Holdings: 0: holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another 1: holding purposely inflicts  serious injury and intended to cause serious injury convey the same specific intent such that it is impossible to commit one without the other 2: holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim 3: holding unsworn declaration as opposed to an affidavit sworn to before a notary public admissible to prove serious injury under 28 usc  1746 4: holding unsworn mri report inadmissible to establish serious injury", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "interlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment ....\u201d) (emphasis added). 15 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(A)(ii). 16 . Id.-, see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure \u00a7 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 17 . First Nat\u2019l Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969). 18 . E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2012); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984). 19 . Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989). 20 . Small ay Int\u2019l. Co., 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). See also 15A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Holdings: 0: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 1: holding that the parties stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment 2: holding that the circuit courts order concluding that it was without jurisdiction to entertain a complaint because the case had been dismissed without prejudice constituted a final order because all other claims either had been refiled or dismissed with prejudice 3: holding that because the claims were dismissed with prejudice there was a final judgment for purposes of appellate review 4: holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). By contrast, \"[g]eneral jurisdiction arises when a defendant maintains 'continuous and systematic\u2019 contacts with the forum state\u201d and permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant \u201ceven when the cause of action has no relation to those contacts.\u201d Id. (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). Only specific jurisdiction over OMsignal is alleged to exist in this case, and on the record before the Court, it is apparent that OMsignal\u2019s contacts with Georgia would not permit this Court to exercise general jurisdiction over OMsignal. 5 . See Toys \"R\" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Holdings: 0: recognizing a split of authority 1: recognizing that takings cases are based on the proper exercise of statutory and regulatory authority 2: holding that the affiants statement  based upon his belief  did not demonstrate the personal knowledge required by fedrcivp 56e 3: holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted 4: recognizing zippo as a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an internet web site", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "999 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex.App.\u2014Amarillo 1999, no pet.); Clemons v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 879 S.W.2d 385, 391 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). When the language of the insurance .policy is unambiguous, it is the court\u2019s duty to give the words used their plain meaning. Clemons, 879 S.W.2d at 391. Here, the policy unambiguously required the insured, Perrotta, to submit to an EUO and sign and swear to it. Perrotta relies on Century Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 135 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014 Austin 1939, no writ) for the proposition that his failure to sign and return the EUO was not a material breach of the policy. Hogan, however, is distinguishable. In that case, the insured provided a reason for not signing the EUO: the notary was unab 736 (Tex.App.\u2014Eastland 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Pogo Holding Corp. v. New York Property Ins. Holdings: 0: holding insureds failure to comply with notice provision in insurance policy resulted in no coverage for a newly acquired car 1: holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed 2: holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted 3: holding insureds failure to comply with terms of policy requiring him to sign and return an euo was a material breach 4: holding that liability insurance policy that expressly excluded coverage for the insureds intentional acts did not cover punitive damages award assessed against the insured and stating in dictum that public policy forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not illegal. She ignores that the Administrative Judge disbelieved her explanation that Asenlix, taken pursuant to a valid prescription, caused her positive drug test. In light of that credibility assessment it is irrelevant whether \u201cillegal drugs\u201d includes drugs prescribed outside of this country. Fuentes\u2019 arguments are relevant only to issues the Administrative Judge never reached. Fuentes offers this court no logical or con vincing reason to reverse the Board\u2019s decision on liability. II. Whether or not a penalty was reasonable we must leave to the sound discretion of the agency unless the Board\u2019s affirmance of the penalty is not supported by substantial evidence or the penalty amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. Def. Logistics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the Board that the authorized Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: holding the court will not disturb the decision of the abcmr unless it was arbitrary capricious contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence 2: holding that the trial court has broad discretion in granting denying dissolving or modifying injunctions and unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated appellate courts will not disturb the trial courts decision 3: holding that when plaintiffs argue an inconsistent jury verdict this court will not disturb the trial courts denial of a motion for a new trial absent a showing of abuse of discretion 4: holding that the court will not disturb a penalty unless it exceeds the range of permissible punishment or is so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of discretion  citation omitted", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "damages, costs and attorney\u2019s fees become available remedies for non-payment of claims against any insurer that does business in Florida and also against any affiliated insurer. 3 . I reject the Commissioner\u2019s assertion that plaintiffs cannot raise their federal constituJ tional claims in federal court. This is an action seeking injunctive relief against the Commissioner in his official capacity. The longstanding doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), squ act is a citizen of the state at issue at the time when the contract is entered, the state does not, for that reason alone, obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under the contract. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Charm, 19 F.3d 624, Holdings: 0: recognizing that even entry into contract with citizen of state does not necessarily subject party to jurisdiction in state 1: holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen 2: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 3: recognizing that a citizen can sue the state in state court to attempt to obtain a discharge of a student loan and allowing the debtor to refile in state court 4: holding that state senator who was attorney for party to contract with state was in violation of  109", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a), Congress provided for judicial review of final orders of removal issued by the BIA. Moreover, Section 1252(b)(1) states that \u201c[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under [\u00a7 1252(a)(1) ], ... [t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(1). Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, a non-criminal alien could seek judicial review of the BIA\u2019s decision through either (i) a petition for review, which was required to be filed within 30 days of the BIA\u2019s issuance of its final order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(1), or (ii) a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241, for which there was no time limit. See Luya Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). On May 11, 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Holdings: 0: holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a  2241 petition 1: holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review 2: holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law 3: holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time 4: holding that review under  2241 still available notwithstanding express language in iirira barring review by any court of final orders of removal for aliens deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense and distinguishing between direct and collateral review", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "advanced by Justice CORRIGAN\u2014 limiting MCR 3.501(F) tolling to identical claims that were asserted or may have been asserted in an initial complaint \u2014 would frustrate the very purpose of MCR 3.501. Further, we perceive no sound reason for the limitation that Justice CORRIGAN would place on MCR 3.501(F). For example, just as the filing of a class action that does not meet the requirements for class certification generally tolls the period of limitations with respect to all persons within the class described in the complaint, American Pipe, supra, the filing of a class action by a person who does not meet the requirements to serve as the class representative also tolls the period of limitations. See, e.g., Birmingham Steel Corp v Tennessee Valley Auth, 353 F3d 1331, 1333 (CA 11, 2003) (<HOLDING>); Lynch v Baxley, 651 F2d 387 (CA 5, 1981) Holdings: 0: holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory 1: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint 2: holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification 3: holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity 4: holding that the district court abused its discretion by decertifying the class without permitting class counsel reasonable time to determine whether a new class representative could be substituted", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1301-02 (1978)); see also Maniscaclo v. Kenworthy, No. 03-P-626, 815 N.E.2d 656 (table), 2004 WL 2185422, at *3 (Mass.App.Ct. Sept.28, 2004) (per curiam) (\u201cWhere, as here, [the] affidavit is uncontradicted other than by the deputy\u2019s return, the affidavit controls.\u201d). Similarly, federal courts have held that an affidavit denying agency, standing alone, may be sufficient to overcome the presumption of proper service created by the return of service. See Hornick v. S. & M. Trucking Co., 208 F.Supp. 950, 952 (M.D.Pa.1962); Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 16 F.R.D. 391, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y.1954); Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp. v. Thistle Down Co., 2 F.R.D. 550, 551 (N.D.Ohio 1942); see also Ellibee v. Leonard, 226 Fed.Appx. 351, 356 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, Holdings: 0: holding that a 16 month relationship was not of sufficient length 1: holding that agreements established agency relationship 2: holding averments of defendants sufficient to refute agency relationship 3: holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish an agency relationship for service to be effective 4: recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "argues that the trial court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because under these facts the search could not be justified as a search incident to arrest where the police had a preplanned intention to arrest him and search the car for investigation of other crimes. He also contends that the search was illegal because the items removed from the car (videotapes, computer disks, and a briefcase) were taken to a remote site (the police department) and \u201csearched\u201d at a later time. Pugh is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction claims unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that he is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient nt v. State, 765 So.2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). It is not clear from this record why Pugh\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle 1: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not 2: recognizing that a search incident to a lawful arrest permits a law enforcement officer to conduct a warrantless search of a container located in the area of the arrestees immediate control 3: holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle 4: holding that search of golf bag was not legal as search incident to arrest because it was not in passenger compartment of vehicle or otherwise within arrestees immediate control", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "different phone calls between Alvarez and Grabe\u2014 without specifying the date or the content of those calls\u2014is not enough to satisfy Rule 9(b)\u2019s requirement to \u201cspecify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent ... state where and when the statements were made, and ... explain why the statements were fraudulent.\u201d Anatian, 193 F.3d at 88; see also Colony at Holbrook, 928 F.Supp. at 1231; McGee, 2009 WL 2132439,. at *5. Also, the calls were between Alvarez and Grabe, not Alvarez and the Town. Indeed, the Complaint does not allege that Alvarez made any fraudulent communication with the Town that could provide a basis for fraud liability. As for Carillo, Pacheco, and Casasola, the Town allege Ltd., No. 12 CIV. 8248 LLS, 2013 WL 5882928, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2013) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the Complaint fails to plead Holdings: 0: holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes 1: holding that  charges should be given more precise content by taxes and fees  2: holding that a plaintiff must plead with specificity as to the statements or omissions considered to be fraudulent the speaker when and why the statements were made and an explanation of why they were fraudulent 3: holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable 4: holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes  but no such fees or taxes were due", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "342 N.C. 813, 823, 467 S.E.2d 428, 433-34 (1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723 (alteration in original)). However, \u201c[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.\u201d State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 438, 629 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1021, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006). Defendant\u2019s statement that he \u201cwas not going to snitch\u201d when asked the correct name of an accomplice is not a clear invocation of his right to silence. At most, his response was ambiguous and did not require officers to cease their questioning or seek clarification. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Finally, defendant contends that he was Holdings: 0: holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel 1: holding that after a suspect unambiguously requests counsel the suspects responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request 2: holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel 3: holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously 4: holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "an injunction ordering issuance of a permit is a proper remedy for a violation of the sitting provisions of the facilities sitting subsection of the TCA); New York SMSA, L.P. v. Town of Clarkstown, 99 F.Supp.2d 381, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (recognizing an injunction is the proper remedy for a violation of the sitting provisions of the facilities sitting subsection of the TCA, but declining to grant an injunction on the facts of the case); Group EMF, Inc. v. Coweta County, 50 F.Supp.2d. 1338, 1350-51 (N.D.Ga.1999) (granting mandamus relief to plaintiff by ordering board of commissioners to grant a permit and concluding remand would frustrate intent of TCA to provide relief on an expedited basis); 360 Communications Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 50 F.Supp.2d 551, 564 (W.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); Iowa Wireless Servs., L.P. v. City of Moline, Holdings: 0: holding enforcement of the tcas substantive provisions through  1983 would distort the scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies created by the tcas remedial provisions after identifying the express private remedy in the tca  332c7 the court concluded that congress did not intend this remedy to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a  1983 action 1: holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy 2: holding injunctive relief ordering issuance of a permit is the remedy that best serves the tcas goal of expediting resolution of actions and granting such an injunction 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction 4: recognizing a permanent injunction as a means of ordering specific performance", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "appeal waiver. 14 F.Supp.2d 816, 819 (E.D.Va.1998). The court concluded that the defendant could still file a petition under \u00a7 2255 if his claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel or challenged the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Id. In sum, a \u00a7 2255 waiver should not bar ineffective assistance of counsel claims or claims that a guilty plea was involuntary, just as direct appeal waivers do not bar those claims. General enforcement of \u00a7 2255 waivers, subject to the same exceptions as direct appeal waivers, aligns with precedent from other district courts in this Circuit that have indicated a defendant\u2019s waiver of the right to file a \u00a7 2255 motion is as valid as a waiver of the right to a direct appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 113 F.Supp.2d 879, 898 (E.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tayman, 885 F.Supp. 832, 834 Holdings: 0: holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver 1: holding the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding a defendants waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement 2: holding that the united states breach of the plea agreement releases the defendant from the appeal waiver 3: holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so 4: holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "arrest matched an exemplar print of Haward\u2019s left index finger. Haward cross-examined Officer Knapp but did not offer a fingerprint expert of his own. The jury ultimately found Haward guilty of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. In this court Haward first argues that the district court did not properly conduct its Daubert hearing to determine the admissibility of fingerprint evidence under Rule 702, a determination that we review de novo. See United States v. Cruz-Velasco, 224 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir.2000). Specifically, he contends that fingerprint evidence is inadmissible under Daubert because it is not \u201cscientifically\u201d based. The standards of Daubert, however, are not limited in application to \u201cscientific\u201d testimony alone. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the idea that fingerprint Holdings: 0: holding that the district court properly admitted expert testimony under daubert that was based on inter alia the doctors clinical experience and review of the medical records 1: holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge 2: holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony 3: holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge  4: holding that the basic gatekeeping obligation of daubert applies to all expert testimony", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "alleged forced sterilization. In re J-S- 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (A.G. 2008). Instead, in order to establish eligibility for relief on family planning grounds, a partner must demonstrate past persecution based on his own \u201cother resistance\u201d to a coercive population control program or a well founded fear that he will be subject to persecution for such \u201cresistance.\u201d Id. Even assuming that Chen-Xu established that he engaged in other resistance, he failed to challenge on appeal to the BIA the IJ\u2019s finding that he did not demonstrate past persecution. Thus, we decline to review as unexhausted Chen Xu\u2019s argument in his brief to this Court that his two day detention and 12,000 RMB f\u00edne amounted to persecution. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 121-22, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the agency reasonably found Holdings: 0: holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement 1: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 2: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 3: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 4: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "stating its reasons for imposing the sentence it did, the district court did not state it was doing so for the purpose of making White eligible for any BOP treatment program. Furthermore, according to the government, Tapia made clear a sentencing \u201ccourt commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.\u201d 131 S.Ct. at 2392. Finally, the government argues this court should discount the district court\u2019s inclusion of \u00a7 3553(a)(2)(D) in the list of factors it considered in deciding to vary upward from the advisory range because that reference came as part of a \u201cformulaic recitation of the statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.\u201d See United States v. Collins, 461 Fed-Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). The government\u2019s arguments as to the absence Holdings: 0: holding a sentencing court is not obligated to expressly weigh on the record each of the factors set out in  3553a 1: holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances 2: holding in similar circumstances that a formulaic recitation of the sentencing factor set out in  3553a2d supplies little indication that a court lengthened a sentence for rehabilitative purposes 3: holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances 4: holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Some of the prerequisites for review by extraordinary writ are arguably met here. The district court\u2019s order brings about a serious intrusion into Vidrine\u2019s privacy and his mental and emotional health, and the question presented is a novel issue of importance affecting privacy interests and the contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition, the district court\u2019s use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 was likely a \u201cclear abuse of discretion.\u201d E.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 109-12, 85 S.Ct. 234. Vidrine did not put his mental or physical health \u201cin controversy\u201d as a disputed merits issue, Fed.R.CivP. 35(a)(1); rather, his mental health is only relevant to whether he may be made to sit for a deposition, cf, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 121, 85 S.Ct. 234 (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 209 Holdings: 0: holding that rule 35 does not permit sweeping examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or physical condition by asserting his mental or physical condition either in support of or in defense of a claim and that mere relevance to the case is insufficient 1: holding that a medical impairment is deemed  severe  when alone or in combination with other medically determinable physical or mental impairments it significantly limits an individuals physical or mental ability to do basic work activities 2: holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness 3: holding that evidence of an impaired mental condition that does not rise to floridas definition of insanity is not admissible 4: holding testimony about plaintiffs mental and physical state before treatment by physician was relevant", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(15) and OCGA \u00a7 16-6-8 (d) at their plain meaning, avoiding an interpretation that would result in surplusage, and applying the last-enacted rule, we conclude that \u201cpublic place\u201d includes \u201cjails and penal and correctional institutions of the state and its political subdivisions\u201d only in the context of the public-indecency statute. Therefore, as a matter of law, Singletary cannot be/could not have been convicted of affray for engaging in a fight in th attery charge. 4 See OCGA \u00a7 16-11-32 (a); see also In the Interest of X. W., 301 Ga. App. 625, 630 (4) (688 SE2d 646) (2009) (though challenged on other grounds, upholding adjudication of delinquency based on affray that occurred inside public-school restroom). See generally Watson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 562, 564 (1) (583 SE2d 228) (2003) (<HOLDING>). 5 See generally OCGA \u00a7 16-1-3 (containing Holdings: 0: holding that pjarticipants in the affray must intend to fight unwilling participants or those acting solely in selfdefense lack the necessary intent footnote omitted 1: holding the defendant sufficiently raised a selfdefense justification in a murder prosecution while thoroughly evaluating selfdefense burden of proof jurisprudence but declining to address applicable burden of proof for raising selfdefense in the virgin islands 2: holding that defendant properly raised selfdefense but passing on the applicable burden of proof for establishing selfdefense in a voluntary manslaughter prosecution in the virgin islands 3: holding that preservation of error in the trial court is not necessary as to lack of standing 4: holding that iiriras permanent rules lack the clear statement of the congressional intent necessary to eliminate habeas review", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "damages which are fairly attributable to defendants\u2019 conduct, etc., speak to the practical considerations of why such a claim should not be allowed. Simply put, plaintiff cannot show that defendants\u2019 alleged conduct was the proximate cause of its injuries. Id. at 944-945. The same conclusion has been reached in every other cigarette case alleging breach of a special duty of which this Court is aware. See, e.g. Wright v. Brooke Group, 652 N.W.2d 159, 178 (Iowa 2002) (\u201cWe do not think the defendants\u2019 statements that they would report on the results of them research into the health effects of cigarette smoking was an undertaking to render a service to its customers.\u201d); Ky. Laborers Disk Council Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 24 F.Supp.2d 755, 774 (W.D.Ky. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Mass. Laborers\u2019 Health & Welfare Fund v. Holdings: 0: holding that any member of the general public can initiate an action to raise issues involving the public trust in air water or other natural resources of the state 1: holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program 2: holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver 3: recognizing an individuals right of privacy in the content of health records and noting that health records are the property of the health care entity maintaining them 4: holding that cigarette manufacturers pledges of resources to assist the scientific and public health communities with tobacco research did not undertake to do anything specific for any particular person or entity", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization\u2019s constitution and bylaws.\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 411(a)(1). \u201cThe law does not require that a collective bargaining agreement be submitted to a local d 654, 666 (7th Cir.1992) (same); Ackley v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1476 (9th Cir.1992) (same); Cumis-key v. Seafarers Int\u2019l Union and Curtis Bay Towing Co., 1988 WL 54041, at *1-2, 1988 Dist. LEXIS 4720, at *4 (E.D.Pa. May 25,1988) (same). Cf. Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators\u2019 Protective Union Local 221, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no express requirement in the Holdings: 0: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity 1: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 2: recognizing violations of section 101a1 where union officials circulated inadequate or misleading information about matters to be voted upon 3: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 4: holding no right under section 101a1 to vote on matters relating to collective bargaining agreements", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "uncertain guide to the meaning of \u201cofficial of the United States.\u201d In fact we need not look to the legislative history to determine the meaning of the term. The provision of the FCA that immediately precedes \u00a7 3731 makes it the duty of the Attorney General to diligently investigate violations of the statute and identifies only private relators and the Attorney General \u2014 not other government agencies \u2014 as parties who may sue under the statute. 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 3730(a) & (b)(1). For this reason, we agree with those courts that have concluded that the term \u201cofficial of the United States charged with responsibility to act,\u201d as used in \u00a7 3731(b)(2), means pertinent Department of Justice officials. Accord, United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354, 363 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Macomb Contracting Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 1: holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances 2: holding without discussion that the official of the united states charged with responsibility could only have been the appropriate official of the civil division of the department of justice which alone has the authority to initiate litigation under the act 3: holding that bribing a public official does not amount to a conspiracy with that official to extort the briber under the hobbs act 4: holding that the color of law element may be satisfied by the fact that an official gains access to the victim in the course of official duty", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "& Guaranty Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo.1999). To determine the ordinary meaning of a term in an insurance contract, the Missouri Supreme Court \u201cconsults standard English language dictionaries.\u201d Id. If there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to construction of the contract, but rather the intent of the parties is determined from the four corners of the contract. Id. \u201cTo ascertain the intent of the parties to an unambiguous contract, we give the language used its natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning, and consider the entire contract, along with its object, nature and purpose.\u201d Robbins, 27 S.W.3d at 496. The absence of a definition of \u201cmanagerial\u201d in the contract does not, by itself, create ambiguity. See Burns v. Plaza West Associates, 979 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). The ordinary, common sense meaning of acts Holdings: 0: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 1: holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa 2: holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract 3: holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning 4: holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "we would not consider it binding, or even persuasive, in determining whether to grant a writ for habeas corpus. \u201cSection 2254(d) requires us to give state courts\u2019 opinions a respect ful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal question, it is the law \u2018as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States\u2019 that prevails.\u2019 \u201d Williams, 529 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. at 1510. We find that the analysis set forth by Johnson is much more compelling. Because the 1997 Amendments do not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, see infra, petitioner\u2019s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Likewise, Meeks does not apply to this case, because it dealt with sentencing statutes and not parole guidelines. See generally Newland, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (<HOLDING>). We agree that it is reasonable to interpret Holdings: 0: holding that an amendment passed two years into a 10year automatic extension period was not effective until the 10year extension period expired and stating that to hold otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless 1: holding that extension of a federal grand jurys term was within the discretionary powers of the district court 2: holding that the extension of meeks by the smith court was inappropriate 3: holding that an amendment of restrictive covenants passed during the running of an automatic 10year extension period was not effective until the end of the 10year extension period 4: holding that a district court may not construe an untimely notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "397 (1994). Accord Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1496, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 924, 110 S.Ct. 2617, 110 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); and Hodge v. Prince, 730 F.Supp. 747, 751 (N.D.Tex.1990), affirmed 923 F.2d 853 (5th Cir.1991). 132 . Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d at 820. 133 . Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir.1993), quoting Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, r.1973). 139 . See Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d at 762. 140 . See Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 43 (5th Cir.1996). 141 . Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d at 769. 142 . See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d at 1329; and Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 622 (5th Cir.1985). 143 . See Eason v. Thalet 14 F.3d 8, 9-10 (5th Cir.1994), (<HOLDING>); Pembroke v. Wood County, Texas, 981 F.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution 1: holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population 2: holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts 3: holding that allegations of a total denial of all access to the prison law library for 25 days following a prison riot stated a constitutional violation 4: holding that during a postriot lockdown refusal of access to main law library is constitutional as long as access to basic law library for initial legal research is permitted", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "court have jurisdiction to review a claim by employees that their union violated the NLRA by charging agency fees for nonrepresentational purposes, which also is arguably an unfair labor practice. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742-43, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988); see also Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 74, 110 S.Ct. 424, 107 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989); Storey v. Local 327, Int\u2019l Bhd. of Teamsters, 759 F.2d 517, 520 (6th Cir.1985) (when Garmon applies, \u201cneither state nor federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction\u201d); id. at 522 (\u201cThough state interference ... was involved in Garmon, the Supreme Court made it clear that pre-emption applies to federal district c me); Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 237-39, 91 S.Ct. 609 (<HOLDING>); Serrano v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 790 Holdings: 0: holding that congress referred claims under the labormanagement reporting and disclosures act not to the nlrb but to the federal courts even when the conduct at issue is also an arguably unfair labor practice 1: holding that the nlrb general counsels decision to issue an unfair labor practice complaint is unreviewable because inter alia review would invade the realm of prosecutorial discretion 2: holding that gannon preemption does not constitute complete preemption for removal purposes because  7 and 8 of the nlra do not create jurisdiction in the federal district courts instead those provisions vest jurisdiction in the nlrb to determine unfair labor practices and state courts are as able to determine if jurisdiction belongs in the nlrb as are the federal district courts 3: holding that federal district courts have jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining contracts even if such violations are also unfair labor practices subject to nlrb jurisdiction 4: holding that a federal district court may decide whether an activity is an unfair labor practice under the nlra when the matter is raised as a defense to a claim under an independent federal remedy over which the federal district courts do have jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "evidence for a reasonable [factfinder] to find that the employer\u2019s asserted non-[retaliatory] reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally [retaliated] against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?\u201d Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. In other words, did the plaintiff \u201cshow both that the reason was false, and that ... [retaliation] was the real reason.\u201d Weber, 494 F.3d at 186 (alterations in original and internal quotations omitted) (quoting St. Mary\u2019s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742). The court must consider whether the fact-finder could \u201cinfer [retaliation] from the plaintiffs prima facie case and any other evidence the plaintiff offers to show that the actions were [retaliatory] or that the non-[r .D.C. May 29, 2008) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff may establish a causal Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection 1: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection 3: holding that causal connection exists where investigation was initially caused in significant part by the disclosure 4: holding that plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection her complaints and the adverse action", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to those who have requested the evidence be preserved creates an inequity for plaintiffs \u2014 like Justo here \u2014 who are hampered in their ability to request preservation. This argument misses the point. The essential reason for a spoliation claim is its deterrent effect on miscreant defendants. This purpose is served only when an actual duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff has been willfully or recklessly disregarded. See Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(finding no basis to award sanctions based on a spoliation allegation where the defendant had not intentionally destroyed the evidence and was not under a court order to preserve the evidence); Pennsylvania Lumberman\u2019s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>). That is not the case here. In fact, Holdings: 0: holding no intentional spoliation occurred where defendant was not on notice that evidence was relevant to claim 1: holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required 2: holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs 3: holding that no spoliation claim existed where the defendant was not under any statutory or contractual duty to maintain or preserve the transformer in question and no evidence showed the defendant received actual notice before destroying the transformer 4: holding that to consider whether to apply a spoliation sanction the evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case and the party who destroyed the evidence must be under a duty to preserve the evidence", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "count does not remove the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction over a misdemeanor count when the misdemeanor count arises from the same incident as the felony count.\u201d 897 So.2d at 405. I agree with the State that the misdemeanor DUI charge upon which Marshall is now to be sentenced arises out of the same incident as did the felony DUI charge upon which Marshall was originally convicted. I therefore concur in the result reached by the main opinion. See also Davis v. State, 806 So.2d 404, 409 n. 1 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (Shaw, J., concurring in the result and noting that \u201cit would appear that a fourth DUI offense, in the absence of proof of three previous DUI offenses, necessarily arises from the same act that gave rise to the felony DUI charge\u201d); Hankins v. State, 989 So.2d 610 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2 . If Justice Lyons's description of the Holdings: 0: holding that dui conviction merges with aggravat ed assault by vehicle while dui conviction 1: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 2: holding that prior dui conviction could be used to enhance an offense to felony even though defendant did not have appointed counsel where defendant could not have been imprisoned for more than six months and was not in fact imprisoned 3: holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction 4: holding that the defendant was not guilty of felony dui because the state was unable to prove that the defendant had three prior dui convictions but remanding the case to the circuit court for resentencing without reference to any potential jurisdictional problem", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "The complete Revised Organic Act of 1954 is found at 48 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1541-1645 (1994), reprinted in V.I. CODE Ann., Historical Documents, Organic Acts, and U.S. Constitution at 159-60 (1995 & Supp. 2003) (preceding V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1) [\u201cRevised Organic Act\u201d]. 4 By contrast, involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or during the negligent commission of a lawful act. Knight, 764 F. Supp. at 1048. 5 Carlock did not challenge the trial court\u2019s self-defense jury instruction below, nor does he challenge it on appeal. 6 Decatur testified that when he first saw Carlock outside of th f witnesses, standing alone, is sufficient to uphold a conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 344 (3d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1255 (3d Holdings: 0: recognizing distinction made in maynard that one accomplices outofcourt statement may corroborate the incourt testimony of another accomplice but outofcourt testimony of a testifying accomplice cannot be used to corroborate his own testimony 1: holding that uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction 2: holding that uncorroborated accomplice testimony may provide the exclusive basis for a criminal conviction 3: holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated 4: holding that the uncorroborated testimony of an informant may be sufficient to sustain a conviction", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "contends was exceeded by the restitution order. Section 3663A(b)(l)(B) of Title 18 authorizes the district court to impose a restitution order for \u201can amount equal to the greater of the value of the property on the date of ... loss ... or the value of the property on the date of sentencing.\u201d See also 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3664(f)(1)(A) (\u201cIn each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim\u2019s losses as determined by the court (emphasis added). Bearden was ordered to pay restitution in an amount equal to the value of the stolen laptop computers, as calculated by the district court. This figure thus does not exceed the \u201cstatutory maximum\u201d found in the restitution statutes. Accord United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Bearden was potentially subject to Holdings: 0: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance 1: holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious 2: holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population 3: holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel 4: holding that  3663a is in this respect like a statute that permits the judge to impose any term of years up to life in prison and thus is not governed by apprendi", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "see also Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 943 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a property interest may arise from an express or implied contract, as well as a state statute or regulation). The plaintiffs assert that defendants deprived them of a property interest in an expected degree from an accredited state institution. Illinois courts have not identified clearly a property right in post-secondary education. However, Illinois courts have found that the payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an implied contract that the school will award a degree upon the student\u2019s satisfaction of the degree requirements established by the school. See Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 150 Ill.App.3d 733, 103 Ill.Dec. 842, 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Illinois Benedictine Coll., 112 Holdings: 0: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 1: holding that violation of accountants duties mandated by statute did not create a cause of action based on breach of implied contract for employee 2: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 3: holding that a student who allegedly completed all the requirements for a diploma but had not been given a diploma stated a cause of action for breach of an implied contract 4: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "these documents also indicate that \u201c[n]ot all Christians ... have found themselves to be targets of ethnic-religious persecution\u201d and that \u201c[t]he ongoing insurgency affects every segment of the population, Sunni, Shi\u2019a, and non-Muslim alike.\u201d Christians In Iraq at 2. According to a 2005 U.S. Department of State report, \u201cinsurgents and terrorists kidnapped and killed government officials and workers, common citizens, party activists participating in the electoral process, civil society activists, members of security forces, and members of the armed forces, as well as foreigners.\u201d Id. at 5. At the merits hearing, Hanna himself conceded that Iraq was in the middle of a \u201cvery bad\u201d civil war. Such a generalized or random possibility of harm in the country of removal is insuffici Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Toma v. Gonzales, 179 Fed.Appx. 320, 324 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that substantial evidence supported ijs conclusion that petitioners claims were consistent with general civil strife in iraq rather than  targeted persecution against christians 1: holding that iraqi petitioner who failed to establish past persecution nonetheless had a wellfounded fear of future persecution because evidence of country conditions supported the conclusion that the iraqi government would persecute as traitors any evacuees who returned to iraq 2: holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination 3: holding that ijs adverse credibility was not supported by substantial evidence where there were significant communication and translation problems  during the asylum hearing and the discrepancies at issue were not crucial to petitioners claim 4: holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where inter alia the petitioners claimed guerrilla persecution on their asylum applications but later claimed government persecution", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "21.) The conversation captured by Riddle\u2019s digital recorder belies this assertion and makes clear the extent of his intrusion, which included ordering Modrell to remain in one place and threatening to handcuff him. Riddle has not identified, and this Court cannot discern, any law-enforcement interest that justified encroaching on Modrell\u2019s privacy and freedom of movement in this way. d. Duration of Seizure The fourth McArthur factor considers whether the length of the seizure was reasonably related to the law-enforcement interest at stake. Scmgineto-Miranda accounts for this factor as part of its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, see supra note 7. A two\u2014 to three-hour delay to procure a search warrant is not per se unreasonable. Compare McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an initially reasonable seizure can become an unreasonable seizure that violates the fourth amendment when officers refuse to return seized property 1: holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement 2: holding that there was no fourth amendment seizure where delivery of package was not delayed because it is the extent of the interference with the defendants possessory interest in the property that determines whether a seizure has occurred 3: holding that a twohour residential seizure was not excessive 4: holding the eighth amendment succinctly prohibits excessive sanctions it provides excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted ", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "75, 76, 81, 83, 84, 91, 92, 94, 102, 105. The court finds these alleged statements insufficient because they are unaccompanied by facts which demonstrate their accuracy or Defendants\u2019 involvement or control in their preparation. Moreover, as recently determined by one court in this district: \u201ca plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of the PSLRA and Rule 9(b) merely by pleading the specific time, place, and contents of misleading statements by a specifically identified analyst. Rather, to hold a defendant liable for misleading statements published by a third party, the plaintiff must at least identify the defendant who provided the information that the third party made public to the market.\u201d Barrie, 2002 WL 1841631, * 3; see also Suna v. Bailey Corp., 107 F.3d 64, 72-73 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In none of the paragraphs alleging statements Holdings: 0: holding that even if defendants knew that the company had inventory problems  that fact standing alone does not show that defendants knew that the statements in their prospectus or other representations were materially false or misleading at the time the material statements were made 1: holding that plaintiffs did not satisfy particularity requirement where plaintiffs assertions were based in part on the statements of unnamed former employees 2: holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant 3: holding that a plaintiff must plead with specificity as to the statements or omissions considered to be fraudulent the speaker when and why the statements were made and an explanation of why they were fraudulent 4: holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the two- year statute of limitations applicable to actions for personal injury or property damage caused by exposure to hazardous chemical substances. 86. CEPA does not provide a statute of limitations. City of Bridgeport v. Santa Fuel, Inc., No. CV 980357102, 1999 WL 203794, at *3 n. 3 (Conn.Super.Ct. Apr.l, 1999). As this Court noted in Ca-labrese, 170 F.Supp.2d at 268, there has been considerable disagreement among the Connecticut courts as to which statute of limitations to apply to state environmental actions. See, e.g., Doty v. Mucci 238 Conn. 800, 805 n. 6, 679 A.2d 945 (1996) (refusing to reach the issue of the applicable statute of limitations for \u00a7 22a-452 claims); Electroformers, Inc. v. Emhart Corp., No. 29 78 91, 1993 WL 28904, at *4-6 (Conn.Super.Ct. Jan.29, 1993) (<HOLDING>); Nielsen v. Siotix Tools, Inc., 870 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations regardless of whether  52577c  52582 or  52577 was applied 1: holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply 2: holding that section 1 claims of direct purchasers of buspirone products were not barred by the statute of limitations 3: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations 4: holding that the plaintiffs claims under conn gemstat  22a16 were barred by the threeyear statute of limitations in conn genstat  52577 which began to run when the vendor caused the contamination of the property even though this was prior to the plaintiffs ownership of the contaminated property", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "FIFRA preempted Plaintiffs failure to warn claims and which relied on Med-tronic only for the proposition that courts must look first to the language of an express pre-emption clause and that the word \u201crequirements\u201d presumptively includes state causes of action as well as laws and regulations. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 571. The court in Hawkins also relied on a New Jersey Appellate Division decision in which that court explicitly distinguished Medtronic from Cipollone and concluded that FIFRA preempts state law failure to warn claims. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 572 (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J.Super. 53, 682 A.2d 724 (App.Div.1996)). Other courts have also continued to find FIFRA pre-emption after Medtronic. See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 288, 289-90 (D.Kan.1997) (<HOLDING>); Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 956 Holdings: 0: holding that those state law claims specifically related to labeling and packaging are preempted by fifra 1: holding that medtronic does not alter clear tenth circuit law holding that commonlaw labeling claims are preempted 2: holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 4: holding the state law claims were not preempted", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of a plan...\u201d); \u00a7 1121(b) (\u201c...only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief\u2019). I find persuasive an additional reason why \u201cunder a plan confirmed\u201d should be construed to describe eligible transfers rather than to impose a temporal restriction on the transaction itself. As a description, \u201cunder a plan confirmed\u201d embodies an intent to exclude ordinary course of business and non-debtor transactions from the scope of \u00a7 1146(c). These meanings lie within the definition of \u201cunder\u201d and are necessary to apply the provision. If Congress intended to encourage plan confirmation, it follows that Congress would facilitate the process by providing tax relief for only those transfers necessary for the plan, rather th 124-25 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>); cf., The Baldwin League of Independent Holdings: 0: holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary 1: holding that new yorks notice to judgment debtors satisfied due process by specifying that a procedure existed to adjudicate exemption claims and advising debtors to contact an attorney even though the notice did not inform judgment debtors of the specific steps to be taken to test exemption claims 2: holding it was irrelevant that irss collection of 100 section 6672 liability against responsible nondebtor debtors principal officer and major shareholder would affect the debtors reorganization although nondebtors financing was necessary for debtors reorganization bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the irs at debtors request on behalf of nondebtor 3: holding that transfers between nondebtor third parties not subject to  1146c exemption even if transfer necessary to finance acquisition of debtors property 4: holding that grant or denial of debtors claim of property exemption is final appealable order", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by the Keeper or designee unless the Keeper disapproves a nomination ....\u201d); id. \u00a7 60.6(t) (\"Any person or organization which supports or opposes the nomination .,. may petition the Keeper during the nomination process either to accept or reject a nomination .... Such petitions received by the Keeper prior to the listing of a property ... will be considered by the Keeper and the nomination will be substantively reviewed.\u201d); id- \u00a7 60.15(a)(4) (\"Properties removed from the:National Register for procedural error shall be reconsidr ered for listing by the Keeper after correction of the error or errors by ... the Keeper, as appropriate,\u201d); Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Moody Hill, 205 F.3d at 558 (<HOLDING>). 22 . This conclusion does not alter the fact Holdings: 0: holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba 1: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state 2: holding that the keeper has independent authority to determine whether properties are eligible for listing on the national register and to name them to the national register without the agreement of state agencies 3: holding that so long as the seller did not have an agreement with the buyer during the term of the listing agreement it was free to delay selling until after the listing agreement had expired even where the delay was for the purpose of escaping the payment of a commission 4: holding a states regulation of wyoming national guard was insufficient to implicate a special sovereignty interest because of the dual federal and state nature of national guard service", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "continuing. {21} Defendant further argues that this order was an acquittal on the refusal basis for aggravated DWI, apparently under the theory that it somehow finalized or solemnized the trial court\u2019s oral comme implicated in this case. The Ratchford exception is limited to an oral grant of a new trial being effective to defeat automatic denial provisions built into the rules of criminal procedure. 115 N.M. at 570-71, 855 P.2d at 559-60. The cases involving discharge of a jury can be distinguished because in those cases the proceedings were terminated and the fact-finder was discharged by the oral comments of the judge, while here, proceedings were ongoing and the court expressly reserved ruling on the aggravated DWI charge. Rodriguez, 2004-NMCA-125, \u00b6 14, 136 N.M. 494, 100 P.3d 200 (<HOLDING>); Reyes-Arreola, 1999-NMCA-086, \u00b6 10, 127 N.M. Holdings: 0: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 1: holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause 2: holding that oral declarations of mistrial which discharge the jury are unlike other oral decisions by the trial court which are not binding and are subject to change until a final written order or judgment is entered 3: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract 4: holding that oral discharge of jury terminated jeopardy", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with the meaning of the word \u2018appeal\u2019 in the context of [Article] VI, Section 27.\u201d Hicks, 105 N.M. at 287, 731 P.2d at 983. {23} In Hicks, this Court held that, because criminal actions in metropolitan court were not of record at that time, \u201cthe right of appeal in such actions is the right to a trial or hearing de novo in the district court[, and] [i]n de novo proceedings, the district court is not in any way bound by the proceedings in the lower court.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). We held that the district court was required to independently determine whether the requirements of the metropolitan court were complied with and thus remanded the case to district court to make such a determination. Id. Compare State v. Spillman, 2010-NMCA-019, \u00b6 6, 147 N.M. 676, 227 P.3d 1058 (filed 2009) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 673, Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendant fails to challenge his plea in district court he must establish plain error 1: holding that before a defendant could contest the validity of a plea entered in metropolitan court by appealing to district court he had to first move to set aside his plea in metropolitan court because in an ontherecord appeal to district court that court is the equivalent of an appellate court 2: holding that the district court had jurisdiction to order restitution of award overturned on appeal even in the absence of a remand from the appellate court 3: holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal 4: holding that if the defendant fails to file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea he cannot attack it for the first time on appeal", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "v. United States, 53 Fed.Cl. 241, 244 (2002) (\u201c[O]nly plaintiffs who are in privity of contract with the government can have standing to bring a claim in this court.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Centex Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed.Cl. 599, 603 (2002). In contrast, parties who sue as shareholders, with no independent stake in the outcome other than through their ownership interest in the corporation, are not in privity of contract and have no basis to allege injury for breach. See Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1354-55 (Fed.Cir.2001) (shareholders did not have standing to sue because they were not third-party beneficiaries to the contract, but at most incidental beneficiaries); First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan and Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); F.D.I.C. ex rel. Karnes County Sav. and Loan Holdings: 0: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 1: holding that shareholders had failed to maintain their status as shareholders by selling their shares after they had filed their complaint and therefore had lost standing to maintain a derivative suit 2: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 3: holding that in order for a plaintiff to file suit against the government on a contract claim in the court of federal claims a plaintiff must have either direct privity or thirdparty beneficiary status 4: holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "52 O.O. at 178, 116 N.E.2d at 424. The constitutionally secured guarantee of equal protection under the law \u201c \u2018implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to courts for both relief and defense under like conditions, with like protection, and without discrimination.\u2019 \u201d Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 595 N.E.2d 862, 866, quoting Sexton v. Barry (C.A.6, 1956), 233 F.2d 220, 224. When, as here, a legislative classification implicates neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, the classification is invalid only if it bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. Adkins v. McFaul (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 350, 351, 667 N.E.2d 1171, 1173. See, also, McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (<HOLDING>). As we noted above, the probate division and Holdings: 0: holding that a factual finding may be set aside if it rests on an erroneous view of the law 1: holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment 2: holding that family courts conclusions will not be set aside if supported by findings 3: holding that a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived of to justify it 4: holding that motion to dismiss should be denied if in view of what is alleged it can reasonably be conceived that the plaintiffs  could upon a trial establish a case which would entitle them to relief", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "neutral. Accordingly, the court must determine whether the defendants\u2019 actions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether there are sufficient alternative channels of communication. 1. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest The determination of whether the Village\u2019s restriction on Sandefur\u2019s speech was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest is a legal rather than a factual question. See Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1046 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1999); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528-29 (D.C.Cir. 1984). It is thus appropriate for resolution on summary judgment when no material underlying facts are in dispute. See MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1034 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). It is well-settled that a local government Holdings: 0: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information 1: holding 18 usca  922g8 passes constitutional muster because it is a reasonable restriction on the right to bear arms and is narrowly tailored to support a compelling government interest 2: holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 3: holding that such classifications are permissible only when suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest 4: holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the School District\u2019s automatic appeals as its own. Because I do not believe that Starwood automatically appealed the 2013 and 2014 assessments pursuant to section 518.1(b) of the Law, I would conclude that the School District\u2019s unilateral discontinuance of its appeal would not thwart that provision. I would also hold that the trial court did not err in permitting the School District to unilaterally discontinue its appeal without seeking leave of court. Pa. R.C.P. No. 229 reflects the \u201clongstanding practice in Pennsylvania\u201d that an appellant may choose to discontinue its appeal on its own initiative. Fancsali v. University Health Center of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159, 1161 (2000); see Farrington v. Department of Transportation, 35 Pa.Cmwlth. 373, 387 A.2d 136, 138 (1978) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 489 Pa. 400, 414 A.2d 128 (1980). Pa. Holdings: 0: holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged 1: holding that unilateral discontinuances are permitted where not specifically prohibited by the governing statute 2: holding that parties not specifically identified are not released 3: holding issues that are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived 4: recognizing that a reading of the oregon criminal statute indicates that the acts prohibited are those which are performed upon the mother rather than any action taken by her", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "his part in referring these criminal charges to court-martial. See Arts. 1(9) and 22(b), UCMJ, 10 USC \u00a7\u00a7 801(9) and 822(b). As Justice Frankfurter said in Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558, 78 S.Ct. 1263, 2 L.Ed.2d 1531 (1958): Audi alteram partem \u2014 hear the other side! \u2014 a demand made insistently through the centuries, is now a command, spoken with the voice of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, ... whenever any individual, however lowly and unfortunate, asserts a legal claim. However, notwithstanding the error made by the trial judge in not ordering a possible accuser under Article 22(a) to be questioned about his motives in referring charges against Captain Rockwood, I would hold this error harmless. See United States v. Jeter, 35 MJ 442, 446-47 (CMA 1992) (<HOLDING>). In my view, any reasonable Division Holdings: 0: holding error to be fundamental when record shows jurisdictional defect 1: holding that a violation of the forum defendant rule is a jurisdictional defect 2: holding jurisdictional defect voids judgment when defect exposes such personal jurisdictional deficiencies as to violate due process 3: holding that the district court which erred in its conclusion that there was jurisdictional defect abused its discretion in denying a plaintiffsmotion for leave to amend his complaint because the proposed amendment would not cure the jurisdictional defect 4: holding defect in referral by accuser not jurisdictional", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien\u2019s arrival in the United States.\u201d INA \u00a7 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(2)(B). An application filed after one year may also be considered \u201cif the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant\u2019s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the period specified____\u201d INA \u00a7 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(2)(D). Nevertheless, \u00a7 1158(a)(3) provides that \u201c[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(3); Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). This jurisdiction stripping provision remains Holdings: 0: holding that ij properly based adverse credibility finding on omission in asylum application where omitted fact went  to the heart of the asylum claim  citation omitted 1: holding that because the ij denied an asylum application as untimely we lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the final order of removal as it pertained to the asylum claim 2: holding that a properly filed motion to reopen is a prerequisite to the filing of a new asylum application when the petitioner is under a final removal order 3: holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application 4: holding that when an ij issues a decision granting an aliens application for withholding of removal without a grant of asylum the decision must include an explicit order of removal designating a country of removal", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "notice to or the presence of either attorney and without any formal record. Her later questioning of the two officers on the stand may have brought some of the substance of this in-chambers interview into formal evidence, but, as with her call to the pharmacy manager, it is impossible for this Court to know what further information may have been shared behind the closed doors of chambers. Thus, it is impossible to adequately review whether or not the private conversation inappropriately affected the judge\u2019s decision. This fact highlights one of the reasons ex parte contacts with a judge are impermissible when they address a matter pending before the judge: They leave no record for the reviewing court on appeal. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 356 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis. 1984) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 18. Our Code of Judicial Conduct supports Holdings: 0: holding that after review the minutes were unambiguous and the trial judge erred in admitting parol evidence 1: holding that trial judge sitting as finder of fact erred by making unnoticed and unrecorded visit to accident scene because in part such actions are outside the record and therefore beyond this courts reach in its review 2: holding that a challenge to the proper weight of the evidence is a question of fact outside this courts jurisdiction 3: holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review 4: holding that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses because evidence is weighed by the administrative agency and not by the courts", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "false and fraudulent information similar to the fourteen returns at trial. The government cited interviews with about twenty people conducted as part of the criminal investigation, another ten interviewed separately, and taxpayer statements that appeared in the audit files indicating that the taxpayers didn\u2019t provide the false information. The district court did not clearly err in finding that this evidence supported a pattern of deception attributable to Littrice and that by excluding from the group of 662 returns all cases in which the taxpayer contested their audit or where no additional tax was due, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the remaining returns reflected Littrice\u2019s relevant conduct. Cf. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 279, 178 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to county on monell claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that similar conduct occurred in the past 1: holding that the district court did not err in finding a pattern of numbers reported for various deductions that was strikingly similar to the returns proven fraudulent at trial established relevant conduct when the taxpayers agreed to pay the assessments without protest 2: holding that district court did not clearly err in giving twolevel enhancement for similar conduct 3: holding that trial court did not err 4: holding that district court did not err in finding that similar scheme involved sophisticated means", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "F.3d 98, 100 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir.2001)). We readily conclude that Duncan had sufficient warning to satisfy the due process concerns articulated in Rogers v. Tennessee. We have carefully reviewed each argument asserted on appeal, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment, sentence, and forfeiture of the district court are AFFIRMED. 1 . In his initial brief, Duncan made this Ap-prendi-type argument only with respect to the drug type issue, and not with respect to the other two enhancements referenced in any of the briefs, i.e., the firearm and role enhancements. Accordingly, he is not entitled to have this Court entertain the argument with respect to those other two enhancements. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241(11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830 Holdings: 0: holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief 1: holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal 2: holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal 3: holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief 4: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the party agreed to do so.\u201d And in AT&T Mobility v. Concepci\u00f3n, the Supreme Court struck down a California rule of decision because it allowed co . Merrill Lynch, 626 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Tyco Int\u2019l Ltd. Sec. Litig., 422 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (\"A determination that a party has waived its right to arbitrate is reviewed de novo, whereas the district court\u2019s findings of fact are subject to 'clear error\u2019 review.\u201d); Hoover v. Am. Income Life Ins. Co., 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 312, 319 (2012) (\"The waiver issue may be reviewed de novo when the question is whether the superior court properly applied the correct legal standard to the undisputed facts.,..\u201d); LAS, Inc. v. Mini-Tankers USA, Inc., 342 Ill.App.3d 997, 277 Ill.Dec. 547, 796 N.E.2d 633, 636 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Guttchen v. Gabriel, 49 P.3d 223, 225 Holdings: 0: holding that review of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is under the de novo standard 1: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo 2: holding that because the facts are not in dispute the court should review the arbitration waiver de novo and gathering federal cases holding the same 3: recognizing de novo standard of review 4: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "theory to worker\u2019s compensation case for exposure to toxic substancesXquoting Owens-Illinois, supra, 138 N.J. at 451, 650 A.2d 974); Universal-Rundle Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 319 N.J.Super. 223, 243-44, 725 A.2d 76 (App.Div.1999), certif. denied, 161 N.J. 149, 735 A.2d 574 (1999)(using continuous trigger theory to determine respective liability resulting from clean-up costs relating to soil and groundwater contamination); Sayre v. Ins. Co. of North Amer. 305 N.J.Super. 209, 211-12, 701 A.2d 1311 (App.Div.l997)(affirming trial court\u2019s use of continuous trigger liability analysis for progressive indivisible injury resulting from environmental contamination and cleanup of manufacturing site); Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 238 N.J.Super. 531, 537, 570 A.2d 443 (App.Div.l990)(<HOLDING>). Cf. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ply Gem Indus. Holdings: 0: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey 1: holding that under new jersey law any party that maintains minimum contacts with the  state that are continuous and substantial will be subject to personal jurisdiction 2: holding that continuous trigger theory reflects the law of new jersey allowing plaintiffs to seek recovery for chemical poisoning claims under successive policies 3: holding that a writ of execution under new jersey law is not an action against the consumer 4: recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to the superior court of the county in which the inferior court is located . . . .\u201d (\u00a7 1466, subd. (a).) 3 Defendant concedes as much in this court. 4 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967) 388 U.S. 307 [18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824] (following so-called collateral bar rule, with certain exceptions); Ex parte Purvis (Ala. 1980) 382 So.2d 512, 514-515 (same); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. (1985) 197 Conn. 141 [496 A.2d 476, 481] (same); Dade County Classroom Teachers\u2019 Ass\u2019n v. Rubin (Fla. 1970) 238 So.2d 284, 288 (same); Dept. of Rev. v. Universal Foods Corp. (1993) 318 Or. 78 [862 P.2d 1288, 1291-1292] (appeal from contempt adjudication may not collaterally attack underlying order, with certain exceptions); but see Wood v. Goodson (1972) 253 Ark. 196 [485 S.W.2d 213, 217] (<HOLDING>); Phoenix Newpapers, Inc. v. Superior Court Holdings: 0: recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack 1: holding that dhss motion to reconsider was a collateral attack on a bia order 2: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 3: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 4: recognizing collateral attack on void order", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "who had committed similar or more severe offenses than those Molloy was accused of were either not disciplined or, if disciplined, were first afforded their rights under the Officers\u2019 Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that the Chiefs proffered explanation for his more harsh treatment of Molloy \u2014 the state police\u2019s advice that she was refusing to cooperate with them and the ostensible advice that the granting of rights was unnecessary where, although suspended, she was still being paid \u2014 was a pretext. Essentially the same evidence also allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff had carried her burden of proving that the Chief had discriminated against Molloy because of her gender in violation of Title VTI. See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Molloy was suspended without being offered Holdings: 0: holding that an employees attempt to prove actual discrimination requires more substantial evidence than a prima facie case because evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employers justification 1: holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination 2: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason 3: holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination 4: holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was dismissed for Sotak\u2019s want of prosecution. Even worse, Sotak did not appeal the dismissal and did not inform his clients their case had been dismissed. In the Wheeler matter, Sotak failed to file the report of first injury within the required timeframe. In the American Built and Ellsworth matters he failed to serve opposing parties within the ninety day parameter set forth in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5). These cases illustrate Sotak\u2019s consistent failure to perform his assumed obligations. B. Misrepresentation In the Wheeler, American Built, and Ellsworth matters he also made misrepresentations to hide the neglect. Misrepresentation of neglect warrants a more severe sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). The practice of law simply cannot have people Holdings: 0: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 1: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 2: holding that suspension for fortyfive days with requirement of paying restitution of 47950 to client plus costs was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorneys conduct relating to representation of client in divorce action in failing to act with diligence failing to keep client informed failing to adequately explain matters to client and failing to return unearned advancefee upon termination of representation and for attorneys conduct in failing to respond to two letters from office of bar counsel seeking explanation of inconsistencies in attorneys response to bar complaint 3: holding multiple instances of neglecting client matters engaging in misrepresentation failing to notify a client of his suspension from the practice of law and failing to respond to inquiries from the iowa supreme court board of professional ethics and conduct warranted eighteenmonth suspension 4: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in question has authority to set policy in that particular area of municipal business. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.2006). This normally involves looking at the specific statutory delegation of authority to the particular official position. See, e.g., McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368-69 (3d Cir.2005). Second, a court must determine \u201cwhether the official\u2019s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.\u201d 455 F.3d at 245 (3d Cir.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). This second inquiry frequently involves looking to see whether any other official has supervisory authority over the specific action of the official in question. See, e.g., id. at 246 (<HOLDING>). b. Analysis Whether Catania issued an Holdings: 0: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 1: holding that while town counsel had final supervisory authority over the hiring and firing of employees in plaintiffs position it did not have supervisory authority over the mayors constructive discharge of plaintiff 2: holding that defendants supervisory position enabled her to embezzle funds while avoiding detection over a long period of time 3: holding over 4: holding that agent part of title viis definition of employer includes someone who serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over  hiring firing or conditions of employment", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and the prosecutor failed to offer any such explanation. Further, the record shows that the prosecutor did not strike Juror 015, a white juror who possessed the same objective characteristics as Juror 016: both were single, employed females with no children who responded to the court\u2019s questions in the same manner, thereby revealing the pretextual nature of this justification. See United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cPeremptory challenges cannot be lawful ly exercised against potential jurors of one gender unless potential jurors of another gender with comparable characteristics are also challenged.\u201d); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 832-33 (\u201c[A] comparative analysis of D.F. with empaneled jurors reveals that a finding of pretext was warranted.\u201d); McClain, 217 F.3d at 1221-22 (<HOLDING>); cf. Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at Holdings: 0: holding that defendants pretext argument failed because the state offered another legitimate reason for striking the prospective juror 1: holding that where a nonblack juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual 2: holding that the statement contained in a juror pamphlet that a reasonable doubt is one for which should he be called upon a juror can give a reason was obviously erroneous under our law 3: holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated 4: holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "if it allows plan participants \"to obtain remedies ... that Congress rejected in ERISA,\" Pilot Life, supra, at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 377, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (alteration in original). 16 . We pause to note that claimants such as Bal-dado who have relied upon HRS \u00a7 432E-6 in pursuing claims for medical coverage have six years from an HMO's denial of coverage in which to file an ERISA claim. See HRS \u00a7 657-1 (1993) (providing a six-year limitations period for \u201d[a]ctions for the recovery of any debt founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability\u201d and for \"[p]ersonal actions of any nature whatsoever not specifically covered by the laws of the State\u201d); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Shofer v. Hack Co., 970 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that absent an applicable federal statute of limitations state statutes of limitations should be applied in  301 cases if they are not in conflict with federal policy 1: holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent 2: recognizing cause of action 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that where congress does not establish a statute of limitations applicable to a federal cause of action a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law  this court has repeatedly borrowed the state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "changes in Decoteau\u2019s medical condition, defendant or the government may move at any time to amend this order. If Decoteau is restored to competence, a report shall be filed with the Court discussing the results of the treatment, whether and how the medications will affect Decoteau at trial, and how to monitor for effects of the treatment throughout trial. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the treatment has failed, the government shall file a report so advising the Court and assessing defendant\u2019s current mental and physical condition. Finally, leave is granted to file an interlocutory appeal within 14 days of the entry of this order, which, except for the order that Decoteau remain at FMC Butner, is stayed pending possible appeal. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176, 123 S.Ct. 2174 (<HOLDING>). Unless the order is further stayed, the Holdings: 0: holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders 1: holding forced medication orders are immediately appealable 2: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 3: holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 4: holding that pendente lite orders and awards are not immediately appealable", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court\u2019s holding in Montana was the notion that \u201c[b]eeause such a [third party] has had the \u2018opportunity to present proofs and argument,\u2019 he has already \u2018had his day in court\u2019 even though he was not a formal party to the litigation.\u201d Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2173(quoting Restatement 2d of Judgments \u00a7 39, Comment a, p. 302). The facts alleged by Bhatia in support of his privity argument come nowhere close to establishing privity between the government and Inderra. To be sure, the FBI was involved in a parallel criminal investigation of Bhatia while the civil suit was ongoing, but nothing in the record supports the claim that the government controlled or influenced the civil litigation, or took the \u201claboring oar.\u201d See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Inderra\u2019s objective was understandably Holdings: 0: holding the failure to establish identity alone is sufficient grounds to deny asylumrelated relief 1: holding that numbers alone are not sufficient to establish or negate a prima facie ease 2: holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted 3: holding that parallel legal interests alone identical or otherwise are not sufficient to establish privity 4: holding that the accrual of attorneys fees alone is sufficient to establish cause", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "did not represent [the doctor] in any way other than as the ship\u2019s doctor ... [the] brochure did not constitute a true \u2018holding out\u2019 or manifestation that an agency existed.\u201d Id. Thus, the court found that it was unreasonable for the plaintiffs in that case to believe that the cruise line had control over the manner in which the doctor treated his patients. In the instant case, however, Plaintiffs assert that in addition to being recognized as the ship\u2019s doctor, Dr. Coiner \u201cwore a Carnival uniform,\u201d \u201cate with the ship\u2019s crew,\u201d \u201c[was] held out to the passengers as an officer of the ship\u201d and \u201cwas addressed by the ship\u2019s crew as an officer of the ship.\u201d (D.E. No. 14, AimComplA 29). According to the Complaint, Dr. Coiner was listed in \u201cliterature provided by Defen 346 (S.D.Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). There is an exception to this rule if the Holdings: 0: holding the implied warranty is implied in all residential leases in california 1: holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty 2: holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract 3: holding that breach of implied warranty action exists solely as a contract remedy which of necessity requires a privity of contract showing as an essential element of the action 4: holding that passenger cannot maintain action for breach of implied warranty to provide safe passage", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the substance of the testimony of several witnesses. None of these witnesses live in New York or Tennessee. On balance, the convenience of the witnesses weighs in favor of transfer. Approximately half of the witnesses identified by,the parties reside in Tennessee, while none reside in New York. If the case is transferred, Chase and Godsey will be relieved of traveling entirely. By contrast, if the case is not transferred, the witnesses identified by the plaintiff, Hozid, Lodge, Jones, and Boyce, will still be required to travel. In the Court\u2019s view, it is only slightly less convenient to travel from the United Kingdom to New York than it is to travel from the United Kingdom to Tennessee. See Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Biomet, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 740, 1999 WL 342306, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>); accord Cento Group, S.p.A. v. OroAmerica, Holdings: 0: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 1: holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless 2: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 3: holding that witnesses traveling from finland were no more inconvenienced by having to travel to indiana than they would be traveling to new york 4: holding that the construction of a median in a roadway that causes traffic traveling to and from an abutting property to travel a cireuitous route does not constitute a compensable taking under indiana eminent domain law", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "depend on adequate levels of cyclic and preventative maintenance and repair, which are also essential to protect the extensive capital investment [of NPS] in the physical facility constituted by park roads, parkways and bridges. Consequently, park roads shall be maintained to the standards to which they have been constructed or reconstructed, and in a condition that promotes safety and protects capital investment. (Id. at 43) (emphasis added). Thus, the NPS is required by the Park Road Standards to maintain its \u201croads\u201d- \u2014 defined to include \u201cthe entire area within the right-of-way\u201d \u2014 in a specific manner: in accordance with \u201cthe standards to which they have been constructed or reconstructed.\u201d (Id. at 43, 48). Cf. ARA Leisure Sens. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). As set forth above, Plaintiffs\u2019 theory of Holdings: 0: holding that the amount of a commission to be awarded to the personal representative requires the exercise of judicial discretion and judgment by the clerk who has original jurisdiction in the matter 1: holding that a policy requiring that park roads conform to the original grades and alignments and that graded roads be firm and of uniform cross section  was a sufficiently specific standard to which to hold the nps alteration in original 2: holding that park services decision not to repave a particular section of road was within discretionary function exception because this section was thirtythird on a maintenance priority list of eighty sections of park road and determining the appropriate course of action would require balancing factors such as beach drives overall purpose the allocation of funds among significant project demands the safety of drivers and other park visitors and the inconvenience of repairs as compared to the risk of safety hazards 3: holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial 4: holding that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the presence of a cross in a city park even though the cross was neither erected nor financially maintained by the government", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Bill of review plaintiffs must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the underlying cause of action, (2) which the plaintiffs were prevented from making by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party or official mistake, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence on their own part. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406-08). Bill of review plaintiffs claiming non-service, however, are relieved of two elements ordinarily required to be proved in a bill of review proceeding. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. First, if a plaintiff was not served, constitutional due process relieves the plaintiff from the need to show a meritorious defense. Id. (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Second, the plaintiff is relieved from Holdings: 0: holding thata bill of review was unavailable where the petitioner had actual notice of a default judgment between twentyone and ninety days of the judgment but failed to utilize rule 306a 1: holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack 2: holding that standard for obtaining equitable bill of review did not apply to statutory bill of review in guardianship proceeding citing jones v parker 67 tex 76 3 sw 222 224 1886 3: holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights 4: holding that the meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review proceeding violates due process where the bill of review plaintiff has no notice of the proceeding in which the default judgment was rendered", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.\u201d Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. How and when a stay is imposed is left to the court\u2019s discretion; in exercising that discretion, a court must \u201c\u2018weigh the competing interests and maintain an even balance,\u201d\u2019 giving due consideration to the interests of the litigants, the court, and the public. Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 1376, 1377, 2000 WL 1825396 at **1 (CIT 2000) (quoting Landis, supra). A stay that fails to properly balance the relevant interests, e.g., a stay \u201cof indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need,\u201d is likely to be deemed an abuse of discretion. Id. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). In this matter, the need for the stay (or, Holdings: 0: holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state 1: recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous 2: holding that trial courts stay was an abuse of discretion because pending actions may take years to complete and because proceedings on liability could not be justifiably stayed merely because a precise determination of damages is not possible at this moment   3: holding that it is an abuse of discretion  to dismiss a complaint merely because of the presence of superfluous matter 4: holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a newly discovered claim", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "court, finding that the Director of the Division of Building and Construction had testified that substantial completion of the entire project had occurred \u201caround June of 1975.\u201d Id. at 41, 453 A.2d 559. The court stated that it was not aware mages? lost profits can be assessed up to the date of substantial completion. For example, in D.A. Davis Construction v. Palmetto Properties, Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 315 S.E.2d 370 (1984), the court awarded three months\u2019 lost rental income to the owner for the builder\u2019s failure to substantially complete the project on the date specified in the contract. Id. at 372. The owner presented evidence that the property was to have been rented to a beer distributor upon substantial completion. See also Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La.Ct.App.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 1272 (La.1979); Holdings: 0: holding that in the context of a rule 10b5 claim when the merger was approved and the exchange of securities occurred the owner of stock had in effect purchased a new security and paid for it by turning in his old one 1: holding that sjince the consumer cannot obtain the right to occupy the room without paying the retail room rate charged by the otc that retail rate is the taxable amount or rent  where rent means the consideration received for occupancy valued in money 2: holding that the owner of retail store should receive the interest it had paid on interim financing and the rent paid on the old building for the period of delay until substantial completion 3: holding that no interest is paid on benefits awarded based on a finding of cue 4: holding that the portion of the retirementplan annuity paid for by the employer but not the portion paid for by the employee  is includable in the marital estate ", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "federal statutory scheme evidences an implicit or explicit intent to exclude Ex Parte Young actions, id. at 647, 122 S.Ct. 1753, and we may also question whether the suit and the remedy it seeks \u201cimplicate[] special sovereignty interests\u201d such that an Ex Parte Young action will not lie. Idaho v. Coeur d\u2019Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). Here, we conclude that the Federal Power Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d) unmistakably evidences an intent to exclude licensees such as AmerenUE from maintaining an Ex Parte Young action seeking to prevent a State from recovering damages to its property resulting from the licensee\u2019s negligence in the operation of the licensed power project. Cf. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 74, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In relevant part, the Act provides: Each Holdings: 0: holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action 1: holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action 2: holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction 3: holding that ex parte young permits jurisdiction over officials who have authority to control the assessments of railroad taxes that are in violation of federal law 4: holding that the medicaid act provision allowing reduction of funds to noncompliant states is not a detailed remedial scheme sufficient to show congresss intent to preempt an action under ex parte young", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Valley, in which the request was for a \u201csingle category of documents that, by definition, [were] available for immediate production,\u201d we held that the statute required MCSO to produce the documents \u201cat once.\u201d Id. We also observed, however, that whether a government agency\u2019s response to a wide variety of document requests was sufficiently prompt \u201cwill ultimately be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each request.\u201d Id. n. 8. \u00b6 15 While we thus consider the facts and circumstances of each of the New Times\u2019 nine requests, we do so pursuant to the requirements of Arizona law. Arizona law places on MCSO the burden of establishing that its responses to the New Times\u2019 re quests were prompt given the circumstances surrounding each request. See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (<HOLDING>); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. Holdings: 0: recognizing a strong presumption favoring arbitrability 1: holding that if a document falls within the scope of the public records statute then the presumption favoring disclosure applies 2: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 3: holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings 4: holding that the burden fell squarely upon the maricopa county attorney as a public official to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "little mitigating weight in tijis case. \u00b6 47 Appellant further contends the trial court erred when it failed to regard the giving of a felony murder instruction at trial as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. We disagree. This court has held that a felony murder instruction \u201cmay be mitigating where there is some doubt as to a defendant\u2019s specific intent to' kill.\u201d State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552, 944 P.2d 57, 67 (1997). Appellant\u2019s actions in savagely beating and strangling the victim to death, however, undermine any argument that he did not intend to kill the victim. Moreover, the jurors unanimously found Appellant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder as well as felony murder, indicating that they found\" intent to kill. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 648-49, 832 P.2d at 665-66 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that the giving of a Holdings: 0: holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant 1: holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense 2: holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill 3: holding that the eighth amendment requires finding that a felony murder defendant killed or attempted to kill 4: holding that the giving of a felony murder instruction is not a relevant mitigating circumstance when the defendant acted alone to kill the victim", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "so strict liability should be imposed. Again, defendants\u2019 argument is more persuasive. Massachusetts has not clearly recognized strict liability for the pumping of subterranean water, even if it results in damage to a plaintiffs land in its natural state. See Gamer, 346 Mass, at 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65 (negligence); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (1958) (negligence). The strict liability-cases on which plaintiff relies have to do with the removal of lateral support by excavation, not by pumping. See Marinucci Bros., 337 Mass, at 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (restating rule on strict liability for excavating and holding that excavator who withdraws mixture of silt and water can be held liable for negligence); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (<HOLDING>). As for the pumping of subsurface water, the Holdings: 0: holding that landowner who digs in such a way as to disturb natural state of neighboring land is strictly liable 1: holding that permanent easement on land containing natural gas pipeline reduced value of directly encumbered land by 75 2: holding that city may by ordinance require abutting landowner to repair sidewalk but that the abutting landowner is not liable in an action in tort for injuries 3: holding unconstitutional a zoning law that purported to give landowners who were not bound by any official duty but wejre free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and could subject a neighboring landowner to their will or caprice authority to prevent a particular use on a neighbors land 4: holding in case where railroad grant was an easement and not a right of way that title vested in abutting landowner once railroad abandoned land", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the treaty\u2019s requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.\u201d). See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule \u201cwas not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not \u2018authorized\u2019 by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.\u201d); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 n. Holdings: 0: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation 1: holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required 2: holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule absent an underlying constitutional violation or right 3: holding that because code  19260 a procedural statute did not expressly provide a right of suppression of evidence a violation of that provision did not require application of the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional violation 4: holding that a violation of  6103 does not require the application of the exclusionary rule", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "original complaint. Id. at 468, 470. Following Nicrosi, the Court determined that the circumstances were such as to give Hughes notice that she was being sued and held that the amendment did not change the nature of the action or add any parties to the action. Id. at 470. The Court stated, \u201cthere was no question as to the identity of the defendant, because Hughes Realty was merely a name under which Hughes did business.\u201d Id. at 470. The Court further stated: \u201c[W]e affirmatively hold that a judgment entered against a trade name is a judgment against the individual doing business under that trade name, at least so long as the individual was personally served with the complaint.\u201d Id. at 471. See also, Box v. Boilermaker Nat\u2019l Health & Welfare Fund, 47 Ala.App. 266, 253 So.2d 326 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the original complaint Holdings: 0: holding appeal not moot where bankruptcy proceedings involved third parties but unlike robehs farms and rochman v northeast utils serv group in re pub serv co 963 f2d 469 1st cir1992 the reorganization plan is not a complex billiondollar affair that has affected innumerable third parties 1: holding that hearing officers noting the parties agreement did not constitute a change in the parties legal relationship 2: holding that insured had not substantially complied with the policys change of beneficiary provisions when the hospitalized insured was physically unable to leave her bed and was unable to retrieve the policy from her lock box at the bank to return to the company for endorsement as required by the terms of the policy 3: holding error where re cording which was later deemed inadmissible was played during opening statement 4: holding that an amendment from re box steel erection company to re box individually and dba re box construction and equipment co did not add or change the parties but merely sought to accurately describe the named defendant", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the authority to represent him in all things concerning the custody, care, and well-being of J.D.S.; and (2) that, in his letter, Sessums stated he wanted to be present in order to provide input on where J.D.S. would be placed \u201cfor the time being.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Even if the Department is correct that Sessums wrote his letter in anticipation of the February 1, 2002, hearing, the letter also contained a request to be physically present at \u201cany and all proceedings\u201d (emphasis added) involving J.D.S. We interpret this as a valid request to be present at his termination hearing. The parent-child relationship is recognized and protected by law to such a degree that it is of federal constitutional dimensions. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The termination of parental rights is final Holdings: 0: holding that consortium is not a part of the parentchild relationship 1: holding that the parentchild relationship is far more precious than any property rights 2: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 3: holding that de facto parentchild relationship does not support a finding of qualifyingrelative status 4: holding that destruction of the parentchild relationship includes grief and mental anguish", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "claims. This immunity applies to the section 1983 claims. Individual immunity is not necessary for the RLUIPA claims. RLUIPA provides a cause of action against \u201cgovernments\u201d and does not appear to allow causes of action against individuals. (A section 1983 claim' against an individual could be based upon a denial of such a statutory right (see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980)), but such a claim would be a section 1983 claim, not an individual RLUIPA claim.) In any event, to the extent Plaintiffs assert or can assert a claim against individual defendants in their personal capacities specifically under RLUIPA, the Court would find the same immunity and such claims are dismissed. See Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, Holdings: 0: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine 1: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity 2: holding trial court improperly granted dismissal on ground of immunity because the defendant had qualified statutory immunity rather than absolute immunity 3: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 4: recognizing that absolute immunity is immunity from charges of either constitutional or statutory violations", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1692f(8). Citing Foti, Zortman argues that because JCC\u2019s message indicated it was \u201cimportant\u201d that constitutes communicating information regarding a debt. Foti, 424 F.Supp.2d at 656 (noting that the message stated it that the \u201cmatter required immediate attention\u201d in concluding that the voicemail was a communication). JCC, for its part in the supplemental briefing, argued that its messages did not violate \u00a7 1692c(b) because they did not disclose that a particular consumer actually owed a debt. JCC points the Court to several cases, though not precisely on point, that indicate that a mere statement identifying a caller as a debt collector may not be sufficient to convey information regarding a debt. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Zamos II v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 423 Holdings: 0: holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt 1: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 2: holding that information was not fatally defective because while defendants name did not appear in the charging part of the information it did clearly appear in the caption and in the verification of the charge by the district attorney 3: holding that the name under which a debt collector is licensed to do business is the debt collectors true name for purposes of the fdcpa 4: holding that a fax requesting employment information and verification did not convey information regarding a debt but also noting that the senders name and logo did not make explicit that the request was from a debt collector", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "when considered in the context of the whole trial. See Alexander, 163 F.3d at 429-30; United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441, 1450 (7th Cir.1993). To guide us in this deci but harmless the prosecutor\u2019s comment that a federal agent would risk his career by committing perjury). Lassar\u2019s comment did not serve to bolster anyone\u2019s credibility and so did not invade the province of the jury to assess credibility or determine facts. Essentially, the prosecution appealed to the jury\u2019s supposed belief that the government only prosecutes strong eases and this was, in Lassar\u2019s opinion, one of the strongest. Although improper, this generalized comment cannot be considered nearly as damaging as introducing a fact that bolsters a particular witness\u2019s credibility. Cf. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the prosecution made the comment Holdings: 0: holding that while not reversible error a prosecutors vouching for a witness was improper and should be avoided on retrial 1: holding that the prosecutors indirect reference to a defendants prior conviction was improper 2: holding that prosecutors remark vouching for credibility of government agent was certainly improper 3: holding that a prosecutors argument about the special agents disincentive to lie was impermissible vouching 4: holding that the prosecutors question to the defendant about a prior unrelated offense was improper", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the adjudication and sentence, a statement of the reasons for such sentence, and a statement of credits received____ A copy of the judgment shall be forwarded to all parties and their counsel by the clerk forthwith upon entry. As we pointed out in State v. Moore, 178 N.J.Super. 417, 427, 429 A.2d 397 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 406, 434 A.2d 1083 (1981), \u201cunder R. 3:21-5, a judgment of conviction occurs when the judge signs the sentencing order and it is entered by the clerk.\u201d See State v. Womack, 206 N. J.Super. 564, 570, 503 A.2d 352 (App.Div. 1985), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 482, 511 A.2d 658 (1986) (stating that \u201cthe judgment is prepared by the clerk and signed by the judge and provides \u2018finality\u2019 \u201d); State v. Robinson, 198 N.J.Super. 602, 603, 487 A.2d 1304 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. L.R., 167 N.J.Super. 364, 367-368, Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court 1: holding that the judgment is entered following sentencing forthwith by the clerk 2: holding that a second judgment controls over an earlier judgment entered in the same case 3: holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief 4: holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "dismissal of claim under misappropriation and copying branches of New York state unfair competition laws as federally preempted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820, 108 S.Ct. 79, 98 L.Ed.2d 42 (1987). Plaintiff alleges that \u201c[a]ll of defendant\u2019s state law claims are based upon the premise that the Pro motional. Previews furnished to Video Pipeline belong to Defendant and were misappropriated by Video Pipeline.\u201d Pl.\u2019s Br. at 16. Misappropriation, or \u201creverse passing off,\u201d is grounded in the alleged unauthorized copying and use of another\u2019s copyrighted expression, and thus fails the extra element, test. See Fundamental Too, Ltd. v. Universal Music Group, Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-1595, 1997 WL 381608, at *4 (E.D.Pa. July 9, 1997); see also Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 666 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1112, 114 S.Ct. 1056, Holdings: 0: holding misappropriation claim grounded solely in the copying of a plaintiffs protected expression was preempted by  301 of copyright act 1: holding misappropriation claim by real estate information service provider against website using services photographs was preempted by copyright act because claim had no extra element 2: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 3: holding copyright act preempted photographers misappropriation claim when claim did not have extra element such as breach of fiduciary duty 4: holding that even if utah law recognized tort of misappropriation such a claim would be preempted by copyright act", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "note, except for appurtenant rights, water interests are separate from real estate surface interest. See Hydro Res. Corp., 2007-NMSC-061, \u00b6 17. We see no reason why this concept does not apply to the inchoate interest the parties were dealing in here. {28} The most relevant argument the Christophers make is that Owens could not reserve an interest because of the speculative nature of his intent to divert water. The cases cited by the Christophers simply do not apply here. The facts in those cases involve situations in which someone attempts to divert more water from a common source than they can actually use with the intent or purpose of then essentially extorting other potential users of water from the same source. See Millheiser v. Long, 1900-NMSC-012, \u00b6\u00b6 30-32, 10 N.M. 99, 61 P. 111 (<HOLDING>); see also New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, Holdings: 0: holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use 1: holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use 2: holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district 3: holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested 4: holding that permits only give the applicant an inchoate or contingent right to put the water to a beneficial use", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was not harmless. 4 . The City also argues that it was effectively denied its right under the Agreement and the AAA Rules to participate in the selection of the arbitrator in a meaningful manner because it might not have agreed to the selection of this arbitrator had it known that an out-of-class pay issue was involved. As the FOP notes, however, the City does not assert that it would have made some other selection. Further, once this arbitrator decided on the first day of the hearings to consider the possibility of out-of-class payments, it was incumbent upon the City to raise an objection at that time if the City truly objected to having this arbitrator in particular decide that issue. The City raised and preserved an objection to ns Board, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 544, 621 A.2d 1184 (1993) Holdings: 0: holding that the statute is mandatory 1: holding that a transfer of work was a mandatory subject of bargaining because the motivation for the shift was to cut labor costs 2: holding that a fiveminute change in employee starting time is a mandatory subject of bargaining 3: holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining 4: holding that giving the work of a bargainingunit sergeant to civilians in the revamping of communications center was a mandatory subject of bargaining", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "declaration thereof has been filed by making and filing with the officer holding the process an affidavit that, in his belief, either the claim is invalid entirely or it is invalid in part or is excessive, specifying wherein such invalidity or excess consists, and if excessive, also specifying the property alleged to be in excess, to be, in all cases, the last named in the claim.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In this case, Bartholomew attempted to contest Gutzmore\u2019s claim of exemption by filing an unsworn objection. This does not meet the requirements of \u00a7 6-10-25, which provides that any contest to a claim of exemption must be made by affidavit. Accordingly, Bartholomew did not properly contest Gutzmore\u2019s claim of exemption. See Griffin v. Bank Street Fin., 587 So.2d 349, 350 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Young v. Strong, 694 So.2d 27, 28 Holdings: 0: holding that a search warrant is invalid if not based on an affidavit 1: holding that the argument that an additional limitation be read into claims 1 3 and 4 was only correct with respect to claim 1 and thus only claim 1 was invalid 2: holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures 3: holding the defendants claim that he was denied the right to testify was appropriate for direct review when the record was adequately developed to permit full consideration of the defendants claim the pertinent facts were undisputed a pcr hearing was not necessary to resolve a factual dispute and would not aid in the application of the law and the defendants claim was presented not as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but rather as an error committed by the trial court in excluding the defendants testimony which was not an appropriate basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 4: holding that a contest to a claim of exemption was ineffective when that contest was not by affidavit and did not properly state that the claim of exemption was invalid or excessive", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "admissions are binding only against \u201cthe party making the admission.\u201d Requests for admission are a tool, not a trapdoor. Goudeau\u2019s attorneys knew perfectly well that defendant USF & G was denying underinsured coverage. Accordingly, they are not entitled to use a response against it when they sent it to the law firm representing it in a different capacity. IV. The Evidentiary Objection Goudeau also objected to the summary judgment on the ground that USF & G\u2019s evidence was not authenticated. The trial court overruled the objection, and the court of appeals did not reach the issue. Contrary to Goudeau\u2019s objection, the un-derinsured policy (which showed the policy language) wa . 117, 931 A.2d 1180, 1182-83 (2007); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105, 1106 (N.M.1988) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Fisher, Holdings: 0: holding claimant was simply not engaged in a transaction oriented to the use of the covered auto at the time of the accident 1: holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant 2: holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over the question of whether truck was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident emphasis added 3: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 4: holding that the plaintiffs location on the supply barge at the time of the accident did not alter his status", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "appropriation to fund a statutory right, not involving constitutional rights or judicial functions, is normally beyond our powers to order. Hillis v. Dept. of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139, 148 (1997) (internal citation omitted); accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (\u201c[AJppropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, \u00a7 9.\u201d); Cal. Ass\u2019n. of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 224, 246 (2003) (finding legislature\u2019s policy decisions when appropriating funds and setting spending priorities from its tobacco tax revenue did not violate state constitution); State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, 873 (1938) (<HOLDING>); Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Auth., 125 Ill.2d Holdings: 0: holding legislatures allocation of road funds did not vio late state constitution because the wisdom economy and policy of statutes are for legislative decision 1: holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night 2: recognizing exception under state constitution 3: holding that park services decision not to repave a particular section of road was within discretionary function exception because this section was thirtythird on a maintenance priority list of eighty sections of park road and determining the appropriate course of action would require balancing factors such as beach drives overall purpose the allocation of funds among significant project demands the safety of drivers and other park visitors and the inconvenience of repairs as compared to the risk of safety hazards 4: holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "carried on; and (f) the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 520 (1977); Leatherwood, 121 S.W.3d at 699-700 (citing Restatement factors). The application of strict liability for ul-trahazardous activities appears to be rather limited in Tennessee, as it is in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ergon, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 966 F.Supp. 577, 583 (W.D.Tenn.1997) (noting that Tennessee courts reject the application of strict liability to gas suppliers for escaping gas, even though gas is poisonous, dangerous, and highly explosive, and holding that defendants with escaping petroleum products also should not merit strict liability). But see Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303, 315-16 (W.D.Tenn.1986) (<HOLDING>), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1188 Holdings: 0: holding that under facts presented defendants creation location operation and closure of toxic chemical dump was abnormally dangerous and ultrahazardous activity 1: holding in a case involving denial of coverage under an insurance contract that the location of documentary evidence related to insurance coverage mattered less than the location of the underlying tort suits 2: holding other than location of the drugs state presented evidence establishing direct connection between drugs and accused thereby creating inference of control 3: holding that an anonymous tip that described a suspects appearance and location and alleged that he was carrying a concealed weapon was insufficiently corroborated by the officers observation of the appellant who matched the description hanging out at the indicated location 4: holding that an officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or 543, 569, 652 P2d 318 (1982) (child\u2019s distress caused by negligently inflicted harm to parent insufficient to state negligence claim). Rather, a plaintiff must suffer harm \u201cto an interest of a kind that the law protects against negligent invasion.\u201d Solberg v. Johnson, 306 Or 484, 490, 760 P2d 867 (1988). Oregon law has long recognized that the fact that a defendant\u2019s negligence poses a threat of future physical harm is not sufficient, standing alone, to constitute an actionable injury. As this court has explained, \u201cthe threat of future harm, by itself, is insufficient as an allegation of damage in the context of a negligence claim.\u201d Zehr, 318 Or at 656; see also Bollam v. Fireman\u2019s Fund Ins. Co., 302 Or 343, 347, 730 P2d 542 (1986) (<HOLDING>) (quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Holdings: 0: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate 1: holding that  the threat of future harm not yet realized is not enough  2: holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence 3: holding declaratory relief is inappropriate where the constitutional injury has already occurred and there is no threat of future harm 4: holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Found, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 502, 862 P.2d 870, 875 (1993). In assessing whether a city attorney\u2019s communication with city officers or employees will be protected by the city\u2019s attorney-client privilege, Arizona has adopted a \u201cfunctional approach\u201d. This functional approach focuses \u201con the relationship between the communicator and the need for legal services.\u201d Id. at 505, 862 P.2d at 878. Thus, if the communication \u201cconcerns the employee\u2019s own conduct within the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that conduct,\u201d then the communication falls within the city\u2019s privilege. Id. at 507, 862 P.2d at 880; see also Ariz. Dep\u2019t of Econ. Sec. v. O\u2019Neil, 183 Ariz. 196, 198, 901 P.2d 1226, 1228 (App.1995) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, as the court in Samaritan Holdings: 0: holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known 1: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 2: holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts 3: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 4: holding that governmental entities may assert attorneyclient privilege to prevent disclosure of information otherwise required by statute", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cthe trial court\u2019s discretion is not unbounded,\u201d Grimes v. Walton Cnty., 591 So.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Trial courts are required to consider whether the prospective inter-venor has an interest in the proceedings. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). \u201cIn order for a party to intervene, its interest must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.\u201d Omni Nat\u2019l Bank v. Georgia Banking Co., 951 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, a party\u2019s asserted interest must already be at issue in the proceedings when the party seeks to intervene. Carlisle, 593 So.2d at 507 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 78 Holdings: 0: holding that where litigation involves more than one claim the origin of the claim test must be applied separately to each part 1: holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine 2: holding with respect to another part of the plra that the court must determine the prisoners status on the date the suit or appeal is brought rather than at some other time 3: holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit 4: holding that the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof  which is the subject of litigation", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "cannot be adjudicated as counterclaims in a \u00a7 3213 proceeding. Noting that Wireless could, if it chose, press its allegations in a separate action, the court then granted summary judgment for Com/Tech. Wireless appealed. \u201cUnder the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.\u201d Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Classifying a rule as substantive or procedural is sometimes a subtle undertaking. See id. But where the matter in question is one covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, \u201cit is settled that ... the Federal Rule applies re gardless of contrary state law.\u201d Id. at 427 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 2211. N.Y. C.P.L.R. \u00a7 3213 d F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 governs counterclaims in the Holdings: 0: holding that a party in an action pending in a federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus violated  65440 by commencing another action in a state court 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a 2: holding that lessees fraud in the inducement claim should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim where lessors original claim was for breach of the lease 3: holding that a waiver of counterclaims potentially valid in state court was inoperative in federal court when its application would have prevented the assertion of a counterclaim that under fedrcivp 13a was compulsory 4: holding that the prosecution in a subsequent action of claims that had been compulsory counterclaims in a previously filed declaratoryjudgment action violated  65440", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a broad interpretation of the meaning of the word \u201cdisability,\u201d and imposes a \u201cnon-onerous\u201d burden on a plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Haley v. Cmty. Mercy Health Partners, 2013 WL 322493 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 28, 2013). Even if an impairment lasts less than six months, it can be considered substantially limiting under the ADAAA. 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1630.2(j)(ix). If a plaintiff has a condition that is connected to an underlying disability, this is referred to as a \u201ccharacteristic manifestation\u201d of the qualifying impairment. Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer\u2019s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir.1998). The Sixth Circuit has held that a \u201ccharacteristic manifestation of [the] physical impairment [is] ... part of the underlying impairment.\u201d Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus, to determine if Plaintiff meets the Holdings: 0: holding without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel that the plaintiff who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ada 1: holding that a plaintiffs bladder infections were connected with her disability of interstitial cystitis 2: recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability 3: holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada 4: holding disability discrimination claim barred", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and State\u2019s Exhibit 10 as cocaine in rock form. When the State offered the exhibits, appellant\u2019s trial counsel stated, \u201c[W]e have no objection, Your Honor.\u201d The court then admitted these exhibits. In general, when a court overrules a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, the defendant need not object to the same evidence in order to preserve the error on appeal. Brown v. State, 183 S.W.3d 728, 741 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. reff) (citing Moraguez v. State, 701 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)). However, when a defendant affirmatively states that he has \u201cno objection\u201d to the admission of the complained of evidence, the defendant waives any error in the admission of the evidence. Brown, 183 S.W.3d at 741; see also Hams v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record reflects that appellant Holdings: 0: holding that an objection raised in a motion to suppress evidence preserves the issue for appeal despite the lack of further objection at trial 1: holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection 2: holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand 3: holding that overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence is received without objection 4: holding that appellants complaint that trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained as result of illegal seizures was rendered moot when state offered complained of evidence and defense counsel affirmatively stated no objection", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of this state. 2. A police officer in \u201chot pursuit\u201d may continue beyond the one and one-half mile [2.\u215b1 kilometers] limit to make an arrest, in obedience to a warrant or without a warrant under the conditions of section 29-06-15, whenever obtaining the aid of peace officers having jurisdiction beyond that limit would cause a delay permitting escape. As used in this subsection, \u201chot pursuit\u201d means the immediate pursuit of a person who is endeavoring to avoid arrest. (Emphasis added.) [\u00b6 10] This Court has also recognized that city police officers have jurisdiction to stop vehicles and arrest individuals outside of their geographical jurisdiction when responding to requests from another law enforcement agency for aid and assistance. See State v. Graven, 530 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). See also N.D.C.C. \u00a7 44-08-20(3) (stating, Holdings: 0: holding a stop was effected where officers vehicle blocked defendants vehicle from proceeding 1: holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop 2: holding that the stop of defendants vehicle was unlawful where officers stopped the vehicle to check the license and registration but had observed no suspicious activity 3: holding that although officers observation and stop of the defendants vehicle occurred outside of the officers geographical jurisdiction the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspects vehicle 4: holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendants vehicle", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Salvador de Jesus Trujillo-Teo, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 summary affirmance of an immigration judge\u2019s denial of his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. Because the transitional rules apply, Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1105a(a). We deny the petition for review. We conclude that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find that Trujillo-Teo established past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his actual or imputed political opinion. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Molinar-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, Holdings: 0: holding that attempted conscription by a guatemalan guerrilla group did not constitute persecution on account of a political opinion where petitioner failed to show that the group was motivated by his political opinion 1: holding that forced recruitment does not amount to persecution without a showing that it was on account of petitioners political opinion 2: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 3: holding that a petitioners unwillingness to return must be based upon persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race religion nationality membership in a particular social group or political opinion   4: holding that retaliation for opposition to government corruption can constitute persecution on account of a political opinion", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "because of the fear that their results would become public knowledge. \u00a7 381.004(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). The specific safeguards provided by the statute to prevent disclosure lend weight to the argument that public dissemination of the test results would cause emotional distress, and thus Continental should have known that by sending the results in an unsecured fax, it was risking causing great emotional distress to the Abrils if an unauthorized party saw the test results. Because the only reasonable damages arising from a breach of section 381.004(3)(f) are emotional distress, and because this emotional damage would be akin to that suffered by victims of defamation or invasion of privacy, we conclude they should not be barred by the impact rule. See Gracey, 837 So.2d at 356-57 (<HOLDING>). Thus, based on our recent precedent in Gracey Holdings: 0: holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized 1: holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any 2: holding that the impact rule should not bar recovery because the emotional distress that plaintiffs allege they have suffered is at least equal to that typically suffered by the victim of a defamation or an invasion of privacy and that ijmposition of the impact rule in this context would render the legislative intent and its statutory implementation meaningless and without substance 3: holding emotional distress suffered must be severe and not trivial 4: holding that employee could not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under fela without a showing of physical impact", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "involving the drugs that were stored in a residence without resultant exposure to children residing therein. The district court did not give unreasonable weight to this factor. 3. Provision of medical, educational, and correctional treatment Adams also argues the district court afforded too much weight to the time needed to provide him with medical, educational, and corrections treatment. Adams asserts that this factor does not warrant a higher sentence because the drug program in which he will enroll lasts only eighteen months, a time period that does not exceed a within-Guidelines sentence. But Adams does not suggest that the district court\u2019s variance was imposed solely to enable Adams to receive substance-abuse treatment. Cf United States v. Yopp, 453 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Instead, Adams argues that the \u201csentence Holdings: 0: holding that where the sole purpose of sentence was to provide mental health and substanceabuse treatment it was substantively unreasonable to sentence defendant to twentyfour months because the 500hour drug treatment program could be finished in nine months 1: holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect 2: holding that period of three years and nine months of prospective employment was not unreasonable 3: holding that a district courts treatment of the guidelines as mandatory renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable 4: holding that when the district court imposed drug testing in connection with a special condition of substance abuse program participation  it was  not required to specify the number of drug tests a defendant must undergo as a part of the treatment program", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "818, 102 S.Ct 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 133 . See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); and Sanchez v. Swyden, 131 F.3d 1144, 1147 (5th Cir.1998). 134 . Sanchez, 131 F.3d at 1147-48. 135 . Docket no. 49, Andrade's Declaration, at \u00b6\u00b6 ir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 854, 110 S.Ct. 156, 107 L.Ed.2d 114 (1989); Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir.1987); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n. 3 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985): \"Isolated violations are not the persistent, often repeated constant violations that constitute custom and policy.\u201d; Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2656, 81 L.Ed.2d 363 (1984), (<HOLDING>); and Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that a section 1983 plaintiff asserting police misconduct must allege a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured or endangered by policyconsistent misconduct or that serious incompetence or misbehavior was general or widespread throughout the police force 1: holding the alleged misconduct taken together did not constitute a pattern of harassment or aggravating conditions 2: holding that to state  1983 claim against defendant plaintiff must allege that defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury 3: holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct 4: holding that the prosecution must establish a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means that the leads making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the police prior to the misconduct and that the police were actively pursuing the alternate line of investigation prior to the misconduct", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "factor is to ensure that a prisoner\u2019s rights are infringed upon to the least possible degree, without compromising the asserted goal of restricting him. See id. at 90-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Were less restrictive alternatives available in this case, the district court would have applied them. Felipe\u2019s example of such an alternative \u2014 allowing correspondence to be exchanged after it is reviewed by the U.S. Attorney\u2019s Office\u2014 ignores the fact that Felipe could easily slip a secret message past those in charge of monitoring his mail. He did it successfully before. Moreover, even the Supreme Court has acknowledged what a difficult task it would be for prison officials to monitor inmate correspondence, and has dismissed this kind of option as a viable alternative. See id. at 93, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (<HOLDING>). . As Judge Martin said in placing the Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence 1: holding that because pretrial detainees fourteenth amendment rights are comparable to prisoners eighth amendment rights the same standards apply 2: holding that prison administration may infringe upon prisoners first amendment rights as long as the infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest 3: holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners fourth amendment rights 4: holding that the prohibition of inmatetoinmate correspondence was not an unconstitutional infringement of prisoners first amendment rights", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "his statement to the authorities. The litany of crimes discussed in cross-examination indicated that Hicks was not a trustworthy individual, and the evidence that he received a benefit for his testimony only would have been consistent with that well-supported notion. Further, as Hicks had already been convicted of perjury once (before the same judge) and had admitted to his use of a variety of false identities, the jury was already under the impression that Hicks was prone to lie at any point. On that basis, even if Gentry had an opportunity to impeach Hicks as to his false testimony regarding the denial of any benefit for testifying, that opportunity would have been cumulative of other impeachment evidence and thus immaterial. See Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Hicks\u2019s testimony was not the Holdings: 0: holding that undisclosed napue evidence is cumulative and thus immaterial where the witness is already sufficiently impeached 1: holding that witness could not be impeached with prior statement because his silence did not constitute testimony  2: holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative 3: holding impeachment evidence was not merely cumulative where the withheld evidence was of a different character than evidence already known to the defense 4: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "only if [the Supreme Court] has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.\u201d Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (construing identical language in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2244(b)(2)(A)). Put differently, \u201c[t]he only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, lay out and construct a rule\u2019s retroactive effect, or cause that effect to exist, occur, or appear, is through a holding.\u201d Id. at 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Robinson does not allege that the Supreme Court announced that its decision in Alleyne would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Def. Mot. at 18 (noting that \u201cthis Court is authorized to find that [Mr. Robinson\u2019s] claim is retroactive\u201d (emphasis added)); id. at 20 (<HOLDING>). Mr. Robinson therefore fails to establish the Holdings: 0: holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review  that was previously unavailable 1: holding johnson announced a new substantive rule and prior supreme court holdings make it retroactive 2: recognizing that several circuits  have recently announced alleyne does announce a new rule of constitutional law not made retroactive by the supreme court emphasis added 3: holding the constitutional rule announced in apprendi does not prohibit a district court from finding by a preponderance of the evidence facts relevant to the application of the guidelines 4: holding that cage has not been made retroactive by the supreme court", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was void. Because the Johnstons moved for a summary judgment on this issue, they must prove that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 644. The record indicates that the IRS gave notice beginning on March 21, 1995 that a sealed bid sale was scheduled for April 11, 1995 in Houston, Texas. The sale was then postponed on April 11. Appellants received a second notice of sale on November 22, 1995. The property was sold to the Bennetts at the sealed bid sale on December 12, 1995 in Houston, and the Bennetts received a certificate of sale. After the 180-day redemption period had expired, a quitclaim deed was issued to Mary Bennett on June 11, 1996, which deed she recorded the next day. The procedures for seizure of land mandated by section 6 r.1973) (<HOLDING>); Koby v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 99, 105 Holdings: 0: holding that a decedents tax settlement with the irs did not establish the value of his estates claim against the irs as a matter of law 1: holding that although irs failed to comply with procedures of section 6335 tax sale was valid due to ratification by taxpayer 2: holding that failure of irs agent to follow irs electronic surveillance regulations before recording conversations between taxpayer and agent did not require suppression of tape recordings in prosecution of taxpayer accused of bribing irs agent since irs was not required by constitution to adopt its regulations governing electronic surveillance violation of agency regulations did not raise constitutional questions 3: holding that a notice of tax deficiency sent to a taxpayer by the irs need not be signed in order to be valid 4: holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1762, supra at 847, quoting Sanders v. Youthcraft Coats & Suits, Inc., 700 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir.1983); see also, Baird v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe R.R. Co., 169 F.Supp.2d 1019, 1025 (D.Minn.2001), aff'd, 24 Fed.Appx. 629 (8th Cir.2001). \u201cA union owes a duty to all members of the bargaining unit, therefore \u2018the union has the affirmative duty not to press grievances which the union believes, in good faith, do not warrant such action.\u2019 \u201d Id., quoting Sanders v. Youthcraft Coats & Suits, Inc., supra at 1229. 2) Legal Analysis. The IFO asserts that the Plaintiffs duty of fair representation claim is time-barred, because all of the alleged acts were committed prior to the ninety (90) day statute of limitations. See, Allen v. Hennepin County, 680 N.W.2d 560, 563-5 (Minn.App.2004) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied (Minn. August 17, 2004). We Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims 1: recognizing a ninety 90 day statute of limitations for claims brought under the pelra 2: holding that georgias statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied to discrimination claims brought under the rehabilitation act and title ii of the ada 3: recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act 4: holding that the virginia disabilities act constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for claims brought under the ada", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law \u00a7 691(4). Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action on March 26, 2001, alleging that defendants: (a) sold them franchises without having an offering prospectus registered with the State, in violation of section 683(1) (the prospectus claim); and (b) committed fraud in connection with the sale of franchises, in violation of section 687(2), because they induced plaintiffs to enter franchises with a false promise to pay 60% commissions for deliveries (the fraud claim). For both claims, therefore, the \u201cact or transaction constituting the violation\u201d occurred when the franchises were purchased. See United Magazine Co. v. Murdoch Magazines Distribution, Inc., 146 F.Supp.2d 385, 407 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (\u201cUnited Magazine \u201d), aff'd, 279 Fed.Appx. 14, 19 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Leung v. Lotus Ride, Inc., 198 A.D.2d 155, Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 2: holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach 3: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 4: holding that the limitations period begins to run at the time that the parties first enter into the franchise agreement", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that she had known McCray for approximately only one to two years. Moreover, the officers' testimony is equally, if not more, contradictory. Thus, the court will not discredit Wallace\u2019s testimony. 8 .If the officers had observed some sort of exchange among the parties that might be an objective factor which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Ruiz, No.Crim. A. 98-120, 1998 WL 622405, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1998) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing money exchange hands in a high drug area). See also United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir.1998) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs and money); United States v. Garrett, 1007 (DC Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Although Washington v. Gilmore is a civil Holdings: 0: holding that an officers observation of a man holding his hand out with a group of other men looking down at his open palm in an high drug trafficking area late at night constituted reasonable suspicion 1: holding officers articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellants contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellants prior arrests for drug offenses appellants lie about his prior criminal history and appellants possession of small jewelers bags used in cocaine trafficking 2: holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion 3: holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers 4: holding that an officers observation of exchange of small object and money in a known drug trafficking area constituted reasonable suspicion", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "actions, \u201cthe district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule ... 24 ..; or over claims by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 ... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.\u201d). But in federal-question cases, the identity of the parties is irrelevant and the district court\u2019s jurisdiction is grounded in the federal question(s) raised by the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331. The jurisdictional requirement, therefore, prevents the enlargement of federal jurisdiction in such cases only where a proposed intervenor seeks to bring new state-law claims. See, e.g., Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 473 (<HOLDING>); Blake, 554 F.2d at 956-57. Where the proposed Holdings: 0: holding that an independent jurisdictional basis is not required in this case because intervenors do not seek to litigate a claim on the merits 1: holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case 2: holding that a dismissal based on a jurisdictional statute of limitations does not constitute a judgmerit on the merits because a judgment on the merits can only be rendered after a court has jurisdiction 3: holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action 4: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with Rule 32.6(b)\u2019s pleading requirements. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.7(d). While the Court of Criminal Appeals refers to all three of these rules in its peitinent order, we focus our analysis on Rule 32.6(b), as Frazier\u2019s failure to provide \"full disclosure of the factual basis\u201d of the relevant claim was the sine qua non of the Court of Criminal Appeals\u2019s dismissal. 7 . It is uncontroversial that \"[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.\u201d Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir.2001); see also Owen v. Sec\u2019y for Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Because we find no procedural default, we Holdings: 0: holding that a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by demonstrating either 1 an adequate cause for and actual prejudice arising from the default or 2 that a miscarriage of justice caused by a substantial denial of constitutional rights will occur if the petitioners federal claims are not considered quoting lynd v terry 470 f3d 1308 131314 11th cir2006 1: holding that in the case of state procedural default a federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate among other things that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice 2: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 3: holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure 4: holding that the novelty of a petitioners claim can constitute cause for a procedural default", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Sentencing Commission\u2019s failure to provide for completed distributions, in the application notes. He maintains further that -if we agree that this is a clarifying amendment, we should remand for resentencing so as to give the sentencing court the opportunity to consider the additional clarifying language. Marmolejos\u2019s argument is based on the established principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect if it \u201cclarifies\u201d the guideline or comment in place at the time of sentencing. If, however, the amendment effects a substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new provision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual \u00a7 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251, 257 Holdings: 0: recognizing this as the general rule 1: holding that the bia rule is unreasonable in this context 2: recognizing this texas rule 3: recognizing this rule 4: holding that this is the rule in virtually all circuits", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the term means \u201csource of secondary power; the secondary power source need not be physically separate from the main power source,\u201d while Defendants contend that it means \u201ca source of power connected to provide power between the data node and the access device using the data signaling pair. The secondary power source is physically separate from the main power source.\u201d The parties disagree whether or not the term \u201csecondary power source\u201d requires the secondary power source to be physically separate from the main power source. Network-1 asserts that since the D\u2014 Link case, Federal Circuit cases have demonstrated that the \u201csecondary power source\u201d need not be physically separate from the \u201cmain power source.\u201d See, e.g., Linear Tech. Corp. v. ITC, 566 F.3d 1049, 1055 (Fed.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Oatey Co. v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1275 Holdings: 0: holding that claim that the circuit courts order was deficient because it did not include specific findings of fact regarding each is sue was not preserved for review where it was not raised in the circuit court 1: recognizing circuit split 2: holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case 3: holding that the terms second circuit and third circuit do not require entirely separate and distinct circuits with each requiring a specific structural requirement 4: holding that the conclusion that the wiretap was necessary in each situation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and bringing the tenth circuit into accordance with the authority of a majority of other circuits", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Signal Corp., 68 F.3d 1488, 1492 (2d Cir.1995) (same); Flanigan v. Int\u2019l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, 942 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.1991) (same); Ghartey v. St. John\u2019s Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir.1989) (same). Applying this standard to this case, we conelud\u00e9 that the cause of action did not accrue prior to January 28, 1999, and therefore this action was timely filed. IAM initially suggests that the cause of action accrued in 1993 when it announced its position that plaintiffs would not be credited with their Eastern seniority. This argument borders on the absurd because, although we have held that the harm that results from the union\u2019s breach need not be beyond all doubt for a cause of action to accrue, see, e.g., Buttry, 68 F.3d at 1492-93 (<HOLDING>), we cannot accept IAM\u2019s contention that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 1: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 2: holding that cause of action accrued when union manifestly abandoned the interests of its members 3: recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members 4: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has experience with gangs would be helpful to the jury. That, however, is not the precise issue. Rather, the issue is whether it is helpful to the jury, in making the determination as to whether a particular group constitutes a criminal gang, to hear from an expert concerning the primary activities of that particular group or association. Neither the Minnesota Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals has had cause to visit this precise question. Those jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, however, have held that, upon establishing proper foundation and meeting the helpfulness requirement, a police officer may offer an expert opinion as to whether a group or association constitutes a criminal gang. See People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal.4th 605, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713, 722 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lewis, 514 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1994) Holdings: 0: holding that murder committed by minor gang members was not foreseeable result of sale of alcohol to gang members 1: holding that experts testimony as to aspects of gang culture relevant to the case including requirements of members obedience silence and staunch defense of other gang members and the punishment meted out to a gang member who violates these requirements went to factual matters outside the experience of the average juror 2: holding that expert testimony by police officer based on conversations with defendants family crip members personal investigations of crimes committed by gang members and information from colleagues and law enforcement organizations was admissible and gave jury sufficient grounds to find that group constituted a criminal street gang defined as 1 an ongoing organization of three or more persons 2 that shares a common name or identifying symbol 3 and has as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more enumerated crimes 3: holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with 4: holding that active participation in a criminal street gang means that there is a relationship between the defendant and the gang that is more than nominal passive inactive or purely technical and that defendant must devote all or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The photograph of Smith\u2019s car is also relevant, as it provides context for the photos of the drugs found inside. The probative value of this evidence in proving Smith\u2019s knowledge and lack of mistake or accident in the possession of the contraband seized from his house was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In addition, the district court\u2019s instructions to the jury properly limited the scope of their consideration of the evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. Likewise, the district court committed no plain error in admitting the actual bags of methamphetamine. IV Finally, Smith argued that the district court erred in imposing a 60-month mandatory minimum sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A), to run d 348 (2010) Holdings: 0: holding that the statute is mandatory 1: holding that dismissed drug counts are not more serious if their effect on the total sentence is less than the  924c fiveyear mandatory consecutive sentence 2: holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute 3: holding that a defendant is subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence for a  924c conviction and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction 4: holding a mandatory sentence is still subject to constitutional scrutiny", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "are not applied strictly. Flexible applications of procedural statutes of limitations may be based on equitable principles, such as the discovery rule, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973), or estoppel, e.g., O\u2019Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).\u201d In short, under varying circumstances we have recognized that tolling of the statute of limitations is the fair and responsible result, because the \u201c[ujnswerving \u2018mechanistic\u2019 application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes.\u201d Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192, 412 A.2d 122, 124 (1980). See also Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514, 521, 267 A.2d 498, 501 (1970) (<HOLDING>). III. The undisputed facts here support an Holdings: 0: holding fanresolution of statutory incongruity is to toll period of limitation from time insured gives notice until liability is formally declined by insurer 1: recognizing that equitable tolling doctrines may toll the time period for filing 2: holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach 3: holding that a defect in notice by the faa does no more than toll the statutory time limit 4: holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Cuffley, 112 F.3d 1332, 1337 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). \u201cA claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon \u2018contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.\u2019 \u201d Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985)). We conclude the NYPSC\u2019s challenge to the FCC\u2019s order is not ripe for review. The order only suggests the FCC, if faced with the precise issue, would preempt fixed VoIP services. Nonetheless, the order does not purport to actually do so and until that day comes it is only a mere prediction. See U.S. Telecom Ass\u2019n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 594 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, as we noted, the FCC has since Holdings: 0: holding that epa regions policy statement does not constitute final agency action because it does not compel action 1: holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action 2: holding that ftc issuance of a complaint meets the apa definition of order and therefore is agency action even if not final agency action 3: holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action 4: holding a general prediction set forth in order does not constitute final agency action", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex.2004) (Schneider, J. dissenting). I. Background, The record demonstrates that the trial court ordered Bazan\u2019s counsel to submit an order after it heard evidence of damages and pronounced judgment in default. Over nine years later, and ten days after the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution, Bazan wrote a letter to the trial court requesting it to \u201csign final orders so this action can become final.\u201d In the same letter he notified the trial court that he had terminated his counsel\u2019s representation and was proceeding pro se. He further apprised the trial court that he had requested the reporter\u2019s record so that Bazan could prepare the final orders, and, if the trial court had final orders before it, Bazan r 2d 121, 124 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>); Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, Holdings: 0: recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions on parties 1: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 2: recognizing the inherent power of courts to ensure an adversarial proceeding 3: recognizing courts inherent power to issue subpoenas 4: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by Ford Elliot, J.), citing Senate Legislative Journal, No. 13, 172nd General Assembly, Volume I, at 1780, 1784, and 1786 (February 23, 1988). See also House Legislative Journal, No. 16, 172nd General Assembly, Volume I, at 357, 363, 373 and 374 (March 16, 1988) (for similar comments). Further, the legislature imposed more severe penalties on those individuals who were found to possess and/or deliver greater quantities of drugs.... [T]he legislature\u2019s scheme of imposing harsher penalties and longer periods of confinement on convicted drug dealers is rationally related to the laudable goal of attempting to put an end to the pernicious effects which drugs and the illicit drug trade have inflicted upon our society. Commonwealth v. Eicher, 413 Pa.Super. 235, 605 A.2d 337, 352 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the statute is not applied Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection 2: holding the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions under 18 pacsa  7508 do not violate the equal protection clause 3: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct,\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2332b(g)(5)(A). It is undisputed that Ibrahim was convicted of federal crimes of terrorism, and the evidence presented at trial showed that Ibra-him was involved in or intended to promote these crimes, which were intended to influence by means of intimidation and to retaliate against the government of the United States of America. To assess an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on false testimony, \u201ca sentencing court must find that the defendant 1) willfully 2) and materially 3) committed perjury, which is (a) the intentional (b) giving of false testimony (c) as to a material matter.\u201d United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The distri 72, 80 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The relevant statute here provides for Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have  sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory 1: holding guidelines to be only advisory 2: recognizing that under the booker remedial regime  the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory 3: holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error 4: holding that judicial factfinding at sentencing is permissible  indeed required  under an advisory guidelines regime", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "presented at trial does not support the finding that he was armed with a weapon when he broke into the Gillespie home. We find no merit in this argument. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E. 2d 497 (1985). The existence of such factors must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). At trial the state\u2019s evidence tended to show defendant removed Coggins\u2019 service revolver from the trooper\u2019s holster, shot him once in the head and took the revolver from the patrol car. The state also introduced William Bray\u2019s sworn testimony from his own sentencing hearing to this effect: Q. Mrs. Gillespie was gone and you did go into the house did you not? A. Yes, I did. ... Q. 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E. 2d Holdings: 0: holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factors of old age and infirmity 1: recognizing attorneys substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor 2: holding that the trial court did not err in using the particularized factual circumstances of the case namely the victims age  as an aggravating factor 3: holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age 4: holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "loss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered\u201d); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis). Moreover, no controverting evidence exists in the record showing any other growth rate should be applied or undermining the data utilized or the computations performed by Shipp to arrive at the growth rates he utilized. Additionally, the western-hat market is neither new nor uncertain, and cowboy hats are not untested products. Compare White, 651 S.W.2d at 262 (<HOLDING>), with Tex. Instruments, Inc., 877 S.W.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes 1: holding that evidence showed hewlettwhite florist shop had been an established business for thirtythree years and that the sale of flowers was not an uncertain or speculative business so as to preclude lostprofits award 2: holding that stateagent immunity was not available to a county employee who sued the plaintiff and had him arrested for operating without a business license because the evidence showed that in so doing the defendant acted with malice willfullness or  so beyond his authority that sovereign immunity would not apply footnote omitted 3: holding that evidence that appellee received complaints intended for appellant showed actual injury to business reputation 4: holding that an employee qualified as a business visitor which the janis court subsequently defined as a business invitee", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may have paid more or less than others, although relevant in assessing damages, does not affect whether the conspiracy, if proven, would have had an impact common to the class. See In re Workers' Compensation, 130 F.R.D. at 110 (in considering whether insurers conspired to fix insurance rates, the Court explained that \"the multiple factors which affect rates\u201d relates to damages, not whether there was common proof of impact); In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. at 271-272 (explaining that \u201ccommon proof of impact is possible even though prices\u201d are \"individually negotiated,\u201d and that defendants' reliance on \"localized and unique\u201d markets and pricing procedures related to damages, not common fact of injury); In re Domestic Air Transp., 137 F.R.D. 677, 689 (N.D.Ga.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Screws Antitrust Litig., 91 F.R.D. 52, Holdings: 0: recognizing that ajntitrust pricefixing conspiracy cases by their nature deal with common legal and factual questions about the existence scope and effect of the alleged conspiracy 1: holding that alleged pricefixing conspiracy involved common questions relating to the existence and proof of illegal agreement 2: holding that the proximate cause requirement was satisfied  because the defendants actions resulted in identifiable losses as outlined in the expert reports and vickys victim impact statements footnote and citation omitted 3: holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level 4: holding common impact satisfied because alleged pricefixing resulted in an artificial base price even though actual fares were discounted or negotiated", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for \u2014 the peremptory challenge. MJ: Captain [K] [trial counsel]\u2019s been very forthright with the Court in the past. I assume, Captain [K] that you\u2019re, likewise, being forthright this time; that you have no other reason for substituting \u2014 or for excusing this member? TC: No, sir, we do not. MJ: And it\u2019s particularly not race \u2014 although I do note that [of 11 members] there are several other minority members on the panel, including the sergeant major who was just in, as well as one female member\u2014 TC: Sir, Sergeant First Class [B] and Sergeant First Class [KA]. ATC: And, for the record, sir, Lieutenant Colonel [B] is also a minority member, based on his worksheet. MJ: Okay. Well, I\u2019m satisfied that the Government has exercised its peremptory challenge on a non-discriminato D.Texas 1994) (<HOLDING>). DISCUSSION The Fifth Amendment guarantees due Holdings: 0: holding lack of factual basis for preemptory challenge renders avowed reason for challenge a pretext 1: holding raceneutral basis for preemptory challenge was pretext where stated reasons for challenge not supported by venirepersons statements 2: holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea 3: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason 4: holding that if a race or genderneutral reason for a peremptory challenge is apparent from the record the trial court may deny an objection to the challenge without requiring the party exercising the challenge to articulate a race or genderneutral reason", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "grown by independent farmers were processed by the employer prevented it from receiving the \u201csecondary agriculture\u201d exemption); Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411-12 (5th Cir.1975) (employees who delivered and disposed of dairy products did not fit within the primary or secondary meaning of agriculture); Brennan v. Sugar Cane Groivers Co-op. of Fla., 486 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1973) (camp cooks for sugar cane workers fell within the secondary meaning of agriculture); Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1971) (clerical work performed for a contractor primarily engaged in leveling agricultural land was not within the secondary meaning of agriculture, as most of that clerical work took place off the farm); NLRB v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 681 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>); Valmac Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 246, Holdings: 0: holding that farm workers who voluntarily choose to ride employers bus to and from field were engaged in noncompensable travel 1: holding that employees who transported live poultry from an independent growers farm to their employers processing plant were not agricultural laborers 2: holding that the antiretaliation provision must protect employees who complain about violations to their employers 3: holding that employers are not liable for conduct of ordinary employees because an ordinary employees conduct will normally be so unrelated to the employers business that it cannot be deemed in furtherance thereof 4: holding that atwill employees have no contractual relationship with their employers to support a cause of action under section 1981", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. This argument marries with Marrero\u2019s contention that factual issues existed on the merits of her section 1983 claim. Marrero, consumed by her belief that such factual issues existed, concludes that the district judge must have converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment in order to dismiss the case. There is, however, no support that such a conversion occurred. The record shows that the district court properly considered the matter as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Defendants did not attach any documents or exhibits outside their pleadings, and the district court never allowed the parties to supplement the record. See Collier, 158 F.3d at 603 (<HOLDING>). Of course, the implication of this holding is Holdings: 0: holding that a court may consider materials outside the pleadings to determine its jurisdiction 1: holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction 2: holding that on a rule 12b1 motion challenging subjectmatter jurisdiction the court has authority to consider matters outside the pleadings 3: holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings 4: holding that such a conversion is proper in order to consider materials outside the pleadings", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 n. 8 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that, once an employee notifies an employer of a disability and requests reassignment, both parties should \u201cinteract in good faith to determine how to reasonably accommodate the employee\u201d). We begin by recognizing that a request for reassignment may constitute protected activity under the ADA. We have treated requests for reasonable accommodation as protected activity under the ADA. See Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir.2001); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir.1999). And a request for reassignment to a vacant position is a request for a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12111(9)(B); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Hence, if Mr. Jones had a reasonable, good Holdings: 0: holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled 1: holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job 2: holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job 3: holding that the employers willingness to accommodate the employee undercut the employees claim of constructive discharge 4: holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in a separate and clear finding,\u201d id. at 95, 113 S.Ct. at 1117, the court may nevertheless make the upward adjustment whenever it finds all three elements of perjury. Here, the district court found that Queen\u2019s testimony was \u201cfalse\u201d and that Queen gave this false testimony, \u201cknowing it to be false and material.\u201d That, we conclude, is sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm Queen\u2019s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have found over 60 published opinions since 1990 addressing the rule. 2 . Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provi efendant's previous sexual advances towards women admissible to show motive in fraudulent scheme to use company funds for personal relationships); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. \u2014, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 159 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence that defendants had participated in several prior drug transactions was properly admitted to establish defendants intent to distribute narcotics 1: holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609 2: holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute 3: holding prior arrest in connection with an undercover drug buy admissible to show intent to distribute narcotics 4: holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "we review de novo.\u201d See Franks Inv. Co. LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir.2010) (en banc) (citation omitted). That standard, however, is only the beginning of the analytical rules we must apply. The nature of the Appellees\u2019 lawsuit \u2014 a facial, prospective challenge \u2014 and the character of the Ordinance \u2014 a housing regulation that falls within the City\u2019s police power \u2014 necessarily affect our analysis. A. Salerno Principle Regarding Facial Challenges That the Appellees waged a facial, prospective challenge to the Ordinance invokes standards of judicial restraint designed to further the interests of federalism and deference to duly passed legislation. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1191, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to United States v. Salerno, the Holdings: 0: holding that there were at least four amendments submitted to the people in a single proposition and for that reason the amendments were not submitted in accordance with  the constitution and notwithstanding the action of the legislature in inserting them in the constitution are null and void and form no part of said constitution 1: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 2: recognizing that fees of 2030 are generally awarded in this circuit 3: recognizing that facial challenges are generally disfavored because they threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the constitution 4: holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "support this conclusion, and nothing points the other way. First, RICO\u2019s statutory scheme resembles the EPCA more than the RCRA. Both RICO and the EPCA stand alone in grappling with a broad social issue, whereas the RCRA had a closely related statute on which the Court in Meghrig relied heavily. Second, as in both Porter and Mitchell, the government brought the suit rather than a private party like the Meghrig plaintiff, and Porter makes clear that district courts may have \u201ceven broader and more flexible\u201d equitable powers where the public interest is involved, 328 U.S. at 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086. This point has particular traction if the government is the only party that may seek equitable relief under RICO. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1083-89 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). But see Nat\u2019l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the fdcpa 1: holding that private plaintiffs can seek equitable relief under rico 2: holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea 3: holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government 4: holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "who are part of the public.\u201d Summary judgment was therefore appropriately granted to the Town. Given that conclusion, there is no need to address VSC\u2019s argument that the court erred in evaluating a different portion of the \u201cpublic use\u201d test set forth in American Museum of Fly Fishing. Affirmed. 1 It is true, as the dissent posits, that the meaning of the term \u201cpublic use\u201d has been fleshed out through our case law, and there is little statutory language to be construed. Nonetheless, the Court is bound to construe tax exemptions strictly against the taxpayer lest all taxpayers be burdened with the costs of conferring a benefit to select individuals rather than to the public at large. See, e.g., Delta Psi Fraternity v. City of Burlington, 2008 VT 129, \u00b6 14, 185 Vt. 129, 969 A.2d 54 (<HOLDING>). 2 We are not persuaded, as the dissent is, Holdings: 0: holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption 1: holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes 2: holding that when interpreting tax exemption statutes we strictly construe the statute in favor of taxation and against exemption 3: recognizing that the right to hold land without being subject to taxation may constitute a substantial detriment to the affected locality and a significant advantage to the landowner and that land use ought not to result in exemption from taxation absent the conferral of a substantial public benefit such as the tax exemption law was designed to foster quotation omitted 4: holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court\u2019s resolution of disputed facts.\u201d Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1992)). When a defendant submits a factual attack on the complaint, he must provide support with \u201caffidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials.\u201d Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). Given the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff must submit evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court does have jurisdiction based on the complaints and evidence. Id. Courts are to hold pro se litigants to less stringent pleading standards than other parties. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (<HOLDING>); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, Holdings: 0: holding that while pro se complaints are liberally construed issues not raised in the district court are deemed waived 1: holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed 2: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them 3: recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings 4: holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "asserts, without citation, that \u201cwhen the patent discloses method and apparatus claims, if only method claims are asserted in the lawsuit and only method claims are found to be infringed, then the marking limitation does not apply.\u201d Halliburton\u2019s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 152), p. 4. Where a patent contains both method and apparatus claims, and there is a tangible item by which notice of the asserted method can be given, the patentee must mark the tangible item to comply with the Marking statute, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 287. American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Medical Engineering Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538-39 (Fed.Cir.1993); Honeywell International Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 2001 WL 66345, *4 (D.Del.2001); Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Technology, Inc., 2000 WL 1728351 (D.Del.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Federal Circuit set forth this principle Holdings: 0: holding that after reading the patent a person of skill in the art would not understand the patentee to have invented a generic method where the patent only disclosed one embodiment of it 1: holding that missouris good samaritan rule which incorporates section 323 comes into play only where the plaintiff is the intended beneficiary of the defendants action 2: holding that the only time that the notice provisions of the federal statute do not come into play is when the patent is directed to only a method or process 3: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement 4: holding that  1338a jurisdiction inures when a complaint establishes that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "plaintiff filed the motion to remand presently before the court. Plaintiff contends that this suit \u201carises under\u201d Alabama\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation laws and, as a result, its removal to federal court is barred by 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1445(c). DISCUSSION Under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1445(c), \u201c[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen\u2019s compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States.\u201d The issue before the court is whether a claim for retaliation for the exercise of rights under Alabama\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation laws \u201carises under\u201d those laws, precluding its removal to federal court. A number of courts have considered this question and the decisions go both ways. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1246 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that  255111 claim does not arise under alabamas workers compensation laws 1: holding that retaliation claim did not arise under states workers compensation laws 2: holding that missouris cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws 3: holding action did not arise under the patent laws 4: holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "buy. Agent Snedeker and Pope discussed in detail the location of the drug buy, the price, the quantity, and the availability of drugs for future purchase. Considering these factors, the statements made by Pope to Agent Snedeker were not testimonial in nature. Therefore, it is immaterial whether the declarant was unavailable or whether the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross examine the declarant. Furthermore, the statements made by Pope to Agent Snedeker fall outside the long- rt intended to overrule its precedent regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. Any ambiguity regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator statements in the wake of Crawford has been firmly resolved by the Fourth Circuit. See United States v. Sullivan, 455 F.3d 248, 258 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Canady, 139 Holdings: 0: holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible 1: holding testimony admissible as showing context of relationship with coconspirator prior to conspiracy 2: holding that bruton does not apply to nontestimonial codefendant statements 3: holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial 4: holding that driving records were nontestimonial", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "able [to] control.\u201d Later, the petitioners note that the BIA\u2019s rejection of their \u201cparticular social group\u201d definition \u201cwas challenged ... in [the] Motion to Reconsider ... which stressed [that] ... young women in general are a particular group that has characteristics which are indisputable and not subject to change.\u201d Finally, the petitioners assert that the BIA\u2019s description of Kuci\u2019s definition as \u201csimply too broad\u201d is \u201cobviously erroneous, especially when you consider the fact that women in Albania are being kidnapped and threatened to be sold as prostitutes to this day, no matter their age.\u201d But the petitioners have failed to elaborate on these statements, none of which explains how the BIA erred in its legal analysis. See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The government recognizes that this court has Holdings: 0: holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient 1: holding a onesentence conclusory objection to an issue in the magistrates recommendation insufficient to preserve that issue for appeal 2: holding that scattered statements in the appellants briefs are not enough to preserve an issue for appeal 3: holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal 4: recognizing that conclusory statements do not preserve an issue for appeal", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "by Eleventh Circuit case law. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a statute may refer to a class of persons or entities and require the government to take action relative to those persons or entities, but still not contain rights-creating language. See Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1345 (\u201c[E]ven though [the statute] contain[s] language requiring the state to take certain actions relative to individual foster children (e.g., the State shall file a petition [to terminate the parental rights of the child\u2019s parents], we determined [the statute] do[es] not have the kind of foeused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gon-zaga.\u201d) (quoting 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2003)). See also Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-73, 101 S.Ct. 1451 (<HOLDING>). Next, the present case is distinguishable Holdings: 0: holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine 1: recognizing  1 of the davisbacon act is a minimum wage law designed for the benefit of construction workers but finding the act does not contain rightscreating language 2: holding that  301 of the labor management relations act of 1947 29 usc  185 does not preempt claims brought under washingtons minimum wage act chapter 4946 rcw 3: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 4: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that this court must find that it is without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs First Amendment claim. Because Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of employment discrimination based on national origin, plaintiffs First Amendment claim is preempted. Cf. Thorne v. Cavazos, 744 F.Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C.1990) (finding that the remedial provisions of ADEA [or in this case Title VII] provides plaintiff with sole remedy for constitutional claims). Therefore, plaintiffs First Amendment claim should be dismissed. B. Civil Service Reform Act Preemption. Even if plaintiffs First Amendment claim is considered separate and apart from his Title VII claim, it is still preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat (N.D.Ohio 1988) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if plaintiffs claim is Holdings: 0: holding that federal employee could not sue supervisors for discharge alleged to have violated her first amendment rights 1: holding plaintiff may sue federal agents for money damages for violation of his constitutional rights 2: holding that search of middle school student violated her fourth amendment rights 3: holding that due to the csra a federal employee has no independent right of action for damages against a supervisor who improperly disciplined the employee for exercising his first amendment rights 4: holding that employers have standing to sue", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201d id. at 1281 (quoting Compact art. VII(d)(l)), to hold that the EIS must include \u201cat a minimum, a \u2018reasonably complete\u2019 discussion of mitigation measures including \u2018analytical data\u2019 regarding whether the available measures would achieve the required result,\u201d id. Two caveats must accompany the League court\u2019s articulation of what constitutes an adequate discussion of mitigation measures under the Compact. First, while NEPA caselaw may provide persuasive authority for interpreting the Compact, it is not controlling. Under NEPA, the duty to study possible mitigation measures stems from the statute\u2019s requirement that the unavoidable adverse effects of a project be studied. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Under the Compact, an EIS needs to include Holdings: 0: holding that an eis must consider the extent to which adverse effects can be avoided by discussing possible mitigation measures 1: recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove 2: holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded 3: holding that an adverse credibility determination must be supported by a true inconsistency 4: holding that perfunctory description of mitigation measures was inadequate", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "serving a sentence. Id. at 793. Thus, it held loss of an opportunity for an earlier supervised release \u201cdoes not constitute a substantial penalty for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.\u201d Id. The court, however, specifically listed revocation of probation as a substantial penalty \u201cthat cannot be imposed * * * because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege not to give incriminating testimony against himself.\u201d Id. (quoting United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 658 (3d Cir.1991)). This is supported by the United States Supreme Court\u2019s statements in Murphy. In explaining under what circumstances the Fifth Amendment privilege becomes self-executing, the Court stated: A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationar 13-15 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cate, 165 Vt. 404, 683 A.2d 1010, Holdings: 0: holding that defendant could be required to reimburse state for buy money in drug case as a condition of probation 1: recognizing that probation condition required probationer to enter into and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program but finding that no condition of probation was imposed that required him to admit to a counselor the sexual acts charged 2: holding defendant was placed in classic penalty situation when he was required as condition of probation to participate in treatment program that required participants to disclose their offense history 3: holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions 4: holding that when the district court imposed drug testing in connection with a special condition of substance abuse program participation  it was  not required to specify the number of drug tests a defendant must undergo as a part of the treatment program", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "further notes that the jury was given extensive instructions on evaluating inconsistent statements and evaluating the credibility of witnesses generally, which, collectively, sufficiently addressed the conflicts in the cooperator testimony. Id. at 138. The Court has assessed the testimony summarized by Demerieux and concludes that the conflicts in testimony do not rise to the level of a due process violation. Demerieux correctly states that, under Napue, a \u201cconviction obtained through the use of false evidence ... must fall under [the Due Process Clause],\u201d and that \u201cit is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness\u2019 credibility rather than directly upon defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (<HOLDING>). But as a threshold matter, Demerieux must Holdings: 0: holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative 1: holding that a conviction obtained through the knowing reckless or negligent use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury 2: holding that false arrest is one means of committing false imprisonment 3: holding that prosecutor cannot obtain conviction with the aid of false testimony where the prosecutor knows such testimony is false 4: holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the defendant knows to be otherwise illegal, while in the case of entrapment by estoppel, because of the statements of an official, the defendant believes that his conduct constitutes no offense. See 53 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249 Proof of Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel \u00a7 20 (1999). Neither defense implicates the defendant\u2019s mens rea, except in the rare case in which mistake of law negates the required mental state of the offense. In such case the defense of entrapment by estoppel also could constitute a failure of proof \"defense\u201d because the government agent's misstatement of the law would lead the defendant to believe that there was nothing criminal about his conduct under any circumstances. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (<HOLDING>); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39, 79 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding that the state police is a state agency 2: holding that appellants fourteenth amendment due process claim did not require reversal where they failed to show that they were prejudiced 3: holding that it would offend due process to permit the state to sanction individuals from demonstrating in an area where police told them they could hold their demonstration 4: holding that the denial of the motions for summary judgment precludes a sanction on the ground that the claims against them were legally insufficient and that a sanction is generally improper where a successful motion could have avoided any additional legal expenses by defendants emphasis in original", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "at 659 (citing 10 C.F.R. at \u00a7 211.61 (1975)). The government also promulgated mandatory petroleum price regulations that applied to \u201ceach sale, lease or purchase of a covered product in the United States.\u201d Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. \u00a7 212.2). \u201cOil from stripper well leases, which represented \u2018probably a majority\u2019 of the production at the Osage Reservation, was exempt from price controls under \u00a7 4(e)(2) of the EPAA.\u201d Id. (internal citation omitted). For the three Tranche One trial months that fell within the time period when price controls were in effect \u2014 January 1976, May 1979 and November 1980 \u2014 the court found that, in addition to the \u201coffered price\u201d breach, the Osage Agency had misapplied price controls to its calculation of royalties owed to the Tribe. Osage II, 72 Fed.Cl. at 661 (<HOLDING>). The court rejected the United States\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity 1: holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court 2: holding that conversion theory of recovery does not extend to money owed on a debt or to general damages 3: holding that price controls did not extend to the calculation of royalty owed to the osage tribe under the 1974 regulations 4: holding that waiver in a sue and be sued clause is limited to actions involving the corporate activities of the tribe and does not extend to actions of the tribe in its capacity as a political governing body", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.\u201d Id.; see, e.g., United States v. O\u2019Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir.1986) (allowing FBI agent to testify regarding witness\u2019s prior identification of defendant after witness recanted at trial). The better course, obviously, is to provide the photo array or other evidence of the prior identification immediately, while the declarant is still on the witness stand. But events at trial sometimes make the better course impractical. In such circumstances, a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine a declarant regarding his prior identification is enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 801, even if the defendant chooses not to use the opportunity. See United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The district court provided Foster such a Holdings: 0: holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment 1: holding that fbi agents testimony regarding witnesss pri or identification was admissible where nothing in the record suggested that the declarant was unavailable for reexamination after the agents testimony 2: holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay 3: holding that an absent witnesss statements are admissible under the confrontation clause only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant   had a prior opportunity to crossexamine 4: holding that the victims prior videotaped testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible as testimony at trial where the victim was unavailable to testify", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the most succinctly: \u201cFirst, there must be either a show of authority or a use of force; and second, the show of authority or use of force must have caused the fleeing individual to stop attempting to escape.\u201d United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir.1999). With respect to when a seizure occurs by physical force, the Supreme Court has clarified that a seizure only occurs \u201cwhen there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.\u201d Br (9th Cir.1994) (finding no seizure where an officer drew his gun at a suspect who subsequently fled, and explaining that \u201ca seizure does not occur if an officer applies physical force in an attempt to detain a suspect but such force is ineffective\u201d); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In the cases in which no physical force is Holdings: 0: holding that no seizure occurred where officer approached the suspect at the bus stop mentioned that he was investigating a bank robbery asked the suspect what he was doing in the area and for his identification and otherwise gave no indication that the suspect was not free to leave or to refuse to respond to questioning 1: holding that where the police roadblock was intended to stop brower by physical impact and did so a seizure occurred 2: holding no seizure occurred when after defendant began to walk away officer directed him to stop 3: holding a seizure occurs when a passenger of a car is hit by a bullet that is meant to stop him 4: holding that no seizure occurred where shots were fired at a truck but did not hit the suspect because they failed to produce a stop", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to the employment contracts of seamen. As adopted by Congress, the Convention is part of Title 9 of the United States Code, 9 U.S.C. \u00a7 1, et seq. (\u201cTitle 9\u201d). According to 9 U.S.C. \u00a7 1, the general provisions of Title 9 do not apply to seamen\u2019s employment contracts. However, there is no indication that the Convention excludes seamen\u2019s employment contracts from its purview. Instead, the Convention states that \u201can arbitration agreement... arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial.. .falls under the Convention.\u201d 9 U.S.C. \u00a7 202. Numerous courts have held in accordance with this inclusive language that the Convention applies to the employment contracts of seamen E.g., Francisco v. STOLT ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Bautista, et al. v. Star Cruises and Holdings: 0: holding that this boilerplate language conflicts with the regulations and rulings 1: holding that first and most importantly the language of the claim defines the scope of the protected invention 2: holding that a rule that conflicts with a subsequent adopted statutory amendment may not be enforced 3: holding that the most significant relationship test as espoused in the restatement of conflicts governs conflicts cases sounding in tort in case where automobile collision occurred in mexico 4: holding that 9 usc  1 conflicts with the inclusive language of the convention and thus may not restrict its scope", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "83 . Staggs v. State, 804 P.2d 456, 458 (Okl.Cr.1991). See also Shelton v. State, 793 P.2d 866, 870 (Okl.Cr.1990) (concluding that \u201c[t]his Court does not encourage the use of photographs taken of victims before their demise and we caution prosecutors to first seek other forms of proof which are less prejudicial.\u201d); Rawlings v. State, 740 P.2d 153, 161-62 (Okl.Cr.1987) (finding that \"[ajlthough this Court does not favor admissions of photographs showing the victim alive, we are of the opinion that the photograph was relevant as to its existence and the location of its discovery.\u201d); Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d 322, 326 (Okl.Cr.1983) (concluding photos showing victim while alive were not relevant because victim's identity was not at issue). 84 . See Rawlings v. State, 740 P.2d at 160 (<HOLDING>). 85 . See Hayes v. State, 738 P.2d 533, 538-39 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence should be excluded where the likelihood that it would confuse the jury and protract the proceedings outweighs its probative value 1: holding probative value of evidence must be balanced against any prejudicial effect 2: holding that prior conviction shall be admissible evidence for impeachment purposes unless danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighs probative value 3: holding that trial court has discretion to determine whether probative value of photo outweighs prejudicial effect 4: holding that inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic evidence that is admissible if its probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "10 . Plaintiff avers incorrectly that the LOGO provision becomes inoperative upon receipt of full funding under the contract. Rather, because this is a fixed-price contract, the LOGO clause remains operative with regard to work under the original scope of the contract or any subsequently executed bilateral modification. 11 . Defendant argued that the LOGO and FP limitations on liability would preclude plaintiff from recovery even in the event of breach. Defendant's argument is curious. The court will not interpret these clauses to reach an unjust or impractical result. It is axiomatic that either party would be entitled to some recovery in the event of a breach of the contract. See Raymond Constructors of Africa, Ltd. v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 147, 166, 411 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Solar Turbines, 26 Cl.Ct. at 1276 (finding Holdings: 0: holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing 1: holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under  107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred 2: recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the governments actions 3: holding limitation clause inapplicable where contractor incurred additional costs as a result of governments failure to perform 4: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Evaluation was then forwarded to the FWS, which issued a re-concurrence stating \u201c[w]e have reviewed your November 1 biological evaluation and concur with your determination that hazing operations conducted under the Management Plan may affect, but are not likely 'to adversely affect grizzly bears.\u201d In conducting a second consultation and Biological Evaluation on the impact of the Management Plan on Yellowstone grizzly bears, and obtaining a second concurrence from the FWS, the federal defendants completed the reinitiation of consultation required by the ESA. See 50 C.F.R. \u00a7 402.16(b). Reinitiation of consultation is the precise relief sought by Alliance. Accordingly, Alliance\u2019s Section 7 claim is moot. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377, 1378-79 (9th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). IV. The ESA Claims A. The 60-Day Notice Holdings: 0: holding the case to be moot where construction of the pro ject had been entirely completed 1: holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed 2: holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions 3: holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot 4: holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "DHHS focused only on Sarah. 2 DHHS\u2019s assumption is faulty, in light of the current state of Arkansas law as to the collateral-estoppel effect of a guilty plea in a subsequent civil proceeding. In Zinger v. Terrell, 336 Ark. 423, 985 S.W.2d 737 (1999), the supreme court overruled prior case law and held that the criminal conviction of a life-insurance beneficiary of first-degree murder of the insured following a trial collaterally estopped the retrial of certain issues in a later civil trial concerning the disposition of the proceeds of the insurance policy. The court cautioned that it did not address the issue of collateral estoppel for criminal convictions other than murder and that it did not overrule Washington National Insurance Co. v. Clement, 192 Ark. 371, 91 S.W.2d 265 (1936) (<HOLDING>). 3 In its statement of the case, DHHS states: Holdings: 0: holding the same for malicious prosecution 1: holding that states nonproseeution agreement did not bar subsequent federal prosecution 2: holding that a judgment in a criminal prosecution for dwi did not bar a subsequent civil proceeding founded on the same facts 3: holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct 4: holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "find, as we did in DiCicco, that Respondent\u2019s conduct frustrated the purpose of MRPC 1.15(a) and in so doing violated the rule. Similarly, in using his Attorney Trust Account to pay personal and business debts, Respondent violated Md. Rule 16-607, requiring that \u201c[t]he portion [... of funds] belonging to the attorney [...] shall be withdrawn promptly when the attorney [...] becomes entitled to the funds ...,\u201d and Rule 16-609 prohibiting an attorney from \u201cpledging] any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account....\u201d In the present case, Respondent withdrew client funds from his Attorney Trust Account, to which he was in no way entitled, in violation of Maryland Rule 16-607 and 16-609. See Attorney Griev. Comm\u2019n v. Herman, 380 Md. 378, 844 A.2d 1181 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Clarke had a child support obligation, Holdings: 0: holding that there was no presumption of a gift where the wifes money was used to make the purchase but title was placed in the name of the husband and finding the facts sufficient to establish a purchase money resulting trust in favor of the wife 1: holding in case where stock was purchased but held in suspense account pending repayment of loan from seller that the fact that the money to purchase the now worthless stock was borrowed does not mean that money was not lost 2: holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan 3: holding the general rule is that money paid to another under a mistake of fact may be recovered because the money belongs in equity and good conscience to the person who paid it 4: holding that it was a violation of maryland rules 16607 and 16609 for an attorney to borrow money in the form of a home equity loan and to then deposit the borrowed money into his trust account in order to pay the amount owed to his client", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "challenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998). We set aside the fact finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). Initially, we note that the jury was asked to determine Grace\u2019s damages for the breach of contract the court had found. The question was worded as follows: What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, w pp.Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (measuring sufficiency of damages evidence against commonly understood meaning of undefined term used in charge); see also Equistar Chems., L.P. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 240 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>); Tribble & Stephens Co. v. Consolidated Holdings: 0: holding on habeas review that counsels failure to object to improper argument at trial did not prejudice petitioner where other evidence supported a guilty verdict and the jury was told closing argument was not evidence 1: holding argument not waived for failure to object where party previously raised argument and district court considered and rejected it 2: holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial 3: holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court 4: holding argument that charge submitted improper measure of damages was waived by failure to object in trial court", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "imputed to employer); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat\u2019l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 99 F.3d 695, 703 (5th Cir.1996) (\u201cWhere the legal claims asserted by the plaintiffs are not independent and mutually exclusive, but rather related to and dependent upon excluded conduct, the claims are not covered, even if asserted against an insured who did not himself engage in the prohibited conduct.\u201d); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 F.Supp. 629, 632 (N.D.Tex.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.1993) (finding no duty to defend insured against claim of negligent hiring when the claim of negligent hiring arises out of agent\u2019s intentional sexual harassment); Columbia, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Huey T. Littleton Claims, Inc. v. Employers Holdings: 0: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate 1: holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself 2: holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective 3: recognizing in context of general liability policy if petition contains allegations which when fairly and reasonably construed state cause of action potentially covered by policy insurer has duty to defend insured in underlying suit 4: holding that under texas law where liability of insured and liability of its agent were related and interdependent court must look to whether agents fraud was covered by policy", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with other free individuals \u2014 was unknown through much of history and is unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other aspects of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by government officials eager to tell us what\u2019s best for us. The recent tendency of judges to insinuate tort causes of action into relationships traditionally governed by contract is just such overreaching. It must be viewed with no less suspicion because the government officials in question happen to wear robes. Ill Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. The California Supreme Court is once again leading the way. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988), has taken a bite out of Seaman\u2019s by holding that tort remedies are 805, 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1983) (<HOLDING>). At long last, however, we seem to be moving Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim was predicated on tort and that it was therefore subject to the statute of limitations for tort actions 1: holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract 2: holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship 3: recognizing that there can be compelling circumstances in which a trial court can determine that neither party prevailed in a contract case 4: holding that a party can be liable in tort for actions authorized by the contract", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "these circumstances, and after extensive consideration, Defendants elected to force the sale of all remaining Employer Stock in the 401(k) Plan. Yet in most cases involving similar claims and similar financial uncertainty, fiduciaries reached the opposite decision. In other words, despite their knowledge that a company was in financial trouble, thereby potentially leading to a decline in value of the company st 995) (remanding case for further proceedings where, in the context of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (\"ESOPs\u2019\u2019), court found that a fiduciary\u2019s continuing investment in company stock despite substantial financial difficulties could be sufficient to overcome the presumption of prudence that applies to ESOPs); DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 397 F.Supp.2d 758, 773-74 (E.D.Va.2005) (<HOLDING>). While this contrast of facts does not Holdings: 0: holding that a trial courts refusal to allow the defendant to attend the jury view was not prejudicial 1: holding defendants were fiduciaries because they had discretion to determine the extent of the companys annual contribution to the plan and whether the contribution would be made in  stock or cash 2: holding that factors such as the possibility of us airways bankruptcy throughout the class period the companys known cash flow problems and its unresolved longterm financial problems following an unsuccessful merger were sufficient to allow a jury to question the prudence of the decision to continue to allow the plan to invest in us airways parent companys stock 3: holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard including the defendant in person and to allow presentation of additional evidence before sentencing 4: holding that to preserve an issue a party must object with sufficient specificity to allow the trial court to address it", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "relevant to the qualified immunity defense are seriously disputed, a court may not reach the ultimate legal question of whether a reasonable police officer should have known that he acted unlawfully. Lennon, 66 F.3d at 421 (citing Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir.1990), and Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649 (2d Cir.1994)). C. The Plaintiffs Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim Brown and Etherton argue that Brown\u2019s use of deadly force in response to the perceived threat posed by Rasanen was objectively reasonable and that they are therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Here, there is no question that the Plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly-established constitutional right in contending that Brown used excessive force in shooting Rasanen. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 143 (<HOLDING>). The question for the Court on summary Holdings: 0: recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest 1: holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause 2: holding fourth amendment protects against use of force while in arresting officers custody until arraignment or formal charge 3: holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment 4: recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "witness list (contrary to his assertion at trial that the presiding officer \u201cdidn\u2019t say anything\u201d) this was not an arraignment. Rather, this was a preliminary and informal meet ing to establish what would be required for the SCM trial proceeding. We find this to be no different than a military judge requiring counsel to submit a docketing request that includes anticipated pleas and forum, and proposed trial dates. See Army Reg. 27-10, Legal Services, Military Justice, para. 5-21 (16 Nov. 2005). As indicated by the lack of a recorder and the informality of the meeting, the purpose of the initial meeting was not to formally call upon appellant to enter pleas, but to properly prepare the presiding officer for what he would need in order to conduct the SCM. See Jackson, 41 C.M.R. at 681 (<HOLDING>). See also, R.C.M. 904 discussion (\u201cThe accused Holdings: 0: holding that a discussion concerning pleas at an offtherecord rcm802 session did not constitute an arraignment 1: holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement 2: holding that the claim that the defendants negligently provided investment advice did not constitute an accident 3: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 4: holding that district courts discussion of an alternative ground for its decision did not undermine its ruling that appellants claim was untimely raised", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Cir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Murphy argues that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law when it dismissed the lone holdout juror during deliberations after the trial judge concluded that the juror refused to deliberate. Murphy, however, cites no Supreme Court case which holds that the dismissal of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates a criminal defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right. Indeed, there are no Supreme Court holdings addressing the issue of whether a trial court\u2019s discharge of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates the Sixth Amendment. We therefore reject Murphy\u2019s challenge under \u00a7 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Ill AEDPA also provides that the court may Holdings: 0: holding that a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under  2254d1 when there are no holdings from the supreme court addressing the issue raised by the petitioner 1: holding state court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law given the lack of holdings from the supreme court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators courtroom conduct 2: holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied 3: holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed 4: holding that the language of  2254d1 expressly restricts the source of clearly established law to the supreme courts jurisprudence", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "resulting IEP against a substantive standard.\u201d Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 8034. Like that under the APA or the CRIPA, the IDEA\u2019S exhaustion scheme was carefully designed to balance the individual complainant\u2019s interest in retaining prompt access to a judicial forum and the countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (discussing policies served by the IDEA\u2019S exhaustion requirement); cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-149, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (describing the balance of interests applicable in exhaustion determinations). Courts therefore may not, consistent with the intent of Congress, impose exhaustion requirements that \u201cmerely add additional steps not contemplated in the scheme of the Act.\u201d Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2nd Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Diamond v. McKenzie, 602 F.Supp. 632, 639 Holdings: 0: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 1: holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process 2: holding that state could not conduct sua sponte review of unappealed due process hearing order 3: recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process 4: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "States. The court held that if an alien\u2019s 1-212 application is granted, he is no longer subject to the reinstatement pro vision, because he is no longer an illegal entrant. Id. at 789. Here, Lino did not apply for a 1-212 application. Consequently, her reliance on Perez-Gonzalez is misplaced. In any event, courts have questioned the Perez-Gonzalez outcome. See, e.g., Lattab, 384 F.3d at 17 (\u201c[W]e have grave doubts about the correctness of the Perez-Gonzalez court\u2019s conclusion.\u201d). Although we recognize the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we have consistently held that \u201cimmigration policy ... is traditionally [within] the province of the political branches.\u201d Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.2002); see also Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 1: recognizing that immigration policy is the clear purview of the legislative branch 2: recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear 3: recognizing that citizens who exercise their rights under the initiative provisions act as and become in fact the legislative branch of the municipal government  4: holding that in the absence of a legislative invasion of constitutionallyprotected rights the judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislatures exclusive policy decisions", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor, in closing argument, may not try to interpret the meaning of a defendant\u2019s not guilty plea by saying that defendant\u2019s not guilty plea constitutes a \u201cchallenge\u201d to the state to prove him guilty. State v. Miles, 255 N.W.2d 48, 49 (Minn.1977). It is just as improper for defense counsel to try to interpret the defendant\u2019s not guilty plea for the jury. In this case, defense counsel arguably was trying to use defendant\u2019s not guilty plea as an equivalent of or substitute for defend ant\u2019s testifying. The trial court so concluded and, by these instructions, was trying to neutralize this. Cf People v. Finney, 88 Ill.App.2d 204, 232 N.E.2d 247 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 2304, 20 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Since the trial court should be given some Holdings: 0: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the states rebuttal remarks when defense counsel raised the issue in his closing argument 1: holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify 2: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the prosecutions questioning of the defendant about prior convictions when defense counsel asked a prosecution witness whether he was aware that the defendant was  a convicted felon 3: holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument 4: holding that defense counsel opened the door to response by prosecutor when he tried to turn defendants failure to testify to his advantage in closing argument", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "That case, National Advertising Co. v. City of Miami, Case No. 02-20556-CIV-KING (\"National II\"), was filed on February 21, 2002 in response to the City\u2019s rejection of seven permit applications to construct billboards. National I and National II were consolidated in the district court below. However, we ordered the cases to be argued separately before this court. In this case we asked the parties to focus solely on the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance itself. In the companion case, National II, the parties were asked to discuss the issues related to the permitting process in its entirety. 2 . Although National's amended complaint added the County as a party, the record makes no mention of appearances by the County and they did n 09 S.Ct. 2633, 2637-38, 105 L.Ed.2d 493 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103, Holdings: 0: holding that a commerce clausebased challenge to florida banking statutes was rendered moot by amendments to the law 1: holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations 2: holding admission of videos containing child pornography was probative of intent to sexually assault a child 3: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment 4: holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "case represents the unusual situation in which a parent owning a building must include imputed rent as part of his income. See Ogard, 808 P.2d at 819 (such rental value may be imputed to owner of apartment upon showing of special circumstances pursuant to Civil Rule 90.3(c)(1)(A)). The free apartment is a benefit t\u00f3 Joe provided by his business interest in renting out the triplex. This imputed rent is to be included with the cash rents received. (Emphasis added.) 2 . Eagley v. Eagley, 849 P.2d 777, 780 n. 3 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 586 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Del.1991)). See also Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1991) (\"Depreciation is a means of reflecting on an annual basis the costs of capital equipment.\u201d). 3 . See Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412, 416-17 (Alaska 1995) (<HOLDING>); Eagley, 849 P.2d at 781 (allowing a deduction Holdings: 0: holding that the superior court erred in determining obligors adjusted income by disallowing straightline depreciation for that portion of the residence that obligor used in his machinery business 1: holding plaintiff entitled to depreciation after repairs in determining the vehicles value at the time of the theft allowance must be made for depreciation then accrued 2: holding that depreciation in land value caused by a material change in a highway grade which made access to the property difficult is compensable 3: holding that under the facts of that case the action primarily involved a custody dispute and therefore that the trial court erred in determining the case by applying the dependency statute 4: holding that court erred in admitting letters written in anticipation of litigation as business records", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Ana Pozos appeals pro se from the district court\u2019s summary judgment in favor of Cory Birnberg APC, in Birnberg\u2019s action to enforce an order awarding attorney fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 928(c) in a Long-shore and Harbor Workers Compensation case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. We review de novo, Feiler v. United States, 62 F.3d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1995), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Birnberg\u2019s attorney fee order was enforceable and the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Pozos\u2019 challenges to the ALJ\u2019s underlying decision. See Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co, 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. *** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that a district court only has jurisdiction to order compliance with compensation orders entered by an administrative law judge alj and reviewed by the benefits review board and to screen for procedural defects but may not otherwise affirm modify suspend or set aside a compensation order based on the substantive merits of the aljs decision 1: holding that a presumptive partial disability exists by virtue of the order to suspend compensation the employer can eliminate liability only by offering suitable work 2: holding that an order in a criminal matter drafted by the prosecutor and signed by the circuit judge was in compliance with requirements of the law 3: holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter 4: holding that this court could not affirm the aljs finding of gross misconduct because the alj failed to make findings on every material contested issue of fact", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "claim, even in Jack\u2019s absence. A review of the complaint indicates that Solomon has sufficiently pled the existence and deprivation of a liberty interest, satisfying the first prong to state a due process claim. As to the second prong, Solomon must allege that the deprivation did not comport with constitutionally due process. Here, his claim fails. It is true that regardless of the state\u2019s practices and procedures, \u201c[w]hat process is due\u201d is a question of constitutional law, not state law. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). When a state seeks to deprive a child of the liberty interest in being nurtured by their parent, it must provide procedures that are fundamentally fair. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (<HOLDING>). Yet, the complaint fails to satisfy the Holdings: 0: holding that state could be liable under ada for inaccessibility of company it contracted with to provide state inmates with jobs 1: holding that state law must give way to treasury department regulations governing survivorship rights in us bonds 2: holding that while the state must provide a defendant access to procedures for making a competency evaluation it need not shoulder the burden of proof in convincing the trier of fact that the defendant is competent 3: holding that when the state moves to destroy  familial bonds it must provide parents with fundamentally fair procedures 4: holding that the extradition procedures are a matter of state law", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "helicopter was manufactured and delivered to the first purchaser on or before July 31, 1971, and that it has not modified the helicopter since delivery. Further, it is undisputed that Bell did not design, manufacture, sell, or install the engine or main fuel control unit that was in the helicopter at the time of the accident. Because the accident occurred on June 1, 2000, more than twenty-eight years had passed since delivery of the helicopter to the first purchaser. Thus, GARA precludes Plaintiffs from recovering against Bell under Texas state law for the following claims: (1) strict liability for defective design, manufacture, and marketing; (2) negligent design, testing, manufacture, and marketing; and (3) negligent failure to warn. See Alter, 944 F.Supp. at 536-41 (S.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Holdings: 0: holding that convictions for both leaving the scene of an accident involving injury and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only were inconsistent and therefore could not be sustained 1: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident 2: holding a limitation on damages arising out of bodily injury to one person involved in an accident applies to all claims arising from the death of that person 3: holding the plaintiffs could not establish a valid claim in a lawsuit involving a helicopter accident because gara prohibits texas state law claims arising from design or manufacturing defects in an aircraft delivered more than eighteen years before the accident 4: holding texass substantive law should apply rather than the law of the state where the accident occurred because texas has a particularly strong interest when the defective product in question was manufactured and placed in the stream of commerce in texas", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the burden of proof to the parents, but for a different reason. According to these circuits, because the statute relies on the expertise of education professionals in local school systems, their decisions about the substantive terms of an IEP are owed deference; as a result, the parents bear the burden of proving why an IEP is deficient. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th Cir.1986); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir.1990). On the other side the Third Circuit assigns the burden of proof to school systems when their IEPs are challenged by parents in administrative proceedings. Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>)). Three other circuits, the Second, Eighth, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it 1: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 2: holding that a rebuttable presumption in favor of the action of an administrative agency and the burden of proof is upon one challenging its action 3: holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged 4: holding that when an administrative decision upholding an iep is challenged in district court the school district has the burden of proof because of its expertise and access to information and witnesses", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cI don\u2019t recall the incident like that, but I do recall him putting it in the report like that,\u201d Id. at p. 36, lines 14-18. 3 The \u201csufficient notice\u201d element of the standard requires the court to examine the situation from the objective perspective of \u201ca reasonable person who has been subjected to the conduct which forms the basis for the plaintiffs complaint.\u201d Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. at 284 (quoting Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 245 (1991)). 4 In his opposition to summary judgment, Martin submitted an affidavit stating that he did not read the evaluation report until 2005. This affidavit squarely contradicts his deposition testimony as referenced in Footnote 2, and is therefore not taken into consideration. See O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 Mass.App.Ct. 905, 906 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 5 The further appellate review in Doe v. Holdings: 0: holding that subsequent affidavit contradicting prior sworn testimony does not create genuine issue of fact 1: holding that inconsistencies in the summary judgment evidence of a single witness create a fact issue 2: holding that it is well settled that a plaintiff may not create a factual issue for the purpose of defeating a motion for summary judgment by filing an affidavit contradicting a statement the plaintiff made in a prior deposition 3: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 4: holding that a plaintiff cannot create an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment through an affidavit that contradicts prior testimony", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was not provided a pre-termination hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public employee dismissible only for cause has a property interest in continued employment and that the due process clause prohibits such an employee from being terminated without a pre-termination hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Here, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with BPW management, advised of the reasons he was to be terminated, and afforded an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, because there are no issues of material fact in dispute, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs due process rights were not violated. See Boals v.. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 690 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). As such, summary judgment will be granted as Holdings: 0: holding that the absolutecertainty standard is similar to a finding that no violation had occurred at all rather than that any error was harmless 1: holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances 2: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 3: holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim 4: holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "id. at \u00b6 19, and that she \u201cwas not afforded the opportunity to transfer to another Georgia-Pacific office as were at least two other similarly situated male employees on prior occasions,\u201d id. at \u00b6 20. Plaintiff alleges that Georgia-Pacific discharged her \u201cbecause of her gender.\u201d Id. at \u00b6 21. In Count IV of her complaint, plaintiff seeks relief under section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981a) (\u201c1991 Act\u201d), which provides, inter alia, for compensatory damages and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases and for the right to a jury trial if the plaintiff seeks either compensatory or pun as not addressed this issue. Compare, e.g., Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F.Supp. 286 (D.P.R.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citing, inter alia, Aledo-Garcia v. Puerto Holdings: 0: holding section 102 of the cra creating the power to recover damages and providing for jury trial did not apply to case pending on appeal on the date of enactment 1: holding no remedy available under amended provisions of title vii for violations occurring prior to date of amendment november 21 1991 where discriminatory acts did not continue into the postamendment period 2: holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time 3: holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background 4: holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a false statement in this bankruptcy case. Jurisdiction This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to Judiciary Code Sections 157(b)(1) and 1334(b), and the Standing Order of Reference dated August 28,1986, as amended by the Order dated December 5, 2012, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. In addition, this Court may adjudicate these claims to final judgment to the extent that they are core proceedings pursuant to Judiciary Code Section 157(b), and to the extent that they are not core proceedings, pursuant to Judiciary Code Section 157(c) because the parties have stated their consent to this Court entering a final judgment. See Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, \u2014 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1940, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (<HOLDING>). Background Mr. Cedillo\u2019s Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that after stem bankruptcy judges have the authority to enter interlocutory orders in noncore proceedings and in core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy court may not enter final orders or judgment consistent with article iii absent consent 1: holding that in a bankruptcy proceeding state law governs the rights of the parties with regard to interests in property 2: holding that bankruptcy court possessed jurisdiction to enter money judgment in noncore proceeding against third party 3: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding 4: holding that in a noncore proceeding a bankruptcy court may enter final orders with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "preliminary activating domain of NF-\u00e9B are, in fact, separable or spatially distinct.\u201d Considering that the inventors of the '516 patent discovered NF-\u00e9B, if they did not know whether the two domains are distinct, one of ordinary skill in the art was at best equally ignorant. Perhaps one of ordinary skill could discover this information, but this does not alter our conclusion that the description of the dominantly interfering molecules \u201cjust represents a wish, or arguably a plan\u201d for future research. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171; see Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567 (rendering obvious is insufficient for written description). Nor is it sufficient, as Ariad argues, that \u201cskilled workers actually practiced this teaching soon after the 1989 application was filed.\u201d See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64 (<HOLDING>). Decoy molecules are \u201cdesigned to mimic a Holdings: 0: holding that where accessible literature sources clearly provided a description of the teachings at issue the written description requirement does not require their incorporation by reference 1: holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities 2: holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint 3: holding that the creditors claim on the petition date for purposes of a  547b5 analysis was the unpaid balance of the store loans as of the filing date plus the total amount of the alleged preferential payments 4: holding thata written description analysis occurs as of the filing date sought", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "means is consistent with its goals. The purpose of the Civil Service Act is \u201cto secure efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public servants.\u201d Tex. Loc. Gov\u2019t Code Ann. \u00a7 143.001(a). Courts have interpreted the Civil Service Act in a manner consistent with a legislative intent to protect the rights of persons serving as officers and employees of police departments and shield them from harassment. See Bichsel v. Carver, 159 Tex. 393, 321 S.W.2d 284, 286 (1959) (recognizing legislative intent to shield \u201cpolice and similar employees from harassment\u201d and interpreting Civil Service Act accordingly); Carrollton v. Popescu, 806 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Crawford v. City of Houston, 487 Holdings: 0: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission 1: holding that lands held by a municipality in its governmental capacity may not be lost by adverse possession 2: holding that action of city legislative body may be judicially examined in light of its surrounding circumstances prior and subsequent actions of such legislative body and public policy in order to determine good faith of questioned action 3: holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment 4: holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "would serve a significant public interest only where \u201cthere is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity,\u201d and that the information sought \u201cis necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.\u201d Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282. The plaintiff demonstrates no such public interest with respect to the third parties described above, including those of investigative interest or those merely mentioned in responsive records. The FBI\u2019s and the EOUSA\u2019s decisions to withhold the names of and identifying information about third parties of investigative interest and about individuals who merely are mentioned in these law enforcement records are fully supported by the case law. See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Rugiero v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 257 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure 1: holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c  are exempt from disclosure 2: holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c 3: holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports  have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed 4: holding that in light of the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations exemption 7c affords broad privacy rights to suspects witnesses and investigators", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "forum, there can be no-\u201cparallel\u201d state court litigation on the basis of which a federal court could exercise Colorado River abstention). B. The federal and state proceedings at issue here clearly are not \u201cparallel\u201d under Colorado River. As a general matter, a \u00a7 1983 action may be brought in either a state or federal forum. Thus, conceivably, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction could exist over the Marcuses\u2019 damages claim. In the present case, however, the state action is criminal in nature and was initiated by the State of Pennsylvania in its criminal court. Pennsylvania law makes no provision by which the Marcuses could raise their \u00a7 1983 claim in a state criminal forum. See Hutchins v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police Harrisburg, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 635, 604 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As a consequence, the Pennsylvania criminal Holdings: 0: holding a party cannot be joined to prevent removal where no cause of action can be brought against that party 1: holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action 2: holding that a municipal corporation cannot form the requisite criminal intent and cannot be held liable under civil rico laws 3: holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal 4: holding a forfeiture provision to be a civil action despite its codification in the states criminal code", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "This order followed a noticed hearing on appellee\u2019s motion to hold appellant in contempt for allegedly disobeying the court\u2019s order on visitation. No pleadings were filed requesting a change of custody nor was there any notice that any such change of custody would be heard or considered by the court. The trial court cannot modify a support order or other adjudicated right unless the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked by appropriate pleadings, and that invoked jurisdiction has been perfected by the proper service of process and due process notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue has been had. This succinctly states the requirements of due process in cases such as the instant case. See also, Fisher v. Whiteside, 541 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(<HOLDING>); Brady v. Jones, 491 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: holding that court lacked jurisdiction to modify visitation where it dismissed the modification petition 1: holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance 2: holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights 3: holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation  award 4: holding that court in habeas petition has no authority to condition visitation right of parent upon payment for support and maintenance", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "we perceive it appropriate in this instance to recognize, any increased protection as being afforded by our state constitution. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Wyo. Const, art. 1, \u00a7 4; Hinshaw. We next turn to the statutes relied upon by Saldana, Wyo.Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7-3-601 to -611 (1987), to determine whether legislative discretion may have been invoked to expand the constitutional protection. Sal-dana claims that, under this Wyoming \u201cwire-tapping\u201d statute, the admission into evidence of his telephone records is prohibited. We rely upon the statute in the form that it had been adopted at the time of Saldana\u2019s conduct instead of at the later, and somewhat more expansive, version relied upon by Saldana. See Wyo.Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7-3-601 to -610 (Supp.1990). Cf. Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo.1992) (<HOLDING>); Wyoming Refining Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647 Holdings: 0: holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent 1: holding legislatures intent to change tax liability retroactively was permissive exercise of legislative power 2: holding that absent clear legislative intent court will not apply statute retroactively even when it creates new remedy 3: holding that a change of an element of an offense could not be applied retroactively to a crime committed prior to the statutes enactment 4: holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs  37869 as an example of such legislative intent", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to Council members in violation of Department and City policy, diminishing the level of protection his speech might otherwise enjoy. Belcher\u2019s interest in speaking privately to the Council members must be weighed against the contrary interests of the City and the Department in maintaining harmony among Department employees. \u201cWhen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer\u2019s judgment is appropriate.\u201d Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1452 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 151\u201452, 103 S.Ct. 1684). Because such close relationships are necessary in a fire department, there is a \u201cheightened governmental interest in maintaining harmony\u201d among fire department employees. Id. at 1452 n. 22 (<HOLDING>). Firefighters place their lives in each Holdings: 0: holding routine exclusion of members of fire and police departments did not violate the faircrosssection requirement because it is good for the community that these workers not be interrupted in their work 1: holding that fire departments are analogous to police departments in this respect 2: holding that a police departments refusal to permit police affin ity group to march in parades was not a form of government speech 3: holding that an expert established a national standard of care for police officer training by testifying that police departments throughout the country commonly trained officers to deal with mentally distuibed persons and by naming several departments that offered such training 4: holding the evidence supported the police officers failure to follow the directives in the montgomery county police departments field operations manual", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "more or better evidence.\u201d (internal quotations omitted)); Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d 131, 136 (10th Cir.1972) (\u201cEvidence of this type is not the result of a different factual situation or changed circumstances. It is, instead, historical in nature and could have been admitted at the first trial if properly submitted. If the taxpayers\u2019 case was not effectively presented at the first trial it wa -04 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that the virtues of issue preclusion do not come without a price: \u201cJust as occasionally \u2018the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong ... but time and chance hap-peneth to them all,\u2019 Ecclesiastes 9:11 (King James ed.), so too the results of an earlier resolution of an issue may simply be wrong.\u201d); Johnson v. Watkins, 101 F.3d 792, 795 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., Holdings: 0: recognizing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel represents an informed choice that the occasional permanent encapsulation of a wrong result is a price worth paying to promote the worthy goals of ending disputes and avoiding repetitive litigation 1: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 2: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 3: holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel 4: holding that the debtor has the burden of showing that collateral estoppel applies", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the victim\u2019s conduct. See \u00a7 90.405, Fla. Stat. (2009). There are, however, important distinctions and evi-dentiary requirements between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b). Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. The purpose of introducing the reputation evidence in a self-defense case is to show that the victim was the initial aggressor. Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. Reputation evidence is offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with a known character trait. Because reputation evidence relates to the conduct of the victim, the defendant is not required to have had prior knowledge of the victim\u2019s reputation in the community. See Dwyer v. State, 743 So.2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Melvin v. State, 592 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim 1: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment 2: holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind 3: holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon 4: holding that corroborative evidence of prior specific acts of violence by victim may be admissible in selfdefense case where the defendant knew of the act", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "tools or equipment necessary to provide chicken catching services. Required tools or equipment, such as tracks, cages, and forklifts, were provided by the processors, and the Catchers supplied themselves with hats, gloves, or boots, if they desired such items. See CE Credits OnLine, 946 A.2d at 1168; Beacon Flag Car, 910 A.2d at 105. Fourth, the Joint Venture did not provide training or instruction on how to catch chickens. See CE Credits OnLine, 946 A.2d at 1168; Beacon Flag Car, 910 A.2d at 105. Fifth, although the Joint Venture accepted jobs from processors, the time, place and location of each job was determined by the processors, not by the Joint Venture or the Catchers, and, therefore, the Joint Venture did not dictate those terms of the job. See Beacon Flag Car, 910 A.2d at 108 (<HOLDING>). Sixth, the Joint Venture did not supervise Holdings: 0: holding that failure to attach the aaa arbitration rules weighed in favor of a finding of procedural unconscionability 1: holding that fact that client not employer controlled time manner and location of services to be performed weighed in favor of independent contractor status 2: holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed 3: holding that texas law does not recognize an implied warranty that services incidental to helicopter maintenance will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner 4: holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "another department and had previously received ratings of \"3\u201d and \"4 \". Bob Laird, who was also already a supervisor when he was transferred to be special services department supervisor had consistently received \u201c4\u201d ratings. Chris Scafidi, a Caucasian male who has held the position since August 1994 had received only \"3\u201d and \"4\" ratings and had two years experience working at the special services desk. (Home Depot\u2019s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at pp. 7-9; Teixeira Aff. at \u00b6\u00b6 20-25). 9 . Courts have commonly applied the same standard of liability for employment discrimination cases alleging Title VII and Section 1981 violations because the elements of each are the same. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1364-65, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928 Holdings: 0: holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee 1: holding that section 1981 afford no greater substantive protection than title vii 2: holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc  1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii 3: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 4: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "321 S.W.3d at 682. A. Citizenship and Immigration Status As noted above, appellant\u2019s citizenship status is not in dispute. The record reflects, and the State acknowledges, that appellant is not a United States citizen. B. Knowledge of Immigration Consequences Before examining the strength of the evidence of the appellant\u2019s guilt, we must examine the record for any indication that the defendant knew the consequences of his guilty plea. VanNortrick, 227 S.W.3d at 713 (stating that the strength or weakness of the evidence against the appellant makes little difference to the harm analysis if the second factor above is not satisfied). To warrant reversal, the record must support an inference that the defendant did not know the consequences of his plea. Burnett, .-Dallas 2004, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). We do not have a silent record. As explained Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 1: holding statements during voir dire and oral motion in limine were merely opaque references to deportation but  silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation and insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea 2: holding trial judges statement during voir dire that appellant likely would be automatically deported if released on probation along with references to deportation by defense counsel and prospective jurors supported inference that appellant knew consequences of plea 3: holding that appellant was harmed by trial courts failure to admonish him of deportation consequences of his guilty plea where the record was silent about whether he was ever specifically informed that his guilty plea could result in deportation and record showed that appellant moved to the united states from korea 4: holding record insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea when record is silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed.Cir.1999). \u201cThe absence of ... a suggestion to combine is dispositive in an obviousness determination.\u201d Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1997). 3. Remaining Issues of Fact The parties dispute the extent to which the prior art could have suggested its combination to create the \u2019014 patent. (PL Reply Memo, on Validity at 9; Def. Memo, on Validity at 8). That determination, whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior art reference, is a question of fact to be decided prior to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2000); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan, Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed.Cir.l999)(<HOLDING>). It must therefore be determined if the Holdings: 0: holding that factual underpinnings of obviousness include whether reference provides motivation to combine its teachings with those of another reference 1: holding that obviousness is determined entirely with reference to a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art  and the actual inventors skill is irrelevant to the obviousness inquiry 2: holding of obviousness affirmed on the basis of the teachings of the prior art references in combination not on the basis of the contemporaneous invention 3: holding that obviousness analysis may include recourse to logic judgment and common sense available to a person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion 4: holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at the time of an accident. Cf. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. National Indemnity Co. (10th Cir. 1971), 435 F.2d 718; Hagans v. Glen Falls Insurance Co. (10th Cir. 1972), 465 F.2d 1249; Ryder Truck Lines v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. (Ind.App.1978), 372 N.E.2d 504; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. (1974), 23 Md.App. 105, 326 A.2d 29. Conversely, there are also numerous cases that reject the notion that the I.C.C. regulations are determinative. Cf. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (3rd Cir. 1966), 368 F.2d 121; Wellman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (8th Cir. 1974), 496 F.2d 131; Vance Trucking Company v. Canal Insurance Company (D.S.C. 1966), 249 F.Supp. 33, aff\u2019d (4th Cir. 1968), 395 F.2d 391, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 945, 89 S.Ct. 129, 21 L.Ed.2d 116 (<HOLDING>). The most recent decision in the area, and one Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to death 1: holding that punitive damages are not duplicative since they are designed to punish rather than to compensate 2: holding that icc regulations are not designed to excuse a party from liability he might otherwise have 3: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined 4: recognizing that prison regulations designed to provide security are not only legitimate but are central to all other correctional goals", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "because the patentee cancelled a claim covering \u201ctriple superphosphate\u201d and expressly disclaimed that compound in his arguments to the examiner to gain patent allowance. Id. We reached a similar conclusion in Ballard Medical Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corporation, 268 F.3d 1352, 1359-62, 60 USPQ2d 1493, 1499-1501 (Fed.Cir.2001), which involved means-plus-function claims. There, the patentee asserted that the accused devices were equivalents, under paragraph 6 of section 112, to the claimed function\u2019s corresponding structure. Id. at 1359, 268 F.3d 1352, 60 USPQ2d at 1499. We rejected that assertion on the basis of prosecution disclaimer: When a patentee advises the examiner (and the public after patent issuance) that a particular structure is not within his invention, the pate 7 (<HOLDING>). To balance the importance of public notice Holdings: 0: recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process 1: holding regular use of process cannot constitute abuse of process 2: holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed 3: holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings 4: holding that the limitation sputterdeposited dielectric excluded a twostep process because the patentee argued during prosecution that the metal oxide in the process was directly deposited and that the invention thus only covered a onestep process", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "tended to prove that Dingle was credible in that it explained the inconsistencies in her statements. See Lawhorne v. State, 500 So.2d 519, 520 (Fla.1986) (\u201cThe credibility of witnesses is always in issue.\u201d (citing Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence \u00a7 401.1 (1984 ed.))). The probative value of the testimony was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. This is especially so when compared to the cases approving such testimony in the context of gang activity, where, like the witness, the defendant is a member of the gang. Moreover, in the above cases, there is usually something more \u2014 such as an express code of silence and a legitimate fear of retaliation \u2014 than the general reluctance to speak truthfully here. In those circumstances, the testimony, unlike the testimony here, 4) (<HOLDING>). The instant case involves the admission of Holdings: 0: holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error 1: holding prosecutors reference to defendant being only witness in courtroom during testimony as tailoring opportunity not plain error 2: holding under plain error review that prosecutions repeated references to defendants silence in a one day trial were not harmless despite defendants responsive comments on silence 3: holding that prosecutors reference to code of silence among witnesses to shooting not plain error where argument finds support in record 4: holding that prosecutors reference to the fact that not one white witness has produced contradictory evidence was plain error", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "25 I. & N. Dec. 850 (BIA 2012), a precedential decision not cited by the BIA here, the BIA held that a \u201cformal judgment of guilt entered by a court qualifies as a conviction under section 101(a)(48)(A) so long as it was entered in a \u2018genuine criminal proceeding,\u2019 that is, a proceeding that was \u2018criminal in nature under the governing laws of the prosecuting jurisdiction.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 852 (quoting Matter of Rivera-Valencia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 484, 486-87 (BIA 2008)); see id. at 853-55. Because the BIA did not consider Cuellar-Gomez when it found that Moreno was ineligible for cancellation, we remand to the BIA for it to consider in the first instance whether Moreno\u2019s infraction is a \u201cconviction.\u201d See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1108 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that when an agency has not reached an issue the proper course is to remand to the agency to address it in the first instance 1: holding that this court has discretion to either address or remand arguments presented to it in the first instance provided it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim 2: holding that a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands 3: holding that this court must remand to the bia to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not yet considered 4: holding deference to agency methodology appropriate unless agency failed to address an essential factor", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and the application paragraph on murder as a party, neither specifically explained to the jury which facts it could properly consider to convict appellant as a party. In fact, the instructions were worse than that because, rather than merely withholding information from the jury, the application paragraph affirmatively misled the jury by telling the jury it could convict appellant for a murder committed by Jermarxian Green-even if appellant was not a party to the murder. This was a legally incorrect instruction that completely misstated the law, and to worsen matters, we cannot tell if the jury convicted appellant as a party based on the legally incorrect instruction or as a principal. See id. at 171-73; Guevara v. State, 191 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); see also Campbell v. State, 910 S.W.2d 475, Holdings: 0: holding no legal duty exists to prevent unforeseeable criminal acts 1: holding that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on a principals theory because there was no evidence that the appellant acted in concert with anyone in committing the charged offenses 2: holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error 3: holding that the failure to plead a particular legal theory when the plaintiff pled two related legal theories was not a bar to recovery 4: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is equal to or greater than the amount of his debt, his right of possession ceases, and the grantor or his legal representatives, and, if none, his heirs, may bring an action to recover the land.\u201d). \u201cThe right of the grantor to redeem by the payment of the debt is never barred, so long as the grantee recognizes a right to redeem, and equity would by analogy decree that the right to redeem would in no event be lost until after the expiration of 10 years from the date of the last recognition by the grantee of the right to redeem.\u201d Gunter, 38 S.E. at 374. While the transaction in the case sub judice is a Security Deed and not a mortgage, the debtor still has a right of redemption. See Wynndam Court Apartment Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 501, 50 S.E.2d 611 (1948) (<HOLDING>). In the case sub judice the letter sent Holdings: 0: holding that the assignment of rents clause contained in the mortgage was enforceable during the period of redemption for the purpose of securing the 300000 deficiency existing after foreclosure of the mortgage 1: recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title 2: holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa 3: holding that the right of redemption is treated the same whether in a mortgage or security deed 4: holding that upon execution of the mortgage the mortgagor retains only an equity of redemption accompanied by a right to possession", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "argument that Defendants treated similarly situated white inmates more favorably than him to be unpersuasive. Plaintiff asserts that the named white inmates must be considered similarly situated because they were found to be in violation of prison rules for playing either their television or radio too loudly. However, the decision as to what sanction to impose for a particular rule violation may be based on the factors set out in Section III(D)(12) of the ISP Handbook. Giles has not shown himself to be similarly situated, considering such factors, with the three white inmates who received sanctions for playing either their television of radio too loud. See generally Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 665 F.Supp. 1372, 1395 (W.D.Wis.1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). This conclusion is exemplified by the fact Holdings: 0: holding that comparison between plaintiff africanameriean law student who was expelled for academic reasons and white student with psychiatric disorder was like comparing apples with oranges 1: holding that a white office was not similarly situated to a black officer who was charged with more offenses than the white officer 2: holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student 3: holding that juveniles use of the f word in dispute with principal and another student over whether student had stolen her money did not constitute fighting words 4: holding proper remedy when a christian student newspaper was denied student activities funds was to make funds available to the religious paper not to deny funds to nonreligious student groups", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "section, referenced in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1960(b)(1)(B), defines a \u201cmoney transmitting business\u201d as any business required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 5313, which in turn relates to \u201cdomestic financial institution[s].\u201d Title 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 5312(b)(1) states that the term \u201cdomestic financial institution,\u201d for purposes of that subchapter, \u201capplies] to an action in the United States of a financial agency or institution.\u201d Because Mazza-Alaluf raised his Title 31 argument in the district court only as it pertained to the government\u2019s reliance on a \u00a7 1960(b)(1)(B) theory of guilt, we review his recasting of that claim to challenge his \u00a7 1960(b)(1)(A) conviction for plain error, and we identify none here. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 678 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Mazza-Alaluf contends that for him to be Holdings: 0: holding that even if a defendant is able to show that there was a plain error that affected his substantial rights a court of appeals is not required to reverse a conviction unless it finds that the error seriously affected the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings 1: holding that a plain error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings even though the error was assumed to have affected substantial rights 2: recognizing that plain error analysis requires 1 error 2 that is plain 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously affects fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings 3: holding that plain error will be identified only if 1 there is error 2 that is clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously impugns fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings 4: holding that failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment and submit it to the jury seriously affects the fairness integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings so that the court should exerciseits discretion to recognize the error", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "see, e.g., SBKC Serv. Corp. v. 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P., 105 F.3d 578 (10th Cir.1997); Milk \u2018N\u2019 More, Inc. v. Beavert, 963 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir.1992), all involve situations where a case ended up in a forum that a party argued was not contemplated by the forum-selection clause in question. For example, in the K & V Scientific case, the plaintiff filed an action in New Mexico, but the clause in question stated that \u201c[jurisdiction for all and any disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement is Munich.\u201d K & V Scientific, 314 F.3d at 496. Likewise, in Excell, the plaintiff challenged removal to a Federal District Court in light of contract language which named the State court as the proper venue. Excell, 106 F.3d at 320; see also Milk \u2018N\u2019 More, 963 F.2d at 1343, 1346 (<HOLDING>). None of these cases involve the situation Holdings: 0: holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory because it provided for exclusive jurisdiction and venue in a particular court 1: holding that remand to state court was appropriate where mandatory forumselection clause placed venue in a specified county of the state 2: holding that a forumselection clause was mandatory where it stated that for any action brought to enforce such terms and conditions venue shall lie exclusively in clark county washington 3: holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory 4: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "must comply with that section. Statutory provisions creating rights and remedies are mandatory and exclusive and must be complied with in all respects. Id. at 937. The court held that the notice requirements of section 42.21 are jurisdictional and affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal. The court in Poly-America distinguished its holding from the decision in Corchine Partnership v. Dallas County Appraisal District, 695 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.App.\u2014Dallas 1985, writ ref\u2019d n.r.e.) in that the plaintiffs in Corchine had failed to give notice to the review board as required by section 42.06. However, the court in Corchine found that section 42.06(b) notice requirements were jurisdictional as well. See also Rockdale I.S.D. v. Thorndale I.S.D., 681 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1984, writ ref\u2019d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). The property owner in Herndon Marine Holdings: 0: holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature 1: holding that notice requirements of 4206a are jurisdictional 2: holding service requirements under fedrcivp 4 to be jurisdictional 3: holding that notice requirements under former rule 40b1 are jurisdictional 4: holding that notice requirements under rule 252b3 are jurisdictional", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "court may also depart if the government\u2019s refusal to file a substantial assistance motion is attributable to bad faith, even when the plea agreement specifies that the decision whether to file is in the government\u2019s sole discretion. See United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir.1998). While Mr. Khan makes the assertion that he \u201cvigorously assisted authorities,\u201d he does not point to any concrete actions on his part other than bringing the authorities to the apartment in Brooklyn where he received the heroin. See Pet. Mot. at 3. The government acknowledged this act but determined it was not sufficient to warrant a substantial assistance motion. Mr. Khan fails to allege any suspect motive on the part of the government. See United States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Given the quantity of heroin involved and Holdings: 0: holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent 1: holding 404b evidence admissible under intent exception but not motive exception where motive not contested 2: holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive 3: holding extrinsic evidence of defendants motive to possess gun inadmissible where defendant did not contest the issue of motive 4: holding that the mere fact that a defendant provided assistance and the prosecutor did not file a motion is not sufficient evidence of suspect motive", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "It is established that when a hearing officer awards relief requested by the parents, the hearing officer\u2019s decision constitutes an agreement between the State and the parents sufficient to change the placement of a child. See 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 300.518 (\u201cIf the hearing officer in a due process hearing ... agrees wit officer\u2019s decision was incorrect, the District was not free to simply ignore its obligation to comply with the HOD. Under these circumstances, the parents were within their rights to enroll M.M. at Ivym-ount, and are entitled to reimbursement for their expenses. See 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing court to grant relief \u201cas the court determines is appropriate\u201d in IDEA action); Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009) (<HOLDING>); District of Columbia v. Vinyard, 901 Holdings: 0: holding that the local educational agency is the appropriate target of a suit under the idea and that private entities cannot be held liable under the statute as the idea obligates the statenot the private schoolto ensure that such children are provided special education and related services in accordance with an individualized education program  1: recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea 2: holding reimbursement for private tutoring available under the idea 3: holding that court may order reimbursement of private school expenses incurred by parents of handicapped child in successful challenge to iep brought under eha predecessor to idea stating that it is beyond cavil that appropriate relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school official to develop and implement at public expense an iep placing the child in a private school and affirming reimbursement award against petitioner local school district  4: recognizing that the idea authorizes courts to order reimbursement of the costs of private specialeducation services in appropriate circumstances", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-05, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Will v. Michigan Dept\u2019 of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Section 1983 does not provide for a remedy against the state; such- an action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099; Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312. Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs\u2019 claims against Sheriff Ackal and Deputy Garcia are asserted against these defendants in their official capacities, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE herein. The Court now turns to the defendants\u2019 defense of qualified immunity in their individuals capacities. See, generally, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (<HOLDING>); Sanders\u2014Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, Holdings: 0: holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities 1: holding that government entities may not assert qualified immunity 2: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 3: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 4: holding officials in their individual capacities may  be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "situation.\u201d Id. at 396-97. Nevertheless, the applicable standard is an objective one: \u201c[T]he question is whether the officers\u2019 actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.\u201d Id. at 397. In the present case, Wilkey was not committing any crime when Argo confronted him. Nor was Wilkey resisting arrest or even seeking to avoid an encounter with law enforcement officers. Instead, he consented to a pat down search prior to Argo\u2019s use of force against him. This search revealed that Wilke degree of force is necessary, gratuitous acts against a person who has been seized might violate the Fourth Amendment\u2019s reasonableness standard. Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 297, 301-02 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Santos, 287 F.3d at 853 (explaining that Holdings: 0: holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station 1: holding that defendant was arrested  when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there 2: recognizing the necessity of analyzing officer coys use of force against phelps in segments where coy arrested phelps placed him in handcuffs took him to the police station for booking and then beat him after he raised his leg in a manner that coy perceived to be a threat to another police officer 3: holding the defendant was not under arrest when police asked him to go to the station and then offered him a ride because he did not have transportation 4: holding that police executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect from his home and brought him in handcuffs to the police station for questioning", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "App 8, 288 Wis. 2d 804, 709 N.W.2d 497, the defendant bears a heavy burden in attempting to convince a reviewing court to set aside a jury's verdict on insufficiency of the evidence grounds. Id., \u00b6 22 (citing State v. Allbaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 807, 808-09, 436 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989)). \u00b6 23. In Booker's trial, the girls' and the detective's testimonies regarding the content of the tape were admitted to prove the \"harmful material\" element of Wis. Stat. \u00a7 948.11. All of the\u2019 witnesses explained that the video's dominant focus was on nudity and explicit sexual acts and suggested that the video had no additional plot line, meaningful dialogue or other notable qualities or characteristics. The girls characterized it as a \"porno\" video. Their descriptions of what they saw provi Cir. 1969) (<HOLDING>); State v. Tee & Bee, Inc., 229 Wis. 2d 446, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the dc circuit has stated that by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of  competing studies the district court conflates the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder  1: holding that issues of prurient appeal and offensiveness to contemporary community standards were appropriately decided by a jury notwithstanding the lack of expert testimony 2: holding that whether and to what extent a witnesss testimony should be believed is a matter to be decided by the jury that saw and heard the testimony not by an appellate court reviewing a transcript 3: holding expert testimony was not required where jury is capable of determining existence of duty 4: holding that defendants truthfulness and the credibility of and weight to be given expert medical testimony are issues of fact for jury", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "jobs are not the same; therefore, they are not equal. Much of the precedent regarding unequal jobs involves comparing two jobs with a common core of duties, but with the higher-paid job having additional duties. See, e.g., Horn v. Univ. of Minn., 362 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that the jobs of two hockey coaches were not equal because the female hockey coach served as a public representative to the hockey team, in addition to the administrative duties she had in common with the male hockey coach), McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 513-14 (8th Cir.1995) (finding two jobs not equal because male employee performed other tasks in addition to the tasks female employee had previously performed), Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 961 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Simpson did not attempt to prove that she and Holdings: 0: holding two maintenance employees jobs not equal where male maintenance engineer had supervisory duties in addition to the job functions that female assistant performed 1: holding that a change in job duties was not an adverse employment action where the new job duties did not constitute qualitatively inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge 2: holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer 3: holding that an employers policy requiring female employees to make larger pension fund contributions than male employees was discriminatory on its face in violation of title vii 4: holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Additionally, William's claims of procedural error are meritless. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court. 1 . AS 22.20.020(c) states, in relevant part: If a judicial officer denies disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the supreme court,. 2 . Capital Info. Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 41 (Alaska 1996). 3 . R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 869-70 (Alaska 1997) (internal quotation marks omilted). 4 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a). 5 . AS 22.20.020(a)(9). 6 . See Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575, 578 (Alaska 1979); Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska App.1 , 767 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); but see Shank v. American Motors Corp., 575 Holdings: 0: holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment 1: holding that statements that employee was doing a good job are more akin to opinions than statements of fact and on this basis are not actionable in fraud and citing a state case as holding that neither opinions nor statement that are general and indefinite are representations of fact giving rise to a misrepresentation claim 2: recognizing that under the rule of necessity where all judges would be disqualified in a suit brought against every district and circuit court judge in the circuit none are disqualified 3: holding that judge should be disqualified for statements suggesting preexisting unfavorable opinions about the management and litigation tactics of the cruise line industry 4: holding that an order or judgment issued by a disqualified judge is void but not because the court lacked jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "instruction notes that if the defendant is not also charged with malice murder, the words in parentheses should be omitted. See id. In this case, although Appellant was not indicted for malice murder, the trial court included the parenthetical words in its jury instruction on felony murder. The court also charged that if the jury found that Appellant was \u201cguilty of the offense of murder with malice af n that the State had to prove malice aforethought for Appellant to be found guilty of felony murder made it harder for the State to make its case, since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder (although it is not inconsistent with that crime). Instructional errors that could only benefit a defendant are harmless. See Sanders v. State, 283 Ga. 372, 375 (659 SE2d 376) (2008) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 72 n. 4 (295 SE2d Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence 1: holding that because a mutual combat charge authorizes a jury to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in lieu of murder it is a charge that benefits a defendant and as such a convicted defendants complaint that it was improper to give the charge is without merit 2: holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error 3: holding that jurys failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge 4: holding that failure to charge jury that state had burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in the heat of passion was harmless because the evidence did not support a charge on passionprovocation manslaughter", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "AS 29.35.210(a)(4) (authorlzmg boroughs to provide garbage services, subject to AS 29.35.050); AS 29.35.050(a)(1) (authorizing garbage collection); AS 29.35.050(a)(6) (authorizing garbage-collection fees); AS 29.35.050(a)(7) (authorizing penalties for garbage-ordinance violations). 10 . AS 29.35.400 (\"A liberal construction shall be given to all powers and functions of a municipality conferred in this title.\"). 11 . Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Associated Grocers, Inc., 889 P.2d 604, 606 (Alaska 1995). 12 . Id. (quoting AS 29.35.410). 13 . AS 29.35.050(a)(5)-(6). 14 . See AS 29.45.300(b) (providing property tax lien \"is prior and paramount to all other liens or encumbrances against the property\"\"). 15 . AS 29.35.125. 16 . Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Howard, 608 P.2d 32, 34 (Alaska 1980) (<HOLDING>). 17 . Id. Following our Howard opinion, the Holdings: 0: holding that iowa sales and use tax law as amended is of general application 1: holding that forced sales of capital assets constitute sales for tax purposes and emphasizing salelike characteristics rather than voluntariness of transaction 2: holding that states have authority to tax sales of cigarettes to nonmembers of the tribe 3: holding property lien for nonpayment of sales tax was beyond boroughs authority to collect sales tax 4: holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that use of undisclosed information will violate due process because of the risk of error.\u201d Id. But the third Mathews factor \u2014 the government\u2019s interest in maintaining national security \u2014 supports OFAC\u2019s position. Given the extreme importance of maintaining national security, we cannot accept AHIF-Oregon\u2019s most sweeping argument \u2014 -that OFAC is not entitled to use classified information in making its designation determination. See generally Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1900, 1905, 179 L.Ed.2d 957 (2011) (\u201c[Pjrotecting our national security sometimes requires keeping information about ou te, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C.Cir.2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 Holdings: 0: holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments 1: holding that states inadvertent or negligent destruction of evidence did not violate defendants due process rights 2: holding that in a military criminal trial the governments use of classified information without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information did not violate the defendants due process rights 3: holding that due process was violated where a death sentence was imposed based on information in a presentence report and the defendant was not given an opportunity to deny or explain the information 4: holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "plain error review available for errors relating to alleged improper remarks being made during closing argument, our prior case law relating to the waiver of issues on appeal stemming from improper closing arguments that were not objected to at trial remains unaffected by OCGA \u00a7 24-1-103 of Georgia\u2019s new Evidence Code.\u201d). Further, this Court is unswayed by Durden\u2019s claim that the prosecutor\u2019s statement in closing argument amounts to an infringement on Durden\u2019s constitutional right to remain silent. Because Durden did not, in fact, testify at trial, the prosecutor\u2019s rejoinder was a permissible attempt to correct defense counsel\u2019s misstatement, rather than an impermissible effort to comment on Durden\u2019s failure to testify. See Jones v. State, 123 Ga. App. 310, 311 (180 SE2d 603) (1971) (<HOLDING>) (citation and punctuation omitted). Further, Holdings: 0: holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error 1: holding that error in denying such challenge is reversible error without demonstration of prejudice 2: recognizing potential reversible error by disclosing defendants prior jury conviction 3: recognizing that the mere fact that the jury is made aware that the defendant is making an unsworn statement does not result in reversible error 4: holding that a failure to instruct the jury on additional uncharged conspiracies is not reversible error so long as the jury is instructed that the government has the burden to prove the charged conspiracy", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "supra, a case which the majority addresses peripherally, we answered the question of whether the Legislature\u2019s delegation of the power to appoint commissioners serving on the Commission on Medical Discipline to a private organization, violated the gubernatorial power provisions of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine in the Declaration of Rights. Chief Judge Murphy, writing for this Court, summarized this Court\u2019s jurisprudence and succinctly and clearly articulated that the power of appointment is not an intrinsic executive function, but rather, that the Legislature can modify, control, and abolish any office it has created: [This question] was considered by the Court in Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854), and Baltimore v , 164 Md. 101, 105-07, 164 A. 155, 156-57 (1933) (<HOLDING>). The majority\u2019s haste to formulate an opinion Holdings: 0: holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee 1: recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole 2: holding that the prohibition of section 35 article iii against the increase or diminution of compensation for public officers applied to the treasurer of calvert county and therefore even though the legislature retained the power to alter or abolish the office it could not change the treasurers salary while in office 3: holding that the requirement that the county seek recommendations for appointments to a civil office from a private corporation was not constitutionally repugnant because where the office was created by the legislature the legislature retains the control over that offices method of appointment 4: holding that the governor had no power to make the appointment of officer of the school commissioner for cecil county without the consent of the senate when the office was not vacant because the legislature which had created and therefore controlled the office had not delegated that power to the governor", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "faked left syndrome accident. On appeal, the Estate concedes that the instruction is a correct statement of the law and that it was not covered by other instructions. However, the Estate contends that the instruction was not supported by the evidence in the record because the alleged sudden emergency was the faked left syndrome and the faked left syndrome does not apply to the accident in question. As discussed supra, no evidence was presented to support the applicability of the faked left syndrome, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony regarding the faked left syndrome. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury regarding sudden emergency. See, e.g., Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). We address the ramifications of this abuse of Holdings: 0: holding trial court erred by instructing jury that employer would be liable under burk if plaintiff showed improper motive was a factor in the decision to discharge him rather than a significant factor 1: holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case 2: holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead 3: holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency 4: holding that trial court erred in instructing the jury on unavoidable accident when no evidence supported its submission", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "clock until August 21,2012. We further reject Eccleston\u2019s challenge to the delay occurring between the original August 21, 2012 trial date and the actual start of trial on September 11, 2012. Ec-cleston apparently takes issue with government counsel\u2019s request for this additional delay, even though government counsel indicated that he was willing to go forward with trial on August 21 if the court so ordered. The district court granted the government\u2019s request due to counsel\u2019s serious medical situation. Unavoidable health concerns are a valid reason for granting a reasonable delay. United States v. Trotman, 406 Fed.Appx. 799, 805 (4th Cir.2011) (unpublished); see also United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 535 (5th Cir.2012); United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 210 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not clearly err in Holdings: 0: holding ends of justice provision was intended to enable plaintiffs to bring all members of nationwide rico conspiracy before a court in a single trial 1: holding that fivemonth openended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate speedy trial act 2: holding that a new trial was warranted where the prosecutor stated as the bible says and the murderer shall be put to death 3: holding that a seven week suspension of the speedy trial clock was warranted under the ends of justice provision where the chief prosecutor was ill and new assistant prosecutors required time to prepare for trial 4: holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Evans rationale would seem inapplicable whenever the mistake was instead attributable to the law enforcement agency\u201d); cf. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (stating, in the context of qualified immunity, that \u201cbecause petitioner [police officer] prepared the invalid warrant, he may not argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate\u2019s assurance that the warrant contained an adequate description of the things to be seized\u201d). But see United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.1991) (en banc) (applying good faith exception to a police officer\u2019s m heard is at best ambiguous, and nearly nonsensical in light of the immediately preceding exchange. Although Antone\u2019s sub sequent conduct concededly makes this a clos (D.C.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as noted above, there was no Holdings: 0: holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises 1: holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations 2: holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted 3: holding that when an agent has limited authority and informs the third party of this limitation the principal is not bound by the agents actions that exceed that authority 4: holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "statements). Even giving the confidential witness statements minimal weight, however, we do not doubt that sufficient facts have been presented to \u201craise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence.\u201d Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. We therefore conclude that Plaintiffs have adequately met the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b). B. Plaintiffs also appeal the dismissal of their \u00a7 11 claim for GAAP-based misstatements and omissions. The district court held that Plaintiffs failed to plead knowledge of falsity and therefore failed to state a claim. Defendants argue that we should affirm because the GAAP allegations are based on \u201csoft information.\u201d Cf. In re Almost Family, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:10\u2014 CV-00520-H, 2012 WL 443461, at *4 (W.D.Ky. Feb. 10, 2012) (<HOLDING>). We disagree that Plaintiffs\u2019 GAAP allegations Holdings: 0: holding that some gaap allegations were soft information because the allegations in plaintiffs complaint focused on defendants beliefs about accounting numbers not on the actual data they reported 1: holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment 2: holding that allegations that defendants designed and implemented improper accounting practices failed to state claim for securities fraud in absence of allegations of particular facts demonstrating how defendants knew of scheme at time they made their statements of compliance that they knew the financial statements overrepresented the companys true earnings or that they were aware of a gaap violation 3: holding that because the allegations purportedly suppressed by the government were not material an evidentiary hearing further exploring the  allegations themselves and the governments knowledge of the allegations is unnecessary 4: holding that the plaintiffs complaint was valid because despite general allegations it provided notice", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u2018a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant\u2019s benefit.\u2019 \u201d (citation omitted)). Second, it prevents \u201c[pros-ecutorial] overreaching.\u201d Johnson, 467 U.S. at 502, 104 S.Ct. 2536. The defendant\u2019s interests are balanced with the state\u2019s \u201cright to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.\u201d Id. (citation omitted); see also Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 330, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (characterizing a \u201cfull and fair opportunity to convict the defendant\u201d as the opportuni ty to \u201cpresent constitutionally sufficient evidence\u201d to achieve a conviction). The plea bargaining context is not immune from a double jeopardy, successive prosecution, analysis. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 8, 107 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners 1: holding that factual basis had to be established at time of guilty plea not later in presentence investigation 2: holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing 3: holding that entering a guilty plea is an admission of guilt and a waiver of the right to jury trial 4: holding petitioners initial guilty plea to mail fraud later vacated by district court at request of petitioner could not then be put before a jury at trial as evidence of petitioners guilt", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "similar results, generally holding that contingency fees are assets of the partnership. As an example, where one partner worked on contingency fee cases with which the clients indicated they wanted him to remain involved after dissolution, a court held that the contractual obligation to conclude the cases was part of the fiduciary duty owed amongst the partners. Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md.App. 499, 434 A.2d 582, 585, 587 (1981). Fees earned from cases pending at dissolution were partnership assets. Id. at 587. The court also affirmed that, although a client has the right to select the attorney the client wants, the client\u2019s right does not diminish or change the fiduciary duties of the partners. Id. at 588. See also Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171, 203 Cal.Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1984) (<HOLDING>); LaFond v. Sweeney, \u2014 P.3d -, -, No. 10CA2005, Holdings: 0: holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability 1: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 2: holding income generated through the winding up of unfinished cases is allocated to the former partners and the right of the client to select an attorney of ones choice is irrelevant to the rights and duties between the parties 3: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case 4: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "questions of law (including interpretation of the Guidelines) and clear-error review of questions of fact,\u201d United States v. Legros, 529 F.3d 470, 474 (2d Cir.2008). Contrary to Garcia\u2019s assertion, the application of a base offense level increase by the district court without jury findings does not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Judicial factfinding that results in an offense level increase under the Guidelines, which are now advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), does not offend a defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, as the Guidelines do not alter statutory maximum or minimum penalties. See Alleyne v. United States,\u2014U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2163, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Singletary, 458 Holdings: 0: holding that facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury but emphasizing that its ruling does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be foundby a jury 1: holding facts that increase the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that any fact that increases mandatory minimum is element that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt 3: holding any fact other than prior conviction that increases statutory mandatory minimum is element of offense that must be submitted to jury and found beyond reasonable doubt 4: holding any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to the jury", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of a firearm. And that conduct would not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person for U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.2(a)(l). By contrast, if the shooter ignored telltale signs of the vehicle\u2019s occupancy, such as its presence at a toll booth where the shooter \u201creasonably should know\u201d the vehicle is occupied, the shooter\u2019s intentional or knowing discharge of a firearm in the direction of the vehicle would violate 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-1.2(a)(2) and in turn, such conduct would constitute a \u00a7 4B1.2(a)(l) \u201ccrime of violence.\u201d Although the shooter may not have known of the vehicle\u2019s occupancy, the shooter still used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force against another person. Cf. United States v. Tapia, 610 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); People v. Juarez, 278 Ill.App.3d 286, 214 Holdings: 0: holding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was alleged to have violated 720 ill comp stat 52412a1 because the shooting occurred in the early hours of the morning when the home would likely be occupied and in fact was 1: holding that the facts that the vehicle described in the tip was parked outside the home that allen gave inconsistent answers to officers questioning and that in addition the defendant fit the physical description of the suspect were sufficient to support the officers reasonable inference that the defendant was actually the suspect and therefore that there was probable cause to arrest him 2: holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold 3: holding that even if the industry and federal regulations evidenced an inherent danger and the defendant knew or should have realized that the device was or was likely to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied there was a complete absence of evidence that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff or its employees would not realize the danger 4: holding that reasonable suspicion existed for an investigatory stop of a vehicle the defendant was driving slowly in the early morning hours down a deadend street where businesses had previously been robbed where the defendant was dressed shabbily but the vehicle was real nice and where the defendant appeared to avoid the officers gaze in passing", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "identification of Respondent would generally be sufficient to establish probable cause. See Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1102 (relying on deposition of victim identifying petitioner after being shown a single photograph of petitioner in upholding finding of probable cause); see also Cervantes Valles, 268 F.Supp.2d at 773 (\u201cIn the domestic law enforcement context, an ordinary citizen\u2019s eyewitness account of criminal activity and identification of a perpetrator is normally regarded as sufficient to supply probable cause.\u201d) (citing Burbridge, 252 F.3d at 778). 3. Credibility of witnesses Respondent also questions the credibility of the witnesses that provided statements to Mexican law enforcement. However, as discussed above, \u201can accused in an extradition hearing has 1131 (C.D.Cal.2005) (<HOLDING>). Here, a witness\u2019s lack of credibility may be Holdings: 0: holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal 1: holding that the government may not introduce evidence obtained through violations of the fourth amendment 2: holding that respondent could not challenge the veracity or validity of a witnesss statement because a fugitive in international extradition proceedings is not permitted to introduce evidence that contradicts the evidence submitted by the requesting country 3: holding that the admission of a report was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove its truth but to impeach the veracity of the witnesss direct testimony 4: holding that trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of prior dealings with the defendant", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "one. We do not anticipate an escalation of such claims. The Legislature has provided a remedy to members of the public injured by \u201cfailure on the part of a public entity to provide an emergency warning signal or device when a condition exists constituting a \u2018trap\u2019 to a person using a street or highway with due care.\u201d N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 comment. But the Legislature has closely limited that remedy by requiring compliance with N.J.S.A 59:4-2, which, among other things, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and that the public entity\u2019s conduct was \u201cpalpably unreasonable.\u201d Those requirements are difficult to meet. See, e.g., DeBonis v. Orange Quarry Co., 233 N.J.Super. 156, 170-71, 558 A.2d 474 (App.Div.1989) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Legislature has recognized Holdings: 0: holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendants fourth amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation 1: holding that contractor owed general negligence duty to thirdparty by dangerous condition contractor created on road 2: recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge 3: recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing 4: holding that countys general knowledge that stones from quarry would occasionally create dangerous condition on road surface was insufficient to impute to county constructive knowledge of condition of road at time of motorcyclists accident because condition was dynamic rather than static and was not predictably recurrent", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "challenge a vehicle search from passenger standing to seek suppression of evidence discovered in a vehicle as the fruit of an unlawful stop, detention, or arrest.\u201d). Now, in response to the district court\u2019s cue, Defendant has raised for the first time on appeal the contention that he was unlawfully detained. In the ordinary civil case, we would have little trouble refusing to address a new argument on appeal under these circumstances. See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (observing that an appellate court will generally \u201cnot resolve issues on appeal unless they are presented, considered, and decided by the district court\u201d). But our criminal cases have been more cautious. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Because there is no evidence in this case Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review is appropriate unless there is some evidence that the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of a particular argument 1: holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act 2: holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver 3: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 4: holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "OF THE COURT PER CURIAM The Appellee herein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in October of 1988. A Motion in Limine to exclude the results of the chemical breath test was made by the defense based on a lapse of two hours between arrest and test. Said Motion was granted. The State appeals. Testing is unnecessary in order for the State to prove a case against a defendant charged with driving under the influence. See \u00a7 316.193(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987); Layman v State, 455 So.2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), cert. denied, 459 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Cf. State v McIntyre, 393 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods 1: holding that a statute must not be given the one of two reasonable interpretations which will render it unconstitutional 2: holding that tex transp code ann  545060a describes one offense 3: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 4: holding that a defendants sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time he committed the offense", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is, at best, in remission. A condition in remission is still a mental disease.\u201d However, the state submitted no evidence that, at the time of the hearing, petitioner\u2019s prior mental health disease was in remission. The only evidence submitted established that a year earlier petitioner had suffered from a medical disease. It is equally as inferable from that evidence that petitioner no longer suffers from a mental disease as it is that the disease continues but is in remission. Once petitioner offered evidence at the hearing that established that he currently no longer suffers from the disease, the state had the burden to overcome that evidence and to show that petitioner still suffers from a mental disease that is in remission. See Martin v. PSRB, 312 Or 157, 166, 818 P2d 1264 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Because the medical records do not suffice to Holdings: 0: holding that jeopardy does not attach in the administrative process preliminary to formal forfeiture proceedings even when the petitioner has filed a petition for remission or mitigation 1: holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case 2: holding that to continue jurisdiction over the petitioner it was necessary to show that he had a mental disease or defect which was in remission at the time of the hearing 3: holding that the state court ruling was objectively unreasonable where prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the petitioner murdered a known drug dealer although the state established that the petitioner planned to rob drug dealers for drugs or money the victim was a known drug dealer who kept drugs in his freezer and that freezer was open and empty after the homicide the petitioner and the victim had engaged in drug transactions in the past the petitioner had a motive because he had seen the victim make a pass at the petitioners girlfriend and the petitioner had possessed and once purchased the murder weapon and a similar gun was seen in his home two weeks before the murder evidence placing the petitioner at the scene was conspicuously absent leaving only a reasonable speculation that the petitioner was present 4: holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioners request for counsel in evidentiary hearing where petitioner had requested counsel and had indicated in his motion that all documents had been prepared by prison law clerk he had only ninthgrade education he had no training in the law and he lacked the skills necessary to participate in hearing", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the intervention of a party with standing after an action has been filed \u201ccannot cure any jurisdictional defect that would have barred the federal court from hearing the original action.\u201d 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 1917 (3 brought this enforcement action, we lack jurisdiction. This conclusion un doubtedly applies to numerous other en- - forcement actions taken by the Bureau for the 18 months of its existence before Richard Cordray was properly confirmed by the Senate in July 2013. But while the Supreme Court understands the practical consequences of invalidating large numbers of agency actions, it has nevertheless done so when the law requires. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2013), aff'd 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014) (<HOLDING>); see also New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 Holdings: 0: holding employment contracts of former executive director of township community mental health board ultra vires and void ab initio though board members had staggered terms of appointment because the contracts extended beyond the term of the township supervisor in office at the time of the execution of the contracts and the board was appointed by the supervisor 1: holding that an action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio 2: holding void ab initio ordinance proscribing punishment in excess of that authorized in charter 3: holding that the denial of enforcement on the basis that the board lacked a proper quorum did not deprive the board of jurisdiction to consider the case anew 4: holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members the nlrb lacked authority to act and the enforcement order was therefore void ab initio ", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of a firearm during and in relation to the drug conspiracy and a carjacking incident) and Count 10 (knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of the drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute). The pre-sentence report stated that the mandatory minimum terms for these convictions were ten and five years, respectively. The Government objected, arguing that Count 10 constituted a second conviction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c) and therefore the mandatory minimum for Count 10 should be 25 years. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (\u201cIn the case of a second or subsequent conviction under [18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924], the person shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.... \u201d); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-33, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The probation officer agreed with these Holdings: 0: holding that  924cs enhanced penalty for a second or subsequent conviction applies when the defendant is convicted of multiple  924c counts in a single proceeding 1: holding that post conviction hearing act is not available to juvenile proceeding since the child is not convicted of a crime 2: holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts 3: holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury 4: holding that severance was not required when a defendant was charged with five counts of forcible rape two counts of felonious restraint three counts of kidnapping two counts of armed criminal action two counts of forcible sodomy one count of second degree assault one count of first degree robbery and one count of stealing", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to the detriment of defendants, but also had ex post facto implications. Fell, 209 Ariz. at 80-81 \u00b6\u00b6 10-12, 97 P.3d at 905-06. No such concerns exist here. \u00b6 16 We also reject the State\u2019s argument, raised for the first time in its supplemental brief, that SB 1449 unconstitutionally disturbs victims\u2019 rights \u201cin the finality of a defendant\u2019s conviction.\u201d The Arizona Constitution provides that \u201ca victim of crime has a right ... [t]o a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of [a] case after the conviction and sentence.\u201d Ariz. Const, art. 2, \u00a7 2.1(A)(10) (\u201cVictims\u2019 Bill of Rights\u201d). But that provision does not give victims a vested right to sustaining a conviction on appeal. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz. 205, 209 \u00b6 14, 150 P.3d 778, 782 (App.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, SB 1449 \u201cis a valid exercise of Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutional definition of criminal offense in  1344016 insofar as it narrowed definition of victim in effect when victims bill of rights adopted 1: holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction 2: holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct 3: recognizing that the legislature may effectively limit the scope of the victims bill of rights by decriminalizing certain conduct or redefining the type of conduct that qualifies as a criminal offense 4: holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "herself, to get her own meals, to perform household chores or to drive. Similarly, at work Gretillat found ways to perform tasks that otherwise might involve squatting, crouching, crawling or kneeling. For example, instead of squatting to get things out of the bottom of a refrigerator, Gretillat would bend over sideways, get a pair of tongs or a long-handled spoon or ask a co-worker to help. Gretillat\u2019s admitted ability to compensate for her limitations weighs against a finding that she is disabled under the ADA. See Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 (directing district courts to analyze \u201cthe extent of the limitation ... in terms of [the plaintiffs] experience\u201d and the individual\u2019s ability to compensate for the impairment) (citing Albertson\u2019s, 527 U.S. at 567, 119 S.Ct. 2162) (<HOLDING>); Ristrom, 370 F.3d at 769 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that an individual is presumed to intend the natural consequences of the individuals actions 1: holding that episodic multiple sclerosis is categorized as an impairment  that will consistently meet the definition of disability and a ministroke is categorized as an impairment that may be disabling for some individuals but not for others 2: holding that monocular vision is not invariably a disability but should be analyzed on an individual basis taking into account the individuals ability to compensate for the impairment 3: holding that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that miti gate the individuals impairment including in this instance eyeglasses and contact lenses 4: holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the employee is performing work on the project,\u201d as factors in selecting the winning bidder. See Cincinnati, OH., Code \u00a7 320-3(j)-(k) (2013). Thus, the Ordinance assesses bidders partially based on their compensation practices on non-City projects. Of course, the Ordinance only imposes this consideration on a select group of contractors: those contractors that affirmatively choose to bid on City projects. One district court that has considered this issue has held that the mere fact that the municipal ordinance applies only to contractors who affirmatively choose to bid on city projects dictates that the ordinance is \u201csufficiently tailored\u201d to the municipality\u2019s proprietary interests. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. New Castle County, 144 F.Supp.3d 633, 639 (D. Del. 2015) (<HOLDING>). As discussed above, we decline to resolve the Holdings: 0: holding that an ordinance requiring bidders on county projects to participate in an apprenticeship program was sufficiently tailored to the countys proprietary interest because it only applied to bidders on the countys projects 1: recognizing that but for a provision in a countys charter allowing for appointment of the county manager for a fouryear term the countys legislators would be unable to appoint the county manager for a term extending into the term of the legislators successors 2: holding that even though the defendant believed the real estate projects he misrepresented were viable his belief did not negate his intent to inflict a genuine harm on the victims by depriving them of material information necessary to determine for themselves whether to continue their development projects thereby continuing or increasing their exposure to the risk of the projects failure 3: holding in a breach of contract action that a state statute established that employees have a right to rely on the layoff and termination procedures advanced by their employers and that to the extent that the government employer considered factors in addition to seniority ability and merit the countys termination of the plaintiffs employment was in violation of the county personnel management act 4: holding a county taxpayer has standing to bring a declaratory decree and injunctive action against public officials of the county when the action seeks to enjoin the grant of certain tax exemptions given to other taxpayers in the county on the ground that such exemptions violate specific limitations on the countys authority to grant tax exemptions imposed by the florida constitution", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "cancel both the \u201cplain and precise\u201d one-year limitation Congress placed on a former spouse\u2019s right to claim the benefits and the clear prohibition against subjecting an annuity to legal process. Id. (quoting King v. King, 225 Ga. App. 298, 483 S.E.2d 379, 383 (1997)). The Court thus found that the Virginia divorce decree, which would effectively negate this federal one-year limitation, was appropriately overridden by the SBP law because clear and substantial federal interests would \u201csuffer major damage if the state law [were] applied.\u201d Id. at 8, 539 S.E.2d at 725 (quoting Yazell, 382 U.S. at 352). The facts and federal law at issue in the instant case are easily distinguishable on all three of these points. First, FEGLIA does not creat 19 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 6 F. Holdings: 0: holding that employee spouses accrued but unvested retirement benefits are a contingent property interest and a community asset 1: holding that feglia preempted a state divorce decree which ordered the insured to maintain his fegli policy for the benefit of his children from his first marriage 2: holding a nonemployee spouse who holds a community pioperty interest in an employee spouses retirement benefits owns a community property interest in the latters iethement benefits as enhanced by eaily xetirement incentives 3: holding that to the extent that california community property law gave the insureds former spouses or his daughter an interest in his fegli benefits it conflicted with feglias order of precedence 4: holding that the asserted right of the insureds child based on his agreement with his mother during their divorce to name the child as his fegli beneficiary was preempted by feglia", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in the \u201cterms and conditions of employment\u201d did not provide defendants notice of claims other than those specifically alleged in the complaint); Davis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 600 F.Supp. 1312, 1318\u2014 19 (D.Md.1985), aff'd, 769 F.2d 210 (4th Cir.1985) (in the context of tolling noting that \u201cnotice only of the fact that [defendants] were being charged with racial discrimination in any and all types of general employment practices ... does not give the defendants ... fair notice\u201d). Nor do the specific references to pay in the Original and First Amended Complaints provide notice of a compensation discrimination claim. See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir.2001) (\u201cSpecific legal theories need not be pleaded so long as sufficient factual averments sho 67, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on the language of the Holdings: 0: holding that a prisoners allegations that a corrections officer retaliated against the prisoner for the prisoners report charging the officer with misconduct properly stated a claim for retaliation noting that aji allegation of retaliation should not be ignored simply because the charge was later dismissed  1: holding that allegations that a prison guard retaliated against a prisoner by terrorizing him with threats of death if proved would constitute a violation of the prisoners first amendment rights 2: holding that not all adverse action taken against a public employee in retaliation for exercising first amendment rights is sufficient to support a cause of action under  1983 3: holding that student stated a claim for violation of his first amendment right to speech when he alleged that school officials prevented him from openly stating that he was homosexual and retaliated against him for doing so 4: holding that prisoners complaint alleging that he was punished for filing a grievance against a correctional officer was sufficient to provide notice of claim that he was retaliated against for exercising his first amendment rights", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "254 S.W.2d at 1011. Though DeToto\u2019s affidavit does not explicitly state that Roberts refused to provide an affidavit, we believe the affidavit implicitly makes this contention through DeToto\u2019s statement that he had spoken with Roberts and that Roberts had denied making the statements. 36 . Because we have found, based on the reasoning already discussed in this section, that appellant\u2019s affidavits are not deficient, we need not address whether appellant\u2019s affidavits are sufficient on some other basis. More specifically, we need not consider whether Roberts\u2019 alleged statements to Clinton are admissible through Clinton because they constitute an admission by party-opponent. See Tex.R. Evid. 801(e)(2); Rodela v. Stale, 829 S.W.2d 845, 847-50 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1992, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); see generally Randolph N. Jonakait, The Holdings: 0: holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made 1: holding that a police officers notes were relevant as prior and possibly inconsistent statements made and recorded by the witness 2: holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors 3: holding that a witness could testify about statements made to him by a police department investigator because the statements were an admission by partyopponent and were thus not excluded by the hearsay rule 4: holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to Hilton. Alternatively, Hilton argues that Arlynn was the initial transferee because Video Depot\u2019s ledger .appears to indicate that the cashier\u2019s check was a \u201cloan\u201d to Arlynn. We address each of these arguments in turn. I. Arlynn\u2019s Control over Video Depot While the Bankruptcy Code does not define \u201ctransferee,\u201d it is widely accepted that a transferee is one who, at a minimum, has \u2018\u201cdominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one\u2019s own purposes.\u2019 \u201d In re Bullion, 922 F.2d at 548 (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893). The bankruptcy court determined that Arlynn did not have, dominion over the $65,-000. The court reasoned that although Arlynn controlled Video Depot\u2019s operations and arranged for the cheek Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 127 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (<HOLDING>); with Ross v. United States (In re Auto-Pak, Holdings: 0: holding that a trustee may settle with an initial transferee and still pursue recovery against a subsequent transferee but notwithstanding the trustee will still be required to prove that the transfers  were fraudulent and improper in connection with its suit against the subsequent transferee because the trustees settlement with the initial transferee did not involve any determination on the merits as to the initial transfers and in this way the subsequent transferee will be afforded its due process rights to contest the avoidability of these initial transfers 1: holding that principal who caused debtor to issue cashiers check to satisfy personal obligation was not initial transferee 2: holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer 3: holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee 4: holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "evidence did not establish the existence of the disease. In his examination report, Dr. Rasmussen noted a smoking history of approximately twenty-five pack years that ended when Marshall stopped smoking in 1973. Contrary to this summary, however, hospitalization records that were submitted in evidence reveal that Marshall continued to smoke at least as late as October 1988. Reliance on an inaccurate smoking history provides a sufficient basis for entirely discrediting Dr. Rasmussen\u2019s opinion con cerning causation. Because Dr. Rasmussen\u2019s opinion was based on misinformation, the reliability of his opinion was undermined, much the same way that an opinion is undermined where it is based on invalid objective data. See, e.g., Lane v. Union Carbide Corp., 105 F.3d 166, 173 (4th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, although he included Marshall\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that because fibromyalgia is a disease that eludes objective measurement alj improperly discredited treating physicians disability determination based upon lack of objective evidence 1: holding that alj properly rejected opinions based on invalid objective studies 2: holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed 3: holding that doctors opinions are not due much weight when based solely on reports made by a patient that the alj found to be incredible 4: holding that animal studies can be a proper foundation for an experts opinion but that those opinions must be sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purport to rely", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or not the Cargill witnesses testified falsely is not a question this court can answer on judicial review, nor can this court decide that the arbitrators erred in concluding that Cargill employees did not lie, because this court \u201c \u2018may not set an award aside simply because ... the arbitrators erred in ... determining the facts.\u2019 \u201d UHC Management Co., 148 F.3d at 998 (quoting Stroh Container Co., 783 F.2d at 751). However, this court can properly consider whether the arbitration proceedings improperly precluded Hoffman from discovering or presenting the pertinent evidence that would have impeached the truthfulness of the Cargill employees\u2019 testimony, pursuant to either 9 U.S.C. \u00a7 10(a)(3) or the extra-statutory \u201cfundamental unfairness\u201d standard. See P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). The preceding five challenges were Holdings: 0: recognizing review for fundamental unfairness as an independent extrastatutory ground 1: recognizing plain or fundamental error 2: holding right to be fundamental 3: recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit 4: holding that section 34810 is an adequate and independent state ground", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "L.Ed.2d 360 (1965), we reaffirmed Remington, holding that the government\u2019s failure to advise a defendant of his right to counsel did not give the defendant \u201ca defense to a charge that he thereafter gave false testimony while under oath in response to a material question directed to him by a competent tribunal.\u201d Id. at 210; see also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 582, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976) (plurality) (\u201cIn any event, a witness sworn to tell the truth before a duly constituted grand jury will not be heard to call for suppression of false statements made to that jury ....\u201d) (rejecting defendant\u2019s argument that Fifth Amendment required suppression where Miranda warnings were not given); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180, 97 S.Ct. 1823, 52 L.Ed.2d 231 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Wheel v. Robinson, 34 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances 1: holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction 2: holding that directing defendant to the secondary inspection area to answer additional questions is permissible under the fourth amendment 3: holding that review of questions not raised to the bia is barred 4: holding that perjury is not a permissible way of objecting to the governments questions", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "distinguishable from this case because there the Court sought to prevent a declaratory judgment action from being used to prejudice a plaintiff in the underlying tort action who was not a party to the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 407-08, 347 A.2d 842. Nevertheless, we find Brohawn persuasive to the extent that it articulates one of many considerations that weigh on the question as to whether a declaratory judgment action is proper. We further find persuasive decisions arising from the courts of other jurisdictions that have refused to endorse the usurping of the jurisdiction of a court with concurrent jurisdiction through the failure to permit the matter to be resolved in its original forum. See, e.g., First Midwest Corp. v. Corp. Fin. Assoc., 663 N.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing Waicker, supra, 347 Md. at 115, 699 Holdings: 0: holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds 1: holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state 2: holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds 3: holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a newly discovered claim 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "before Odettes filed this suit. In sum, whether Odettes\u2019 delay in filing suit against defendants is taken as six years or three, it was clearly unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Because the delay is inexcusable, and because defendants suffered prejudice from it, this case is an appropriate one in which to apply the doctrine of laches. Odettes is therefore barred from recovering damages from any of these defendants for any infringement occurring before June 29,1995. An appropriate Order has already issued. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record. 1 . A more complete recitation of the facts appears in a previous Memorandum Opinion in this case. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 906 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Va. 1995) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Briefly, an ATL is a computer-controlled Holdings: 0: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 1: holding that sentence factor manipulation applies to statutory minimums as well as to the guidelines 2: holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the court of federal claims 3: holding that second sentence of 35 usc  102g is applicable to determine priority of invention in infringement suits as well as in interference proceedings 4: recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 usc  1983 and suits under united states constitution", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Thus, it appears to this court they would still be a proper member of the class. Their claims do not have to be identical to the class representatives. ii. Geographic Diversity It is undisputed the potential class covers tribes all over the United States. They involve tribes in 35 states. Defendant argues geographic diversity is insufficient to defeat joinder because it cannot be ascertained where the purported class members reside due to the vagueness and imprecision of the proposed class. However, the court agrees with plaintiffs that the geographic diversity of the potential class members makes joinder impractical, if not impossible. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir.1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 1159, 120 S.Ct. 1169, 145 L.Ed.2d 1078 (2000) (<HOLDING>) Hi. Ability to Identify Class Members The Holdings: 0: holding joinder not practicable where 100 to 150 class members were geographically dispersed 1: holding that joinder is impracticable where the class consisted of at least fifty members 2: holding that 100 to 150 members  is within the range that generally satisfies the numerosity requirement 3: holding numerosity requirement to be satisfied where putative securities fraud class consisted of more than 90 geographically dispersed plaintiffs 4: recognizing that in determining numerosity the proper focus is not on numbers alone but on whether joinder of all members is practicable in view of the numerosity of the class and all other relevant factors", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or using the common meaning would lead to absurd results. FKM P\u2019ship., Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Houston Sys., 255 S.W.3d 619, 633 (Tex.2008). When the words of the statute are clear, they are determinative. Entergy Gulf States, 282 S.W.3d at 437. In moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Occidental relied on several W.3d 412, 416 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (observing that statute of repose operates as affirmative defense on which defendant bears burden of proof); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 94. Unless Occidental conclusively established each element of its affirmative defense, its failure to obtain a jury finding in its favor is fatal. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 805-06 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Whitney Nat\u2019l. Bank v. Baker, 122 S.W.3d 204, Holdings: 0: recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof 1: holding defendant bears burden of establishing affirmative defense of official immunity 2: holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense 3: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 4: holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "damage arising out of the discharge\u201d of hazardous wastes \u201cinto or upon the land\u201d unless \u201csuch discharge ... is sudden and accidental.\u201d (Emphasis added). The occurrence that must be sudden and accidental then, is the disposal of hazardous wastes \u201cinto or upon the land\u201d from which the property damage arose, not the unexpected migration and corresponding damages. See, e.g., Warwick, 26 F.3d at 1203 (under Rhode Island law, initial disposal of waste at landfill site was relevant discharge that had to be sudden and accidental for coverage to exist under exception to pollution exclusion clause in general liability policy; release of pollutants from landfill into surrounding environment was not relevant discharge); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co. (6th Cir. 1995), 50 F.3d 370, 373 (<HOLDING>). \u00b636 To hold otherwise eliminates the Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors deposit of funds was not in the ordinary course of business and was for the purpose of creating a setoff right for the bank 1: holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale 2: holding that monitoring telephone calls is in the ordinary course of business where the employer has reason to suspect an employee of disclosing confidential information to business competitor 3: holding under kentucky law that coverage barred insureds depositing of drums and fiberboard barrels containing ink and glue at landfill when the disposal took place on regular basis or in ordinary course of business 4: holding that boat repair was done in the ordinary course of business of river transportation company", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "caused the plaintiffs\u2019 injuries. JA 21. There was no further development of this bare assertion in the Complaint regarding any specific Municipality actions undertaken pursuant to its customs and policies. In Rosaura Building Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 778 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015), this court affirmed the district court\u2019s dismissal of \u201cclaims against the municipal government under Monell, after it found that Rosaura failed to plead a scintilla of facts against that government entity ... [about the] execution of a government\u2019s policy or custom.\u201d Id. at 61-62, 69 (citation omitted). Here, given the record, we similarly conclude that there is no sufficient allegation that the Municipality acted under color of law. In summary, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, we c h Cir. 1955) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The enactment of a statute may, of Holdings: 0: holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law 1: holding that californias mandatory iota program does not involve a taking of property without just compensation as prohibited by the fifth amendment to the united states constitution 2: holding that a patent confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself without just compensation 3: holding that a statute requiring a natural gas producer to make gas available to pump water for agriculture irrigation at a price fixed by the corporation commission is not a regulation under the police power but a taking of the producers property without due process of law and an appropriation of the producers property without just compensation 4: holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "[debtor] significantly increases his income, he would go to his grave either indebted to ECMC or, if not, indebted to the IRS on the tax obligation incurred when ECMC forgives the unpaid loan.\u201d). Second, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s reasoning, consideration of the ICRP would not impermissibly diminish the authority of the Bankruptcy Court by precluding discharge based upon undue hardship whenever a debtor is eligible for, but did not participate in, the ICRP. See Bronsdon, 2009 WL 95038, at *4. (citing Denittis, 362 B.R. at 64-65). Applying the Brunner test, three circuit courts of appeals have concluded that eligibility for the ICRP should be considered as a component of the undue hardship analysis but is not necessarily dispositive. In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir.2008)(<HOLDING>); In re Alderete, 412 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law 1: holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief 2: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith 3: holding when applying the brunner test that while not a per se indication of a lack of good faith debtors decision not to take advantage of the icrp is probative of her intent to repay the loans 4: holding that seeking out loan consolidation options such as the icrp is an important component of the good faith inquiry under the brunner test", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "new trial, and Muller moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Defendants challenged the Court\u2019s pre-trial 'suppression orders, the evidentiary rulings made at trial that allowed out-of-court identifications into evidence, and the Court\u2019s refusal to declare a mis 994) (discussing Dunaway\u2019s holding' \u201cthat the \u2018reasonable suspicion\u2019 which permits a limited stop under Terry v. Ohio ... is not enough to allow the police to transport the person stopped to the police station and extract information through detention and interrogation\u201d (citation omitted)). Other appellate courts have also concluded that transportation to and detention in a police station or other custodial setting constitutes a de facto arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Centanni v. Eight Unknown Officers, 15 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff had standing to challenge constitutionality of a georgia criminal trespass law because he was warned twice to stop handbilling and was told that if he engaged in the activity again he would be arrested 1: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave 2: holding that under royer the defendant was arrested when he was prevented from boarding his plane placed in handcuffs involuntarily transported in restraints to an official holding area some distance from the place of the original stop confined to a small interrogation room and kept there under observation for more than a momentary period yet he was never informed how long he would be detained nor told that he was not under arrest 3: holding that defendant was not in custody for miranda purposes when fieldsobriety tests were conducted and when deputy responded in the negative to defendants question of whether he was under arrest and never placed defendant in handcuffs or in the back of a patrol car during the questioning 4: holding that a de facto arrest had occurred where petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found  but rather was taken  to a police car transported to a police station and placed in an interrogation room", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "record accompanied by a presumption of correctness, \u201cunless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.\u201d Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). If some of the trial court\u2019s factual findings are based on its determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, then this Court will afford great weight to those credibility determinations, and will not reverse such determinations absent clear evidence to the contrary. See McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1995). Whether the ultimate issues of dependency and neglect or severe child abuse have been established by clear and convincing evidence are questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 810 (Tenn.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 548 Holdings: 0: holding that the question of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of a permanency plan was a question of law reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness 1: holding in a termination of parental rights case that as a question of law the trial courts ruling that the facts of this case sufficiently support the termination ground of willful abandonment are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness 2: holding that trial courts determination of facts has a presumption of correctness but trial courts legal conclusions are subject to de novo review 3: holding that appellate review of hearsay issues is de novo with no presumption of correctness 4: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and times of the alleged incidents, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the records on relevance grounds. Victim\u2019s OASIS Interview {37} Defendant asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant\u2019s request to play a DVD of Victim\u2019s OASIS interview at trial. However, the district court admitted the DVD itself into evidence as Defendant\u2019s Exhibit A. Although the OASIS interview was not played for the jury in open court, Defendant cross-examined Victim about the content of the OASIS interview and impressed upon the jury in closing argument the importance of reviewing the DVD. Presentation of evidence is a matter for the trial court\u2019s discretion. Rule 11 \u2014 611(A)(1), (2) NMRA; see State v. Hovey, 106 N.M. 300, 303, 742 P.2d 512, 515 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Because Defendant has not shown that the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse discretion in limiting the number of diary entries that could be read to the jury and explained by the defendant where there were hundreds of diary entries and all diaries were admitted into evidence and available for review by the jury 1: holding that where an officer of a corporation has possession of corporate records which disclose his crime there is no ground upon which it can be said that he will be forced to produce them if the entries were made by another but may withhold them if the entries were made by himself 2: holding that this court is required to assume that the jury followed the limiting instructions given by the district court 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants request for severance because the district court nullified any prejudicial error when it repeatedly admonished the jury throughout the trial to consider the evidence only against the defendant to whom it related and at the end of trial gave the jury instructions that admonished the jury to consider separately each offense and evidence in support of each offense 4: holding that testimony concerning the content of certified docket entries admitted into evidence only through an fbi agent who read the docket entries into the record in lieu of admission of the redacted docket was pursuant to the public records exception to the hearsay rule under the federal rules of evidence admissible to show the existence of prior misdemeanor convictions for certain purposes", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "suppression motion for failure of the prosecution to go forward with an evidentiary showing. II. 18 We hold that the trial court erred in assigning the initial burden of going forward to the prosecution and reverse the suppression order. A. Standard of Review T9 We review a suppression order with deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact and will not overturn those findings if supported by competent evidence in the record. People v. Castaneda, 249 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Colo.2011). We review the trial court's legal determinations de novo. Id. B. Applicable Law $10 A motion to suppress under Crim. P. 4l(e) is a claim that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. People v. Jansen, 713 P.2d 907, 911 (Colo.1986); People v. Jorlantin, 196 P.3d 258, 259 (Colo.2008) (<HOLDING>). The motion should state with reasonable Holdings: 0: holding that the driver of a borrowed car had the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy to support standing for fourth amendment purposes 1: recognizing that standing for a motion to suppress invokes the movants fourth amendment right to privacy 2: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 3: holding that squatter had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no fourth amendment standing to challenge search of abandoned structure 4: recognizing an implied fourth amendment action for damages", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Influenced Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961, et seq. (\u201cRICO\u201d) and also asserted an equitable claim for unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for Delta on both claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291 and we affirm. A. RICO Claim To prevail on a civil RICO claim the plaintiffs must show, among other elements, a \u201cpattern 1992) (same). Although the parties dispute whether the amounts charged in each debit memo are the actual measure of Delta\u2019s damages, and, in some cases, whether the ticketing violation even occurred, these issues concern the interpretation of the ARC Agreement and amount to nothing more than a contract dispute. See, e.g., Union Nat\u2019l Bank of Little Rock v. Federal Nat\u2019l Mortgage Association, 860 F.2d 847, 857 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Delta\u2019s threat to terminate its Holdings: 0: holding that regardless of whether the defendant actually had a right to monies claimed defendants demands under the contract were not extortion because they were motivated by the defendants interpretation of the agreement 1: holding that apprendi was not triggered because the defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were within the maximum penalties for the rico offenses that they were found guilty of committing 2: holding that monies were not property of the estate once the irrevocable election had been made and thus were not subject to turnover 3: holding that the defendants had received sufficient notice where the original defendants and the newly added defendants shared an identity of interests and were represented by attorneys who were involved in the litigation from its inception 4: holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "use, and (4) lost profits on gas that TGP was unable to sell because it had to be used for venting and to perform emergency shutdowns. Id. at 10-11. C. Analysis We conclude that some of the damages awarded to HP are permitted direct damages and some are impermissible consequential damages. 1. Costs Relating to Transformer B: Damage Elements (a), (b), (c) & (f) Damages that flow \u201cnaturally and necessarily\u201d from a breach of the parties\u2019 contract are those inherent in the nature of the breach of the obligation between the parties, as compared to those damages that flow \u201cnaturally but not necessarily\u201d from the breach because they require the existence of some other fact (known or unknown) beyond the relationship between the parties. Cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 2008 WL 3876141, at *9-10 (<HOLDING>); Hoppenstein Props., Inc. v. McLennan Cnty. Holdings: 0: holding that government claim seeking incidental and consequential damages for plaintiffs alleged breach of contract did not require certification 1: holding that cost for backup generator necessitated by power outage were consequential damages of defendants premature dismantling of old generator and costs for penalty under utility contract for delayed use of utilities were consequential damages from construction delay because the cost depended on terms of owners contract with third party utility company 2: holding that consequential damages are not to be considered 3: holding that provision barring recovery of consequential damages did not necessarily bar all loss of use damages but damages for loss of use of money were consequential 4: holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "own name. These facts supported the jury\u2019s finding of alter ego. Therefore, the trial court correctly used the jury\u2019s finding of alter ego to hold the Hubbards individually liable for the $17,-981 debt. See Tex.Bus.Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.21(A) (West Supp.1995) (allowing imposition of individual liability under alter ego theory where fraud and direct personal benefit have been shown). B Thrift contends next that the Hub-bards should not recover for interference with prospective business relations and that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the issue because the Hubbards failed to plead that cause of action. A court may instruct the jury on an issue only if the issue has been properly tried by the parties. Neubauer v. City of McAllen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1575 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThe trial court has no duty to give the jury Holdings: 0: holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue 1: holding that failure to try issue made instruction on that issue reversible error 2: holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue 3: holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue 4: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of a fire occurring\u201d was \u201cinsufficient\u201d for defendants to claim immunity. Geiger at 494. Similarly, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-82-5 requires that the alleged negligent act occur \u201cat the scene\u201d of a reported fire before a rural volunteer fire department can assert immunity. The fact that plaintiff\u2019s wreck occurred where defendants had filled their fire trucks with water from a fire hydrant, one-half mile away from the reported fire, is insufficient for defendants to claim immunity. The words \u201cat the scene\u201d provide immunity for defendants for acts and omissions only in a specific place. A broader reading of the statute would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words. See State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom Cty. Etc., 575 P.2d 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) aff\u2019d, 593 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1979) (<HOLDING>). II. Plaintiff further argues that defendants Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident 1: holding that convictions for both leaving the scene of an accident involving injury and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only were inconsistent and therefore could not be sustained 2: holding that an offduty officers assertion to bystanders that he was on the job  at the scene of a car accident did not place him within the scope of employment 3: holding that the words at the scene   imply a specific place    and limit rather than expand the officers power to arrest and the scene is the place where the accident occurred 4: holding scene of accident was suspicious place", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or operators\u201d of uninsured or un-derinsured motor vehicles). After liability is established, if the damages exceed the tortfeasor\u2019s liability insurance limits, \u201cthe excess is payable by the [plaintiffs] under-insurance carrier to the extent of its coverage.\u201d Dean v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn.1995). UIM coverage thus serves the same basic purpose as UM coverage: both coverages stand as a proxy for the coverage of the uninsured or underinsured motorist, and both unquestionably constitute forms of y not paid until after the tort action has been tried, UIM benefits are not a collateral source in the usual case. See Minn.Stat. \u00a7 548.251, subd. 1 (defining \u201ccollateral sources\u201d to include only payments made \u201cup to the date of the verdict\u201d); Smith, 586 N.W.2d at 786 (<HOLDING>). In the normal course, a UIM claimant is Holdings: 0: holding that the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict 1: holding that failure to move for judgment after verdict entitled party only to a new trial not a judgment in its favor 2: holding that premium reduction was legal where the insured had given consideration for reduction 3: holding that the collateralsource statute requires a reduction of the judgment only for payments made prior to the verdict 4: holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of her appeal, and thereby \u201cfailed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her rights\u201d). Here we agree with the BIA that even if Acquaah\u2019s motions were found to be timely, he would still not be entitled to relief because, as explained below, he has not shown that he missed his hearing due to exceptional circumstances. Acquaah does not dispute that he had proper notice of the hearing date and does not allege that he was ill or in custody at the time of his hearing. Rather, he asserts that had Kloek promptly filed a motion to reopen \u2014 which Klock all 92) (affirming the denial of motion to reopen where an alien appeared ten minutes late at a hearing because he and his attorney had \u201ccrossed signals\u201d about where to meet); but see Barseghian v. INS, 14 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding this general trend, the Holdings: 0: holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due 1: holding that where surety was given until date of forfeiture hearing to produce defendant and defendant was killed by police before that date bond would not be forfeited 2: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act 3: holding that trial courts resetting of hearing date for motion for summary judgment made timely summaryjudgment evidence that had been untimely based on hearing date in effect when the evidence was filed and served 4: holding in a twopage unpublished opinion without supporting caselaw that exceptional circumstances existed where an alien misunderstood a court interpreter to say that his hearing date was a week later than the date of the actual hearing", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the sudden emergency instruction, was appropriate considering the trial court\u2019s finding that the situation lacked spontaneity. Id. In the case before us, a jury could find that a vehicle suddenly spinning out of control immediately ahead of defendant-driver created a spontaneous reaction not necessarily present when vehicles are stopped in the road ahead of a driver who is able to see the stopped vehicles before the collision. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the rear-end collision instruction amounted to harmless error and that the sudden emergency jury instruction was correctly given. Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial justice erred in granting the motion for new trial. See Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 673 (R.I.2003) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion We vacate the order of the Holdings: 0: holding that trial judge should have granted new trial rather than judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the judge could not know in what order the jury reached its inconsistent verdicts 1: holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted 2: holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b 3: holding that where jury has been properly instructed counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to an instruction 4: holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "trial testimony describing the soil from the stain on the sweatpants as \u201ckind of soot,\u201d reveals that defense counsel objected to the description and the trial court sustained the objection. Even if the trial court had overruled the objection, we would find no error in its doing so because the officer\u2019s description \u2014 although it may contain a conclusion, opinion, or inference-accords with the ordinary experience of everyday life. \u201cWitnesses are permitted to express conditions in terms understandable to the average person, even though the term utilized is a summary of a combination of sensory impressions or separate physical conditions.\u201d Travelers Indem. Co. v. Woods, 663 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo.App. S.D.1983), citing Whitney v. Cent. Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Mo.App.St.L.D.1969) (<HOLDING>). As this court stated in Woods: The test for Holdings: 0: holding that testimony that wood was rotten should have been allowed 1: holding that psychologists testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony was both relevant and reliable and thus should have been admitted 2: holding that child support should have been made retroactive 3: holding that the prisoner should have been allowed to choose whether to leave his car parked in a public parking lot 4: holding that an arbitrators award should have been vacated", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and (2) judicial estoppel. Neither of these two grounds involve an attack on the legal or factual basis for the Claims. In analyzing the affirmative defense of election of remedies, this court does not inquire into these matters. See Gorman, 811 S.W.2d at 546; Bocanegra, 605 S.W.2d at 850-52; Heggy, 123 S.W.3d at 779. After reviewing Horizon\u2019s allegations in this case, we conclude that the remedies, rights, and facts Horizon alleges in this case are not inconsistent with the remedies, rights, and facts Horizon alleged in the English suit. In addition, to the extent there is any inconsistency, it is not so unconscionable, dishonest, contrary to fair dealing, or so stultifying to the legal process or trifling with justice as to be manifestly unjust. See Musick, 531 S.W.2d at 588-89 (<HOLDING>); Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Holdings: 0: holding that dyfs was not required to try the title 9 action to conclusion before filing a title 30 action for the termination of parental rights 1: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property 2: holding that claimant could recover all of his attorneys fees because declaratoryjudgment claim in boundary dispute was based on the same facts as his claims for adverse possession trespass and trespass to try title 3: recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim 4: holding that election of remedies did not apply because filing a trespass to try title action by the mortgageetrusteedeed grantee was not inconsistent with its successful settlement of claim against the title insurer", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of Leistiko. State v. Jones, 353 Or 208, 297 P3d 480 (2013). On remand, we concluded that a trial court\u2019s admission of prior bad acts evidence under OEC 404(3) to prove a defendant\u2019s intent \u2014 in a case in which the defendant disputed committing the charged acts and the jury had not been instructed that it must first find that the defendant had committed the charged acts before it could consider the prior bad acts evidence to determine intent \u2014 was properly reviewable as plain error, in light of Leistiko, because \u201cplain error\u201d is determined by the law as it exists at the time the appeal is decided. Jones, 258 Or App at 5-6 (discussing Leistiko, 352 Or at 174; State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132, 136, 57 P3d 970 (2002)); see also State v. Hutton, 258 Or App 806, 816, 817-18, 311 P3d 909 (2013) (<HOLDING>). We now apply the foregoing principles to this Holdings: 0: holding that to admit evidence of prior bad acts under rule 404b ala r evid the state must demonstrate that the evidence was reasonably necessary to its case 1: holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred 2: holding prior bad acts evidence is admissible where there is an articulation or identification of the consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other acts is directed 3: holding that it is error for a trial court to admit evidence of prior bad acts without properly conditioning the jurys use of that evidence 4: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the obviousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that confronted the inventor before the invention was made.\u201d). The problem is not properly framed as creating an internal regenerating dryer for a IMS detector device designed for field use that is capable of regenerating while the detector operates (i.e., is capable of continuous use), nor is it properly framed in reference to an IMS detector dryer that never needs to have its desiccant replaced. Such constructions would improperly rely on hindsight to define the problem, and in actuality, come closer to defining the problem as it existed for Smiths while it tried to play \u201ccatch-up\u201d after Morpho\u2019s Itemizer 3 product was commercialized. See Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377 (<HOLDING>); cf. Nascom Video Depo. 46:3-46:17 (testimony Holdings: 0: holding that the district court committed legal error by using a survey to define the meaning of a phrase  and then insisting that verification meet the standards thus established 1: holding that district court error was not clear error because no prior ninth circuit authority prohibited the course taken by the district court 2: holding the district court committed reversible error by certifying a class with respect to fraud claim 3: holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error 4: holding that the district court committed error by using the invention to define the problem that the invention solves", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of 1996, the time of the enactment of the legislation. See supra. In any event, under this Court\u2019s holding that attorney fee awards are payable to the attorney, not the plaintiff, the awards are the property of the attorney and therefore not subject to offset for the plaintiffs debts. See Marr\u00e9, 117 F.3d at 304 (finding that \u201cthe government cannot set off [the plaintiffs] tax obligations against the attorneys\u2019 fee award, as no mutuality of debt exists between the government and [the plaintiffs] attorneys\u201d). Plaintiff\u2019s Counsel Is Entitled to an Additional Fee Award This Court further finds that the plaintiffs attorney is entitled to an additional fee award under the EAJA for his time spent litigating this issue. See Commissioner, 496 U.S. 154 at 160-161, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (<HOLDING>). The Government recognizes that this Court has Holdings: 0: holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  1: holding that eaja fees may be awarded for fee litigation without a separate finding that the government was not substantially justified in its position as to the fee litigation as the single finding that the governments position lacks substantial justification  operates as a onetime threshold for fee eligibility  and presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil action 2: holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied 3: holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required 4: holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Action until' after the Bankruptcy Court granted him a discharge, he was fully aware of the Guarantors\u2019 repudiation of the Consulting Agreement before he filed his bankruptcy petition, see R.67, Ex. O (Exs. C-E to Dist, Ct. Compl.), and the breach of contract claim is therefore property of his estate, see O\u2019Dowd v. Trueger (In re O'Dowd), 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing a pre-petition cause of action is property of the estate). Insofar as the Consulting Agreement payments are recovered in the Contract Action, such payments will not be for any services actually performed by Segal but will be damages for his pre-petition breach of contract claim and will therefore be property of the estate. See Venn v. Sherman (In re Sherman), 322 B.R. 889, 892-93 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2004) (<HOLDING>); cf. Stinnett, 465 F.3d at 313 (rejecting the Holdings: 0: holding that causes of action for age and sex discrimination that arose prepetition were property of the bankruptcy estate 1: holding lost future wages recovered pursuant to a prepetition cause of action are property of the estate 2: holding that a valid judgment hen is enforceable against the property of the estate recovered by the trustee 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in the child\u2019s mother, Procanik; for a child\u2019s cystic fibrosis on a doctor who failed to test a symptomatic sibling for that genetic disease, Sckroeder; or for a child\u2019s Down\u2019s Syndrome on a doctor who failed to warn a pregnant woman that her age put her at increased risk of delivering a child with that condition, Berman. It is quite another to impose liability for prescribing a drug that had no connection with a birth defect. In one ease, the condition is the foreseeable result of the doctor\u2019s omission; in the other, it is not. The majority\u2019s result is unprecedented in any jurisdiction. In every previous failure-to-warn case, the harm about which the doctors failed to warn was the harm that in fact occurred. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F.Supp. 746 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. United States, 575 F.Supp. 1309 Holdings: 0: holding that to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on fear of contracting aids plaintiff must allege actual exposure to hiv 1: holding plaintiffs administrative complaint alleging negligent exposure to radiation established subject matter jurisdiction for plaintiffs civil claim alleging failure to warn of radiation exposure 2: holding that where plaintiffs emotional distress was the direct result of documented physical injury and was reasonably foreseeable in light of the fact that the plaintiff may have been exposed to hiv he was not required to prove actual exposure to the disease in order to state a viable cause of action 3: holding that absent any proof that the plaintiff was in fact exposed to hiv he could not recover damages for his fear of contracting aids 4: holding medical providers who failed to warn mother about danger of exposure to hiv liable when baby born with hiv", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "date for valuation, [the] fair market value of the property was $425,000 less the reasonable cost of remediation of then existing contamination of which the arbitrator finds to be $245,000 ... rendering the true market value to be $180,000 as of March 12, 1990. It is true that the arbitrator referred to the \u201cexercise of the right\u201d to repurchase, but we cannot construe that language to imply a determination that Avatar had the right to repurchase, because the arbitrator was merely setting the valuation date. Perhaps it would have been better for the arbitrator to have referred to the assertion of the right to repurchase, but we cannot read into the award a determination the arbitrator was not authorized to make. See Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So.2d 1327 (Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Avatar\u2019s claim that it would Holdings: 0: holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator 1: holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by addressing a question that was not submitted to arbitration and actually emerged six weeks after the original issue arose 2: holding that because the parties agreed to arbitrate and both placed the issue before the arbitrator the issue of consolidation was for the arbitrator 3: holding that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to consider an issue which was not included in the written notice of arbitration and was added on the first day of the arbitration hearing 4: holding that an arbitrator exceeds his or her power by going beyond the authority granted by the parties or the operative documents and decides an issue not pertinent to the resolution of the issue submitted to arbitration", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the body-cavity search, which was performed at approximately 2:15 a.m., officials placed Thompson in a room with seven other prisoners until 7:00 a.m. The room lacked toilet facilities, and at least one of the prisoners urinated on the floor. An official then led Thompson, in his bare feet, to a damp toilet stall, where he was directed to give a urine sample. No one cleaned the toi occurred, but whether the search was hygienic. Because of the strikingly unsanitary conditions under which the officials searched Thompson and performed the urinalysis, I believe that the prison officials in the instant case violated clearly established law. Nor could the prison officials reasonably have believed that their conduct was lawful. See Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The California Department of Corrections Holdings: 0: holding that government officials receive qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a constitutional right and the law to this effect was clearly established under thenexisting law such that a reasonable official would have known that his behavior was unlawful 1: holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had 2: holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity 3: holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established 4: holding that if official has violated clearly established law he is entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable official could have believed conduct was lawful", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to justify briefly stopping individuals to question them \u201cabout their citizenship and immigration status ... but any further detention ... must be based on ... probable cause.\u201d Id. at 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (emphasis added) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868); see also id. at 884 (\u201c[Tjhe Fourth Amendment ... forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens\u201d). Guided by this Supreme Court prece-' dent, we have also required that immigration officers have reasonable suspicion to briefly stop individuals to question them regarding their immigration status and probable cause for any further arrest and detention. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez-de Jesus, 85 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 69 (1st Holdings: 0: holding that passenger who attempts to walk away from a legal traffic stop cannot be detained absent reasonable suspicion of dangerous or criminal activity 1: recognizing that brignoniponce stands for the principle that an individual may not be briefly detained for questioning about citizenship absent reasonable suspicion that the person is an illegal alien 2: holding that where an alien was ineligible for a visa as a matter of law his citizenship was illegally procured and subject to revocation 3: recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure 4: holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "undermines her arguments. (Defs-.\u2019 Mem. 9-10.) However, the issue before the Court on this claim is not whether Plaintiff was guilty of disclosing official NYPD -information, but whether her termination was motivated, even in part, by her sex. The evidence that a similarly situated male lieutenant who engaged in comparable or worse conduct than Plaintiff received a much lighter pen alty, in combination with the evidence that Defendants departed from procedural regularity by providing Commissioner Weisel with an inaccurate and version of Plaintiffs disciplinary record than they provid: ed to Plaintiff, is legally sufficient for- a reasonable jury to find that Defendants terminated Plaintiff in part on the basis of her sex. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, summary judgment is Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs prima facie case plus evidence of pretext sufficed to permit reasonable juror to infer that retaliation was butfor cause of adverse action 1: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action 2: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 3: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation without evidence that the decisionmaker knew about plaintiffs protected activity when he made the decision that resulted in the adverse action 4: holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "by the DOJ, the DOJ has specifically stated that a public entity \u201cis not accountable for discrimination in the employment or other practices of [a company licensed by the public entity], if those practices are not the result of requirements or policies established by the [public entity].\u201d Department of Justice, Title II Technical Assistance Manual \u00a7 II-3.7200, available at http://www.ada.gov/ taman2.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). Here, any failure of the driver education schools to comply with the ADA or Rehabilitation Act cannot be said to be \u201cthe result of. requirements or policies established by the\u201d TEA. Instead, the named plaintiffs\u2019 claim is at most that the 11, at *5-6 (E.D.La. Aug. 14, 2013) (same); Reeves v. Queen City Transp., Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1187 (D.Colo.1998) (<HOLDING>); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 849 F.Supp. 1429, Holdings: 0: holding title company liable for bad faith 1: holding that city is not liable for inaccessible restaurants and liquor stores it licenses 2: holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen 3: holding that public entity is not liable for inaccessible taxi companies it licenses and regulates 4: holding that public utility company is not liable for inaccessible bus company it licenses where there is no contract between them", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the \u201cinextricably intertwined\u201d exception, the trial court may conclude that segregation is required and that, without segregation, the court does not have sufficient information to determine the amount of reasonable and necessary fees. If the party seeking fees refuses to segregate, the trial court may be forced to deny recovery of fees, as the trial court did in this case. Based on both the judgment and the findings of fact, we conclude that the only basis for the trial c etermining segregation because it contradicts the legal standard articulated in Sterling as well as precedent from this court and the majority of cases on this issue from other courts of appeals. See Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 11-12; Goebel v. Brandley, 76 S.W.3d 652, 657-58 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>), disapproved of on other grounds by Martin v. Holdings: 0: holding that because plaintiffs claims were presented as a single claim based on the same facts and based on the same alleged damages multiple awards would be duplicative 1: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property 2: holding claimant did not have to segregate fees between fraud and contract claims because both claims were based on the same set of facts and circumstances 3: holding that claimant could recover all of his attorneys fees because declaratoryjudgment claim in boundary dispute was based on the same facts as his claims for adverse possession trespass and trespass to try title 4: holding that election of remedies did not apply because filing a trespass to try title action by the mortgageetrusteedeed grantee was not inconsistent with its successful settlement of claim against the title insurer", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in Salinas was not necessary to the resolution of that case and therefore provides no binding authority. See, e.g\u201e Baumgart v. State, 512 S.W.3d 335, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (refusing to treat statement in previous, case as binding authority because it was not necessary to the resolution of the case). We review decisions of courts of appeals on discretionary review. Tex. Const. art. V, \u00a7 5(b) (\u201c[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals may, on its own motion, review a decision of a Court of Appeals in a criminal case.\u201d); Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (\u201cIn our discretionary review capacity we review \u2018decisions\u2019 of the court of appeals.\u201d). In Salinas, the court of appeals never considered the issue of retroactivity because it declared the court costs at 2013) (<HOLDING>). That is why I would grant review in this case Holdings: 0: holding portions of the coercion of public servant or voter statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment and in violation of the separation of powers 1: holding new yorks disclosure law unconstitutionally overbroad 2: holding portions of the online solicitation of a minor statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment 3: holding the improper photography or visual recording statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment 4: holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has standing to require compliance with that provision.\u201d). Cf. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at 457-58, 98 S.Ct. 2441 (noting the reliance interests of foreign producers on both the continuity of U.S. laws, and the adherence to international legal principles); Made in the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1318. Because prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff \u201c \u2018arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question,\u2019 \u201d Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (quoting NCUA, 522 U.S. at 488, 118 S.Ct. 927), there are no prudential standing restraints to bar Plaintiffs\u2019 claims here, accord United Food & Commer. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996) (<HOLDING>). III. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE Defendant Holdings: 0: holding that article iii constitutional standing must be addressed before considering lanham act prudential standing 1: holding that congress may dispense with prudential standing requirements 2: holding that constitutional requirements under article iii and prudential requirement that plaintiffs be the proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they base their suits are distinct aspects of standing inquiry 3: recognizing prudential concerns underlying antitrust standing restrictions 4: holding that plaintiffs may not circumvent the requirements for prudential standing by relying on forms of relief that benefit the public at large", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "& Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 33.003 (West 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, if legally sufficient evidence does not exist of the negligence of a settling physician, his percentage of responsibility should not be submitted. See id. \u00a7 33.003(b) (expressly prohibiting submission to jury of any person\u2019s percentage of responsibility absent legally sufficient evidence); Rehab. Facility at Austin, Inc. v. Cooper, 962 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (interpreting predecessor statute and holding that trial court properly refused to submit settling defendant\u2019s negligence to jury); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 278 (authorizing trial court to submit to jury only questions raised by pleadings and evidence); Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). That is, section 33.003, the comparative Holdings: 0: holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff 1: holding that defendant was not harmed by submission of invalid fraud claim 2: holding submission of question on comparative responsibility of settling defendant is required only if evidence exists supporting liability on part of settling defendant 3: holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 4: recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "manufacturers.\u201d); id. (\"Permitting GM in bankruptcy, to ignore state dealer laws upsets the competitive balance among GM and every other automotive manufacturer. \u201d). 127 . It also at least seemingly would not be a person aggrieved with standing to appeal, but that is an issue for the appellate courts. 128 . See discussion at 492-93, above. 129 . Adelphia Settlement-Bankruptcy, 327 B.R. at 166. 130 .Adelphia Settlement-District, 337 B.R. at 477. 131 . See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 199-206 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009); see also id. at 205-06 (\u201cWhere a state law unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law [will] have to yield\u2019 \u201d) (quoting In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2009)). 132 . 406 B.R. at 205-06; see also Vallejo, 403 B.R. at 77 (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). 133 . 406 B.R. at Holdings: 0: recognizing that the supremacy clause does not of its own force create rights 1: holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government 2: holding that congress enacted section 365 to provide debtors the authority to reject executory contracts this authority preempts state law by virtue of the supremacy clause and the bankruptcy clause 3: recognizing that the supremacy clause is not a source of any federal rights 4: holding in a bankruptcy context that any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the supremacy clause", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201cpurge himself of the charge of contempt before this court, before further participating in this trial.\u201d On appeal, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals reasoned that \u201c[t]he proper thing to do is to excuse the jury and thereafter fine counsel.\u201d Id. at 130, 225 P.2d at 819. Noting that such a mistake was not per se reversible error, id., the Court held that, nevertheless, the defendant in that case had not received a fair trial. Id. at 132, 225 P.2d at 820. Likewise, in Meek v. State, 112 Nev. 1288, 1295-97, 930 P.2d 1104, 1109 (1996), the Supreme Court of Nevada held, inter alia, that the defendant\u2019s case had been prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s ruling the defense counsel in contempt and fining him before the jury. See also United States v. Kelley, 314 F.2d 461, 463-64 (6th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>); Neal v. State, 36 Ala.App. 156, 158, 54 So.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that providing defendant with hobsons choice between incompetent lawyer or no lawyer violates right to counsel 1: recognizing that state agencies might require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated by supplying copies of the court documents or material that led the lawyer to the fact 2: holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person 3: holding that trial judges act of threatening defense lawyer twice with contempt tended to belittle the lawyer in the eyes of the jury and operated to prevent the defendant from having a fair trial 4: holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the USAF letters did not qualify as requests FPRs under FAR 15.307(b). Id. at 263. The court finds that, like the USAF letters in Dubinsky, the July 8, 2011 letter failed sufficiently to convey that OPM \u201cintend[ed] to make award without obtaining further revisions.\u201d See FAR 15.307(b). The court does not find the request in the July 8, 2011 letter for a \u201cformal proposal revision,\u201d AR 342 (July 8, 2011 letter), to be evidence to the contrary. Nor does the court consider the request in the July 8, 2011 letter for responses to be submitted \u201cno later than 3:00 PM on July 21, 2011,\u201d id. (emphasis omitted), to be determinative of the matter. FAR 15.307(b) requires that requests for FPRs include, among other things, a \u201ccommon cut-off date.\u201d FAR 15.307(b); accord Cleveland, 43 F.3d at 658 (<HOLDING>). Given that none of the other offerors in the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates 1: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted 2: recognizing that language giving notice to all offerors of a common cutoff date for receipt of offers has the intent and effect of a request for bafos internal quotation maiks omitted 3: holding that beneficiary of general support trust has a legal right to compel distribution of funds internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has failed to assert a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: \u201cNo State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law....\u201d Thus, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the States; it does not apply to the Federal Government or the District of Columbia. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987) (\u201cThe Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed association in this case is between the [defendant] and the Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.\u201d); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff has sued only the District Holdings: 0: holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia 1: holding that the plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a district of columbia resident if a geolocation service places his her ip address within the district of columbia or within a city located within 30 miles of the district of columbia 2: holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government 3: holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim 4: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "party-opponent of his having assaulted the victim. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 2. The district court did not err when it denied Jose\u2019s motion to suppress statements made to Detective Rosales. Detective Rosales warned Jose that his statements could be used against him in court. She was not required to specifically warn Jose that his statements could be used against him in a federal prosecution. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1022-23 (9th Cir.2002). 3. The district court\u2019s imposition of fifty-one months\u2019 imprisonment was substantively reasonable. Considering the totality of circumstances, the district court imposed a sentence within the applicable sentencing range and adequately explained its reasoning. See United States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that when a court miscalculates the guideline range yet imposes a sentence that falls within a properly calculated guideline range the sentence enjoys a presumption of reasonableness 1: holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guideline range is usually reasonable 2: holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 3: holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 4: holding that imposition of a sentence within the properly calculated range is not reviewable", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Wright contends that the district court erred by sentencing him to consecutive sentences of imprisonment following the revocation of his supervised release because the original plea agreement and sentence provided that the terms of imprisonment be concurrent and co-terminous. The district court did not err because under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district court may impose consecutive sentences after the revocation of supervised release even when the original sentences were concurrent. See United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir.1999). Wright also contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release following his re-imprisonment. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694, 713, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: recognizing that probation officers are mandated to enforce a sentencing courts terms and conditions of supervised release 1: holding that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial to determine whether terms of supervised release have been violated 2: holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release 3: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release 4: holding that district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "State was of the view that a plea agreement with Langston was necessary because \u201cthe case against Langston was, at best, shaky, while the case against [Clabourne] was overwhelming, with much of the evidence coming from his own mouth.\u201d Appellee\u2019s Answering Briefi'Cross-Appellants Opening Brief at 51. c. Length of Time on Death Row \u00b6 43 Clabourne has been sentenced to death for eighteen years. He claims this is mitigating because he has a mental illness and Langston and Carrico, who do not, have not had to face the prospect of execution for the same period. We find these facts altogether unrelated to Clabourne\u2019s character or record and the circumstances of his offense and, therefore, reject this proffered mitigation. Cf. State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 259, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997) (<HOLDING>). c. Independent Reweighing \u00b644 Upon Holdings: 0: holding the death penalty disproportionately cruel and unusual when imposed for the crime of rape 1: holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment 2: holding that twentythree years served on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment 3: holding that the fact that defendant spent years on death row awaiting execution does not render the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment 4: holding that twentythree years on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1 A.3d 658, 671 (2010). In addressing this issue, the District Court looked to a 1998 district court opinion that predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not allow an affirmative cause of action for intentional spoliation, Larison v. City of Trenton, 180 F.R.D. 261, 266 (D.N.J.1998). The New Jersey Supreme Court has since authorized tort recovery for intentional spoliation. See Rosenblit, 766 A.2d at 758. Moreover, when it did so, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not adopt the strict causation and damages theories propounded by Larison. Compare Larison, 180 F.R.D. at 266 (predicting that a prima facie case could not be established unless and until the plaintiff shows that he failed to prove his original case because of the missing evidence), with Tartaglia, 961 A.2d at 1190 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, plaintiffs did not have to Holdings: 0: holding that where an express contract was in place between plaintiff and defendant that governed the compensation sought by plaintiff plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment 1: recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue 2: holding by new jersey supreme court that a plaintiff may recover from a spoliator even if the plaintiff prevails in the original suit 3: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey 4: recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "994 A.2d at 878 n. 13. In ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 192, 686 A.2d 250, 268 (1996), Judge Rodowsky, writing for the Court, refused, on a Motion for Reconsideration, testimony contained in depositions which were not contained in the five volume, 2,437 page, joint record extract, explaining The liberalizing provision ... in Rule 8-501(c) does not excuse the failure to furnish in the brief references to factual material in support of a party\u2019s argument as required by Rule 8-504(a)(4). Nor does the liberalization in Rule 8-501(c) alter the fundamental rule of appellate practice under which the appellate court has no duty independently to search through the record for error. Id. (footnote deleted); see also State Roads Comm\u2019n v. Halle, 228 Md. 24, 26-27, 178 A.2d 319, 320 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md.App. Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument 1: holding that recording is notice to one bound to search the record 2: holding that the court had no obligation to search large record extract 3: holding that the district court has no affirmative obligation to plumb the record to procure material facts 4: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "While we agree that the definition of employer requires that the entity \u201cemployf] workers under the terms of the W orkers\u2019 Compensation Act,\u201d we disagree that the language requires that all counted workers actually be eligible for workers\u2019 compensation insurance coverage. Section 52-1-15. {9} There are several instances in which a worker is counted to determine whether an employer is subject to the Act but is not ultimately covered under the Act\u2019s provisions. See, e.g., Howie v. Stevens, 102 N.M. 300, 302, 694 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that an illegally employed minor would presumably be counted to determine application of the Act to the employer but has the right to circumvent the Act\u2019s coverage and pursue remedies in tort), Garcia, 111 N.M. at 211, 803 P.2d at 1116 (<HOLDING>). But the most important example is contained Holdings: 0: recognizing retaliatory discharge claim where employer prevented employees exercise of workers compensation rights because of employees intention to file claim 1: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage 2: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding that past employees who were regularly employed are still to be counted to determine worker minimums even though those workers are now no longer employees and thus ineligible for coverage", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to hold those for either \u2014 they\u2019re on file, he can bring them, if you choose to do that.\u201d On December 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. II. ANALYSIS A. Posttrial Motions Defendant first contends that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings because the trial court failed to rule on his post-trial motion for recusal or his motion for a new trial. At the outset, we question whether defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motions were properly before the trial court. The motions were filed at a time during which he was represented by counsel. It is well established that a defendant may not simultaneously proceed pro se and by counsel. See People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836-37 (1996) (<HOLDING>); People v. Taggart, 233 Ill. App. 3d 530, 557 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 1: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial 2: holding that pro se pleadings from defendants who are represented by counsel in the pending criminal proceedings are unauthorized 3: holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel 4: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "vacating the old Brightmoor Station Post Office, the USPS intended to remain in legal possession of the premises, and therefore Settlement Agreement I did not effect a surrender of the leasehold. See Third Am. Compl. IT 32; see also Reply PI. Supp. SJ at 13-18. As a matter of law, however, when a tenant \u201cmerely retains the keys to the premises,\u201d the tenant does not become a holdover tenant. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant \u00a7 14.2, Reporter\u2019s Note to Section 14.2, Note 6 (1977). If a tenant retains the keys to the premises, the court must examine the circumstances in their totality, looking to other factors to determine if the tenant should be deemed a holdover tenant. See Hoopes v. Prudential Ins. Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 146, 6 Ill.Dec. 167, 362 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct.1977) (<HOLDING>); see also Four \u201cS\u201d Alliance, Inc. v. Am. Nat\u2019l Holdings: 0: holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction 1: holding where 1 the government provided the defendant with all the necessary drugmaking materials 2 the government provided instructions on how to make the drugs and 3 the defendant sought out the materials and help from the undercover government agents the case set the outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes but the governments conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation 2: holding that when the defendant asserted in her answer that she was not a tenant and that she had an equitable interest in the property ejectment not eviction was the proper remedy and the matter should have been transferred to the circuit court 3: holding that even though the tenant retained the keys the tenant was not a holdover tenant because the tenant provided the landlord with notice he was moving out and the tenant had actually moved out 4: holding that the court retained cafa jurisdiction even though class certification was denied", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "her testimony). 6 See Cromer v. Mulkey Enterprises, 254 Ga. App. 388, 392 (2) (562 SE2d 783) (2002); Hyde v. State, 189 Ga. App. 727, 728 (1) (377 SE2d 187) (1988). 7 See Richey v. State, 261 Ga. App. 720, 724-725 (3) (583 SE2d 539) (2003). 8 See Cannon v. Jeffries, 250 Ga. App. 371, 376 (2) (551 SE2d 777) (2001). 9 See Joiner v. Lane, 235 Ga. App. 121, 126 (4) (508 SE2d 203) (1998). 10 See id. at 125-126. 11 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 126. See also Doctors Hosp. of Augusta v. Bonner, 195 Ga. App. 152, 160 (3) (392 SE2d 897) (1990). 12 Doctors Hosp., supra at 159. 13 See Joiner, supra; Randall Mem. Mortuary v. O\u2019Quinn, 202 Ga. App. 541, 543 (1) (414 SE2d 744) (1992) (physical precedent only). 14 OCGA \u00a7 16-5-24 (a). See also Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 730, 732 (1) (571 SE2d 788) (2002) (<HOLDING>). 15 It was unclear from the testimony at trial Holdings: 0: holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter 1: holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth 2: holding that aggravated battery of peace officer encompasses both insulting or provoking contact and battery resulting in bodily harm 3: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery 4: holding that when a battered victim has suffered a severe injury to his brain resulting in the loss of normal brain functioning he is said to have been deprived of his brain thus suffering an aggravated battery", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 961, the predecessor statute to TexLoc.Gov\u2019t Code Ann. \u00a7 6.012, and holding that \u201ctwo-thirds of the council\u201d means two-thirds of the entire five member council); City of Alamo Heights v. Gerety, 264 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014San Antonio 1954, -writ refd n.r.e.). The statutory requirements for obtaining type A status are to be strictly construed. Etheridge, 32 S.W.2d at 831; City of Centerville v. Adkisson, 291 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Waco 1956, no writ). However, where there has been colorable compliance with the statute, and the ordinance has been in place for a sufficient period of time, the municipality may become a de facto type A municipality. See Cook v. Town of Putnam, 283 S.W. 649, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1926, writ dism\u2019d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); Couch v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d 255, Holdings: 0: holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest 1: holding that de facto type a status was achieved where the only violation of the statute was the failure to file the ordinance with the county clerk 2: holding that the county attorney had de facto authority and noting that the objection to the county attorneys authority was first made on appeal 3: holding that a de facto parents rights do not infringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other legal parent in a family unit because de facto status can be achieved only through the active encouragement of the biological or adoptive parent by affirmatively establishing a family unit with the de facto parent and child or children that accompany the family 4: holding county clerk sued in official capacity was entitled to the immunity the county enjoyed", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Likewise, whereas the qualifications to serve as a probate or juvenile judge of the city and county of Denver are set forth in Colorado Constitution article VI, sections 14 and 15, respectively, the term of office is set forth for both judges by reference to Colorado Constitution article VI, section 10(2). I agree that our decision in In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1197 n. 11 (Colo.1998), includes a footnote that suggests that a single initiative which sought to alter the manner in which judges are nominated, appointed and retained, judicial terms of office, and term limits would not violate the single-subject mandate of section 1(5.5), so long as the subject of the initiative was qualific .2d 1205, 1211 (Colo. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Because I do not read the term Holdings: 0: holding that the colorado constitution reserves no authority in the state legislature to change add to or diminish the qualifications for constitutionally created offices 1: holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature 2: holding that the requirement that the county seek recommendations for appointments to a civil office from a private corporation was not constitutionally repugnant because where the office was created by the legislature the legislature retains the control over that offices method of appointment 3: holding that state legislature may at pleasure create or abolish public offices 4: recognizing that provisions of the colorado constitution should be construed in the context of the constitution as a whole", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (noting that \u201cagreement to agree\u201d is unenforceable). Nor does the complaint allege facts indicating that Shaw relied on Boccardi\u2019s confidential information in making its subsequent public bid for Riviera. Boccardi claims to have advised Shaw that such a bid would cause the share price to increase, but even if Shaw relied upon this unextraordinary prediction, no factfinder could conclude that it constituted confidential information within the meaning of the Agreement, which expressly excluded from that definition \u201cinformation ... generally available to the public.\u201d Cf. Buhler v. Michael P. Maloney Consulting, Inc., 299 A.D.2d 190, 191, 749 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (1st Dep\u2019t 2002) (<HOLDING>). Because we conclude that Boccardi fails to Holdings: 0: holding that a customer list may be protectable as a trade secret if it is secret and the court examines and determines if it is protectable based on three factors 1 what steps if any an employer has taken to maintain the confidentiality of a customer list 2 whether a departing employee acknowledges that the customer list is confidential and 3 whether the content of the list is readily ascertainable 1: holding that the plaintiffs customer list was not a trade secret in part because there was no evidence that by the nature of the plaintiffs business extraordinary effort was involved in compiling the customer list 2: holding that contact list based on inter alia information that was publicly available did not qualify as trade secret 3: holding contact information of potential computer network services clients was not a trade secret because all businesses are now potential customers of computer network services and their contact information is publicly available 4: recognizing that nondisclosure agreements did not have to list the secret information in order to put employees on notice", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "499 F.Supp.2d 501, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2007) for the proposition that the privilege does not reach \"routine operating decisions.\u201d PL\u2019s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26, but it is the Mead Data opinion that has precedential value here. 7 . Even the cases the Committee cites indicate that the privilege covers agency deliberations about decisions, as well as the formulation of policy positions. In Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C.Cir.1981), the Court stated, \"the privilege protects documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated ....\u201d See also Paisley v. C.I.A., 712 F.2d 686, 698-99 (D.C.Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In Waters v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 218 Holdings: 0: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 1: holding that in analyzing whether materials are protected from disclosure under exemption 5 of foia which protects materials covered by the deliberative process privilege  a court must first be able to pinpoint an agency decision or policy to which these documents contributed and stating that the decision whether to prosecute an individual is the type of decision protected by the privilege 2: holding that emails among prosecutors relating to decision not to prosecute were covered by the deliberative process privilege 3: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 4: holding that internal emails about how to present an agency decision to the public were covered by the deliberative process privilege", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Given her admissions, which are described above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs interests \u201c \u2018are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the [TCPA] that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. 750). Indeed, it is unfathomable that Congress considered a consumer who files TCPA actions as a business when it enacted the TCPA as a result of its \u201coutrage over the proliferation of prerecorded telemarketing calls to private residences, which consumers 'regarded as an intrusive invasion of privacy and a nuisance.\u201d Leyse, 804 F.3d at 325 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Because Plaintiff does not have \u201cthe sort of interest in privacy, 17, 2011 WL 1812496, at *6-7 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests protected by the tcpa because they attempted to use the statute in a way not intended or contemplated by congress and because their damages are not of the vexatious and intrusive nuisance nature sought to be redressed by congress in enacting the tcpa 1: holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa 2: holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment 3: holding that the plaintiff had prudential standing because her interests in avoiding harassment via the telephone line installed in her home are not so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that they fail to fall within the tcpas zone of interests 4: holding the defendant does not possess statutory standing to attack the subpoena  because he has not demonstrated that he was within the zone of interests intended to be protected by  876a", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not \u201cserious\u201d enough to require the protection of that a constitutional guaranty of jury trial does not apply to proceedings to punish for contempt of court whether in a court of law, a court of equity, a court having criminal jurisdiction, or other court.\u201d Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 184 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1944) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ahern v. Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73, 82 (Tenn.2000). Additionally, unlike criminal prosecutions, general contempt proceedings do not require an indictment and subsequent' prosecution by the State. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 42(b)(2); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185-86, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958), overruled in part on other grounds by Bloom, 391 U.S. at 196 n. 1, 198, 88 S.Ct. 1477; State v. Wood, 91 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). Contempt proceedings are often initiated upon Holdings: 0: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at the time of a  formal charge which we construe to be an arrest warrant or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant or by indictment or presentment when the charge is initiated by the grand jury quoting state v mitchell 593 sw2d 280 286 tenn 1980 1: recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part 2: holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment 3: recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment 4: holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for a sentence of fifteen years in prison with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. After Marckman entered his plea, the court granted him a one-week furlough. The court informed Marckman that it would sentence him to thirty years as an HFO if he got arrested on a new charge while out on the furlough or failed to appear for sentencing. Marckman agreed to this additional term, and trial counsel amended his change of plea form accordingly. Marckman failed to appear for sentencing and was subsequently arrested for failure to appear and for a new charge. The trial court sentenced Marckman to thirty years in prison as an HFO with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. In ground four of his postconviction motion, Marckman argued that the trial cour d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); Butler v. State, 764 So.2d 794, 795 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion 1: holding that claim that plea was involuntary because the court failed to comply with rule 3172c was cognizable in a rule 3850 motion 2: holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion 3: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 4: holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "his position as an \u201cex-post facto attempt to add additional terms to the Forbearance Agreement.\u201d Instead, Saverin asserts, he is alleging that Wendy\u2019s bad-faith actions breached the existing terms of the Forbearance Agreement. Specifically, he posits that the very purpose of the Forbearance Agreement was frustrated when Wendy\u2019s failed to prevent the occurrence of a condition \u2014 the appointment of a receiver \u2014 that permitted Wendy\u2019s to prematurely terminate the Forbearance and Franchise Agreements. But this reasoning ignores the principle that the implied duty of good faith cannot be breached by acting as allowed by the specific terms of the contract. Ed Schory & Sons, 662 N.E.2d at 1083; see also Jim White Agency Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 F.3d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Simply put, Saverin admits that Wendy\u2019s did Holdings: 0: holding that franchisor not only has valid interest in protecting good will it has developed but it also has an interest in being able to place a new franchisee at or near the same location where its goodwill has been created 1: holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurers failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party 2: holding that a lending institution does not violate a separate duty of good faith by adhering to its agreements with a borrower or enforcing its contractual rights as a creditor 3: holding that franchisor has an interest in the goodwill its franchise has created 4: holding in a case decided under ohio law that a franchisor cannot be found liable for failure to act in good faith where it has done no more than to insist on enforcing its contract rights to the detriment of its franchisee", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 446 (4th ed.1994). 6 Malingering is the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external incentives, such as obtaining compensation or drugs, avoiding work or military duty, or evading criminal prosecution. American Psychiatric Association, supra, at 683. 7 The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 195, 570 A.2d 960 Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion 1: holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against experts wishes 2: holding that an insurer had conclusively established a reasonable basis for denying a claim when it relied on an experts opinion even though another expert had expressed a conflicting opinion 3: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion 4: holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Rico that portion of his motion which sou der is appropriate. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand in part so that, consistent with the District Court\u2019s order of December 13, 2010, that portion of Rodriguez\u2019s motion which seeks return of property seized in Puerto Rico may be transferred to the District of Puerto Rico. As explained below, however, we will affirm the District Court\u2019s denial of Rodriguez\u2019s Rule 41(g) motion in all other respects. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291, and we review the District Court\u2019s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir.1999). Rodriguez argued that he did not receive sufficient notice of the forfeiture of items 3, 4, and 5. United States v. McGlo-ry, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). In these circumstances, due process requires Holdings: 0: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review a legal claim not presented in administrative proceedings below 1: holding that district courts have jurisdiction to review a claim that a person received inadequate notice of completed administrative forfeiture proceedings 2: holding that inadequate notice did not trigger plans time bar for administrative review 3: holding that where notice was deficient in administrative forfeiture proceedings proper remedy was to grant claimant right to a hearing 4: holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "memorandum asserting that Chase\u2019s motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff attaches four exhibits to her supplemental memorandum: (1) excerpts of the mortgage agreement; (2) a Standard Flood Hazard Determination; (3) a flood policy declaration from Prudential Financial; and (4) a flood insurance renewal invoice from Liberty Mutual. The Court finds that these documents are referred to in the complaint and are central to plaintiffs claims against Chase. The Court, therefore, grants plaintiffs motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum and will consider the attached documents without converting Chase\u2019s motion into one for summary judgment. See Gen. Retail Servs. Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, LLC, 255 Fed.Appx. 775, 786 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Shamrock Associated Indus., L.L.C. v. Fid. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss 1: holding plaintiffs reference to and attachment of franchise agreement excerpts in opposition to defendants motion did not convert motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment because plaintiff did not introduce support for arguments beyond the allegations in the complaint 2: holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment 3: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 4: holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to the carrier or fund. Here, Libner does not allege that he directly notified the Association of the existence of the lien. He asserts that the Association should have been on notice as a result of his relationship with his client, his communications with the Association on behalf of that client, and the Association\u2019s receipt of a copy of a letter Libner sent to his client indicating that he had a right to recover his fees. [\u00b6 11] Without deciding whether, and in what circumstance, an attorney may impose a lien against the fund of the opposing party or its carriers, we conclude that no lien may be imposed without direct and specific notice to the carrier or fund that a lien is asserted before the proceeds are disbursed. See Sowder v. Sowder, 127 N.M. 114, 977 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1999) (<HOLDING>). [\u00b6 12] Because Libner failed to provide any Holdings: 0: holding that no lien may be imposed without direct and specific notice to the fund of an opposing party or its carriers that a lien is asserted before the proceeds are disbursed 1: holding that the constitutional right to be present is satisfied so long as the defendant is given an opportunity to register his opinions with counsel after juror questioning and is present when the exercise of strikes is given formal effect even if the defendant is not present when his lawyer actually exercises the peremptory challenges 2: holding that if an attorney seeks to assert a lien but does so only after distribution of the proceeds of the judgment his notice even if given to all appropriate parties is too late and the hen is lost 3: holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy 4: holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "emotional distress to Plaintiff. Notably, the object of Defendant Manley\u2019s engagement in investigating and arresting Plaintiff was clearly not for the benefit of Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant Manley undertook this' obligation for a law enforcement purpose, to investigate the illegal sale of PCP and apprehend those involved, for the benefit of the community. While the investigation of Plaintiff as a suspect in criminal activity and his related arrest may be emotionally distressing to Plaintiff if conducted negligently, it does not form the type of relationship or undertaking between Defendant Manley and Plaintiff that would give rise to a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. See Aubin v. District of Columbia, No. 14-02133 (RJL), 2016 WL 509283, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has not pled any additional facts Holdings: 0: holding neither a phone call by the police requesting an arrestee to come to the station for questioning nor the questioning of an arrestee at the station was a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 1: holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada 2: holding that police officer did not subject arrestee to excessive force by requiring him to stay outside in cold temperatures during an investigation that lasted more than an hour 3: holding a police officer did not have the requisite relationship with or undertook an obligation to an arrestee that implicated the arrestees emotional wellbeing 4: holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Abrams v. Dep\u2019t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir.2014) (same). Notwithstanding Dooley\u2019s argument to the contrary, the temporal relationship between her sex-discrimination complaint and the denial of her internal appeal is not \u201cevident,\u201d as her amended complaint provides no date for either event. In fact, Dooley does not even allege that there was close temporal proximity between them. All we know is that both occurred after she was fired. Dooley\u2019s claim therefore fails to satisfy the fourth prong, as it is impossible to determine whether \u201cthe temporal proximity [between the two events is] very close.\u201d Clark, 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Holdings: 0: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action 1: holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity 2: holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action 3: holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation 4: holding that the plaintiffs failure to set forth a time frame in which his protected activity and the adverse action took place precluded an inference of a causal relationship between them and warranted dismissal of his first amendment retaliation claim", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of a contractual obligation to share in operating costs.\u201d); see also Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 52 Fed.Cl. 730, 733 (2002) (dismissing indemnity claim, but permitting plaintiff to show damages for breach of contract if it could prove its loss was a \u201cdirect and foreseeable consequence of [the government\u2019s] breach of some other contractual duty\u201d); Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 1, 19 (1987) (explaining that indemnity claims seek all losses within the scope of an indemnity clause, while breach claims generally seek expectation damages), subsequent ruling, 13 Cl.Ct. 72 (1987), vacated for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1500, 855 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Compare Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 129 F.3d 1226, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>), with Rick\u2019s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United Holdings: 0: holding that the government was liable for partial breach of contract 1: holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract 2: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract 3: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation 4: holding government could be liable for breach of a contractual obligation to purchase insurance for plaintiff", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "military, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts secret.\u201d). In AHIF-Oregon\u2019s view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly,, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O\u2019Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F.Supp.2d 637, 660 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F.Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.D.C.2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (<HOLDING>); People\u2019s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of Holdings: 0: holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions 1: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final 2: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional 3: holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights 4: holding that in a military criminal trial the governments use of classified information without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information did not violate the defendants due process rights", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the LPT Schroeder was a managing director at Morgan Stanley and was among the top ranked property and casualty insurance industry analysts. Tr. 382-83. The team she led regularly advised institutional investors about AIG. Tr. 377, 409. 12 . At the time of the LPT Cohen was a senior equity analyst at Merrill Lynch focusing on property and casualty insurance companies, including AIG. Tr. 3544-45. His clients included institutional investors such as hedge funds, pension funds, and mutual funds. Tr. 3546. 13 . In reaching this conclusion, the Court also notes that a misstatement is material so long as investors would consider the misstated facts significant in making investment decisions, even if investors would consider other information to be more important. See Gemi-no, 228 F.3d at 162 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Reyes, No. 06-00556-1, 2007 Holdings: 0: holding that no remand is necessary  where no additional facts need be developed and any district court decision of the issue would be reviewed de novo 1: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 2: holding that nature and occasion of offenses are facts inherent in convictions and those facts need not be alleged in indictment or submitted to jury 3: holding appellate court need not address issues unnecessary to its decision 4: holding an investment decision need not hinge on misstated facts", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "competing motion for summary judgment. We overrule Faucette and Schadler\u2019s first issue. Damages for Breach of Option Contract In their second issue, Faucette and Schadler contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove damages for breach of contract. They argue that Grace was awarded what she would have received from the sale of the remaining shares of Sarco without any evidence of the value of the shares she should have surrendered in the transaction. According to Faucette and Schadler, proper proof of damages required not only evidence of the amount Grace would have received had the sale of the shares been performed, but also evidence of the value of the shares she would have surrendered in the transaction. See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 215 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>); Holt Atherton Indus. Inc. v. Heine, 835 Holdings: 0: holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue 1: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 2: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 3: holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach 4: holding damage award resulting from a breach of an agreement to purchase securities is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the asset at the time of the breach", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "223, 230 (Mo.1982)(en banc) (\u201cNotice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided by the state in a meaningful manner prior to deprivation of a protected interest. This rule is not necessarily applied when there is a temporary taking, as is the case here. Due process is a flexible concept.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also State v. Doe, 46 Conn.Supp. 598, 765 A.2d 518, 523-29 (2000) (concluding defendant had not been prejudiced by issuance of initial protective order without an attorney where he had the order modified with the aid of counsel). Notably, appellate courts from other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to this state\u2019s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are not violative of due process. See, e.g., Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417-19 (La.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Kampf v. Kampf, 237 Mich.App. 377, 603 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief 1: holding that protective orders in the landlord and tenant branch are distinguishable from ordinary prejudgment security devices because protective orders are not statutory creations and because a tenant who fails to pay a protective order may suffer the irreparable consequence of losing possession of the property 2: holding that mere neglect for prisoners safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation 3: holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred 4: holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "requires tha ion the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.\u201d). The same is true under federal law. See United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir.2002) (compiling cases); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir.1992) (\"For parole and probation revocations, the Guidelines specify that the original sentence and the sentence imposed after probation is revoked are added and counted as if they were one sentence.\u201d). 4 . In subsequent cases, we noted that this exception to mootness only applies where a \u201cpersonal liberty interest is at stake.\u201d Matter of Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). There can be no question, however, that a Holdings: 0: recognizing that under puerto rico law res judicata may not apply if  public policy demands an exception but noting that this exception was successfully argued in only two cases and concluding that public policy does not demand an exception in this case 1: holding that the exception does not apply to osha inspection cases 2: holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review 3: recognizing exception 4: holding report to authorities for violating osha does not qualify as protected activity under title vii", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Serrano, To what extent the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination bars the nonevi-dentiary use of immunized testimony is a difficult question. Neither Murphy [v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)] nor Kastigar addressed this question, and lower courts have disagreed on the issue. The commentators are also divided over this issue. 870 F.2d at 16-17 (rejecting notion \u201cthat all nonevidentiary use necessarily violates the Fifth Amendment\u201d and citing federal court decisions as split on the issue of non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony); see Ely, 708 A.2d at 1339-40 (discussing split of authorities regarding nonevidentiary use); State v. Gault, 551 N.W.2d 719, 724-25 (Minn.Cl.App.1996) Holdings: 0: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 1: recognizing divergence of opinion on nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony 2: recognizing that an owners opinion testimony on the value of his property cannot be based on naked conjecture or solely speculative factors 3: holding opinion testimony of sales should have been excluded because opinion not based on comparable sales 4: recognizing a divergence of opinion regarding the retroactive application of mennonite", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "examined Rebolla-Sanchez\u2019s statute of conviction, it would have been bound by this precedent to come to the same conclusion it already reached. Because remand to the district court to examine the statute underlying Rebolla-Sanchez\u2019s felony conviction would only \u201cbe delaying] the inevitable,\u201d we grant the government\u2019s motion for judicial notice and affirm Rebolla-Sanchez\u2019s sentence. See United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.2007). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 . Plain error review, rather than harmless error review applies to this claim because Rebolla-Sanchez did not raise the issue before the district court. See United States v. Charles, 581 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir.2009) Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court 1: holding that plain error review applies to objections that were not raised when the district court asked the appropriate question at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing 2: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 3: holding that where a defendant fails to challenge his plea in district court he must establish plain error 4: holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "show that: 1) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; 2) the harassment was based on her sex; 3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the condition of her employment and create a hostile or abusive atmosphere; and, 4) there is a basis for employer liability. Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir.2007). To satisfy the third prong, Wheeler must demonstrate that Antonacci\u2019s behavior was both objectively and subjectively offensive. Rhodes v. Ill. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir.2004). Wheel er\u2019s August 2007 complaint to Stobba provides sufficient evidence that she was subjectively offended by Antonacci\u2019s comments, and Brady does not claim otherwise. See Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 807 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Courts look to several factors to determine Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs allegations of loosely related actions that she perceived to be hostile to her based on her race are insufficient to meet the heavy burden required to prove hostile environment 1: recognizing that a jury reasonably could find based on an employees complaints to a superior that the employee perceived her environment as hostile 2: holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments 3: holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive 4: holding that the fact that the offensive material was not directed specifically at the plaintiff does not as a matter of law preclude a jury from finding that the conduct subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her sex", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See McCall v. State, 862 So.2d 807, 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (under the habitual felony offender statute, \u201ca sentence includes the sanction of probation\u201d) (appeal docketed for review in Florida Supreme Court, SC04-136); Render v. State, 742 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (probation is a \u201csentence\u201d for habitualization purposes). We also certify conflict with Richardson v. State, 884 So.2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>) (appeal docketed for review in Florida Supreme Holdings: 0: holding that probation is not a sentence 1: holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation 2: holding that it is sufficient grounds to revoke a probation if only one condition of the probation is broken 3: holding that probation is a sentence for habitualization purposes 4: holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to rule on a motion and therefore forgot to rule on a motion to strike. Reply at 2. The court finds this argument speculative at best. In light of the \u201crelative unseemliness of a court\u2019s altering a legal ruling as to the same litigants,\u201d Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 953, the court needs greater justification to re visit Judge Johnson\u2019s ruling than conjecture about whether she forgot something or felt rushed. Because the defendant fails to offer such justification, its motion for reconsiderat 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.1981) (finding that the grant of summary judgment for the defendant \"was so inconsistent with the plaintiff's request for leave to amend to state a new claim for relief as implicitly to deny the motion to amend\u201d); Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). The de fendant attempts to distinguish cases Holdings: 0: holding that wjhile it is certainly the better practice to specifically rule on all pending motions the determination of a motion need not always be expressed but may be implied by an entiy of an order inconsistent with granting the relief sought 1: holding death sentence need not be pending in order for this court to engage in review of issues on appeal 2: holding order granting motion to withdraw plea to be the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial because like a postverdict mistrial it returns case to posture it had been before trial 3: holding that the scheduling order merely prescribes the date by which all motions to amend shall be filed the date on the scheduling order does not confine the district courts consideration of the merits of such motions and does not preclude it from finding that an amendment would result in prejudice 4: holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 54 . Under section 38.02 of the Penal Code, \"[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has ... lawfully detained the person.\u201d Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 38.02(b)(2). The offense is elevated from a class B to a class A misdemeanor if the person was a fugitive at the time of the offense. Id. \u00a7 38.02(d). 55 .See Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 809-10 (when deputy initiated investigative detention, he did not know appellant had given him incorrect spelling of his name; thus, officer's further detention could not be based on reasonable suspicion of violation of failure-to-identify statute); cf. Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187, 190-91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref\u2019d) (<HOLDING>). 56 . See People v. Miles, 343 Ill.App.3d Holdings: 0: holding that appellant was not lawfully detained for investigation of public intoxication when he gave false identification therefore trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his false identification statements 1: holding whether passenger was lawfully detained as witness to traffic violation when officer asked his name so that his false identification violated failuretoidentify statute not necessary to decide since other articulable facts justified continued detention 2: holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety 3: holding that officer may order driver out of vehicle once lawfully detained for traffic violation 4: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "has not made any provision for deferring or staying adjudication as part of that disposition. See Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.135, subd. 1(a) (1998); cf. Minn. Stat. \u00a7 609.095(b) (1998) (providing that except in drug cases or by agreement of the parties, court may not refuse to adjudicate guilt). The supreme court has noted a trial court order providing for vacation and dismissal as part of a stay of imposition. City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 269, 246 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1976). But there is no precedential authority approving such a disposition. See Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1998) (providing that if felony defendant given stay of imposition successfully serves probation the conviction is deemed to be a misdemeanor); United States v. Johnson, 43 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Clipper, 429 N.W.2d 698, 701 Holdings: 0: holding that probation is not a sentence 1: holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation 2: recognizing of course the suspension of the imposition of sentence and the grant of probation 3: holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal 4: holding that minnesota stay of imposition is sentence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines even if no term of probation was imposed", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "on April 11, 2001, in the District of Maryland. In the context of the foregoing, we must assess whether any of the Convicted Offenses are barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, we assess whether the Defendants\u2019 \u00a7 846 conspiracy convictions are barred under the applicable double jeopardy principles. We readily conclude they are not barred, because, put most simply, the conspiracy offenses previously charged and mistried in the District of Columbia and Maryland do not implicate a double jeopardy analysis. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (\u201c[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a \u2018hung jury\u2019 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.\u201d); United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Thus, even if the \u00a7 846 conspiracy offense Holdings: 0: recognizing this rule 1: recognizing rule 2: recognizing this as the general rule 3: recognizing foregoing rule as wellsettled 4: recognizing general rule", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the scope of DuPont Dow\u2019s waiver is the validity of the 107 patent, when the opinion of counsel relied on was related to the invalidity of the 107 patent and was provided in response to a request for an assessment of the validity of the patent. Moreover, in support of its position on the subject matter scope of the waiver in this case, DuPont Dow has failed to cite any patent infringement case where a party asserted reliance upon the opinion of counsel as a defense and the court limited the waiver to a subject matter more narrow than whether a patent was valid, not infringed, or unenforceable. See Def.\u2019s Mem. at 5-8; see also Applied Telematics, 1995 WL 567436, at *3 (limiting the scope of the waiver to the issue of infringement); Mushroom Assoc., 1992 WL 442892, at *3 (<HOLDING>); Saint-Gobain, 884 F.Supp. at 34 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement 1: holding in a patent case that when the plaintiff brought the suit in federal district court it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit including those pertaining to the counterclaim of the defendants 2: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent 3: holding that alleged infringer waived privilege with respect to all documents pertaining to the infringement of the patent 4: holding that the objective prong for willful infringement is generally not met where an accused infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of infringement", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "State made no effort to distinguish Cox; in fact, the State\u2019s brief does not even cite Cox. As previously discussed, the State was required to prove that when Phares induced Daniel Walker to pay him money, Phares intended to unlawfully deprive Walker of the money, ie., to take the money without performing the agreed-upon work. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. \u00a7 31.01(3)(A), \u00a7 31.03(a); see also Wilson v. State, 663 S.W.2d 834, 836-37 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (To prove theft, the State must show intent to deprive the complainant of property at the time the appellant accepted remuneration pursuant to the contract.). On this record, there is no evidence from which such a deceptive intent can be inferred. See Cox, 658 S.W.2d at 669-71; see also Phillips v. State, 640 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (<HOLDING>). As in Cox and Phillips, in the case sub Holdings: 0: holding that a paywhenpaid clause does not preclude a subcontractors recovery under the miller act payment bond because the federal legislation conditions payment of the subcontractor not on payment by the government to the contractor but rather on the passage of time from completion of the work or provision of materials 1: holding that an assignment was recognized by the government because the government issued a check made payable to the assignee as payment under the contract 2: holding that payment made in reasonable belief that it was required by an insurance contract was involuntary 3: holding that when the appellant and the complainants entered into a residential construction contract the complainants made a down payment and the defendant took measurements drew up plans but ultimately failed to perform under the contract the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant obtained the down payment by deception 4: holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "] the primary object of the patent laws\u201d to promote future innovation. Id. Preemption is therefore part and parcel with the \u00a7 101 inquiry. For example, we have often cited the lack of preemption concerns to support a determination that a claim is patent-eligible under \u00a7 101. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2016); BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1352 (\u201c[T]he claims of the ... patent do not preempt the use of the abstract idea of filtering content on the Internet or on generic computer components performing conventional activities.\u201d). But we have consistently held that claims that are otherwise directed to patent-ineligible subject matter cannot be saved by arguing the absence of complete preemption. See, e.g., Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1150 (<HOLDING>); FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1098 (\u201cBut even Holdings: 0: holding that there was no federal question removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule 1: holding that removal is proper based on complete preemption only when congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive 2: holding that an argument about the absence of complete preemption misses the mark 3: holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption 4: holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "even appeared at a review hearing smelling of the impurities of alcohol. The court found the only obstacle to Atwell achieving the goals in the performance agreement was her lack of cooperation, and that HRS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Atwell failed to substantially comply with s for termination because the evidence showed that the risk of future abuse was likely, considering Atwell\u2019s past conduct, and that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that her behavior will improve. Hroncich v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So.2d 804, 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court appropriately determined that returning M.A. to Atwell would place M.A. at a significant risk of neglect and abuse. See In Interest of C.W., 616 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). Atwell argues that termination of parental Holdings: 0: holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim 1: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights 2: holding that noncompliance with terms of agreement did not terminate agreement failure to comply with date requirement in termination procedure rendered termination ineffective and letter between nonparty and party could not terminate agreement 3: holding that termination of parental rights may be supported by past neglect in addition to failure to sub stantially comply with performance agreement 4: holding that generally parents have a due process right to participate in a permanency hearing because the opportunity to defend against charges of abuse and neglect may prevent a termination of parental rights", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a petition for review which challenges a removal order to limit its review to the facts in the administrative record, the court of appeals will not be in a proper position to rule on a \u201cconstitutionally based injunction on the execution of a removal order.\u201d Id. In the absence of habeas jurisdiction in the district courts, Petitioner fears that she will be deprived of an adequate and effective forum for judicial review. In such a situation, Petitioner argues, \u00a7 106 of the REAL ID Act constitutes an unlawful suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. In order to avoid a Suspension Clause violation, Petitioner argues that this court should interpret \u00a7 106 so that her case is not transferred to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 299-300, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Holdings: 0: holding that the rule of strict construction does not require the court to assign the narrowest possible interpretation to the statute 1: holding that if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems 2: holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable 3: holding that we are to apply the legislative intent underlying a statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity 4: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "under the old Maryland default judgment rule. See Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 620, 541 A.2d 969 (1988) (concluding that trial judge would have been justified in refusing to strike a default judgment, even if it was timely filed, because the defendant f this case, it is nonetheless instructive. Based on the facts of this case and the clear policy regarding the treatment of default judgments under Maryland law, this Court concludes as a matter of law that a Maryland appellate court would have reversed Judge Angeletti\u2019s decision to enter a default judgment. It is undisputed that Salomon had several meritorious defenses in the Jerome litigation, including res judicata, statute of limitations, and a general release. See Burris v. Richards, 79 Md.App. 554, 565, 558 A.2d 750 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the only real issue is whether it would Holdings: 0: holding that the three month limitation of faa  12 on a motion to vacate an award did not apply to a state court motion to vacate because the procedural aspects of the faa are confined to federal cases 1: holding that limitations is a meritorious defense for the purposes of a motion to vacate under rule 2613 2: holding that a defendant who fails to raise statute of limitations defense in a pretrial motion to dismiss or by requesting a jury instruction on limitations if there is some evidence that the prosecution is limitationsbarred waives that defense 3: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 4: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by September 30, 1994, the loss would be $55,768, and if she returned by March 31, 1995, the economic loss would be $132,752. 11 . A somewhat analogous issue has arisen under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 621-634. The ADEA allows for liquidated damages which are compensatory and punitive in nature. Because of this, a district court in Rhode Island declined to allow punitive damages under state law, as well as liquidated damages, reasoning that this would allow a double recovery for a single wrong. As it was not challenged on appeal, the First Circuit mentioned this outcome without comment. Keisling v. Ser-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 757, n. 1 (1st Cir.1994). See also Bailey v. Container Corp. of America, 660 F.Supp. 1048 (S.D.Ohio 1986) (<HOLDING>); but see Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 Holdings: 0: holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages 1: holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter 2: holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award 3: holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla 4: holding that liquidated damages under userra are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of Jotun\u2019s defense costs have not been recovered, Jotun may be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of defense paid by Jotun and not paid by Zurich. See Coleman, 418 F.3d at 525; Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 807 So.2d 1010, 1022 (La.Ct.App.2002) (\u201c[The insurer] must underwrite reasonable costs incurred by the insured.\u201d). G. Jotun\u2019s Ability To Recover Attorney\u2019s Fees Incurred in the Instant Lawsuit With respect to Jotun\u2019s claims that it be reimbursed for attorney\u2019s fees and costs in this action, Liberty argues that Jotun cannot recover these fees pursuant to Louisiana law. Jotun claims that Louisiana Revised Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 22:658 and 22:1220 provide an award of attorney\u2019s fees as a result of its having to enforce Liberty\u2019s duty to defend. \u201c g, PA., 691 So.2d 715, 727 (La.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). Jotun has failed to allege in its Holdings: 0: holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed 1: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith 2: holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage 3: holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer 4: holding that an insured could not recover attorneys fees pursuant to  22658 for litigating the coverage issue because the insurer did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and the insurers coverage defense was not frivolous", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to discern whether the amendment to the VWPA was intended to overrule Hughey \u201cin the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.\u201d The Second Circuit has found that it was not: Although Hughey involved the preamendment version of the VWPA, courts have extended its analysis to the amended version of that statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.1998) (\u201cThat part of Hughey which restricted the award of restitution to the limits of the offense, however, still stands.\u201d). We have approved of this analysis and, because the amended version of the VWPA contains identical language to the MVRA, we have further extended Hughey to the MVRA. United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction 1: holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction 2: holding that the victim and witness protection act limits the amount of restitution to the loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis of the offense of conviction 3: holding that the conduct underlying the offense of conviction thus stakes out the boundaries of the restitutionary authority under the mvra 4: holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "which would undoubtedly violate due process if true. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); United States v. Watts, 29 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1994). To establish such, a violation, the defendants must show that (1) the government acted in bad faith by not preserving evidence, (2) the exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent before its destruction and (3) the defendant cannot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528; Watts, 29 F.3d at 290. The defendants produced no credible evidence that any evidence was actually destroyed. Whitacre never claimed he destroyed tapes; rather, he offered but then recanted an allegation that a friend to whom he sent some tapes destroyed the Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Andreas and Wilson counter that the FBI\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that informant acted under color of law when fbi supervised recording 1: holding that private doctor under contract with a state prison to provide medical care to prisoners acted under color of state law when he treated inmate 2: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action 3: holding that a federal drug informant acting under the partial direction of the fbi and for pay was not a federal employee under the ftca 4: holding that cooperating witness under direction of fbi was acting under color of law", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "are in violation of Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521, 525 (Fla.1993). In support, Dunn claimed that the information, police reports, and testimony from trial transcripts would establish that all of his charges occurred during a single criminal episode. He pointed out that he previously raised this claim, only to have it denied by the post-conviction court based on the erroneous finding that such a claim must be raised pursuant to rule 3.850, and that consideration under rule 3.850 would be impossible due to the two-year time bar. See Hubbard v. State, 773 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). See also Speas v. State, 887 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that a Hale claim may be raised in a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a)); but see Calla-way v. State, 642 So.2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). Pointing to its previous denial of this Holdings: 0: holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion 1: holding that a sworn motion pursuant to rule 3850 is the appropriate method for resolution of hale issue 2: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 3: holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues 4: holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "payment of any kind. Arredondo testified he did not know that the great-grandmother was losing her mental abilities. Arredondo was arrested on the charge of injury to a child in June 2000. He stayed in jail for two or three months and was released on probation. On December 8, 2000, he was arrested for violating his probation and was in jail until March 20, 2001, when he transfe could form a firm belief that reasonable efforts had been made to return the children to Arredondo but he did not regularly visit them or maintain contact with them. Evidence of similar force also exists illustrating that he made only minimal efforts to meet the requirements of his service plan after he had been re-incarcerated. See In re P. R., 994 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. dism\u2019d w.o.j.) (<HOLDING>); In Interest of B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d 481, 486 Holdings: 0: holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding under subsection n when the defendant routinely missed her counseling sessions had at least ten different jobs lasting only a short period of time had lived at 13 to 17 different places attended only two anger management classes attended no parenting classes and only visited her child sporadically which resulted in a lack of bonding between them 1: holding that the alj erred in finding that the claimants mental retardation did not manifest itself before age 22 where the claimant attended special education classes dropped out of school in ninth grade had trouble with reading writing and math and had frequent fights with other children 2: holding that similar impairments do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her impairment rendered the plaintiff unable to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes within a geographical area to which she had reasonable access 3: holding that the record did not belie the claimants iq of 58 where he attended special education classes did not live independently and dropped out of school at a low grade either in the sixth or eighth grade 4: holding that the plaintiffs inability to engage in frequent lifting of more than ten pounds  would not significantly restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "law. The fact that the state could have adopted a Luce-type rule and warned a defendant of its consequences without violating his constitutional rights does not mean, as the majority appears to believe, that the state\u2019s violation was one of state law only. There are a number of actions a state may take without violating a defendant\u2019s federal constitutional rights if a state statute or rule provides for them l constitutional right to testify in his own defense by the trial court\u2019s unlawful threat to permit the prosecutor to introduce his prior conviction, that waiver is constitutionally invalid as a matter of federal law despite the fact that the state could have adopted such a rule constitutionally had it chosen to do so. Cf. Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979, 982-84 (2nd Cir. 1976) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Galindo was not only unlawfully Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: recognizing that where a guilty plea is shown to be constitutionally invalid leave to withdraw the plea is constitutionally mandated 2: holding that a defendants guilty plea is not knowingly made and is hence constitutionally invalid and subject to reversal on habeas if it is based upon erroneous sentencing information provided by the judge 3: holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently 4: holding that a sentence is subject to reversal if the trial judge selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of conviction, [and Benris] conviction[s] [are] not ripe for appeal.\u201d Ex parte Kelley, \u2014 So.3d at \u2014. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Benris appeal. The State appears to concede that the Alabama Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Kelley supports the position that no judgments of conviction have been entered in these cases but argues that this Court should nonetheless hold that the issuance of a sentencing order without the pronouncement in open court of a sentence is sufficient to enter Benn\u2019s judgments of conviction. In Ex parte Kelley, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the State\u2019s argument and rejected it, holding that nothing less than a pronouncement in open court of the defendant\u2019s sentence will satisfy the sentencing element of a judgment of conviction. \u2014 So.3d \u2014 (<HOLDING>). \u201c[T]his Court is bound by the decisions of Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment 1: holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered 2: holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment 3: holding that in the interest of judicial economy considering appeal from order denying posttrial motions and ordering entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff even though judgment was not actually entered 4: holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "proceeding to allow for issuance of a writ of error coram nobis to permit a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jarrett v. State, 2014 Ark. 272, 2014 WL 2566093 (per curiam). Again, a coram-nobis proceeding is an exceedingly narrow remedy that requires a showing of facts that were extrinsic to the record that would have prevented rendition of the judgment at trial. Pitts v. State, 2014 Ark. 132, 2014 WL 1096185 (per curiam). Petitioner\u2019s claim that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the scope of such a proceeding. We decline to refashion the writ to afford petitioner a remedy. See Zulpo v. State, 2014 Ark. 14, 2014 WL 197837 (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). As the State urges and as we held in Williams Holdings: 0: holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding that while an original bankruptcy proceeding where the state is not named as a defendant is not a suit an adversary proceeding directly against the state would be 2: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding 3: holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview 4: holding that the scope of a coramnobis proceeding would not be expanded to include an argument outside the four categories recognized as being within the purview of a coramnobis proceeding", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to have less capacity than adults to understand their rights and privileges. See, e.g., Colo. Const, art. VII, \u00a7 1 (person under eighteen has no right to vote); \u00a7 13-22-101, C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen does not have competence to enter into contracts, to manage estates, to sue and be sued, or to make decisions regarding his or her own body, such as donating blood or organs); \u00a7 14-2-106(l)(a)(I), C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen needs to obtain parental consent before receiving marriage license); \u00a7 19-2-511(1), (juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation required to have parent or guardian present before waiving right to counsel); C.R.J.P. 3(a) (advisement for juveniles entering plea requires presence of a parent or guardian at initial appearance); Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1219 (<HOLDING>). In acknowledging this special need to protect Holdings: 0: recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance 1: holding that a prisoner has no first amendment right to provide legal assistance to other inmates and that therefore prison officials did not violate the prisoners constitutional rights when they intercepted a letter containing legal advice that he sent to another prisoner 2: holding that where parents have previously stipulated that the children should be adjudicated as being in need of aid ocs still has the burden of proving in the subsequent termination of parental rights proceeding by clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid 3: recognizing special circumstances exception 4: recognizing that children have less capacity than adults to understand legal rights and therefore need special assistance", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "only relies on a self-serving affidavit. Consistently, the Supreme Court has held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires \u201cadequate time for discovery\u201d before granting summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (stating that \u201csummary judgment be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition\u201d). The presentation of a potential genuine issue of material fact weighed against the lack of corroborating evidence indicates the need for discovery prior to the resolution of a motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Americable Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Dep\u2019t of Navy, 129 F.3d 1271, 1274 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Despite the fact that the plaintiff relies on Holdings: 0: holding that the court is in no position to decide  whether there is a genuine dispute  because the district court did not permit  any discovery before issuing its ruling 1: holding that an appellate court can affirm a district courts order on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law including grounds upon which the district court did not rely 2: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 3: holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports 4: holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "because CBFWA has alleged nineteen violations of the Agreement by BPA since 1991. However, because they are challenging only the decision to enter into the agreements, and are not suing for violations of the agreements, we do not consider this ground. 8 . BPA also cites Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 767 (9th Cir.1986), for the proposition that, \"[a]s a general rule, we will not consider issues not presented before an administrative proceeding at the appropriate time.\u201d Insofar as Marathon Oil can be read to require exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing a claim in federal court under section 10(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 704, it has been modified by the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Section 839d(l) provides: The Holdings: 0: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to  1983 1: holding that a courts authority to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in actions brought under the apa is limited when neither the statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review 2: holding that under the apa exhaustion is a prerequisite to judicial review when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review so long as the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review 3: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action 4: holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to a lawsuit under foia", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the MHSAA is not a federal aid recipient, it is nonetheless subject to Title IX. The premise of this argument is that because local Michigan school districts have \u201cceded control\u201d over interscholastic athletics to the MHSAA, and because interscholastic athletic programs receive federal financial assistance, MHSAA has control over a federally funded activity and should be subject to Title IX. This precise issue was left unresolved by the recent Supreme Court decision in Smith which explicitly declined to consider whether, \u201cwhen a recipient cedes controlling authority over a federally funded program to another entity, the controlling entity is covered by Title IX regardless [of] whether it is itself a recipient.\u201d Id. at 930. Given that the Supreme Court has left this issue unresolved 9) (<HOLDING>). See also Kemether v. Penn. Interscholastic Holdings: 0: holding in part that the ncaa was subject to title vi because it exercised controlling authority over athletic programs receiving federal financial assistance 1: holding that title ix subjects state athletic association to suit under the theory that association controls athletic programs receiving federal aid 2: holding that the ncaa did not exercise controlling authority over school athletic programs 3: holding that federal programs that require uniform application necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules 4: holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and misappropriation liability.\u201d Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555; see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271 (acknowledging that after O\u2019Hagan and before Rule 10b5-2 \u201cit [was] unsettled whether non-business relationships ... provide the duty of loyalty and confidentiality necessary to satisfy the misappropriation theory\u201d). Accordingly, the imposition of a duty to disclose under Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) when parties have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, even if the rule were to conflict with the Court\u2019s interpretation of deceptive devices, the Court \u201cdid not purport to adopt or apply the unambiguous meaning\u201d of \u00a7 10. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm\u2019r, 515 F.3d 162, 170 n. 11 (3d Cir.2008); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that Holdings: 0: holding that a courts prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion 1: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 2: holding that to foreclose a conflicting agency interpretation a prior court decision must hold that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute 3: holding that when a statutes terms are clear and unambiguous on their face there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning 4: recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The plaintiff was thus entitled to some type of post-deprivation procedure. The plaintiff was afforded this post-deprivation remedy in the form of the two administrative appeals, brought pursuant to 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1415 and Conn. Gen.Stat. \u00a7 10-76L The plaintiff has not alleged that either of these appeals were procedurally defective. The court therefore concludes that the defendants afforded the plaintiff all the process that was due to him under the Due Process Clause. See Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F.Supp. 147, 153 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (concluding that the plaintiffs, who requested and received an impartial hearing, were provided with an adequate post-deprivation remedy for alleged violations of the IDEA); see also \u201cBD\u201d v. DeBuono, 130 F.Supp.2d 401, 435 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>). Based on the above, the court concludes that Holdings: 0: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional 1: holding that the appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal for his discovery violation allegations 2: holding that idea administrative procedures provided an adequate post deprivation remedy 3: holding that bivens plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies where administrative remedy program provided only for injunctive relief 4: holding that by its terms the idea does not require exhaustion where the relief sought is unavailable in an administrative proceeding under the idea monetary damages are not available so exhaustion is not required", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "feed his dogs, which he did on a daily basis. The backyard was fenced on three sides with two-wire fencing, and the fourth side was enclosed by the neighbor\u2019s wood privacy fence. The dogs were kept approximately 70 yards from the road, behind the house, in a central part of the back yard. Some of the dogs were chained to the ground near doghouse structures, and others were in pens surrounded by chainlink. Certainly the housing and shelter of animals is a common private use for one\u2019s backyard. We recognize that Appellant did not have an ownership interest in the property, but that is just one factor to consider and not a requirement for a person to have standing to challenge improper police actions. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that defendants had no standing where they conceded that they did not own the automobile searched and were simply passengers the owner of the car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search 1: holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop 2: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle 3: holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop 4: holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "did not lack procedural safeguards because she, like the plaintiffs in the instant case, was covered by an agency regulation which promulgated its own elaborate personnel management regulations. Id. Third, it further stated that Fausto held certain federal employees were foreclosed from obtaining judicial review of personnel actions because Congress, in enacting the CSRA, established a comprehensive remedial scheme which was designed to \u201cbalance the legitimate interests of the various categories of federal employees with the needs of sound and efficient administration.\u201d Id. (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S. at 445, 108 S.Ct. at 672). The court concluded that the CSRA provided NAF employees their exclusive remedy for federal employment personnel actions. Id. See also P\u00e9rez, supra, 680 F.2d 779 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs ask this Court to entertain their Holdings: 0: holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden 1: holding that a contractors employees were not within the scope and course of their employment when they deviated from their work to shoot at squirrels 2: holding naf employees were not employees within the appeal provisions of the civil service reform act of 1978 and therefore they were not entitled to appeal their terminations to the mspb 3: holding to the effect that a court must consider section 24 fifth in conjunction with the antidiscrimination provisions of the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 as amended which are codified at title 11 of the united states code 4: holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the capacity to prejudice the penalty-phase proceedings of a capital murder case. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232; State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 276-77, 550 A.2d 117 (1988). \u2018With the stakes so high, the possibility of prejudice on the penalty phase persists as a cause for continuing concern.\u201d Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 132, 594 A.2d 232. The use of two juries \u201ccommends itself when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial.\u201d Id. at 133, 594 A.2d 232 (citing Monturi, supra, 195 N.J.Super. 317, 478 A.2d 1266). One instance in which the Court has required separate juries is when the State relies on aggravating factor c(4)(a), conviction of another murder. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A.2d 172 (<HOLDING>). Except for that specific category of cases Holdings: 0: recognizing the diminished importance of the state policy factor 1: recognizing that our finding that defendant is entitled to voir dire potential jurors on the possible blinding impact of the e4a factor most likely will require a twojury system for all capital cases in which the state seeks to prove that factor 2: holding that the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained 3: recognizing that court need not address each hahn factor if defendant does not raise issue relating to that factor 4: recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge\u2019s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252. We review \u201cwhether substantial evidence supports a finding by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that [Valenzuela] abandoned [her] lawful permanent residence in the United States.\u201d Khodagholian v. Ashcroft, 335 F.Sd 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency\u2019s determination that the government met its burden of showing Valenzuela abandoned her lawful permanent resident status because the record does not compel the conclusion that she consistently intended promptly to return to the United States. See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Chavez-Ramirez v. INS, 792 F.2d 932, Holdings: 0: holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial 1: holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period 2: holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent 3: holding that the only showing of intent required for a vcea claim is the intent to do the act involved 4: holding that removal for temporary employment with intent to return was not abandonment", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is the default sanction once a court determines that the party\u2019s failure was neither substantially justified nor harmless. In Design Strategy, the Second Circuit applied the four-factor test when considering an argument that the district court had improperly excluded certain evidence, and affirmed the district court\u2019s conclusion \"that sanctions, including severe sanctions, were warranted.\u201d 469 F.3d at 296-97. In other words, the Circuit referred to the four Patterson factors to assess the correctness of the district court\u2019s \u201csubstantially justified or ... harmless\u201d inquiry; it reviewed the district court\u2019s decision to preclude not as such, but because under Rule 37(c)(1) that decision was, in the district court\u2019s view, the logical consequence of its finding th d 1222, 1244 (D.N.M.2011) Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by defendants failure to disclose documents before her deposition because she had a unique familiarity with documents at issue 1: holding that when a plaintiff attaches documents to her complaint containing statements by the defendant that conflict with the plaintiffs allegations the plaintiff is not required to adopt every word in the documents as true 2: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 3: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable 4: holding that admission of one defendants deposition was proper where she was present at the deposition even though she was represented at the time by the same counsel as her codefendants", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir.1999) (finding issue of fact regarding whether officer was justified in firing on vehicle from side after stepping out of the way to avoid being run over, and explaining that \u201c[a] passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect\u201d); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n. 9 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that analyzing separate segments of single encounter may be appropriate if \u201cthe officers\u2019 initial decision to shoot was reasonable under the circumstances but there was no need to continue shooting\u201d); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Bates ex rel. Johns v. Chesterfield Holdings: 0: holding that when fleeing felon tossed a mesh bag weighing four or five pounds toward the officer the officer would have been justified if he fired at that moment out of fear that the bag might knock his firearm out of his hand but that he was not justified in firing after bag hit him and fell to the ground without injuring him and suspect turned and ran 1: holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole 2: holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone 3: holding an officers reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed was sufficient justification for seizure of suspects makeup bag and exigent circumstances justified the subsequent warrantless search of the closed bag 4: holding that the owner of a shoulder bag located on the front seat of his girlfriends car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "validity of the conviction is at issue, but because the jury needs to examine the circumstances of the offense (as well as any aspect of the defendant\u2019s character or prior record) in order to decide intelligently the question of punishment. It is not error to inform the resentencing jury that the defendant has already been found guilty, and to tell the jury that its duty is to determine the punishment to be imposed, considering \u201call of the evidence\u201d presented at the resentencing trial, and \u201call of the facts and circumstances of the case.\u201d Transcript, Vol. 41 at 2851, 2857-59. See Alderman v. State, supra at 212 (11 b). 14. Potts complains of the state\u2019s use of a prior conviction for murder based on a guilty plea that was not shown to be voluntary. See Pope v. State, supra at 195 (17) (<HOLDING>). Potts raised before trial the issue of Holdings: 0: holding that once the defendant raises the issue of intelligent and voluntary waiver with respect to prior guilty pleas the burden is on the state to establish a valid waiver 1: holding that record did not show voluntary or intelligent waiver 2: recognizing that the burden to establish a valid waiver of a constitutional right is upon the prosecution 3: holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act 4: holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that the court erred in determining that her answer admitted paragraph seven of Burr\u2019s complaint and that the court should have made its decision based on the trial evidence, not the pleadings. The court, however, did not rely solely on the pleadings. Rather, it began by accepting the ninety-foot admission in the pleadings, and then addressed the facts presented at trial to arrive at a final declaration of the location of the boundary line. [\u00b6 9] To the extent the court relied on Jordan\u2019s admission it did not err in doing so. Admissions contained in a party\u2019s pleadings are binding on those parties both at trial and on appeal. See M.R. Civ. P. 8(d); cf. Connolly v. Connolly, 2006 ME 17, \u00b6 7 n. 1, 892 A.2d 465, 467; see also MP Assocs. v. Liberty, 2001 ME 22, \u00b6 28, 771 A.2d 1040, 1048-49 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in the absence of a trial Holdings: 0: holding that parties are generally bound by the stipulations they agree to 1: holding that parties are bound by the stipulated facts in a pretrial order 2: recognizing stipulations the one at issue in particular are treated as contracts 3: holding that stipulations involving questions of law are not binding on the court 4: holding that parties are bound by admissions in pleadings", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to make ... antitrust claims ... inappropriate for arbitration.\u201d American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.1968). Since that time the foundations of the American Safety doctrine have been significantly eroded. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.1987), adhered to, in part, dismissed, in part, on reconsideration, 685 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.1988). The Supreme Court has held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transactions. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Finding it \u201cunneces U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The federal policy in favor of arbitration Holdings: 0: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable 1: holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement 2: holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable 3: holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable 4: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the color of state law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant. (App.308-09.) This error was reinforced by the verdict form, which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a single finding of fact: whether Dombroski ordered the landlord to open the door. In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages against the upper management of a company could only be awarded if upper management was involved in the violation. 174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir.1999). We reversed the finding of punitive damages because the jury instructions \u201cfailed to provide proper guidance for the jury on a fundamental question.\u201d Id. at 124; see also Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int\u2019l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The District Court in this case did not Holdings: 0: holding that the plain error and harmless error standards of review merge in the ease of jury instructions because the duty to properly instruct the jury lies with the trial court 1: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error 2: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 4: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "approach is the correct one here. With the benefit of a full factual record \u2014 in this case, following years of discovery \u2014 plaintiffs in pattern and practice claims cannot rely on abstract legal concepts alone. Although abstract legal concepts may inform the Court\u2019s analysis regarding the risk of error, GE must also demonstrate that the current procedures in fact result in an unacceptable rate of error. It would make little sense to ignore the empirical record altogether in favor of a hypothetical concern that the risk of error may be too high, a. Abstract Concepts According to GE, the crucial element missing from EPA\u2019s pre-UAO issuance process is a neutral decision-maker. Although the Constitution does not require a neutral decision-maker, see, e.g., Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 968 (<HOLDING>), ample case law supports GE\u2019s point that a Holdings: 0: holding such service satisfies due process 1: holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause 2: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 3: recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard 4: holding that an opportunity to be heard by a contracting officer the very person deciding whether the plaintiff is a responsible contractor satisfies due process", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832. 4 . USC\u00cdRF cites two cases arising under civil service employment laws, Suzal v. Director, United States Info. Agency, 32 F.3d 574 (D.C.Cir.1994) and Nat\u2019l Treasury Empls. Union v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895 (D.C.Cir.1984). Suzal and Nat\u2019l Treasury Employees concern the definition of \u201cadverse action\u201d in a collective bargaining agreement, as it bears on the question of which employment disputes can be sent to arbitration. See Suzal, 32 F.3d at 579-80 (<HOLDING>); Nat\u2019l Treasury Employees, 743 F.2d at 914-15 Holdings: 0: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 1: holding that nonrenewal of an appointment is not a removal under 5 usc  7512 and thus not an adverse action as defined in 5 usc  7512 2: holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b 3: holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an adverse action 4: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a disregard for the employer\u2019s interests. Under the circumstances, it must be concluded that the claimant was discharged for misconduct within the meaning of the unemployment compensation law. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Fritzo v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 59 Pa.Cmwlth. 268, 429 A.2d 1215 (1981), a Pennsylvania court found willful misconduct based on a scenario analogous to the instant case: The claimant was a regular employee who fully comprehended her obligation to report for work on a given date. She testified her usual practice was to \u201cask\u201d the floor lady\u2019s permission to be absent. In this instance, the claimant deviated from that practice; the record discloses that, rather than tion Bd. of Review, 64 Pa.Cmwlth. 342, 439 A.2d 1342 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Several other jurisdictions have also held Holdings: 0: holding that single incident of failing to return to work after doctors visit without permission due to employees professed anxiety after being informed she may have skin cancer constituted willful misconduct related to work justifying denial of unemployment insurance benefits 1: holding that claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy 2: holding that the claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy 3: holding that single incident of leaving work early without receiving permission from supervisor to address problem of impending termination of electrical service to his home by employee on probation due to poor attendance record constituted willful misconduct related to work justifying denial of unemployment insurance benefits 4: holding that leaving work early without permission after having been previously warned constitutes misconduct", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a witness need not have specialized training in a particular field and may gain his expertise solely through work experience. Wileman v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 642, 647-48, 484 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1997) (qualifying bank official as expert in comparing signatures to determine authenticity). However, \u201c[w]here a statute designates express qualifications for an expert witness, the witness must satisfy the statutory criteria in order to testify as an expert.\u201d Commonwealth v. Allen, 269 Va. 262, 273, 609 S.E.2d 4, 11 (2005). Also, where a statute requires an individual to be licensed before working in a particular field, a witness not licensed in that field may ,not testify as an expert in that field. See Lee Gardens v. Arlington County Bd., 250 Va. 534, 539-40, 463 S.E.2d 646, 648-49 (1995) (<HOLDING>). In keeping with this principle, \u201c[t]he Holdings: 0: holding prospectively that a vendees interest in a real estate contract constitutes real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statute 1: holding equivalent automatic license revocation provision of colorado real estate statute unconstitutional 2: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 3: holding the real estate sale proceeds 4: holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Property Interest Plaintiffs final claim is that he was denied due process of law when the defendants deducted money from his inmate account without providing him notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the imposition of assessments concerning his destruction of government property. This states a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Holloway v. Lehman, 671 A.2d 1179 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). See also Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1984) (inmate stated claim for due process deprivation resulting from deduction of money from his prison account); Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935 (10th Cir.1989) (allegations of freezing of inmate\u2019s funds in his prison account sufficient to state civil rights claim for due process deprivation); Artway v. Scheidemantel, 671 F.Supp. 330 (D.N.J.1987) (<HOLDING>). Pennsylvania law provides that the Department Holdings: 0: holding invalid procedurally defective interim regulations that were issued without notice and comment and in the absence of good cause 1: holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice 2: holding that prosecutors statements were not evidence and could not support restitution order 3: holding that procedures whereby amount of restitution were determined without a hearing were constitutionally defective 4: holding that notice was not constitutionally adequate where the clearcut statutory procedures for notification were not followed", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to the merits of the litigation.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted); Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep\u2019t of Social Servs., 699 F.Supp. 846, 849 (D.Colo.1988) (denying attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to \u00a7 1988 where civil rights action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we vacate the district court\u2019s grant of attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to \u00a7 1988. B. Before the district court, defendants sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, rather than attorney\u2019s fees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. The district court did not address defendants\u2019 Rule 11 motion. That the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Branson\u2019s complaint does not preclude it from imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Westlake N. Property Owners Ass\u2019n. v. City of Holdings: 0: holding that a district court could constitutionally impose rule 11 sanctions in a case in which was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 1: holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 2: holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case 3: holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s confirmation of the plan would \u201ccreate an unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy Court\u201d to undo the portion of the plan that had been carried out and thus the appeal was equitably moot. See Roberts Farms, 65 Retail Stores, Corp., 216 F.3d 882, 884-85 (9th Cir.2000). Additionally, the Court of Appeals further explained, While the doctrine of equitable mootness focuses on whether it is, for all practical purposes, impossible to award effective relief, other equitable considerations center on whether it would be unfair to grant the relief requested. Therefore, even if an appeal is not equitably moot, a court may still hold that the equities weigh in favor of dismissing the appeal. See, e.g., In re Federated Dep\u2019t Stores, Inc., 44 F.3d 1310, 1320 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 885. The first concept discussed above Holdings: 0: holding that an appeal was not equitably moot because the person who was issued the money was a party and was aware when the payment was made that the award would be appealed 1: holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action 2: holding that even though the appeal was not moot because effective relief was possible it was inequitable to require that the debtors counsel disgorge fees and costs awarded by the bankruptcy court 3: holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds 4: holding that the case was not moot even though claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were no longer alive because the plaintiff had requested pecuniary relief", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "exercised supervisory powers over persons who actively participated in the constitutional deprivation. Id. \u201cAn official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if she acts with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiffs constitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and consent.\u201d Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996 (citing Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 498-99 (7th Cir.1979); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir.1971); Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir.1980); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 1000-01 (7th Cir.1980); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir.1974)); see also Hamilton v. Scott, N.D.Ill.1991, 762 F.Supp. 794, aff'd. 976 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has acknowledged in deposition that Holdings: 0: holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense 1: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred 2: holding that an inmates complaint was not sufficient to state a claim against the director or warden of the prison absent an allegation that they were directly involved in the alleged misconduct or recklessly indifferent to the constitutional violations of which they had some knowledge 3: holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms 4: holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in the Schreiner Oaks Society, an honorary organization for substantial Schreiner contributors, all of which overpowered Estha\u2019s mind. Despite these suggested inferences, the beneficiaries offer no evidence that any alleged influence subverted or overpowered Estha\u2019s mind at the time of the will\u2019s execution. Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922 (emphasis added). Even in cases exhibiting fairly egregious facts, courts have declined to find undue influence. See Guthrie v. Suiter, 934 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)(finding no evidence of undue influence by brother and primary business ad-visor despite testatrix\u2019s inability to care for herself and labotomy forty years prior to will execution); Green v. Earnest, 840 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied)(<HOLDING>). C. No Execution \u201cBut For\u201d the Influence The Holdings: 0: holding that it is a violation of the fourth amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant 1: holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment 2: recognizing that factors such as physical and mental condition of the maker of the instrument at the time of its execution including age any weakness or infirmity are probative evidence of undue influence 3: holding that despite testators death caused by the beneficiary shooting the testator a little more than a month after the third wills execution no evidence of undue influence existed at the time of the wills execution 4: holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "between Long Creek, Little River, Limehouse, and Lake Wylie, the Court can attest that the factual premise of Rickborn\u2019s argument is an understatement. Nevertheless, that prevalence of pickups is not persuasive. The command to construe an exclusion against the insurer applies only when the exclusion\u2019s meaning is ambiguous. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nivens, No. 0:12-cv-151-MBS, 2014 WL 4793987, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (stating the rule applies \u201c \u2018if doubt exists as to the extent or fact of coverage\u2019 \u201d (quoting Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1967)) (emphasis added)). As this Court has explained, exclusion A.7 is not ambiguous on the issue of whether a pickup is a private passenger auto. Cf. Home Indem. Co., 280 F.Supp. at 448 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Rickborn asserts it would be Holdings: 0: recognizing that certainly under many circumstances a pickup truck is used by its owner as a private passenger automobile but nonetheless holding that policy read as a whole unambiguously excluded pickups from that term 1: holding that a contract will be read as a whole and the intent of each part will be gathered from a consideration of the whole 2: recognizing that a statute should be read as comprehensive whole 3: holding pickup truck was not a private passenger automobile under policy although that term standing alone might be  ambiguous there was no room for misunderstanding whether it included pickups because separate defined policy term included pickups 4: holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(1982) (analyzing and sustaining Virginia statute under which Virginia Public Building Authority was charged with construction, maintenance, and operation of public buildings funded by Authority-issued notes and bonds and secured by State rental payments). Various other state courts have approved the issuance of bonds that are debt-serviced through future discretionary legislative appropriations. Again as in New Jersey, those courts have focused primarily on the discretionary nature of the state\u2019s duty to make the appropriation, and clear language in the bonds informing purchasers that the State has no legal obligation to service the bond debt through future appropriations or otherwise. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by the Colo. State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 566 P.2d 350, 355 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. Ky. Transp. Cabinet, 884 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted 1: holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes 2: holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature 3: holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language 4: holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the initial order to be a final adjudication of Dudley\u2019s repayment obligation. We analyze Dudley\u2019s due-process claim with this understanding of the court\u2019s action. We think the hearing provided to Dudley satisfied due process. It occurred pri- or to final judgment being rendered against him, and he was allowed to present evidence and argument with respect to the amount of the judgment as well as any repayment plan. Therefore, the hearing afforded Dudley was \u201cat a meaningful time\u201d and was conducted \u201cin a meaningful manner\u201d as required by the Due Process Clause. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 241. Even though Dudley was given the opportunity to be heard, he points out section 815.9 makes no provision for a hearing and so is unconstitutional on its face. See Fitch, 581 F.Supp. at 278 (<HOLDING>). The State argues Dudley has no standing to Holdings: 0: holding that a statute that does not provide for notice and a hearing is not unconstitutional because those provisions may be incorporated by implication to prevent a holding of unconstitutionality 1: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 2: holding evidence was not newly discovered because the underlying facts were well within the partys knowledge prior to the district courts entry of judgment 3: holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment 4: holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.\u201d Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must meet the standard of \u201cplausibility.\u201d See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1970, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although the complaint need not provide \u201cdetailed factual allegations,\u201d id. at 1964; see also ATSI Commc\u2019ns v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 n. 2 (2d Cir.2007) (applying the standard of plausibility outside Twombly\u2019s anti-trust context), it must \u201camplify a claim with some factual allegations ... to render the claim plausible.\u201d Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-158 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis in original) (<HOLDING>). The complaint must provide \u201cthe grounds upon Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs complaint was valid because despite general allegations it provided notice 1: holding that the statute of limitations did not commence  despite the filing of a prior complaint against another physician  until the defendants deposition made the plaintiff aware of the defendants involvement in the decedents death where the plaintiff failed to discover the defendants involvement because of the defendants misstatement concealment or fraud 2: holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief 3: holding that the plaintiffs complaint adequately alleged the personal involvement of the attorney general because it was plausible that officials of the department of justice would be aware of policies concerning individuals arrested after 911 4: holding that plaintiffs complaint against tribal officials was barred under doctrine of sovereign immunity because the officials votes individually had no legal effect and it was the official action of the band following the officials votes that caused plaintiffs injuries", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "467, 174 Ill.Dec. 829, 599 N.E.2d 913, 917 (1992); accord, Ratford v. State, 52 Md.App. 163, 447 A.2d 496, 500 (1982), aff'd in pertinent part, 296 Md. 289, 462 A.2d 1192 (1983). 12 . Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 18 Cimt. C (1965). 13 . 424 SW.2d 627 (Tex.1967). 14 . 1d. at 629. 15 . Id. at 629-30. 16 . 190 Miss. 656, 1 So.2d 510 (1941). 17 . Id. at 511. 18 . See generally LaFave & Scott, supra note 4, \u00a7 7.15(b), at 303. 19 . 108 N.M. 208, 769 P.2d 1299 (App.1989), overruled on other grounds, State v. Fuentes, 119 N.M. 104, 888 P.2d 986, 988 (App.1994). 20 . Id. at 1301. 21 . 113 N.M. 437, 827 P.2d 152 (App.1992). 22 . Id. at 154-56. 23 . 766 So.2d 310 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000). 24 . Id. at 311. 25 . Id.; see also People v. Harris, 65 Cal.App.3d 978, 135 Cal.Rptr. 668, 674 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 26 . See Harlow v. State, 820 P.2d 307, 309 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim 1: holding that indirect use of force constituted robbery when defendant tried to push a jewelry case lid open while the victim tried to hold it shut 2: holding that complaining witness was an accomplice as a matter of law despite her testimony that i didnt consent to it  when i had intercourse with my father i tried to get away but i couldnt do it i tried to get loose from him  i tried to get up and hit him but that didnt do no good he was so much stouter than i was was insufficient to establish that she was not an accomplice 3: holding that evidence the victim tried to keep defendant from fleeing the scene of a crime and defendant killed victim in order to escape supported the finding that murder was committed to avoid arrest 4: holding that where the states definition of robbery has on its face the element of use or threatened use of physical force a robbery conviction is properly used as a predicate under acca", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rather, it was an action for equitable apportionment of response costs already incurred by a PRP, who was unable to seek relief under \u00a7 107. Id. To accept the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Sun Company, the W.R. Grace court reasoned, would result in two separate statute of limitations periods and accrual mechanisms for CERCLA contribution actions. Id. \u201cIf a gap exists in the statute of limitations for CERCLA actions under \u00a7 113(f)(1), it is one to be resolved by Congress.\u201d Id.; see also Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 1116, 1125 (N.D.Fla.1995) (refusing to borrow another statute of limitations where no triggering event under \u00a7 113(g)(3) had occurred or was likely to occur); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Service, 901 F.Supp. 906, 914 (M.D.Pa.1995) (<HOLDING>), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 232 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence was insufficient for the statute of limitations to bar recovery of a quantum meruit cause of action 1: holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim 2: holding that plaintiffs entering into a consent agreement with the epa did not trigger the running of the statute of limitations under  113g3 for purposes of a  113f1 contribution action and further distinguishing a  113f1 contribution action from a cost recovery action to which the limitations periods of  113g2 would apply 3: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 4: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7 (a). We begin by applying the actual words of the ethical rule to Martin\u2019s case. First, we consider whether the presiding judge erred by viewing Martin\u2019s original lawyers as necessary witnesses. There was no dispute that the lawyers were the only witnesses, other than the original trial judge whose integrity was already being disputed by the lawyers, who claimed to have any knowledge about what the judge might have said to the lawyers in chambers. Thus, as the parties agreed, the lawyers were necessary witnesses if the claim regarding the judge\u2019s statements were to go forward. See Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 129, 132 (1) (616 SE2d 888) (2005) (<HOLDING>). The lawyers stated at the hearing that they Holdings: 0: holding under georgia rule of professional conduct 37a that party seeking disqualification must demonstrate that the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts 1: recognizing that state agencies might require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated by supplying copies of the court documents or material that led the lawyer to the fact 2: holding that a lawyer is a  necessary witness if his or her testimony is relevant material and unobtainable elsewhere 3: holding that a lawyer is a necessary witness where the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and where there is no other evidence available to prove those facts 4: holding that evidence that defendant plaintiffs former client consistently failed to pay other lawyers was relevant to prove the element of intent to defraud", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to section 4177(d)(4) as section 4177(d)(4) defines fourth offenses as felonies. Therefore, we hold that only when an individual is convicted of a violation of 21 Del.C. \u00a7 4177(a), such violation occurring after three prior convictions under section 4177(a), may he or she be sentenced as a fourth-time offender under section 4177(d)(4). Conclusion We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to admit the HGN evidence without the proper foundation. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the appellant\u2019s conviction for the June 25, 1995 incident and remand the case for a new trial. Consequently, we also set aside Zimmerman\u2019s sentence for the Au person, bec o. 185, 1996, 1997 WL 70816 (Feb. 7, 1997) (ORDER). 9 . Id. at 356-62. 10 . See Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 356 (<HOLDING>). Cf. McLain v. General Motors Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that hgn evidence is scientific and therefore must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence governing the admission of such evidence 1: holding that plaintiff must present such evidence 2: holding that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence there is therefore much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence the exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not be applicable and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel 3: holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence 4: holding that scientific evidence must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence concerning admission of scientific testimony or evidence ie dre 401 402 403 702 and 703 and be relevant and reliable", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "I believe the obligation to prove a knowing and willful violation of Maryland's licensing law is clear from the plain language of \u00a7 1960(b)(1)(A) and the Maryland law it references, I reject the Talebnejads\u2019 argument that \u00a7 1960(b)(1)(A) is void for vagueness. See United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (\u201cThe void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes define crimes so that ordinary people can understand the conduct prohibited and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the different scienter requirements made the statute ambiguous, I would reach the same result through applying the rule of lenity. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (<HOLDING>). A knowing and willful violation of Maryland's Holdings: 0: recognizing that the rule of lenity only applies if after considering text structure history and purpose there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the court must simply guess as to what congress intended 1: holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines 2: recognizing that the rule of lenity applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions but also to the penalties they impose 3: holding rule of lenity in the penal context to be a rule of last resort 4: holding that the rule of lenity ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "included \u201cinformant testimony, confirmed by independently verified evidence, that Carlos Powell was a major player in a drug trafficking ring in Detroit.\u201d United States v. Powell, 943 F.Supp.2d 759, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2013). The affidavit stated that obtaining Carlos Powell\u2019s cell-phone location information would assist in finding him and identifying his associates, the locations used to store narcotics, and the assets derived from the narcotic sales. Id. Importantly, the government does not ask us to decide whether the long-term tracking of cell phone location information in this case should be deemed a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The possibility that it could constitute a search was suggested in dicta in United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2851, 186 Holdings: 0: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not 1: holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search 2: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 3: holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment 4: holding shortterm cellphone tracking was not a search", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "policies. 24 . 182 La. 551, 162 So. 177. 25 . No. 6829, 1917 WL 1628 (La.App. Jan. 9, 1917). 26 . A \u201cconstructive total loss\" occurs when a covered peril renders something economically, if not physically, useless. See Hart, 162 So. at 180 (finding a constructive total loss when building was 75% destroyed by fire, rendering it useless, and thus, demolished by city order); Briede, 1917 WL 1628, *3 (building insured for $10,000 was gutted by fire, requiring $8,330 to repair it to state before fire or $10,830 to repair it to pass current code, court concluded homeowner suffered constructive total loss). 27 . In both Langston v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 53-219, slip op. (La. 25th Jud. Dist. Ct., Plaquemines Parish, Feb. 8, 2007) (unp 77 So.2d 774, 775-76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). 30 . Compare Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.702(1) (2003) Holdings: 0: holding that causation is a coverage question for the court when an insurer wholly denies that there is a covered loss and an amountofloss question for the appraisal panel when an insurer admits that there is a covered loss the amount of which is disputed 1: holding that the vpl requires an insurer to pay the full value of the policy only when a covered peril causes a total loss 2: holding that the repair or replace limitation of liability capped the insurers liability at the amount necessary to return the car to substantially the same condition as before the loss and did not include liability for loss due to stigma on resale 3: holding that if the insurer has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss that liability is for the face amount of the policy citation omitted emphasis in original 4: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "entities like GasPlus. See generally S. Rep. 106-150 at 5, 7, 10. And GasPlus\u2019s interests were clearly regulated by the BIA\u2019s decision to void the Management Agreement. Indeed, GasPlus\u2019s basic argument in this lawsuit is that the BIA has imposed a greater burden on GasPlus (and the Nambe Pueblo) than what Congress intended when it amended Section 81. The prudential standing test, which \u201cis not meant to be especially demanding,\u201d Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Assoc., 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987), is therefore satisfied. The other standing requirements are also satisfied. GasPlus has suffered an injury in fact: namely, the loss of its rights and benefits arising from the Management Agreement. See, e.g., Idaho Power Co. v. F.E.R.C., 312 F.3d 454, 460 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The causation requirement is satisfied Holdings: 0: holding a deviation from the terms of a contract constitutes an impairment of contract 1: holding that even though an executive order mandating agency consideration of environmental justice concerns created no private right of action for an agencys failure to comply with that mandate the court would review the agencys action as an exercise of discretion under the apa and nepa 2: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable 3: holding that an agencys interference with a private partys contract rights constitutes an injury in fact 4: holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "added to the underlying works is protected by copyright.\u201d). The term original means that a writing must have been \u201cindependently created by the author ... [and] possess at least some minimal level of creativity.\u201d Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282. However, \u201cthe requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.\u201d Id.; see also Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ\u2019g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir.1991) (\u201cSimply stated, original means not copied, and exhibiting a minimal amount of creativity.\u201d). While a finding of originality is generally a question a of fact for the jury, under these circumstances it may be treated as a matter of law. See CMM Cable Rep Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1517 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Spilman has registered his Red Book as well Holdings: 0: recognizing a claim for injunctive relief is disposed of when expressly tied to claims dismissed on summary judgment 1: holding that affidavit in support of summary judgment may not be based upon factual conclusion or conclusions of law 2: holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law 3: holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial 4: holding that where there is insufficient evidence to permit a reasonable factual finding of originality the question may be disposed of as an issue of law at summary judgment", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "guilty\u201d was reasonable, and thus, trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating). 36 See OCGA \u00a7 17-9-40 (\u201cA verdict may be amended in mere matter of form after the jury have dispersed; but, after it has been received, recorded, and the jury dispersed, it may not be amended in matter of substance, either by what the jurors say they intended to find or otherwise.\u201d); Groves, 162 Ga. at 166 (\u201cThere must be the unanimous assent of the entire twelve jurors before there is a legal verdict. When it develops that such is not the fact, there is no verdict. If the jury has not dispersed, they should be sent to the jury-room, with the direction to consider the case for the purpose of reaching an agreement on a verdict.\u201d); Handley v. McKee, 8 Ga. App. 570, 573 (3) (70 SE 94) (1911) (<HOLDING>); see also Ballard v. Turner, 147 Ga. App. 584, Holdings: 0: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict 1: holding that verdict returned by jury should have been received and recorded and that trial court erred by granting a continuance after jury returned its verdict applying the principle announced in merchantsbank of macon 7 ga at 200 4 that a verdict shall be considered as published eo instanti in which it is handed to the plaintiffs counsel or other person directed by the court to receive it emphasis omitted 2: holding that trial court erred in granting plea in bar as to murder when prior to receipt and publication of fact that jury could not reach a verdict on murder count jury had indicated in notes to the trial court that it had acquitted defendant of murder and holding that there was no verdict until it was received and published in open court 3: holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial 4: holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that ground was inappropriate. 5 . Walter Energy potentially could have asserted a claim against the Audley defendants based on similar federal securities-regulation statutes; however, it has elected not to do so, stating in its complaint that \"the claims asserted herein are based entirely on Alabama law, and no claims are asserted under any federal law.\u201d 6 . Our holding on this issue obviates the need to review the trial court\u2019s alternate basis for dismissing Walter Energy\u2019s Alabama Securities Act claim, specifically, that Walter Energy lacks standing to pursue such a claim because it has not alleged that it purchased any shares of Walter Energy stock following the Audley defendants\u2019 alleged scheme to manipulate the share price. See, e.g., Cowin v. Bresler, 741 F.2d 410 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Walter Energy does not explain in its Holdings: 0: holding that stepgrandfather who was neither a biological nor an adoptive grandparent lacked standing to seek access to stepgrandchildren 1: holding that a party that was neither a purchaser nor a seller of the securities involved lacked standing to seek injunctive relief under the federal counterpart to  8617 2: holding because the district court refused to grant plaintiff reinstatement or any other injunctive relief the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief 3: holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 82, 43 (1978), where we held that a Board of Education rule requiring employees to take unpaid leaves of absence while campaigning for elective political office was a barrier to candidacy \u201cas formidable as the filing date changes at issue in\u201d Hadnott and Allen. In other contexts, we have interpreted \u00a7 5 broadly to require preclearanee of changes in residence requirements for candidates, City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 160-161 (1980); alterations of municipal boundaries, Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975); reapportionment and redistricting plans, Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973); and the location of polling places, Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971). 23 See Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U. S. 305 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 24 Only one black candidate filed for Holdings: 0: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 1: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 2: recognizing in union democracy context potential adverse impact of requiring candidates to qualify long before election 3: recognizing that the involvement of supervisory union members in union affairs conflicts with the need to assure the complete devotion of union negotiating teams to employee interests 4: recognizing impact of child support guidelines", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "transcript of jury request to review witness testimony (D.Mass. Dec. 7, 1995); United States v. DeBartolomeo, 95-CR-10239-WGY, trial transcript of jury request to review witness testimony (D.Mass. Jan. 22, 1996). 2 . Against this background, the current proposals to authorize \"real time\u201d court reporters to provide \"unscoped\u201d transcripts for a fee seem odd indeed. They wholly misconceive real time court reporting as some sort of \u201cproduct,\u201d rather than the vital, justice-enhancing \u201cservice\u201d it is in fact. More importantly, unscoped transcripts can in no sense be said to be accurate \"records\u201d of the judicial proceedings. There is only one such record \u2014 the record certified by the court's official reporter. See e.g., United States v. Abrams, 95-10272-WGY (transcript) (D.Mass. Feb. 2, 1996) Holdings: 0: recognizing that the only record of grand jury testimony is the court reporters certified transcript not her tape recording of the proceeding 1: holding the trial court erred in ordering the transcription of grand jury proceedings so that it could intervene in the operations of the grand jury 2: holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose 3: holding where tape corroborated by independent testimony of two police officers and where defendant did not challenge accuracy of recording court did not err in admitting tape despite prosecutions failure to authenticate it 4: holding that the defendants offer of proof which consisted only of a tape recording and a private investigators affidavit did not satisfy the defendants preliminary burden under franks without the offering of other sworn testimony or reliable evidence", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Tex.R. Evid. 702. In these cases, the jury was required to determine the appropriate sentence for each of appellant\u2019s offenses. In making that determination, the jury was entitled to consider \u201cany matter the court deem[ed] relevant to sentencing.\u201d Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, \u00a7 3(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (noting that, during punishment, State and defendant may introduce any evidence court deems relevant to sentencing). One such matter is the accused\u2019s \u201cpersonal responsibility\u201d and \u201cmoral culpability\u201d for the crime charged. See Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 896 Holdings: 0: holding evidence admissible in punishment phase of trial because evidence had bearing on appellants personal responsibility and moral guilt 1: holding that capital punishment must be tailored to the defendants personal responsibility and moral guilt 2: holding defendant waived right to contest lawfulness of search on appeal after he had admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial 3: holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment 4: holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "The percentage interest appurtenant to a unit represents the unit owner\u2019s percentage interest in the common expense and common profits of the Condominium, and his undivided share in the common elements of the Condominium. The percentage interest shall have a permanent character and, except as specifically provided in Title 11, may not be changed without the written consent of all the unit owners and their mortgagees. We note that the above language mirrors that of RP \u00a7 11-107, entitled \"Percentage interests.\u201d For an example of out-of-state cases that directly consider whether certain provisions are properly characterized as \"use restrictions,\u201d or whether they alter unit owners\u2019 property rights in the common areas, see Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>); Kaplan v. Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435, 573 Holdings: 0: holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest or failed to file a claim with the state within a twenty year period 1: holding that property owner could not argue it had no notice of deed restrictions simply because guidelines were unclear when owner acknowledged having copy of such restrictions 2: holding that a tenured teacher who can be dismissed only for good cause has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her position and may not be deprived of it without due process of law 3: holding that contrary to restrictions regarding use a unit owner may not be deprived of his interest in a substantial portion of the general common elements without his consent 4: holding that use of guns to effectuate arrest and handcuffing of defendant did not render his consent to search his home involuntary", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "it fails prong one. Cases that qualify under prong one present controversies of inherently limited duration. In one of these cases, it is not \u201creasonably foreseeable\u201d that plaintiffs can obtain full review before their case becomes moot. First Nat\u2019l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). For example, \u201c[pjregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.\u201d Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (quotation marks omitted). Cases challenging a prior restraint on free speech also typically fit into this exception. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm\u2019rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Cases that only present live controversies in Holdings: 0: holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations 1: holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot 2: holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order 3: holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired 4: holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(\"To read the Wal-Mart plan literally would allow the plan to free ride on the efforts of the plan participant's attorney, contrary to the equitable concept of common fund.\u201d). 18 . Van Gemert, 444 U.S. at 478, 100 S.Ct. 745 (citations omitted). 19 . Id. (citations omitted). 20 . Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 208 F.3d 274, 277-78 (1st Cir.2000) (\"Typically, these courts have read the reimbursement clauses\u2019 silence on the issue of attorney fees as an ambiguity, then based their holdings on the prevailing state-law principle that ambiguities in insurance policies must be construed in the insured's favor.\u201d) (citing York Ins. Group of Maine v. Van Hall, 704 A.2d 366, 368 n. 3 (Me.1997)). But see Bishop v. Burgard, 198 Ill.2d 495, 261 Ill.Dec. 733, 764 N.E.2d 24 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 21 . E.g. Wells, 213 F.3d at 402; Blackburn Holdings: 0: holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause 1: holding that the federal common fund doctrine may not be applied in contravention of a plans terms 2: holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans 3: holding that motion to adjudicate lien was not preempted by erisa and illinois common fund doctrine overrode plan language and would reduce plans reimbursement of expenses paid for insured 4: holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "financial interest in AeroMed. First, the order does not in any form prohibit the offering of evidence; it prohibits certain claims. Second, the language clearly permits claims of medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, which are the issues in the instant case. Next, the order only prohibits the assertion of claims that have as an essential element a financial relationship between the physician and AeroMed. However, this case is a medical malpractice and lack of informed consent action that does not require proof of a financial interest as an essential element. See Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 824 (Pa.Super.2001) (stating the essential elements required to prove medical malpractice); and see Bey v. Sacks, 789 A.2d 232, 2001 WL 1602971 (Pa.Super. December 14, 2001) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 23 As stated above, questions referring to Holdings: 0: holding that a patient who endures an operation without his consent may base his action on a tortious battery 1: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery 2: holding that an operation without the patients consent sounds in battery 3: holding that battery is clearly a factual determination readily resolved by the application of a legal standard defining battery to the facts in question 4: holding that in pennsylvania lack of informed consent claims utilize a battery standard that is a physician commits battery where the patient does not consent to the procedure on his person thus constituting a harmful or offensive contact", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to lay any foundation at all for the documents and, thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them from evidence. We also agree that, when evidence is excluded, counsel generally may make an effective offer of proof by summarizing the excluded evidence. Benchmark Properties v. Hipolito, 161 Or App 598, 605, 984 P2d 927 (1999). However, that rule does not mean that an offer of proof is sufficient if counsel represents that a document has a certain identity but in addition (1) fails to represent that he or she is prepared to lay a foundation establishing its authenticity and, if the court excludes the document from evidence, (2) fails to request that the document be identified and placed in the record as an offer of proof. See State v. Busby, 315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The state could have requested a continuance Holdings: 0: holding timely and sufficiently specific objection is required to preserve error 1: holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal 2: holding that an offer of proof is not necessary to preserve an issue for appeal when the asserted error does not relate primarily to the admissibility of particular evidence but involves an underlying legal ruling that results in the exclusion of evidence as a consequence 3: holding that an adequate offer of proof is normally required to preserve error when a trial court excludes evidence 4: holding that to properly preserve an objection to the trial courts imposing a time limit for the presentation of evidence the objecting party must make a specific and definite offer of proof informing the trial court of the evidence that is being excluded by the limitation", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1342 (10th Cir.1981). While it is probably true that the police officer exerted some subtle psychological pressure on Nadworny (whether intentional or not), this Court, after a thorough and independent review of the written record, finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the police officer did not pressure Nadworny to the point that his will was overborne and his statements were involuntary. As both Nadworny and the Commonwealth agree, Nadworny was not in custody. In fact, because Nadworny called the police officer, the officer had no idea where petitioner was during their conversation. This was not a situation in which the police officer, knowing Nadworny\u2019s location, had only to go there to arrest him. Cf Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 531-33, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is nothing in the police Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him 1: holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station 2: holding that defendant in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a thirddegree assault charge 3: holding that a defendant who sought to receive the death penalty had the right to refuse to present mitigation evidence 4: holding that defendant was arrested  when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at *3-5 (D.D.C. February 16, 2006) (entering judgment in favor of the defendant where a plaintiff failed to file an EEO complaint regarding her claims of retaliation, and explicitly rejecting the argument that \u201ca claimant need not exhaust her administrative remedies for a claim based on retaliation when that retaliation claim arises after an administrative complaint has already been filed\u201d). A more recent view is that acts of alleged retaliation occurring after an EEO charge is filed need not be separately exhausted where they necessarily would have come within the \u201cscope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from [the] initial [EEO] charge[.]\u201d Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *8 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Lewis, 535 F.Supp.2d at 7 (<HOLDING>); Pierce v. Mansfield, 530 F.Supp.2d 146, 154 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 2: holding that a court cannot entertain claims arising from incidents omitted from an eeo complaint unless those incidents were within the scope of the investigation that would have followed the initial eeo charge 3: holding plaintiffs claims could not succeed without proof that the city had knowledge of prior incidents 4: holding that 8 incidents of assault theft robbery or burglary on the premises and 80 similar incidents within a 2bloek area within the prior 3 years did not constitute special circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "advice and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Jamaica, where he has resided ever since\u2014separated from much of his family, including his parents and his daughter, and from the country he had called home for most of his life. Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court offered Newman a ray of hope. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), it held that defense attorneys provide inadequate representation when they fail to advise their clients about the likely deportation consequences of pleading guilty. Armed with that decision, Newman filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, which provides a means of collaterally attacking a conviction when the person is no longer in custody. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Newman argued that a writ was appropriate Holdings: 0: recognizing that under the common law applications for writs of error coram nobis were civil in character 1: holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act 2: recognizing the all writs act gives federal courts authority to issue writs of coram nobis to correct fundamental errors in criminal proceedings where the person is no longer in custody 3: holding that this court has authority in appropriate circumstances to issue writs under all writs act 28 usc  1651a 4: holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under all writs act", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the constitutionality of a statute, the court must presume a statute enacted by the legislature is constitutional. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.1996); Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.1985). The party seeking to invalidate the statute as unconstitutional bears the burden of demonstrating the statute fails to satisfy constitutional requirements. Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex.1996). Where the trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a sufficiency of the evidence review to the factual findings and review its conclusions of law de novo. Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. deni 17, 222 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The State contends, and the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that purpose of stop was complete upon the issuance of the citation 1: holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation 2: holding that conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means 3: holding before the advent of the federal rules of evidence that the use of a tax return for the purpose of impeachment was proper 4: holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "undertook the defendant\u2019s retroactivity claim under plain error review standards because the defendant had failed to preserve the issue by objecting. The Supreme Court described its review under the plain error rule as discretionary, not mandatory. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. Further, the Supreme Court ultimately denied relief to Johnson because, even though the new rule was retroactive, under plain error there was \u2018ho basis for concluding that the error \u2018seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u2019 \u201d Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S. Ct. at 1550. \u00b646 These principles are not limited to federal jurisprudence, but are broadly recognized in different states and federal circuits: Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, (Ind. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Milligrock v. State, 118 P.3d 11, 15 (Alaska Holdings: 0: holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a mental state requirement he had not preserved another constitutional objection 1: recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively 2: holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review 3: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery 4: holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "which rejected the Plan. The Bankruptcy Code does not provide a standard for determining when \u201cunfair discrimination\u201d exists. See 203 N. LaSalle, 190 B.R. at 585 (noting \u201cthe lack of any clear standard for determining the fairness of a discrimination in the treatment of classes under a chapter 11 plan\u201d and that \u201cthe limits of fairness in this context have not been established\u201d). Rather, courts may examine the facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine whether unfair discrimination exists. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 636 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986) (\u201cThe language and legislative history of the statute provides little guidance in applying the \u2018unfair discrimination\u2019 standard.\u201d); see, e.g., In re Freymiller Trucking, Inc., 190 B.R. 913, 916 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 589 Holdings: 0: holding that a determination of unfair discrimination requires a court to consider all aspects of the case and the totality of all the circumstances 1: holding that an adverse credibility determination under the real id act must take into account the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors 2: holding the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances 3: holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances 4: holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u2018either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that [he or she] had a claim.\u2019 \u201d 2013 WL 717755, at *6 (quoting Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751, 759 (8th Cir.2009)). However, as discussed herein, Congress manifested a different intent for the applicable statute of limitations period for 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1658(a). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that by amending subsection (b), and not subsection (a), \u201cCongress was silent on the discovery or injury-occurrence rule.\u201d (Pl.\u2019s Resp. to Defs. at 28 n. 3 [Doc. No. 13].) In fact, in TRW Inc., the Supreme Court stated that a directive from Congress need not be explicit \u2014 it may also be implied from the text or structure of a particular statute. TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 27-28, 122 S.Ct. 441 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff also misapplies the Supreme Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that while as a general matter discovery should be freely permitted  j jurisdictional discovery is justified only if the plaintiff reasonably demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery 1: recognizing without explicitly affirming the general rule 2: holding that the more transformative the new work the more likely the use of the old work is a fair one 3: holding that the text and structure of the fair credit reporting act fcra demonstrates that congress implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by explicitly including a more limited one 4: recognizing general rule", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 105. 20 . Mims v. Fidelity Funding, Inc. (In re Auto International Refrigeration), 275 B.R. 789, 810 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2002). 21 . Id. at 811. 22 . Id. at 812. 23 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 101(a)(4). 24 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(a) and (b) 25 . Auto Interna'l Refrigeration, 275 B.R. at 812 (citing In re Metro Square, 1988 WL 86679 (Bankr.D.Minn.1988); In re PCH Associates, 122 B.R. 181, 198 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1990); In re Texaco, 73 B.R. 960, 967 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1987)). 26 . 73 B.R. at 967. 27 . Id. 28 . Id. at 968. 29 . Id. 30 . 29 B.R. 787 (D.Md.1983). 31 . Id. at 791. 32 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 506(b). 33 . United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). 34 . See, e.g., Bank of Honolulu v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 69 B.R. 105, 108 (9th Cir. BAP 1986) (<HOLDING>); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that an oversecured creditor is entitled to postpetition interest if the creditor is oversecured or if the estate proves to be solvent 1: holding that nonconsensual oversecured creditor shall receive the statutory rate of interest unless it can be characterized as a penalty 2: holding that nonconsensual oversecured tax claim is entitled to the statutory rate of interest unless the statutory rate constitutes a penalty 3: holding that when a creditor is oversecured solvency is not required for the creditor to be entitled to postpetition interest and fees and granting contractual default interest to the oversecured creditor of approximately 24 4: holding that when an oversecured creditor seeks interest on its claim courts apply the interest rate provided for in the contract", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "its own jurisdiction and to rectify any errors it may have made. Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review. Therefore, the propriety and legality of the exercise of the civil contempt authority of the tribal court must first be determined in the Ute Tribal Court system. Even if the contempt is considered criminal contempt, see Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988)(as to the distinction between civil and criminal contempt), after the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>), Congress enacted an amendment to the Indian Holdings: 0: holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization 1: recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians 2: holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation 3: holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians 4: holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in judicial speculation.\u201d Gustafson, 290 F.3d at 909. The court is to examine the record for evidence of potential or actual disruption, but not engage in excessive Monday morning quarterbacking of a police official\u2019s determination that potential disruption was present. See id. at 909-12; Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 845-46. Here, the record demonstrates that Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks perceived potential disruption from McGreal\u2019s conduct. In light of the need for structure, loyalty, and harmony in a police department, that potential disruption is sufficient to tip the Pickering scale in favor of Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks. Having found that Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks have carried their burden under the Pickering test, they are entitled to qualified immunity. See e.g. Gragg, 289 F.3d at 965-66 (<HOLDING>). Typically, this would end the analysis, but Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern 1: holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern 2: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 3: holding that defendants claiming qualified immunity to  1983 action were entitled to summary judgment where factual disputes were not material 4: holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of ORS 183.310(9), a rule is: \u201cany agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. The term * * * does not include: \u201c(a) * * * internal management directives * * * which do not substantially affect the interests of the public: \u00ab:{: * * \u2021 * \u201c(B) Within an agency, between its officers or between employees [.]\u201d The parties agree that the health policy constitutes a \u201cdirective, standard, regulation or statement.\u201d Further, the health policy has general applicability, as it applies to all inmates who receive or may need to receive medical care while incarcerated. See Smith v. Board of Parole, 250 Or App 345, 350-51, 284 P3d 1150 (2012) (<HOLDING>). The parties disagree about whether the health Holdings: 0: recognizing that cjlearly buie requires more than ignorance or a constant assumption that more than one person is present in a residence 1: holding that a noticeofrights form that plainly affects more than one person and encompasses more than an immediate set of facts and is applicable  to all inmates in a particular category is a rule 2: holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a \u201cfinal adjudication on the merits\u201d of the issue now precluded from re-litigation. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (2005). Because there was no final adjudication of Edison Learning\u2019s negligence, the School District\u2019s claim fails. At no point in the Viruet litigation did the court determine that Edison Learning was negligent. Even conceding the School District\u2019s arg 2, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (concluding there was \u201cno question of collateral estoppel ... because the ease was never tried\u201d and instead settled (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if considered final, settlement of a claim is not an automatic admission of liability. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Rue, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 187, 393 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Parties settle for many reasons, including to Holdings: 0: holding that because the settlement agreement here specifically did not contain any admission of liability the plaintiff must therefore prove some liability on the part of defendant 1: holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff 2: holding that where there has been no settlement or judgment of liability regarding the underlying claim any imposition of liability is not so immediate as to warrant declaratory relief on the issue of indemnification 3: holding that a binding settlement on a tax liability must follow the requirements of the tax code which include the execution of a closing agreement 4: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and Fenner had not misrepresented his condition as he was merely asked his opinion about his physical abilities: \u201cDo you have any injuries, you know, that would prevent you from doing this type of work.\u201d Fenner answered in the negative. Whether this ruling was correct must remain unexamined. Trimac\u2019s appeal on this issue was deemed untimely by this Court, and consequently, we are constrained to review only Fenner\u2019s post-employment conduct. 11 . Some of the cases the majority offers to support its argument are inapplicable, as well, because they rely on a lower standard than that required in South Dakota. See, e.g., Appleby, 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (considering whether an employee's actions aggravating a pri- or injury were merely reasonable); Amoco Chemical Corp., 318 A.2d 614 (<HOLDING>); Johnnie\u2019s Produce Co., 120 So.2d 12 (noting a Holdings: 0: holding exclusion h does not apply where employees were merely negligent 1: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 2: holding that written warnings that impacted the probability an employee would be terminated are adverse employment actions 3: holding an employees actions in disregarding his doctors warnings were negligent 4: recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "LEXIS 1468, at *9 n. 4 (D.S.C. Jan 31, 2000) (Plaintiffs' allegations that defendant \u201cpresented materially false information to the public in order to ensure the completion of a public offering that would provide him huge profits from the sale of his personally-held stock\u201d was sufficient to plead scienter); In re American Bank Note Holographics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F.Supp.2d 424, 444-45 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (\"[Defendant company] had the most to win by inflating the price of the IPO, and was thus motivated to make statements or omit facts that would result in a higher price.\u201d). 56 . San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 814 (2d Cir.1996) (quotations omitted); see, e.g., In re Crystal Brands Sec. Litig., 862 F.Supp. 745, 749 (D.Conn.1994) (<HOLDING>). 57 . The allegations in the Complaint, Holdings: 0: holding that alleged motives of directors and officers to maintain good relations with suppliers retailers and lenders and to protect their positions are insufficient because they pertain to virtually any company that manufactures goods 1: holding that allegations of a motive to maintain good relations with suppliers retailers and lenders  pertain to virtually any company that manufactures and distributes goods and are therefore inadequate 2: holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive 3: holding that the hobbs act jurisdictional nexus was met by the robbery of a delicatessen that sold goods produced out of state without mentioning whether the goods were purchased from outofstate or instate suppliers 4: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1988), and International Union UAW Local 91 v. Park-Ohio Ind., Inc., Nos. 88 Civ. 3145, 88 Civ. 3147, 1989 WL 63871 (6th Cir. June 15, 1989). In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit held that a beneficiary could not recover for extraeontractual damages against a fiduciary under Section 1132(a)(3) for improper processing of benefit claims. 857 F.2d at 518. In International Union, the Sixth Circuit held that neither Section 1132(a)(1)(B) nor Section 1132(a)(3) provide for extraeontractual compensatory damages. 1989 WL 63871, at *7. 24 . The Court notes that the Second Circuit does not adhere to the Seventh Circuit's presumption of awarding prejudgment interest in ERISA cases. See Mendez v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Assoc. and College Retirement Equities Fund, 982 F.2d 783, 790 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) 25 . In order to submit a claim for benefits Holdings: 0: holding that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases except in peculiar or exceptional circumstances 1: holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion 2: holding that prejudgment interest should be awarded when the claimant has been denied the use of money which was legally due 3: holding that a court may in its discretion award prejudgment interest in erisa cases where appropriate but it is not axiomatic that such interest should be awarded simply because  the prevailing party has demonstrated entitlement to the funds 4: recognizing general rule that prejudgment interest may be awarded in claims for liquidated amounts", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "firms or corporations liable\u201d is unambiguous and discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability. See, e.g., Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C.App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961). The parties t ic evidence of intent must be considered); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla.1980) (adopting intent rule and holding that release containing handwritten and preprinted terms was inherently ambiguous); Cram v. Toum of Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800, 575 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1991) (reversing summary judgment because accident victim filed an affidavit in which she stated she intended to discharge only the driver who injured her); Wells, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 521, 526 N.E.2d at 12 (<HOLDING>); Krauss, 852 P.2d at 1019-20 (same). A Holdings: 0: holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous 1: holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous 2: holding that court must determine intent of parties by reference to language of release turning to extrinsic evidence only when it determines as a matter of law that terms are ambiguous 3: holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous 4: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "it be argued that the timeliness of appellants' bad faith claim depended upon our Supreme Court\u2019s ruling that Miller was a permissive user of Madalyn Gower\u2019s vehicle, which ruling required appellee to pay the policy limits. A bad faith action under section 8371 is neither related to nor dependent on the underlying contract claim against the insurer. See March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 435 Pa.Super. 597, 646 A.2d 1254 (1994) (\u201ca claim brought under section 8371 is a cause of action which is separate and distinct from the underlying contract claim.\u201d). As a result, Miller (and, by extension, appellants) were not required to wait until the merits of the contract claim were decided to file suit for bad faith. See Boring v. Erie Insurance Group, 434 Pa.Super. 40, 641 A.2d 1189 (1984) (<HOLDING>); and Margolies v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Holdings: 0: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 1: holding arbitration decision disallowing insurers coverage defense binding in subsequent personal injury action where the issue was actually litigated and decided in prior action 2: holding that although the issue of coverage had not yet been decided appellants action under 8371 was a separate claim and the dismissal of that claim was instantly appealable 3: holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits 4: holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "under California\u2019s \u201cthree strikes\u201d law for perjury on a Department of Motor Vehicles driver\u2019s license application. Reyes had filled out a license application and attempted to take the written portion of the exam under the name of his cousin Miguel Soto. At trial, Reyes testified that he tried to take the exam for Soto because Soto was illiterate and had failed to pass. Because the perjury conviction was Reyes\u2019s third strike, he was sentenced to 26 years to life. Reyes is married and has two children who were one and three years old at the time of sentencing. Reyes contends that his 26 years to life sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by Lockyer v. An-drade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172-75, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (<HOLDING>), and Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,123 Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment 1: holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states 2: holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences 3: holding that a california state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25 years to life sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law 4: holding that 25 years to life sentence under the california three strikes law did not violate the eighth amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "decision is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. While it may generally be possible to permit a party to call a witness without disclosing the fact of his or her prior engagement by the opposing party, there may be little reason to require this effort if other expert witnesses are readily available. See Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 461. 5 . One such situation may be if on cross examination, the party who had originally retained the witness seeks to attack the expert's qualifications. In such a situation, a court may well decide that the opposing party should be permitted to attempt to rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony from the witness that the party had thought highly enough of the witness to consult him or her originally. See Granger, 656 P.2d at 1242, & n. 4 (<HOLDING>). 6 .On direct examination, appeEees\u2019 counsel Holdings: 0: recognizing split within the circuit on whether the rule is mandatory or discretionary but not resolving the conflict 1: recognizing the open question 2: recognizing but not resolving this question 3: recognizing this rule 4: recognizing without resolving the split in authority on the meaning of the word", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The consensual overhear applications and orders for eavesdropping devices worn on the person are not included in the appellate record as required by Supreme Court Rule 608(a)(6). See 210 Ill. 2d R. 608(a)(6) (the record on appeal must contain, among other things, eavesdropping orders and other similar documents). 4 Following oral argument, this court granted Stroud\u2019s motion to cite additional authority regarding the proper standard of review for eavesdropping necessity. Stroud argued that there was a split in the federal circuit courts regarding the proper standard of review. Our research reveals that the majority of circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, use an abuse of discretion standard of review. See United States v. Ramirez-Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219, 1222 n.l (10th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>), citing United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion 1: holding that the conclusion that the wiretap was necessary in each situation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and bringing the tenth circuit into accordance with the authority of a majority of other circuits 2: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion 3: holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "against a concrete sidewalk); State v. Jacobs, 34 Or.App. 755, 579 P.2d 881, 882 (1978) (conviction upheld where defendant placed four-year-old child in scalding hot water). Third, Begay made clear that the residual clause applies to offenses involving \u201cthe deliberate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms.\u201d Begay, 553 U.S. at 147, 128 S.Ct. 1581. In noting that the enumerated offenses all \u201ctypically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct,\u201d the Begay Court explained that the conduct involved in those offenses \u201c ) of Oregon\u2019s second-degree assault statute, Or.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 163.175(1)(b), presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and \u201ctypically involve[s] purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct,\u201d Begay, 9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Begay focused on a nearly identical Holdings: 0: holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude 1: holding that washington seconddegree assault with a deadly weapon statute was a crime of violence under guidelines section 4b12a1 without considering whether it was a per se crime of violence under the application notes 2: holding that a prior conviction for abusive sexual contact under 18 usc  2244a3 was a per se crime of violence within the meaning of the application notes and declining to consider application of the residual clause 3: holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence 4: holding that burglary of commercial building is crime of violence under guidelines", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "requested an attorney and interrogation had ceased. The Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the conviction, holding that the defendant\u2019s confession was voluntarily given. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding \u201cwaivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.\u201d Id. at 483, 101 S.Ct. 1880. To invoke a Fifth Amendment right to counsel, one must give \u201csome statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.\u201d McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); see also State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C. 426, 430, 510 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, this Court has held that [\u0430] Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 1: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease 2: recognizing two aspects to assertion of fifth amendment rights 1 a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand request was made for an attorney and 2 the request was for assistance with a custodial interrogation not for subsequent hearings or proceedings 3: holding a juveniles request to speak to a probation officer is not a per se invocation of fifth amendment rights 4: holding that an unequivocal invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel must be presented in a manner that a reasonable police officer under similar circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for the presence of an attorney", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Supreme Court concluded in Bell that strip searches were not per se unreasonable and could be performed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment on less than probable cause in some instances. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-560, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. In order to determine the reasonableness of the search and the instances requiring less than probable cause, the Supreme Court set out the following test: The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope L.Ed.2d 479 (1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980), aff'g, 479 F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Wis.1979) (<HOLDING>). Courts considering the strip search issue Holdings: 0: holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional 1: holding that arrestees for minor offenses may be subjected to a strip search only if jail officials have probable cause to believe that arrestees are concealing weapons or contraband 2: holding unconstitutional blanket jail policy of subjecting all arrestees to strip and visual body cavity searches 3: holding that police may search containers whether open or closed located within arrestees reach 4: holding that mandatory routine visual strip search policy for all arrestees who were to be introduced into general jail population was constitutional", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "criminal laws.\u201d Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3164, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Thus, based on our analysis of Williams\u2019 sentence pursuant to the Solem objective criteria, we hold that 11 DelC. \u00a7 4214(b), as applied to Williams, does not impose an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Conclusion The judgments of the Superior Court, which resulted in Williams\u2019 convictions and his sentencing as an habitual criminal, are AFFIRMED. 1 . Some time after the police left, Thornton saw a person wearing the clothes he had described sitting in the back seat of a police vehicle on 17th Street. 2 . State\u2019s Answering Brief at 7, Williams v. State, Del.Supr., No. 411, 1986 (citing Dalton v. State, Del.Supr., 252 A.2d 104, 105 (1969)) (<HOLDING>)). See also Tasco v. State, 223 Md. 503, 165 Holdings: 0: holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient 1: holding jury cannot return any verdict except acquittal when evidence is insufficient to corroborate accomplice witness 2: holding that mere presence at the crime scene without more is insufficient to prove accomplice liability 3: holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict 4: holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(2d Cir. 1982)). The Court will not construe unfair competition/misappropriation claims to apply to the two musical compositions at issue, however, because federal copyright law preempts them. Compare 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 301(a) (preempting state law claims \"equivalent\u201d to exclusive rights under the federal copyright laws for, inter alia, unpublished works created prior to 1978), with \u00a7 301(c) (excluding sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972 from preemption until 2067). 19 .\u201d[T]he existence of a valid copyright\u201d is the first essential element for a claim of copyright infringement, under both New York law and federal law. Lime Grp., 784 F.Supp.2d at 436; see also Capitol Records, LLC v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., No. 12 Civ. 6646 (AJN), 2015 WL 1402049, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, a claim of unfair competition by Holdings: 0: holding that a fraud claim premised on thirdparty reliance raises a cognizable claim under new york law 1: holding that the most analogous claim for relief under new york law is a claim for employment discrimination 2: holding that dalessio did not justify removal where the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was that defendants made materially false statements to them in a manner prohibited by new york law and in violation of duties created by new york law and no construction or interpretation of federal law was required 3: holding that new york law applies to this matter 4: holding that elements of a common law copyrightinfringement claim under new york law mirror those of a federal copyrightinfringement claim", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "no matter how quickly and ably given, could salvage a fair trial for the defendant.\u201d). Moreover, apparently the only reason the State sought to introduce the prior inconsistent statement was its belief that the jury would be swayed by the statement when determining guilt, or innocence. See United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir.1984) (\u201c[I]t would be an abuse of the [impeachment] rule, in a criminal case, for the prosecution to call a witness that it knew would not give it useful evidence, just\u201d so it could introduce hearsay evidence against the defendant in the hope that the jury would miss the subtle distinction between impeachment and substantive evidence \u2014 or, if it didn\u2019t miss it, would ignore it.\u201d (emphasis added)). See also Nance, 331 Md. at 566, 629 A.2d at 642 (<HOLDING>); State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343, 378 S.E.2d 754, Holdings: 0: recognizing that questions of intent and credibility make it difficult to grant summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of proof 1: holding that absence of epidemiological evidence not fatal but makes his task to show general causation more difficult 2: recognizing the jurys role in evaluating credibility 3: recognizing inherently difficult task of proving a negative 4: recognizing the jurys difficult task of separating substantive proof from impeachment evidence bearing solely on a wit nesss credibility", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1 . The amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub.L.No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (\"IIRIRA\u201d), are not applicable to the instant case. As such, references herein are made to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it existed prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA. The IIRIRA repealed the section under consideration in this case, but provided transitional rules that apply to cases, such as the instant case, where the deportation proceedings commenced prior to April 1,, 1996. The transitional rules provided that the INA applies as codified prior to the passage of the IIRIRA. See IIRIRA \u00a7\u00a7 306(c)(1), 309(a). 2 . In early 1996, Scorteanu had married Doi-na Zieminska and retained attorney Mosabi Hamed to file an 1 1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Damon W. Taaffe, Comment: Tolling Holdings: 0: holding that  242bc3as time bar is not jurisdictional and thus subject to equitable tolling 1: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling 2: holding title vii subject to equitable tolling 3: holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that the ninetyday filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and is subject to equitable tolling", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "representation that the investment program was \u201cbacked\u201d or otherwise sponsored by Jackson Hewitt. D. No Reliance by the Kamans The Kamans were also unable to prove the reliance element necessary to establish an apparent agency. Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrated that they did not rely on a purported agency relationship between Jackson Hewitt and JHIS when they decided to invest with Prewett. First, Dr. Kaman conceded that he knew the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service office in Sarasota was a franchise operation before investing with Prewett. It follows that he could not have reasonably believed that JHIS was owned, controlled, or operated by the franchisor, Jackson Hewitt. See Mann v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., No. 90 C 5518, 1990 WL 205286, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 1990) (<HOLDING>); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Lesch, 319 Md. 25, Holdings: 0: holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy 1: holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees 2: holding that tort claims act contemplates waiver of immunity when negligence of public employees causes unsafe dangerous or defective condition on property owned and operated by the government 3: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 4: holding that the employees of a local real estate franchisee could not maintain claims against the franchisor based on apparent agency when the employees knew that the franchisee was independently owned and operated", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Landvest Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-2025-CM, 2006 WL 897612, *7-8 (D.Kan. Mar. 31, 2006) (three years prior to plaintiff's termination was a reasonable scope in light of the three-year statute of limitations). 17 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). 18 . Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.Kan.2005); Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D.Kan.2001). 19 . Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 646 (D.Kan.2004) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)). 20 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 615-16; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D.Kan.2003). 21 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 616; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Steil, 197 F.R.D. at 445. 22 . See United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Sprint, 236 F.R.D. at 529 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that assertions of privilege must normally be raised as to each record sought and each question asked so that  the court can rule with specificity 1: holding that products dissimilar in price can have similar features so as to compete with each other 2: holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors 3: holding that each provision of a statute must be afforded meaning when possible 4: holding that each element required under the act must be included in the written notice and each element must be sufficiently clear and accurate ", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "affidavit did not allege any facts suggesting that any relationship existed between the two after that employment was terminated. See Bixler v. State, 471 N.E.2d 1093, 1100-01 (Ind.1984) (defendant not entitled to change of judge where trial judge went to same church as victim\u2019s family and had drawn up will some years earlier for step-father of victim\u2019s mother). Furthermore, the fact that Judge Gifford imposed a sentence in excess of the minimum does not, as McKinney contends, \u201creflect bias against McKinney and sympathy for the victim\u2019s family.\u201d Id. at 9. As discussed further in Section VI of this opinion, McKinney\u2019s sentence is justified by the heinous nature of his crime and the existence of only one mitigating circumstance. See Johnson v. State, 472 N.E.2d 892, 911 (Ind.1985) (<HOLDING>), reh\u2019g denied. Judge Gif-ford\u2019s denial of Holdings: 0: holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts 1: holding that imposition of lengthy sentences did not show prejudice where sentences were warranted by facts shown in the evidence 2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to modify hfo sentences where sentences were not illegal and sixty days had transpired since imposition of the sentence 3: holding that the law allows the government to offer reduced sentences in exchange for assistance even if it results in sentences of such disparity as would strike many as unfair 4: holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the last sentence of the statute. The statute sets forth the duty a vehicle operator has to pedestrians. The last sentence of section 41-6-80 states that the seetion sets aside any conflicting provision of the traffic rules and regulations found in chapter 6 of the annotated Utah Code or of a local ordinance. The plain language of the section clearly states that if either a local ordinance or a state statute under chapter 6 creates a duty for a vehicle operator that is any more or less than that stated in this section (which, inter alia, is to exercise the appropriate pre caution upon observing any child), that ordinance or statute is set aside. See Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 41-6-80. 150 The jury was given several instructions on the various duties of a driver and also on those of a pe .1992) (<HOLDING>); Shpigel v. White, 357 Md. 117, 741 A2d 1205, Holdings: 0: holding that jury should decide whether plaintiffs testimony proved reasonable and necessary medical expenses 1: holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence 2: holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary 3: holding that reliance must be proven by some evidence 4: holding that a statutory entitlement to payment for reasonable and necessary medical treatment cannot give rise to a property interest until the payments in question have been proven to be reasonable and necessary", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "evidence of these matters is not required to sustain a conviction. Indeed, the \u201caffirmative links\u201d analysis is a way \u201cto explain why the circumstantial evidence in a particular case [is] sufficient for conviction.\u201d Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747. In addition, the trial court, as trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and could have disbelieved the defense witnesses\u2019 testimony that others had used Wiley\u2019s car. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. In such a case, there would be no basis for considering Wiley\u2019s possession of the car to be shared with others. Wiley also relies on Miller v. State, 627 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd), for the proposition that evidence that the defendant possessed keys to pp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 741-46 Holdings: 0: holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger 1: holding evidence that showed only that defendant drove car in which cocaine was found was insufficient to connect him to it especially in light of his attempts to dissociate himself from passenger who was high and in possession of pop at time of arrest 2: holding evidence did not connect defendant to narcotics found in individual bags inside a larger bag in a car following the defendants car when the only connection was his fingerprints on outer bag and when the driver and passenger of the car in which the drugs were found exhibited nervousness and other factors indicating consciousness of guilt 3: holding that defendant who was a passenger in a car had joint constructive possession of drugs found next to the defendants luggage in truck of car even where she disclaimed ownership of the drugs 4: holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ORDER OF THE COURT. Appellant\u2019s motion for rehearing is d r citing Graham, which the trial court granted. The court resentenced Roman to forty years in prison for count one and a consecutive fifteen-year prison term for count two followed by twenty-five years of sexual offender probation. The court imposed a concurrent fifteen-year term in prison for count three. We affirm Roman\u2019s fifty-five-year aggregate prison sentence on the basis of Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (<HOLDING>). We certify conflict with Peterson v. State, Holdings: 0: holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham 1: holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence 2: recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly  apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences 3: holding that probation is not a sentence 4: holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 262-63, 102 S.Ct. 2421 (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964)). Coe says that because Tennessee\u2019s waiver practice has not been consistent in cases with similar circumstances, it cannot serve as the basis for a procedural bar. The state responds by citing numerous eases that establish waiver, and it has the better of the argument. Coe\u2019s eases are mostly either adverse, or too old to constitute current \u201cstrict and regular\u201d practice. The few that remain are isolated and unpublished, and so are also insufficient to defeat an otherwise \u201cstrict and regular\u201d practice. See Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn.1987) (not mentioning waiver); Moore v. State, No. 03C01-9212-CR-00445, 1994 WL 17864, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 25, 1994) (<HOLDING>); Sneed v. State, No. 03C01-9201-CR-00027,1992 Holdings: 0: recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver 1: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 2: holding that trial court has no duty to establish waiver on record 3: holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver 4: holding that record did not establish knowing waiver", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and later search at station); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353, 127 S.Ct. 2065, 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007) (approving the retrieval of call records and text messages from the defendant\u2019s cell phone incident to his arrest, and finding that the \u201cincident to arrest\u201d basis for this ruling was unaffected by the fact that the police transported the defendant a short distance before conducting this search); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding a search of a cell phone incident to an arrest for the limited purpose of obtaining the cell phone number, which in turn was used to subpoena call history records from the telephone company); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fuentes, 368 Fed.Appx. 95, Holdings: 0: holding that while law enforcement officers properly separated and assumed possession of a cell phone from arrestees person during the search incident to arrest a warrant was required before the information data and content of the cell phone could be accessed and searched by law enforcement 1: holding a warrantless search of cell phone contents did not exceed permissible scope of search incident to arrest 2: holding that the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest includes the contents of a cell phone found on the arrestees person 3: holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone 4: holding that finley authorizes a police officer to search the electronic contents of a cell phone recovered from the area within an arrestees immediate control", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "A.2d 300, 304 (App.Div.) (finding requisite level of intent if insured were guilty of child molestation and concluding, \u201c[i]t is simply against public policy to indemnify a person for a loss incurred as a result of his own willful wrongdoing\u201d), cert. denied, 122 N.J. 147, 584 A2d 218 (1990). Teti disagrees, contending that New Jersey law applies and that New Jersey has \u201cnot adopted the strict [Pennsylvania] test of the \u2018inferred intent doctrine.\u2019 \u201d Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment, doc. no. 8, at 4. Instead, Teti argues, under New Jersey law, the intent to injure may be presumed only \u201cwhen the [insured\u2019s] actions are particularly reprehensible\u201d in the underlying case. Voorhees v. Preferred Mwt. Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 165, 607 A.2d 1255, 1265 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Teti submits that this case does not rise to Holdings: 0: holding that accident does not include intentional act if insured acted with intent to harm and noting that intentional acts exclusion applies if insured acted with specific intent to harm 1: recognizing strong presumption in favor of parents right to custody absent misconduct or neglect which renders the parent unfit 2: recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child 3: holding that  statements of insured parent at public meeting questioning competency of teacher albeit unquestionably intentional could not trigger presumption of intent to injure because parents conduct was not particularly reprehensible 4: holding that trial court abused its discretion in admitting alcoholism experts opinion that the insureds mental capacity was so impaired at the time of the shooting that he could not form intent to injure opinion lacked an adequate foundation when there was no scientific basis regarding the effects of intoxication on mental capacity to form intent to injure", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "rate that is added to the total amount of commissions earned. As such, NHC\u2019s nonrecoverable draw functions much more like a salary than a true draw on commissions. Regardless of whether the Level I plan constitutes a salary plus commission, a quota bonus plan, or a hybrid of both, the pre-determined compensation referred to by the Defendant as a \u201cnon-recoverable draw\u201d does not represent commissions. To the contrary, in light of the way that compensation actually functions, it represents a salary. Therefore, this portion of the account executives\u2019 compensation cannot be taken into account when determining whether more than fifty percent of the Plaintiffs\u2019 earnings represent commission, as is required to qualify for the retail-service exemption. See Donovan, 1986 WL 11266, at *4 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the Court must examine only the true Holdings: 0: holding over 1: holding that the commission exercises substantial discretion in selecting the appropriate ratemaking methodology and this is especially true where as here the issues involve complex factual determinations peculiarly within the expertise of the commission 2: recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss 3: recognizing that the only true commission portion of the salaries appears to be those amounts over the threshold level 4: holding that the commission may only exercise jurisdiction over utilities expressly included in the scope of the pua", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "characterize a claim of procedural error as one of jurisdictional dimension. The fact that a trial court may have erred along the course of adjudicating a dispute does not mean it lacked jurisdiction. Thus, while we might casually say, \u201cJudge Flywheel assumed jurisdiction,\u201d or \u201cthe court had jurisdiction to impose a ten-year sentence,\u201d such statements do not have anything to do with the law of jurisdiction, either personal or subject matter. Real jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without any service of process. Thus characterizing other sorts of procedural defects as \u201cjurisdictional\u201d misapprehends the concepts. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 541-42 (Ind.2006) (emphasis in original) (<HOLDING>). In Packard v. Shoopman, our supreme court Holdings: 0: holding that the alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the unsafe building act was a procedural rather than jurisdictional error and was thus waived when it was not raised in a timely fashion 1: holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional 2: holding that petitioner could not collaterally attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of an agency decision 3: holding that the juvenile courts alleged failure to approve by written order the filing of a delinquency petition was a procedural error and not a jurisdictional one and thus could not be attacked collaterally 4: holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for providing compensated lawyers where the defendant cannot afford to compensate counsel himself eliminates the opportunity for such extraneous influences on criminal proceedings. Nor was the district court entitled to rely on Rivera-Corona\u2019s statement during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with Marchi\u2019s representation. According to Rivera-Corona, Marchi demanded money that his client presumably did not have as a condition of going to trial, and was prepared to \u201cprosecute\u201d \u2014 presumably sue\u2014 Rivera-Corona\u2019s family if he didn\u2019t pay it. If true, these facts could support a motion to set aside his plea, as Rivera-Corona\u2019s statement of satisfaction with Marchi at the colloquy could be explained by the same facts. See United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The implication of Rivera-Corona\u2019s remarks Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs evidence that his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50 of the jobs previously available to him was enough to classify him as disabled under the ada 1: holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty 2: holding that the movant failed to establish that plea counsel coerced him to plead guilty to avoid taking the case to trial 3: holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the defendant did not admit to facts demonstrating the required mental state 4: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty  and threatened him if he did not take the plea", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and signed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized in writing ... .[ ] The easement granted by Hoover over his property, lot 2, for the benefit of Zaher and his property, lot 3, was reduced to a written document. Under the statute of frauds, however, to transfer an interest in property, all parties possessing an interest in the subject property must sign the document. Forge, 458 Mich at 206 (\u201c[a]ll owners of jointly held property must sign a contract conveying an interest in the property,\u201d e.g., an easement in Forge); Slater Mgt Corp v Nash, 212 Mich App 30, 32; 536 NW2d 843 (1995) (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that Hoover\u2019s wife, Linda, Holdings: 0: holding that the equal rights amendment requires that wife as well as husband be permitted to recover for loss of consortium 1: holding that the statute of frauds applies to a sellers wife holding only a dower interest in the property so the wife must sign the purchase agreement as well as the seller husband 2: holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted 3: holding that a reservation clause gave a life estate to a spouse pursuant to a deed reserving use of the property to both husband and wife for life even though the husband had no interest in the property 4: holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "this suit was not a deficiency judgment because it was an action on a separate note for a different debt \u201cand for which a conveyance of other property was made as security.\u201d Id. 143 Ga.App. at 77, 237 S.E.2d at 626. Likewise, in Baker v. NEI Corp., 144 Ga.App. 165, 241 S.E.2d 4 (1977), two notes were secured by two deeds that covered two different properties. Each deed con tained an open-end provision. The lender foreclosed on both deeds, but only obtained confirmation of the sale under the second deed. The lender then sued for the itional property and had obtained confirmation of that sale, it would still need to obtain confirmation of the sale of the Tift County tracts in order to seek a deficiency judgment. See Surety Managers, Inc. v. Stanford, 633 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 121, 70 Holdings: 0: holding that suit on a note secured by two properties was barred when lender failed to obtain confirmation of the foreclosure on one of the properties 1: holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met 2: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 3: holding impairment of secured creditors foreclosure remedy permissible 4: holding that federal express fee required by lender was a transaction imposed by the lender as incident to the extension of credit and needed to be disclosed within the finance charge", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "23 S.W.3d at 485. A landowner with an easement of access is entitled to compensation through an inverse condemnation claim whenever the access is \u201cmaterially and substantially impaired.\u201d Heal, 917 S. t in the public alley.\u201d TXDOT asserts that GAR does not possess an easement of access and that the \u201cdriveway\u201d was not a \u201cpublic road or alley.\u201d TXDOT further asserts that \u201cthere was no dedication of the State\u2019s property as a public road\u201d and that GAR\u2019s \u201ctemporary permissive use of the property\u201d did not \u201cresult in a dedication.\u201d \u201c[A]butting property owners have private rights in existing streets and alleys in addition to their rights in common with the general public.\u201d City of San Antonio v. Olivares, 505 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Tex.1974); see also State v. Meyer, 403 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex.1966) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThis right is in effect a private right of Holdings: 0: holding that waters in utah are of two classes private and public and title to public waters is in the public all are equal owners that is have coequal rights therein 1: recognizing that abutting property owners have certain private rights in existing streets and highways in addition to their right in common with the general public to use them 2: holding that it is well settled that while one tenant in common may acquire homestead rights in the common property the rights so acquired are not superior to the rights and remedies of the other joint owners he can acquire no such rights as will prejudice or in anywise interfere with the rights of the other tenants in common 3: recognizing private right of action 4: recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "abuse occurrence.\u201d In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned is mindful that Florida has adopted the \u201ccause\u201d theory to assess whether one or more \u201coccurrences\u201d have taken place as the term \u201coccurrence\u201d might appear or be defined in many comprehensive general liability policies. The theory has been utilized by the courts where, unlike in this case, the \u201coccurrence\u201d policy either failed to define \u201coccurrence\u201d or defined \u201coccurrence\u201d as being in the nature of an accident \u201cincluding continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful conditions.\u201d See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. RLI Ins. Co., 807 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (reasoning that \u201c[t]he act which causes the damage constitutes the occurrence\u201d); See also Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So.2d 263 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). In such cases, courts inquire whether \u201cthere Holdings: 0: holding each act of shooting from a vehicle constituted a separate and distinct crime explaining where completed offense has occurred a separate charge may be brought for a repetition of the same conduct 1: holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of a single event an indicium of lack of an administrative scheme 2: holding a judgment that reserved the issue of child support indefinitely and not pending the occurrence of a specific event to be final 3: holding that each separate pull of a trigger during the same shooting spree is an event sufficiently in time and space to constitute an independent occurrence 4: holding that the liability creating event constitutes an occurrence", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and, thus, the order fell easily within the ambit of Rule 2 (a)(6). But even more to the point, National Enterprises has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the chancery court\u2019s 1994 order. In its first notice of appeal in 1994, National Enterprises referred to the 1994 order as a \u201cfinal Order\u201d and stated that it was appealing issues relating to the deeds, easements, and the License Agreement and specifically mentioned ingress and egress and parking. Because National Enterprises failed to perfect its appeal in a timely fashion by tendering the record too late, it failed to appeal the 1994 order. Because the order was not appealed, it became a final order and became binding on all the parties. See, e.g., Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fauria, 279 Ark. 291, 651 S.W.2d 80 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In addition to its notice of appeal, on May Holdings: 0: recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment 1: holding that poliey language stating that insurer will pay all interest accruing on judgment against its insured requires an insurer to pay interest on the entire judgment amount 2: holding that court of appeals was without jurisdiction to modify judgment against insurer because judgment against insurer became final when it failed to appeal 3: holding that in a dispute between insurer and insured in which the insurer admitted liability hut disputed the amount of damages it was only after entry of a judgment upon that verdict that the claim became liquidated 4: holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "ALJ did not accurately describe the treatment received by Ms. Grier for fibromyalgia and the ALJ also failed to credit Ms. Grier\u2019s longitudinal history of back pain. The Regulations state that relevant factors for an ALJ to consider when evaluating a claimant\u2019s pain symptoms include, \u201cthe type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication\u201d taken by the claimant, as well as any \u201c[treatment, other than medication, [claimant] receives or ha[s] received for relief of [claimant\u2019s] pain or other symptoms[.]\u201d 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v). A claimant\u2019s statements \u201cmay be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints[.]\u201d SSR 96 \u2014 7p; see also Farley v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-2219-VEH, (Doc. 11 at 9-12) (N.D.Ala. Dec. 2, 2009) (<HOLDING>). However, the ALJ must not draw any inferences Holdings: 0: holding that exaggeration of pain versus treatment sought was substantial evidence for the aljs credibility determination 1: holding the alj was permitted to consider fact claimant had not sought treatment for her alleged back pain 2: holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence 3: holding that ves unchallenged testimony was substantial evidence supporting aljs decision 4: holding that court reviews aljs decision for substantial evidence on the record as a whole including the new evidence submitted after the determination was made", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "counsel filed a motion asserting that the court did not follow the proper procedures for a jury trial waiver. The motion was denied and the defendant was sentenced. This appeal followed. Both the Federal and New Hampshire Constitutions guarantee a right to trial by jury. U.S. CONST, amends. VI, XIV; N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 15. We consider the defendant\u2019s argument under the State Constitution first. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 (1983). Because the Federal Constitution offers no greater protection than our State Constitution with regard to the rights asserted by the defendant, we need not undertake a separate federal analysis and cite federal law only to aid our analysis. See State v. Bousquet, 133 N.H. 485, 488 (1990); see also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (<HOLDING>). It is well established that \u201c[w]hen waiving a Holdings: 0: holding that decisions on whether to plead guilty or waive the right to a jury trial reside solely with the defendant 1: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict 4: holding that written jury waivers alone cannot validly waive a defendants right to a jury trial", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966), the United States Supreme Court also expressed the view that a witness\u2019 motive to lie does not render his or her testimony inadmissible: \u201cThe petitioner is quite correct in the contention that [the informant], perhaps even more than most informers, may have had motives to lie. But it does not follow that his testimony was untrue, nor does it follow that his testimony was constitutionally inadmissible. The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury.\u201d Id. at 311, 87 S.Ct. at 418. Other cases in accord with Cervantes-Pacheco include: United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545, 547 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362, 365 Holdings: 0: holding that claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing defendant to proceed while incompetent was facially insufficient where defendant did not allege he actually was incompetent to proceed to trial or insane at the time of his offense 1: holding that the due process clause prohibits the trial of a person who is incompetent 2: holding that a contractors experience in his profession qualifies him to testify as an expert to reasonable rates 3: holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify 4: holding that an informants anticipated receipt of 1000 if his testimony resulted in a conviction did not render him incompetent to testify", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that \"gender\" connotes cultural or attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their physical characteristics. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender Prom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1 (1995) (\"gender [is] to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female\u201d). See also JEB v. Alabama, - U.S. -, -n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1436 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While it may be useful to disaggregate the definition of \"gender\u201d from \"sex\u201d for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort, using the terms interchangeably to refer to whether an employee is a man or a woman. 2 . Compare, e.g., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (<HOLDING>) and Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 Holdings: 0: holding that samcscx sexual harassment claims are actionable under title vii 1: holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii 2: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 3: holding that noneconomic injury resulting from a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment is actionable under title vii 4: holding that title vii does not protect employees from harassment based on sexual orientation", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "commenced by filing a complaint with the court.\u201d Fed. R.Civ.P. 3. Plaintiffs rely heavily on statements made by the United States Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals to support their position that filing a complaint alone is sufficient for statute of limitations purposes. Pis\u2019. Mem. in Opp\u2019n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (\u201cIn a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations.\u201d); Pis.\u2019 Mem. in Opp\u2019n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal. While it is true that federal and District of Columbia law do not require service to be effected within the statute of limitations period, see Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, 424 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that it is proper to consider prelimitations period conduct in determining whether conduct within the limitations period violated the antitrust laws 1: holding that the property appraiser was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the failure to bring the action within the limitations period was the direct result of the property appraisers failure to timely perform a related duty owed to plaintiff 2: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 3: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 4: holding that the plaintiff filed suit within the statute of limitations even though he could not prove the time at which he mailed his petition", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to agree are subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA.\u201d In the more common case in which Boys Markets injunctions have been issued, the strike is occurring at the time of suit or is imminent. See 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law 1461 (5th ed. 2006). Boys Markets itself concerned an ongoing violation of a no-strike clause. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 239-40, 90 S.Ct. 1583. In theory, questions may arise as to the application of Boys Markets to job actions short of actual strikes. But we have held that activities short of an actual strike may also violate no-strike clauses, including work slowdowns and concerted refusals to work overtime. Natl Elevator Indus., 776 F.2d 374; see also Avco Corp. v. Local Union # 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). The fact that there is no present ongoing Holdings: 0: holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief 1: holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer 2: holding that concerted refusals to work overtime fell within the proscriptions of a cba nostrike clause and were subject to injunctive relief under boys markets 3: holding that lack of subject matter jurisdiction precluded court from awarding injunctive relief as well as damages 4: holding that injunctive relief is a form of equity which is generally subject to the courts discretion", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a claim for or the receipt of workers\u2019 compensation benefits or other payments arising from events unrelated to the ior injury is inadmissible because it is \u201cclearly irrelevant to the issues being tried.\u201d Leslie v. Higgason, 779 So.2d 470, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Evidence concerning a \u201c[plaintiffs] previous injury\u201d may, however, be relevant to the issue of the defendant\u2019s liability or the amount of damages due. Id. There are also circumstances where evidence specifically concerning litigation or claims by a plaintiff for a prior injury will be considered relevant to matters at issue and therefore admissible. Thus, \u201ca plaintiff may properly be questioned about prior lawsuits or claims for injuries similar to those complained of in the present laws 2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, evidence relating to a subsequent Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred in excluding from evidence the application for social security benefits that the plaintiff made eight months prior to the accident at issue in which he described in detail his inability to work which was probative in establishing the plaintiffs condition prior to the accident and stating that since the plaintiff was denied social security benefits  there was no collateral source 1: holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits 2: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits 3: holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits 4: holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "exemption statutes like Mo.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 513.-430(10)(e). A credible argument against ERISA\u2019s preemption of such state exemption statutes exists and has been adopted by what one court has called an \u201cemerging minority.\u201d In re Kazi, 125 B.R. 981 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1991). The Eighth Circuit has recently resolved this issue against the position taken by the trustee, by holding, \u201c... ERISA does not preempt state law exemptions of pension plan benefits reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor.\u201d In re Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir.1992). However, when the Debtors asserted their exemptions the courts within the Eighth Circuit that had considered this pre-emption question had reached conflicting results and the Circuit Court had not yet ruled. See In re Gaines, 121 B.R. 1015 (W.D.Mo.1990) (<HOLDING>), compare, In re Vickers, 116 B.R. 149 Holdings: 0: holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy 1: holding a state workers compensation regime preempted by erisa to the extent state law applied to pension plans governed by federal law 2: holding that erisa does not preempt revstatmo  51343010e because it is entirely consistent with both erisa and the bankruptcy code 3: holding that to the extent revstatmo  51343010e affects erisa it is preempted 4: holding that a state election law is preempted only to the extent that it conflicts with federal law", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the services rendered by the Firm may have been of some incidental benefit to Heller, given the broad description of the services rendered and the services already rendered by Heller\u2019s counsel, this Court concludes that there was no direct correlation between the services rendered by the Firm and the actual disposition or preservation of Heller\u2019s collateral. In essence, the Firm was representing the Debtors \u2014 nothing more. Thus, the incidental benefits derived by Heller from the Firm\u2019s representation do not trigger Section 506(c). Id. Moreover, such standard potential administrative expense claims should not be transformed into Section 506(e) claims when the Court does not approve them as administrative expenses. See FDIC v. Jenson (In re Jenson), 980 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Proto-Specialties, Inc., 43 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that debtors obligation to pay portion of debt representing administrative expenses of collection was dischargeable 1: holding that  506c was not intended as a substitute for recovery of normal administrative expenses from the debtors estate 2: holding that although the lessor was not entitled to an administrative expense claim under  365d10 for the debtors use of leased property during the first sixty days of the ease the lessor would be entitled to those expenses under  503b1 to the extent the lessor could prove the expenses represented the actual necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate 3: holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate 4: holding that  506e is not intended as a substitute for the recovery of administrative expenses normally the responsibility of the debtors estate", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "pretrial proceedings, Defendant was repeatedly advised of the risks he faced by choosing to proceed without counsel. Nevertheless, Defendant unequivocally maintained throughout the proceedings, orally and in writing, that he wished to represent himself. Defendant argues that certain technical errors, specifically a typographical error in the indictment and the prosecutor\u2019s initial misstatement of the maximum sentence at the arraignment, render his conviction invalid. Without a showing of prejudice, these errors do not constitute grounds for reversal. See United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1015 (9th Cir.1981). Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice; the technical errors were promptly corrected. See Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 645-46, 34 S.Ct. 456, 58 L.Ed. 772 (1914) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that instructional errors that are trial errors are subject to harmless error analysis 1: holding that incorrect charges on substantive elements of a crime constitute reversible error 2: holding that error in denying such challenge is reversible error without demonstration of prejudice 3: holding that technical errors in arraignment do not constitute reversible error absent actual prejudice to the defendant 4: holding the denial of a bill of particulars was not reversible error because it failed to cause the defendant any prejudice", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of the identification, intent, and modus operandi of defendant. The trial court expressly limited the admission of the evidence of the subsequent rape in instructions to the jury both before the tender of the evidence and in its final mandate to the jury immediately prior to their deliberations. As the evidence of the subsequent rape was admitted in part to show intent and modus operandi of defendant, remoteness in time of the second act is less important to its admissibility. Id. As defendant concedes, this Court has upheld the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) where the crimes] wrongs, or acts occurred after the offenses for which a defendant was on trial. State v. Hutchinson, 139 N.C. App. 132, 136, 532 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, under the plain language of the rule, Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of gang involvement was properly admitted to prove motive for participating in the alleged crimes 1: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge 2: holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive 3: holding the trial court properly admitted evidence of defendants subsequent conduct in determining whether he possessed the intent and motive for the first degree burglary charge 4: holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the owner of the collective work also owns the constituent parts of the collective work. See Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F.Supp. 62, 64 (S.D.N.Y.1996)(\u201c[W]here the owner of the copyright for a collective work also owns the copyrights for its constituent parts, registration of the collective work satisfies the requirements of Section 411(a) for purposes of bringing an action for infringement of any of the constituent parts.\u201d); Greenwich Film Prod., S.A. v. DRG Records, Inc., 833 F.Supp. 248, 252 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (copyright registration for motion picture was sufficient to cover musical compositions contained in sound track of picture, even though musical compositions were prepared in advance of completion of film); Howard v. Sterchi, 725 F.Supp. 1572, 1575-76 (N.D.Ga.1989) (<HOLDING>). These cases are supported by the leading Holdings: 0: holding that the juvenile defendants who voluntarily left their homes in the middle of night to ride to the police department in patrol cars and who were told they were not under arrest were not in custody 1: holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets 2: holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary 3: holding designer of log homes properly registered her purported copyrights in floor plans as independent derivative works by registering the plan books in which they were published 4: holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to as a \u201cmodified categorical approach\u201d in which we look to the record of conviction, including the indictment, plea, verdict, and sentence (or any other documents admissible under the federal regulations to prove a criminal conviction, see 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.41 (1995)) to determine whether the actual offense of which the alien was convicted qualifies as a crime of violence. See Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.2000); Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir.2000); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964); see also Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 334 (BIA 1996)(en banc). The courts have emphasized that it is not what the alien did, but the crime of which he was convicted, determined by the record of conviction, that is dispositive. Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d at 1133 (<HOLDING>); In re Madrigal-Calvo, 21 I. & N. Dec. 323, Holdings: 0: holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction 1: holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 2: holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted 3: recognizing that a court may look to the charging document in making a crime of violence determination but only where the statute provides disjunctive methods of committing the offense and the court needs to determine which of the statutory alternatives is involved in the particular case 4: holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was unable to perform all of the material duties of any occupation for which plaintiff was or might have reasonably become qualified based upon her education, training or experience or that solely due to her arthritis, arthralgia and/or myalgia she was unable to earn more than 80% of her Indexed Covered Earnings. Aplt. App. Vol. 7 at 701560. Ms. Null argues that medical records alone could not establish her ability to perform different occupations and that the testimony of a vocational expert was required to establish that fact. She asserts that it was LINA\u2019s obligation to secure such evidence. Normally, with an initial disability claim, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that she is unable to perform in any occupation. Torix v. Ball Corp., 862 F.2d 1428, 1431 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). There is authority, however, that the burden Holdings: 0: holding a state cannot impose an income tax on indians whose income is solely from reservation sources 1: holding that a claimant is required to establish a physical inability to follow any occupation from which he can earn a reasonably substantial income rising to the dignity of an income or livelihood although the income may not be as much as was earned prior to the disability 2: holding that net farm income when applied to a producer in the fishing industry means net income from all fishing activity not just that income from a particular commodity and further providing that the regulations make it reasonably clear that the determination of   net fishing income is not to be made solely on the basis of tax return information if other information is relevant to determining the producers net income from all   fishing sources 3: holding that trial judge has discretion to not include bonuses as part of gross income if he or she determines that the bonus income is not dependable or would place a hardship on a parent 4: holding that in determining the amount of income to impute to a party the court does not necessarily have to impute the amount of income the party would earn by his or her best efforts to gain employment equal to the parties capabilities", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49 [49 U.S.C. \u00a7 30102]) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 7 . A claim which meets the requirements of the \"hanging paragraph\" is known as a \u201c910-claim.\u201d See Dean, 537 F.3d at 1318 n. 2. 8 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1129(a) provides that \"[t]he court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met: .... \u201d 9 . See, e.g., Sparks v. HSBC Auto Fin., No. 1:06cv670, 2007 WL 2080289, **5-6, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51943, at *14-*15 (S.D.Ohio July 18, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Horr v. Jake Sweeney Smartmart, Inc., No. Holdings: 0: holding debtors are entitled to establish and recover their compensatory damages under 11 usc  105a for violations of the discharge injunction 1: holding debtors negative equity in a tradein vehicle included in amount financed created a purchase money obligation within the meaning of 11 usc  1325a 2006 we summarily affirm the portion of the district courts order at issue in no 081850 2: holding that  1325a is mandatory and that the general powers of the court codified in 11 usc  105a do not permit a court to confirm a plan that does not satisfy  1325a 3: holding a bankruptcy court is empowered to reopen a bankruptcy case on its own motion under 11 usc  105a 4: holding that bankruptcy court has discretionary power pursuant to 11 usc  105a to order preconfirmation plan payments in a chapter 12 proceeding", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "so that Plaintiff could attend medical appointments (Id. at 37, 39); (3) former supervisor Jose So-mohano denied Plaintiffs request to leave early during a bleeding emergency because he did not have a cashier to replace Plaintiff (Id. at 43, 74); and (4) Betty Montano denied Plaintiffs request for a part-time accommodation as ordered by Plaintiffs doctor (Id. at 43-44). Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding these allegations because Plaintiffs assertions are inadmissible hearsay and because Plaintiff failed to create a nexus between the discriminatory acts she described and her alleged termination. Defendants fail on both accounts. Plaintiffs assertions are not hearsay. See Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094-1095 (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Plaintiff does not need to show Holdings: 0: holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent 1: holding that a text message constituted hearsay insofar as it was offered to prove the truth of the statement asserted 2: holding that the district courts improper admission of an unauthenticated registration statement was harmless because the proponent of the registration statement later properly authenticated the statement in a motion to reconsider 3: holding that defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection to admission of another part of same statement 4: holding that a hearsay statement can itself be considered in first determining if a conspiracy existed when the statement was made", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "create such a doubt, it is material even if it would not convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates was the killer. Under the circumstances presented by the record before us, we cannot be confident that the result of Harrington\u2019s murder trial would have been the same had the exculpatory information been made available to him. We hold, therefore, that Harrington\u2019s due process right to a fair trial was violated by the State\u2019s failure to produce the police reports documenting their investigation of an alternative suspect in Schweer\u2019s murder. See Mazzan, 993 P.2d at 74-75 (finding Brady violation where withheld \u201cpolice reports provided support for [the defendant\u2019s] defense that someone else murdered\u201d the victim); Davis v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 588, 491 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecutions failure to disclose information regarding a witnesss past cooperation with law enforcement did not constitute a brady violation in light of other impeachment evidence in the record including testimony regarding the witnesss extensive drug use and past cooperation with the dea 1: holding claim based on failure to disclose information to the epa preempted 2: holding prosecutions failure to disclose information of other africanamerican females in vicinity of drug sale constituted a brady violation 3: holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial 4: holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was alive when the complaint was filed. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). A party\u2019s subsequent acts will render a case moot if those acts make it impossible for the court to grant \u201c \u2018effectual relief.\u2019 \u201d Church of Scientology of Cal v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653,16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895)). However, because the \u201c[m]ootness of an action relates to the basic dispute between the parties\u201d and \u201cnot merely the relief requested,\u201d a case will not be rendered moot by subsequent acts if some of the requested relief remains available. Intrepid v. Pollock, 907 F.2d 1125, 1131 (Fed.Cir.1990); accord Church of Scientology of Cal, 506 U.S. at 12, 113 S.Ct. 447 (<HOLDING>). In his application to the BCNR for the Holdings: 0: holding that a case is not moot so long as the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief for the injured party 1: holding plaintiff must prove that he or she was deprived of  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 2: holding that an appeal is not moot so long as the appellate court can fashion relief that is both effective and equitable internal quotation marks omitted alteration in original 3: holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief 4: holding that constitution requires  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner  for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was voided, meaning that it was not good at that time. Not destroyed in any sense of the word of shredding or tearing up, no, that\u2019s not the way I meant it.\u201d In short, the only facts Cotton reported involved voiding \u2014 not destroying \u2014 citations; and there is no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in Cotton\u2019s circumstances would have believed the voiding of tickets was a violation of law. After reviewing the record under the applicable standard of review, we conclude there is legally insufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s implied finding that a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed the facts Cotton reported were a violation of law. See Harris County Precinct Four Constable Dep\u2019t v. Grabowski, 922 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex.1996) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Lane v. Tex. Dept, of Health, No. Holdings: 0: holding evidence legally sufficient 1: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge 2: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination by the employer based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the employer had constructively discharged the plaintiff 3: holding evidence legally insufficient 4: holding although there was some evidence plaintiff subjectively believed conduct he reported violated the law there was legally insufficient evidence this belief was reasonable", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "trial court erred in denying appellant\u2019s motion and opting for venue in Harris County. While both statutes contain language of mandatory effect, the receivership venue section contained in the insurance code was amended subsequent to the workers\u2019 compensation venue provision and its language is specific that exclusive venue for insurance companies in receivership lies in Travis County. The language contained in section 4(h) \u2014 \u201cshall have exclusive venue\u201d \u2014 could not be clearer in expressing the Legislature\u2019s intent. Other cases examining this issue outside of the workers\u2019 compensation area are analogously supportive of this conclusion. Whitson v. Harris, 792 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1990, no writ). See also Langdeau v. Burke Investment Co., 163 Tex. 526, 358 S.W.2d 553 (1962) (<HOLDING>). Such a statutory scheme as to venue is Holdings: 0: holding that adverse inferences are permissive not mandatory 1: holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of  presenting additional facts to the district court 2: holding that predecessor statute to section 4h provides for permissive venue 3: holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution 4: holding that pursuant to rule 2a2 a party may appeal an order denying a motion for permissive intervention", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to Herrada, the property right at issue in this case is her right to retain possession of her money, subject only to lawful actions by the City that comport with due process. Herrada clearly has a property interest in her money. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that prisoners have a property interest in their money). ' Determining whether the City improperly interfered with or deprived her of this interest, however, presents a more difficult question. The City argues that because Herrada voluntarily paid her parking ticket, no government action interfered with her property interest. This position finds support, at least by way of analogy, in two decisions from the Tenth Circuit. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Yearous v. Niobrara County Mem\u2019l Hosp., 128 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant did not deprive the plaintiff of a property interest in his continued employment because the plaintiff voluntarily resigned when he refused to report to work after being transferred to a new position 1: holding that property interest in continued expectation of public employment does not include right to actually occupy position 2: holding that former municipal judge did not have property interest in continued employment 3: holding in an employment discrimination case that the continued employment of the plaintiffs rival in a position previously held by the plaintiff did not constitute a systemic violation 4: holding that plaintiff did not have dueprocessprotected property interest because he failed to sufficiently plead a rule or other mutually explicit understanding from the manual or otherwise bridling the reason for which he could be terminated and thereby creating a sufficient expectation of continued employment  the critical component herewithout alleging such a bridle plaintiff was an atwill employee consequently he lacked a property interest in his continued employment", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "status of a business invitee. It is not easy to reconcile this concession with Sherwood\u2019s argument that, at the moment of the terminal ion of the claimant\u2019s employment, he ceased being an employee. 7 The decision of the Appellate Court in Fulco was codified by the 1993 enactment of \u00a7 31-275 (16) (B) (iii). 8 The facts of this case do not require us to consider the more difficult question of whether an injury is compensable if it is incurred when a discharged employee returns to the job site. There is authority for the proposition that such an injury is compensable if industry custom allows a discharged employee to return to pick up his or her paycheck on a designated day, or to retrieve his or her personal belongings. See Nails v. Market Tire Co., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Parrott v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 145 Holdings: 0: holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction 1: holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act 2: holding that injury incurred when employee returned to retrieve paycheck six days after employment had been terminated occurred in course of employment 3: holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga  349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action 4: holding compensable injuries sustained when employee returned to employers premises two days after employment had been terminated in order to retrieve personal tools and tool box", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "he is either a donee or The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Appellants are not parties to any contract that may exist between Vantage and SFWA. Appellants instead contend in their second issue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. To determine whether any Vantage and SFWA contract expressed a clear intent to directly benefit Appellants, we must interpret the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. See Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425. Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, the assorted emails and attachments that Appellants claim constitute the contract between Vantage and SFWA nowhere identify Appellants by name as intended beneficiaries. Compare Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 588 (<HOLDING>), with Brown v. Fullenweider, 52 S.W.3d 169, Holdings: 0: recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary 1: holding decrees failure to identify attorney by name was insufficient to confer thirdparty beneficiary status on him concerning decrees allocation of the payment of his fees 2: holding that courts considering government contracts must take a more narrow view of thirdparty beneficiary status  and apply a more stringent test to determine whether a third party qualifies for beneficiary status 3: holding decrees identification of person by name was sufficiently specific for purposes of thirdparty beneficiary status 4: holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Nurse Sancho premised on their alleged deliberate indifference to Harrison\u2019s serious medical needs. Unlike the \u201cpurpose to harm\u201d standard that governs Fourteenth Amendment claims where an official \u201cmakes a snap judgment because of an escalating situation,\u201d Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554, where \u201cactual deliberation is practical,\u201d deliberate indifference is sufficient to support a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Id. The Supreme Court has contrasted, for exam- pie, an officer\u2019s decision to give chase to a fleeing suspect with \u201cthe luxury enjoyed by prison officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations.\u201d Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Porter, 546 F.3d at 1139 (citing Lee Holdings: 0: holding that but for standard applied to retaliation case brought under texas law 1: holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied 2: holding purpose to harm standard applied to highspeed police chase 3: holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion but applied an incorrect standard 4: holding the manifest error standard of review is the proper standard to be applied to the mixed question of law and fact presented by a determination of whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is most commonly used in other contexts to refer to proceedings initiated before a court. See Iowa Code \u00a7 611.2 (\"A civil action is a proceeding in a court of justice in which one party, known as the plaintiff, demands against another party, known as the defendant, the enforcement or protection of a private right, or the prevention or redress of a private wrong.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Kelso v. Noble, 1998 WL 552831, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 1998) (\u201c[W]e think it clear that a \u2018civil action' requires the involvement of the courts in a matter presented for trial.\u201d); E.E.O.C. v. Ill. State Tollway Auth., 800 F.2d 656, 660 (7th Cir.1986) (\"Congress uses the term 'civil action\u2019 in specific reference to a lawsuit.\u201d); Key Buick Co. v. Comm'r., 613 F.2d 1306, 1307-09 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>). Black's Law Dictionary defines a \u201ccivil Holdings: 0: recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 1: holding that the term civil action or proceeding used at 42 usc  1988 1976 amended by pub l 96481  205 94 stat 2321 1980 referred to litigation in court and not agency proceedings 2: holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 3: holding that under 42 usc  1988 which allows the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights action under  1983 a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorneys fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust  quoting srep no 941011 p 4 1976 4: holding that 42 usc  1988 may permit recovery of those charges according to the custom of the community", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 Santa Clara L. Rev. 739 (1990). 30 See Texas Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 71.01, providing in part: \"(d) Three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities.\u201d Section 71.02(a) defines criminal activities as collaboration in drug, gun, sex, or gambling crimes, and including other felonies. See also Cal. Penal Code \u00a7 186.22 \"Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act\u201d (STEP); part (b)(1) provides for mandatory enhanced sentences for \"gang\u201d crimes; parts (e) and (f) provide a definition of gang and classify certain crimes as \"gang activity\u201d. But see People v. Green, 227 Cal. App. 3d 692, 700, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 146 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 31 See Molina, supra; Burrell, supra. 32 See Holdings: 0: holding that active participation in a criminal street gang means that there is a relationship between the defendant and the gang that is more than nominal passive inactive or purely technical and that defendant must devote all or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang 1: holding appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal district courts decision to admit evidence that defendant was a member of a gang because gang membership was relevant to show motive and intent 2: holding that murder committed by minor gang members was not foreseeable result of sale of alcohol to gang members 3: holding that experts testimony as to aspects of gang culture relevant to the case including requirements of members obedience silence and staunch defense of other gang members and the punishment meted out to a gang member who violates these requirements went to factual matters outside the experience of the average juror 4: holding the district court properly admitted expert testimony on defendants active gang membership", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "bars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue sought to be p ration of orders to provide installments of a fixed amount, rendering the party's overall exposure a direct consequence of the order's duration. See, eg., Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App.1983) (noting marked difference in available remedies where one was limited in compensation and duration and the other posed much greater degree of liability with long term consequences). Although the incentive to vigorously defend might be artificially created by the operation of collateral estoppel principles, augmenting a party's incentive to litigate in the first instance would undermine the very purpose behind permitting t ication of workers' compensation benefits. See\" Messina, 874 P.2d at 1066 n. 13 (<HOLDING>). Temporary total disability benefits are Holdings: 0: holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period 1: holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel 2: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 3: recognizing that rationale underlying inapplicability of collateral estoppel to unemployment hearings is useful when analyzing same doctrine in workers compensation cases 4: holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the puddle, what the liquid was, or that any U of M or State Fair staff had notice of it. She testified that the puddle was not on the step when she ascended the stairs at 10:00 p.m., but was there when she descended the same stairs at about 10:30 p.m. The puddle was on the step at most a half hour, but could have been made only moments before appellant\u2019s fall, since there is no evidence suggesting that others had walked through the puddle. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, and assuming the puddle was made just after 10:00 p.m., 30 minutes was not sufficient time to give respondents constructive notice of the late-night puddle made in the coliseum stands during the horse show. Cf. Otis v. First Nat\u2019l Bank of Minneapolis, 292 Minn. 497, 195 N.W.2d 432 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Saari v. S.S. Kresge Co., 257 Minn. 290, 293, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of a puddle of water that had accumulated on a bank floor on a rainy day 20 minutes after the bank opened 1: holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor 2: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 3: holding that the trial court committed no error in sustaining objection to plaintiffs testimony that the water had been there for some time because the plaintiff had no personal knowledge of how long the puddle had been there 4: holding that drying footprints and tracks leading away from puddle of liquid was no evidence that the puddle had been there long enough to put the store on constructive notice", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at 1474. Whether ERISA preempts a plaintiffs state law claims is a question of law we review de novo. Ward v. Management Analysis Co. Employee Disability Benefit Plan, 135 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1998); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir.1993). A. Government Exemption The Basts first argue that the district court improperly granted summary judgment because there is an issue of fact as to whether the Plan was managed by an agency of the government. ERISA exempts from preemption any plan that is established or maintained by the U.S. government, a state government or by any agency or instrumentality of the government. 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1002(32); 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1003(b)(1). The Basts argue that during the relevant time period, the Plan was \u201cmaintained\u201d by the R 1253 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Cole\u2019s employee benefit plan is not a Holdings: 0: holding that a public trust that exercised control over the beneficiarys employment did not change the benefit plan into a government plan because the trust did not establish the plan or control it 1: holding that plan did not comply 2: holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary 3: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 4: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the circuit court determines that amending his petition would do substantial justice. See Maryland Rule 4-332(h); See Hunt, 443 Md. at 249-50, 116 A.3d at 483-84 (requiring petitions filed pursuant to Crim. Proc. \u00a7 8-301 to, inter alia, comply with the pleading requirement contained in Maryland Rule 4-332(d)(9)). In determining whether allowing Respondent to amend his petition would do substantial justice, the circuit court must articulate its reasoning on the record. If the circuit court concludes that Respondent may amend his petition to comply with the pleading requirement in Maryland Rule 4\u2014332(d)(9), Respondent\u2019s averment must allege which convictions he is \u201cactually innocent\u201d of, meaning which offenses he alleges he \u201cdid not commit.\u201d See Smallwood, 451 Md. at 320, 152 A.3d at 793 (<HOLDING>); see also Maryland Rule 4\u2014332(d)(9). Holdings: 0: holding that only defendants who can allege they are actually innocent meaning they did not commit the crimes for which they are convicted may bring a petition for relief under crim proc  8301 1: holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense 2: holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not know the residence for which they obtained a warrant actually contained multiple units 3: holding in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction that once federal funds are distributed to the states and obligated they cannot be recouped and that it would be impossible  to award the plaintiffs the relief they request if they should eventually prevail on the merits 4: holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "fiduciaries by this subchap-ter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary.... 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1109(a). Under \u00a7 1109(a), the fiduciary is liable for at least two types of damages: losses to the plan and profits made by the fiduciary. In order to recover damages for losses to the benefit plans, the Plaintiffs must show causation between the breach of fiduciary duty and the loss. See In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 445 (3d Cir.1996) (interpreting-similar language in 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1104(c) to require causal connection and quoting Brandt v. Grounds, 687 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>)); Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270, 286 n. 23 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that  1109a requires causal connection between breach and loss 1: holding that eight months between charges and dismissal created inference of causal connection 2: holding that the language of the statute clearly requires  proof of a causal connection between the drivers intoxication and the death of another person 3: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 4: holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conduct constitutes sex discrim ination.\u201d La Day v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir.2002). If this determination is answered in the affirmative, the court must decide whether the challenged conduct meets the applicable standards for either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. For example, same-sex harassment that is \u2018severe or. pervasive\u2019 enough to create a hostile environment ... might be excluded from the coverage of [T]itle VII because it was not discriminatory on the basis of sex. On the other hand, same-sex harassment that is indisputably discriminatory might not be serious enough to make out either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. Id. (citation omitted). See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int\u2019l Security, Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Court\u2019s first task is to determine Holdings: 0: holding that transsexuals are not a protected class under title vii in response to the plaintiffs argument that because a persons identity as a transsexual is directly connected to the sex organs she possesses discrimination on this basis must constitute discrimination because of sex 1: recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex 2: holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim 3: holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination 4: holding that actions of plaintiffs coworkers which included slashing plaintiffs tires grabbing their crotches and making kissing gestures and uttering a phrase used to describe oral sex however vulgar  did not constitute  discrimination because of sex", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of personnel management ... with proper regard for their... constitutional rights.\u201d See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2301(b)(2), 2302(b)(12); See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1991) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717 (1978), as reprinted- in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N, 2860, 2865) (\u201cCongress did expect \u2018prohibited personnel practices\u2019 to cover supervisors\u2019 violations of employees\u2019 constitutional and privacy rights.\u201d); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 225 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1988); Jarvis v. Cardillo, No. 98 CIV. 5793, 1999 WL 187205, at *9 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 6, 1999) (observing that the CSRA has been interpreted \u201cflexibly to cast a wide net over constitutional challenges arising from federal employment\u201d); Porter v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Army, No. 93 C 6900, 1995 WL 461898, at *6 & n. 4 (N.D.Ill. July 17, 1995) (<HOLDING>). The question presented by Defendants\u2019 motion Holdings: 0: holding that admiralty and general maritime claims fall within the category of any other civil action governed by the second sentence of  1441b 1: recognizing that claims alleging due process violations arising out of employment actions fall under the catchall category of prohibited personnel practices  2: holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions 3: holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration 4: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "court found, as the majority suggests, that their respective state statutes were unconstitutional because they lacked an \u201cescape clause\u201d providing for a written agreement between the parties. The court in McIntyre found the applicable statute problematic because it barred the petitioner from the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood \u201ceven if respondent had agreed with [the donor that he would have parental rights] before he gave her his semen in reliance on that agreement.\u201d 98 Or. App. at 468. The court noted the statute contained no qualifying language and, in a footnote, compared a Washington state statute which contained a written opt-out provision similar to that found in K.S.A. 38-1114(1). 98 Or. App. at 468 n.2; see also In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 33 n.7 (Colo. 1989) (<HOLDING>). The court in Mclntryre, however, did not Holdings: 0: holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights 1: recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights 2: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights 3: recognizing in footnote that a growing number of legislatures have sought to clear up this confusion by enacting laws that extinguish parental rights of semen donors unless the donor acknowledges his paternity in writing 4: holding that a father who impregnated his childs mother in the usual and customary manner after signing a preconception agreement to forego parental responsibilities was not merely a sperm donor and thus was not statutorily bound to give away his parental rights", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in a habeas proceeding. Hill v. Norris, 2010 Ark. 287, 2010 WL 2210926 (per curiam). The State is entitled to amend a felony information before the case has been submitted to the jury, provided the amendment does not change the nature or degree of the crime charged or create an unfair surprise for the defendant. See Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413; Glaze v. State, 2011 Ark. 464, 385 S.W.3d 203. Although appellant asserts that the amendments |Bhere changed the nature of the crime charged in that he was charged with felony capital murder but convicted of premeditated capital murder, the changes made in this case did not change the nature of the crime charged. See Terry v. State, 371 Ark. 50, 263 S.W.3d 528 (2007) (citing Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 918 S.W.2d 114 (1996)) (<HOLDING>). Here, the nature of the offense remained the Holdings: 0: holding premeditated murder and felony murder are the same crime with various means of commission 1: holding that whether amendment to capital felonymurder information to add the charge of premeditated and deliberate murder was improper turned on whether there was prejudice or surprise 2: holding intoxication to a degree that made specific intent impossible was a valid defense to a charge of willful premeditated firstdegree murder 3: recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest 4: holding that states pretrial amendment of the original indictment charging defendant with willful and deliberate first degree murder to add an alternative murder theory of depraved mind murder did not add a different offense and therefore did not prejudice the defendant", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291.\u201d Wheeler Mach. Co. v. Mountain States Mineral Ent., Inc., 696 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1983)(per curiam). See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291 (2004)(providing that \u201c[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review maybe had in the Supreme Court\u201d). The Court may alter or amend an interlocutory order at any time before the filing of the final judgment. See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d at 1217. This approach is in accord with other Judges\u2019 opinions from this District. See Hunt v. Green, 2005 WL 1661732, 376 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1049 (D.N.M.2005)(Browning, J.); Shannon v. United States, No. CIV 02-717, at 3-4 (D.N.M. August 11, 2004)(Black, J.)(<HOLDING>); Organ Water & Sewer Assoc, v. Moongate Water Holdings: 0: holding prior order was interlocutory and subject to change at any time because all claims not yet litigated 1: holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable 2: holding that all matters litigated or which could have been litigated in al foreclosure action are forever at rest  3: holding that a case should not proceed as a b2 action where virtually all of the issues would have to be litigated individually in order to determine whether a particular alleged class member was entitled to any damages at all 4: holding that burden was on nonmoving party to show issue was not litigated where moving party presented arbitrators order showing issue had been litigated", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "instead, the plaintiff has received the benefit of her bargain where the defendant has substantially performed on the contract. See Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C.Cir.1985); see also Sununu v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 35, 39 (D.D.C.2009) (noting that \u201c \u2018[substantial performance\u2019 is generally considered to exist when a contracting party has failed to render full performance but any defects in performance are considered minor\u201d). Thus, to sustain her claim that she has standing based on her overpayment for the AARP membership, Austin-Spearman must plausibly allege that Defendants failed to render substantial performance of the AARP membership contract. Compare, e.g., Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 733 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) with Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that state burdenofproof rule was not a mere incident of form of procedure and denied admiralty plaintiff the benefit of the full scope of federally created rights 1: holding that the plaintiff could not show surprise when the plaintiff had received the additional terms from the defendant prior to the agreement 2: holding that the plaintiff was not denied the benefit of the bargain and therefore lacked standing where plaintiff had bought a prescription painkiller that was later withdrawn from the market but plaintiff found the painkiller to be effective and did notsuffer harmful side effects 3: holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits 4: holding that the plaintiff was denied the benefit of the bargain and therefore had standing where plaintiff did not receive the full number of agreedupon minutes he purchased in a wireless cellular phone service agreement", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Trial clock if they are to count as excluda-ble days from her own Speedy Trial clock. Maryea is correct that the case law in this Circuit has not addressed head on whether the Co-Defendant Clause as a general matter is subject to a reasonableness limitation, and we decline to do so here. However, the court agrees with the government that, under the facts of this particular case, the district court did not err when it denied Maryea\u2019s motion to dismiss. In line with the principles outlined in the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Bloate as well as the reasoning of our sister circuits, the Court will assume without deciding, for the purposes of this case, that a reasonableness requirement applies, and that the requirement may be met through a factors-based assessment. See Bloate, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 & Holdings: 0: holding that the press and public can be constitutionally excluded from a pretrial suppression hearing 1: holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation 2: holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7 3: holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under  3161h7a 4: holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but may be excluded only when a court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under  3161h7", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "based on Feeder Fund property. B. The Objecting Claimants Did Not Entrust Cash or Securities With BLMIS for the Purpose of Trading or Investing in Securities Further, the Objecting Claimants failed to fulfill the \u201ccritical aspect of the customer definition\u201d \u2014 they did not entrust cash or securities with the debtor for the purpose of trading or investing in securities. In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.2006) (\u201cThe critical aspect of the customer definition is the entrustment of cash or securities to the broker-dealer for the purposes of trading securities.\u201d) (quoting Appleton v. First Nat\u2019l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir.1995)); see also Rosenman Family, LLC v. Picard, 420 B.R. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd, 395 Fed.Appx. 766 (2d Cir.2010), (<HOLDING>); In re ESM Gov\u2019t Sec., Inc., 812 F.2d 1374, Holdings: 0: holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities for purposes of  510b 1: holding rosenman was a customer under sipa because he entrusted funds with the debtor blmis for the purpose of investing in securities 2: holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds 3: holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtors securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities 4: holding that an investor who entrusts cash with the debtor for the purpose of trading or investing in securities has a fiduciary relationship with the brokerdealer", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "prior adversary proceeding to allow Defendant to change his position on this issue for purposes of this adversary proceeding. CONCLUSION Based on its conclusion that Defendant is bound by collateral estoppel to the Court\u2019s prior determination of insolvency and equitable estoppel to his admissions that the Debtors were insolvent from 2004 through 2012, the Court concludes that Defendant\u2019s attempt to satisfy the Loan through a stock redemption in Holding was ineffective to satisfy Defendant\u2019s obligations under the Loan since the stock had no value at the time of the redemption. See In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir.1983) (finding that a corporation received nothing of value in a stock redemption because the corporation was insolvent); Schafer v. Hammond, 456 F.2d 15 (10th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). Based upon the foregoing and since the sole Holdings: 0: holding that the transfer of stock in an insolvent corporation did not constitute fair consideration to support conveyance of property to its stockholder 1: holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors 2: holding that transfer of property to llc involved no consideration for state conveyance tax purposes because it was a unilateral act and not the result of a bargainedfor exchange 3: holding in forfeiture case that circumstances surrounding mothers conveyance of stock to her soninlaw were sufficient under wisconsin law to create constructive trust in stock in daughters favor where testimony showed such was intent of conveyance despite facts that stock registered in husbands name and that no documentation supported testimony 4: holding that an insolvent corporations salary payments to a corporate officer did not lack fair consideration because there was no evidence that the salary was either excessive or unreasonable or that the corporation did not receive full value in return", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "assets. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the sponsor\u2019s use of a trust, rather than payment directly from general assets, does not automatically obviate any potential conflict of interest. The parties cite to no Ninth Circuit authority expressly addressing whether the plan sponsor\u2019s use of a trust precludes a finding of structural conflict. The Court, however, need not resolve herein either of the above-referenced disputes. Rather, as discussed below, the Court, assuming, arguendo, the existence of a structural conflict, finds no reason to accord such conflict any significant weight, as plaintiff has failed to submit evidence demonstrating malice, self-dealing or a parsimonious claims-granting history on the part of defendant. See Metropolitan Life, 128 S.Ct. at 2351-52 (<HOLDING>); Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969 (noting level of Holdings: 0: recognizing conflict 1: recognizing structural conflict ordinarily will be less important where administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential bias 2: holding that a structural conflict of interest exists when an insurer acts as both the plan administrator and the funding source 3: holding that district court was required to give conflict some weight but the existence of the conflict alone was not determinative when record contained no evidence of claims administration history or of claims administrators efforts to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy 4: recognizing the conflict", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "factor for consideration. Whether the number 50 in this hypothetical District is a minimum, a maximum or just a guideline for the permissible number of osteopathic beds was a subject of confusion among the witnesses who testified at the hearing. Also subject to confusion was whether the proposed rule has the effect of limiting non-osteopathic facilities to 95% of the toal bed need as computed under Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code. (11) In determining the need for osteopathic and allopathic beds in a given area, it is the generally accepted practice of health planning experts to consider such factors as historical, current and projected utilization or occupancy rates of existing acute care beds, the average of length of patient stays, and the admission rates of physicians (<HOLDING>). Another useful predictor of need for Holdings: 0: recognizing significant differences in text of state and federal equal protection clauses 1: recognizing distinction between two types of waiver 2: recognizing split among district courts 3: recognizing the differences in admission practices among specialties and types of physicians 4: holding defense applicable to both types of claims", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "burden is on Cig-na to demonstrate \u201cconstitutionally significant inconvenience[.]\u201d Id.; see also id. (\u201cBecause we conclude that the First American defendants have not demonstrated any constitutionally significant inconvenience, we find no infringement of their individual liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\u201d). None of the evidence presented by Cigna conforms to this Fifth Amendment framework. Rather, Cigna offers only proof related to its lack of contacts with Alabama, but this type of evidence is essentially meaningless when the federal statute bestowing this court with federal question jurisdiction contains a nationwide service of process provision, such as ERISA does. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also discussion supra, at 1292 n. 2. At a Holdings: 0: holding that  1132e2 allows for nationwide service of process and thus jurisdiction and that the nationwide service of process provision comports with the constitution 1: recognizing that although provision of municipal service is not fundamental right inequitable provision of that service is subject to equal protection analysis 2: recognizing that erisas venue provision can provide broad access to the federal courts and clarifying that nationwide service of process is available only if the suit is an action under this subchapter   emphasis in original quoting 29 usc  1132e2 3: recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act 4: holding that ricos nationwide service of process provision did not authorize service outside the united states", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "made by individuals with substantial influence over plaintiff's employment); Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F.Supp. 558, 564 (N.D.Ill.1989) (if deci-sonmaker's sources of information about plaintiff are \"polluted by racial bias, that might be enough to poison the well\u201d). See also Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201ccircumstantial evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere at a plaintiff's place of employment is relevant to the question of motive in considering a discrimination claim\u201d); Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1342 (1st Cir.1988) (\"The inquiry into a corporation's motives need not be artificially limited to the partic ular officer who carried out the action.\u201d). But see Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The Bank relies heavily on Mazzella v. Holdings: 0: holding that comments relating to age made some three to fifteen or more years prior to plaintiffs discharge were not relevant to show that he was fired because of his age 1: holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference 2: holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive 3: holding that supervisors reactions to comments did not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination where comments were made six months prior to plaintiffs discharge and were unconnected to the discharge decision 4: holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an English transaction entered into by English parties with the reasonable expectation that their rights and obligations would be construed and enforced under English law. In international contracts, the choice of law and forum clauses generally will be given effect in our courts unless any of the four conditions is present: (1) the clauses are the \u201cresult of fraud or overreaching;\u201d (2) the chosen forum is gravely inconvenient or unfair; (3) \u201cthe fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy;\u201d or (4) the clauses \u201ccontravene a strong public policy of the forum state.\u201d Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd\u2019s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotations omitted). See also Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-16, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Holdings: 0: holding that forum and law selection clauses are prima facie valid if 1 the parties choice is not a product of fraud undue influence or overweening bargaining power 2 the choice is not unreasonable and unenforceable if the chosen forum is seriously inconvenient for the trial of the action and 3 enforcement would not contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought 1: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 2: holding order dismissing action without prejudice based on contractual forum selection clause is final and appealable because it terminates the litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum 3: holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts 4: holding that a forum selection clause should not be enforced where a consumer is told by a corporate agent to ignore boilerplate contract language containing a forum selection clause where there is a material difference in bargaining power and where the forum designated by the contract has little to do with the transaction and is gravely inconvenient for the parties and witnesses", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with respect to prejudice.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770) (second alteration in original). The error at issue in this case is the lack of congruence or consistency between, on the one hand, the crime as charged in the indictment and found by the jury and, on the other, the crime for which the defendant was sentenced. It is thus possible to view the consequences of this error in one of two ways: either the defendant was improperly sentenced to a greater penalty than the one authorized by Congress for the crime of which he was justly convicted, or the defendant was improperly convicted, because the crime.of conviction was not fully alleged in the indictment and found by the jury. Compare United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir.2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, No. 01-6398 (Sept. Holdings: 0: holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error 1: holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed 2: holding at the governments urging that a similar error was an error in sentencing 3: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 4: holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the court instruct the prosecutor not to make a general-deterrence argument. Moreover, the argument is misleading because general deterrence has nothing to do with the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor\u2019s argument in the present case was improper for this reason, stating that \u201c[unquestionably, any argument based on general deterrence to others has no application to either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Argument of this nature is inappropriate at a sentencing hearing.\u201d State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn.1988). In my view, the majority oversteps its role by second-guessing the Tennessee Supreme Court\u2019s explicit conclusion on this question of state law. See Cristini v. McKee, 52 .2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the prosecutor expressed his Holdings: 0: holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness 1: holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty 2: holding that the prosecutors request that the jury send a message to the community was improper in the guilt phase of the trial but was not so flagrantly improper as to constitute plain error 3: holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify 4: holding that a prosecutors comment that jurors should impose the death penalty  in order to fulfill their societal duty was not improper because the prosecutor did not ask the jury to send a message to other potential murderers or robbers", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for the first violation for selling fireworks with an excessive powder content. However, \u00a7 320.136 states that M-80s are expressly prohibited from possession within the state for any purpose. The Commission found that Shelton possessed M-80s. Section 320.116 grants the state fire marshal the discretion to revoke the permits of any license holder who has violated the provisions of \u00a7\u00a7 Sections 320.106 to 320.161 for a period of three years. Further, possession of illegal fireworks under \u00a7 320.136, which includes M-80s, may \u201cresult in the ... revocation of the license(s) of the licensee.\u201d 11 C.S.R. 40-3.010(21). It is clearly within the discretion of the fire marshal to determine the appropriate penalty for a licensed fireworks\u2019 dealer who possesses M-80s. Walker, 781 S.W.2d at 116 (<HOLDING>). Shelton possessed over 1,000 M-80s in his Holdings: 0: holding the boards affirmance of the penalty of removal was within the discretionary authority of the board because the record reflects a reasoned concern for the factors appropriate to evaluating a penalty  1: holding that the authority to determine the appropriate penalty is with the supervisor of liquor control and not the administrative hearing commission or the reviewing court 2: holding that in reviewing a gaming commission decision the court will examine the record to determine if there is any evidence to support the commissions order 3: holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence 4: holding that the district court is limited to considering the administrative record in reviewing the denial of benefits under an erisa plan", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the case, the trial court did hot consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60(b)(1) or in Starling. There was no inquiry by the trial court into whether appellants\u2019 counsel\u2019s actions constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect which would justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Moreover, there was no inquiry into whether appellants had actual notice of the proceedings, acted in good faith, and took prompt action; nor was there any inquiry as to possible prejudice to the non-moving party or a recognition by the trial court of \u201cevidence in the record reflecting unjustified delays, or noncompliance with the court rules, attributable to the appellant .... \u201d Id. (citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). The failure to inquire into the factors Holdings: 0: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion 1: holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion 2: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case 3: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not making the necessary inquiry and in failing to address two factors that bore directly on the rule 60b motion 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a rule 60b motion when the relevant change in law occurred eight months prior and petitioner filed the motion two days before his execution", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the alleged wrongdoer are deemed to be more substantial. Thus, the clear and convincing proof standard reduces the risk to the alleged wrongdoer of having his or her reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiffs burden of proof. Masaki, 71 Haw. at 14, 780 P.2d at 574; see also Iddings, 82 Hawai'i at 14, 919 P.2d at 276. In this manner, the \u201cstandard [of proof] serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.\u201d Masaki, 71 Haw. at 14, 780 P.2d at 574; see also Iddings, 82 Hawai'i at 13, 919 P.2d at 275. As we have pointed out, under a clear and convincing standard of proof, an alleged abused family or household member would carry a heavy burden in proving that a protective order sho 81) (<HOLDING>); State v. Miller, 84 Hawai'i 269, 933 P.2d 606 Holdings: 0: holding hrs  7044114 which places the burden on the insanity acquittee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is fit to be released does not violate due process principles 1: holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding that the trial court violated the defendants due process rights by relying on conduct of which he had actually been acquitted when imposing a sentence 3: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding the due process rights of one acquitted by insanity are not violated when he or she is committed on a determination of risk of danger to self or the person or property of others by a preponderance of the evidence", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "lessee under section 41.418 lacks standing to protest an adverse appraisal decision. See Toumeau Houston, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 24 S.W.3d 907, 909 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (owner or agent); see also Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. 2001) (indicating in dictum that whether one is authorized lessee under section 41.413 or is owner\u2019s designated agent under Tax Code section 1.111(a) is matter of standing, not capacity). Lack of standing to protest an ad valorem tax appraisal deprives a court of subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain a suit for judicial review based on that protest because standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Toumeau Houston, Inc., 24 S.W.3d at 909 (<HOLDING>); see also Texas Ass\u2019n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees 1: holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider suit for judicial review filed by entity that was neither owner of property nor owners properly designated agent 2: holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants motion to withdraw guilty plea filed beyond term of court in which defendant was sentenced 3: holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts 4: holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "question as to the power of a Circuit Justice[, or the Court itself,] to dissolve a stay entered by a court of appeals.\u201d Commodity Futures Trading Comm\u2019n v. British American Commodity Options Corp., 434 U.S. 1316, 1319, 98 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed.2d 28 (1977); Petition of Johnson, 72 S.Ct. 1028, 1031-32, 96 L.Ed. 1377 (1952) (discussing power of Circuit Justice to stay execution of judgment). The exercise of that power does not, however, constitute a decision on the merits. See Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 957 (11th Cir.1987). Nor does it necessarily deprive a lower court of jurisdiction. Cf. Johnson, 72 S.Ct. at 1031-32 (suggesting that stay of execution of district court judgment could be entered by Circuit Justice pending resolution of case by court of appeals); Messer, 831 F.2d at 957 (<HOLDING>). Because no final judgment had been entered by Holdings: 0: holding that filing of appeal to federal circuit divests this court of jurisdiction to consider motion to stay court order pending appeal 1: holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending 2: holding that supreme courts stay of execution did not divest court of appeals of jurisdiction to consider petitioners appeal en banc 3: holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition 4: holding that a federal district court has jurisdiction to stay an execution prior to the filing of a formal habeas corpus petition", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that Harline was a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, because all four requirements of issue preclusion are met here, Harline is bound by the bankruptcy court\u2019s factual finding that he acted with the requisite state of mind to support a denial of discharge despite Vlahos\u2019 negligent preparation of the statement of affairs and schedules. Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline\u2019s bankruptcy dis L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). Because Har-line is precluded from Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtors first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys 1: holding that the district court had bankruptcy jurisdiction over a professional malpractice action filed by a title 11 debtor against the law firm that represented him in his bankruptcy case under section 1334b because the malpractice claim arose in the bankruptcy case 2: holding that suit for professional malpractice was compulsory counterclaim to earlier award of fees in bankruptcy to debtors attorney 3: holding that a corporate chapter 7 debt ors malpractice claim against its bankruptcy attorney was related to its bankruptcy case 4: holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the rule allows such a safe harbor.\u201d Id. Although Guardsmark explained the safe harbor to some employees, the Board found the company\u2019s explanation \u201cplainly insufficient to avoid a violation of the Act [because] narrowing interpretations of overly broad rules must be communicated to the entire work force covered by the rule.\u201d Id. at *5. Guardsmark argues that nothing in the rule explicitly prohibits off-duty solicitation and that employees would not reasonably so construe it, especially after the company clarified the rule\u2019s safe harbor. We disagree. To begin with, because Guardsmark failed to communicate the safe harbor clarification to all employees who had received the handbook, the Board properly focused on the rule\u2019s language. See Ichikoh Mfg., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1022 (1993) (<HOLDING>). And because that language prohibits Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: holding that employees failure to comply with employers rule requiring employees to notify employer when a temporary job placement ended did not constitute gross misconduct because the violation was an isolated incident and employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of employees unavailability 2: holding that an employer must establish all three elements of the defense with regard to its employees in order to prevail 3: holding that an employer must show that it clearly communicated to all the  employees to whom the presumptively invalid rule was disseminated that the rule did not mean what it said 4: holding that the hospital failed to show how it was harmed by failure to verify the rule to show cause", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "A majority of the Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this issue. Cf. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (\u201cContrary to the dissent, we have held that this rule of deference applies to an agency\u2019s interpretation of a statute designed to confine its authority.\u201d (citation omitted)) with id. at 386, 108 S.Ct. 2428 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (\u201cI cannot, however, agree with Justice SCALIA\u2019s conclusion that courts must defer to an agency\u2019s statutory construction even where, as here, the statute is designed to confine the scope of the agency\u2019s jurisdiction to the areas Congress intended it to occupy.\u201d); see also N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec\u2019y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We are not persuaded by the USPTO\u2019s arguments Holdings: 0: recognizing justice scalias concurrence in mississippi power stating that the supreme court has not definitively ruled on the issue and declining to grant deference to the agencys determination of its own jurisdiction 1: holding that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant rule 37 relief where petitioner herred was in custody at the time the court ruled on his motion 2: recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant 4: holding that the supreme court will not issue advisory opinion on issue not before the court", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "411 of this title, and in addition thereto for the amount of damage done by said boat, vessel[.]\u201d 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 412 (2007) (emphasis added). The only pecuniary penalties specified under \u00a7 411 are \u201ca f\u00edne of up to $25, 000 per day[.]\u201d 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 411 (2007). Thus, I find the plain language of the statutes to suggest that the in rem defendants can be liable for the pecuniary penalties of up to $25,000 per day, and \u201cin addition thereto for the damage done\u201d to Plaintiffs public works. See also Barge Line, 424 F.Supp. at 456 (\u201cSection 412 imposes the statutory penalties of s 411 upon any boat or vessel violating s 40[8].... Accordingly, the Court assesses a penalty of $500.00 against each of the offending vessels.\u201d); see also United States v. Tug Otto, 296 F.Supp. 1130, 1134 (D.C.Tex.1967) (<HOLDING>), aff'd., 404 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.1968). In Holdings: 0: holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states 1: holding that a state agency proceeding did not constitute an action in a court of the united states or a state within the meaning of 33 usc  1365b1 2: holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity 3: holding that a barge being a vessel used and employed in violation of 33 usc  408 is liable to the united states for a pecuniary penalty of 500 under the provisions of 411 and 412 and in addition thereto for the damage done 4: holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that her expulsion will preclude her from taking part in any special education programs offered at Danbury High School. If plaintiff is expelled, she will be restricted ito placement in a private school or to homeIbound tutoring. Regardless of whether these two alternatives are responsive to plaintiff\u2019s needs, the PPT will be limited to their use in fashioning a new special education program for plaintiff. Of \"particular concern to the Court is the possibility that an appropriate private placement will be unavailable and plaintiff\u2019s education will be reduced to some type of homebound tutoring. Such a result can only serve to hinder plaintiff\u2019s social development and to perpetuate the vicious cycle in which she is caught. See Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F.Supp. 180, 183 (S.D.W.Va.1973) (<HOLDING>). The Court is persuaded that plaintiff\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that it is imperative that every child receive an education with his or her peers insofar as it is at all possible 1: holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records 2: holding that it is not 3: holding that it may not 4: holding that an item is material  if the time for including it in income or deducting it is at issue", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.\u2019 \u201d Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., \u2014 U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 422 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, \u2014 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). The touchstone of a preemption analysis, therefore, turns on congressional intent. Cippollone, \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d at 422 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978)); see also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Generally, Congress\u2019 intention to preempt may Holdings: 0: holding that in light of the presumption against preemption there is no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a substantial question of federal patent law because congress has not expressed its clear and manifest intention to preempt that area of law 1: holding that ejxcept in matters governed by the federal constitution or by acts of congress the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state 2: holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards 3: holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority 4: holding that preemption is not foreclosed by the fact that the federal statute intrudes into the range of subjects over which the states have traditionally exercised their police powers if congress intent to displace state law is clear", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with the great weight of authority, with the rule of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, and with the views of eminent text-writers.\u201d Id. (citations omitted). Juxtaposed to this authority, we have a competing concern \u2014 the ability of parties to fully and finally resolve disputes between them. Parties should be able to bargain for and execute a release barring all further dispute. This principle necessarily contemplates that parties may disclaim rebanee on representations. And such a disclaimer, where the parties\u2019 intent is clear and specific, should be effective to negate a fraudulent inducement claim. As an example, a disclaimer of reliance may conclusively negate the element of reliance, which is essential to a fraudulent inducement claim. See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 161-62 (<HOLDING>); Estes v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 46 Holdings: 0: holding that agreement to buy property as is in which buyer included voluntary freely negotiated affirmation that he was depending on his own assessment of the building precluded claim for damages when building was found to contain asbestos 1: holding that while the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations it must contain more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim and must state a claim that is plausible on its face 2: holding that to be adequate a complaint must contain a statement of facts on which a claim is based showing that the pleader is entitled to relief 3: holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted 4: holding that pennsylvanias full judicial review of a denied building permit is adequate process", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "remains the same,\u201d such as by correcting a \u201cmisnomer\u201d or mistake of form. United States v. Young Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 693 (5th Cir.1984). Thus, the issue is whether the amendment to the serial number constituted a change in form akin to correcting a typographical error or a change in substance that impermissibly altered the indictment. Although we have never addressed this question directly, precedent from this circuit and others suggests that the particular attributes of a firearm are not actual elements of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 417 (5th Cir.1998) (finding no grounds to reverse conviction when indictment charged a dif ferent gauge of shotgun than that presented during trial); United States v. Robinson, 974 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 369 Holdings: 0: holding that government may prove facts outside the overt acts alleged in the indictment 1: holding that when an indictment alleges nonessential facts the government need not prove them in order to sustain a conviction 2: holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner 3: recognizing that the government need only prove that crime occurred reasonably near the date stated in the indictment 4: holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the case must be adjudicated before the NLRB. See Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir.2004) (\u201cApplied to claims in federal court, and arising under federal law, Garmon has nothing to do with either preemption or subject-matter jurisdiction. It is a rule of primary jurisdiction, allocating to an administrative agency the first crack at certain matters.\u201d). Accordingly, Garmon preemption provides no basis for removal jurisdiction in federal court. A case falling within the scope of the doctrine must be adjudicated before the NLRB. The lower courts are uniform in finding that Garmon preemption under the NLRA does not completely preempt state laws so as to provide removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Suarez v. Gallo Wine Distribs. LLC, No. 02 Holdings: 0: holding that a federal district court may decide whether an activity is an unfair labor practice under the nlra when the matter is raised as a defense to a claim under an independent federal remedy over which the federal district courts do have jurisdiction 1: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 2: holding that federal district courts have jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining contracts even if such violations are also unfair labor practices subject to nlrb jurisdiction 3: holding that garmon preemption provides no basis for removal jurisdiction in federal court and observing that the lower courts are uniform in finding that garmon preemption under the nlra does not completely preempt state laws so as to provide removal jurisdiction 4: holding that gannon preemption does not constitute complete preemption for removal purposes because  7 and 8 of the nlra do not create jurisdiction in the federal district courts instead those provisions vest jurisdiction in the nlrb to determine unfair labor practices and state courts are as able to determine if jurisdiction belongs in the nlrb as are the federal district courts", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "its offer. Notwithstanding this assumption, we do not think the equities of this case warrant an award of attorney fees. A party\u2019s potential liability for attorney fees is intended to motivate the parties to work out their disagreement on fair value and avoid litigation. Id. We do not believe, nor do the Kellys contend, that an offer from Sieg of $40.74 (Maroney\u2019s opinion of fair value) would have led to settlement of this case. By then, the Kellys had an expert advising them the value of their stock was $220.39 per share. Given this fact, the trial court could have reasonably concluded Sieg\u2019s failure to change its position did not warrant an attorney-fee award. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees. See Davis-Eisenhart, 539 N.W.2d at 143 (<HOLDING>). In summary, we cannot say as a matter of law Holdings: 0: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial 1: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion to sever separate charges of rape committed against the appellants two nieces 2: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing amendments to pleadings because they came too late 4: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing attorneyfee award against corporation where dissenter demanded more than his own appraiser said the stock was worth", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201crights\u201d and a state court\u2019s discretion than any prior Texas cases. Prior case law has indicated the types of acts or omissions that demonstrate significant impairment of the child, such as physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral behavior on the part of the parent. See Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1994); In re Hidalgo, 938 S.W.2d at 494, 497 (affirming appointment of mother and step-grandmother as joint managing conservators when mother effectively abandoned child after birth; child was raised first by father and stepmother, then, after father\u2019s death by stepmother, and then by step-grandmother; and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old); Thomas v. Thomas, 852 S.W.2d 31, 32-36 (Tex.App.-Waco 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The \u201c[ejvidence must support the logical Holdings: 0: holding that grandmother who had intermittent custody of her grandchild had no protected liberty interest in the continued custody of the child 1: holding trial court did not err in appointing maternal grandmother as managing conservator when evidence showed grandmother had been childs primary caretaker for years father had history of criminal conduct drug and alcohol use dishonesty unemployment and instability and had abandoned and failed to support child and mother who had immoral and unstable lifestyle and had exposed child to violence asked court to award managing conservatorship to grandmother 2: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in trial of mother for felony injury to child when after grandmother testified that she had been concerned about leaving a child with mother or suspicious of her when another of mothers young children had diedevidence which had been the subject of a motion in limine the trial court strongly instructed the jurors three times that day and polled them individually the next day about whether they could follow the instruction to disregard 3: holding that court could permit grandparent or other person having substantial past contact with child to intervene in pending sapcr even though original suit requesting possessory conservatorship could not be filed by grandparent or other person and further holding that stepgrandmother had standing to intervene to seek managing conservatorship of child under section 102004b and section 1020039 where natural mother abandoned child after birth parents were divorced natural father remarried father had custody of child after father died child lived first with stepmother then with stepgrandmother and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old 4: holding that maternal grandmother had standing to intervene in pending sapcr to seek managing conservatorship of child pursuant to former section 102004b and section 102004a where she had substantial past contact with child there was evidence of abuse and neglect of child by mother and mother had been arrested and had subsequently engaged in bizarre and dangerous behavior towards child had attacked grandmother with frying pan and hedge clippers and had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric center all of which established serious and immediate concern for welfare of child", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "litigation because, for example, relevant business documents pertaining to the antitrust conspiracy may not exist and covert behavior may have to be proven through less direct means.\u201d); Callahan v. AEV, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 175, 179 (W.D.Pa.1996) (\"Discovery in an antitrust case is necessarily broad because allegations involve improper business conduct.... Such conduct is generally covert and must be gleaned from records, conduct, and business relationships.\u201d). 13 . In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. MDL-1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29160, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 29, 2004). 14 . Id. at *16. 15 . Id., at *12. 16 . Id. 17 . No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001). 18 . Id. 19 . Id. 20 . See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2275531, at *2 (<HOLDING>); In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., Holdings: 0: holding that market participant socal edison is in privity with the california power exchange corporation not with other market participants 1: holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach 2: holding that the market price is understood to mean the current market price being paid for gas at the well where it is produced 3: holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue 4: holding that information and documents that relate to among other things the nonu s manufacture sale and distribution of aspartame may prove relevant to establishing the existence of a global conspiracy to allocate the market for aspartame the ability of market participants to engage in domestic price fixing and the mechanisms employed by market participants in price fixing", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "characterize the ruling of the trial court. The trial court actually concluded that \u201cthe evidence before the Court is as strongly supportive of Paul Donald Cappo having voluntarily disappeared.\u201d Thus, the trial court ruled that the evidence that Paul Cappo voluntarily disappeared was as strong as the evidence that he was murdered. The court did not conclude that Paul Cappo had voluntarily disappeared, but rather that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proving not only that he did not voluntarily disappear, but that he died from accidental bodily injury. Appellant attempted to rely on the legal presumption of Paul Cappo\u2019s death created by his absence of at least five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 490.260 (1986); Sanderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo.App.1946) (<HOLDING>). This presumption was not conclusive, however. Holdings: 0: holding that the common law presumption of incapacity of a minor between the ages of seven and fourteen years to commit a crime no longer applies 1: holding that federal common law is the law that would govern in the absence of the warsaw convention 2: recognizing presumption 3: holding that a common law presumption of death is triggered after an absence of seven years 4: holding that the presumption is weaker if triggered at all where there is not a tradition of state legislation", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Se lack of record evidence demonstrating a cognizable link between his injuries and either his shipmate\u2019s drunkenness or the M/V Bennett\u2019s alcohol policy. A defendant \u201cmay not be held liable\u201d for its employee\u2019s misconduct \u201cunless the particular act performed negligently was also in the scope of employment of the negligent employee.\u201d Trost v. Am. Hawaiian S.S. Co., 324 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir.1963); see also Gallose v. Long Island R.R., 878 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1989) (applying Trost\u2019s rule in context of FELA claim); Higgins v. Metro-North R.R., 318 F.3d 422, 426 (2d Cir.2003) (following Gall\u00f3se ). Like the district court, we easily conclude that drinking alcohol was not within the scope of the shipmate\u2019s employment. Cf. Robinson v. Ne. S.S. Corp., 228 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>). Nor could Reynolds demonstrate that the M/V Holdings: 0: holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action 1: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 2: holding that in the absence of superiors directive or authorization negligence of marineremployee who assisted drunken shipmate was not attributable to shipowner 3: holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe coumadin and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence 4: holding that the absence of privity does not constitute a policy reason for not imposing liability where negligence is a substantial factor in causing the harm alleged", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "suits constituted extortion under the Hobbs Act. However, Aspex\u2019s mere fear of economic loss in the face of VSP\u2019s warnings does not give rise to a claim under the Hobbs Act. \u201c[Ejxtortion requires more than fear____[t]he use of the fear must be \u2018wrongful.\u2019 \u201d Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir.2006). The Hobbs Act does not make actionable VSP\u2019s threats of altering Aspex\u2019s network status, at least to the extent that the basis for those threats \u201cdo not rise to the level of a sham,\u201d id. at 939-40, of which there is no evidence on this record. Accordingly, VSP was entitled to use some economic pressure falling within the scope of its legal rights in order to bring Aspex to the negotiating table. See Rothman v. Vedder Park Management, 912 F.2d 315, 318 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Aspex also alleges that VSP\u2019s conduct is Holdings: 0: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 1: holding that tenants interest in a sublease terminated upon the landlords termination of the lease and affirming order that landlord entitled to receive 12 months of rent deposited by subtenant with court subsequent to termination of lease and prior to denial of petition for relief from forfeiture 2: holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave 3: holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second 4: holding that a landlords alleged threats that tenants who did not sign a lease would have to pay their own utility bills and be subject to future rent increases did not constitute a wrongful use of force or fear", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "other equitable relief, costs, and attorneys fees (Doc. 115) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: plaintiff shall recover from defendant back pay in the amount of $8,063, with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,363; plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorney\u2019s fees; compensatory damages as found by the jury in the amount of $1,000; pecuniary damages as found by the jury in the amount of $12,000; and punitive damages as found by the jury in the amount of $20,000. 1 . 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e et seq. 2 . See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.1983) (\"title 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(g) leaves to the discretion of the trial court the amount of back pay to be awarded a successful plaintiff in an employment discriminatio 61 F.Supp.2d 1219 (D.Kan.2001) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 416. Holdings: 0: holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion 1: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court 2: holding that an arbitral award of back pay that continued beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was perfectly appropriate because the agreement contained no provision restricting back pay to the term of the agreement 3: holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment 4: recognizing equitable nature of back pay award under age discrimination in employment act", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "A substantial threat is one that is reasonably likely to induce a belief that it will be carried out and one that threatens significant confinement, restraint, injury, or damage. A threat meets the latter criterion if it threatens an act that would cause an average person to experience significant apprehension upon contemplation of the occurrence of the threatened act. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1488, 1442 (9th Cir.1983) (invalidating on First Amendment overbreadth grounds a Montana intimidation statute that punished threats to \u201ccommit any criminal offense\u201d in part because it applied \u201cso broadly to threats of minor infractions\u201d and \u201cto threats not reasonably likely to induce a belief that they will be carried out\u201d); U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Cir. Ct., 624 F.Supp. 68, 71 (N.D.Ill.1985) (<HOLDING>). D. I would therefore construe the Colorado Holdings: 0: holding a substantially similar probation condition overbroad 1: holding that an illinois intimidation statute was substantially overbroad because it made it an offense to threaten to commit any crime no matter how minor or insubstantial 2: holding the language of the statute applicable to floating buffer zones was substantially overbroad and burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve the states interest 3: holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants 4: holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in relevant part: The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 365(d)(3) (emphasis added). The purpose of \u00a7 365(d)(3) is to protect landlords by requiring debtors to timely perform their obligations arising under the lease. With regard to rent, courts generally agree that \u00a7 365(d)(3) requires debtors to pay rent obligations in full and without proration as they come due in the pre-rejection period. See Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse Road Co. (In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.), 203 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Towers v. Chickering & Gregory (In re Holdings: 0: holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second 1: recognizing and applying rule that lessee who breaches a lease is entitled to a rent credit for any proceeds gained by the landlord from reletting during the period of the original lease term 2: holding that where the rent payments during the original and extended terms were the same the lessees payment of rent and continued occupation of the leased premises standing along was insufficient  to establish that they had exercised their option to renew the lease for an additional term 3: holding that tenants interest in a sublease terminated upon the landlords termination of the lease and affirming order that landlord entitled to receive 12 months of rent deposited by subtenant with court subsequent to termination of lease and prior to denial of petition for relief from forfeiture 4: recognizing two lines of eases regarding calculation of administrative claims for rent  one based on reasonable value of portion of demised premises actually used and occupied and one on the reasonable value without regard to amount of space used holding that landlords were entitled to full rental payments not warehouse value of premises until lease assumed or rejected", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was granted \u2014 that the submission date had been re-set to March 18 made it impossible for plaintiffs to file controverting evidence.\u201d Thus, the majority\u2019s conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18 is contradicted by the Insureds themselves. In addition, the Insureds\u2019 assertion in their motion for rehearing that they had insufficient notice of the trial court\u2019s resetting of the submission date is not a basis for granting rehearing because it is well-established that, if the trial court did not give sufficient notice in this regard, the Insureds had to raise this complaint in the trial court. See Okonkwo v. Washington Mut. Bank, No. 14-05-00925-CV, 2007 WL 763821, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>); Babajide v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., Holdings: 0: holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal 1: holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection 2: holding appellant waived his complaint that trial court gave him no notice of submission date for summaryjudgment motion by not raising the objection in the trial court 3: holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard 4: holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "MURGUIA, District Judge. Pending before this Court is Defendant United States of America\u2019s Motion in Limine (Dkt.# 27) to permit it to contact (<HOLDING>), aff'd 982 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.1993). Plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that arkansas privilege law and public policy considerations prohibit ex parte interviews 1: holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction 2: holding that federal common law allows ex parte interviews as discovery tool and controls even when state law supplies the rule of decision 3: holding that minnesota law prohibiting ex parte interviews was not integral to its privilege law but was merely procedural rule and therefore not controlling in diversity action and the federal rules allow ex parte interviews as method of informal discovery 4: holding that preservation of the integrity of maine privilege law limits defendant to formal mechanisms of discovery provided by federal rules which do not allow ex parte interviews absent consent", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "waives this privilege if he \u201cvoluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter.\u201d At trial, Ross testified extensively about what he said to his wife on the night of the shooting. This was clearly a voluntary disclosure of a \u201csignificant part of the privileged matter\u201d under Rule 504. We therefore agree with the State that Ross\u2019s testimony constituted a waiver of the Rule 504 privilege in this case. Furthermore, Ross could not use the trial court\u2019s initial ruling to exclude the marital communications as a means to commit perjury by way of a defense. The State was certainly entitled to cross-examine Ross as to his version of what he disclosed to his wife on the night of the shooting. See Rooks v. State, 250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm on this point. As for Holdings: 0: recognizing the importance of crossexamination in casting doubt on credibility 1: holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony 2: holding that it was permissible for the state to test the credibility of appellants trial testimony by crossexamination 3: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error 4: holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. LeChambord Rest., 246 A.D.2d 514, 667 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y.App.Div.1998), (relying on Trincere, which held that a one-half inch elevation of a cement slab in the plaza area of a municipal building was not actionable as a matter of law). To determine whether a defect is too trivial to be negligent, the court should consider the \u201ctime, place, and circumstances\u201d of the injury, in addition to dimensions and appearance of the defect. Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 Holdings: 0: holding that a postconviction claim that is refuted by the record is without merit 1: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived absent exceptional circumstances 2: holding that a oneinch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable and that plaintiffs assertions that triable issues of fact were raised by the time place and circumstances of the accident are without merit 3: holding that the plaintiffs claims for assault and battery were patently without merit since the officers actions under the circumstances were justified 4: holding that exhaustion of issues is waived if not raised by the government", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of emotional distress claim beyond those asserted above, namely BANA\u2019s failure to provide her with proper notice of the foreclosure. The trial court did not err in concluding that she \u201cfailed to allege any acts by [BANA] that were extreme and outrageous or that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.\u201d Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. at 313 (3). Consequently, the grant of judgment on the pleadings as to this claim was proper. See id. (affirming dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon bank\u2019s foreclosure, allegedly without her knowledge, and subsequent attempts to remove her from the property); Racette v. Bank of America, 318 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) (733 SE2d 457) (2012) (<HOLDING>) (punctuation omitted). Compare DeGolyer v. Holdings: 0: holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale 1: holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final 2: holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable 3: holding that debtors allegation that mortgage holder failed to provide him with the statutorily required notice of foreclosure was sufficient to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure 4: holding that appellants allegation that creditor conducted foreclosure sale despite knowing of inaccuracies in the published foreclosure advertisements cannot be described as extreme outrageous atrocious intolerable or beyond the bounds of decency", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "legitimate interests and concern. The contrary evidence cited by the court falls far short of \u201cclearly precluding]\u201d the FLRA\u2019s interpretation of the record. Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at 490, 71 S.Ct. at 465. The court points primarily to the fact that after union representative Foust left the area where Reed was being interviewed, Deputy Chief Patrol Agent Barnette opined to Foust that OPR lacked authority to grant administrative immunity. It is undisputed that Agent Reed did not even hear Barnette\u2019s ill-founded statement, if at all, until after the interview. Because the focus of \u00a7 7114(a)(2)(B) is on the risk of discipline reasonably perceived by the employee at the time o/the investigatory interview, the court\u2019s reliance on Barnette\u2019s statement is quite misguided. See at 729 (<HOLDING>). Even if Deputy Barnette\u2019s odd statement were Holdings: 0: holding that deference to legislative fact finding does not foreclose the courts independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law 1: holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal 2: recognizing a split of authority on this issue 3: recognizing this rule 4: recognizing that events subsequent to inss interview of reed have no bearing on issue of whether  7114a2b was violated in this case", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "evidence and must uphold the decision unless the evidence compels a contrary result. Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the IJ\u2019s denial of asylum based on an adverse credibility finding. Singh testified that he drove a taxi from 1998 to 2000 as his full-time job and was arrested a third time after driving militants in his taxi. In his application for redetermination of custody status, however, he stated that he was a farm worker during this period. When questioned about the inconsistency, Singh was evasive and nonresponsive. Because Singh provided inconsistent statements regarding the circumstances of his third arrest, the IJ\u2019s adverse credibility finding is supported. See Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because Singh failed to establish eligibility Holdings: 0: holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding 1: holding that minor discrepancies that do not involve the heart of the asylum claim are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding 2: holding that ijs adverse credibility was not supported by substantial evidence where there were significant communication and translation problems  during the asylum hearing and the discrepancies at issue were not crucial to petitioners claim 3: holding that minor discrepancies in the date of an aliens graduation from high school as compared to the date of a beating did not justify an adverse credibility finding 4: holding adverse credibility finding was supported based on discrepancies between aliens testimony and statements regarding a police detention", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "704, 714-15 (9th Cir.1996), reasoned that the defendant had not made a prima facie case of racial discrimination where the prosecutor challenged two African-Americans in the jury pool but where three others remained on the panel. I would hold that the judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to sustain defense counsel\u2019s Batson objection. Even following our more stringent decision in United States v. Moore, 28 MJ 366,1 am convinced that the prosecutor adequately set forth the basis for her peremptory challenge. The judge concluded that the prosecutor had been forthright in the past and that there was no evidence of a discriminatory intent. 1 . Some examples include the following: Right to counsel. Compare Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994)(<HOLDING>) with United States v. Kelly, 45 MJ 259 Holdings: 0: holding an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid because no prison term was imposed and the conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense 1: holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction 2: holding uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be sentence enhancer 3: recognizing that felony and misdemeanor dwi are separate offenses because a prior conviction is an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated but it is not an element of the misdemeanor offense 4: holding misdemeanor conviction for petty larceny triggered disenfranchisement", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "2. The Hatch Letter Select portions of two paragraphs of the August 9, 1984 letter from Robert A. McConnell to Senator Orin G. Hatch have been redacted pursuant to Exemption 5, because defendant claims that they contain information protected by the deliberative process and attorney work-product privileges. Second Ferrel Decl. \u00b6 5 and Exhibit 1 thereto. Plaintiff claims that this letter is not covered by Exemption 5 because it was prepared after the Moon case had concluded. However, the fact that the final decision to prosecute was made and the litigation was concluded prior to the date of the Hatch letter does not remove this information from Exemption 5 and the attorney work-product privilege. Federal Trade Comm\u2019n v. Grolier, 462 U.S. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the Supreme Court has held that Holdings: 0: holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia 1: holding attorney workproduct was exempt from disclosure under foia exemption 5 even after the case was dismissed and litigation terminated by the ftc 2: holding that memoranda prepared by various levels of staff lawyers within the department of justice tax division and by an assistant united states attorney were exempt from disclosure under foia exemption 5 3: holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption 4: holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that probable cause did not exist. Qualified immunity protects those officers who make a reasonable error in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest an individual. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (<HOLDING>)). Although qualified immunity is an Holdings: 0: holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation 1: holding that a defendant need not be advised of the right to terminate questioning at any time 2: holding that the saucier procedure need not be followed in any particular sequence 3: holding that courts are not bound to decide any particular jurisdictional question before any other 4: holding that a claim on an algorithm for converting binarycoded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers was not patent eligible because the claims were not limited to any particular art or technology to any particular apparatus or machinery or to any particular end use", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to be read his Miranda rights before the school police questioned him and, given their failure to do so, we find that Appellant\u2019s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination was violated. Accordingly, the Superior Court\u2019s order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case. CAPPY, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN, Justice, files a concurring opinion. SAYLOR, Justice, files a concurring opinion. EAKIN, Justice, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Although Justice Castille\u2019s dissent goes Holdings: 0: holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously 1: holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer 2: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease 3: holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed 4: holding that constitutional precedent does not require that a convicted defendant be warned of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent prior to submitting to a routine authorized presentence interview", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u00b6 18 The dictionary defines a \u201cstructure\u201d as \u201c[sjomething constructed.\u201d The American Heritage Dictionary of the E luding that the Restrictions at issue did not preclude the construction of the proposed roadway. As demonstrated above, a roadway is a \u201cstructure\u201d within its ordinary meaning and wi .2001); Chase v. Joslin Mgmt. Corp., 128 N.H. 336, 512 A.2d 434, 436 (1986) (affirming the trial court\u2019s ruling that an access road violated a restrictive covenant that only permitted the construction of single-family homes); L. W., Inc. v. Trice, 416 So.2d 736, 738 (Ala.1982) (\u201c[A] roadway is a structure and ... a lot limited for residential use is limited to residential use within the subdivision of which it is a part.\u201d); Beyt v. Woodvale Place Apartments, 297 So.2d 448, 450 (La.Ct.App.1974) (<HOLDING>); Duklauer v. Weiss, 18 Misc.2d 747, 182 Holdings: 0: holding that a roadway is a structure and its construction would violate the restrictive covenant limiting the land to residential purposes 1: holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable 2: holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable 3: holding that a restrictive covenant will be upheld where a franchisor has a protectable interest in the sale of his franchise 4: holding that a roadway benefitting land outside the subdivision was not a residential purpose and was therefore a violation of the restrictive covenant", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Stat. 1107, 1567 (1988), was enacted in part because of the inadequacy of a '337 action. In particular, Congress recognized the limited remedies available to a patent owner in a '337 action for the use of a process patent outside the Unites States. See S.Rep. No. 100-83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 30 (1987); H.R.Rep. No. 100-60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1987). 12 . Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed.Cir.1996), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1183, 117 S.Ct. 1466, 137 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997) (\"The government's unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment through the government's exercise of its power of eminent domain .... \u201d); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336 (Fed.Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); Trojan, Inc., 885 F.2d at 857 (Newman, J., Holdings: 0: recognizing  1498 is based on principles related to the taking of property namely a patent license 1: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent 2: recognizing that the theory behind united statess use of a patent is a taking 3: holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest 4: holding motorist entitled to hearing before taking his license under statute that required loss of license if uninsured driver involved in an accident", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "claims are defaulted, but Louisiana prisoners can benefit from the Martinez/Trevino exception to the procedural-default, rule if they can show that they have a substantial IATC claim and received IAC from state habeas counsel. As an appellate court, we cannot adequately evaluate, in the first instance, Coleman\u2019s factual allegations against his trial and state habeas lawyers. Therefore, the judgment dismissing the petition is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED. The distinct court should determine whether Coleman has satisfied the remaining two requirements to show cause for procedural default under Martinez and Trevino and should conduct proceedings as needed. We express no view on what decisions the court should make on remand. 1 . State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) (<HOLDING>); State v. Woodard, 9 So.3d 112, 118 (La. 2009) Holdings: 0: holding court unable to rule on issue when the record fails to include copies of the evidence needed to decide issue on appeal 1: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived 2: holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal 3: holding that if the record discloses evidence needed to decide the issue of iac and that issue was raised by assignment of error on appeal it can be decided on appeal in the interest of judicial economy 4: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it  ", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). The prosecutor having offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the parties in order to determine whether the reason articulated by the prosecutor is, indeed, legitimate and non-discriminatory, or if it is, in fact, pretextual. Based on the Supreme Court\u2019s observation that the defendant in Batson had made a timely objection to the peremptory challenge, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that in order to preserve the Batson issue for subsequent review, a defendant must make an objection at the l exceptions to the procedural default are not applicable in a Batson claim. Wiley, 969 F.2d at 101 (<HOLDING>). The eases in this line of precedent address Holdings: 0: holding that the cause and prejudice standard applied to defendants failure to object to his career offender classification at sentencing 1: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice 2: holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule bars federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice 3: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 4: holding that a showing of cause and prejudice fails to overcome a defendants initial failure to object", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with regard to the modification of previously granted spousal support awards. The divorce court has no express or implied authority to modify retroactively a spousal support award that was merely erroneous and not entered as a result of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or as a result of fraud upon the court. In such cases, until prospectively modified or terminated by the divorce court, the obligated spouse is required to make his or her spousal support payments in accordance with the terms of the court\u2019s decree. See generally Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961); accord Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. App. 141, 147, 371 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1988) (<HOLDING>). When an erroneous spousal support award is Holdings: 0: holding that a court is without authority to modify its spousal support decree retroactively and relieve a party of the obligation to pay past due installments 1: holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order 2: holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment 3: holding that where payments are made on past due support they must first be applied to  current child support installments due then to accrued and outstanding interest on  delinquent child support obligations and finally to the principal amount due on unpaid child support 4: holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "JJ., concur. 1 . On appeal, Amquip argues the trial court also erred in denying: its motion for summary judgment, the admission into evidence of depositions, and its motion for a continuance. 2 . Amquip contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its request to admit deposition transcripts into evidence and in denying its motion for continuance when it was unable to get the deposition transcripts into evidence. As mentioned previously, those issues are moot because this case is reversed on the denial of the right to a trial by jury. 3 . Although Vercon contends Amquip waived its right to a jury trial by participating in a nonjury trial, this argument relates to whether Amquip preserved the issue for appeal. See Crespo v. Crespo, 28 So.3d 125, 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) Holdings: 0: holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered 1: holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial 2: holding that a claim was not preserved for review where the defense failed to object on the specific grounds advanced on appeal 3: holding that the defendant waived the issue on appeal when he failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of such evidence at trial 4: holding exwifes claim regarding admission of parol evidence was not preserved for appeal because she failed to object to the evidence or to having an evidentiary hearing", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Judge. John Wesley Felton pled nolo contende-re to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to carrying a concealed weapon, reserving the right to appeal the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress a ,22-ealiber rifle. We disagree with the trial court\u2019s determination that the facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Felton was engaged in criminal activity and, accordingly, reverse. See Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>). In reviewing the trial court\u2019s assessment of Holdings: 0: holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo 1: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo 2: holding that trial courts determination of facts has a presumption of correctness but trial courts legal conclusions are subject to de novo review 3: holding appellate court reviews legal conclusions de novo 4: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan. (b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor. (c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan. [11 U.S.C section 1327 (1982).] Nothing in 11 U.S.C. section 1327, or elsewhere in chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code, suggests that confirmation of the chapter 13 plan results in the case being closed or dismissed or a discharge being granted or denied. See also In re Herbert, 61 B.R. 44 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (<HOLDING>) Therefore, there is no termination of the Holdings: 0: holding that refusal to provide chapter 7 debtor transcript because of default on student loan was a violation of the automatic stay based on the plain language of 11 usc  362 1: holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay 2: holding that the automatic stay provisions of section 362 remain in full force and effect during chapter 13 proceedings in order to prevent harassment of debtor while he attempts to rehabiliate himself and pay off some outstanding debts 3: holding that relief from the codebtor stay is mandated to the extent that the chapter 13 plan does not propose to pay the claim in full 4: recognizing that in enacting  362 in 1978 congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "lose \u201cmerit pay, extra class assignments normally to be expected such as summer school, promotion and increased pay, publishing opportunities, paid speaking opportunities, paid sabbaticals, research grants, and the like.\u201d Neither the Wisconsin Administrative Code nor the UW-Whitewater University Handbook creates an entitlement to a certain earning capacity level for UW faculty members. Furthermore, where a censured employee retains his job and does not suffer any loss of pay or rank, any alleged harm to his stature or earnings prospects is purely speculative. See Lowe, 841 F.2d at 858. Powell \u201ccannot complain that he has been made unemployable; he remains employed, and in a job that has considerable tenure rights attached to it.\u201d Hershinow v. Bonamarte, 735 F.2d 264, 266 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). The cases that Powell cites in support of Holdings: 0: holding that a school principals suspension with pay did not implicate a constitutionally protected property interest 1: holding that a threeday suspension without pay did not infringe police officers liberty interest 2: holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action 3: holding that a suspension with pay does not invade any recognized property interest 4: holding that a suspension with pay does not violate any recognized property interest", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A.1982). 7 . See Specifications 1 and 2 of the Charge. These specifications allege violations of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1470 and 2422(b) respectively. 8 . Specifications 3 through 7 allege violations of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2252A. 9 . The Benchbook does not list such a requirement either. See Military Judges\u2019 Benchbook, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-9 at \u00b6 3-60-2B (1 Jan 2010). 10 . United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F.2002). 11 . In evaluating harmlessness for nonconstitutional error, we apply the standard of whether the error \"had a substantial influence on the member\u2019 verdict in the context of the entire case.\u201d United States v. Yammine, 69 M.J. 70, 78 (C.A.A.F.2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 12 . See Mil. R. Evid. 201A(a) (<HOLDING>); Moore, 55 M.J. at 781. 13 . Although not Holdings: 0: recognizing that mil r evid 201a authorizes judicial notice of domestic law even a of consequence to the action 1: holding procedural requirements of mil r evid 201g do not apply where military judge takes judicial notice of domestic law that is a fact of consequence to the determination of the action 2: holding that the notice requirements of section 101101 do not apply to employees because they are not governmental units 3: holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim 4: holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "3553(e)[,] asserting the defendant\u2019s substantial assistance to the Government; or (2) the defendant meets the \u201csafety valve\u201d criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(f).\u2019 Otherwise, post-Booker sentencing courts lack discretion to depart below relevant statutory m\u00ednimums.\u201d In this case, the gov 606, 2008 WL 946065 (5th Cir.2008) (noting that alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis). 4 . Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). 5 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 6 . Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 7 . Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 8 . Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 9 . See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (<HOLDING>). 10 . U.S. Const. amend. VI. 11 . Crawford, Holdings: 0: holding that lesser sentence imposed on codefendant did not constitute abuse of discretion where defendant was sentenced within the statutory and guideline range and where codefendant received reduction for acceptance of responsibility and for being a minimal participant 1: holding that a defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights are violated when a court admits into evidence an incriminating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant 2: holding that admission of a postal inspectors testimony about an oral confession by a defendants codefendant violated the defendants sixth amendment right to crossexamine his codefendant who was unavailable because the codefendant asserted his right not to testify 3: holding that the defendants allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendants behalf because he had been coerced by the state were sufficient to state a prima facie claim of newly discovered evidence 4: holding that the admission of a pretrial confession of a nontestifying codefendant that incriminates the defendant violates that defendants right to confront witnesses even if a limiting instruction is given", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "failure to argue harmless error, the majority concludes that the constructive-possession instructional error was harmless, primarily by relying on Mr. Little\u2019s supposed exclusive control of the well house. However, the majority\u2019s harmless-error analysis does not alter my view that the resolution of the harmlessness question is at least debatable and far from certain or readily apparent. As the majority candidly acknowledges, the cases on which it relies only hold that constructive possession may be inferred from a defendant\u2019s exclusive control of the premises in which the firearms are found; the cases do not indicate that a defendant\u2019s exclusive control of the premises necessitates an inference of constructive possession. See United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants dominion control and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found emphasis added 1: holding that if the site where the contraband is found is in joint rather than exclusive possession a defendants knowledge of the contrabands presence and his ability to control it cannot be inferred merely from the defendants proximity to the contraband 2: holding that circumstance that contraband was found in a box bearing defendants name was sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and dominion and control 3: holding that where drugs are found in the presence and plain view of the owner or resident occupant of a home dominion and control maybe inferred 4: holding when drugs are found on premises exclusive control provides significant proof of constructive possession", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conceivable means, proving it to be in fact ineffective. A good-faith effort is all that should be required. See Emery Realty, 863 F.2d at 1265; Husky Oil, N.P.R. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 643, 645 (10th Cir.1982). 11 . The only available strip of public property, the edge of the grassy apron, abuts the Berlin Turnpike, a four-lane highway with a speed limit of 50 m.p.h. The area is commercial in character and there are indications in the record that traffic is more than minimal. There is no traffic signal or stop sign at the entrance from the turnpike into the Plaza. 12 . Accessibility, in this context, is dichotomous. One aspect implicates the geography of the workplace. Cf., e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 799, 65 S.Ct. 982, 986, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Husky Oil, N.P.R. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, Holdings: 0: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 1: recognizing need for access to remote mining or lumber camp where the employees pass their rest as well as their work time 2: holding that a contractors employees were not within the scope and course of their employment when they deviated from their work to shoot at squirrels 3: recognizing the need for judicial economy in family issues as well as  the need to avoid fundamental unfairness 4: holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties the employees are not speaking as citizens for first amendment purposes and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "any \u201cperson engaged in commerce ... [or] any agent of such person.\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 623(a), \u00a7 630(b); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e, \u00a7 2000e(b); see Legal Services Corp. of P.R., 932 F.Supp. at 50. Although all three statutes provide that a supervisor is an employer, a number of courts have held that Congress included the phrase \u201cany agent\u201d to make sure that respondeat superior liability was imposed on the employers for the acts committed by their agents, not upon the agents personally. Id. at 50-51. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ADA claims against the Individual Defendants are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. B. TITLE VII CLAIMS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS The First Circuit has held that there is no individual employee liability under Title VII. Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22 (1st Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). \u201c \u2019The statutory scheme of Title VII itself Holdings: 0: holding that the definition of employer for title vii purposes does not encompass individu al supervisors even if such individuals are acting as agents of the employer 1: holding that only employers not individuals acting in their individual capacity who do not otherwise meet the definition of employers can be held liable under title vii 2: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 3: holding that title vii does not provide for a damages claim against supervisors or fellow employees 4: holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that a tennis court was a use of land, not a structure. Id. at 191. This interpretation focused on the specific zoning provisions regulating buildings and structures, as opposed to uses. We were unwilling to extend the term \u201cstructure\u201d to a use of land. Williams, supra at 190-191. These opinions demonstrate that we have been sensitive to the purposes for which the term \u201cstructure\u201d has been used in the particular statute or regulation in issue. To the extent that our cases interpreting the term \u201cstructure\u201d in other statutes and by-laws are relevant, as the newspapers contend, there are numerous other cases that take a broad interpretation and reach the opposite conclusion from Galligon and Williams. See, e.g., Scott v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 356 Mass. 159, 161-162 & n.2 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Selectmen of Lancaster v. DeFelice, 352 Mass. Holdings: 0: holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below 1: holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function 2: holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum 3: holding that swimming pool was structure for zoning bylaw purposes although it was mostly below ground level 4: holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "plaintiffs limitation of liability claim pending); Bergeron v. Elliot, 466 F.2d 514, 516 n. 3 (5th Cir.1972) (allowing appeal of grant of summary judgment as to one of several defendants). Cf. Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. v. Barge Hercules, 992 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of grant of summary judgment on one defendant\u2019s cross-claim against another for indemnification because plaintiffs claims for liability as to any defendant had not been determined). As the District Court did neither of these and did not otherwise determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, McLaughlin\u2019s appeal is not yet ripe for review and cannot be heard by this court. Accord Francis v. Forest Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Upper Miss. Towing Corp. v. West, 338 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a pretrial order that the 500 cogsa limitation applied was not appealable under 28 usc 1292a3 1: holding order setting aside summary judgment for procedural irregularity was not immediately appealable 2: holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order  is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable 3: holding that an order denying summary judgment is not appealable under  1292a3 even though it may have had important procedural consequences 4: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Therefore, it was an allegation based on speculation and conjecture. The trial court conducted a hearing, at which Walker could have pursued this legal theory, objected to the State\u2019s alleged lack of evidence of probable cause to arrest, presented evidence to support his allegation, and argued that the lack of evidence required that his statement be suppressed. Walker, however, remained silent; he did not pursue this issue in the trial court; and he did not allow the trial court the opportunity to prevent the alleged injustice. See Adams v. State, 585 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.l991)(\u201cMatters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, since review on appeal applies only to rulings by the trial court.\u201d)- Cf. Coulliette v. State, 857 So.2d 793, 795 (Ala.2003)(<HOLDING>). Walker\u2019s silence and abandonment of this Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court considers the entire record on appeal not just the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in affirming the denial of a motion to suppress 1: holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal 2: holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived 3: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 4: holding that because a specific argument raised on appeal was not presented at suppression hearing  the motion to suppress did not give the trial court notice of the specific issues the defendant  raised in his appellate brief therefore the trial court did not have the opportunity to rectify these alleged errors the defendants motion was not sufficient to preserve the issues presented by him in his brief  quoting aeree v state 673 so2d 855 856 alacrimapp1995", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to the very heart and substance of the contract. It was material; indeed, it is difficult to imagine anything more material, given nearly three years of delays, three contract extensions, and two federal lawsuits involving the sale of this very property. The Sellers displayed the patience of Job by waiting nearly 3/\u00e9 years to accomplish the sale of farmland that was originally intended to be transferred within six months. Paragraph 15 of the settlement agreement clearly called for closing or termination \u201c[i]f closing has not occurred on or before January 25, 2001, for any reason,\u201d and the closing failed to occur in a timely fashion. Based on the facts before us, we do not perceive any clear error with the district court\u2019s findings. See O\u2019Malley, 86 Ill.App.2d at 451, 229 N.E.2d 878 (<HOLDING>); Schneider, 767 F.2d at 1014 (\u201cThe parties Holdings: 0: holding that explicit deadline coupled with forfeiture provision was sufficient evidence of materiality 1: holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under  981 the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to  2461c and 853p 2: holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a criminal forfeiture action where a state court in a related state court forfeiture proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the same currency subject to forfeiture 3: holding evidence legally sufficient 4: holding a forfeiture provision to be a civil action despite its codification in the states criminal code", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the sale and he was not arrested until seven months later. He had also testified that although his mother lived near the location where the buy had occurred, he could not remember if he had visited her that night or where he had been at that time. Then-Justice Castille concurred, noting that under the facts \u2014 \"namely the lengthy time period between the alleged transaction and the arrest\u201d \u2014 the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Payne, 656 A.2d at 80. However, Justice Castille disagreed with much of the majority's explanation of the test to be applied, in particular disputing the emphasis the majority placed on the availability of testimony from \"a more disinterested source\u201d than a police officer. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 427 Pa. 261, 234 A.2d 423 (1967) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Washington, 463 Pa. 206, 344 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged  to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident 1: holding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial where the only witnesses to a drug transaction other than the defendant were an fbi agent and a cl 2: holding that defendant was not entitled to specific performance of alleged cooperation agreement entered into with fbi agent who allegedly promised defendant he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated in making a statement where there was no evidence establishing that agent was authorized to make promises to obtain defendants cooperation 3: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 4: holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "applying the legal \u201ctax\u201d definition utilized by courts under the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the court determined that the assessment involved an \u201cinvoluntary pecuniary burden,\u201d because the marketing order involved statutory, rather than contractual, obligations. Id. at 387. Also, the assessment was found to be for a public purpose, since the funds were utilized \u201cto defray the necessary expenses incurred by the director in the formulation, issuance, administration and enforcement of each marketing order.\u201d Id. at 388. However, contrary to the Farmers Frozen Food decision, courts under the Code have not hesitated to determine certain assessments to be \u201cfees,\u201d despite the fact that they stemmed from statutory obligations. In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); In re Shooters Emporium, Inc., 135 B.R. 701, Holdings: 0: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment 1: holding that background check assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code 2: holding that permit fee assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code 3: holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes 4: holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "remedies available to him. Nevertheless, Jacquez-Perez\u2019s petition must fail. In expanding the definition of \u201caggravated felony,\u201d Congress explicitly stated that the expanded definition \u201capplies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before ... the date of enactment [September 30, 1996],\u201d IIRIRA \u00a7 321(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(43)), and that the new definition \u201cshall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred,\u201d id. \u00a7 321(c). See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318-19 & n. 43, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (using these sections as an example of Congress\u2019s unambiguous intent to apply the expanded definition retroactively); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, the relevant \u201caction taken\u201d is ICE Holdings: 0: recognizing that 1996 amendment to definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively 1: holding that the expanded definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively in actions taken on or after september 30 1996 2: recognizing that 1996 amendment specifically applies regardless of date of prior conviction constituting aggravated felony 3: holding that  212c applies to all applications for relief filed after november 29 1990 regardless of when conviction occurred for offenses within the original definition of aggravated felony 4: holding that an ij or bia decision that occurs after september 30 1996 is an action taken that triggers iiriras aggravated felony rules", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of influencing the grand jury as to any proper matter pertaining to its inquiry or which might have influenced the grand jury or impeded its inquiry.\u201d United States v. Doherty, 906 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). To be material, the statement \u201cneed not directly concern an element of the crime\u201d being investigated, \u201cnor need it actually influence the jury.\u201d Doherty, 906 F.2d at 44. Because materiality is a mixed question of fact and law for the jury, Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512-15, 115 S.Ct. 2310, a court may only decide the issue, as a matter of law, when no reasonable juror could find materiality on the evidence presented, cf. In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Sec. Litig., 414 F.3d 187, 209 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). On appeal, Silveira contends that the Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence 1: recognizing only that the guidelines must be advisory not that judges may find no facts 2: holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation 3: holding in a securities fraud action that a court may only find the lack of materiality where a jury could not reasonably find materiality 4: holding in securities law context that in cases involving nondisclosure of material facts  materiality rather than reliance  becomes the decisive element of causation", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "those state laws that specifically \u201cregulate insurance.\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1144(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has recently set forth a new two-part test for determining whether a state law \u201cregulates insurance\u201d and is, therefore, saved from ERISA\u2019s preemptive effect. This two-part test requires the state law to: (1) \u201cbe specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance\u201d; and (2) \u201csubstantially affect the risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.\u201d Ky. Ass\u2019n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, _ U.S. _, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 1479, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003). If this two-part inquiry reveals that the state' law regulates insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption. \u201cThis does not, however, end [the] preemption analysis.\u201d Cono Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Fink v. Dakotacare, 324 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Holdings: 0: holding claims under the montana unfair trade practices statute were conflictpreempted because the montana law provided nonerisa damages for essentially claim processing causes of action 1: holding that an action which seeks nonerisa damages for what are essentially claim processing causes of actionf clearly falls under the  1132 preemption exemplified by pilot life 2: holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted 3: holding that a complaint that seeks nonerisa damages for what are essentially claim processing causes of action clearly fall within the ambit of  1132 preemption exemplified by pilot life 4: holding that state common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan are removable to federal court", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of unsuccessful appeals through the state court system. Thus, to the extent the arbitrator evaluated a slim record, it was a record starved by Kalyanaram, not by any inadequacy of the arbitration process. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 1 . Kalyanaram\u2019s suit claimed that NYIT submitted fraudulent information to federal and state agencies so that the school\u2019s students would be eligible for subsidized student loans. His claims were brought under the federal False Claims Act and its New York state equivalent. See 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 3729, N.Y. State Fin. Law \u00a7 189. 2 . Even if the arbitration award had not yet been confirmed by state courts, it could still have preclusive effect. See Jacobson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 261, 267-68 (2d Cir.1997) Holdings: 0: holding that collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to quasijudicial agency decisions 1: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to issues resolved by arbitration where there has been a final determination on the merits notwithstanding a lack of confirmation of the award citations omitted 2: holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes 3: recognizing exception to application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles to decisions of administrative proceedings where there has been manifest error in the record 4: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in Berry, 670 F.2d at 597, did say that \u2018The more intrusive on an individual's freedom complying with a request would be, the greater should be the skepticism with which a court treats assertions that an individual consented to a request\u201d; but this does not determine when consent was given, however, or suggest less validity to an acquiescence voluntarily and intelligently extended. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555-56, 100 S.Ct. at 1877-78; Gonzales, 842 F.2d at 754-55. 17 . Zukas, 843 F.2d at 183 (\"The suspicion did not rise to the level of probable cause [for arrest], though, until after Zukas and the passenger had consented to a search that resulted . in the discovery of cocaine.\u201d). 18 . Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3148 n. 22, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310, 87 Holdings: 0: holding that traffic stops do not ordinarily place a motorist in custody the court rejected the position that custody arises as soon as the level of suspicion amounts to probable cause to arrest 1: holding that traffic stops based on probable cause are valid even if the officer stopping the vehicle suspects that the occupant is engaged in other illegal activity 2: recognizing that district courts finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances is ordinarily accorded deference 3: holding that arrest took place inside home even though officers did not physically enter residence to place suspect in custody 4: holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "public policy and case law surrounding Commonwealth contract claims,\u201d and did not alter or diminish the Board of Claims\u2019 jurisdiction, except as explicitly enumerated in \u201ctwo minor areas (i.e. by eliminating Board jurisdiction over medical assistance claims and allowing for nonmonetary relief, excluding specific performance, on state contract claims before the Commonwealth Court).\u201d Id. at 1 (citing 62 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 1724(c), (d)). In terms of its main request, the Board of Claims centers a substantial portion of its presentation on the question of whether the amendments to the Procurement Code reconstituting the tribunal narrowed its jurisdiction only to claims for breaches of procurement contracts. See generally Hanover Ins. Co. v. SWIF, 35 A.3d 849, 856 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The Board of Claims also places particular Holdings: 0: holding that a nonfrivolous allegation of board jurisdiction is one which if true would establish a prima facie case that the board has jurisdiction over the matter at issue 1: holding that the courts jurisdiction is limited to the appeal of final board decisions that are adverse to the claimant 2: holding consistent with the board of claims position that the provisions of the procurement code have not altered or limited the exclusive jurisdiction of the independent administrative board over a particular nonprocurement matter 3: holding that the denial of enforcement on the basis that the board lacked a proper quorum did not deprive the board of jurisdiction to consider the case anew 4: holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that Mexican gangs attempted to extort money from his family by threatening to kidnap his sister. The IJ reasonably found that the callers targe 3 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that general civil strife does not establish a well-founded fear of persecution). The IJ also reasonably found that Vargas did not establish a likelihood that he would be tortured by Mexican gangs because, despite the high level of gang violence, Vargas testified that none of his family living in Mexico had been harmed and he did not provide evidence that the Mexican government permits gang violence. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir.2004) (requiring applicant for CAT relief to show that torture would be perpetrated with the government\u2019s consent or acquiescence); Melgar de Torres, 191 F.3d at 313 (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: holding members of two distinct pension plans were not similarly situated for equal protection analysis 1: holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim 2: holding that where similarly situated family members continued to live in aliens native country claim of future harm was diminished 3: holding that wellfounded fear was established where all of petitioners similarly situated family members were persecuted 4: holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "motions are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. While the request for posteonviction relief filed by Barnes was timely filed in accordance with Rule 37.2(c), which requires that, when a petitioner entered a plea of guilty, a petition under the Rule must be filed in the trial court within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment, the request for postconviction relief filed by Barnes was not properly verified. For that reason, it was subject to dismissal by the trial court. Keck v. State, 2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240 (per curiam). Barnes could not circumvent the requirement that a [.\u00a1petition for postconviction relief be verified by labeling his petition as a motion to retract his guilty plea. See Lambert v. State, 2012 Ark. 310, at 2, 2012 WL 3373199 (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); see also Livingston v. State, 2014 Ark. 364, Holdings: 0: holding that because the petitioner had already filed a rule 371 petition he was barred from submitting a subsequent petition under that rule and his petition was subject to dismissal on that basis regardless of the label he placed on it 1: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition 2: holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule 3: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition 4: holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to be free from liability for one\u2019s own negligence is to use the word \u2018negligence,\u2019 is erroneous.\u201d). Here, the release provided that it applied to \u201call claims, demands, expenses, attorneys\u2019 fees, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature, resulting from or claimed to have resulted from the sale, use or administration of ProHeart 6 INJ.\u201d (Emph 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (same); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Federated Dep\u2019t Stores, Inc., 782 So.2d 445, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (same). However, in this case, the release was completely typewritten. The reference in the release to \u201call other persons, firms, corporations and entities\u201d clearly applies to appellees for claims resulting from \u201cthe sale, use or administration of ProHeart 6.\u201d See Hester v. Gatlin, 332 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (<HOLDING>). However, we conclude that in entering a Holdings: 0: holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged 1: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release 2: holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release 3: holding that release which specifically referenced certain parties but went on to discharge any and all other persons andor corporations was sufficient to release unnamed third party 4: holding that release discharges only those tortfeasors specifically named in the release agreement", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (issues not raised in an opening brief are waived). To the extent that Verdu-Degregorio contends that he did not knowingly waive his right to appeal his removal order and request withholding of removal, his due process claim fails because he does not explain how his due process rights were violated in his signing of the waiver, nor did he establish any resulting prejudice. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim). To the extent that Verdu-Degregorio is collaterally attacking his underlying state criminal conviction, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim. See Ramirez-Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED Holdings: 0: holding that petitioner could not collaterally attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of an agency decision 1: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review 2: holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed 3: holding that a habeas petitioner cannot collaterally attack the conviction serving as a predicate for a removal order 4: holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a prior state conviction during a federal sentencing proceeding in a different case", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "150-51. As just stated, Harry\u2019s directive to transfer King to another Level II institution in order to give the staff a break was facially legitimate. King produced no evidence that Chaffee knew or should have known that he was not actually instigating other prisoners to defiance. Indeed, King\u2019s trial counsel elicited from Chaffee on direct examination that he did not have any first hand knowledge whether King was instigating other prisoners. Trial Trans. (Vol.1) at 139. Thus, King failed to show that Chaffee knew or should have known that the reasons Harry gave him for the transfer were false or given for retaliatory reasons. Therefore, King failed to prove that in facilitating his transfer, Chaffee acted with retaliatory intent. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 393 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Chaffee cannot have known of any Holdings: 0: holding a subordinate will be liable under  1983 for following a superiors orders if he knew or should have known his acts were violating plaintiffs constitutional rights 1: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 2: holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under  1983 3: holding that a request is sufficiently clear if the administrator knew or should have known that plan information was requested 4: holding that defendant who sets in motion series of events that he knew or should have known would cause others to deprive plaintiff of rights may be liable under  1983", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (declining to find a due process right to appointed counsel on appeal from state collateral review even when under state law, ineffectiveness claims relating to trial or direct appeal could only be brought in a state collateral review proceeding). To the extent Petitioner premises her asserted entitlement to collateral review on the constitutional nature of her ineffectiveness claims, we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, see 42 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 9545(b), the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature\u2019s restrictions on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 Holdings: 0: holding that where the appellant had the opportunity to bring his petition within the parameters of the jurisdictional requirements of the pcra yet did not do so he cannot complain of a lack of due process 1: holding no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely pcra petition 2: holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable 3: holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a pcra petition has no effect on the application of the pcra jurisdictional time bar 4: holding that a pcra petitioner may not raise new claims by merely supplementing a pending pcra petition without court authorization because to do so would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the pcra", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The Posts clearly could have litigated the insurance claim in their prior foreclosure action. A foreclosure judgment determines with finality the rights of the parties to the contract. See Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 325 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1982). The effect of strict foreclosure is to bar and foreclose the purchaser's equitable interest in the property and terminate the purchaser's rights under the contract. Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 142 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1966). Foreclosure also \"is effective to fully liquidate and discharge the contract . . . [and] bars any other rights of the vendor under the contract.\" Id. (quoting 3 American Law of Property sec. 11.75 at 187 (1952)); see also Kunz v. Whitney, 167 Wis. 446, 449-50, 167 N.W. 747, 748 (1918) (<HOLDING>). This, we conclude, \"conforms to the parties' Holdings: 0: holding that the land contract vendors were entitled to insurance benefits when before the fire that damaged the subject property the vendors obtained a judgment of forfeiture based on the vendees default on the land contract 1: holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties 2: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 3: holding that when the holder of a land contract repurchases the land in foreclosure the contract between the parties is effectively canceled and the purchaser is relieved of any unperformed obligations of the contract 4: holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). Under rational basis review, a classification is permissible \u201cif there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.\u201d Id. (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096). Plaintiffs contend that the EO discriminates on the basis of religion and was designed to exclude Muslims from the United States. They further allege that it singles out citizens of seven different countries. At oral argument, plaintiffs relied on \u201castonishing evidence of intent\u201d from President Trump which, in their view, demonstrates that EO was \u201csubstantially motivated by improper animus.\u201d See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Defendants responded that the cases examining Holdings: 0: holding that the state law violated equal protection principles 1: holding that where racial bias motivated its original enactment a facially neutral felon disenfranchisement law violated the equal protection clause 2: holding that a provision in the alabama constitution violated equal protection even through it was facially neutral because it was motivated by animus 3: holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial 4: holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Edward C. Tadefa appeals pro se from the district court\u2019s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241 petition for writ of habe-as corpus. We dismiss. Tadefa contends that the special mental health aftercare requirement imposed as a condition of his release violates his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Because this issue is not yet ripe for review, we dismiss. See United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 931-32 (9th Cir.2009); Cf. United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir.2005). Tadefa\u2019s motion to supplement the record is denied. See Fed. R.App. P. 10(e); see also Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Tadefa\u2019s motion for appointment of counsel is Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court will not normally address issue raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 2: recognizing that this court construes rule 10e narrowly and has held that normally the reviewing court will not supplement the record on appeal with material not considered by the trial court 3: holding that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this court 4: holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "federal court, but we agree it is not necessarily improper. 2011 WL 477175, at *1. Tex. Lab.Code \u00a7 410.251 allows judicial review after exhaustion of administrative remedies for parties aggrieved by a final decision of an appeals panel of the DWC. The Texas Legislature, when attempting to limit jurisdiction, makes this intent clear in the statute. See, e.g., Chapman v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 814 F.Supp.2d 716, 721 (N.D.Tex.2011) (finding the Texas Legislature not using the term \u201cexclusive jurisdiction\u201d in the Texas Title Insurance Act \u201cwas not just mere oversight because the Texas Legislature has demonstrated that it knows how to confer such jurisdiction when it desires by carefully selecting the wording of the statute.\u201d); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). While Chapman and Entergy Corp. each Holdings: 0: holding that the utilities commission has the discretion to use a hypothetical capital structure in setting customer rates particularly where the utility is a whollyowned subsidiary of a holding company 1: holding that the commission may only exercise jurisdiction over utilities expressly included in the scope of the pua 2: holding that the texas legislature limited jurisdiction to the public utilities commission for disputes about rates operations and services of an electric utility by stating that the commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over these issues citing tex utilcode  32001 west 2007 3: holding commission created and given full power to investigate hear and determine disputes between utility and general public primarily for the interest of the consumer 4: holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "with complete waiver as the penalty imposed for any untimely filed claims. Rule 24.035(b), (g); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (\u201cBy failing to timely file, the movant has completely waived his right to proceed on his post-conviction relief claims.\u201d). Finally, Rule 24.035 restricts the authorized scope o.f appellate review \u201cto a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.\u201d Rule 24.035(k); see also Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Mo. banc 2006). These Rules combine to prohibit appellate review of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is not timely raised in a Rule 24.035 motion. State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73, 92 (Mo.App.S.D.1997) (cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 48, 50 Holdings: 0: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived 1: holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief 2: holding that claims not raised in a timely postconviction motion are waived 3: holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal 4: holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "are \u201cpersons\u201d under 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6672. Plaintiffs argue that they are not \u201cpersons\u201d because: 1) they did not make the decision to stop paying tax funds or to prefer some creditors over the IRS; and 2) Manley had enough funds free and clear of any control by the bank to have paid the payroll taxes withheld to the United States. The United States argues that under the line of credit loan and security agreement, the bank has the power to control Manley in the event of default, plaintiffs are \u201cpersons.\u201d \u201cPerson\u201d is defined in 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6671(b), as follows: \u201c[t]he term \u2018person\u2019, as used in this subehapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under it, Inc., 956 F.2d 703 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). When a lender does not exercise control over Holdings: 0: holding the lender hable when after borrower defaulted the lender took control of borrowers finances determined which creditors were paid and loaned the borrower money for the purpose of paying employees on condition that none of the money be used to pay withholding taxes 1: holding that it was not improper for a lender to halt the proposed settlement and discounted payment of plaintiffs loan when the lender believed the loan would otherwise be paid in full 2: holding that where lender financed collected and retained one years premium on credit life insurance for borrower it assumed a contractual obligation to obtain credit life insurance for such borrower and to apply the amounts so received to credit life insurance and  it stood in a fiduciary capacity towards the borrower to see that the amount so charged collected and withheld were actually applied to obtaining and purchasing such insurance 3: holding that the lender was subject to the dtpa because the borrowers purpose in obtaining the loan was the purchase of a house 4: holding lender might be held responsible for buyers alleged damages where facts indicated lenders active participation in the sale of the residence or the existence of a special relationship between the lender and the borrower", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.\u201d State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). The plea only differs from the traditional guilty plea \"in that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he or she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.\u201d Id. at n. 1. 2 . We acknowledge our decision today is the third within a year that recognizes collateral consequences based on the court\u2019s acceptance of the plea notwithstanding the defendant\u2019s deferred judgment. See Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 592, 598 (Iowa 2011) (defendant lost federal pharmacy license as result of a plea to three felonies for taking prescription pills notwithstanding the deferred judgment); State v. Deng Kon Tong, 805 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 2011) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The parties stipulate Van Haaften Holdings: 0: holding a deferred judgment is not a final judgment of sentence from which a defendant may appeal under iowa code section 8146 1: holding that petitioners prior guilty plea and deferred adjudication for forgery did not amount to a conviction within the meaning of the immigration reform and control act 8 usc  1255a 2: holding that a guilty plea for which the defendant received a deferred adjudication counted as a conviction under federal law for purposes of ussg  4b11 3: holding a guilty plea pursuant to a deferred judgment is a conviction for purposes of the feloninpossessionofafirearm statute iowa code section 72426 4: holding that determining what care is reasonable under iowa code section 8527 is a question of fact", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "abuse of discretion. Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss it in part. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez\u2019s motion to reopen because Perez did not demonstrate that his prior attorney\u2019s failure to apply for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility caused Perez any prejudice. See Iturribavria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2003) (petitioner must show prejudice in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel). We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA\u2019s discretionary determination that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 212(h), Perez is prima facie ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because Perez failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. Cf. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152 (<HOLDING>). Perez\u2019s remaining contentions also lack Holdings: 0: recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims 1: holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction under the transitional rules of the iirira 2: holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases 3: holding under the predecessor to  1229bb that denials of suspension based on the  element of extreme hardship are discretionary decisions 4: holding that judicial review is available over the determination of whether extreme hardship exists though no jurisdiction exists to review the ultimate decision of whether to grant a waiver under  1186ac4a", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the disciplinary process has violated his rights under the First Amendment; however, his discussion of this issue is perfunctory at best, and certainly insufficient to form a cognizable claim for us to address. See Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1015 n. 8 (R.I.2007) (repeating well-established rule that this Court will not substantively address an issue that is not adequately briefed). 13 . This statute is now codified at G.L.1956 \u00a7 8-1-2. 14 . This Court went on to explain the historical roots of this institutional structure in common law England. See Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association, 55 R.I. 122, 132-33, 179 A. 139, 143-44 (1935). 15 .See also G.L.1956 \u00a7 8-6-2 (judicial authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure); G.L.1956 \u00a7 11-27-18 (<HOLDING>); G.L.1956 \u00a7 7-5.1-2(2) (identifying the Holdings: 0: recognizing this rule 1: recognizing this presumption 2: holding that the authority of the supreme court to discipline judges and members of the bar is plenary 3: recognizing right of this court to regulate and discipline members of the bar 4: holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "special education and daycare at different sites, children who receive both daycare and special education services at the same site are not entitled to transportation under the IDEA as incorporated by Minn.Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 123B.88,125A.03(a). This court retains the authority to review de novo questions of law, which arise when an agency decision is based upon the meaning of words in a statute. St. Otto\u2019s Home v. Minn. Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 39-40 (Minn.1989). A reviewing court is not bound by an agency\u2019s interpretation of a statute. Id. When interpreting Minnesota statutes, \u201cwords and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.\u201d Minn.Stat. \u00a7 645.08(1) (2004). If a statute, construed according 773, 785 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 Holdings: 0: holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law 1: holding that when state educational benefits exceed minimum federal standards the state standards are enforceable through the idea 2: holding that congress did not authorize the states to enforce federal law where it gave states regulatory control through enforcement of their own laws 3: holding that states may enforce their own laws for disabled children and are not limited to the minimum standards of the federal law 4: holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Judge. Jonathan Outing appeals from the sentence imposed upon him following the revocation of his probation. He correctly argues, and the State concedes, that the State failed to present sufficient nonhearsay evidence that Outing violated the terms of his probation by changing his approved residence. See McCrary v. State, 464 So.2d 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we reverse the order of Holdings: 0: holding that probation cannot be revoked solely for violation of conditions requiring payment without evidence that probationer is able to pay 1: holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions 2: holding that probation and suspension of sentence may not be revoked based solely on a violation or criminal offense that was committed before the offender was actually placed on probation 3: holding that where defendant admitted to two violations of probation and was sentenced therefor court could not enter second order of revocation and resentence defendant on third charge of violation of probation which was pending at time defendants probation was first revoked 4: holding that a defendants probation cannot be revoked solely on the basis of hearsay", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "This is not fee simple. When all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party, there is a disputed issue of fact as to when and how MassMutual determines its compensation for each SIA involving a single mutual fund. The caselaw is clear that a service provider\u2019s retention of discretion to set compensation can create fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to its compensation. Generally speaking, a service provider \u201cdoes not act as a fiduciary with respect to the terms in the service agreement if it does not control the named fiduciary\u2019s negotiation and approval of those terms.\u201d Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009) (citing cases); Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2:10-ev-01655, 2013 WL 3864395, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013) (<HOLDING>). However, \u201cafter a person has entered into an Holdings: 0: holding that service provider was not a fiduciary with respect to revenue sharing because the total expenses associated with each investment option were fully disclosed 1: holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation 2: holding the same with respect to an apartment 3: holding that when attorneys were acting as members of the firm with respect to the case in question section 504b1 applies to allow  fee sharing with any member whether that membership is regular or sporadic 4: holding that defendant was not a fiduciary with respect to a fixed fee that was set by an agreement negotiated at arms length", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "311 (7th Cir.1992); Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948, 950 (9th Cir.1993). Construing the ambiguity against the drafter under the applicable state law doctrine of contra proferentem, these circuits have held that the limitation does not include organically based illnesses. Phillips, 978 F.2d at 311; Patterson, 11 F.3d at 950. This court has held that \u201c[a]n insurance contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations that can fairly be made. When one of these interpretations results in coverage and another results in exclusion, ambiguity exists in the insurance policy.\u201d Dahl-Eimers v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379, 1381 (11th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). The district court reasoned th 8 F.2d 302, 304, 310-11 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), with Brewer v. Lincoln Nat\u2019l Life Ins. Co., Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling 1: holding that a mental illness limitation limiting the maximum payment for care of mental illness or care of nervous conditions of any type or cause is ambiguous because the plan contains no definition or explanation of the term mental illness  and thus construed against the insurance company does not include physically based illnesses 2: holding that upon applying the doctrine of contra proferentem the insureds organically based illness does not fall within the mental illness limitation as a matter of law 3: holding that a mental illness limitation containing the exact language at issue in this case is ambiguous because it does not specify whether a disability is to be classified as mental by looking to the cause of the disability or to its symptoms and thus construed in favor of the insured does not encompass organically based illnesses 4: recognizing attorneys mental illness as grounds for relief under rule 60b6", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as we know it. On the other hand, a decent respect for the collective wisdom of the jury and for the function entrusted to it in our system, certainly suggests that in most cases the judge should accept the findings of the jury, regardless of its own doubts on the matter. Probably all that the judge can do is balance these conflicting principles in light of the facts of the particular case. If, after having given full respect to the jury\u2019s findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new trial. 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 2806 (2d ed.1995). See also Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 672 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 2. The Size of the Verdict Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 1: holding that a district court must compare and weigh the opposing evidence and it must set aside the verdict if it determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence 2: holding that the court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the evidence and may only set aside the finding if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust 3: holding that a jurys award of compensatory damages will be set aside on the grounds of excessiveness only if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice 4: recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "broad clauses have their limits. Because we are concerned only with the dispute before us and its connection with or relation to the several agreements before us, we need not explore these outer limits,\u201d). In PaineWebber, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply the arbitration clauses from three Option Agreements to a dispute arising under a separate Referral Agreement. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank, 260 F.3d 453, 464 (5th Cir.2001). \u201cCertainly, the extremely broad language of these clauses, if read in a vacuum, would appear to bind the parties to arbitrate any and all disputes that may arise between them. When read in context as they must be, however, the reach of the arbitration clauses in the Option Agreements is simply not capable of such an expansive grasp.\u201d Id. (<HOLDING>). Here, the loan and checking account Holdings: 0: holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease but providing no more specific time requirement the lessee had a reasonable time to exercise the option within the term of the lease 1: holding that even if the doctrine applies to option contracts no conversion would take place until the option were exercised by the party having the right of election 2: holding that option agreements were limited in time and scope and in no way modified or superceded referral agreement 3: holding in part that the utah state probation agreement does not create such an option 4: holding that agreement referencing rights and remedies of another agreement was subject to the referenced agreements arbitration clause", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "conduct. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id. \u00a7 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines sentence range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty, as is the case here, is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The weight accorded any specific \u00a7 3553(a) Holdings: 0: holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum 1: holding sentences need only be below the statutory maximum 2: recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum 3: holding a sentence 110 the length of the 20year statutory maximum sentence was reasonable 4: holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "third party which are otherwise subject to state control.\u201d); Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 533 (discussing New York regulations at issue in Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 74 S.Ct. 550, 98 L.Ed. 767 (1954), that prohibited any banks other than New York\u2019s charter savings banks from advertising that they accepted \u201csavings,\u201d and reasoning that \u201cwe do not believe that the regulation at issue in Franklin National Bank would have presented any less of a conflict with the National Bank Act if it indirectly restricted a national bank\u2019s power by prohibiting New York advertising firms from using the word \u2018savings\u2019 when preparing advertising for a bank, or if it had prohibited billboard owners from posting signs for banks that included the word \u2018savings\u2019 \u201d); Bank One, 190 F.3d at 847-50 (<HOLDING>). Next, the State argues that even if the Holdings: 0: holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence 1: holding that such provisions are valid 2: holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa 3: holding provisions of the iowa efta that restricted outofstate banks from operating atms within iowa were preempted by nba even though the state of iowa attempted to enforce provisions of the iowa efta against thirdparty retailer 4: holding the same under iowa law", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "argument is that because these factors restate the factors charged in the indictment, they are not \u201cadditional non-statutory aggravators.\u201d United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Defendant urges the Court to interpret the Fourth Circuit\u2019s use of the word \u201cadditional\u201d to mean \u201ca factor unrelated to the Defendant\u2019s crime of conviction.\u201d This argument ignores the fact that the FDPA expressly permits juries to consider statutory aggravators as well as \u201cany other aggravating factor for which notice has been given.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3592(c). In other words, the FDPA empowers jurors to consider nonstatutory ag-gravators that are appropriately noticed. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant\u2019s argument that allowing 689, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. June 17, 2016) (<HOLDING>), with Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) Holdings: 0: holding that hurst did not render unconstitutional californias capital sentencing scheme which utilizes a jury in the factfinding process 1: holding that alabamas capital sentencing scheme which utilizes a factfinding jury remains constitutional under hurst 2: holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular 3: recognizing two solutions in a sentencing scheme very similar to hawaiis 1 the present system of fixed terms with factfinding assigned to a jury or 2 reform of the system to create a true sentencing range 4: holding we reject the notion that alabamas statutory scheme for compensating attorneys in capital cases in and of itself denies a defendant effective representation", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "proof in this case. Under rational basis review, the government \u201chas no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.\u201d Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). The challenged ordinance is presumed constitutional and plaintiff bears the burden of negating \u201cevery conceivable basis which might support it.\u201d Id. As a matter of law, plaintiff has not carried this burden. Although the City need not present evidence of a rational basis for the 15 per cent demolition threshold, the Court finds that it has in fact done so. In determining the rationality of a challenged statute, the Court may consider the legislative history underlying the statute. See United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 880 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Sec\u2019y of Horn. & Urban Dev., 985 Holdings: 0: holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category 1: holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear 2: holding that the legislative history under the act indicates that liquidated damages are intended to be punitive in nature 3: holding that legislative history cannot supply a clear statement 4: recognizing legislative history as source which illustrates rational link between dna act and governments interest in enforcing criminal law", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of a detailed offer of proof, which includes affidavits, in support of the allegations of falsity is one of the five requirements that a defendant must fulfill to warrant a Franks hearing. United States v. Di Cesare, 765 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir.1985). More recently, the Ninth Circuit has stated that a defendant\u2019s failure to offer an affidavit or sworn statement in support of allegations that a warrant affidavit was based upon deliberately false information is enough in itself to defeat a defendant\u2019s demand for an eviden-tiary hearing under Franks. United States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331, 334 (9th Cir.1995). The Seventh Circuit has addressed the issue of the sufficiency of a defendant\u2019s offer of proof in a number of decisions. See United States v. Walker, 25 F.3d 540, 544-45 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1225 Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify 2: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 3: holding where tape corroborated by independent testimony of two police officers and where defendant did not challenge accuracy of recording court did not err in admitting tape despite prosecutions failure to authenticate it 4: holding that the defendants offer of proof which consisted only of a tape recording and a private investigators affidavit did not satisfy the defendants preliminary burden under franks without the offering of other sworn testimony or reliable evidence", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "law that we \u00ed\u2019eview de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.2005). The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that Simmons, a twenty-nine-year-old high school graduate, understood the waiver provision in his plea agreement. In his plea agreement, Simmons specifically waived the right to challenge his sentence on appeal, reserving only the right to challenge an upward departure from the Guidelines range established at sentencing, and Simmons averred at his Rule 11 hearing that he read and understood the plea agreement. We therefore conclude that Simmons knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his sentence. Turning to the scope of the waiver, the sentencing claims Simmons raises on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver provision. See id. at 169-70 (<HOLDING>). Because Simmons\u2019 valid and enforceable waiver Holdings: 0: holding that blakely and united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 are not retroactive on collateral review 1: holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing 2: holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 does not provide a basis for a sentence reduction under 18 usc  3582c 3: holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not alter the standard of review for the interpretation and application of the guidelines 4: holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence in plea agreement accepted before decision in united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "an expectation of privacy is entitled to enhanced protection in a given circumstance.\u201d Joye, supra, 176 N.J. at 613, 826 A.2d at 651. In essence, we conclude that, because the police did not suspect criminal wrongdoing and were not investigating criminal activity, the officers could ask defendant to step out of the car and, incident to their good faith performance of their \u201ccommunity caretaking\u201d function, conduct a \u201cpat down\u201d incident to placing him in the police car for the limited period necessary to inquire about the \u201cmissing person\u201d report. We are not dealing with a minor motor vehicle or traffic violation which precluded the placement of defendant in the police vehicle and the \u201cpat down\u201d incident thereto. See State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 525-526 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 792-793 Holdings: 0: holding that during a routine traffic stop it is reasonable for an officer to search the driver for weapons before placing the driver in a patrol car if placing the driver in the patrol car during the investigation prevents officers or the driver from being subjected to a dangerous condition and placing the driver in the patrol car is the least intrusive means to avoid the dangerous condition 1: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search 2: holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver 3: holding that injury of plaintiff  who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle  did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible 4: holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1103(a)(3) (2005), which provides: A petition or motion to terminate the parental rights of either or both parents to his, her, or their minor juvenile may only be filed by one or more of the following: . . . Any county department of social services, consolidated county human services agency, or licensed child-placing agency to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction. Second, the trial court in D.D.J. had no jurisdiction to enter the 17 March 2004 order on termination subsequent to granting \u201cfull custody\u201d of the juveniles to custodial guardians on 26 September 2003 and specifying that \u201cthis case is closed.\u201d See In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 7, 618 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Here, James R. and Crystal Helms, H.D.\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts order refusing to exercise jurisdiction and remanding to the magistrate court for trial was sufficiently final for purposes of appeal and then determining that the remand was in error 1: holding that jurisdiction in the district court was terminated by the trial courts order to close the case and that dss was required to file a new petition alleging neglect 2: holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial 3: holding that an untimely petition for a rehearingreconsideration of a motion in a criminal case was beyond the district courts jurisdiction 4: holding that even where postconviction petitioner reserved the option to file an amended petition in his opening petition simply filing an amended petition is insufficient to request leave to file an amended petition a motion for leave to file an amended petition was required before it was necessary for the district judge to consider the amended petition", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the alternative method of demonstrating scienter\u2014 motive \u2014 has not been established. Plaintiffs contend that the Andersen defendants were motivated to participate in the fraud because of personal gain. However, they have alleged no gain other than the fact that the Andersen firm was compensated for its professional services. It would defy common sense to hold that the motive element of the Beck scienter analysis would be satisfied merely by alleging the receipt of normal compensation for professional services rendered, because to do so would effectively abolish the requirement, as against professional defendants in a securities fraud action, of pleading facts which support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Section 10(b) claim is Holdings: 0: holding that a professional owes no duty to third persons unless the professional had actual knowledge that those persons would rely on his rendering of professional services 1: holding professional malpractice claim not contractual 2: holding that ijnsurance policies are contracts and as such they are to be enforced according to their provisions and ijnsurance companies must be able to rely on their statements of coverage exclusions disclaimers definitions and other provisions in order to receive the benefit of their bargain 3: holding that professional defendants who merely perform their usual professional functions and receive their normal compensation are not liable under the draconian provisions of section 122 4: holding that 1 principal shareholder and chief executive officer of chapter 11 debtor in liquidation is not entitled to compensation beyond normal salary for performing duties required of the debtor 2 professional is a term which is not narrowly construed but applies to anyone the nature of whose services meet the criteria of a professional person 3 a professional license is not dispositive and 4 factors include form of compensation time of retention pre or postpetition and whether employment is full time or parttime", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "bankruptcy court record, including the consolidated pre-trial order, the McFarlands\u2019 proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and their post-trial, brief, shows that the McFarlands did not present the constructive trust arguments they raise on appeal to the bankruptcy court for resolution. (See Bankr. Dkt. Entries 43, 53, & 76). Nor did they make these arguments in their brief on appeal to. the district court. (See Dist. Dkt. Entry 6). Rather, they asserted throughout the underlying proceedings only that a resulting trust was established. Therefore, the McFarlands cannot now complain that the bankruptcy court failed to address whether a constructive trust was established, and we decline to consider these arguments for the first time on appeal. See In re Egidi, 571 F.3d at 1163 (<HOLDING>). In any case, the McFarlands\u2019 arguments do not Holdings: 0: holding that an argument not raised before the bankruptcy court will not be considered for the first time on appeal 1: holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal 2: holding that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this court 3: holding that an argument raised for the first time in response to defendants motion to dismiss instead of in an amended complaint was not properly raised before the district court and would not be considered on appeal 4: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the debtor may only do so \u201csubject\u201d to 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 365. See 1322(b)(7). Consequently, the Debtor has the option of assuming the Lease in his Plan but, in opting to do so, he obligates himself to satisfy the requirements of \u00a7 365 which he has not done. There is no provision in his Plan for curing his default or providing adequate assurance of his future performance under the Lease. See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 365(b). Furthermore, while the Bankruptcy Code permits a Chapter 13 debtor to modify the rights of certain holders of secured claims, since the Movants are parties to an unexpired lease and not a security agreement, the Debtor is not entitled to modify the terms of the Lease and force Movants to finance his purchase of the Vehicle. In re Calloway, 2010 WL 5597723 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. Oct.28, 2010) (<HOLDING>); In re Pittman, 289 B.R. 448, 450 Holdings: 0: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 1: holding that since property of the chapter 7 estate relates back to what was property of the bankruptcy estate when the chapter 13 was commenced and since the debtor still has the vehicle in his possession the present equity in the vehicle does not belong to the chapter 7 trustee or to unsecured creditors of this estate 2: holding that the debtor could not treat a lessor as a secured creditor by paying the present value of the purchase option price of the lease through her chapter 13 plan 3: holding that since motor vehicle contract between the debtor and fifth third bank was a lease and not a security agreement the debtor was required to treat fifth third banks claim in his chapter 13 plan as a lease and not as a secured debt which meant that the debtor could not obligate fifth third bank to finance the purchase of his vehicle 4: holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.\u201d Id. at 397, 66 S.Ct. 582 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 88 U.S. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874)). The Supreme Court went on to note that \u201c[t]his equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation.\u201d Id. The relatively few courts that have addressed whether equitable tolling may be applied to 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 727(e)(1) are virtually unanimous in holding that it may not. E.g., Roost v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 189 B.R. 199 (Bankr.D.Or.1995); International State Bank v. Fresquez (In re Fresquez), 167 B.R. 973 (Bankr.D.N.M.1994); Malloy v. Frank (In re Frank), 146 B.R. 851 (Bankr.N.D.Okla.1992). See also Gordon v. Bulbin (In re Bulbin), 122 B.R. 161 (Bankr.D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>); Santos v. Mast Construction Company (In re Holdings: 0: holding that lack of knowledge of state court decision may provide basis for equitable tolling when prisoner acts diligently 1: holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 2: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling 3: holding that plaintiffs lack of knowledge of the bankruptcy case doesnt affect the deadline in  727e1 for filing a  727d1 complaint but not expressly discussing equitable tolling 4: holding  727d1 complaint was untimely and noting the one year period for filing runs from discharge rather than discovery of the fraud but not addressing expressly equitable tolling", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "victim of age discrimination. Four employees testified that they heard Collins confess that he overcharged the complaining customer, and Collins adduced scant evidence of discriminatory intent. In short, Collins would have us believe that there is some reasonable possibility that the jury, in order to eliminate the chance that Collins might be awarded attorney fees, took the disproportionate step of returning a verdict against him even though it believed he was the victim of age discrimination, notwithstanding the District Court\u2019s clear instructions to the contrary. In our view, such a theory is too implausible to support a finding of plain error. A contrary holding is not required by the two cases on which Collins principally relies. See Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d at 318 Holdings: 0: recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 1: holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 2: holding defendant may receive only the portion of his fees under 42 usc  1988 that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim 3: holding that a contingentfee agreement should not act as a ceiling on the award of attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 4: holding that plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 usc section 1988 despite dismissal of the appeal as moot and vacation of the district court judgment", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) to deny Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to his Fourth Amendment seizure and false arrest claims against defendant Siler. See Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir.1999). 17 . The Officers also argue that because Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving damages on any of his claims that he is not entitled to summary judgment. The 'Court refuses to accept this argument as it is well settled that a Court may find that a Constitutional violation has occurred even in the absence of \u201cactual compensable injury.\u201d See Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317 (2d Cir.1999). When this occurs, a Court simply awards a litigant nominal damages. See id.; see also Alexander v. Schenk, 118 F.Supp.2d 298, 303 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Moreover, as pointed out in footnote 16, Holdings: 0: holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights 1: holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages 2: holding that the first amendment right to free speech is absolute and an award of nominal damages is required even if the defendant fails to object to the nominal damages instruction 3: holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict 4: holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Eastland v. TVA, 704 F.2d 613, 618 (11th Cir.), opinion modified and reh\u2019g denied, 714 F.2d 1066 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. James v. TVA, 465 U.S. 1066, 104 S.Ct. 1415, 79 L.Ed.2d 741 (1984)). As the Supreme Court stated in Teamsters, [s]tatistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative ... [in employment discrimination cases] only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired. 431 U.S. at 340 n. 20, 97 S.Ct. at 1857 n. 20; accord Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>) (citing Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing 1: holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii 2: holding proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose required to show equal protection violation 3: holding that when plaintiffs allege classwide racially discriminatory treatment in violation of title vii proof of discriminatory motive is essential although the burden may be met in some situations by presentation of statistical evidence that permits an inference of racial discrimination 4: recognizing that the test for intentional discrimination in suits under  1981 is the same as the formulation used in title vii discriminatory treatment cases", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was admissible. The likelihood that a different result would have been reached (no verdict of death) if a properly worded jury instruction had been given, is remote. Therefore, the harmless error analysis offered by the Warden is correct. Claims 25 and 26 are dismissed. NRS 34.770(2). Exhibit R5, pp. 979-81. Rogers appealed. See Exhibit P563. On May 13, 2002, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Exhibit P564. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, on procedural grounds, the dismissal of Rogers\u2019 claims regarding the torture, depravity of mind, or e in this case, providing for a depravity-of-mind aggravating circumstance, was unconstitutionally vague. See Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 994, 123 S.Ct. 1788, 155 L.Ed.2d 695 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1162 Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutionally vague under the reasoning of godfrey an aggravatingcircumstances instruction directing jurors to determine whether the murder was especially heinous atrocious and cruel 1: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague 2: holding the same nevada aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally vague under godfrey 3: holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague 4: holding that an aggravating circumstance in the georgia death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Benavidez test because dismissing his time-barred claims will not simply postpone the inevitable filing of a new suit. Bustos does not claim the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in failing to extend the statute of limitations, nor does he seek the \u201cequitable\u201d remedy the majority provides. Rather, Bustos only claims that he satisfies the Benavidez test. As noted above, he does not. Bustos elected to intervene on limited grounds. Bustos did not seek an extension of the statute of limitations to assert his own claims, nor did he seek to be substituted for OneCap before its dismissal. It is not the province of this Court, at this stage, to introduce a remedy that in hindsight appears better for the appellant as a matter of equity. See, e.g., In Re Bernal, 207 F.3d 595 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also, F.D.I.C. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, Holdings: 0: holding that the fourth amendment remedy sought is suppression 1: holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs 2: holding that where noteholder improperly sought intervention after default where the proper remedy was substitution pursuant to fed r bankrp 7025 court had no remedy for the noteholder 3: holding that retroactive award of benefits proper remedy where district court made finding that claimant was disabled 4: holding that rendition is remedy for no evidence", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has one year from that date to file a motion. In this case, this means that Dorsey had one year from October 7, 1996, the date on which the Supreme Court denied certiora-ri, in which to file his 2255 motion. Dorsey deposited his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7, 1997, but the Clerk of this Court did not receive the motion until one week later. The issue therefore remains whether Dorsey timely filed by depositing his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7,1997. II. The \u201cMailbox Rule\u201d under \u00a7 2255 Dorsey cites to two cases for the proposition that the date a prisoner deposits papers in the prison mailbox should constitute the date of filing, the so-called \u201cmailbox rule.\u201d See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-76, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2381-85, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep\u2019t, 947 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a pro se prisoners notice of appeal is considered filed upon delivery to prison authorities for mailing to the court 1: holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court 2: holding that pro se prisoners 28 usc  2254 application deemed filed for limitation purposes when deposited with prison officials for mailing 3: holding that prisoners notice of appeal is deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court 4: holding that a pro se prisoners notice of appeal of 2254 motion was filed for purposes of federal rules of appellate procedure 3a and 4a1 when prisoner delivered papers to prison authorities", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not be sufficient, but cumulatively such actions may arise to adverse action for purposes of supporting a retaliation claim. For example, in Sanford v. Main Street Baptist Church Manor, Inc,, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although some of the incidents might not rise to the level of adverse action, \u201cthe incidents taken together might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.\u201d 327 Fed.Appx. 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding combination of being assigned absent students, temporary paycheck reduction, and failure to notify of curriculum claim cumulatively amount to \u201cmaterial adverse action\u201d); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 Fed.Appx. 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 292 Holdings: 0: holding that change of schedule video surveillance and disciplinary warnings were not material adverse actions sufficient to sustain retaliation claim 1: holding that denial of transfer request from a morning to a night shift was not adverse employment action because difference in working hours alone is not sufficient under title vii 2: holding delayed paychecks denial of personal time criticism of work performance and shift change were adverse actions 3: holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action 4: holding that counseling sessions and written criticisms of employees work performance did not fall within the types of materially adverse employment actions", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "court abused its discretion in applying the New Jersey Court Rules instead of adopting the involuntary loan theory recognized in A-S Dev., Inc. v. W.R. Grace Land Corp., 537 F.Supp. 549 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1388 (3d Cir.1983) (table). Liberty argues that under this theory, the district court should have applied the interest rate Ford would have charged Liberty for late payments or loans during the same period. See br. at 41. In arguing that the involuntary loan theory is \u201cparticularly appropriate\u201d since Liberty \u201cpartially underwrote Ford\u2019s coverage of its manufacturing defects,\u201d id. at 41, 43, Liberty ignores the fact that A-S Development applied the involuntary loan theory as an element of damages and not as a measure of prejudgment interest. See A-S Dev., 537 F.Supp. at 559 (<HOLDING>). Liberty points to nothing requiring the Holdings: 0: holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages 1: holding that plaintiff is entitled to damages in an amount to be calculated on the involuntary loan theory 2: holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan 3: holding that damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages was purely speculative 4: holding that any sentence that is properly calculated under the guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 477 U.S. 792, 801-06, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In order to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was subjected to an adverse job action, (3) his employer treated similarly situated employees not within the protected class more favorably, and (4) he was qualified to do his job. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.1997). It is undisputed that plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was subject to an adverse job action, and was qualified for his position. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir.l999)(<HOLDING>). However, defendant argues that plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding qualification presumed where plaintiff previously held the position 1: holding that a jury is presumed to heed the district courts instruction to disregard the fact that the defendants were held in contempt and admonished before the jury 2: holding that collateral estoppel is not applicable to finding against plaintiff on merits where court also held that plaintiff lacked standing 3: holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions 4: holding that a jury is presumed to follow a judges instructions", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an action in equity, tried by the judge alone, ... this Court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its views of the preponderance of the evidence.\u201d Stackhouse v. Cook, 271 S.C. 518, 521, 248 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1978). LAW/ANALYSIS I. Express Trust Settlemeyer argues the circuit court erred by denying relief on his claim of an express trust. We disagree. The statute of frauds r Settlemeyer relief on his claim of an express trust. The remaining issues are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR and the following authorities: As to Issue II: Smith v. South Carolina Ret. Sys., 336 S.C. 505, 529, 520 S.E.2d 339, 352 (Ct.App.1999) (\u201cIn general, a constructive trust may be imposed when a party obtains a benefit \u2018which does not equitably belong to him a , 249, 489 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 250, 489 S.E.2d at 476 Holdings: 0: recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child 1: recognizing that third party may not recover contribution against parent where child has no cause of action against parent for negligent supervision 2: recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian 3: holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the presumption is that the purchase was a gift to the child and thus no resulting trust arises 4: holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the parent has the burden of proving a gift was not intended", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "tacitly approved the policy. Accordingly, I will allow the action to proceed against Stanley in his individual capacity. 4. Official Capacity Suits Barrett has sued the defendants in their official capacities. It is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state entities and state agents working in their official capacities unless the state has expressly waived immunity, which has not been done by New Hampshire for actions brought under \u00a7 1983. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court); Will v. Michigan Dep\u2019t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 5.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Official capacity suits against officers of Holdings: 0: holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under  1983 1: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 2: holding that under authority of will v michigan dept of state police 491 us 58 71 109 sct 2304 105 led2d 45 1989 neither the state nor state public service commission officials acting in their official capacities are persons subject to suit under  1983 3: holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under  1983 4: holding that state employees acting in their official capacities are insulated from liability for money damages", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was reasonable, it believes that plaintiffs have met the Tenth Circuit\u2019s modified interpretation of the \u201clikelihood of success\u201d requirement. The court believes that plaintiffs have successfully shown \u201cquestions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make the issues fair ground for litigation and deserving of more deliberate investigation.\u201d See Buca, 18 F.Supp.2d at 1201 (citing City of Chanule, 754 F.2d 310 and Otero Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, 665 F.2d 275). Moreover, the court believes that if plaintiffs ultimately prevail on a theory of promissory estoppel, the covenant would be enforceable to the extent that it protects any legitimate business interest beyond mere competition. See Eastern Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977) (<HOLDING>). The court concludes from the record before it Holdings: 0: holding that the restraint of a covenant not to compete must be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case and that only a legitimate business interest may be protected by the covenant 1: holding employment agreement consisting entirely of a covenant not to compete unenforceable because the covenant must be supported by valuable consideration 2: holding that michigan courts would not enforce a covenant not to compete which violates mcla 445761 even though the covenant would have been enforceable in missouri where the contract was executed 3: holding that a covenant not to compete for two years was enforceable 4: holding that in the employment context cause of action seeking tort remedies for breach of implied covenant is not permitted recovery for breach of this covenant is limited to contract remedies", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 1413 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the district court erred in admitting the evidence because \u201cthe prosecutor made no effort to explain a probative purpose or connection of the earlier conduct in Mississippi to this case\u201d and, further, because \"[s]uch a general assertion as a basis for introducing evidence of prior wrongs or conduct is not sufficient for purposes of Rules 403 or 404(b).\u201d Id. at 1416. This case is readily distinguishable from Sullivan; here, the government explained the purposes for which the evidence was offered (e.g., knowledge and intent) and, as discussed in detail infra, the other-acts evidence offered is clearly relevant to the crimes charged. Cf. United States v. Maass, 153 F.3d 729, 1998 WL 458577, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). 16 . To be sure, the assessment of the Holdings: 0: recognizing that in sullivan it was obvious that the mississippi cook evidence at issue was not related to the crime charged 1: holding that agencys construction of statute it was charged with enforcing was entitled to deference because it was reasonable in line with the statutes meaning and related to its expertise 2: holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime 3: holding that improper use of a summary chart was harmless because the evidence was merely cumulative and there was overwhelming evidence of the charged crime 4: holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in the criminal proceedings despite the provision in rule 198.3 that her answers could \u201cnot be used against [her] in any other proceeding.\u201d And it cannot be determined whether the trial court properly applied the law of privilege as to each individual request for which Ferguson asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege. Accordingly, I would hold that Ferguson has not presented us with a record that is adequate to support the issuance of a writ of mandamus. In sum, it cannot be concluded that the trial court acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner in overruling Ferguson\u2019s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege and ordering her to. respond to Ber-nal\u2019s requests for admissions. See, e.g., In re Pilgrim\u2019s Pride Corp., 187 S.W.3d 197, 198-99 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Le, 335 S.W.3d 808, 813-14 Holdings: 0: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 1: holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds 2: holding that appellate court should overturn a district courts denial of a motion to amend a complaint only if the district court has abused its discretion 3: holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial 4: holding that appellate court could not determine whether trial court abused its discretion in denying relators motion to compel the other party to produce documents because it could only speculate whether there was evidence to support the trial courts denial", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "when he signed off from the ship after the end of the voyage, they complied with the Seafarer\u2019s Agreement, as well as the applicable law (Docket # 42. Exs. A & O). We agree. The Seafarer\u2019s Agreement unambiguously states that \u201cif Seafarer becomes ill or injured, his/her entitlement to un earned wages shall extend only to the end of the voyage from which Seafarer signs off articles.\u201d (Docket # 42, Ex. O). Plaintiffs have not contested that Co-plaintiff Plesha signed off on August of 2001 when the voyage concluded (Docket #42 SUF No. 34). It follows that Defendants\u2019 payment of unearned wages until August of 2001 complied with the terms and conditions of the Seafarer\u2019s Agreement signed by Co-plaintiff Plesha. As such, Plaintiffs\u2019 claim on this respect must fail. Blainey, 990 F.2d at 891-92 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Defendants\u2019 motion for summary Holdings: 0: holding that absent a law or collective bargaining agreement a municipal employee is an employee atwill 1: holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end 2: holding that an arbitrators interpretation of the scope of the issue submitted to him is entitled to the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement 3: holding that order reducing the notice of a claim of lien was not interim in the sense of being an intermediate step toward a further end rather it is an end in itself for its very purpose is to clarify the parties rights in the interim period pending a final decision on the merits 4: holding that absent a collective bargaining agreement which extends the employment period past the end of a particular voyage a seaman is entitled to unearned wages until the end of the voyage", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Court. Rather, the requirement that the alleged de facto parent live with the child for not less than two years is contained within the American Law Institute\u2019s standards. See Am. Law Inst., supra, \u00a7 2.03, at 107-08, cmt. (c) at 119. Our Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the American Law Institute\u2019s standards for de facto parentage were slightly different from the ones adopted in L.B., and the court did not incorporate any particular time prerequisite into its test. L.B., 155 Wn.2d at 706 n.24. 10 Johnston\u2019s claim that such a result violates the biological parent\u2019s constitutional rights has already been debunked. Our Supreme Court explicitly held that the multipart de facto parentage test adequately protects a biological parent\u2019s constitutional rights. L.B., 155 Wn.2d at 710-12 (<HOLDING>). Johnston also contends that Franklin cannot Holdings: 0: recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian 1: holding that de facto type a status was achieved where the only violation of the statute was the failure to file the ordinance with the county clerk 2: holding that a de facto parents rights do not infringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other legal parent in a family unit because de facto status can be achieved only through the active encouragement of the biological or adoptive parent by affirmatively establishing a family unit with the de facto parent and child or children that accompany the family 3: holding that 16 years justifies de facto status 4: holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of remand \u2014 a time that may or may not present exigencies permitting an exception to disqualification under Rule 3.7. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Francis Wagner died on April 14, 1999. 2 . Mr. Wagner sued for loss of consortium. 3 . On March 8, 2001, this court affirmed the dismissal against Dr. Kobrine but reversed the judgment in favor of Georgetown, remanding with instructions that Mrs. Wagner\u2019s lack of informed consent claim could proceed against the hospital. Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546 (D.C.2001). 4 .See Wagner, 768 A.2d at 564-65. 5 . Actually, the court inadvertently disqualified defendants\u2019 counsel instead of Camenisch. I 673 S.W.2d 860, 864-65 (Tenn.1983) (<HOLDING>); MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, \u00a7 22.12, Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that motion to set aside default made at least seven months after defendant learned of entry of default was not made within a reasonable time 1: holding bondholders injured at time of default not when lawsuit concluded against grantors 2: holding that the point of accrual is better linked to a time at which the indemnitee is injured not the time at which the original plaintiff was injured 3: holding that risk must be measured at the time the lawsuit is filed 4: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "opportunity to correct the defect or upgrade the piping for the culvert that was growing increasingly susceptible to flooding; and that the City did not hire Screws or anyone else to correct the defect or upgrade and maintain the piping. I believe the testimony of Screws and Underwood on this issue constituted substantial- evidence, presented by experts, demonstrating that the City was derelict in responding to a known defective condition of the culvert. I am concerned, as well, that the courts have encouraged the City to continue ignoring known problems with the piping for the culvert and the drainage system; The reason Screws was unable to provide more evidence of causation is because the City never hired him to do the necessary Work to alleviate the flooding. If the a.Civ.App.2009) (<HOLDING>); cf. Royal Auto., Inc. v. City of Vestavia Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered 1: holding that because the trial court properly entered the summary judgment on the longs negligentmaintenance claim the trial courts disposal of the longs nuisance and trespass claims was also proper 2: holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief 3: holding that when the trial court proceeded to consider affidavits submitted with motion to reconsider summary judgment the affidavits were properly before the appellate court for purposes of reviewing the propriety of the trial courts grant of summary judgment 4: holding that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the health care provider", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "certificates of compliance and deeds for the lots to Vicente and Bonifacio. These government actions constituted a taking of Cabrera\u2019s property. The trial court correctly awarded public land to Cabrera as compensation for the taking of 24,927 m2 of land comprising Lots 303 and 304. This award is consistent with Commonwealth constitutional and statutory law expressing a policy of favoring compensation in the form of public land, as opposed to monetary damages, where the government takes private property. Based on the analysis above, we AFFIRM the decision of the trial court. 3 There are actually two appellees in this case: Joaquin C. Cabrera, administrator of the estate of Antonio M. Cabrera, and Antonio\u2019s widow, Isabel Cabrera. The trial court held that the A 444, 445 n.3 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 11 Apatang v. Mundo, 4 N.M.I. 90, 92 (1994). Holdings: 0: holding it is a question of fact 1: holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact 2: holding that conclusion as to ownership of land is a legal question where parties do not dispute trial courts findings of fact 3: holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact 4: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the record and orally agreed to because the hearing was held \u201cat a hotel ... where [they were] without the usual secretarial support available, that is [they had] no word processors. [They had] no typists.\u201d Id. Immediately before asking for the plaintiff\u2019s oral acceptance of the settlement agreement\u2019s terms, the Administrative Judge stated, \u201cThis settlement agreement will take effect on October 26, 1994.\u201d Id. at 5. The hearing was held on October 26, 1994. Such a clear statement that the settlement agreement takes effect on the day of the hearing belies an interpretation that a settlement was still days away. After the Administrative Judge asked her if she accepted, the plaintiff answered, \u201cI do accept.\u201d Id. See Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Given the express language of the settlement Holdings: 0: holding that absent a factual basis rendering it invalid an oral agreement to settle a title vii claim is enforceable against a plaintiff 1: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 2: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 3: holding that an arbitration agreement that was invalid due to unconscionability was not enforceable 4: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. 21 C.F.R. \u00a7 808.1(d). This regulation makes clear, the Mitchells contend, that common law causes of action survive preemption unless the FDA has established \u201cspecific counterpart regulations\u201d or \u201cother specific requirements\u201d for the medical device in question. They submit that, because no such \u201cregulations\u201d or \u201crequirements\u201d exist with respect to Zyderm, none of their common law causes of action are preempted. In response, Collagen does not challenge the validity of the FDA regulation. Cf. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1343-45 (<HOLDING>). Rather, it contends that the detailed Holdings: 0: holding regulations entitled to chevron deference 1: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 2: holding that this portion of 21 cfr  8081d is entitled to deference 3: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 4: holding that sec interpretation of federal securities law is entitled to deference if it is reasonable", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1328(a), the chapter 13 dischargeability provision. See Johnson, 728 F.2d at 166 n. 4; see also Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (adding \u00a7 523(a)(8) debts to those debts nondischargeable under \u00a7 1328(a)). 19 .This type of analysis also led some courts to draw a distinction between chapter 13 and chapter 7 debtors in determining whether a stay violation occurred since, at the time those cases were decided, student loan obligations were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1328(a). See, e.g., Parham, 56 B.R. at 533- 34 (contrasting Johnson, a chapter 7 case, to the chapter 13 case at bar to find that a debtor who develops a schedule of payments as part of a good faith effort will receive a discharge of that debt upon successful completion of the confirmed plan); Reese, 38 B.R. at 683 (<HOLDING>). 20 . In its analysis, the Billingsley court Holdings: 0: holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7 1: recognizing the requirement of  363 to obtain approval or consent in a chapter 13 case 2: holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case 3: holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13 4: holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees  avoidance power", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as all require interpretation of the CBA and arise out of the same circumstances from which the duty of fair representation arises. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-13, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910-12, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (state law claims preempted by federal labor law where evaluation of the state claim requires consideration of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (\u201cif the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is preempted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute\u201d); May v. Shuttle, Inc., 129 F.3d 165, 180 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. United Transp. Union, 964 F.2d 818, Holdings: 0: holding the state law claims were not preempted 1: holding rla duty of fair representation claim preempts identical state law claims of fraud and deceit 2: holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit 3: holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "any payment for a false dependent given directly to an individual preparer. It is clear that Barber had decision-making authority and exercised control over a significant criminal operation. Thus, we conclude that the. district court did not clearly err in applying the four-level role increase under \u00a7 3Bl.l(a). B. Loss Amount Calculation Barber also argues that the government should have been able to determine the actual loss amount based on all 434 tax returns that reported HSH income, rather than estimating from a sample of only 105. returns. In fraud eases like Barber\u2019s, the guidelines provide for a 14-level increase to the defendant\u2019s base offense level if the total loss from the offense is more than $400,000 but less than $1,000,000. U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2B1.1(b)(1)(H); see id. cmt. n. 3(A) (<HOLDING>). A district court \u201cneed only make a reasonable Holdings: 0: holding the defendant responsible for the greater of the actual or intended loss 1: holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss 2: holding that an intended loss  cannot exceed the loss a defendant could have occasioned if his or her fraud had been entirely successful 3: holding that the district court must make findings on the record as to the basis for its conclusion about the amount of actual loss 4: holding plaintiff responsible for attorney error", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Andrade v. State, 246 S.W.3d 217, 224 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd). The public trial right extends to the jury selection phase, including voir dire. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 212-13, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010) (per curiam); Steadman v. State, 360 S.W.3d 499, 510-11 (Tex.Crim.App.2012). In determining whether any portion of a trial was closed to the public, we look at \u201cthe totality of the evidence and determine whether the trial court fulfilled its obligation \u2018to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance\u2019....\u201d Lilly v. State, 365 S.W.3d 321, 331 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (quoting Presley, 558 U.S. at 215, 130 S.Ct. 721); see also Cameron v. State, 415 S.W.3d 404, 409-10 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2013, pet. granted) (<HOLDING>). The Voir Dire Record The transcript of the Holdings: 0: holding the lilly analysis is not a sequential twostep process but rather one broad inquiry 1: holding that factual basis inquiry is one way of satisfying the constitutional requirement that a guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent but it is not mandated by due process 2: recognizing that the reviewing court is not rigidly confined to wildburs  twostep analysis in every case 3: holding that sauciers twostep sequence is not mandatory 4: holding that twostep sequence is no longer an inflexible requirement", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of Singh are inapposite. In the present case, unlike Singh, the defendant expressed his views of the veracity of the state\u2019s witnesses during his direct examination. Thus, the defendant opened the door for cross-examination on the subject of the credibility of the state\u2019s witnesses. See State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 766, 772 A.2d 703, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921, 774 A.2d 141 (2001). \u201cAs a general rule . . . if a party delves into a particular subject during examination, he is said to have \u2018opened the door\u2019 for further examination regarding that subject.\u201d Id. Once that door was opened, the prosecutor had the right to inquire into the defendant\u2019s statement and ask whether all the witnesses in the case were lying. Cf. State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 169, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in her cross-examination of the Holdings: 0: holding trial court free to evaluate credibility of witnesses 1: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 2: holding that in light of defendants attack on credibility of states witnesses prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument when he implied states witnesses were credible 3: holding a prosecutors comments indicating his personal belief in the states witnesses was a fair reply to defense counsels attack on the veracity of the states witnesses 4: holding that review by certiorari was available to remedy a trial court order that improperly struck two of the states witnesses as a sanction for the states failure to disclose the address of one of the witnesses in discovery", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Plaintiff, need not specifically reference the FMLA when requesting FMLA leave, she must put the University on notice that her request is for FMLA leave. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff did not request FMLA leave in her letter dated March 21,' 2011, but only suggested that she might need to take leave. The purpose .of the letter was to request an extension of her review which Plaintiff was previously advised could be denied. Based on the undisputed facts of the record, no FMLA violation has been demonstrated, and certainly, no willful or reckless violation of the FMLA is presented. As such, summary judgment should be granted on Count V as well using either of the dates that Plaintiff submits. III. RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends t (11th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>). RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to object to the magistrate judges report releases the court from its duty to independently review the motion 1: holding that under current eleventh circuit rule the failure to object limits the scope of our appellate review to plain error review of the magistrate judges factual findings  however failure to object to the magistrate judges legal conclusions does not preclude the party from challenging those conclusions on appeal 2: holding failure to timely object to magistrate judges recommendation waives appellate review of factual and legal questions 3: holding that under the firm waiver rule a party who fails to make a timely objection to the magistrate judges findings and recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions 4: holding that failure to object to magistrate judges recommendation waived issue on appeal", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "it is relatively well-settled, despite some ambiguity in the statutory language, that an injury to Body Part X resulting in a functional impairment to Body Part Y will be classified according to X and not according to Y under the schedule. Our Circuit was the first to articulate this \u201csitus of the injury\u201d rule, in Long v. Director, OWCP, 767 F.2d 1578 (9th Cir.1985), which construed the Act to mandate recovery under \u00a7 908(c)(21) rather than under the schedule \u201cfor impairments to limbs caused by an accidental injury to a part of the body not specified in the schedule.\u201d 767 F.2d at 1582. Since then, the First and Fifth Circuits have both followed Long, while no other circuit has taken a contravening approach. See Barker v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 138 F.3d 431, 434-435 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Pool Co. v. Director, OWCP, 206 F.3d 543, 547 Holdings: 0: holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 1: holding that while the language of sec tion 908c  may admit of differing interpretations an injury to a body part not included in the schedule must be compensated as an unscheduled injury no matter that the petitioners symptoms extend beyond the injured area 2: holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 3: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 4: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "where there has been a complete denial of counsel or where the circumstances are such that any competent attorney would be unable to provide effective assistance, a defendant need not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel\u2019s actions. Id. at 659-62, 104 S.Ct. at 2047-48. The presumed prejudice exception to Strickland has been found to apply where there was an actual or constructive denial of counsel, the state interfered with counsel\u2019s assistance, or counsel had an actual conflict of interest. See [Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ]. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1128. See also Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 292-93 (Pa.2008). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that such instances are rare. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190, 125 S.Ct. 551 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, this Court has stressed that Holdings: 0: holding that a showing of actual prejudice was required where the defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial 1: holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase 2: holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that trial courts witness interrogation did not cause defendant prejudice when there was already overwhelming evidence showing defendants guilt 4: holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff.\u201d Id. The moving party must establish that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int\u2019l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir.1993); In re Mobile Tool Int\u2019l, Inc., 306 B.R. 778, 779-80 (Bankr.D.Del. 2004). B. Count I \u2014 Preferences In Count I of its Complaint, Vision seeks to avoid, as preferential transfers, the payments and other concessions it made pursuant to the First Agreement. Because the First Agreement was assumed by Vision, however, it may not recover those payments as preferences. See, e.g., Kimmelman v. The Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. (In re Kiwi Int\u2019l Air Lines, Inc.), 344 F.3d 311, 323 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because Count V of the Complaint (which Holdings: 0: holding that notice provided by plaintiff that alleged she  was injured  as result of fall was insufficient as matter of law and precluded invocation of savings clause 1: holding that where an action is brought by the debtors at the initial proceeding the appeal of that action is not a continuing proceeding against the debtors 2: holding a bankruptcy trustees rule 60b6 motion timely despite a delay of eighteen months from the date of the court order and fifteen months from the denial of the trustees written request for a refund government found to have been put on notice of intention to reopen settlement by earlier actions of trustee 3: holding that the trustees preference actions against each of the defendants was precluded as a matter of law by the debtors earlier assumption of its agreements with them  4: holding an internal error that caused the movant to receive the trustees notice of motion twentysix days after the court heard the trustees motion  may have constituted excusable neglect had the movant made a prompt motion for reconsideration and pointing out it is the movants actions after he became aware of the existence of the trustees motion  that reaches the level of willfulness", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "However, it ruled Dougherty\u2019s testimony about appellant\u2019s alleged hearsay statements was inadmissible because the evidence failed to establish the reliability of those statements. Appellant contends sufficient corroborating evidence established the reliability of the proffered statements and, thus, that the trial court erred in excluding them. We hold the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the testimony of the hearsay declarant\u2014appellant\u2014was unavailable. Because appellant had complete control over his own availability as a witness, we hold that he failed as a matter of law to prove his testimony was unavailable, and we conclude the trial court\u2019s refusal to admit the statements was not error. See Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 581-82, 701 S.E.2d 431, 436-37 (2010) (<HOLDING>). \u201c \u2018[T]he sufficiency of the proof to Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court in affirming trial courts decision may rely in part on a ground not presented to trial court 1: holding that despite a trial courts failure to make specific factual findings an appellate court is free to affirm on any grounds for which there is sufficient record to permit conclusions of law 2: holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required 3: holding that an appellate court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record even if the circuit court did not rely on it 4: holding that an appellate court may affirm the result reached by a district court on alternative grounds", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not contend that the interest would have been included in Thomas\u2019s bankruptcy estate on another basis. 4 . It is undisputed that Sherry did not obtain an equitable interest in the Property solely by virtue of marriage. Miller v. Fulton Cnty., 258 Ga. 882, 375 S.E.2d 864, 865 (1989) (\u2018\u2018[N]o property rights are created in the assets of the marriage while the parties are still married.\u201d). 5 . Likewise, the third-party testimony that the McFarlands presented at trial supports their position that they believed the property was jointly owned but not that there was an agreement to create a 'purchase money resulting trust. 6 . The presumption of a gift between spouses did not apply when the Property was purchased in 1968. See Woodward v. Woodward, 245 Ga. 550, 266 S.E.2d 170, 171-72 (1980) (<HOLDING>). But the code section relied on in Woodward Holdings: 0: holding that under minnesota law refinancing and consolidation of purchase money loans did not destroy their purchase money character for bankruptcy lien avoidance purposes 1: holding that the statute of frauds applies to a sellers wife holding only a dower interest in the property so the wife must sign the purchase agreement as well as the seller husband 2: holding that there was no presumption of a gift where the wifes money was used to make the purchase but title was placed in the name of the husband and finding the facts sufficient to establish a purchase money resulting trust in favor of the wife 3: holding in case where stock was purchased but held in suspense account pending repayment of loan from seller that the fact that the money to purchase the now worthless stock was borrowed does not mean that money was not lost 4: holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or cannot insist that those practices are mandated. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever adopted a rule limiting protection to practices that are compelled by a litigant\u2019s religion. We decline to adopt such a rule today. C. The Impingement Threshold The fact that the First Amendment does not protect only compelled religious conduct does not mean that the Constitution forbids all constraints on religiously motivated conduct, however trivial. Instead, the First Amendment is implicated when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to inconsequential, burden on the litigant\u2019s religious practice. Our cases make clear that this threshold showing must be made before the First Amendment is implicated. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). This requirement accords with the Supreme Holdings: 0: holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 1: holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination 2: holding that when determining the proper amount for a burdened property that was purchased in a package only two methods suggest themselves as arguably appropriate 1 a determination of the fair market value of the  property burdened by the right of first refusal or 2 a determination of the portion of the  purchase price which based on the percentage of the fair market value of the entire package represented by the  property burdened by the right of first refusal should be allocated to the  property burdened by the right of first refusal 3: holding that to sustain its claim under either the constitution or rfra a plaintiff must first establish that its free exercise right has been substantially burdened 4: holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "L.Ed. 1356 (1953). Plaintiff argues the Supreme Court in Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 119 S.Ct. 489, 142 L.Ed.2d 502 (1998), implicitly considered and rejected the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine\u2019s application to Section 1985 by allowing an employee to bring a Section 1985(2) action against his employer and its officers. Plaintiff misconstrues the scope and holding of Haddle. Although Haddle involved a Section 1985(2) action alleging conspiracy among an employer and its officers, the intracor-porate conspiracy issue was not considered. The Supreme Court made clear its review was \u201cconfined to one question: Can petitioner state a claim for damages by alleging that a conspiracy. proscribed by \u00a7 1985( ction 1985 claims. See Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). The Circuits are divided over whether Holdings: 0: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision 1: holding that when two executives of the same firm make a decision to discriminate in furtherance of the purposes of the business this decision cannot be called a conspiracy for purposes of  1985 2: holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy 3: holding that it was immaterial for conflict of interest purposes whether one attorney or two attorneys in the same firm represented the witness and the defendant 4: holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "indicating that he was Chairman of the Board. (Exh. E, F to PI. Resp.) FHSBC provides a declaration by Benjamin Dessange, the managing director of Franklin Holding and Vice President of FHSBC, averring that Anthonioz has had no affiliation with FHSBC since March, 1998, long before process was served in March, 2000. (Decl. of Benjamin Des-sange, Attach to Def. Mot. to Dismiss.) Furthermore, FHSBC argues that the report from the New York Department of State was not current as of the time of service and that the Dun & Bradstreet report was inaccurate. This court concludes that FHSBC was not properly served. Salon has the burden of establishing that it properly effectuated service. See Slates v. Int\u2019l House of Pancakes, Inc. 90 Ill.App.3d 716, 46 Ill.Dec. 17, 413 N.E.2d 457, 463 (1980) (<HOLDING>) Though self-serving, Dessange\u2019s declaration Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 1: holding that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing that he properly served an agent of the defendant 2: holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property 3: holding defendant bears burden of establishing affirmative defense of official immunity 4: recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "probable cause can exist even without those particular field tests. See Soest v. Dir. of Revenue, 62 S.W.3d 619, 621 (Mo.App. E.D.2001) (\u201cEven if the tests requiring walking and standing are disregarded, the [failed] nystagmus test ... provided further grounds for the officer\u2019s reasonable belief.\u201d); Hawkins v. Dir. of Revenue, 7 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Mo.App. E.D.1999) (\u201c[T]he weight of the evidence shows the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Driver was driving while intoxicated, even though no field sobriety tests were conducted due to Driver\u2019s refusal.... [T]he officer\u2019s observations and Driver\u2019s own statements provided reasonable grounds to support the officer\u2019s belief that Driver had been driving while intoxicated.\u201d); Chancellor v. Lohman, 984 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Mo.App. W.D.1998) (<HOLDING>). Even without the walk-and-turn and Holdings: 0: holding that eyewitness accounts and an officers observations established probable cause 1: holding field sobriety tests are not mandatory as they merely are an aide to an officers other observations in determining whether he has probable cause for an arrest 2: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 3: holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant 4: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to the district court at sentencing that he did not have the Montgomerys' books and records either. 8 . The $137,990 figure factored in solely Montgomery\u2019s Contracting\u2019s cost of goods sold. The $68,995 figure factored in both the cost of goods sold and the Montgomerys\u2019 purportedly deductible charitable contributions. At sentencing, Mr. Montgomery's counsel conceded that accounting for the contributions was \"problematic\u201d and therefore focused the district court's attention on the $137,990 figure. Because the Montgomerys failed to brief whether the district court should have accounted for any deductible charitable contributions that the Montgomeiys could have claimed, they have waived this issue. See Rodriguez v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 436 F.3d 468, 474 n. 21 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Compare United States v. Hoskins, 654 Holdings: 0: holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal 1: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief 2: holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument 3: holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal 4: holding that appellant waived argument by failing to raise argument before workers compensation board and failing to list or brief issue in administrative appeal to superior court", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "degrees of flexibility depending upon the specific linkage to company plans and objectives. If flexibility is not explicitly indicated in a policy, it is required that the policy be executed as defined.\" But the Disclaimer is prominently set forth in a separate text box, in bold font, at the beginning of Policy 210, which is the section of the Manual dealing with \"Addressing Misconduct and Improving Performance.\" This placement is such that \"a reasonable employee ought to notice it.\" See id. at 1112. 1 44 Unlike the Homilton disclaimer, the Disclaimer in this case does not specifically state that employment at NCR is \"at-will,\" nor does it define the voluntary nature of the employment relationship. See id.; accord Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003-04 (Utah 1991) (<HOLDING>). While both NCR and the trial court concluded Holdings: 0: holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will 1: holding that a disclaimer setting forth policies for general guidance only which stated that it did not create a binding contract and that the employee could be terminated without notice and at will at any time for any reason unambiguously provided that employment was atwill 2: recognizing that wrongful or malicious interference with atwill employment contract may give rise to a tortious interference claim the fact that the employment is at the will of the employer and the employee does not make it one at the will of third parties 3: holding that without a provision stating that an employee can be terminated only for cause the atwill doctrine permitted termination in the absence of any reason at all summary judgment and directed verdict in companion cases affirmed 4: holding that employee guidebook did not create an implied employment contract as it contained a clearlystated boldfaced disclaimer and statement that employment was atwill", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "c. 93A). Plaintiffs\u2019 final amended complaint, which they filed with leave of court on April 2, 2004, does not, however, contain a Chapter 93A claim, nor did it incorporate by reference any earlier complaint or claims. Defendant persuasively argues that the Chapter 93A claim has, therefore, been waived. Even if the Chapter 93A claim were properly before the Court, however, it would fail because plaintiffs have alleged no facts to support the contention that Banknorth committed unfair or deceptive trade practices other than those relating to their fraud claim and to Banknorth\u2019s alleged breach of the RCA. As explained above, summary judgment will be entered with respect to those claims for the reasons set forth. See, e.g., Macoviak v. Chase, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 755, 667 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Wasylow v. dock, Inc., 975 F.Supp. 370, 382 Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment on chapter 93a claim is appropriate when summary judgment is granted on fraud claim and chapter 93a claim is solely based on the underlying claim for common law fraud 1: holding that where there was no evidence of the claimed underlying violation and where there were no unique arguments related to the chapter 93a claim defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs chapter 93a claim 2: holding that where summary judgment is granted on the underlying tort claims a conspiracy claim must also fail 3: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 4: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and files for entire software products lines\u2014each involving hundreds of thousands of different files.\u201d Id. at 1140. C. Positions of the Parties Rimini and EFF contend that the statutory language \u201cwithout permission\u201d should not be read in a way that criminalizes violation of a website\u2019s terms of use. As EFF puts it, \u201c[n]either statute ... applies to bare violations of a website\u2019s terms of use\u2014such as when a computer user has permission and authorization to access and use the computer or data at issue, but simply accesses or uses the information in a manner the website owner does not like.\u201d Oracle, on the other hand, urges us to read the state statutes as not requiring unauthorized access for a violation, which appears to be how the district court construed them. See id. at 1143-44 (<HOLDING>). D. Analysis We review the denial of Rimini\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that where by virtue of state action access is limited but remains reasonable there is no such denial of access as entitles the landowner to compensation 1: holding that in analyzing whether a limited public forum has been created we consider the nature of the property or means of communication the governments purpose in permitting whatever limited access it has allowed and the conditions of access eg whether permission is required 2: holding that a schools internal mail system was not a public forum because users needed a principals permission for access 3: holding that an individuals access to a service or website that requires an indication of assent to contractual terms before access to the service or website will be granted was sufficient evidence that the user clicked i accept  4: holding that riminis claim that they had permission from their clients to access oracles  website is irrelevant under the state statutes", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which the award of sanctions .under \u00a7 14-10-129.5 is based. See Colo.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 14-10-129.5(2)(b) (\u201cthe court, in the best interests of the child, may issue orders which may include ... [modifying the previous order to meet the best interests of the child ... [and] [ajwarding to the aggrieved party, where appropriate, actual expenses ... \u201d) (emphasis added). Under these circumstances, most courts hold that fees \u201cinextricably intertwined with proceedings affecting the welfare of the child,\u201d such as custody and visitation, should be deemed support. In re Peters, 133 B.R. at 295; see also Dellapa v. Vazquez (In re Vazquez), 92 B.R. 533, 535 (S.D.Fla.1988) (fees awarded in litigation over visitation, custody, contempt and child support nondischargeable); In re Farrell, 133 B.R. at 147-48 (<HOLDING>); In re Poe, 118 B.R. at 812 (fees incurred in Holdings: 0: holding that a debt for attorney fees incurred by an exspouse in a postjudgment divorce contempt proceeding was nondischargeable 1: holding that in a chapter 7 case postpetition interest on a nondischargeable tax claim is also nondischargeable 2: holding that a challenge to part b determinations in an order involving both part a and part b must begin in district court 3: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 4: holding nondischargeable fees imposed in part to punish debtor for disobeying court order in proceeding to compel return of child", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cpersonal\u201d to some creditors or \u201cgeneral\u201d as to all is relevant only \u201cafter a claim has been analyzed to determine whether it is properly assertable by the debtor or creditor, and not as a substitute for the analysis itself.\u201d In re Seven Seas Petroleum, 522 F.3d at 588 (construing In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.1999) (emphasis added)). For instance, a claim that would ordinarily be brought by creditors nonetheless belongs to the debtor\u2019s estate if it pursues property in which the debtor retains an equitable interest, see, e.g., In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1983) (construing a fraudulent transfer claim to belong to the debtor\u2019s estate), or if the debtor itself could have brought the claim under applicable state law, see, e.g., id. at 1276-77 (<HOLDING>); In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, Holdings: 0: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 1: holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law 2: holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors 3: recognizing a cause of action under texas law for misappropriation 4: holding texas law permits a corporate debtor to bring a trust fund denuding action", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(1964). Thus, the State agencies return to their point, discussed above, that Congressional action is necessary to enforce the Takings Clause against the states. {45} We do not find the argument persuasive. It is Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with the \u201cjust compensation\u201d remedy found in the Takings Clause that abrogates state sovereign immunity. Section 5 gives Congress the power to create remedies, if Congress decides any are necessary, to enforce the rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment, including those found in Section 1. An example of such legislation, protecting against the denial of due process is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (<HOLDING>). The ADA provides the remedy under Section 5 Holdings: 0: holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government 1: holding that title ii of the ada was a valid use of congress power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under  5 of the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that title ii does not apply to the states", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Thus, in the absence of an injury and with no \u201creal and substantial\u201d dispute, the court properly declined to entertain Count I upon removal. In its Dismissal Opinion, the district court compared this proceeding to the situation in Bowen v. First Family Financial Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir.2000). In Bowen, the class action plaintiffs lacked standing to question whether arbitration agreements are generally unenforceable under the Truth-in-Lending Act. The Eleventh Circuit so ruled because \u201cthere [was] no allegation that First Family has invoked, or threatened to invoke, the arbitration agreement to compel the plaintiffs to submit any claim to arbitration.\u201d Id. at 1339. This action is similar to Bo 02, 704 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>). Notably, some courts have premised such Holdings: 0: holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision 1: recognizing as nonjusticiable challenge to arbitration provision absent sufficient indications that it would be invoked 2: holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced 3: holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy 4: holding that  4 does not empower court to rewrite venue provisions of arbitration clause or to order arbitration within district absent contractual provision so indicating", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM: Mirza Azamali Baig and his wife, Yas-meen Baig, natives and citizens of Pakistan, petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge\u2019s (IJ\u2019s) order denying withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They argue that they are entitled to relief based on a showing of past persecution and a fear of future persecution on account of their political opinions. To the extent that the Baigs argue that they were entitled to asylum, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because the couple did not submit an application for asylum before either the IJ or the BIA. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). We generally have authority to review only Holdings: 0: holding that claims not presented to the ij and bia should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 1: holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte 2: holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte 3: holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue 4: recognizing that failure to exhaust an issue before the bia strips us of jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at any time after an action for equitable distribution has been filed and prior to the final judgment of equitable distribution, enter orders declaring what is separate property and dividing part of the marital property between the parties. The partial distribution may provide for a distributive award. Any such orders entered shall be taken into consideration at trial and proper credit given. Interim equitable distribution orders are by nature preliminary to entry of a final equitable distribution judgment and thus are interlocutory. See Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377, reh\u2019g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950) (explaining that an interlocutory ruling is one that does not finally determine the issues presented but instead leaves the matter 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, permitting an immediate appeal from Holdings: 0: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 1: holding forced medication orders are immediately appealable 2: holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 3: holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders 4: holding that pendente lite orders and awards are not immediately appealable", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "are no plaintiffs and defendants in a will contest, and it is not instituted by the filing of a complaint. This was the case in the Civil Code, which applied to probate courts only in civil actions and had separate provisions governing will contests. See Civil Code ss 24, 806, s 513. While those provisions governing will contests have been superseded by the Probate Code of 1949, the nature of the proceedings has not. Coleman, 257 Ark. at 408, 520 S.W.2d at 242. Here, the will was not probated, and the Estate did not seek to contest the will under the probate statutes. Rather, the Estate\u2019s state court complaint asserted a claim pursuant to Arkansas\u2019s declaratory judgment act. That act provides, in pertinent part: \u201cAny person interes , 485, 41 Ill.Dec. 633, 407 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Assuming, without deciding, that an action to Holdings: 0: holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act 1: holding that a plaintiffs declaratory judgment petition with a copy of the third codicil attached was sufficient to initiate a will contest in a probate proceeding 2: holding that the trial courts determination that the invalidity of an unprobated will under texass declaratory judgment act was not error where the action was joined with a probate action and multiple wills were before the court 3: holding that an action under the illinois declaratory judgment act to void a will must be construed as a will contest that is governed by the laws controlling such contests in probate proceedings 4: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "have uniform application within the class of those subject to its provisions. This attribute alone disqualifies WCTF\u2019s claim under \u00a7 65(8) from classification as a tax. B. The Principle of Equal Distribution. There is another reason, however, for treating claims under \u00a7 65(8) as non-tax claims. As noted above, Feiring teaches that the policies of the Bankruptcy Code establish the criteria upon which priority status of a claim is to be determined. 313 U.S. at 285, 61 S.Ct. 1028. Giving tax priority to WCTF\u2019s reimbursement claim here would enervate the Bankruptcy Code\u2019s central policy of equal distribution among similar creditors. See Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1067-68; New Neighborhoods, 886 F.2d at 718-19 (noting the need to limit priority claims in bankruptcy); Suburban II, 36 F.3d at 487 (<HOLDING>) (citing Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 Holdings: 0: holding that courts should give due consideration to the premise that equality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the bankruptcy code 1: holding that section 105a facilitates compliance with the bankruptcy code and the bankruptcy courts orders and compliance is one of the central goals of civil contempt sanctions 2: holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution 3: holding that creditors rights are subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the bankruptcy code 4: holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "failed to pay Wall\u2019s commissions or did so in bad faith in order to receive treble damages. We disagree and find that the trial court\u2019s interpretation was not an abuse of discretion. South Carolina case law does not support Fruehaufs position. Fruehauf cites to a number of cases which discuss puni tive damages in general, but not treble damages under \u00a7 41-10-80(0). See, e.g., Carter v. R.C. Jordan Oil Co., 301 S.C. 84, 390 S.E.2d 367, 368 (S.C.Ct.App.1990). Although South Carolina law requires that there be no good faith dispute concerning the wages due in order for treble damages to be awarded under \u00a7 41-10-80(0, the decision is in the complete discretion of the trial court and no specific finding of bad faith or willfulness is required. Rice, 318 S.C. 95, 456 S.E.2d 381 (S.C.1995) (<HOLDING>); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Holdings: 0: holding that the tcpas treble damages provision is remedial 1: holding that when a trial court determines that the amount of damages awarded by a jury is excessive the court may either suggest remittitur or grant a new trial on the issue of damages 2: holding that threequarter guarantee payments were not wages under arizona wage payment laws permitting treble damages for nonpayment under rationale that wages are restricted to compensation due an employee in return for work performed 3: holding that the treble damages provision is not mandatory and will not apply if the trial court determines that a good faith dispute over the wages allegedly due exists 4: holding that the award of treble damages while a matter of discretion for the trial court is inappropriate in circumstances where there is a bona fide wage dispute", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "indicia of fraud to create inquiry notice as a matter of law in Betz, UL was engaged in endorsing products for reasonably safe consumer use, and its listing of the Cadet heaters as safe, in combination with the 1999 recall, was sufficient to give Platt notice that UL\u2019s prior assurances of the heaters\u2019 safety were potentially false. It is irrelevant what else Platt might have learned through further diligent investigation after 1999 about UL\u2019s misrepresentations or intent to deceive Platt and others regarding the Cadet heaters\u2019 safety, because in 1999 Platt already knew that UL\u2019s prior representations about the heaters\u2019 safety were false, and that knowledge was sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations for fraud under California law. See Hamilton Materials, 494 F.3d at 1206-07 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). These cases demonstrate Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice 1: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 2: holding in a civil rico case based upon predicate acts of mail and wire fraud that the plaintiff must plead a material misrepresentation of fact that was calculated or intended to deceive persons of reasonable prudence and comprehension and that the plaintiff relied upon that material misrepresentation to establish the fraud statutes requisite scheme to defraud 3: holding that a plaintiff need not have notice of the defendants specific intention to deceive before the fraud action accrued all that is relevant is that a reasonable person  would have been on notice of a potential misrepresentation 4: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the codefen-dants\u2019 testimony that Green had firearms at his home and that they went to Green\u2019s house specifically to obtain firearms to use in the burglary. Green argued that even if the evidence of these firearms had some relevance, which Green did not concede, any relevance was significantly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court overruled Green\u2019s objections and admitted the firearms into evidence. As to the two firearms found in Green\u2019s roommate\u2019s bedroom, the trial court erred by admitting any evidence of these guns because they were completely irrelevant. Relevant evidence is evidence that tends to prove or disprove a material fact. See \u00a7 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Zabner v. Howard Johnson\u2019s Inc. of Fla., 227 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (<HOLDING>). Here, not only were these two firearms not Holdings: 0: holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury 1: holding relevance of evidence is established by any showing however slight that the evidence makes it more or less likely that the defendant committed the crime in question 2: holding that relevant evidence has a tendency to establish a fact in controversy or to render a proposition in issue more or less probable 3: holding that speculative theory of possible injury insufficient to establish injury in fact under article ills case or controversy requirement 4: recognizing that the case or controversy requirement for standing is no less strict in a declaratory judgment proceeding than in any suit where other relief is sought", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "counsel? RYAN, Judge, with whom STUCKY, Judge, joins (dissenting): This Court granted review of the decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals on one issue raised by Appellant: \u2018Whether [detailed counsel\u2019s] failure to disclose his conflict of interest resulted in an uninformed and invalid election of counsel.\u201d Rather than answer this question, which is directly controlled by Supreme Court precedent and not an open issue, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (\u201c[T]o demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u201d), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>), the majority remands the case for additional Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel where appointed counsels representation presented a conflict of interest 1: holding defendant must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance 2: holding that to demonstrate that a conflict of interest violated his sixth amendment rights a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance 3: holding that defense counsels performance was adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest if a specific and seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was available to defense counsel but it was inherently in conflict with his duties to others  4: holding that defendant must demonstrate both that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyers performance to establish a sixth amendment violation", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "award, do not justify overturning that award. Instead, only \u201cutterly irrational\u201d legal conclusions will be cognizable; \u201c[i]n these circumstances the appropriate standard of review is whether the construction of the contract presents such an egregious mistake that it amounts to an arbitrary remaking of the contract between the parties.\u201d 277 Cal.Rptr. at 714. Other jurisdictions have applied stricter standards for upsetting an award than that adopted by the plurality. E.g., Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (1988) (reviewing Uniform Arbitration Act and holding mistakes of law insufficient to overturn an award absent fraud or corruption); Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Runewicz v. Keystone Ins. Co., 476 Pa. 456, Holdings: 0: holding that an award of arbitration cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment either as to the law or the facts if the award is within the scope of the submission and the arbitrators are not guilty  of the acts of misconduct set forth in the statute the award operates as a final and conclusive judgment and  however disappointing it may be  the parties must abide by it 1: holding that manifest disregard of the law is one of the very unusual circumstances in which a federal court can set aside an arbitration award 2: holding that errors of law without accompanying fraud or misconduct not enough to set aside arbitration award 3: holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment 4: recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "unrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court informed the foreperson that it needed to give him \u201cone other instruction\u201d and instructed him that \u201c[t]he issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues you that are not to share with the other jurors.\u201d While the record sufficiently reveals that the trial court violated the unanimity requirement by instructing only the foreperson, the record is inadequate to meet the demanding task of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet its burden, the record must reveal the substance of the conversations at issue or the conversations must be adequately reconstructed. See, e.g., Boyd, 332 N.C. at 106, 418 S.E.2d at 474 (<HOLDING>); State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794-95, 392 Holdings: 0: holding that the state could not meet its burden of proving harmless error where the record did not reveal the substance of the trial courts unrecorded conversations with prospective jurors 1: holding that in appellate proceedings where no transcript is provided a trial courts decision has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error 2: holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error 3: holding that without transcript of trial proceedings appellate court cannot review underlying evidence so as to conclude that trial courts judgment is not supported by evidence 4: holding that the state cannot demonstrate harmless error where the substance of the trial courts conversation with an excused juror was not revealed by the transcript or reconstructed at trial", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Cir.2000). Patria potestas is codified in Peruvian law under the term \u201cparental authority,\u201d which is defined as the right and duty of the parents, to take care of the person and properly of their minor children. Civil Code of Peru \u00a7 418. In addition to providing rights and duties relating to the development, education, and assets of a child, parental authority gives parents the right to \u201c[k]eep the children with them and appeal to the proper authority in order to recover them,\u201d which necessarily implies rights relating to the child\u2019s residence. Code of Children and Adolescents of Peru art. 74(e). Such patria potestas rights, which Correa received when the Children were born, are recognized as \u201crights of custody\u201d within the meaning of the Hague Convention. See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459 (<HOLDING>). Cf. Bader v. Kramer, 445 F.3d 346, 350 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that patria potestas rights under mexican law are custody rights under the hague convention 1: holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the montreal convention 2: holding that because hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction lacks specific remedy for rights of access to children matters relating to access are best left to the state courts which are more experienced in resolving these issues 3: holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area 4: holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "cause existed. Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317. The totality of the circumstances, as set forth in Deputy Beuer\u2019s affidavit, supported a finding of probable cause. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); see also United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming probable cause finding based in part on buzzing noise and odor of growing marijuana); United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (9th Cir.1989) (affirming denial of motion to suppress where officer smelled growing marijuana); United States v. Roberts, 747 F.2d 537, 544 (9th Cir.1984) (affirming probable cause finding in part due to frost-free garage roof and covered windows suggesting marijuana grow operation). The existence of the Compass r.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531 (Cal.2006) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly denied a hearing Holdings: 0: holding that an affirmative defense is ordinarily lost if not timely raised 1: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 2: holding cua is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial 3: holding mmpa is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial 4: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "further action by the trial court). An interlocutory decree is immediately appealable only if permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277 (1996), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (1990), or N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(d) (1995). The only possible basis on which the present order could be immediately appealable under any of these statutes is on the ground it affects a substantial right. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 l-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(l). To be immediately appealable on that basis, plaintiff has the burden of showing that: (1) the order affects a right that is substantial; and (2) the deprivation of that substantial right will potentially work injury to plaintiff if not corrected before appeal from final judgment. Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990). Fur 5 (1982) (<HOLDING>); and Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. Holdings: 0: holding order awarding father temporary partial custody prior to custody hearing was not final and appealable under rule 341 1: holding that a temporary order granting emergency relief and temporary child custody under the domestic violence act is not immediately appealable 2: holding that mandamus is appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable 3: holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father 4: holding that mandamus was appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "with leaving his property unprotected by a properly applied chemical treatment barrier.\u201d But as plaintiff readily acknowledges, he filed this suit a mere eight days after purchasing Terminate, despite the fact that the Terminate label specifically advised, under the heading, \u201cIMPORTANT USAGE NOTES\u201d: Results depend upon the species involved, weather, moisture, time of year, and may take 1-4 months or longer. Time required for effectiveness depends upon how quickly the terminates enter the stake and feed upon the bait. While for reasons undisclosed -by plaintiff in his complaint or otherwise, plaintiff may have suspected, within a- mere week of his purchase of the Terminate, that the product ultimately would not perform as represented and that his property 66 Cal.Rptr. 106 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Zamora v. Shell Oil Co., 55 Cal.App.4th 204, Holdings: 0: holding the mda did not preempt plaintiffs state common law claims for defective design defective manufacture and failure to warn 1: holding that plaintiffs failure to prove that the subject air valve had not been altered in some way invalidated their design defect claim 2: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 3: holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control 4: holding plaintiff with inherently defective heart valve failed to state a claim unless the valve malfunctioned", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "relies, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), involved a status-offense statute. The defendant in Lewis was charged with the federal offense of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony by a state court. He attempted to defend on the ground that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in connection with the predicate felony conviction. The United States Supreme Court rejected Lewis\u2019s challenge, concluding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings. Id. at .60. The Court distinguished the status-offense statute in Lewis from cases that involved penalty-enhancement statutes where the sentence was overturned. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115-16 (1967) Holdings: 0: holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury 1: holding an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid because no prison term was imposed and the conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense 2: holding that felony conviction for which imposition of sentence was stayed could be counted as prior felony conviction under sentencing guidelines 3: holding uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be sentence enhancer 4: holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that conclusion in Leimkuehler, rejecting arguments that Plan servicers met the requirements of subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition by selecting which mutual fund share classes to include on the investment menu offered to a 401(k) plan; by exercising authority or control over the management and disposition of plan assets in the separate accounts because that task had nothing to do with the alleged breach of fiduciary duty; and by reserving the right to substitute or delete funds made available to the Plan participants for the same reason. 713 F.3d at 911-12. It is worth noting that in Leimkuehler, the Seventh Circuit only addressed the fund-substitution theory under subsection (i) of the functional fiduciary definition, and attributed th , 270 (W.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>). Some courts have held that in some Holdings: 0: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 1: holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions 2: holding that insurer was a fiduciary to a 401k plan because the insurer had the ability to substitute investment options and the plan had no meaningful opportunity to reject substitutions because of the penalty charges associated with doing so 3: holding that service provider which offered a big menu of investment options from which 401k the plan trustee selected a smaller plan menu was not a fiduciary because provider did not have ultimate authority over which investments were included in the plans 4: holding that plan servicer which provided 401k plan a menu of investment options was not a fiduciary because parties contract required servicer to give the plan notice of and opportunity to reject any changes to the menu", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "disorder, bipolar affective disorder, and recurrent major depressive disorder does not automatically entitle him to a competency hearing especially since his most recent evaluations attest to his competency. Given our evaluation of the weight due to the various psychiatrists\u2019 reports, we find that the Court has sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding the defendant\u2019s competence without further proceedings. The stipulations filed by the government and defense counsel regarding defendant\u2019s competence provide a complete picture of the defendant\u2019s mental state and demeanor. Here, both parties were given a chance to provide what evidence they deemed appropriate to determine the defendant\u2019s competence. See United States v. O\u2019Neal, 969 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This Court holds that a competency hearing is Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court need not hold a voluntariness hearing where the defendant did not object and no evidence presented raised the issue 1: holding that the district court did in effect hold a hearing when it gave the defense a chance to supplement a psychiatric report with further evidence 2: holding after remand that where the opposing party thus raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence the district court must hold an in limine hearing a socalled daubert hearing to consider the conflicting evidence   3: holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer 4: holding that court did not have to hold a hearing to determine attorneys fees where detailed affidavit was provided", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "involve whether a particular sale qualified as a taxable \u201cretail sal 7 Shetakis Dist. v. State, Dept. Taxation, 108 Nev. 901, 907, 839 P.2d 1315, 1319 (1992); Sierra Pac. Power v. Department Taxation, 96 Nev. 295, 297, 607 P.2d 1147, 1148 (1980). 8 Dawley, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ind. T.C. 1992). 9 NRS 372.105. 10 NRS 372.050. 11 NRS 372.185; see also NRS 372.190 (explaining that the user of purchased property is generally liable for the use tax). 12 State, Dep\u2019t Taxation v. Kelly-Ryan, Inc., 110 Nev. 276, 280, 871 P.2d 331, 334 (1994); see also NRS 372.345 (noting that use tax does not apply to property if sales tax was already collected with respect to that property\u2019s sale). 13 Nev. Const. art. 10, \u00a7 3(A)(2)(a) and (b). 14 See also NRS 372.265 (<HOLDING>). 15 Although the Tax Department has argued Holdings: 0: holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution 1: holding that definition of seizure under state constitution differs from that under us constitution 2: recognizing exception under state constitution 3: holding that under the federal constitution the states retained unlimited authority in matters of taxation except where trumped by for instance the commerce clause 4: recognizing that items prohibited from taxation under the nevada constitution are not taxable under nrs chapter 372", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with the approval of the Governor and in accordance with \u00a7 5 of the Voting Rights Act, ends its current impasse and adopts its own redistricting plan. 5 . The Supreme Court has also held that courts must utilize single-member districts \"[ujnless the ... [c]ourt can articulate ... a singular combination of unique factors\u201d that justifies a different result. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). The South Carolina General Assembly is already organized exclusively into single-member districts. 6 . For simplicity's sake, we refer to the Leath-erman plaintiffs simply as \"Leatherman\u201d and the Marchar\u00eda plaintiffs as the \"ACLU.\u201d 7 . See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Smith, 946 F.Supp. at 1206 (noting that Holdings: 0: recognizing frequent use of respect for municipal boundaries as criteria in evaluating redistricting plan 1: recognizing the obviously important government interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities  contained in the hatch act 2: holding that redistricting plan violated state constitutional mandate and thus affirming trial courts findings that 1 3: recognizing that a redistricting plan can be driven at least to some extent by partisan interests 4: holding redistricting plan would violate equal protection clause if it reflected a naked desire to increase partisan strength", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 2518(l)(e) when it is not required for a violation of \u00a7 2518(l)(b)(iv). Disclosure of prior applications naming those individuals who are targets of a new investigation necessarily depends on the naming of the targets in the new application. If failure to name target Smith in a wiretap application would not require suppression, the failure to disclose prior applications which Smith was a named interceptee should not require suppression. Sullivan, 586 F.Supp. at 1323; Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1536-37 (quoting Sullivan). Accordingly, at least where, as here, a violation of subsection (l)(e) is inadvertent, suppression is not justified. Van Horn, 789 F.2d at 1500; Abramson, 553 F.2d at 1170; Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1537; Sullivan, 586 F.Supp. at 1323; but see Massino, 657 F.Supp. at 107 (<HOLDING>). In this ease, after initially deciding that a Holdings: 0: holding that a prior application might affect the issuing judges finding of necessity 1: holding that failure to follow state law requiring issuing judge to record testimony did not affect validity of warrant 2: holding that procedural violations merely affect the weight of the evidence 3: holding that resigntorun requirement in delaware judges code of judicial conduct did not violate first amendment interests of judges 4: holding that issuing judge may draw reasonable inferences from the material presented in the warrant application", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with less than ideal clarity; occasionally, legislation is opaque in instructing which federal tribunal is the proper \u2014 or a proper \u2014 forum for the first court airing of, or an appeal in, a particular kind of federal case. Compare Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 239-41 (D.C. Cir.1985), with id. at 944-946 (dissenting opinion) (divided views on \u201cplain meaning\u201d of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1295(a)(2) (1982)). When administrative' action is in question, as in the instant case, the governing statute may fail to say with precision whether judicial review should initially occur in a district court, or directly in a court of appeals. The matter at hand pointedly illustrates these difficulties, as did our previous encounter with these appellants, Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>), rev\u2019d sub nom. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that there must first be a denial by atf for the district court to review 1: holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case 2: holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record 3: holding in land use situations courts have concluded in order for a regulatory takings claim to be ripe there must be a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue 4: holding that judicial review of nuclear regulatory commission decision at issue must first occur in district court", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "As noted above, the act requires a shipyard that has agreed with a ship purchaser on a ship price to \u201csubmit [to Mar-Ad] backup cost details and evidence that the negotiated price is fair and reasonable.\u201d 46 App. U.S.C. \u00a7 1152(a)(ii). The words \u201cfair\u201d and \u201creasonable\u201d indicate that the Secretary should use an objective standard when determining whether the negotiated ship price is acceptable, since to do otherwise would relegate each inquiry under the statute to a web of subjectivity and destroy the continuity and predictability of administration and enforcement. Similarly, these words also indicate that the cost estimates that a shipyard submits to MarAd must also be objectively reasonable. See generally United States v. Davis, 666 F.Supp. 641, 643 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (Weinfeld, J. ) (<HOLDING>). In the legislative history of the 1970 Holdings: 0: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 1: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable 2: holding that marad subsidy contracts must be consistent with the enabling statute which authorizes their execution and that therefore cost estimates that shipyards provide to marad must be fair and reasonable 3: holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary 4: holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "We need not resolve this question. Regardless whether a presumption of correctness attached to the boards\u2019 of equalization valuations in this case, the presumption was \u201c \u2018.one of fact and [was] rebuttable and only served the place of evidence until [Ameren] ... came .forward with the evidence hereinbefore set out.\u2019\u201d State ex rel. Kahler, 393 S.W.2d at 465 (quoting Koplar v. State Tax Commission, 321 S.W.2d 686, 693-94 (Mo. 1959)). Once Ameren came forward with evidence to establish that which 'the assessors in fact admitted\u2014that the valuation methodology the assessors used, though correct, was unlawfully and unfairly applied due to the failure to consider depreciation\u2014the' presumption of correctness, if any, attached to the boards\u2019 of equalization valuations was defeated. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Ameren\u2019s fourth point on appeal is denied as Holdings: 0: holding that agency decisions enjoy a presumption of correctness 1: holding that a trial court has discretion to qualify experts and rely on various methods in making a valuation determination 2: recognizing that the mcdonnell douglas framework is less useful in the context of an alleged discriminatory disciplinary decision than in the context of an alleged discriminatory hiring decision 3: holding that presumption of correctness defeated when taxpayer alleged assessors valuation was discriminatory and presented evidence of discriminatory valuation methods 4: holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "findings of fact were based on Rapoport\u2019s own admissions. A litigant\u2019s right to due process is not forfeited, however, because the most damaging evidence comes from his own confession or admissions. The right ) (\"An attorney must be accorded due process in ... disciplinary proceedings, and the requirements of due process are met when the attorney is served with charges or specifications reasonably informing him of the charges against him and the attorney is thereafter accorded a hearing with an opportunity to defend.\u201d). 7 . The majority opinion seems to suggest that Rapoport, who was proceeding pro se at the time, should have spelled out the disputed issues of fact in his request for a continuance. 1 find this reasoning disingenuous for if Rapo-p So.2d 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) Holdings: 0: holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 1: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 2: recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard 3: holding the completely fully fairly element is met if the party against whom preclusion is sought had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue 4: holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "address entitlement to benefits or level of benefits for employees who have lost employment due to fault, and leaves open the question of whether any consequence should attach to termination from post-injury employment for fault. Therefore, the statute is ambiguous, and we attempt to discern the Legislature\u2019s intent. [\u00b6 9] Prior to 1992, Maine\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act did not include a provision analogous to section 214(1)(D) and (E). See 39 M.R.S.A. \u00a7 55-A (Pamph. 1987); 39 M.R.S.A. \u00a7 55-B (Supp. 1989). In several decisions construing pre-1992 versions of the statute, we determined that an employer could not terminate or reduce benefits when the employee was fired from post-injury employment for fault. See Bernard v. Mead Publ\u2019g Paper Div., 2001 ME 15, \u00b6 9, 765 A.2d 576, 579 (<HOLDING>); Cote v. Great N. Paper Co., 611 A.2d 58, 59 Holdings: 0: holding pursuant to former title 39 that termination for fault did not constitute grounds for discontinuing benefits 1: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault 2: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer 3: holding there were no grounds for challenging in a termination proceeding the alleged failure to comply with the ada in the provision of services because services are not required by the termination statute 4: holding failure of reemployment drug test did not constitute grounds for reducing employees benefits", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "determining whether the state court magistrate, who did not know about the information the Cl provided to Dunn on October 16, 1997, properly found that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. This 'Court has long held that only the information presented under oath and affirmation to the judicial officer who issued the warrant may factor into the calculus of whether probable cause existed for the warrant to issue. See e.g., Tabasko v. Barton, 472 F.2d 871, 874-75 (6th Cir. 1972) (refusing to consider proof to support probable cause where statement at issue was not in affidavit and state court record failed to show that affiant made the statement under oath in state court before the issuing magistrate); see also United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288, 292-93 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). There is no indication that the state magis Holdings: 0: holding informants testimony corroborated by evidence consisting of defendants presence at scene coupled with cash found in his pocket carrying serial numbers matching those provided to informant for controlled buy and videotape of transaction included conversation of defendant regarding prior drug sale 1: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause 2: holding that affidavit officer submitted to state court judge coupled with officers sworn testimony before that judge regarding informants controlled drug purchases at defendants residence sufficed to establish probable cause 3: holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence 4: holding that a known informants statement can support probable cause even though the affidavit fails to provide any additional basis for the known informants credibility", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "claim concerning the admission of evidence related to his three prior felony convictions was raised as a state law claim, and not as a federal due process constitutional claim. Petitioner\u2019s brief on direct appeal did not mention any due process analysis regarding this claim. Petitioner did cite to one federal case in his brief, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). In Old Chief, the Court considered whether the State could introduce evidence regarding the nature of a prior offense to prove possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. However, the Old Chief decision was based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not on any constitutional analysis. See also Sims v. Larson, 2002 WL 1497922 at *4 & n. 7 (N.D.Cal. Jul.2, 2002) (<HOLDING>). That Old Chief was being cited to analogize Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence 1: recognizing that old chief was based entirely on the federal rules of evidence rather than the constitution 2: holding that a change between old and new rules was fundamental to a degree that impacts our jurisdiction over the plaintiffs challenges to the old rules 3: recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings 4: recognizing privilege under federal rules", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Camacho Every citizen has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during lawful arrests. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-78 (3d Cir.2004). \u201cViolation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control\u201d over the plaintiff. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). An excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police act \u201cthrough means intentionally applied\u201d to secure physical control of the plaintiff. Id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378. The acquiring of physical control, or seizure, need not occur in the manner originally intended by the police, but it must result from volitional police activity performed for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (<HOLDING>); In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, Holdings: 0: holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis 1: holding that no seizure occurred where the defendant initially stopped in compliance with a police officers order but then drove off quickly before the police officer could reach the suspects car 2: holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible 3: holding that a seizure results whenever an individual is stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result 4: holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The participant may also be subject to an early withdrawal penalty. But, the plan administrator has no right to payment under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 . See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 331 (7th ed. (abridged) 2000). 12 . Under the USAF\u2019s system, repayment of 75 percent of the allowance was a condition precedent to receiving retirement checks. Mullen, 696 F.2d at 471. 13 . See, e.g., McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190, No. EP-06-CV-436-PRM (W.D. Tex. April 26, 2007); In re Jones, 335 B.R. 203, 210 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005); In re Esquivel, 239 B.R. 146, 151 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1999); Inre Fulton, 211 B.R. 247, 264 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1997); In re Scott, 142 B.R. 126, 131-32 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1992); In re Jones, 138 B.R. 536, 537-38 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1991). But see In re Buchferer, 216 B.R. 332 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1997) (<HOLDING>). 14 . The bankruptcy court has also pointed Holdings: 0: holding that a debtors obligation to repay a pension plan loan is a debt because the plans right to offset the obligation against future benefits constitutes a method of enforcement sufficient to create a right to payment 1: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 2: holding that benefits in excess of the support obligation could not be credited against future support 3: holding that obligation to pay pension benefits gave rise to a constructive trust relationship and obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy 4: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "one exception, these pleadings fail because of defendant\u2019s status as a notary or because they are claims for legal malpractice barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-15(c). See, e.g., Sharp, 113 N.C. App. at 592, 439 S.E.2d at 794 (noting \u201cclaims \u2018arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services\u2019 based on negligence or breach of contract are in the nature of \u2018malpractice\u2019 claims, [and] are governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-15(c)\u201d). Similarly, any claim based on defendant\u2019s breach of a fiduciary duty is time barred. See Heath v. Craighill, Rendleman, Ingle & Blythe, 97 N.C. App. 236, 244, 388 S.E.2d 178, 183 (1990) (\u201cBreach of fiduciary duty is a species of negligence or professional malpractice.\u201d); Childers v. Hayes, 77 N.C. App. 792, 795, 336 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The exception is plaintiff\u2019s only remaining Holdings: 0: holding breach of fiduciary duty claim is essentially a negligence or professional malpractice claim 1: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action 2: recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims 3: holding professional malpractice claim not contractual 4: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "mandatory sentence prescribed ' in subsection (b). Any other reading of HRS \u00a7 712-1200(4) would produce an absurd result, Franks, 74 Haw. at 341, 843 P.2d at 674, and contradict the obvious meaning of the statute. State v. Paaluhi, 70 Haw. 237, 240, 768 P.2d 235, 237 (1989). Id. at 395-96, 885 P.2d at 1135-36 (emphasis in original). Because we were satisfied that an absurd result could only be avoided by employing the \u201cplain meaning\u201d approach to the construction of the term \u201csubsequent of fense,\u201d we noted in Ramela that resort to the legislative history was \u201cnot necessary to our analysis,\u201d although we observed, in a footnote, that the legislative history supported our construction. Id. at 396 n. 3, 885 P.2d at 1136 n. 3. See also State v. Simpson, 9 Haw.App. 165, 827 P.2d 1156 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, because the plain meaning of the Holdings: 0: holding that a second offense was subsequent for purposes of hrs  71212004 inasmuch as it was  subsequent in terms of both commission and ascertainment of guilt notwithstanding that the two convictions had occurred simultaneously in the course of the same proceeding 1: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 2: holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it 3: holding that notwithstanding code  182231s application to successive trials conviction of both the completed substantive offense and the underlying conspiracy are permitted in virginia provided the convictions occurred as here in a single trial 4: holding that two offenses are separate for the purposes of  4a12a1 where all the elements of the first offense occurred before any activity forming the basis of the second offense", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the September 19, 1996 order. The district court did not explain the procedural grounds upon which it proceeded to award relief restricting Ford\u2019s policy, after denying the only motion contesting that policy. While it is unclear whether the district court intended the order as a sanction for what it perceived as an \u201cend run around the clear intention of\u2019 the March order, slip op. at 1-2, or as an entry of judgment on Liberty\u2019s allegation that Ford\u2019s newly adopted policy violated the NJFPA, we conclude that we cannot sustain the order on either basis. We cannot sustain the September order as a sanction for noncompliance with the court\u2019s March order because the policy which the court restricted in the September order did not violate any clear mandate set fort F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, Holdings: 0: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion 1: holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record  even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions 2: holding that where party had reasonable grounds to believe conduct was in compliance with the district courts order imposition of sanctions was not warranted and constituted an abuse of discretion 3: holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined 4: holding district courts dismissal following explicit and reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u25a0 after the LHWCA\u2019s enactment, \u25a0 however, courts struggled to define when an injured worker was entitled \u2022 to relief. Initially, the LHWCA provided coverage on the basis of a \u201csitus test\u201d alone, allowing recovery for a work-related injury as long as,the injury occurred on \u201cnavigable waters\u201d and the employer had at least one employee (but not necessarily the injured employee) who was engaged in maritime employment'. Ne. Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. O\u2019Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340-42, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953)). Thus construed, however, the situs test often produced arbitrarily restrictive outcomes. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224-25, 90 S.Ct. 347, 24 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (<HOLDING>). To address this problem, Congress in 1972 Holdings: 0: holding evidence insufficient for conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances when the drugs were not found on the person of or in the same room as the defendant but were only found on other persons on the premises 1: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added 2: holding that longshoremen killed or injured on a pier while loading or unloading a ship were not covered under the act but would be if they had been thrown into the water or were on the deck of the ship when the accident happened 3: holding that where the claimants were servicemen injured or killed while on active duty due to the negligence of others in the armed forces they could not seek recovery under the ftca for injuries sustained that arose out of or were incident to their military service 4: holding for the purposes of the california public records act that a city disclosed all documents in a reasonably timely manner when records that had not been in the citys possession or could not be found were promptly disclosed when they were found or became available", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Nations with ample notice of its intent to charge her as a habitual offender, and she had a fair opportunity to present any defense to that charge. \u00b615. Moreover, at the March 23, 2014 hearing on the State\u2019s motion to amend the indictment to charge her as a habitual offender, Nations\u2019s attorney specifically stated: \u2018Tour honor, we don\u2019t have any opposition [to the State\u2019s motion]. It\u2019s either \u2014 she\u2019s habitual or she\u2019s not. I think that we had already talked and she is in that status.\u201d After Nations\u2019s attorney\u2019s statement, the trial judge granted the State\u2019s motion. It is difficult to imagine a clearer waiver of the issue. Thus, Nations\u2019s claim of unfair surprise is not only without merit but also procedurally barred. Newberry v. State, 85 So.3d 884, 888 (\u00b6 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial Holdings: 0: holding that a noticebased objection to a motion to amend an indictment to charge the defendant as a habitual offender is waived if the defendant fails to make a specific and contemporaneous objection 1: holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully 2: holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review 3: holding that a party fails to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal not only by failing to make a specific objection but also by making the wrong specific objection 4: holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "needed to have probable cause when he first observed the items he seized, it noted that \u201c[a] plausible limitation would require Hyde to form probable cause during this search in this house, but the more specific limitation urged by [defendant] does not seem prudent.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir.1996), one of several agents executing a search warrant for the defendant\u2019s apartment found a loaded firearm in plain view. The warrant did not authorize a search for weapons, and the agent who came upon the gun did not have a basis to believe its possession to be criminal. The agent nevertheless reported his discovery to a fellow agent in the apartment who was supervising the search. The supervising agent was aware that the defendant r.1985) (<HOLDING>). The government has cited no cases holding Holdings: 0: holding that agents were allowed to seize and question occupants of business while executing search warrant for illegal aliens 1: holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence 2: holding that when agents executing a search warrant for narcotics came upon a firearm in plain view they properly detained the firearm for security reasons and that when the same agents at a later point in their search came upon documents indicating the resident had a felony record the firearm could lawfully be seized 3: holding that even personal papers of a defendant discovered during a permissive search of his parents home were protected by the privilege 4: holding that subsequent discovery during same search of papers indicating defendant was on parole permitted agents to return to and seize a firearm they had previously observed in plain view", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "vapors from reaching the surface and harming nearby homeowners. The Court finds that both cases are inapposite to the case sub judice. In Lueke and Baker, the basis of the plaintiffs\u2019 interference with use claims were the health risks posed by contamination, and such interference was' actually remediated by filtration. In contrast, in this case, while the GAC remedi-ates the harm C8 poses to human health, it does not undo the other harms C8 poses to the Plaintiff, which are outlined supra and include interference with expansion projects, with revenues from water sales, etc. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that under Banford, it can recover for annoyance damages without having to show physical discomfort, since it has shown interference with use. 126 Ohio St.3d at 215, 932 N.E.2d 313 (<HOLDING>). This Court finds that Plaintiff misinterprets Holdings: 0: holding that claimants may be entitled to damages for loss of use and enjoyment in addition to returned rents and profits 1: holding award that included damages for loss of enjoyment of life not excessive 2: holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent 3: holding that loss of quiet enjoyment is not a sufficient plus 4: holding plaintiff may recover for annoyance and discomfort for a nuisance including fear and other emotions without a physical component if the annoyance or discomfort are connected to the persons loss of use or enjoyment", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "this study, Ashley Creek knows what its own costs would be only within a margin of plus or minus 25%. Ashley Creek does not know the cost to ship its concentrate from the end of the pipeline to its potential customers. Ashley Creek does not know whether there are any customers who would buy concentrate at the price Ashley Cr\u00e9ek would have to charge even if the Pipeline tariff were zero. While Ashley Creek claims that the tariff is too high, it does not know whether it could profitably ship at the actual tariff rates or indeed at any tariff rate. Merely knowing that there are phosphate deposits on its leases is not sufficient to demonstrate that Ashley Creek is prepared to enter the market. See Practice Perfect Inc. v. Hamilton County Pharm. Ass\u2019n, 732 F.Supp. 798, 803 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (<HOLDING>); Gas Utilities Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Southern Holdings: 0: holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established 1: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim 2: holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2 3: holding plaintiffs principals failed to identify a sufficient market for their services which was an essential element for the success of their proposed business 4: holding dismissal proper where complaint fails to allege an essential element of plaintiffs claim", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "coverage of an existing one. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). Faced with a dearth of federal precedent, blindly resorting to only the forum state\u2019s privilege law is inappropriate. Appellant has not shown that California law is in accord with most states, or that it is likely that the federal common law would be advanced by the injection of California\u2019s broadened view of the client-representative extension of attorney-client privilege. Fed.R.Evid. 501 (stating that federal courts should recognize evidentiary privileges according to the principles of the common law in the light of reason and experience); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (<HOLDING>); Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies 2: holding that a party seeking a new privilege must overcome a significant burden of establishing that excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth 3: holding that a party seeking a writ bears the burden of proving that it has no other means of attaining the relief such as by appeal 4: holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Tex. Prop. Code Ann. \u00a7 202.003 (West 2014). We also agree with Munson that the term \u201cresidence\u201d \u201cgenerally requires both physical presence and an intention to remain.\u201d Munson, 948 S.W.2d at 816. Thus, \u201c[i]f a person comes to a place temporarily, without any intention of making that place his or her home, that place is not considered the person\u2019s residence.\u201d Id. at 817. Instead, those persons are using a home for transient purposes. Id. And, as in Munson, we draw a distinction between \u201cresidential\u201d purposes and \u201ctransient\u201d purposes. See id. at 816-17. One leasing his home to be used for transient purposes is not complying with the restrictive covenant that it be used solely for residential purposes. See also Benard v. Humble, 990 S.W.2d 929, 931-32 (Tex. App.\u2014Beaumont 1999, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record is clear that Tarr, through Holdings: 0: holding that babysitter living in home connected via ramp to defendants home had no authority to consent to search of defendants home 1: holding that homeowners short term rental of home violated deed restriction that home could be used only for singlefamily residence purposes 2: holding that home purchased with separate funds and titled in one spouses name was transmuted into marital property because home was used as marital residence and the other spouse contributed to payments and repairs on home 3: holding that a covenant stating that all lots shall be used exclusively for singlefamily dwellings was both a structural and a use restriction that prohibited the building of roads not used in connection with a residence 4: holding that homeowners did not control the premises to the extent a duly  arose for injury during a home show when homeowners had moved only a few items in and had surrendered possession for the home show", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "WL 3487723, at *4-*6 (W.D.Tex. Nov. 3, 2005) (rejecting policy argument). For example, Albany Insurance Co. v. Bengal Marine, Inc. involved a policy requiring the insured to pay a certain deductible before the insurer became liable; the Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law, held that, in light of Louisiana\u2019s direct action statute, the insurer was liable for claims above the deductible up to the policy limit when the insured could not pay the deductible due to insolvency. 857 F.2d 250, 255-56 (5th Cir.1988). Other courts have reached a similar result by holding that enforcing retained limit or deductible provisions in this situation would defeat state bankruptcy provision laws. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Hooper, 294 Ill. App.3d 626, 229 Ill.Dec. 129, 691 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1998) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 178 Ill.2d 576, 232 Ill.Dec. Holdings: 0: holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana 1: holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision 2: holding that an insurers reliance on a retained limit provision referred to as a selfinsured retention limit  to avoid payment when the insured became insolvent was directly contrary to the public policy as declared by the legislative enactment of illinois bankruptcy provision law 3: holding contribution claim against attorney not contrary to illinois public policy 4: holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "States v. Eide, 297 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 2002), the defendant was convict ed of attempting to manufacture five grams or more of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 702. On appeal, he argued the government\u2019s evidence was not sufficient as to quantity, and thus \u201che should be resentenced on the included offense of simple attempted manufacturing.\u201d 297 F.3d at 704. As in Cain\u2019s case, the government in Eide did not find any methamphetamine in the defendant\u2019s residence, but it did find pseu-doephedrine and equipment commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 702-03. Therefore, the government relied on expert testimony to establish the quantity of methamphetamine the defendant attempted to manufacture. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The government\u2019s expert was Patricia Krahn, a chemist from t (<HOLDING>). In Eide, after rejecting the government\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding testimony must be accurately tailored to the specific manufacturing conditions ingredients and skill of the accused 1: holding that if the reason the victim cannot testify at trial is that the accused murdered her then the accused should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable 2: holding that an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved 3: holding that defense counsel had duty to communicate formal offer from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused 4: holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Tischendorf v. Tischendorf 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn.1982). Although appellant did not raise his equal protection argument in the district court, we believe the conditions described in Tis-chendorf have been met here, and elect to review the issue. \u201cThe granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court.\u201d State v. Cameron, 603 N.W.2 Guidelines III.C.3 (credit for confinement as a condition of stayed sentence \u201cis limit ed to time spent in jails, workhouses, and regional correctional facilities\u201d); Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. Ill .C.04 (\u201cCredit should not be extended for time spent in residential treatment facilities or on electric home monitoring as a condition of a stay of imposition or stay of execution.\u201d); see also State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). Although treatment may be available both as Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who does not receive concurrent sentences on multiple charges  is not entitled to have his jail time credit pyramided by being given credit on each sentence for the full time he spends in jail awaiting disposition he is only entitled to jail credit on the first of the consecutive sentences quoting daniels v state 491 so2d 543 545 fla1986 1: holding that the statutory entitlement to presentence jail credit starts with the initial arrest for a criminal offense 2: holding that a defendant must be granted credit for time served in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a county jail 3: holding defendant who received treatment in a state hospital was not entitled to jail credit for that time 4: holding that jail credit may be granted for presentence custodial period spent under a civil commitment order at state security hospital and observing that denying credit for time relating to probationary conditions is not inconsistent with that holding", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Further, as the court stated in its July 27, 2011 Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part Magistrate Judge Azrack\u2019s Monsanto Hearing Report and Recommendation, \u201c[b]y setting up an accounting system in which all of the [GDC] subsidiaries contributed to and received funds from a single [account], which was also funded with loan proceeds, USW entangled itself with the allegedly fraudulent loan proceeds.\u201d (July 27th Order at 22.) The court further noted that \u201cthe group of related subsidiaries, including USW, all shared in the [same account] 'and benefited from transfer hecks, as opposed to security interests, petitioners are unable to assert rights to a particular asset or specific funds) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Schwimmer, 968 F.2d 1570, Holdings: 0: holding that employers have standing to sue 1: holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures 2: holding that representatives of the news media have the standing to contest a court order restricting public access to legal proceedings 3: holding that 20 of creditors knowing of consignment relationship does not satisfy general knowledge requirement notwithstanding that such creditors represented 63 of claims against debtor 4: holding that a contest to a claim of exemption was ineffective when that contest was not by affidavit and did not properly state that the claim of exemption was invalid or excessive", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the product as promised minus the value of the product delivered.\u201d). Thus, the proper question is not how much the erroneous sticker may have reduced the vehicle\u2019s perceived value for any individual purchaser or lessee. Rather, damages should reflect the difference between the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with perfect safety ratings for three standardized categories and the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with no safety ratings. Unlike the calculation of an individual consumer\u2019s direct pecuniary loss, which would limit the plaintiff to the difference of what she paid and the actual value received, the FDUTPA \u201cbenefit of the bargain\u201d model provides a standardized class-wide damages figure because the plaintiffs out-of-pocket payment is immaterial. See Coghlan, 240 F.3d at 453 (<HOLDING>); 13 A.L.R.3d 875, \u00a7\u00a7 3(a) and 4(a) Holdings: 0: holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state 1: recognizing that fdutpa cases apply a benefit of the bargain damages formula 2: recognizing that berry altered the apportionment and valuation portions of the taggart formula 3: holding that banks damages were benefit of the bargain type damages that fail to constitute a substantial and independent injury sufficient to remove borrowers claim from the operation of the statute of frauds 4: holding that competitor could seek only injunction under fdutpa not damages", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of Fourth Amendment protection as is the interior of a residence.\u201d Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1189, 124 S.Ct. 1432, 158 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). Nothing in the record indicates that Romo displayed any \"no trespassing\u201d signs or other evidence indicating that he wished to keep people off his property, and as previously articulated, the back driveway of the home was not enclosed, was open to the alleyway at the rear of the house, and gas meters were located on the driveway. 6 . The Rodriguez court states, \"There is no legitimate expectation or interest in \u2018privately\u2019 possessing an illegal narcotic.\u201d 106 S.W.3d at 229; see Wilson v. State, 98 S.W.3d 265, 272-73 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.l 2002, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that a hotel guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room during the period of time for which the room is rented 1: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest 2: holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment 3: holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest 4: holding a dog sniff outside the defendants front door was not a fourth amendment search", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to that in Katz, none of those cases specifically addresses standing. And in each case, while the officers did not need a warrant to view areas from the air, the information observed, without more, was not enough to justify a warrantless search or seizure of the property. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52, 109 S.Ct. 698, 102 L.Ed.2d 885 (1989) (plurality op.) (reversing the trial court\u2019s grant of a motion to suppress contesting the search of a greenhouse in a residential backyard conducted pursuant to a warrant, which was obtained based upon observations gained from helicopter surveillance, because the helicopter surveillance did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (<HOLDING>); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215, 106 Holdings: 0: holding only that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the fourth amendment 1: holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment 2: holding that mere insertion of key was not a search or at least not an unreasonable search protected by the fourth amendment 3: holding that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rules are not implicated by a private search 4: holding that a canine sniff is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Media of Ill., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines, Ill., 391 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (N.D.Ill.2005) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2003)). Parties challenging a statute on First Amendment grounds may represent the interests of third parties \u201cwhose protected expression is prohibited or substantially burdened by the regulation.\u201d Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir.2000). Additionally, businesses may represent their customers\u2019 constitutional rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (beer vendors may challenge an alcohol regulation on equal protection grounds on behalf of their customers); Pierce v. Soc\u2019y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (<HOLDING>); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 696 Holdings: 0: holding that courts may rely solely on affidavits in granting preliminary injunctions 1: holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party 2: holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students 3: holding that school officials may not limit the first amendment rights of students and teachers to freedom of speech and expression 4: holding that a school may assert the rights of its students parents and gathering cases granting injunctions to businesses on behalf of customers", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it as where money has been paid by accident, mistake of fact, or fraud, or has been acquired through a breach of trust or the violation of a fiduciary duty.\u2019 \u201d (quoting SSI Med. Servs. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (1990))); see All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279, 308, 20 S.E.2d 741, 753 (1942) (\u201c \u2018The law will not permit a party to deliberately put his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through intervention of a court of equity, regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been accom plished.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N.E. 919, 920 (1906))). As to Issue III: Bowen v. Bowen, 352 S.C. 494, 499, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. Holdings: 0: recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party 1: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 2: holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the presumption is that the purchase was a gift to the child and thus no resulting trust arises 3: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 4: holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the parent has the burden of proving a gift was not intended", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "hearing is only necessary if \u201cthe movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved on a paper record.\u201d U.S. v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir.1996). There is no such showing made here, the basic facts are undisputed. 3 . The undisputed facts relevant to the instant motion are drawn entirely from the Affidavit of Special Agent Jeffrey Commander (\"the affidavit\u201d) filed along with the complaint (Docket Entry # 1, Exhibit 1), incorporated by reference within claimant\u2019s memorandum (Docket Entry # 15) as \"anticipated facts\u201d and within the government's opposition (Docket Entry # 18). 4 . The court distinguishes this case from those cited by claimant, namely, U.S. v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), and U.S. v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Holdings: 0: holding failure to promote was an isolated incident of discrimination which is insufficient to prove a continuing violation 1: holding that an isolated incident of a vehicle crossing into the emergency lane of a roadway does not violate state statutes requirement that vehicles remain entirely in a single lane as nearly as practical 2: holding that one in stance of weaving does not constitute a violation of utah code ann  416611 3: holding that one isolated incident of partially weaving into emergency lane does not constitute a traffic violation in tennessee 4: holding that a uhaul trucks similar one time entry into the emergency lane failed to constitute a violation of a statute nearly identical to the statute at issue", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the defects. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1326(d); see United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, an alien is barred from collaterally attacking the validity of an underlying deportation order \u201cif he validly waived the right to appeal that order\u201d during the deportation proceedings. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted). Such a waiver must be \u201cconsidered and intelligent.\u201d Id. A waiver is not considered and intelligent when the record contains an inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation, but the IJ fails to advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that iirira and aedpa are not applicable to criminal alien who entered a guilty plea at a time when alien was eligible for  212c relief 1: holding that failure to advise an alien of possible forms of relief may violate due process 2: holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he is eligible for relief from deportation constitutes due process violation where alien establishes prejudice 3: recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable 4: holding that there is no due process violation where the ijs finding was not arbitrary and the alien was not denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "must have an ownership right in the property sought and must come into the transaction with \u201cclean hands.\u201d Howell, 425 F.3d at 973-75. \u201cThe court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion.\u201d \u2022 Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(g); see also United States v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir.2001) (concluding the district judge incorrectly denied a criminal defendant\u2019s Rule 41(e) motion based on the government\u2019s unsupported allegation that the property at issue had been destroyed). Herrera-Contreras has cited no binding precedent in support of his argument the district judge was required to hold a hearing, where the judge received evidence showing the government did not possess the $2.1 million at issue. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(g); Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d at 1314 (<HOLDING>). The district judge received a declaration Holdings: 0: holding where record fails to establish whether and how appellant presented motion for new trial to the trial court it was not timely presented 1: holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted 2: recognizing the government must submit some evidence of property destruction but it is within the district judges discretion to determine how evidence should be presented 3: holding that a defendant owed no duty to a plaintiff with regard to the safekeeping of evidence because there was no promise by the defendant or its employees to inspect or safeguard the evidence for the plaintiffs benefit and destruction of physical evidence was not criminal because destruction was innocent and designed to ensure the safety of the defendants employees 4: recognizing that evidence of government knowledge of the defendants conduct could be part of a defendants argument that it did not knowingly submit false claims", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "but also must give the de fendant credit for the full elapsed period of the administrative suspension, see id. \u00a7 1311-A(5)(C). This interleaving, the petitioner suggests, signifies that the civil sanction must itself be punitive. We do not accept this syllogism. A remedial sanction is not transmogrified into a punishment simply because a similar sanction sometimes may be imposed as part of a criminal sentence. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631, 636, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 1431-32, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988) (explaining that the characterization of a sanction as remedial or punitive depends on the nature of the sanction itself, not the proceeding in which it is imposed); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101-02, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). In all events, the credit provision, fairly Holdings: 0: holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence 1: holding that the use of the written form is mandatory and that failure to use the written form as mandated is reversible error 2: holding that police officers charge to protect the public differentiated them from the public 3: holding that although imprisonment is generally thought to be the paradigmatic form of punishment pretrial detention to protect the public is not regarded as punitive 4: holding that the good faith requirement of the whistleblower statute was not met where the purpose of the employee at the time of the making of reports was not to protect the public but to protect the jobs of himself and his coworkers", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "were actually taken by Trooper Chad Chandler and that Sgt. Alexander is merely the case agent assigned to investigate the incident. 2 . Sgt. Alexander has been sued in his official capacity only. Therefore, he is entitled to the same sovereign immunity (and subject to the same exceptions) as the Department of Public Safety. 3 . Similarly, the doctrine of sovereign immunity might not apply to the $115,000 Gore seeks to recover if he were attempting to replevy the seized cash instead of seeking damages for conversion. However, such an action would also have been due to be dismissed because 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 881(c) and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1355(a) give the federal district courts original jurisdiction in all federal forfeiture actions. See Edney v. City of Montgomery, 960 F.Supp. 270 (M.D.Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>). 4 . In Lightfoot, the police also claimed Holdings: 0: holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states 1: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 2: holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties 3: holding that the united states adoption of a states seizure of currency has the same effect as if the united states had originally seized the currency 4: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Hospital Damas. See id. (\u201c[A] fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent\u2019 action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.\u201d (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924))). f. L.C.V. also argues that, as a matter of public policy, issue preclusion should not be applied to this case, which, according to her, involves Fundaci\u00f3n\u2019s perpetration of a \u201cfraud\u201d \u201cto evade responsibility and eventually justice.\u201d We are unpersuaded by L.C.V.\u2019s public-policy argument. For starters, the\u2018cases on which L.C.V. relies apply Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 737 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of appeals correctly stated the public policy exception but erroneously concluded that the exception did not apply 1: recognizing that under puerto rico law res judicata may not apply if  public policy demands an exception but noting that this exception was successfully argued in only two cases and concluding that public policy does not demand an exception in this case 2: recognizing exception 3: recognizing the public interest exception 4: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "must be granted for the same reasons. First, - if plaintiffs proposed amendment were allowed, the Amended Complaint would nonetheless be subject to dismissal as unexhausted. It is well established that \u201c[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (requiring complete exhaustion of correctional facility administrative remedies). The exhaustion requirement for prison condition claims is mandatory. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In interpreting the exhaustion requirement of Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal under 42 usc  1997ea was required even though case had gone to trial as inmate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies 1: holding that inmate plaintiff satisfied  1997ea where he attempted to exhaust all available administrative remedies but was prevented from doing so by prison personnel 2: holding exhaustion is required regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures 3: holding that 42 usc  1997ea requires prisoners to exhaust a process and not a remedy 4: holding that congress has provided in  1997ea that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "history, and other appropriate matters that throw light on the subject. Id. Additionally, it is fundamental that a general statute does not apply and must yield when there is a specific statute addressing a particular subject matter. Id. Appellant\u2019s argument is that \u00a7 5-64-403 is unconstitutionally vague because it authorizes different penalties for the same conduct: possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. However, the legislature may authorize different maximum penalties for the same conduct if the law clearly defines the conduct prohibited. Further, the punishment authorized is not unconstitutional merely because a statute contains overlapping provisions authorizing different maximum penalties. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Arkansas General Assembly has Holdings: 0: holding the statutory scheme of two federal laws was not void for vagueness and did not violate equal protection or due process even though the defendants conduct violated both laws 1: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 2: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 3: holding transfer eligibility rule did not deny the student equal protection of the laws or procedural or substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "are inapplicable because they relate to athlete registration requirements, not eligibi nt arbitration decision by the FIFA Players\u2019 Status Committee regarding this controversy, which finds that (1) FIFA\u2019s statutes give USSF authority to sanction professional soccer matches in the United States; (2) Under this authority, USSF has the right to charge sanctioning fees and require the posting of a bond securing those fees; and (3) USSF has the right to notify FIFA in the event that a FIFA-licensed match agent refuses to pay a sane tioning fee or post a performance bond. The exercise of the above-named rights would arguably constitute unreasonable restraints of trade under the Sherman Act. See, Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 359-60, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963) (<HOLDING>), which is why USSF claims the antitrust Holdings: 0: holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation 1: recognizing infrequency of state law antitrust actions under chapter 133 wisconsin courts follow federal interpretation of corresponding federal antitrust laws 2: holding that the fcc was not given the power to decide antitrust issues and that its actions do not prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts 3: holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing 4: holding antitrust laws serve to protect freedom to compete unhindered by group actions of others", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim. The reason is simple: hostile work environments are by definition different because their very nature involves repeated conduct. 811 F.Supp.2d at 177-78 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks committed). 9 . In fact, this allegation does not even support her theory of the case. Following the Jeffers/Perry email episode, the Agency in fact responded to complaints about insulting emails in the workplace and took corrective measures \u2014 it sent around an office-wide memorandum about inappropriate emails and hired the Littler Mendelson firm to investigate the matter. However, plaintiff complains nonetheless because she disagrees with the way in which it remediated the problem. 10 . See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (<HOLDING>); Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374 (\"As a general rule, Holdings: 0: holding that two acts were not sufficiently similar when one consisted of verbal threats and other resulted in physical violence 1: holding that when two penetrations were separated by a short period of time two independent assaults occurred 2: holding delay of two years and four months lengthy enough to warrant review of other factors 3: holding that a dozen racial incidents over a two and one half year period were too few to constitute a custom with the force of law 4: holding that employees four verbal altercations with supervisor two impositions of leave restrictions two proposals of suspension and other clashes over twoyear period were too sporadic", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Act is to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of its employees during the course of his employment.\u201d). 11 .See Ala Code \u00a7 25-5-11. See also Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir.1985) (setting out the conflict between Mississippi and Alabama workers compensation laws). 12 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). 13 . See Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1134 (5th Cir.1984). 14 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws \u00a7 145(2). 15 . Id. \u00a7 6(2). 16 . McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989). 17 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws \u00a7 146 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss.1968) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Blanton, 824 So.2d 558, 562 Holdings: 0: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect 1: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision 2: holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state 3: holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim 4: holding that the site of the injury does not invariably determine choice of law when the most substantial relationships of the parties and the dominant interest of the forum require application of another states law", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 34; Black, 246 S.W. at 80; Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75; Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676. Each of these cases involved a suit brought by property taxpayers who had voted to issue bonds to be paid for from general tax revenues, in- eluding from their property taxes. See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners\u2019 court and \u201celectorate entitled to vote at said election\u201d and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (<HOLDING>); Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75 (in action by Holdings: 0: holding that county commissioners court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to the will of those having to bear the bond burden 1: recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest 2: holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county 3: holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed 4: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "No. 95-0641, 1996 WL 633382, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1996). Plaintiffs allege that there is no legitimate public purpose to reduce the State contribution rate, a substantial impairment of their contractual rights, or that the same was necessary and reasonable to accomplish said purpose. See Dkt. No. 1 at \u00b6\u00b6 95-99, 124-125. On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept these allegations as true. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts suggesting that Defendants\u2019 actions were not reasonable and necessary. While Defendants rely upon the economic emergency, a resolution of the issues surrounding Defendants\u2019 fiscal crisis and economic situation will involve questions not appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss. See Nat'l Educ. Ass\u2019n-Rhode, 890 F.Supp. at 1164 (<HOLDING>). Courts have held that \u201cResolution of ... Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants motion for discharge was premature and thus properly denied by the trial court 1: holding that the defendants challenge to the evidence through a pretrial motion to dismiss was premature because such a challenge can only be made after the state has had an opportunity to present its evidence to the trier of fact 2: holding that a determination of the reasonableness of the defendants actions based upon the economic crisis involving the retirement system was premature on a motion to dismiss 3: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss 4: holding that the district court properly denied defendants motion to dismiss based upon a lack of jurisdiction when defendant challenged the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in this case. See Ronald Lature McCray v. State, No. 02C01-9412-CC-00277, 1995 WL 568388 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Jackson, September 27, 1995); George Cheairs v. State, No. 02C01-9304-CC-00070, 1994 WL 583331 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Jackson, October 26, 1994). In George Cheairs v. State, this court made the following observation: If the parties can agree that a defendant be sentenced to a term of years exceeding the maximum for his range, then logically by agreement he could be sentenced to a term less than the minimum. The release eligibility date would then be determined by agreement rather than the Range. Thus, the statutory ranges and the corresponding release eligibility percentages would be virtually meaningless, with sentencing structure governed by contract rather than by statute. At *2 (<HOLDING>). Although we cannot distinguish Cheairs and Holdings: 0: holding that an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is rendered moot when a defendant receives an illegal sentence 1: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that the failure of defense counsel to object to erroneous punishment charge authorizing an illegal sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel 3: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 4: holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Court subsequent to his trial. Effecting a significant change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that in criminal prosecutions, unless a declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the Confrontation Clause forbids use against the defendant of the declarant\u2019s out-of-court testimonial statements admitted for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Government does not dispute that the pleas, allocutions, and post-arrest statement made at a proffer session constitute \u201ctestimonial statements\u201d of the sort barred by Crawford. We assume without deciding that this characterization is correct. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at Holdings: 0: holding that in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment based on a plea of guilty or no contest a defendant must bring forward a full statement of facts including a transcription of the plea proceedings 1: holding that a plea allocution is a testimonial statement 2: holding that the defendant was entitled to have his plea accepted absent a sound reason for rejecting the plea 3: holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense 4: recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "discrimination charge were invalid, the information sought in the subpoena is nonetheless within the scope of the EEOC\u2019s investigative authority. During the course of the EEOC\u2019s investigation, Milliren additionally alleged that she would be one of only two female LGMs out of 500 LGMs nationwide if she had completed the GMDP and that a female applicant was rejected for a manager position because she had children. Because the EEOC\u2019s investigation into Milliren\u2019s charge of individual gender discrimination revealed potential systemic gender discrimination, the EEOC had the authority to subpoena information relevant to systemic gender discrimination even absent a valid systemic charge by Milliren. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). III. We affirm the district court\u2019s order Holdings: 0: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 1: holding that statements made to internal investigator of employer were made in an investigation under this subchapter where investigation was pursuant to a charge filed with eeoc 2: holding that plaintiff stated a discrimination claim despite not including a discrimination heading in eeoc complaint because the facts included in eeoc complaint were sufficient to trigger an investigation into whether plaintiff suffered an adverse action because of his religion 3: holding that general employment practices are relevant to eeoc investigation of individual disparate treatment claim 4: holding that the eeoc has authority to investigate a broader picture of discrimination that appears during the investigation of an individual charge", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "snowshoe hare ruby-crowned kinglet pygmy nuthatch white-tailed ptarmigan white-crowned sparrow merriam\u2019s turkey yellow-bellied sapsucker macgillivray\u2019s warbler northern three-toed woodpecker Tr. Vol. XV, 190-95, 203-04. 10 . See Tr. Vol. XV, 178-79. 11 . See Tr. Vol. I, 162. 12 . See Tr. Vol. I, 125. 13 . As the Herrington court noted, the fact that a computer model is approved for use in this case does not necessarily justify agency use of the model in all future cases. Herrington, 768 F.2d at 1391. Rather, the agency is under a continuing duty to evaluate the accuracy of a computer model, through empirical testing if possible, and to abandon or improve the model if shown to be unreliable. Id. See also Ohio v. E.P.A., 784 F.2d 224, 226-31, affd, 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). 14 . The EA cites to the work of Bartlet, Holdings: 0: holding that a motion for administrative reconsideration which congress did not order the agency to entertain which the agency dismissed in relevant part on procedural grounds and which the petitioner filed over sixty days after the agency acted cannot effectively extend  retroactively the thirtyday period congress specified for judicial review petitions 1: holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits 2: holding that while every agency use of  computer models need not be validated at each site for which the model is used where the statutory language required the agency to gather empirical data and where there was a factor which all parties agreed was significant but the effect of which was untested and unknown the agency was not entitled to rely on the model without empirically testing it at the site 3: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 4: holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "officer questions [the suspect], tries to identify him[,] and attempts to gather additional information to ... dispel or confirm his suspicions.\u201d Id. at 279-80, 720 S.E.2d at 78. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest \u201cexists when the facts and circumstances within the officer\u2019s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.\u201d Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)); cf. Heien v. North Carolina, \u2014 U.S.-,-,-, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535, 539-40, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (assessing whether the officer h 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (<HOLDING>); see Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 Holdings: 0: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 1: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law 2: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law 3: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 4: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1994; (ii) that Montulli reviewed the design and software architecture of the cookies invention with John Giannandrea\u2014Montulli\u2019s supervisor and later Netscape\u2019s Web browser division\u2019s chief technology officer\u2014during a series of design meetings in July and August 1994; and (iii) that Montulli thereafter began to reduce the invention to computer source code, which he began logging into the Netscape source code repository on October 3 or 4, 1994. Taken together, these facts supported a finding that, prior to the critical date, Montulli made an enabling disclosure that would have allowed Giannandrea, a person skilled in the art, to practice the claimed invention under the Federal Circuit\u2019s decision in Robotic Vision Systems v. View Engineering, 249 F.3d 1307, 1312 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). A. With respect to the \u201cready for patenting\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that the second pfaff prong is satisfied despite no actual completion of such software  provided that there is a disclosure that is sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to write the necessary source code to implement the claimed method 1: holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term 2: holding that the determination of whether sufficient structure is disclosed in the specification to support a meansplusfunction limitation is based on the understanding of one skilled in the art 3: recognizing that source code is speech but not reaching the object code issue 4: holding that a specific pretext instruction is not necessary", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "simply wrong. Under our reading of the policy, the CGL coverage does not completely subsume the CPPL coverage so as to render the latter superfluous. In some respects, the CGL coverage is more limited than the CPPL coverage. For example, the CGL coverage requires an \u201coccurrence,\u201d defined as an \u201caccident.\u201d The CPPL coverage does not require an \u201coccurrence.\u201d The CGL coverage also contains an exclusion for bodily injury that is \u201cexpected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.\u201d The CPPL coverage does not contain an exclusion for expected or intended injuries. Finally, the CGL coverage applies to \u201cbodily injury,\u201d but the CPPL coverage applies to \u201cinjury.\u201d \u201cBodily injury\u201d is a narrower category than \u201cinjury.\u201d See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 822-25 (Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, an injury that arises out of Holdings: 0: holding that bodily injury does not include purely emotional injuries 1: holding that life sentence imposed for kidnapping with bodily injury was not cruel and unusual even if victims injuries were minor 2: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 3: recognizing that when a defendants negligence causes bodily injury the plaintiff can recover damages for past present and future medical expenses bodily injury and emotional distress 4: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1.102-2(c)(1) ; quoting FAR 15.306(e)). Command argues, however, that the \u201cprocurement [was] tainted by an apparent or actual impropriety, conflict, unfair competitive advantage[,] or bias occasioned by the Murray/Lewis assistance to HCS,\u201d the presence of which requires \u201c(a) a thorough inquiry by the [CO], followed by [ (]b) appropriate ameliorative measures to ensure that HCS enjoys no unfair competitive advantage.\u201d Pl. Mot. JAR at 28 (citing Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 31-35). FAR 1.102-2(c)(l) and FAR 3.101-1 require disqualification of a procurement offer- or where impropriety or the possibility of an unfair competitive advantage in the acquisition process is present. Pl. Mot. JAR at 28-29 (citing FAR 1.102-2(c)(1); FAR 3.101-1; see also NFK Eng\u2019g v. United States, 805 F.2d 372, 377 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Telecommunication Sys. Inc., B404496.3 (GAO Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that the incapacitated person has assets in the district alone provides a sufficient basis for keeping the case here 1: recognizing that the appearance of impropriety alone can be a sufficient basis to disqualify an offeror and finding that the agency reasonably decided to disqualify the offeror on that basis 2: holding that the agency cannot use insufficient evidence as a basis for finding no adverse impact 3: recognizing that circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to demonstrate a defendants guilt 4: holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "association with, supervision of, delegation of authority to, support for, training of, or participation in a private group practice with, a member or members of a particular class of health care practitioner or professional, or (E) any other matter that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct of a physician. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 11151(9). 18 . Respondents assert that Dr. Freilich's \"asserted bad faith whistle-blower animus standard ... conflicts with HCQIA\u2019s objective reasonableness standard.\u201d 19 . Our holding is also consistent with cases in which we set forth a plaintiff's burden when faced with a defense motion for summary judgment under other totality of the circumstances tests. See, e.g., Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 681, 766 A.2d 617, 628 (2001) (<HOLDING>); see also Magee v. DanSources Tech. Servs., Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs burden at summary judgment in a case involving a totality of the circumstances test is whether the facts put forth by petitioners  examined in their totality and in the light most favorable to  the nonmoving party  might satisfy a trier of fact that the  test was met 1: holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances 2: holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable 3: holding that the level of detail in testimony is a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances test of credibility employed by immigration judges 4: holding that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all doubts are resolved against the moving party", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 198 (1st Cir.1999) (\u201cCourts generally adhere to the principle that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously if possible, and if not, that more recent or specific statutes should prevail over older or more general ones.\u201d). 15 . Prior to Wyandotte., this Court explained that \"[i]t was possible to find [the Wreck Act and Limitation Act] consistent and, indeed, complementary as long as the shipowner was able effectively to limit his liability merely by abandoning his vessel.\u201d Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 557 F.2d at 451. 16 . In addition to the Wreck Act, courts have found that other later-enacted statutes impliedly repealed the Limitation Act for cases arising under those statutes. See Tug ALLIE-B, 273 F.3d at 948-49 (<HOLDING>); Complaint of Metlife Capital Corp., 132 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act 1: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the park system resource protection act 2: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the transalaska pipeline authorization act 3: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the oil pollution act 4: holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "law. See Anderson, ATI U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. It follows, then, that \u201c[e]ntry of summary judgment indicates that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the losing party.\u201d Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). II. Schwartz\u2019s Due Process Claims Are Denied A. Procedural Due Process In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court considered the question of what pre-termination process was due to a public employee who may only be discharged for cause. \u201cThe essential requirements of due process ... are notice and an opportunity to respond....\u201d Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (\u201cLoudermill \u201d); see also Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, Holdings: 0: holding that organizations designated by the secretary of state as terrorist organizations must have the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner and must have the opportunity to present at least in written form such evidence as those entities may be able to produce to rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that they are foreign terrorist organizations 1: recognizing fundamental fairness requires criminal defendants be granted a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense 2: holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 3: holding plaintiff must prove that he or she was deprived of  an opportunity  granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 4: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by the following: (i) where there is a contract of employment providing for a specific duration and termination without just cause occurs before expiration of-that duration, see Rosen v. Gulf Shores, Inc., 610 So.2d 366 (Miss.1992); (ii) where termination is retaliatory, because the employee reports or refuses to participate in an unlawful act,, see McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993); and (iii) where a handbook does not sufficiently preserve the at-will nature of employment and the employer \u201ccompletely ignores\u201d specific progressive disciplinary penalties for rule infractions, thus giving rise to contractual obligations, see Bobbitt, 603 So.2d 356. See Byest v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-0009-DMB-JMV, 2014 WL 3891295, at *7 (N.D.Miss. Aug. 7, 2014) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff apparently contends that her claim Holdings: 0: recognizing that the legislature can create statutory exceptions to atwill employment 1: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 2: recognizing exceptions to immunity 3: recognizing doctrine 4: recognizing three exceptions to atwill doctrine", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "distinct aspects of a combined criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture). Thus, trials are generally bifurcated based upon a recognition that judicial resources will be preserved if specific issues are separately tried. See Bolton v. Bd. of County Comm\u2019rs, 119 N.M. 355, 361, 890 P.2d 808, 814 (Ct.App.1994). If, as suggested by Defendant Esparza, a court were required to simultaneously resolve the criminal charges and the forfeiture matter, the clear policies underlying the use of bifurcated proceedings would be undermined. In addition, such a requirement would impermissibly interfere with the inherent ability of district judges to manage their dockets and to expedite the flow of cases through the courts. See State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, \u00b6 28, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328 (<HOLDING>). {22} Accordingly, we do not believe that Holdings: 0: recognizing district courts power to admit evidence for a limited purpose 1: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 2: recognizing power of district courts to control movement of cases from filing to final disposition 3: holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted 4: recognizing the power of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the cases and controversies clause of article iii", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "finding, the Court declines to determine whether a jury could find reasonably that Lee violated De Contreras\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant Lee on De Contreras\u2019s Fourth Amendment claim. B. De Contreras\u2019s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Lee and Mastaler for Fabricating Police Reports The record lacks any evidence to support Plaintiffs\u2019 claim that Lee or Mastaler fabricated their police reports. Furthermore, as De Contreras was convicted on the charges alleged in the police reports (see April 9, 2012 Minute Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Doc. No. 42)), he cannot now challenge the validity of those police reports under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (<HOLDING>) Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff requesting relief under  1983 had no cause of action unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed expunged invalidated or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a 42 usc  1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal  or called into question by federal courts issuance of writ of habeas corpus footnote omitted 2: recognizing that  1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated 3: holding that a claim for damages that would invalidate a conviction or sentence that has not already been invalidated or reversed on direct appeal by executive order by an authorized state tribunal or by a writ of habeas corpus is not cognizable under  1983 4: holding that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal courts issuance of a writ of habeas corpus", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Although Joseph challenged the constitutionality of the drug-quantity determination in his sentencing memorandum, the Government points out that Dunbar did not make a constitutional challenge in the district court, and argues for plain-error review. The result is the same regardless whether our review is de novo or for plain error. According to the Court, Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an \u2018element\u2019 that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an \u2018element\u2019 that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, \u2014 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (internal citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). However, Joseph and Dunbar do not challenge Holdings: 0: holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense 1: holding that  use certainly includes brandishing  a firearm quotation marks omitted 2: holding defendants minimum sentence could not be increased for brandishing a firearm where based on jury instructions jury convicted defendant of the lesser offense of carrying rather than brandishing the firearm 3: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 4: holding that the trial court was not entitled to impose a threeyear mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where the jury verdict did not specifically find actual possession", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of Congress to regulate commerce\u201d that power is vested in the legislative branch. Id. Therefore, it is not enough for TVA to show that it has condemned the land surrounding the waterway in question. As a federal corporation falling under the purview of the Executive Branch, TVA is not able to arrogate control over navigable waters by its own authority. See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-25, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L.Ed. 96 (1866) (\u201cCommerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie.\u201d); United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1940) (<HOLDING>); Owen v. United States, 851 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 Holdings: 0: holding lake on private land was not navigable in fact and there was no right of public use and enjoyment as lake was not fed by or part of a navigable stream 1: holding that congress had the authority under the commerce clause to require private riparian land owners to obtain a license prior to construction of dams even where the river in question was not navigable but could potentially have been made navigable 2: holding that state ownership of submerged lands remains subject to congress paramount power over navigable waters under the commerce clause 3: holding that riparians owners have the right of access to the navigable part of the river  the right to make a landing wharf or pier  subject to such general rules and regulations of the legislature 4: holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "hearing that followed, the trial judge recanted on having the counselor arrested but admonished him outside the jury\u2019s presence. When the jury returned, the trial judge attempted to give a curative instruction. During that instruction, however, the trial judge told the jury that his own behavior was \u201cbecause the defendant\u2019s lawyer was about ten miles out of limit.\u201d Id. at 257, 589 A.2d at 554. Noting the arrest of counsel in the jury\u2019s presence and his poorly-worded curative instruction, the Court of Special Appeals held that under the totality of the circumstances, the judge\u2019s comments \u201cpainted such a prejudicial portrait of the defense counsel as to deny appellant his right to a fair trial.\u201d Id., 589 A.2d at 555. See also Long v. State, 31 Md.App. 424, 432, 356 A.2d 588, 592 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In the case sub judice, the judge\u2019s act of Holdings: 0: holding that a judges lengthy perjury warnings to a defense witness effectively drove the witness off the stand thereby denying the defendant his due process right to present his defense 1: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 2: holding that trial judges order to arrest defense witness in front of jury and accompanying comments indicated his disbelief of the witness thus committing prejudicial error 3: holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime 4: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "See Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *14 (\u201c[Defendant\u2019s] transformative use of the Tape excerpts to produce an entertainment news story does not affect Lee\u2019s market for the same service, because Lee is not in such a market.\u201d). Balancing of Harm and Public Interest Similarly, it is doubtful that the balancing of harm and public interest warrant preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that even minimal interference with the First Amendment freedom of the press causes an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass\u2019n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); see also Barbnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531-32, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the Holdings: 0: recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters 1: holding that bargaining unit employees have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their home addresses under the freedom of information act and concluding that that interest substantially outweighed the virtually nonexistent public interest in disclosure under foia and the privacy act not the nlra 2: holding that first amendment interest in publishing matters of public importance outweighed conversants privacy rights given fact that media outlet had played no part in illegal reception 3: holding that issues involving the local board of education were matters of public importance 4: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "distributed. Inasmuch as the Ohio Legislature has not expressly adopted a discovery rule in libel and/or invasion of privacy cases and because of the single publication rule, the cause of action as to the plaintiff in her libel and invasion-of-privacy claims accrued in December 1975. Therefore, this Court concludes the present case is not timely filed. PLAINTIFF\u2019S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS The plaintiff Donda R. Morgan also contends that she has brought an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that this cause of action did not accrue until the first time she was aware of the picture. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a new and recognized theory of a tort action. See Yeager v. Local Union 20, supra (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the plaintiff has only Holdings: 0: holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 1: recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 2: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 3: holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort 4: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "upon a highway, it most certainly could have done so. Statutes providing for forfeiture of driving privileges or punishment for habitual violations of the traffic statutes are designed to protect the public from persons who have demonstrated that they are unable to obey traffic laws established for the safety of citizens and that their driving presents a hazard to life and property. See Owens v. State (1978), 178 Ind.App. 406, 382 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-1315. The absence of limiting language in L.C. 9-30-10-16 reveals the legislature's recognition that the danger to the public is equally as great on private property used by the public, such as shopping center parking lots and apartment complex roads, as it is on public highways. See Huey v. State (1987), Ind.App., 503 N.E.2d 623, 626-627 (<HOLDING>). Guidry contends that if .C. 9-30-10-16 is Holdings: 0: holding that corpus delicti of dwi is that someone drove or operated motor vehicle in public place while intoxicated 1: holding that indianas operating while intoxicated statute which states that a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a class a misdemeanor is not limited to operation of motor vehicles on public highways 2: holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a 3: holding dwi intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle in a public place is clearly not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16b 4: holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendants conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class c felony", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Recently, the Third Circuit has held that to establish a due process violation, and overcome qualified immunity, regarding a claim of government interference with familial relations, a plaintiff must establish that a child welfare worker, in removing a child from parental custody, possessed no objectively reasonable basis for believing that parental custody threatened the child\u2019s welfare or safety. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir.1997). See also Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no due process violation where child welfare worker had objectively reasonable basis for believing parent represented threat to child\u2019s welfare); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Croft decision, however, was decided Holdings: 0: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 1: holding child welfare worker entitled to qualified immunity where child removed on reasonable suspicion of abuse 2: holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child 3: holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse 4: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "judgment. We shall address the propriety of the granting of the summary judgment as to each defense separately. Defendants first challenge the trial court\u2019s characterization of the Agreement as a \u201ctransaction or compromise\u201d, which thereby precluded them from asserting their claim that the Agreement is subject to rescission on the basis of lesion. Under the law, a transaction or compromise, having between the interested parties a force equal to res judicata, may not be attacked on the basis of lesion. La.Civ. Code art. 3078; delaVergne v. delaVergne, 514 So.2d 186, 190 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987). However, a partition is susceptible to attack on the basis of lesion. La.Civ.Code art. 1398 (repealed by La.Acts 1991, No. 689, \u00a7 1); Oberfell v. Oberfell, 516 So.2d 424, 426 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Defendants argue that the Agreement, which Holdings: 0: holding military service disability payments are community property 1: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 2: holding disability benefits from us civil service are community property 3: recognizing that a voluntary community property set tlement agreement may be rescinded for lesion beyond onefourth 4: holding that a written mutual release memorializing a compromise and settlement may be rescinded for fraud in its procurement", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "treated as a predicate felony conviction for career offender status because, while the maximum sentence at the time he was convicted and sentenced was two years imprisonment, a change in the law the following year reduced the maximum sentence to 150 days. For career offender purposes, a \u201cprior felony conviction\u201d is any prior conviction \u201cpunishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,\u201d even if the offense is not designated as a felony. USSG \u00a7 4B1.2, comment. (n.l). Polk objected to his career offender status on this ground in the district court, but at sentencing he acknowledged that settled Fourth Circuit law did not support his position. See United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 435, 444-45 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>)); United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 427 Holdings: 0: holding that the mere possibility of an upward departure beyond one year qualifies a kansas offense as one punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 1: holding that to determine whether a north carolina conviction for a crime is punishable by a prison term exceeding one year a court is to consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted 2: holding that defendant has right to trial by jury before conviction of contempt punishable by severe punishment 3: holding that a prior north carolina conviction was for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than one year 4: holding that determination of whether prior conviction was punishable by term of imprisonment exceeding one year is governed by law in effect on date of conviction", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Government has waived any possibility of a \u00a7 9.51 defense by failing to raise it in its answer. We find this contention to be without merit. The Government did assert a law enforcement officer\u2019s privilege to use force in its motion to dismiss. Such an assertion suffices to raise the defense. See Terrell v. DeConna, 877 F.2d 1267, 1270 (5th Cir.1989) (\"The defendant ... raised the defense of issue preclusion by a motion to dismiss. That motion was sufficient to raise the defense, and there was therefore no waiver.\u201d). Further, the parties' joint pretrial order listed whether \"federal agents were privileged to use reasonable force in effectuating the detention of [Villafranca].\u201d Raising the defense there was also sufficient. See Vanhoy v. United States, 514 F.3d 447, 450-51 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 3 . There is some dispute about whether the Holdings: 0: holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice 1: holding that the government did not waive an affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer because it raised the defense at a pragmatically sufficient time by listing the defense in the joint pretrial order 2: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 3: holding that the district court properly allowed the defendant who asserted the disputed defense as a contested issue of law in the joint pretrial order to pursue the defense despite the defendants failure to comply with rule 8c 4: holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to a decision concerning the effective date for service-connected PTSD under these circumstances and thus it was error for the Board not to discuss its applicability. See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 553 (2008) (requiring the Board to consider all theories of entitlement raised by the claimant or by the evidence of record). Because the Board has not yet made any factual findings pertinent to the application of this regulation, the appropriate remedy is for the Court to vacate the Board\u2019s conclusion that the appellant cannot receive an effective date earlier than November 20, 2002, for his service-connected PTSD, and remand the matter so that the Board may address the applicability of \u00a7 3.156(c) in the first instance. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION After consideration of the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court is not the appropriate forum for initial factfinding 1: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 2: recognizing that booker error may occur even in the absence of judicial factfinding where district court treats guidelines as mandatory 3: holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts 4: holding that the situs of the alleged tortious conduct is relevant in choosing the most appropriate forum", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "give me a chance. They said hateful things. They tased me without reason.\u2019 And he wants you to believe that.\u201d On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting Baxter to testify that defendant had \u201cnothing to say\u201d to her in response to her request that he tell her his version of events. Defendant points out that he was in custody at the time and had a constitutional right, under Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment, not to answer Baxter\u2019s question. He argues that his statement to Baxter was an unequivocal invocation of that right, see State v. Avila-Nava, 356 Or 600, 618, 341 P3d 714 (2014), and that evidence of that invocation was not admissible at his criminal trial under State v. Smallwood, 277 Or 503, 505-06, 561 P2d 600, cert den, 434 US 849 (1977) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Ragland, 210 Or App 182, Holdings: 0: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease 1: holding that defendants general objection to states specific questions regarding defendants failure to appear before grand jury was sufficient to put trial court on notice of objection based on defendants constitutional right to remain silent 2: holding that in context of criminal trial defendants right to remain silent cannot be compromised by prosecutorial comments that cast aspersions on its exercise 3: holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial 4: recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or [2] operated to change materials to a \u2018different state or thing.\u2019 \u201d See PTO Supp. Br. 4 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 2522). In Diehr, the Supreme Court confirmed that a process claim reciting an algorithm could state statutory subject matter if it: (1) is tied to a machine or (2) creates or involves a composition of matter or manufacture. 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048. There, in the context of a process claim for curing rubber that recited an algorithm, the Court concluded that \u201c[t]ransformation and reduction of an article \u2018to a different state or thing\u2019 is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.\u201d Id (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70, 93 S.Ct. 253); see also In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, a claim that involves both a mental Holdings: 0: holding that because a valid arbitration clause existed the parties had to arbitrate all disputes when the subject matter of the dispute has a reasonable relationship to the subject matter of the contract 1: holding that petitioners allegation of a due process violation was precisely the kind of procedural error which requires exhaustion 2: holding when a claim does not invoke a machine   101 requires some kind of transformation or reduction of subject matter 3: holding consent is irrelevant and estoppel does not apply when subject matter jurisdiction is in question 4: holding that premium reduction was legal where the insured had given consideration for reduction", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "protection of the laws. The district court then stated, however, that \u201c[b]efore there can be any liability under section 1983, there must be \u2018a direct causal link\u2019 between the personal conduct of Deputy Lopez or the municipal conduct of Sonoma County and the alleged constitutional deprivation, in this case the murder of Mar g that \u201cour first inquiry in any case alleging mu nicipal liability under \u00a7 1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation\u201d); Kibbe, 480 U.S. at 267, 107 S.Ct. 1114 (stating that \u201cthe Court repeatedly has stressed the need to find a direct causal connection between municipal conduct and the constitutional deprivation\u201d) (O\u2019Connor, J., dissenting); Harris, 664 F.2d at 1125 (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted). Neither court has used the Holdings: 0: holding that individuals can be held liable under  1981 only when they have been personally involved or directly participated in the discrimination 1: holding that even a temporary deprivation of first amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm 2: holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur 3: holding that liability under  1983 requires a causal link to and direct responsibility for the deprivation of rights 4: holding that a superior can be held liable in his individual capacity if he participated in the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "involved. Critical to the application of DR-105(c) is that the clients give informed consent to the multiple representation. The issue, therefore, is whether Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had \u201cdiffering interests\u201d while they were both represented by BG & S and, if so, whether BG & S could have competently represented both Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor, and whether they provided BG & S with their informed consent to the dual representation. It is clear that Mr. Sabatino and the Debtor had differing interests from the beginning of the representation. It is well settled that \u201c[a] passenger will almost always be advised to assert claims against all other drivers, including the passenger\u2019s driver.\u201d Shaikh et al. v. Waiter, 185 Misc.2d 52, 54, 710 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (2000) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). In Pessoni v. Rabkin, 220 A.D.2d 732, 633 Holdings: 0: recognizing the conflict 1: holding that right to appeal claim of inef fective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel had disqualifying conflict of interest waived because record did not show that jordan would have pleaded not guilty but for alleged conflict of interest 2: recognizing conflict 3: holding that a lawyer representing both passenger and driver incurs a substantial risk of a disqualifying conflict of interest 4: holding that defense counsel suffered from an actual conflict of interest in representing two codefendants because had the attorney not been facing a conflict of interest he might have been able to negotiate a plea agreement on one defendants behalf in return for becoming a prosecution witness against the eodefendant", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not rest upon a few words taken out of context of the entire testimony.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 803 (quoting Wilkes-Barre, City v. WCAB, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 230, 420 A.2d 795, 798 (1980)). In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693, 698 (1971), this Court first adopted the rule permitting a \u201cmedical witness to express opinion testimony on matters based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence, but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.\u201d We have further held that while an expert may base his opinion on facts of which he has no personal knowledge, those facts must be supported by evidence of record. Newcomer v. WCAB (Ward Trucking Corp.), 547 Pa. 639, 692 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1997); Casne v. WCAB (Stat Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (<HOLDING>). This Court has explained: Collins v. Hand, Holdings: 0: holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent 1: holding that when an experts opinion regarding the relevant market is not supported by sufficient facts or when the record contradicts or renders the opinion unreasonable it cannot support a jurys verdict 2: holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct 3: holding that a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks solid support in the record and is merely speculative at best 4: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Opinion w . Having concluded that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, this Court nevertheless notes that Stern v. Marshall, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) sets forth certain limitations on the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final orders. Therefore, this Court has a duty to constantly inquire into its constitutional authority to enter a final order for any matter brought before this Court. In the first instance, this Court concludes that its denial of the Application is not a final order because the denial is without prejudice to the refiling of another application seeking approval of the Firm that includes the information discussed in this Memorandum Opinion. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citing Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 339 Holdings: 0: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 1: holding that a district courts dismissal that expressly grants leave to amend is not final and that a final judgment must be obtained before such a case becomes appealable 2: holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order 3: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order 4: holding that when a district court expressly grants leave to amend it is plain that the order is not final", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "statement that Shaw paid him $8,900 to bum Shaw\u2019s house would likely make him vulnerable to a prosecution for \u201ccommission of a felony for hire.\u201d Even though Russo\u2019s statement implicates Shaw in the burning of the house, the statement that Shaw paid Russo to bum the house is a necessary predicate to the crime of \u201ccommission of a felony for hire.\" Therefore, Russo\u2019s statement, even though it implicates Shaw, would be \u201cself-inculpatory\u201d under the reasoning of Williamson. See Williamson, 114 S.Ct. at 2436-37. See also United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (indicating that, because \u201cstatements against penal interest\" is a firmly rooted hearsay exception, a court can infer the reliability of such evidence). But see United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff further argues that Russo\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause 1: holding that it did not violate the confrontation clause of the united states constitution to convict defendant for conspiracy to distribute controlled substance based upon a lab report admitted under the federal business records exception rule because this exception was firmly rooted 2: holding codefendants confession incriminating defendant was not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule under roberts standard 3: holding that rule 8034 hearsay exception is firmly rooted for sixth amendment purposes 4: holding that the exception is not firmly rooted", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(noting that disability plan need not provide same benefits for all disabilities); Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (\u201cThe ADA does not require coverage for every type of disability.\u201d); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015-19 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc) (\u201cThe disparity in benefits [is permitted] by the ADA because the ADA does not mandate equality ...\u201d); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir.1996) (upholding plan that promised physical-disability benefits until age 65, but mental-disability benefits only for two years); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir.1996) (ruling that excluding one disability from coverage does not violate ADA if exclusion applies to all individuals); see also Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1061 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Today, this court joins the numerous courts Holdings: 0: holding that punitive damages may not be awarded  in suits brought under  202 of the ada and  504 of the rehabilitation act 1: recognizing there is some confusion among the circuit courts as to the availability of damages under  504 of the rehabilitation act and without expressing an opinion on the matter noting that courts generally agree damages are available for violations of  504 2: holding  504 of the rehabilitation act does not require equivalent benefits for different disabilities 3: holding that post2001 new york was clearly subject to suit under section 504 of the rehabilitation act 4: holding rehabilitation act applicable", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "law upon which they had been relying to sue the RAC defendants on statutory grounds. See Brief for Appellants at 71. Prior to the notification, the crux of the concern of the RAC plaintiffs was that RAC officials failed to communicate federal rights to minority applicants. The RAC defendants provide no assurances, other than this notification, that the same behavior has not and will not continue. In fact, the plaintiffs provide some evidence, through the Warda Thomas and Felicia Stokes testimony and the RAC handouts, that RAC has not complied with this notification. Even assuming the defendants had ceased the allegedly illegal conduct, we will not dismiss the claims as moot if the harm is \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review.\u201d Southern Pacific, 219 U.S. at 515, 31 S.Ct. at 283 (<HOLDING>). Otherwise, such orders effectively would Holdings: 0: holding ease not moot when challenged administrative order expired because icc proceedings are continuing and their consideration ought not be defeated by short term orders capable of repetition yet evading review 1: holding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permits originally issued eight years earlier was capable of repetition yet evading review 2: recognizing a mootness exception for abortion litigation because pregnancy  truly could be capable of repetition yet evading review  3: holding that we have no difficulty concluding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permit was capable of repetition yet evading review 4: holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "travel to Cuba); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984) (regulation banning most economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba). 15 . Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171-72, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (statute denying Supplement Security Income benefits to persons outside of the United States for certain periods of time). 16 . Aznavorian, 439 U.S. at 177-78, 99 S.Ct. 471. 17 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14-16, 85 S.Ct. 1271; Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-308, 101 S.Ct. 2766; Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-243, 104 S.Ct. 3026. 18 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). 19 . Compare Aptheker at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (<HOLDING>) and Agee, 453 U.S. at 308, 101 S.Ct. 2766 Holdings: 0: holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion 1: holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech 2: holding that the specific date restriction set forth in  541a5 controls and that  1306a1 does not eliminate that restriction 3: holding unconstitutional a travel restriction on communist party members 4: holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "local branches of government. DECISION Because respondents\u2019 remaining claims present a nonjusticiable political question, we reverse the district court\u2019s order refusing to dismiss for lack of justiciability, without addressing appellants\u2019 other assignments of error. Reversed. 1 . Although respondents supported their constitutional claims with allegations of segregation, respondents did not make a traditional segregation claim based on racial discrimination. Instead, respondents' claims are rooted in a purported right to an education of a certain quality under the Education Clause, Article XIII, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution. A segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Appellants cite the following cases: Neb. Holdings: 0: holding that segregation in public education is a denial of equal protection of the laws 1: holding that the concept of separate but equal has no place in public education 2: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 3: holding that wisconsin violated equal protection rights of handicapped children by denying them an education at public expense 4: holding that a claim of inadvertent errors in administration of election procedure without some allegation of intentional discriminatory conduct did not properly allege a denial of equal protection of the laws", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to dive, plaintiff was not relieved \u201cof the duty to make this inquiry [as to the safety of diving] when diving for the first time into an unfamiliar pool.\u201d .Id. In Murphy v. D\u2019Youville Condominium Association, Inc., 175 Ga.App. 156, 333 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1985), the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a factual dispute regarding the actual depth of the water prevented summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence. \u201c[E]ven if the water level had been low, \u2018[a]ppellant ... was under a duty to use ... his sight to discover any defects or dangers.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff was not permitted to recover because \u201cby the exercise of very slight care [appellant] could have avoided the injury.\u201d Id. at 3; see also La Croix v. State, 477 So.2d 1246, 1251 (La.Ct.App.) (<HOLDING>); writ denied, 478 So.2d 1237 (La.1985). Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because whether the danger posed by a swimming pool was known or obvious was a fact question 1: holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void 2: holding in dicta that plaintiff was eontributorily negligent by diving into a murky shallow pool without first determining that it was suitably deep for diving 3: holding that allegation that plaintiff relied on defendants representation by entering into a lease with it stated valid cause of action for negligent misrepresentation 4: holding that defendant must have placed plaintiff in a situation where it was abundantly clear that plaintiff was in grave personal peril for some specifically defined period of time for negligent infliction claim to be actionable", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "our supreme court\u2019s specific proclamation in Grady that imputation of income is permitted in spousal support cases: We have not dealt with this issue direcdy, but elsewhere it has been held that the court may consider the fact that a supporting spouse voluntarily changes employment so as to lessen earning capacity and, in turn, the ability to pay alimony and child support. Camp v. Camp, 269 S.C. 173, 236 S.E.2d 814 (1977). A court may in proper circumstances impute an income to a spouse according to what could be earned by the use of his or her best efforts to gain employment suitable to his or her capabilities. Klinge v. Klinge, 554 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. 1977). Grady, 295 Ark. at 97, 747 S.W.2d at 78-79 (emphasis added); see also Christianson v. Christianson, 671 N.W.2d 801, 806 (N.D. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Moore v. Moore, 242 Mich. App. 652, 619 Holdings: 0: recognizing the validity of the doctrine but holding no equitable tolling on the facts presented 1: recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case 2: recognizing that missouri courts have often held that regulations may establish the appropriate standard of care in a negligence case 3: recognizing that other states have permitted imputing income in spousal support cases citing grady but holding that imputation not appropriate on facts of the case 4: recognizing contribution in the appropriate case", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "See also United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir.1987). In United States v. Tranowski, 702 F.2d 668 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3586, 82 L.Ed.2d 884 (1984), the Court of Appeals allowed the government to appeal from district court\u2019s denial of its motion to retry the defendant following reversal of the original conviction. The Court reasoned that such an appeal was permitted under Section 3731 because the district court\u2019s order was \u201c \u2018tantamount to a dismissal of the indictment ...,\u2019 though not labeled a dismissal.\u201d 702 F.2d at 670, quoting United States v. Esposito, 492 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135, 94 S.Ct. 879, 38 L.Ed.2d 760 (1974). See also United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). We too hold that in the case before us the Holdings: 0: holding that a sufficiency challenge must be preserved in the trial court in a parental termination case to be reviewed on appeal 1: holding that an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved 2: holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal 3: holding that a petitioner must specify which issues form the basis of the appeal 4: holding that the direction the governments appeal must take or whether it may appeal at all is to be governed by the substantial basis of the orders sought to be reviewed rather than their designation and form", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "344, 354 (1910) (noting that it is the prerogative of the civil courts to determine the meaning and legal effect of civil contracts). An aggrieved party, including a criminal defendant, remains free to seek enforcement of the terms of a release in civil court. Our criminal courts are permitted to take note of these agreements in deciding whether to order restitution and in what amount, but these agreements in no way preclude a criminal court from ordering restitution when appropriate under statute. Id. In essence, the Haltom court upheld a restitution order in the amount of the victim\u2019s medical expenses and lost earnings even though the victim had also received $100,000 \u2014 the limit of Haltom\u2019s policy\u2014 from Haltom\u2019s insurer. See also Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 781 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>). We are mindful, however, that elementary Holdings: 0: holding that restitution is a criminal penalty that negates the imposition of prejudgment interest 1: holding civil restitution judgment that was originally imposed as part of a criminal sentence nondisehargeable 2: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function 3: recognizing criminal forfeiture as an aspect of punishment 4: holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "forth the exceptions). Consistent with Illinois law, the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department\u2014which Anderson himself invokes as definitive of \u201cthe authorized time and space limits\u201d 'of Moussa\u2019s employment, Doc. 53 at 5\u2014make clear that officers are tasked with \u201crespond[ing] to ... law enforcement needs in different parts of the City,\u201d and \u201cprotecting] ... life, limb and property in the City of Chicago.\u201d Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department (\u201cCPD Regulations\u201d) at I.B.9 and II.A (Doc. 53-1 at 5, 7) (emphases added). The fact that Moussa was operating outside both the time and the place limits of his employment suffices, standing alone, to establish that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Adames, 330 Ill.Dec. 720, 909 N.E.2d at 757 (<HOLDING>). But Anderson also has not satisfied the third Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to satisfy the time and spacelimits criterion forecloses a finding that an employee acted within the scope of his employment 1: holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred 2: holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment 3: holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred 4: holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and housekeepers. Thus, Reid has demonstrated that Reid's Housekeeping has a legitimate interest, ie., the good will with its current clients and housekeepers, worthy of protection by the covenant not to compete. See, e.g., Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs. Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind.1983) (\"Indiana courts have held the advantageous familiarity and personal contact which employees derive from dealing with an employer's customers are elements of an employer's 'good will' and a protecti-ble interest which may justify a restraint[.]\"); Sharvelle, 836 N.E.2d at 437 (\"The continued success of [a medical] practice, which is dependent upon patient referrals, is a legitimate interest worthy of protection.\"); McGlothen v. Heritage Envtl. Servs., L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). B. Scope of the Covenant A covenant not to Holdings: 0: holding that a covenant not to compete that restrained the employee who worked at the management level of a cleaning and maintenance business and had gained the advantage of personal acquaintance with the employers customers from acting not only as a proprietor but also as an employee in furnishing janitorial services was unreasonable and beyond the seope of the employers legitimate interest of protecting its good will 1: holding that the seller of a business implicitly transferred a property right in the firms good will to the buyer and that the seller could not then impair that right by actively soliciting the customers of his former business 2: holding that monitoring telephone calls is in the ordinary course of business where the employer has reason to suspect an employee of disclosing confidential information to business competitor 3: holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business 4: holding that any acts in which employee engaged with intent to woo plaintiffs wife away from him during business meetings and trips simply had no connection to business of employer", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "showing presentment or the setting of a hearing date. The only suggestions of presentment appearing in the record include: (1) a statement in the motions for new trial that \u201cTHE DEFENDANT HEREBY PRESENTS THIS MOTION TO THIS HONORABLE COURT\u201d; and (2) several anonymous notations and markings appearing on the copies of the motions for new trial filed with the trial court. This evidence is insufficient to establish presentment. Hiatt argues the inclusion of a statement in a motion for new trial reflecting \u201cTHE DEFENDANT HEREBY PRESENTS THIS MOTION TO THIS HONORABLE COURT\u201d is an act of presentment. Courts have consistently rejected the notion that a statement, similar to the one at issue here, is suf 46, *12 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Owens v. State, 832 S.W.2d 109, 111-12 Holdings: 0: holding a certificate of presentation appearing on the last page of appellants motion for new trial did not establish presentment 1: holding a certification of service and presentment was insufficient to establish the trial court received actual notice of the defendants motion for new trial 2: holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment 3: holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment 4: holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "time after time. What I\u2019m exceeded the bounds of its discretion when it, in effect, treated Ruperd\u2019s failure to appear as a waiver of his right to a hearing on his motion to suppress. The state contends that the district court never ruled on whether Ruperd was entitled to another hearing on his motion because Ruperd never brought another notice of hearing for the district court to deny. However, as we have previously noted, the district court unequivocally stated to Ruperd and his counsel on multiple occasions that the motion to suppress would not be reheard because Ruperd failed to appear, not because it was waiting for counsel to file a notice of hearing. The law does not require the doing of a useless thing. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 554 (10th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We, consequently, conclude Ruperd was not Holdings: 0: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 1: holding that the court correctly denied a mistrial when the statement that the witness saw the defendant when the defendant was signing in as a condition of bail was brief and added nothing to the governments case 2: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 3: holding that in order to show unavailability of a witness service of process by the defendant was not required when the witness had jumped bail and fled 4: holding that death of potential alibi witness did not cause actual prejudice because defendant failed to relate the substance of the testimony of the missing witness in sufficient detail and to show witness testimony not available from other sources", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Instead, the BIA found him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT on the merits. Because the BIA did not order Fajardo-Alvarez removed based upon his offense and made a determination on the merits, we have jurisdiction to review the decision. See Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 931, 936-37 (9th Cir.2005). However, we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition on the merits. Fajardo-Alvarez failed to exhaust the critical issue of credibility in his appeal to the BIA, notwithstanding the IJ\u2019s clear and unambiguous findings regarding adverse credibility. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore have no basis to consider Fajardo-Alvarez\u2019s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT. See Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). PETITION DENIED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding where withholding of removal and cat claims were based on the same discredited testimony the bia properly concluded the adverse credibility finding was fatal to all claims 1: holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each 2: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility 3: holding that petitioners failure to exhaust the adverse credibility finding precluded this court from having jurisdiction to consider her claims of asylum withholding of removal and cat 4: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "state law that required parents to send their children to a public school for a period of time because it \u201cunreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control\u201d); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (finding that \u201cprimary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition\u201d); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that \u201c[t]his Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to educate their children\u201d); Ohio Ass\u2019n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal 1: holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child 2: holding that liberty includes the right of parents to establish a home and bring up children and to control the education of their own 3: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 4: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Co., 347 Mass. 285, 288 (1964) (internal citation omitted) (\u201cThe construction of an unambiguous written contract is a \u2018pure question of law\u2019 \u201d). Moreover. \u201c[i]t is . . . elementary that an unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to its terms.\u201d J.F. White Contracting Co. v. MBTA, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 938 (1996). Accordingly, the Agreement's construction should be resolved by the court. See id. The court will limit its review to the document itself, rejecting parol evidence \u201cto vary the unambiguous terms of the contract.\" Vakil v. Anaesthesiology Associates of Taunton, Inc., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 114, 119(2001). As part of the written contract, the Agreement\u2019s indemnity clause will be construed by the court. See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 778, 782 (1996) (<HOLDING>). To construe the indemnity clause, the court Holdings: 0: holding that courts interpret indemnity provisions same as written contracts 1: holding extrinsic evidence may be used only to interpret not alter a written contract 2: recognizing that the rules of statutory construction apply when we interpret constitutional provisions 3: holding same 4: holding that the indemnity provisions to which gs  22b1 apply are those construction indemnity provisions which attempt to hold one party responsible for the negligence of another", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "establish a principle of law. For the decisions of other courts to provide such \u201cclearly established law,\u201d these decisions must both point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be found wanting. Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass\u2019n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir.1988). When a claim to qualified immunity is raised within the context of a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must allege facts sufficient to indicate that the act in question violated clearly established law at the time the act was committed. See Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the plaintiff must effectively pass two Holdings: 0: holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right 1: holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation 2: holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts 3: holding that plaintiff is obliged to present facts that if true would constitute violation of clearly established law 4: holding that a federal court is obliged to determine its own jurisdiction for each case", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the revenues are subject to a valid security interest that was perfected by the filing of a UCC1. Therefore, they are cash collateral subject to the requirements of adequate protection. A bankruptcy court should apply the following standard when determining whether a debtor should be permitted to use cash collateral: (1) The court must establish the value of the secured creditor\u2019s interest; (2) The court must identify risk to the secured creditor\u2019s value rtgage Documents Magnolia has a perfected security interest in personal property, including accounts receivable and intangibles. If the hotel room receipts are considered \u201crents,\u201d Magnolia has a lien under the First Rent Assignment. Debtor argues that because the Mechanicsburg Hotel is projected to generate a po 7 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>); In re Chatham Parkway Self Storage, LLC, Holdings: 0: holding that a state tax lien was not judicial lien arising from judgment such that it could be avoided in bankruptcy by a chapter 13 debtor 1: holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond 2: holding that a chapter 13 debtor had standing to avoid a judgment lien to the extent of her exemption amount but not the entire judgment lien 3: holding that it was disingenuous to offer replacement lien on postpetition rents because lender already had lien on rents 4: holding that replacement lien in rents is illusory because  552b provides lien on postpetition rents", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for the State. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 94 (\u201cWe can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.\u201d). Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti\u2019s allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a \u00a7 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (<HOLDING>); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, Holdings: 0: holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity 1: holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony 2: holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing 3: holding that prosecutor retained absolute immunity despite allegations of witness intimidation in attempt to suppress testimony 4: holding that a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "activity in this case, and despite the invocation of other RICO language, the RICO claims must be dismissed because the complaint does not go beyond those labels and language to include sufficient factual allegations that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. This case arises out of a routine commercial dispute involving shippers (or sellers) of a specific and defined amount of paper materials (whether those materials are classified as solid waste or source-separated materials), railroad transporters of those materials, and buyers or potential recipients of the materials. It involves a specific number of railcars, a limited number of victims, and a closed, limited period of time. Moreover, although it appears that there on Ctrs., 863 F.Supp. 447, 460 (E.D.Mich.1994) (<HOLDING>). The allegations in the complaint simply do Holdings: 0: holding reliance is still an element of a 10b5 action and that the fraud on the market theory subject to rebuttal is applicable to meet the reliance element in securities fraud cases where corporations make materially misleading statements in an impersonal and efficient market 1: holding that a jury could find a nineteen month period of racketeering activity sufficient to satisfy continuity requirement 2: holding that three sales of used copy machines as new within approximately two years did not meet the continuity element 3: holding that allegations of isolated acts of fraud occurring over an eighteenmonth period did not meet the continuity element 4: holding that a six month closedended period did not satisfy the continuity requirement", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "him leading up to the decision to seek his termination amounted to \u201cprogressive discipline\u201d and were close enough in time to his purportedly protected speech to allow a reasonable fact finder to infer that the actions were taken because of that speech. That discipline, Kidwell contends, was composed of the following five incidents: the written reprimand on April 15, 2008; the restrictions on when and how he may meet with informants in late April 2008; the cancellation of his COPS Unit assignment in June 2008; the two-day suspension he received in September 2008; and the fact that the police department sought to terminate him following the car accident in September 2008. At the outset, we note that suspicious timing will \u201c \u2018rarely be sufficient in and of itself to c 6-97 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In this case, there was a significant time Holdings: 0: holding that a two to threeday time period between the employees complaint and his discharge was sufficient 1: holding that motion to extend time period for filing dischargeability complaint must be made before the running of that period and that court lacks discretion to grant late filed motion to extend time to file dischargeability complaint 2: holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient 3: holding that the threeday grace period in fed rcivp 6e does not apply to motions for a new trial under fedrcivp 59 in part because the time period for filing those motions begins to run from entry of judgment 4: holding that a 17 month time period between the employees protected speech and his termination could not support an inference of causation", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "settlement, the insurer may be liable to the insured to pay the verdict rendered against the insured even though the verdict exceeds the policy limit of liability. The reason for this rule is that the insurer \u2018may not gamble\u2019 with the funds of its insured by refusing to settle within the policy limits.\u201d); Delaney v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.1991) (\u201cGeorgia law is clear that in a case in which a liability insurer defending a claim brought against its insured refuses, in bad faith, an offer to settle within the policy limits, and an excess judgment is entered against the insured, the insured may recover the amount by which the judgment exceeds the policy limits.\u201d);c/ Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2009) (<HOLDING>). To Nationwide\u2019s predictable chagrin, it is Holdings: 0: holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict 1: holding action by judgment creditor of insured against insurer for bad faith failure to settle claim against insured not a direct action within section 1332c proviso 2: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith 3: holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second 4: holding that insured was not required to suffer an excess judgment before it could sue its excess insurer and primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle where it was alleged the insurers arbitrarily refused to settle and insured was required to pay 1 million in settlement to avoid near certainty of larger judgment that would exceed all available coverage", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on any of her claims against Legg Mason. Based on this disposition on the merits, the Court need not reach Defendants\u2019 additional arguments concerning timeliness, administrative exhaustion, and the effect of the release of liability. Accordingly, Defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #49] is granted. The Clerk is directed to close this case. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . See, e.g., Rogers v. Apicella, 606 F.Supp.2d 272, 284-85 (D.Conn.2009). 2 . Sacco brings discrimination claims under both Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law. Because claims under both statutes are analyzed under the same framework, Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n. 1 (2d Cir.2000), the claims will be grouped together here. 3 . See Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). \"The critical issue\u201d in such a case \"is Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion 1: holding that a single offensive racist comment was not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment 2: holding that referring to a female colleague as dancing girl or call girl ignoring her except to comment on her appearance and another female employees quitting because of the same person was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment because the offensive utterances do not rise to the level required by the supreme courts definition of a hostile work environment 3: recognizing that a jury reasonably could find based on an employees complaints to a superior that the employee perceived her environment as hostile 4: holding that the fact that the offensive material was not directed specifically at the plaintiff does not as a matter of law preclude a jury from finding that the conduct subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her sex", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "will be deemed non-final for the purposes of the exercise of appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 54(b). The application of Rule 54(b), either directly or by analogy, to the appeals of bankruptcy proceedings for the purpose of determining finality pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 158(d) establishes a much-needed, bright- line test for determining finality, providing certainty for litigants as to whether their appeals are final for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 158(d). This certainty has not been provided by prior caselaw interpretations of the word finality within the meaning of \u00a7 158(d). We are authorized to apply the procedural requirements of Rule 54(b) by analogy pursuant to the supervisory power of appellate courts. See United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249-50 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 980, 108 S.Ct. 478, 98 Holdings: 0: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 1: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 2: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 3: holding pursuant to courts inherent supervisory power over courts that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons 4: holding that states may exercise their supervisory power to take custody of bank savings deposits", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "itself cause such an appearance of impropriety as to prevent Palomo from receiving a fair trial. Therefore, we disagree with the trial court's reliance on a possible future appearance of impropriety to warrant the removal of the district attorney and Capital Crimes Unit. We also note that Palomo bases his argument on the method by which the prosecution obtained Padilla's personnel file, but Palomo has no standing to assert Padilla's physician-patient privilege. The physician-patient privilege is personal to the patient or her estate. Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo.App. 857, 362, 492 P.2d 862, 864 (1971). Courts routinely deny defendants the standing to assert a third party's right, including the physician-patient privilege. Knight v. State, 207 Ga.App. 846, 429 S.E.2d 326, 827 (19983) (<HOLDING>), People v. Wood, 447 Mich. 80, 523 N.W.2d 477, Holdings: 0: holding prisoners had no clearly established right to privacy in medical records in 1995 1: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 2: recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records 3: holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records 4: holding that defendant had no standing to assert his wifes privacy right pertaining to medical records introduced into evidence at trial", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and walked out slamming the door. Arredondo testified that he had never formally married the children\u2019s mother. They had lived together intermittently at her great-grandmother\u2019s house. He claimed to have worked at various jobs and that he provided for his children. However, the only time the children did not live at their great-grandmother\u2019s house was for a few mo lustrating that Arredondo was unable or failed to provide a safe environment because of his vague and unstable employment history, lack of a permanent residence when out of prison, failure to obtain proper medical assistance for one child\u2019s urinary tract infections and a prosthesis for another child, recurrent alcohol abuse, and failure to abide by the conditions necessary to stay out of prison. In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d at 416 (<HOLDING>). In summary, and without viewing the evidence Holdings: 0: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 1: holding that a child has a  1983 action against the state while in foster care where the state is deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a foster home is unsafe yet places the child there or allows the child to remain there 2: recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment 3: holding there was a showing of an inability to provide a safe environment because of living at 13 to 17 different places in the last year an unstable employment history failure to obtain immunizations for the child and use of methamphetamines and marijuana the day before a courtordered psychologist evaluation 4: holding that the affiants profession of an intent to return to the places they had visited before  is simply not enough because such some day intentions without any description of concrete plans or indeed any specification of when the some day will be  do not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our cases require emphasis in original", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "important to balance the duty to assist against the futility of requiring VA to develop claims where there is no reasonable possibility that the assistance would substantiate the claim. For example, wartime service is a statutory requirement for VA [NSC] pension benefits. Therefore, if a veteran with only peacetime service sought pension, no level of assistance would help the veteran prove the claim; and if VA were to spend time developing such a claim, some other veteran\u2019s claim where assistance would be helpful would be delayed. 146 CONG. REC. S9212 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2000) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller). Thus, because the law as mandated by statute, and not the evidence, is dispositive of this claim, the VCAA is not applicable. See Smith (Claudus) v. Gober, 14 Vet.App. 227 (2000) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed.Cir.2002); Sabonis, Holdings: 0: holding that where payment toward judgment was for less than the total amount of principal and interest  owed that payment then did not terminate the accrual of interest on the remaining principal 1: holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest 2: holding that vcaa did not affect federal statute that prohibits payment of interest on past due benefits 3: holding that vcaa did not affect issue of whether federal statute allowed payment of interest on pastdue benefits 4: holding that  1322b2 prohibits modification of the interest rate on the loan on the debtors principal residence", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Craig v. United States, 523 A.2d 567, 568 (D.C.1987) (citing Ball, supra, 429 A.2d at 1360). The maximum penalties for the three offenses of which Hicks was convicted are as follows: Accordingly, contrary to Hicks\u2019 contention, AWIS cannot be a \u201cgreater\u201d offense than taking indecent liberties or enticement. B. Legislative Intent. Finally, Hicks contends that the legislature has explicitly forbidden convictions for taking indecent liberties and for enticement on facts such as those presented here. He relies on D.C.Code \u00a7 22-3501(d) (1989), which states that \u201c[t]he provisions of this section [taking indecent liberties and enticement] shall not apply to the offenses covered by \u00a7 22-3502 [sodomy] or by \u00a7 22-2801 [carnal knowledge].\u201d See Watson v. United States, 524 A.2d 736, 742 (D.C.1987) (<HOLDING>). Citing Brake v. United States, 494 A.2d 646, Holdings: 0: holding that state of new jersey is not a person under  1983 and thus not amendable to suit under that statute 1: holding that enticement and sodomy merge under  223601d 2: holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act 3: holding that under byrd kidnaping and sexualabuse convictions do not merge 4: holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and stated that white males with inferior attendance records were retained. Nothing in Green\u2019s EEOC charge related to incidents of harassment, nor did anything mention the dates on which they occurred. Because the facts alleged in Green\u2019s EEOC charge form cannot be said to encompass a hostile work environment claim, we affirm the district court\u2019s finding that his claim was therefore procedurally deficient. See Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466 (explaining that a Title VII complaint may encompass only the kinds of discrimination like or related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge). Unlike Title VII, \u00a7 1981 does not require that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. See Caldwell v. Nat\u2019l Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). As such, a hostile work environment claim Holdings: 0: recognizing that the test for intentional discrimination in suits under  1981 is the same as the formulation used in title vii discriminatory treatment cases 1: holding that white woman who sued under title vii to enjoin racially discriminatory employment practices was aggrieved person within meaning of the statute 2: holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix 3: holding that a plaintiff alleging discriminatory employment practices with regard to race has an independent remedy under  1981 without respect to exhaustion under title vii 4: holding that participation in an interracial relationship places a plaintiff in a protected class under title vii and  1981", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "it encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.\u201d Bottom Line Enters., 302 NLRB 373, 374 (1991). The Board recognizes two limited exceptions to requiring an employer to bargain to impasse: \u201c[w]hen a union, in response to an employer\u2019s diligent and earnest efforts to engage in bargaining, insists on continually avoiding or delaying bargaining, and when economic exigencies compel prompt action.\u201d Id. The mandatory subjects of bargaining include \u201cwages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 158(d). Employees\u2019 workloads, such as the number of rooms a housekeeper must clean at issue here, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See HTH, 2011 WL 2414720, at *6 (<HOLDING>); see also Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts erroneous rulings violated respondents sixth amendment right to paid counsel of his choosing 1: holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining 2: holding that respondents violated  8a1 and 5 of the act uni laterally changing the housekeepers workloads by adding two additional rooms to clean per day 3: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act 4: holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on her right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005). She argues that dismissing her PCRA petition because she is no longer serving a sentence would deny her any opportunity to vindicate this constitutional right and therefore would deny her due process. Turning to the specific requirements of due process, Petitioner relies on the procedural due process guarantee of the opportunity to be heard. See Com. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1996) (<HOLDING>). She argues specifically that she was denied Holdings: 0: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 1: recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard 2: holding that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard 3: holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard 4: holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was overworked or that his job duties were otherwise burdensome. Mota, 261 F.3d at 521, is similarly distinguishable. In Mota, the plaintiff presented evidence that, during his employment as a visiting professor, the university \u201cstripped [him] of his duties as principal investigator on certain projects.\u201d Significantly, the university limited Mota\u2019s ability to serve as principal investigator only \u201con certain projects,\u201d and there was no indication that being a principal investigator on those projects was a significant part of his job as a visiting professor. Id. In contrast, Thompson alleges that he lost his ability to perform his essential job functions in all investigations, not just on certain projects. Compare id., with Schirle, 484 Fed.Appx. at 898, and Lavalais, 734 F.3d at 633 (<HOLDING>). For the above reasons, Thompson states a Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff successfully pleaded an adverse employment action where the plaintiff alleged facts indicating that his duties were so restricted on the midnight shift that it is as if he is not a sergeant 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 3: holding that once a plaintiff has pled facts in the complaint indicating that the statute of limitations is a complete or partial bar to an action it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead either in the complaint or in amendments to it facts establishing an exception to the affirmative defense 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "show and what must be shown to resolve the fac tual dispute at trial. Whether otherwise reliable testing procedures were performed without error in a particular case goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Only if a party challenges the performance of a reliable and relevant technique and shows that the performance was so particularly and critically deficient that it undermined the reliability of the technique, will evidence that is otherwise reliable and relevant be deemed inadmissible. \u201cOf course, once a particular theory or technique has satisfied \u00a7 36-18-30, a court may take judicial notice of that theory or technique\u2019s reliability. See [Ex parte ] Perry, 586 So.2d [242] at 251 [ (Ala.1991) ]; [United States v.] Beasley, 102 F.3d [1440] at 1448 [ (8th Cir.1996)] (<HOLDING>); [United States v.] Martinez, 3 F.3d [1191] at Holdings: 0: holding pcr motions alleging an illegal sentence are not subject to the timebar 1: holding that reliability of the polymerase chain reaction pcr method of dna typing would be subject to judicial notice in future cases 2: recognizing that pleadings in the underlying case are subject to judicial notice by an appellate court 3: holding that the reliability of the restriction fragment length polymorphism rflp procedure was subject to judicial notice 4: holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "carving out exceptions for certain kinds of markets. E.g., UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 216, 110 S.Ct. 2807 (citing Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 744, 97 S.Ct. 2061); Del. Valley, 523 F.3d at 1124 (same). Neither do they depend on case-specific factors. See UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 216-17, 110 S.Ct. 2807 (observing that Illinois Brick\u2019s rationale \u201cwill not apply with equal force in all cases\u201d and that its economic assumptions \u201cmight be disproved in a specific case,\u201d but affirming its brightline rule regardless). The exceptions cover situations where either Illinois Brick\u2019s concern over multiple recovery and apportionment does not apply, or its policy of encouraging private antitrust suits would be stymied by mechanical application of its bright-line rule. See Shamrock Foods, 729 F.2d at 1214 (<HOLDING>); Royal Printing, 621 F.2d at 326 n. 7 Holdings: 0: holding that the policy considerations identified in illinois brick do not apply in coconspirator cases 1: holding that state substantive rules of decision apply in federal diversity cases 2: recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings 3: holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases 4: holding that state courts must apply the federal pleading standard in fela cases", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "limestone on right of way); Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 158 (1965) (defining trespass as unauthorized entry by \u201cthing\u201d or person); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts \u00a7 13 at 70 (5th ed.1984) (same). When such a tangible invasion occurred, the element of damages was presumed. Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 721, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan.1954). As the bankruptcy and district courts noted, however, some courts have adopted a \u201cmodern\u201d view of trespass that recognizes intangible invasions. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 390 (Colo.2001) (\u201c[W]e now hold that, in Colorado, an intangible intrusion may give rise to claim for trespass.... \u201d); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 686-88, 709 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Wash.1985) (<HOLDING>); Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, Holdings: 0: recognizing that an expression of opinion about monetary value is not a representation of fact which gives rise to an action for fraud 1: holding deposit of microscopic particulates gives rise to action for trespass 2: holding that the unique nature of psychotherapistpatient relationship gives rise to a duty of care to the patient 3: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract 4: holding that repudiation alone gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to sign the declination statement. As a result, on January 21, 2003, Military Personnel Flight officials properly executed the declination statement in his absence. See AFI 36-2110 \u00b6 2.29.6.3.1. (If the career airman refuses to sign AF Form 964, the Military Personnel Flight will administer the form on behalf of the career airman with an accompanying statement signed by the person who counseled the airman.). Thus, substantial evidence supports the Correction Board\u2019s determination that Mr. Young\u2019s PCS declination statement and the corresponding decimation code were not erroneous or unjust. Because the assignment declination code was appropriate, Mr. Young was not entitled to reenlistment or a promotion prior to his date of separation on April 12, 2005. See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (<HOLDING>); see also Dysart, 369 F.3d at 1313-15 Holdings: 0: holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 1: holding defendant had no constitutional right to a mitigation specialist or a right to an effective one 2: holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison 3: holding that no serviceperson has a right to enlist or to reenlist in the armed forces unless specially granted one 4: holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "they qualified as an excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. As well, we agree with Haygood that the circuit court erred in distinguishing this case from Crawford on the bases that the statement in Crawford (1) was taken in a custodial interrogation and (2) was not an excited utterance. First, the fact that the statements here were not taken at a police station during custodial interrogation, although a proper factor to consider, is not dispositive. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (considering the difference in the level of formality between the interview in the station house in Crawford and the frantic 911 call in Davis as one of the factors in determining whether the statements from the 911 call were testimonial); Hammon, 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (<HOLDING>); Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1166-67 (considering the Holdings: 0: recognizing the crawford interrogation was more formal but determining the interrogation of hammons wife was formal enough in considering that factor and determining the wifes statements were testimonial 1: recognizing that there are no formal procedures for determining the validity of rs 2477 claims 2: holding that edwards protection only extends to interrogation and that denial of counsel is only one factor to be considered in determining whether  consent was voluntarily given but it is not a decisive fact 3: holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation 4: holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in 1995 and 1997 and by the accompanying comments. Accordingly, we hold that the stock of closely-held corporations is a security within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. \u00a7 47-8-102 (Supp.1998). Because this conclusion cannot be reconciled with our holding in Blasingame, that case is overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition that closely-held stock is not a security within the meaning of the UCC. D. Other Jurisdictions Our holding brings Tennessee within the majority of states that have addressed this issue and have concluded that the stock of a closely-held corporation is a \u201csecurity\u201d under the UCC. See Giuffre Org., Ltd. v. Euromotorsport Racing, Inc., 141 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.1998); In re Hryniewicz, 222 B.R. at 18; In re Turley, 213 B.R. 857, 861 (C.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>) (rev\u2019d on other grounds, 172 F.3d 671, 675 Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of frauds found in chapter 8 of mississippis ucc applies to the sale of shares of stock in a corporation comprised of only twelve shareholders 1: holding that the statute of frauds of chapter 8 of kansass ucc applies to the sale of 50 of banks stock 2: holding that subrogation rights are not security interests under ucc article 9 3: holding that closelyheld stock is a security under chapter 8 of californias ucc 4: holding that chapter 8 of colorados ucc applied to the sale of shares in a corporation whose entire stock was held by one individual", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a third party beneficiary of an agreement made by others has the burden of proving that he was intended by the makers of the agreement to be such beneficiary.\u201d A prospective third-party beneficiary may prove the intent of the parties to an agreement by relying on the unambiguous language of the agreement itself, Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 105 N.M. 575, 581, 734 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1987), or, in the absence of such language, on extrinsic evidence such as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, Permian Basin Inv. Corp. v. Lloyd, 63 N.M. 1, 7, 312 P.2d 533, 537 (1957). A number of courts have applied these general principles of contract law in cases involving the scope of a general release. See, e.g., Neves v. Potter, 769 P.2d 1047, 1053-54 (Colo.1989) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 586 Holdings: 0: holding parol evidence is admissible to show mistake 1: holding that parol evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual term that is ambiguous 2: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties 3: holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract 4: holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "succeed, Pearson\u2019s participation must have somehow harmed Iglesias\u2019s defense. Anticipating our conclusion that estoppel requires a showing of prejudice, the Athridges maintain that prejudice should be presumed in this case. This argument stands on firmer ground: An insured may be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, depending on the amount of control the insurer exercised over the defense. See Nat\u2019l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 384 F.2d 316, 318 (D.C.Cir.1967); Diamond, 476 A.2d at 657-58. Assuming the Athridges were entitled to this presumption, summary judgment was still proper because Aetna rebutted the presumption with uncontroverted evidence that its participation did not harm Iglesias. Cf. Curtis v. Cuff, 537 A.2d 1072, 1075 (D.C.1987) (<HOLDING>). To begin with, Iglesias knew that Aetna would Holdings: 0: holding that where uncontroverted evidence rebuts a presumption that a defendant consented to the drivers use of his vehicle the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 1: holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law 2: holding that a drivers knowledge that there are concealable weapons in the car available for the drivers use is evidence of possession 3: holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence 4: holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "witnesses. Williams failed to produce the kinds of expert witnesses which may have been helpful in proving his claim that his plea was affected by drug-induced confusion. On this record and on the face of the pleadings which raised the colorable claim which required an eviden-tiary hearing, abundant doubt is raised concerning Williams\u2019s need for the assistance of counsel. That doubt should have been resolved in his favor. Id. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion in at least two cases involving a trial court\u2019s denial of appointment of counsel for an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim that included alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to interview witnesses. See Witherspoon v. State, 634 So.2d 208, 209-10 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. State, 499 So.2d 24, 26 (Fla. 4th Holdings: 0: holding that counsels failure to call an expert rebuttal witness does not constitute ineffectiveness the pcra petitioner must demonstrate that an expert witness was available who would have offered testimony designed to advance his cause 1: holding that trial court erred in denying appointment of counsel where court had no information concerning petitioners education or ability to represent himself petitioner presented no expert testimony concerning competency of defense furnished by trial counsel petitioner did not call alibi witness to testify at hearing and effective crossexamination may have revealed that counsels own problems with federal government interfered with his representation of petitioner 2: holding that petitioner was not deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing where petitioner did not cooperate with counsel regarding the investigation and identification of mitigating evidence imposed restrictions upon counsel and refused to submit to further psychological or psychiatric testing 3: holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioners request for counsel in evidentiary hearing where petitioner had requested counsel and had indicated in his motion that all documents had been prepared by prison law clerk he had only ninthgrade education he had no training in the law and he lacked the skills necessary to participate in hearing 4: holding that trial courts failure to consider appointing counsel for petitioner in evidentiary hearing was improper where record revealed petitioners lack of education and sophistication petitioner had limited participation in hearing and record indicates that there was abundant doubt raised concerning gordons need for the assistance of counsel", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "340). California courts have uniformly rejected IIED claims related to foreclosure actions, including allegedly wrongful foreclosure. See, e.g., Baidoobonso-Iam v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-9171, 2011 WL 5870065, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (\u201cto the extent that Collier\u2019s claim is solely predicated on the foreclosure of his property, California courts have held that such conduct does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.\u201d); Smith v. Wachovia, No. C 09-01300, 2009 WL 1948829, at *4 (N.D.Cal. July 6, 2009) (allegations that defendant \u201cwrongfully and intentionally initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings\u201d were \u201cnot so extreme as to exceed the bounds of civilized society\u201d); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F.Supp.2d 862, 884 (N.D.Cal.2010) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff provides no response to Defendant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that tobacco companies statements that they would report on the results of their research into the health effects of cigarettes were not an undertaking to warn customers of those effects 1: holding that the sound of a television on the inside of the house and the presence of a car in the driveway were sufficient to form the basis of the reasonable belief that the suspect was in the home 2: holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on the distributor 3: holding that when a person entrusts effects to another and the police discover those effects in the others home by means of a search that violates article i section 9 the search also violates the entrustors rights under article i section 9 4: holding that the act of foreclosing on a home falls shy of outrageous however wrenching the effects on the borrower", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "regard to the third factor concerning the issue of primary liability, the majority concludes that Far East was primarily liable for the debt which it paid; to wit, the letter of credit which it issued in favor of the Surety. The majority reasons that the letter of credit agreement between Far East and the Surety created a separate and independent obligation for which Far East bore primary responsibility to pay. As support for this proposition, the majority relies on San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bank Leumi, 42 Cal.App.4th 928, 933, 50 Cal. Rptr.2d 20 (1996), and Western Sec. Bank v.Super. Ct., 15 Cal.4th 232, 933 P.2d 507, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 (1997), both of which confirm the \u201cindependent\u201d nature of letters of credit. Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal.4th at 248, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507 (<HOLDING>); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 42 Cal.App.4th at Holdings: 0: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 1: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation 2: recognizing that strict compliance with  1557 is required 3: recognizing that an issuer has the primary obligation to pay on letter of credit such that literal compliance with the letter of credits terms for payment is all that is required 4: holding that strict compliance is not required", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "In re Gearheart, No. 07-70232, 2007 WL 4463342 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. Dec. 14, 2007); In re Logan, No. 07-70212, 2007 WL 4414784 (Bankr.E.D.Ky. Dec. 14, 2007); In re Fuller, No. 07-81703, 2007 WL 3244113 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 2007); In re Oliveira, 378 B.R. 789 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2007); Herrin v. Green Tree-AL, LLC, 376 B.R. 316 (Bankr.S.D.Ala.2007), aff'g In re Herrin, No. 06-12249-WSS-13, 2007 WL 1975573 (Bankr.S.D.Ala. July 3, 2007); In re Bartolome, No. 07-10731-DHW, 2007 WL 2774467 (Bankr.M.D.Ala. Sept. 21, 2007); In re McLain, 376 B.R. 492 (Bankr. D.S.C.2007); In re Manning, No. BK 07-70190-CMS-13, 2007 WL 2220454 (Bankr.N.D.Ala. Aug. 2, 2007); In re Cox, No. 07-60073, 2007 WL 1888186 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. June 29, 2007). But see In re Shepherd, 354 B.R. 505 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2006) (<HOLDING>), rev\u2019d, In re Shepherd, 381 B.R. 675 Holdings: 0: holding that the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b is applicable to a mobile home irrespective of whether the home is attached to the real property on which it sits 1: holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa protects holder of secured claim in a mobile home that is debtors principal residence from modification under 11 usc  1322b 2: holding that the addition of a definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa did not change the scope of the 11 usc  1322b antimodification provision and  1322b remains applicable only to real property 3: holding that a lien on the debtors mobile home which was the debt ors principal residence as defined by 11 usc  10113aa was not subject to modi fication under 11 usc  1322b 4: holding that the definition of debtors principal residence in 11 usc  10113aa does not operate to extend the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b to structures that are not real property", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "21, 2012, supplement and treated that supplement as a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion seeking relief from the default judgment, it could not have conferred jurisdiction on the trial court because, although the allegation that Thurmond erroneously expected to be given notice of a hearing before a judgment was entered against him could be treated as an allegation of \"mistake\u201d pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., (1) the September 21, 2012, supplement contains no allegations that could be treated as alleging grounds specified in Rules 60(b)(2), (3), (4), or (5), Ala. R. Civ. P.; (2) it contains no allegations of aggravating circumstances that would justify its being treated as a Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, see Noll v. Noll, 47 So.3d 275, 278-79 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (<HOLDING>); (3) it was untimely because it was not filed Holdings: 0: holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment 1: holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment 2: holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion 3: holding that a motion that alleged rule 60b1 grounds could not be treated as a rule 60b6 motion in the absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances 4: holding that when ruling on a motion under rule 60b1 the trial court is not required to make written findings of fact unless a request is made", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the time of the physical injury that caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at- the time of the \u201coccurrence\u201d that caused it. {\u00b6 10} CGL policies are not intended to protect business owners against every risk of operating a business. In particular, [these] policies * * * are not intended to insure \u201cbusiness risks\u201d [see generally Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims under Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 Tort & Ins.L.J. 785 (1994)] \u2014 risks that are the \u201c \u2018normal, frequent, or predictable consequences of doing business, and which business management can and should control or manage.\u2019 \u201d [Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schauf 967 nc., 348 S.C. 559, 565-566, 561 S.E.2d 355 (2002) (<HOLDING>). {\u00b6 11} Here, all of the claims against which Holdings: 0: holding that an agent breaches its duty to use reasonable care and diligence in procuring insurance when it fails to provide an insurance policy that covers the contents of the insureds business as the insured had requested 1: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 2: holding that under a cgl policy an insurer had no duty to defend its insured in an action resulting from faulty workmanship and that a cgl policy  is not intended to insure business risks ie risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which business management can and should control or manage rowland h long the law of liability insurance  10011 specifically the policies do not insure an insureds work itself but rather they generally insure consequential risks that stem from that work id 3: holding an attorney does not have a duty to insure or guarantee that the most favorable outcome possible and because no amount of work can guarantee a favorable result attorneys would never know when the work they do is sufficiently more than adequate to be enough to protect not only their clients from error but themselves from liability 4: holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage    a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work    as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "redress, Ms. Feral must have visited and intend to visit ranches that hunt captive antelopes without an otherwise valid permit under Section 10. Second, the plaintiff must adduce some evidence that Ms. Feral\u2019s alleged injury is imminent. Although the plaintiff argues in its brief that Ms. Feral \u201cintends to continue monitoring canned hunting ranches and visiting the antelope on these ranches,\u201d see Pl.\u2019s Mem. at 34, Ms. Feral\u2019s declaration states only that she will \u201ccontinue to monitor the Y.O. Ranch and other sport-hunting facilities.\u201d See Feral Decl. at \u00b641. Ms. Feral does not describe how she intends to \u201cmonitor\u201d the Y.O. Ranch, whether by subsequent visits or otherwise. According to the record, Ms. Feral\u2019s last visit to a ranch containing captive antelope occurred in 2006. t. 2130 (<HOLDING>); WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, Holdings: 0: holding that the government must demonstrate that the accused had some knowledge of the conspiracys unlawful aims emphasis in original 1: holding that the affiants profession of an intent to return to the places they had visited before  is simply not enough because such some day intentions without any description of concrete plans or indeed any specification of when the some day will be  do not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our cases require emphasis in original 2: holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day 3: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 4: holding that the affiants profession of an tent to return to the places they had visited beforewhere they will presumably this time be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered speciesis simply not enough to establish standing", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "decision in Goodman and recognized that Minnesota\u2019s personal injury limitations period governed section 1981 actions. See Rhodes, 709 F.Supp. at 168; Rice, 677 F.Supp. at 612. In Rhodes, the court acknowledged that the courts of this district had applied the two-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims following the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Wilson. See Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461, 463-65 (D.Min 615 (8th Cir.1995) (analogizing section 1983 claims and section 1981 claims with claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and recognizing that in Minnesota, section 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period); see also Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Although Owens only speaks to section 1983 Holdings: 0: recognizing that owens clarified wilson and designating the sixyear limitations period in section 54105 subd 15 as the applicable limitations period for section 1983 claims 1: holding that the limitations period in section 13  214a takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13  202 of the code 2: holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable 3: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 4: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "engaged in the following colloquy with Juror Five. THE COURT: Juror [Five] was the verdict of guilty as to both counts your verdict when you were in the jury room? JUROR [FIVE]: The first one was, yes, but not the second one. THE COURT: And as to the second issue, did you vote to convict on the second count? JUROR [FIVE]: Yes. THE COURT: Is that your verdict now? JUROR [FIVE]: Yes. THE COURT: Is it freely and voluntarily made by you as you sit here now? JUROR [FIVE]: Yes. THE COURT: So you are good with the verdict as it stands? JUROR [FIVE]: Well, can you explain becau 733 SE2d 36) (2012) (punctuation omitted); accord Powell v. State, 271 Ga. App. 550, 551-52 (610 SE2d 178) (2005). 13 McCullough, 317 Ga. App. at 855; see Steele v. State, 270 Ga. App. 488, 492 (606 SE2d 664) (2004) (<HOLDING>). 14 See McCullough, 317 Ga. App. at 855-56 Holdings: 0: holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue 1: holding that the sentencing courts conclusion that there was simply no way to avoid the base offense level did not indicate mandatory application of the guidelines 2: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 3: holding that extrinsic offense evidence was admissible to prove intent where the prosecutor stated that she anticipated the defendant would deny his intent to be involved in the charged offense and defense counsel did not even mention that he would refrain from contesting the intent issue 4: holding that courts announcement that it would deny firstoffender status b ased on the nature of the offense did not indicate mechanical sentencing policy", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "any other requested relief, shall be entitled to recover damages equal to the actual expenses incurred by the defendant in responding to the notice from the requestor pursuant to Section 4 of this act, and the expenses of litigation directly related to obtaining judgment quieting title in the defendant or asserting an affirmative defense with respect to the interest or apparent interest forming the basis of the action against the defendant, including costs and reasonable attorney fees. 2 . Mitchell also argues that the dock agreement was not binding on her. This issue was resolved by the district court's order granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and cannot be raised in this proceeding. Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 1990 OK 66, n. 27, 796 P.2d 276, 283 n. 27 (<HOLDING>). 3 . As Mitchell notes, the agreement among Holdings: 0: holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing 1: holding that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action 2: holding that judgments on the merits in former proceedings are binding on the original parties as well as their privies 3: holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action 4: holding that ujnder res judicata or claim preclusion a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties  from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in the prior action", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), which is mentioned, provides for a 120-day period. Nobles and Hales\u2019s proposed amended complaint could relate back if it met the requirements of either Rule 15(c)(1) or Rule 15(c)(3). Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 966 n. 11 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Rule 15(c)(3) sets forth the federal rule for Holdings: 0: recognizing strictness of maryland rule in a diversity case 1: holding that a proposed amendment seeking to change a defendant in a diversity case could relate back under either rule 15c1 or 15c3 2: holding that in order for a defendant to remove a case to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction there must be complete diversity of citizenship both at the time that the case is commenced and at the time that the notice of removal is filed 3: holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case 4: holding that statutory change in diversity requirements is not other paper", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "covenant not to sue the licensee. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citation omitted). In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Accordingly, a licensor who has implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement. Moreover, in light of LabCorp\u2019s continuing royalty payments on the panel test, Lab-Corp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for which it continues to pay royalties. Cf. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1382 (<HOLDING>). The district court\u2019s opinion concerning the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 1: holding that persons not parties to a contract did not have standing to seek declaratory judgment on contracts validity 2: holding that a licensee who continued paying royalties to the licensor did not have sufficient apprehension of suit giving rise to declaratory judgment subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 4: holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its contract with the government", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "did not apply because the wife had failed to file her petition with the clerk until after the sale. 43 Kan. at 596-97. Similarly, in Graham v. Pepple, 129 Kan. 735, 284 Pac. 394 (1930), a wife filed a petition for divorce asking for 53% acres in Washington County as alimony. The husband later sold this land to a third party. The Kansas Supreme Court held the real estate was sufficiently described for purposes of lis pendens because the husband owned only one 53%-acre tract in Washington County: \u201cIf the derelict husband had owned a hundred acres and she had merely laid claim to some undefined portion of it,\u201d there may have been sufficient ambiguity in the description to uphold the transfer to the third party. 129 Kan. at 737; see also Rumsey v. Rumsey, 150 Kan. 49, 90 P.2d 1093 (1939) (<HOLDING>). In the context of mechanic\u2019s hens, which also Holdings: 0: holding that words which expressly refer to adequate legal description provide nucleus of description that is legally sufficient for statute of frauds 1: holding that a void decree has no legal effect 2: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect 3: holding to the same effect 4: holding divorce petition giving full legal description specific enough to generate lis pendens effect", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "non-violent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such conduct is also excluded from Section 242.1[Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function] and thus is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code.\u201d \u00a7 242.2 cmt 2. The American Law Institute\u2019s decision not to recommend criminalization of this type of conduct reflected the considered judgment that the charge of r 38-39 (1980) (reiterating that \u201c[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes\u201d); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (<HOLDING>). But see Commonwealth v. Montoya, 457 Mass. Holdings: 0: holding that force exerted against an officer after an arrest is complete cannot be used as the basis for prosecuting one for resisting arrest 1: holding that it is equally wellestablished that a suspects mere flight to escape arrest does not violate the resisting arrest statute 2: holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest 3: holding that conviction for speeding did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim arising from acquittal on charges of resisting arrest and attempted escape 4: holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "would not influence him or cause him to assign greater weight to the testimony of law enforcement officials. (R. 72-73). Barker also did not raise his hand when asked by the trial court if anyone had any bias or prejudice that would influence their verdict. (R. 8) Further, Barker stated during individual voir dire that he [had] no opinion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and that he wold enter the jury box and decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial. This allegation is directly refuted by the record; thus, it fails to state a claim and does not establish that a material issue of fact or law exists as required by Rule 32.7(d). Therefore, this allegation is hereby denied by the Court. See Gibby v. State, 753 So.2d 1206, 1207-1208 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P. \u201c... Duncan Holdings: 0: holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit 1: holding that misadvice of counsel as to the length of a sentence is a basis for postconviction relief if not refuted by the record 2: holding that where the coercion alleged to enter a plea is legally insufficient or conclusively refuted by the record there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing or appoint conflictfree counsel 3: holding that a postconviction claim that is refuted by the record is without merit 4: holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit was properly filed", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by the Rose Foundation and others had no effect on the decision to sue Mr. Hurwitz,?\u201d Williams responded, \"Absolutely so.\u201d 84 . See, e.g., Schwarzer, 104 F.R.D. at 196 (\u201cWere a court to entertain inquiries into subjective bad faith, it would invite a number of potentially harmful consequences,, such as generating satellite litigation, inhibiting speech and chilling advocacy.\u201d). 85 . 126 S.Ct. at 1704. 86 . Id. at 1704 n. 7. 87 . Id. at 1706 (\"The connection, to be alleged and shown, is the absence of probable cause.\u201d). 88 . Id. 89 . See, e.g., Davis v. Veslan Enters., 765 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir.1985) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions for improper purpose where a party brought a removal petition solely to delay the judgment in a case); Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 66 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 Holdings: 0: holding that rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate when a motion is filed in part for a legitimate purpose even when the motion includes certain evidence which is assertedly presented for an improper purpose 1: holding that rule 11 is not properly used to sanction the inappropriate filing of papers where other rules more directly apply 2: holding that filing a supplemental complaint to intimidate the defendant into a large settlement was an improper purpose while also finding other rule 11 violations internal quotations omitted 3: holding that under chevron step two courts may not disturb an agency rule unless it is arbitrary or capricious in substance or manifestly contrary to the statute internal quotations omitted 4: holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trust between individuals, free expression and individuality, or as stated by the court in Thorpe, the \u201cconfidence and sense of security in dealing with one another.\u201d 424 N.E.2d at 258. While it is certainly true that surreptitious recording of conversations between citizens can have a chilling effect of such forms of freedom, this effect is rendered de minimis \u201cwhen one is aware, or reasonably should be aware, that he or she is speaking to a police officer.\u201d City & Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1984) (tape recording of defendant\u2019s conversation with police officer was properly admitted into evidence at trial, when defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that he was speaking to police officer); People v. Suite, 161 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 (Ct. App. 1980) (<HOLDING>); In re A. W., 982 P.2d 842, 847 (Colo. 1999) Holdings: 0: recognizing lack of requirement to prove reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to intercepted wire communications 1: holding that police officer had no reasonable expectation of privacy while in his official capacity he interrogated suspect in jailhouse 2: holding that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made to companion while seated in police car 3: holding that defendants reliance on cases decided on a reasonable expectation of privacy standard was sorely misplaced when he sought to suppress recordings of telephoned bomb threats to police observing that it was ludicrous for defendant to argue that his calls to police were confidential communications 4: holding notice received by pretrial detainee of recording of calls disposed of his fourth amendment claims related to recordings as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "specific acts indicating that propensity. Although the State does not advance this argument in its brief, it might be claimed that the defendant had done so by giving direct testimony in which he indicated that he \u201cwould\u201d not \u201cunder any circumstances\u201d \u201cever\u201d have hired someone to kill his mother or have told Pope that it was \u201cokay\u201d to kill her. However, we do not believe that such \u25a0 ambiguous statements, which appear to have been made in the context of attempting to show that the defendant had a close and loving relationship with his mother, and, hence, no motive to kill her, can be fairly construed as an unequivocal assertion of good character that would justify cross-examination about prior violence against others generally. Compare United States v. Collier, 29 M.J. 365 (C.M.A.1990) (<HOLDING>), with State v. Guritz, 134 Or.App. 262, 894 Holdings: 0: holding that discharge of a police officer for the choice to enter into a relationship with the wife of his superior officer on the force was rational 1: holding that defendants constitutional right to travel was not abridged when he was ordered not to make contact with the victim he attempted to rape 2: holding that a defendants answer on direct examination that he would have at eased if ordered to do so by a particular superior officer was not an unequivocal assertion that he possessed the character trait of obedience to orders because the defendants answer could be explained by showing a special relationship to that superior officer 3: holding suspects contradictory answers on miranda waiver form that he would answer questions without an attorney and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous 4: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "filed a complaint against Guest Services, Inc., alleging that her discharge was wrongful. Ms. Washington claimed that her co-worker\u2019s conduct in spraying the food with cleaning fluid contravened applicable District of Columbia health and food regulations, and that Guest Services had dismissed her (Ms. Washington) \u201cfor protesting safety, health, and food code violations on the part of the defendant.\u201d On June 17, 1996, Guest Services filed a motion for summary judgment. Guest Services argued that Ms. Washington was an at-will employee and that her allegations, even if true, did not bring her within the only public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine that had been recognized by this court at the time. See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C.1991) (<HOLDING>). On July 23, 1996, the trial judge granted Holdings: 0: holding that an atwill employee may not be discharged for refusal to violate the law 1: holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981 2: holding that an atwill employee can be discharged for any reason or no reason unless employee is discharged for reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy 3: holding that absent a law or collective bargaining agreement a municipal employee is an employee atwill 4: holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at a residence in Carroll County by officers of the 24th Judicial District Drug Task Force and the Carroll County Sheriffs Department. The appellant, although not the \u201ctarget\u201d of the search, was at the residence during its execution and was detained by law enforcement officers. \u201cWith his left hand, he pulled out a [pill] bottle... [and] threw it to the ground.\u201d The pill bottle contained 6.4 grams of a white powdery substance, later identified as cocaine. Analysis During voir dire of the venire, the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a young African-American male. The juror was discharged and excused from the courtroom. Defense counsel objected to the juror\u2019s removal as being a possible violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The State provided the court with several Holdings: 0: holding that courts must entertain a challenge to a private litigants racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial 1: holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that private litigants in civil cases may not use peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner 3: holding that peremptory challenges may not be exercised in a discriminatory manner 4: holding that allowing a defendant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized or than available to and exercised by the prosecution does not in and of itself amount to structural error", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Miranda - warnings - specifically - acknowledging his right to exercise at any time the right to remain silent, and he indicated that he understood that right. The agents never threatened or implied that a refusal by Ko-verman to make a statement would result in discharge. The CBI policy stating that if an employee is \"requested to make a statement in the course of an official Bureau investigation, members shall make full, complete and truthful statements\" also does not support an objectively reasonable fear of termination. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the Fifth Amendment does not give an accused the right to lie. Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 265-66, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 L.Ed.2d 695 (1998); cf. Hoffler v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 27 P.3d 371, 376 (Colo.2001) (<HOLDING>). The mere requirement that a witness testify Holdings: 0: holding that absolute immunity extends to statements made in the course of judicial proceedings but not to preliminary investigations prior to the institution of criminal charges 1: holding that the doctrine of commonlaw privilege that grants immunity to witnesses in quasijudicial proceedings does not extend to disciplinary proceedings against a state employee who makes false statements in the course of an official investigation 2: holding that the debtors false statements about the location of assets of the estate were material to the proceedings 3: holding a continuance of lawyer disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of related criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required 4: holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from other circuits to support his argument that the beaches are a public forum. Tellingly, these cases involve parks and beaches readily available to the general public where property use was not limited to recreation by deed restriction or otherwise. See, e.g., Naturist Soc\u2019y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1992); Paulsen v. Lehman, 839 F.Supp. 147, 158-61 (E.D.N.Y.1993). In contrast, IVGID has historically limited access to the beaches to certain persons for recreational uses only because it is required to do so by the restrictive covenant. The beaches here are similar to properties where the government has restricted access or only allowed the public to use portions for limited, non-expressive purposes. See, e.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 455 F.3d at 920 (<HOLDING>); Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 Holdings: 0: holding that the courthouse lobby was a nonpublic forum 1: holding that a courthouse was a nonpublic forum but an unenclosed courthouse plaza was a designated public forum 2: holding that the fact that a speech regulation is now being enforced  is not enough to convert the property into a nonpublic forum 3: holding that the airspace surrounding honolulus beaches was a nonpublic forum partly because of the traditional limitations on use of and access to airspace 4: holding first amendment guarantees access to criminal trials and limitations on access are subject to strict scrutiny", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "claims that could have been brought either in the district court\u2019s supplemental jurisdiction or in admiralty. Panek\u2019s contract with Con-cordia was sufficiently maritime in nature to fall within the district court\u2019s admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S.Ct. 886, 889, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (marine insurance contracts); Carroll v. Protection rcised jurisdiction over the counterclaims either under its \u201csupplemental jurisdiction\u201d pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367, or admiralty, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1333, at least with respect to the breach of contract and negligence claims. Having concluded that Rule 9(h) could be invok laimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (<HOLDING>); cf. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hansen, 125 Holdings: 0: holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction 1: holding that a demand for a trial by jury is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty 2: recognizing that parties had right to trial by jury in trespass action but holding that parties waived that right under cr 3804 by not filing a demand for a jury trial 3: holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored 4: holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "jurors 7, 9, 20, 41,43, 65, and 84 as those who expressed concerns about the facts of the case. None of these individuals were ultimately empaneled: five were excused for cause because they stated they could not be fair and impartial, one was stricken by the defense using a peremptory challenge, and one was not selected. See State v. Rackley, 2000-NMCA-027, \u00b6 9, 128 N.M. 761, 998 P.2d 1212 (explaining that \u201c[t]he jury selection process, including the excusal of jurors for cause, insures that a defendant is tried before an impartial jury\u201d). Finally, Defendant had two remaining peremptory challenges at the conclusion of jury selection and has not offered an explanation as to why she did not exercise those challenges. See State v. Isiah, 1989-NMSC-063, \u00b6 29, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293 (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. Holdings: 0: holding that a white defendant can object to the exclusion of minority jurors through the use of peremptory challenges 1: holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause 2: holding that is not the fact that a jury is all white or all black that violates batson rather it is the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors 3: holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more 4: holding that where a defendant does not use all of his or her peremptory challenges the defendant may not complain of prejudice for failure to dismiss prospective jurors", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the State has met its burden to prove the child engaged in acts of delinquency, the statute has not supported such review since 1965 and urges us to adopt a standard of review identical to the review we conduct in criminal cases. Such a standard would require us to determine whether, viewing the light in the evidence most favorable to the State, any reasonable fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the delinquent acts. See State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2003). As the State describes, before 1965, proceedings under chapter 232 were \u201cin equity.\u201d Iowa Code \u00a7 232.13 (1962). Thus our review on appeal was de novo, as it is in all equity cases. See Iowa R.App. P. 6.907. However, chapter 232 was substantially revised in 1965 App.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re A.D., 771 A.2d 45, 48 Holdings: 0: holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction 1: holding that an appellate court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and grants the state all reasonable inferences 2: holding that in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jurys verdict 3: holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government 4: holding that in reviewing sufficiency of evidence in juvenile adjudication the appellate court considers the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and affirms if those inferences constitute substantial evidence", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the laws of the forum state and may have the minimum contacts with the forum state sufficient to meet the due process requirements of the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the forum state. In conclusion, we hold that the signing of a guaranty by a nonresident of a debt owed to a New Mexico creditor does not in and of itself constitute a sufficient contact upon which to base in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident. Rather, the circumstances surrounding the signing of such obligations must be closely examined in each case to determine whether the quality and nature of defendant\u2019s contacts with New Mexico justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him in an action on the obligation. Here, the Hiatts did nothing more tha on, Inc., 558 F.Supp. 1118, 1123-24 (N.D.Ill.1983) (<HOLDING>). 3 . We note that in Hunter-Hayes Elevator Co. Holdings: 0: holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 1: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction 2: holding no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor 3: holding that nonresident defendants failure to make payments in florida coupled with forum selection clause sufficient for court to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant 4: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where defendant assignee received patents from assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction in part because the unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "both Sergeant Boggs\u2019 and Sheriff Peters\u2019 testimony that they did not initially consider Davis a suspect as a factor in its analysis. See Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101. Because neither Sergeant Boggs nor Sheriff Peters communicated his belief to Davis, the court agrees with Davis that the officers\u2019 subjective intent is not relevant to the objective question of whether Davis was in custody. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25, 114 S.Ct. 1526. Even if the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals\u2019 statement, when taken in isolation, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, however, the court is confident that the state appellate court\u2019s decision, as a whole, constitutes a proper application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) (internal footnote omitted). The court Holdings: 0: holding that pursuant to 28 usc  2254d1 if  the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry 1: holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end 2: holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing 3: recognizing an appellate court may affirm a trial courts decision that reached the right result regardless of the trial courts reasoning 4: holding that it is axiomatic that this court can affirm a circuit court if the right result is reached even if for a different reason", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "council\u2019s decisions were based on recommendations by the Bureau, those recommendations involved precisely the sort of delegated responsibility that earmarks the exercise of discretionary judgment. Plaintiffs alternative theory appears to be that defendant had a duty to succeed in executing a traffic management strategy that would prevent accidents. That assertion is incorrect. Immunity is not defeated merely because defendant\u2019s choice of traffic management and control devices did not prevent the tragic loss of life in this case or, for that matter, because plaintiffs expert testified that another strategy likely would have been more effective in reducing the incidence of speeding. See Garrison v. Deschutes County, 162 Or App 160, 167-68, 986 P2d 62 (1999), rev allowed 329 Or 650 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In Garrison, the plaintiff argued that the Holdings: 0: holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility 1: holding that in granting summary judgment the trial courts disregard of the plaintiffs proffered expert testimony was not erroneous because that testimony would go not to the question of whether defendants decision took safety into account but rather would go to the question of the quality of the decision 2: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question 3: holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been 4: holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of action. The components of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability. The test for cause in fact, or \u201cbut for causation,\u201d is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. A finding of cause in fact may be based on either direct or circumstantial evidence, but cannot be supported by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation. 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted). In explaining further, the court went on to remind: \u201cas we have frequently said, some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence. We have also said that an inference stacked only on other inferences is not legally sufficient evidence.\u201d Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). \u201cExpert opinions must be supported by facts Holdings: 0: holding that experts opinion that doctor performed surgeries in order to avoid financial losses due to insurance deductibles was nothing more than conjecture and speculation 1: holding that mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient under a preponderance standard 2: holding that causation cannot be proved based on speculation 3: holding that burden of clear and convincing proof cannot be satisfied by mere conjecture or speculation 4: holding that experts opinion on proximate causation amounted to no more than mere conjecture and speculation as to events surrounding accident", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at the close of the preliminary hearing that the court \"has sufficient information based on the preliminary hearing to indicate that there's probable cause on Count II,\" which charged third-degree sexual assault, also a felony. Thus, there is no dispute that Powers was properly bound over for trial on at least one felony. See State v. (John) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 536, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). A prosecutor may include in an information any counts that are \"transactionally related to a count on which the defendant is bound over,\" regardless of whether the State established probable cause at the preliminary hearing to believe that the defendant committed the transactionally related felonies. Id. at 537; see also State v. (Scott) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 544 N.W.2d 400 (1996) (<HOLDING>). There can be no question that count one of Holdings: 0: holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause 1: holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it 2: holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury 3: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause 4: holding that the state need only establish probable cause that a felony occurred as to one count in a set of transactionally related counts for there to be a valid bind over on that set and need not establish probable cause that the specific felony alleged in each count was committed", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "United States, No. 13-11603 (11th Cir. June 21, 2013). II. DISCUSSION The denial of a \u00a7 2255 motion to vacate presents a mixed question of law and fact, and we review the district judge\u2019s factual conclusions for clear error and questions of law de novo. Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and, consequently, must be construed liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam). District judges must resolve all claims for relief raised in habeas proceedings, regardless of whether relief is granted or denied. Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935-36 (involving a 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 petition filed by a state prisoner); Rhode, 583 F.3d at 1291 (<HOLDING>). When a district judge fails to address all of Holdings: 0: holding  2254 applies to administrative proceedings 1: holding that 60day time limit for notice of appeal in civil cases not 10day limit in criminal cases applies to  2255 proceedings 2: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings 4: holding clisby applies to  2255 proceedings", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "where the damage can be characterized as being continuous or progressive.\u201d Wrecking Corp. of Am., 574 A.2d at 1350 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., Leafland Group-II, Montgomery Towers Ltd. Partnership v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 118 N.M. 281, 881 P.2d 26, 27, 29 (1994) (reciting that, after purchasing an apartment building and obtaining an all-risk policy thereon, the insured learned of the presence of asbestos in the building and received an appraisal stating that the asbestos diminished the building's value by $1.75 million; and holding that the insured could not claim coverage under the policy because the \"claimed loss occurred prior to the time the insurance was purchased\u201d). 15 . Accord Citizens Bank of Oregon v. Am. Ins. Co., 289 F.Supp. 211, 214 (D.Or.1968) (<HOLDING>); Fitchburg Sav. Bank v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Holdings: 0: holding that bank incurred a loss when it made a loan upon the collateral of pledged stock certificates 1: holding that a court should consider pledged collateral when determining the amount of the intended loss 2: holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor 3: holding that a bank customer was not bound to arbitrate where the signature card that was signed referenced a collateral document which contained an arbitration clause but the bank never sent the customer a copy of the collateral document 4: holding that bank was equitably estopped from recovering against stock broker for conversion of stock certificates that were assigned in blank and that broker had sold for a bank employee who misappropriated the stock certificates from the bank", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "over the conduct of non-Indians on fee land when the conduct \u201cthreatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.\u201d Id. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 1258 (the \u201ctribal interest\u201d test). Yakima Nation asserts that we should apply the Colville test and hold that it has authority to zone non-Indian fee land under that test. Because we conclude that Yakima Nation has authority under the more stringent tribal-interest test employed in Montana, we need not determine whether the Colville analysis is appropriate to determine tribal authority over non-Indians. We recently held that \u201c[i]t is beyond question that land use regulation is within the Tribe\u2019s legitimate sovereign authority over its lands.\u201d Segundo, 813 F.2d at 1393 (<HOLDING>). Zoning, in particular, traditionally has been Holdings: 0: holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight 1: holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff 2: holding that a city could not apply its rent control ordinance in conflict with tribal ordinance to nonindians on reservation trust land 3: holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance 4: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "between Nobri-ga and the victim of his Hawaii AFHM conviction does not fall within any of the four categories prescribed by \u00a7 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the government did not establish that Nobriga had .previously been convicted of a \u201cmisdemeanor crime of domestic violence.\u201d Nobriga\u2019s motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. Nor is there any question as to whether we should correct the error. As our above analysis indicates, the district court\u2019s error was plain and prejudiced Nobriga. A plea based on an offense that the defendant could not have committed as a matter of law satisfies Cotton\u2019s third prong \u2014 whether the error affected substantial rights. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781; see also United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 607-08 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). That Nobriga did not raise this ultimately Holdings: 0: holding that prosecutorial error does not warrant reversal unless substantial prejudice results 1: holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming 2: holding that even if evidence admitted in error admission must result in material prejudice to warrant reversal 3: holding that a plain error that is fatal to a conviction is sufficient to warrant reversal 4: holding that even if there is error in failing to award nominal damages to a plaintiff such error is not a basis for reversal", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or management of the partnerships. According to Nichols, his involvement was limited to signing documents. Despite Nichols\u2019 efforts to distance himself from his partnerships\u2019 activities within the state of Florida, it was proper for the trial court to consider these activities in determining that Nichols had continuous and systematic general business contacts in Florida. Florida courts have recognized that, because a limited partnership gains its identity from its general partners, the limited partnership\u2019s contacts with a particular forum may be attributed to the general partners. Kelly v. Department of Insurance, 597 So.2d 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Levinson v. Brosche, 578 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). See also Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan Corp., 433 F.Supp. 1226 (E.D.Pa.1977) (<HOLDING>). In addition to these partnership activities, Holdings: 0: holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest 1: recognizing same principle 2: recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state 3: holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties 4: recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on the basis of sex is the sine qua non of a Title IX sexual harassment case.\u201d Id. In the context of a Title IX sexual-harassment claim, \u201cthe plaintiff \u2018must always' prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations,\u2019 but in fact constituted discrimination \u2018because ... of sex.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)); see, e.g., id. at 67 (affirming dismissal of Title IX claim \u201c[i]n the absence of conduct cre 1st Cir.2002) (affirming jury finding of sexually hostile work environment where female plaintiff was subject to \u201chumiliating sexual remarks and innuendos\u201d on a daily basis for over a year);, Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 1: holding that male coworkers conduct in inter alia repeatedly calk ing plaintiff a whore slut bitch and cunt over the course of months could constitute sexual harassment 2: holding that evidence that male employees consistently called plaintiff whore floor whore curb whole curb side cunt and bitch a male employee pushed plaintiff against a wall and placed his knee between her legs and other men made comments to plaintiff that a woman had no place in a car dealership was sufficient to establish sexual harassment 3: holding that there was substantial similarity between plaintiff and her male predecessors job 4: holding that the plaintiff had a right of privacy in the contents of a settlement agreement that stated that the plaintiff had sued his employer for failing to hire him because he was a single gay male and because his employer suspected that he had aids", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "term.\u201d). Notwithstanding the existence of section 5-13-70, the courts in Cowart I and Cowart II co 6, 561 (Ct.App.2004), aff'd, 373 S.C. 390, 645 S.E.2d 245 (2007) (\u201c[A]ny legislation [that] is in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and not extended in application beyond clear legislative intent.\u201d); id. (\u201cTherefore, a statute is not to be construed in derogation of common law rights if another interpretation is reasonable.\u201d); State v. Prince, 316 S.C. 57, 66, 447 S.E.2d 177, 182 (1993) (\u201c[I]t is presumed that no change in common law is intended unless the Legislature explicitly indicates such an intention by language in the statute.\u201d (citing Nuckolls v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 192 S.C. 156, 161, 5 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1939))); Nuckolls, 192 S.C. at 161, 5 S.E.2d at 864 (<HOLDING>); id. (\u201c[T]he rules of the common-law are not Holdings: 0: holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent 1: holding that when construing a general enactment and a more particular enactment within the same statute and when the plain language of the two subsections cannot be otherwise reconciled the more specific subsection should be given effect 2: holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary  3: holding property code provision was subject to commonlaw rescission principles because it was not intended to be punitive 4: holding that it is presumed that no change in the commonlaw was intended by the legislatures enactment of a statute on the same subject unless the language employed clearly indicates such an intention", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "either be on the persons of the assailants or about the premises where they lived.\u201d). Second, Chambers argues that the police exceeded their authority under the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 8953, thereby invalidating the search warrant, because the shooting occurred in Harrisburg, was investigated by Harrisburg police, and Harrisburg police obtained the search warrant, but the warrant was approved by a Swatara magistrate and executed in Swatara Township. Even if Chambers\u2019s interpretation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act were correct, however, he does not explain how a violation of state law would be relevant to the federal constitutional analysis required here. Cf Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176-78, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Chambers\u2019s argument that the Holdings: 0: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 1: holding that a warrantless arrest on probable cause does not violate the fourth amendment even if state law required the police to have prior authorization 2: holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment 3: holding that arrest in backyard violated fourth amendment 4: holding that state law is immaterial for fourth amendment search analysis and refusing to suppress evidence obtained illegally under state law after warrantless arrest because the arrest rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone and as we have just concluded it is not the province of the fourth amendment to enforce state law that amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a constitutionally permissible arrest", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "its submissions. See, e.g., NSK Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 590, 593, 825 F.Supp. 315, 318-19 (1993). Lastly, because Chengde delayed requesting correction until after the ITA had issued the Final Results, the requirement of administrative finality necessarily outweighed its belated concern for correctness. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1352-54 (Fed.Cir.), reh\u2019g denied, 434 F.3d 1345, cert, denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 577, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006)(distinguishing requests to correct errors at the final-result versus preliminary-result stages); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d at 1292 (\u201cthere is a strong interest in the finality of Commerce\u2019s decisions\u201d); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT at 351, 201 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (<HOLDING>). Thus, under these circumstances, where (1) Holdings: 0: recognizing the tension between extrarecord evidence and a recordbased standard of review 1: holding that under  1988 consideration of the results obtained relative to the relief requested is required 2: recognizing the tension between finality and correct result and denying relief where party requested correction after final results had issued 3: recognizing the possibility but denying relief 4: recognizing but refusing to resolve tension between bradley and bowen", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a right possessed by all [Tennessee] residents,\u201d not a right created by federal law. Fin. & Trading Ltd. v. Rhodia S.A., No. 04 Civ. 6083(MBM), 2004 WL 2754862, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004) (Mukasey, J.). Notwithstanding the fact that S & P is an NRSRO, and thus subject to federal regulation, Tennessee\u2019s claims \u201cmay be assessed entirely by applying [state] common law standards to the facts in this case.\u201d Id. at *7. The contrast with Grable and its progeny is telling \u2014 and dispositive. In Grable, the plaintiff would \u201cnecessarily\u201d have had to show a violation of federal law even if the defendant had never removed the case to federal court and even if the defendant had never invoked federal law as a defense. See 545 U.S. at 314-15, 125 S.Ct. 2363; see also Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1065 (<HOLDING>); Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim 1: holding that the first grable requirement was met where the plaintiff in order to prevail on his legal malpractice claim had to show that he would have prevailed on his claim under federal patent law 2: holding that the plaintiffs state statutory claim against volkswagen did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction under grable since the claim was based on alternative theories some of which had no necessary federal element 3: recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance 4: holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "statutes control over more general statutes.\u201d City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 149, 879 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1994). This principle, however, is inapplicable since section 9-508 and section 54-2050 address two different issues\u2014 the former the enforceability of commission agreements and the latter the standards of professional conduct for real estate brokers. Section 9-508 specifically sets forth the requirements of a \"valid\u201d commission agreement. I.C. \u00a7 9-508. Section 54-2050, on the other hand, was enacted as part of the Idaho Real Estate License Law, which governs the professional conduct and dealings of real estate brokers and salespersons. See I.C. \u00a7\u00a7 54-2001 to -2080. Section 54-2050 only indicates that brokerage agreements \u201cmust 1082, 1085 (1978) Holdings: 0: holding a party breaches a plea agreement by acting in a manner not specifically prohibited by the agreement but still incompatible with explicit promises made in the agreement 1: holding that the earnest money agreement indicating a full legal property description was attached to agreement incorporated property description by reference where the description was always with the earnest money agreement and the broker testified that the legal description was kept side by side with the earnest money agreement in the brokers files 2: holding that even though an agreement was approved by the family court it retained its character as an agreement for purposes of legal analysis 3: holding that a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff agreed to drop all claims against the defendants in exchange for a specific sum of money was enforceable despite the fact that the agreement did not specify whether the plaintiffs promise would take the legal form of a release or a covenant not to sue 4: holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Aug. 18, 2006), 988 So.2d 1078 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) ], held that equi le tolling is not available in a case such as this one. Moreover, because Rule 32.2(c) does not establish a jurisdictional bar, the trial court has the power to hear an untimely petition because the running of the limitations period would \u2018not divest the circuit court of the power to try the case.\u2019 Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536, 539 (Ala.2006). \u201cFurther, as Ward points out, under federal habeas corpus practice, the federal courts have held that equitable tolling is available for a \u00a7 2244 petition, notwithstanding that the word \u2018shall\u2019 appears in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2244(d)(l)(estab-lishing procedures for petitions for the writ of habeas corpus). See, e.g., Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir.2003)(<HOLDING>); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that where client was abandoned by attorney due to attorneys mental illness equitable tolling may be appropriate 1: holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling 2: holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances 3: holding that equitable tolling may be available where the attorneys behavior was outrageous or the attorneys incompetence was extraordinary 4: holding that mental incapacity is an extraordinary circumstance that may warrant equitable tolling", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the second element of her sexual harassment claim, in relating how she was harassed, plaintiff claims that she was harassed because Herron and Lohse instructed co-workers to \u201ckeep track of\u2019 plaintiff and that rumors about her were discussed at work. Dkt. 58 at 19. Plaintiffs claim that Herron and Lohse instructed co-workers to \u201ckeep track of\u2019 her is conclusory. Moreover, even if this allegation were proved, plaintiff claims that defendant\u2019s actions were covert. It is unclear how plaintiff was \u201charassed\u201d by those actions if she was not even aware of them. With respect to the third element of her claim, plaintiff is unable to show that the alleged harassment was \u201cbecause of\u2019 her sex. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In support of her argument that she was Holdings: 0: holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination 1: holding that a plaintiff claiming sexual harassment must always prove that the conduct at issue  actually constituted discrimination  because of  sex  emphasis added 2: holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination 3: holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment 4: recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "happened,\u201d and that \u201c[i]f a plaintiff alleges multiple discriminatory acts, each individual act ordinarily triggers a new clock for filing charges alleging that act\u201d (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted by 2012 WL 4364492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), affd, 549 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2013); Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 904 N.E.2d 733, 751 (2009) (finding that a claim for refusal to rehire an employee two years after termination constituted an independent claim that accrued when the request was denied, and noting that \u201cthe failure to rehire an employee is considered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope\u201d); cf. Nat\u2019l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, it is unclear when the statute of Holdings: 0: holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable 1: holding that a proposed termination is the very type of discrete act   identified  as separate actionable unlawful employment practices 2: holding in the context of a title yii claim that discrete acts such as termination  or refusals to hire are separate retaliatory adverse employment decisions that each constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  3: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 4: holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  for which an administrative charge must be filed", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the International Shoe due process analysis.\u201d Id. at 653 (emphasis in original). The Court has already determined that Biomeasure and Ipsen Pharma are not the \u201csame entity\u201d for jurisdictional purposes. Accordingly, Ipsen Pharma is not a \u201cmere continuation\u201d of Biomeasure, and it is not subject to this Court\u2019s jurisdiction as a successor-in-interest to Biomeasure. In acquiring the '186 patent, Ipsen Pharma may have submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 293, but it did not submit to jurisdiction in Louisiana simply because the patent may have arisen out of research in Louisiana. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Purdue Research Foundation v. Holdings: 0: holding that personal jurisdiction was lacking when the only contact by defendant with forum state was initiated by plaintiffs counsels paralegal for the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction 1: holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 2: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in texas though not determinative is important consideration in establishing minimum contacts 3: holding that although an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose thus indicating that it is foreseeable that a particular automobile may cause injury in a forum state  foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the due process clause 4: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the circuit court is to \u201chear the testimony of witnesses and try the case de novo.\u201d Tenn.Code Ann. \u00a7 37-l-159(a). While the record of the juvenile court proceedings is required to be provided to the circuit court on appeal, Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 37-l-159(c), the circuit court is not limited to that record. On the contrary, the circuit court in a dependency and neglect proceeding may not rely solely on the record made before the juvenile court, but under Tenn.Code Ann. \u00a7 37-1-159(c) must try the case de n fact in support of the ultimate issues, we review the factual findings pursuant to Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d), de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re A.T.P., No. M2006-02697-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 115538, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.10, 2008) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 1: holding that findings of fact in a dependency and neglect action for severe child abuse are presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates against them 2: holding that actions for neglect and dependency governed by uccja 3: holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse 4: holding that findings of fact made in administrative proceedings are considered to be prima facie correct and that where a district court has heard and considered additional evidence  we review its findings of fact for clear error", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "After discussing these and other findings by Dr. Scardigli, the ALJ sweepingly concluded: In reviewing the record in its entirely, we find that the opinion of Dr. Scardigli that Mr. Schonewolf was unable to work is inconsistent with her narrative and clinical findings. (R. 16.) This is hardly an explanation as to why Dr. Scardigli\u2019s opinion is unreliable, as the ALJ never even attempts to explain why Dr. Scardigli\u2019s conclusions are inconsistent with her own findings. The ALJ has no basis for concluding that his interpretation of Dr. Scardigli\u2019s findings is valid while her own conclusions are unreliable; or if he has such a basis, he never discusses it in his opinion. The ALJ, therefore, invalidly substitutes his medical conclusions for those of the physician. Kent, 710 F.2d at 115 (<HOLDING>). The ALJ\u2019s dismissal of Dr. Scardigli\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available 1: holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid 2: holding that review of medical history during an examination assisted doctors medical conclusions 3: recognizing that prison officials should defer to medical professionals on medical matters 4: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that the new evidence Chen submitted in support of her Falun Gong claim, including the letters, would not \u201caffect the outcome of her proceedings,\u201d where she failed to overcome the IJ\u2019s adverse credibility determination. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234. Finally, the record supports the BIA\u2019s finding that Chen failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief under the CAT. We note that the BIA inaccurately found that Chen\u2019s evidence did not address the treatment of individuals repatriated to China. Nevertheless, the BIA cannot be said to have abused its discretion in denying Chen\u2019s motion without \u201cmore particularized evidence\u201d that she was more likely than not to be subjected to torture if returned to China. Cf. Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners argument that the evidence in the record clearly establishes that he is more likely than not to face torture if removed citation quotation marks and brackets omitted 1: holding that cat applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country 2: holding that to qualify for protection under the convention against torture an alien must show that he will more likely than not be tortured in his home country if removed 3: holding that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the petitioner would more likely than not be subjected to torture if removed to china based solely on the fact that she had illegally departed china without more particularized evidence 4: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien established that he will more likely than not be tortured if  removed", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Cir. 1974); Kerbs v. Fall River Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); Lawrence v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 398 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1968); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951, 88 S.Ct. 1043, 19 L.Ed.2d 1143 (1968); Harrison v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 435 F.Supp. 281 (W.D.Mich.1977); Starck v. Dewane, 364 F.Supp. 466 (N.D.Ill.1973); Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F.Supp. 571 (N.D.Ill.1963), the Seventh Circuit has expressly declined to take a position on the question, Hidell v. International Diversified Investments, 520 F.2d 529, 536-37 n.15 (7th Cir. 1975). See also Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 342 F.Supp. 1162, 1163-64 (N.D.Ohio 1971); Rosen v. Albern Color Research, Inc., 218 F.Supp. 473, 475-76 (E.D.Pa. 1963) (<HOLDING>). The absurdity of holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that the hobbs act did not apply to the robbery of a computer company executive in his home even though the crime may have prevented him from getting to work or making busi ness calls because his only connection with interstate commerce was his employment by a business engaged in interstate commerce 1: holding that local telephone calls are inadequate to satisfy jurisdictional requisite of interstate commerce 2: holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce 3: recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce 4: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of this breach of contract claim. See Edwards, 178 F.3d at 241 n. 6. Next, the Joneses dispute the district court\u2019s dismissal of their third claim, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the Uniform Commercial Code (\u201cUCC\u201d), as adopted by Virginia, which they based on Defendant\u2019s alleged breaches of contract discussed supra. The Joneses\u2019 claim fails as a matter of law for two reasons. First, the UCC does not apply to transfers of real property. Greenwood Assocs., Inc. v. Crestar Bank, 248 Va. 265, 448 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1994). Second, even if the deed of trust falls under the UCC as the Joneses argue, their claim fails because it was pled as a separate tort claim. See Charles E. Brauer Co. v. NationsBank of Va. N.A., 251 Va. 28, 466 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Joneses contend that the Holdings: 0: holding that where the conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim is the same conduct forming the basis for the breach of contract claim the claims merge and there is no separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing 1: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 2: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract 3: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 4: holding that breach of good faith and fair dealing claim requires showing of breach of contract", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Amendment, the City has not destroyed \u201ca major portion\u201d of the license\u2019s value. Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d at 262. Plaintiff has two other wireless communication towers within the City (AR, Ex. 1 at 23), Plaintiff has rejected a site because it would be too \u201ccomplex\u201d to build upon (AR, Ex. 1 at 22), and Plaintiffs own witnesses have not testified that other sites would be entirely unavailable (See, e.g., AR at 21-22, 27-28). In other words, Plaintiffs FCC license is being used within the City through the two existing towers, and may well be used more if Plaintiff applies at additional sites. Plaintiff has not proven to the satisfaction of this Court that the value of its FCC license has decreased. See United States v. 129.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the Court grants the Holdings: 0: holding that landowner was entitled to compensation because the condemnation destroyed all reasonable access to remainder property 1: holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies 2: holding the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings 3: holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property 4: recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "clearly states that the precise location of an easement need not be designated for the easement to be valid. See McConnell v. Golden, 104 R.I. 657, 663, 247 A.2d 909, 912 (1968). Instead, the holders of the dominant estate are entitled to a convenient, suitable, and accessible easement of way. Id. Therefore, despite the lack of specificity in the original writing that created the easement, plaintiffs are entitled to the use of \u201ca rear roadway, at least ten feet in width,\u201d to be \u201ckept open so that vehicles can reach the rear of the building [once] known as First National Store Since this language was referenced in defendant\u2019s deed, and because it has not been modified by subsequent instrument, it remains in effect. See Crawford Realty Co. v. Ostrow, 89 R.I. 12, 19, 150 A.2d 5, 9 (1959) (<HOLDING>). There is no question that defendant caused a Holdings: 0: holding that an express easement ran with the dominant estate 1: holding that increase in vehicular traffic arising out of the subdivision of the dominant estate was reasonably foreseeable and so did not restrict the rights of the dominant owner 2: recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement 3: holding that the dominant tenement a power company rather than the servient tenement had affirmative duties of inspection and repair related to its easement 4: holding that the owner of the dominant tenement may extinguish an easement appurtenant by specifically excluding it from a conveyance of the dominant estate", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "court made individualized determinations for each defendant, this argument overlooks the fact that the court neglected to identify the particular evidence presented at trial and at the sentencing hearing that led it to find Orlando accountable for $449,000. See United States v. Corvado, 227 F.3d 528, 540-41 (6th Cir.2000) (remanding the case for re-sentencing because the district court \u201ceither summarily adopted the findings of the [PSR] or simply declared that the enhancement in question was supported by a preponderance of the evidence,\u201d thereby failing to comply with the requirement of Rule 32(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that it make specific factual findings for each sentencing matter controverted); United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 396-97 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, Holdings: 0: holding that the district court failed to comply with rule 32c1 because its oral finding regarding the value of loss resulting from monuss offense was stated in general terms and did not explain how it calculated the amount of loss or respond to the defendants specific factual objections to the methods of calculation included in the psr 1: holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding 2: holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard 3: holding that where the real value of an anchoring system design is in the idea not in the physical plans that memorialize it any loss in value of the design represents a loss in the value of the idea which is not a loss of use of tangible property 4: holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented  to the district court", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the claims of fraud against BMC because it allegedly committed the fraud as BMC\u2019s agent. If Plaintiffs are unable to show fraud on the part of BMC or First Boston, as BMC\u2019s agent, BMC will have no claim for contribution or indemnity against First Boston. If Plaintiffs are able to show fraud on the part of First Boston, it might be held liable for all or part of the claim against BMC, even though it would not be liable for the particular relief sought. The power to implead First Boston based on its fraud as an agent of BMC should not be limited by the form of the remedy requested in the Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint, especially when, as here, the relief sought is a lump sum of $30,000,000 minus the value of the Notes. Cf. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Concast, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 566 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>). Although no authority is presented for the Holdings: 0: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding thirdparty complaint proper in action for declaratory judgment even though the defendant would have no pecuniary liability to plaintiffs 3: holding that if a declaratory judgment will not end the controversy it is not proper 4: holding that filing of infringement action twelve days after complaint for declaratory judgment obviated the need for a declaratory judgment in this case", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a substantial question of federal law.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the District Court correctly held, the ease before us does not depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Petitioner argues that because his petition for vacatur alleged that arbiters had disregarded federal law by holding that a settlement agreement bound the parties, there is federal-question jurisdiction. But whether a settlement agreement is binding is generally a question of state contract law. Of course, federal common law does sometimes govern settlements, as when state law over settlements might otherwise conflict with federal policy or frustrate objectives of federal legislation. See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161, 81 S.Ct. 561, 5 L.Ed.2d 486 (1961) (<HOLDING>). But in the case before us, the underlying Holdings: 0: holding that under illinois law interpreting the meaning of a contract is a question of law determined by the court 1: holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that the validity of releases under the federal employers liability act was a question to be determined by federal rather than state law 4: holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "muscle tenderness on repeated examinations ...; or, [a]ny other medical signs that are consistent with medically accepted clinical practice and are consistent with the other evidence in the ease record.\u201d Id. at 3. Further, CFS may be established by: (1) laboratory findings including neurally mediated hypotension or an abnormal exercise stress test; and (2) mental findings, including problems with short-term memory, information processing, visual-spatial issues, comprehension, concentration, speech, word-finding, calculation, and anxiety or depression. Id. Citing Ruling 99-2p, we have recognized that \u201cthere are no specific laboratory findings that are\u201d widely accepted as indicative of CFS and no test for CFS. Vega v. Comm\u2019r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). B. Medical Opinions Generally, the opinions Holdings: 0: holding that the alj failed to analyze the effect of cfs on a claimants ability to do work meaningfully when he rejected cfs as a diagnosis for want of a definite test or specific laboratory findings to support the diagnosis 1: holding that individual has privacy interest in medical information including diagnosis 2: holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record 3: holding that the alj erred in determining that the claimant was disabled when a retrospective diagnosis along with all other medical evidence supported a finding of disability 4: holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as to correct an inadvertent omission concerning a hiring freeze. See Gassaway Decl. \u00b6\u00b6 8-13; [D.E. 35-7]; [D.E. 35-8]. Moreover, ECSU reposted the position two additional times after .Gray and Cherry applied in order to increase the applicant pool, and such reposting \u25a0 obviously did not favor Gray who already had applied. See Gassa-way Decl. \u00b6\u00b6 12-13; Branch - Decl. \u00b6 7; [D.E. 35-9]; [D.E. 35-12]; [D.E. 35-13]; [D.E. 35-14];, [D.E. 35-15]. Furthermore,, a job posting for a senior law-enforcement management position that references a preference for law-enforcement management experience is not evidence that an employer intentionally sought to exclude African-Americans in general, or to exclude Cherry in this case. Cf. Feldman v. Law Enf't Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted); Jiminez v. Mary Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court does not sit as a superpersonnel department to review the prudence of employment decisions 1: holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts 2: holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department 3: holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this court 4: holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": ". Id. 42 . Id. at \u00b615. 43 . Id. at \u00b6 16. Plaintiff was recommended to Defendant by Judith Hunter, a master representative. Id. at \u00b6 15. Based on this recommendation, Stewart pushed for Plaintiff's hiring despite his lack of manager verification. 44 . Pl's. Am. Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J\u201e 16. 45 . Attachment 6 to Docket Entry 81 is an excerpt of Judith Hunter's deposition testimony. Hunter\u2019s deposition, however, does not mention verifiable relevant experience. Instead, the portion attached seems to focus on the confidential documents Plaintiff allegedly took from Custer\u2019s office. 46 . Custer's summary was noted on an Authorization Form. See Attachment A to Plaintiff\u2019s Response to Summary Judgment at (DE #41). 47 . E.E.O.C. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir.1988)(<HOLDING>). 48 . Balmer, 423 F.3d at 612. 49 . Id. 50 . Holdings: 0: holding that the legitimate business reason standard is the appropriate benchmark against which to measure the factor other than sex defense 1: holding that the  fair and just reason standard is simply more generous than the standard for determining whether a plea is invalid 2: holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false 3: holding that majority shareholders had legitimate business reasons for terminating a shareholder which included the reason that the shareholder was not working well with other employees 4: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "we explained: Equitable tolling would be appropriate, for example, when a prisoner is actually innocent, when an adversary\u2019s conduct\u2014 or other uncontrollable circumstances\u2014 prevents a prisoner from timely filing, or when a prisoner actively pursues judicial remedies but files a defective pleading during the statutory period. Simple excusable neglect is not sufficient. Moreover, a petitioner must diligently pursue his federal habeas claims; a claim of insufficient access to relevant law, such as AEDPA, is not enough to support equitable tolling. Id. (internal citations omitted). Mr. Bisner has not shown that any of the three circumstances discussed in Gibson, or any similar circumstances, exist. And the reasons Mr. Bisner offers for equitable tolling are simply inadequate. See id. (<HOLDING>); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that aedpas statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling only when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 1: holding that the general equitable tolling doctrine is read into every statute of limitations 2: holding petitioners alleged ignorance of aedpas statute of limitations is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling 3: holding statute of limitations period defined in 28 usc  2244d is subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "isolated investigation reveals relatively little about the conduct of the Air Force as an agency. Given this, and given Major Bux-ton\u2019s strong privacy interests in her personnel files, it is clear that even under the more exacting standard of \u00a7 552(b)(6), disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus, the requested documents are properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. III. Because the requested documents are exempt from disclosure under either \u00a7 552(b)(6) or \u00a7 552(b)(7)(C), and consequently, also under the Privacy Act, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be denied and the Air Force\u2019s motion for summary judgment must be granted. An appropriate order will enter. 1 . See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C.Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Although the language of \u00a7 552(b)(7)(C) Holdings: 0: holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia 1: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 2: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 3: holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption 4: holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "sentence.\u201d (Emphasis added.)); Keven Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 La. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2016) (\u201cRestitution is an important component of a criminal offender\u2019s sentence.\u201d (Emphasis added.)); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 94 (Iowa 2014) (\u201cRestitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence has become a core component of criminal punishment.\u201d (Emphasis added.)). If the legislature intended the statute to apply narrowly, it could have used narrow language. It did not. As succinctly noted by an appellate court, the term \u201csentence\u201d is not synonymous with the term \u201cjail.\u201d State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Smarr v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 748 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (<HOLDING>), disapproved of on other grounds by Martin v. Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs 1: holding that the law is clear that when a defen dant is sentenced to a split sentence consisting of incarceration and probation  the combined sanction cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law 2: holding that work release qualified as incarceration 3: holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration 4: holding a sentence of imprisonment is considered punitive and therefore criminal contempt if it is limited to a definite period", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a situation where Christopher-son was alone with him and able to have sexual contact. Id. [\u00b6 15.] In Perkins, 444 N.W.2d at 36, the defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree rape stemming from three incidents of sexual contact with a female minor, D.J.K. All three incidents occurred when D.J.K. was babysitting or visiting in Perkins\u2019 home. The circuit court admitted testimony of two other girls indicating that Perkins had initiated sexual contact with them when they were babysitting his children or otherwise visiting his home. We concluded that \u201c[t]he challenged testimony demonstrat[ed] a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home.\u201d Id. at 38. See also State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669, 670-71 (S.D.1986) (<HOLDING>). [\u00b6 16.] Under these authorities, Big Crow\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the striking similarity between the acts alleged in the indictment and the prior incidents rendered incidents that occurred fifteen years prior to the acts alleged in the indictment relevant and admissible under rule 404b 1: holding that a defendant must show that the victim had previously been exposed to a sexual act and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experience and ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge 2: holding that evidence was insufficient where the victim testified that she was awake and communicated her desire not to have sexual intercourse with the defendant 3: holding other acts testimony showed a common scheme where defendants stepdaughter testified to incidents of sexual contact which paralleled the complaint made by the present victim 4: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "morale, comfort, and dignity, it is not our province to take such action, which rests with the State Department of Social Services, its Board of Social Welfare, and the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Unlike Alabama\u2019s \u201csubstitute father\u201d regulation, which was struck down for inconsistency with the controlling federal statute in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), New York\u2019s resources and income exemptions do not run contrary to the central purpose of the controlling federal statute. As New York\u2019s regulations do not \u201cplainly and palpably\u201d infringe upon the policy of an Act of Congress, they must be allowed to stand. See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 867-868 (S.D.N.Y.1968), affd., 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed. 2d 511 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Equal Protection Plaintiffs\u2019 next contention Holdings: 0: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined 1: holding that medicaid recipients do have enforceable rights under  1396aa23 2: holding that new yorks welfare laws and regulations requiring welfare recipients in certain instances to repay the cost of assistance benefits if they are discovered to have property recover for injuries in a lawsuit or are entitled to insurance proceeds are not inconsistent with social security provisions which grant aid to families with dependent children to enable recipients of assistance to attain or retain capability for    maximum selfsupport and personal independence 42 usc  601 3: holding ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted so as to provide maximum coverage to the insured 4: holding that assuming compliance with a standard form and the absence of conflict with statute the parties to a contract of insurance are free to incorporate such provisions and conditions as they desire", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "as displaying a total lack of competence in the law.\u201d Aplt. Opening Br. at 7. Further, in addition to charging that the judge has violated federal law \u201chundreds of times,\u201d thus demonstrating his \u201cheinous criminal nature,\u201d plaintiffs state: \u201cOf course, it don\u2019t make no never mind to [the district judge, he] is so far above the law, [he] cain\u2019t [sic] see the law, but then, [the judge] makes it up as he goes along anyway.\u201d Aplt. Reply Br. to Aplee. Smith at 3. Referring to one of the defendants\u2019 attorneys, plaintiffs wrote: \u201cbut hey\u2014 when you get to he like hell to gain advantage as [the attorney] has done \u2014 well go ahead and lie! Who cares?\u201d Id. at 4. These statements come perilously close to forfeiting plaintiffs\u2019 right to appellate review. See Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we have carefully reviewed the Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs scurrilous briefs that failed to address substance of claims forfeited appeal 1: holding that the supreme court will not address an argument on appeal if a party has failed to obtain a ruling below 2: holding that when an application letter included a statement referring to the appellate division briefs the claims in the briefs were fairly presented to highest state court because the fair import of this statement was that petitioner was requesting the new york court of appeals to review the same claims that were advanced in the appellate division 3: holding that an appellant abandons an issue for purposes of appeal where he fails to argue it in his briefs 4: holding that a habeas petitioner abandons the claims he does not address on appeal", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or to consult with an attorney or to have a parent present during questioning.\u201d The Court applied the rule requiring all interrogation to cease when an adult defendant requests an attorney, to a juvenile who requests an attorney, parent, guardian, or custodian. See id. Once a juvenile defendant has requested the presence of a parent, or any one of the parties listed in the statute, defendant may not be interrogated further \u201cuntil [counsel, parent, guardian, or custodian] has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.\u201d Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631, 636 (1986) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also State v. Hunt, 64 N.C. App. 81, 86, 306 S.E.2d 846, 850 (<HOLDING>), disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 824, 310 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that juvenile defendants miranda rights were violated when the police continued to interrogate him after he requested his parents 1: holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles 2: holding that officers remarks to a sixteenyearold juvenile that a cooperative attitude would be to his benefit were far from threatening or coercive where he was thoroughly informed of his miranda rights and the officers questioning was restrained and free from the abuses that so concerned the court in miranda  3: holding that the trial court violated the defendants allocution rights when the court sentenced him without allowing him to offer mitigating remarks 4: holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "followed by three years supervised release. In accordance with \u00a7 1326(b) and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual \u00a7 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2000), Hernandez-Roman\u2019s sentence was enhanced because of his prior conviction of an aggravated felony. Hernandez-Roman asserts that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the aggravated felony was an element of the offense that had to be charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held to the contrary in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219,140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), and the Apprendi Court did not overrule that holding. 530 U.S. at 489-90. See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 931, 122 S.Ct. 2606, 153 L.Ed.2d 792 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We also reject Hernandez-Roman\u2019s argument Holdings: 0: holding that almendareztorres remains the law after apprendi 1: holding both that almendareztorres was not overruled by apprendi and was not limited to facts in which the defendant does not contest prior convictions 2: holding that almendareztorres remains good law after apprendi 3: holding that almendareztorres was not overruled by apprendi 4: holding that apprendi carved out an exception for prior convictions that specifically preserved the holding of almendareztorres", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is encapsulated in the general negligence principles that apply to any other design professional. 17 . There was a jury finding that the property owner was negligent in hiring and supervising the contractor. McDaniel, 887 S.W.2d at 170. Such a claim is not covered by Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 795-96 (Tex.1962), which we discuss below. 18 . This Court has recently explained in another context that, when a party takes on multiple roles with respect to an event or transaction, the fact that one of those roles is one for which there is no liability (former premises owner) does not shield the party from liability arising out of the other roles (designer of a faulty acid addition system). See Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 279-81 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>). 19 . According to Occidental, this portion of Holdings: 0: holding that role as limited partner with no duty did not insulate party from liability for other nonpassive role in partnership which did give rise to duty 1: holding the voluntary assumption of a duty will give rise to liability if the performance is not done with reasonable care 2: holding only a party to the partnership agreement can breach it and be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty relating to partnership obligations 3: holding that under texas law limited partner could not bring breach of fiduciary duty claims without the partnership because the partners claims would be indirect and duplicative of the partnerships claims 4: holding partner owes fiduciary duty in dealings effecting the winding up of the partnership and the proper preservation of partnership assets during that time", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Kamal Matian, a native and citizen of Iran, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge\u2019s deportation order, which denied all relief except protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252, Femandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.2006), and we deny the petition for review. Matian\u2019s sole contention, that he is eligible for relief under former \u00a7 212(c), is foreclosed by Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). See also Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 Holdings: 0: holding that iirira and aedpa are not applicable to criminal alien who entered a guilty plea at a time when alien was eligible for  212c relief 1: holding that bars on 212c relief do not apply to aliens entering preaedpa nolo contendere or guilty pleas in reliance on 212c availability but that those bars do apply to aliens convicted through other means prior to the enactment of aedpa and whose proceedings commenced postaedpa 2: holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c 3: holding that aliens who pleaded not guilty and elected a jury trial  are barred from seeking  212c relief 4: holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for  212c relief", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the trial court erred when it failed to invoke the equitable principle of \u201csubrogation\u201d and declare that, to the extent MECO pays Subcontractors, either voluntarily or involutarily, MECO should be entitled to the security held by Subcontractors, mainly, the Subcontractors\u2019 mechanics\u2019 liens. Stated otherwise, MECO charges the trial court erred when it failed to \u201caward MECO a right of subrogation against the Subs mechanic\u2019s lien against the property.\u201d In developing this point, MECO argues that \u00a7 429.270, RSMo 1994, and case law interpretations thereof make it clear that mechanics\u2019 lien cases are proceedings in equity in every sense of the word and for every purpose, including application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation. See, e.g., Huggins v. Hill, 236 S.W. 1051 (Mo. banc 1921) (<HOLDING>). MECO then cites Cole v. Morris, 409 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one 1: recognizing equitable subrogation 2: holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government 3: holding mechanics lien action is equitable not only because the statute so denominates it but is equitable in substance 4: holding the beginning of a creditors action to subject an equitable estate to the payment of a judgment gives a specific lien upon the property which it is sought to reach and this lien continues while the cause is pending", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof\u2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with affidavits, depositions, interrogatories or other sworn evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party may not satisfy this burden simply by \u201cshow[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.\u201d Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), quoting Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 Holdings: 0: holding a finding of fact by the commission may not be based upon surmise conjecture or speculation but must be founded on evidence of sufficient substance to afford a reasonable basis for it 1: holding that a nonmoving party cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by relying on conclusory statements 2: holding that a court may not engage in conjecture or surmise in determining the offense for which a defendant was convicted 3: holding that a nonmovant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely  on the basis of conjecture or surmise 4: recognizing the general rule that when one party files a motion for summary judgment the nonmovant cannot merely rely on matters pleaded in the complaint but must by factual affidavit or the like respond to the motion", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the employee was invited to an employer-sponsored dinner meeting. After attending the meeting, while on her way home, the employee was severely injured in an automobile accident. After accepting the Commission\u2019s finding that the employee had been required to attend the dinner, the court held the em ployee\u2019s journey was covered under the special mission exception: Here, claimant was attending an off-premises dinner meeting, after normal working hours, under at least the implied direction of her employer, and travel to and from the meeting was a necessity. These special circumstances justify the Commission\u2019s determination that claimant\u2019s injuries while returning from the meeting were compensable. Id. at 916. See also Brown v. City of Wheeling, 212 W.Va. 121, 569 S.E.2d 197, 203 (2002) (<HOLDING>); State of Utah (Tax Commission) v. Industrial Holdings: 0: holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus 1: holding that it was appellants burden to prove that her husbands death occurred in the scope of employment and that she was eligible for widows benefits 2: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 3: holding that the employers party was a social event thus the employee was not acting within the scope of her employment when drinking at a party or when she was driving home afterwards 4: holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006); see Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted unless there has been: (1) \u201cerror,\u201d (2) that was \u201cplain,\u201d (3) that affected \u201csubstantial rights,\u201d and (4) that \u201cseriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.\u201d United States v. Redo, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.2004). 1. Moreland first asserts that his due process rights were violated when the prosecution compelled him to testify regarding whether two government witnesses lied during their testimony. It is improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant regarding the veracity of a government witness. United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the prosecutor twice asked Holdings: 0: holding that testimony regarding witness credibility is prohibited unless it is admissible as character evidence 1: holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony 2: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error 3: holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness 4: holding coconspirators guilty plea is admissible as an aid to the jurys assessment of witness credibility but not as substantive evidence of a defendants guilt", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to recover the benefits that she claimed. Ms. Wilson did not initiate this action until July 28, 2011, approximately 34 months after the three year contractual time limit for a lawsuit expired. The record does not support Ms. Wilson\u2019s request for equitable tolling of that limitation period. Doc. 19 at 22-23 (third alteration in original). We agree. A plaintiff is not reasonably diligent when she fails to investigate basic issues that are relevant to her claim or to proceed with it in a reasonably prompt fashion. See Irwin v. Dep\u2019t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (explaining that equitable tolling generally cannot be invoked if \u201cthe claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights\u201d); Motta, 717 F.3d at 846-47 (<HOLDING>). Wilson could have requested a copy of the Holdings: 0: holding that a prisoners claim under the ftca based on being imprisoned for an extra ten days did not call into question the conviction or sentence and was not barred by heck 1: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim against the united states for negligence was not a tort claim within the ftca where it was founded upon an alleged failure to perform explicit or implicit contractual obligations 3: holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendants failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an adverse personnel action and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendants failure to transfer her 4: holding that equitable tolling could not apply to the plaintiffs ftca claim because she was not diligent and her lack of diligence was evidenced by her failure to call the ftca helpline search a website that included a relevant link or ask for an address before the limitations period ran", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "taxpayers should be allowed to conduct their own midcycle revaluations of their property whenever they believe that their property values have declined since the last time the county revalued their property according to the legislatively sanctioned program. But if ASiMI is correct, counties would have to conduct out-of-cycle revaluations every time a taxpayer alleged a declination in property value during a midcycle year, unless they simply acquiesced to every allegation. Such a system is unsupported by statute and would render meaningless the uniformity goals of cyclical revaluation programs. Not only are ASiMI\u2019s arguments unsupported by the language of RCW 84.36.005 and RCW 84.40.020, they are also unreasonable in light of chapter 84.41 RCW. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11-12 (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION \u00b618 ASiMI has cited to no Holdings: 0: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts 1: holding that the plain meaning of a statute is ascertained by looking at all related statutes 2: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous 3: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 4: holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "specifically to Arteaga\u2019s counsel\u2019s argument that the jury \u201c[had] to make a decision whether or not when my client looked at [the photographs] he was viewing them as lewd.\u201d The trial court\u2019s instruction was not improper. Arteaga was allowed to argue and present evidence that others, including appellant, might not view the photographs as lewd. Specifically, Arteaga testified, without objection, that he did not consider the photographs to be child pornography. The argument the jury was instructed to disregard went a step further\u2014informing the jury that the jury\u2019s consideration of lewdness was limited to whether appellant viewed the photographs as lewd. The trial court correctly instructed that it was within the jury\u2019s province to decide whether the photographs were lewd. See id. at 792 (<HOLDING>). We also note the jury charge tracked the Holdings: 0: holding that a conviction for a lascivious act with a child in violation of iowa code  7098 was a crime of violence 1: recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography 2: holding a defendant found in possession of three or more copies of the same article of child pornography during a single episode may only be prosecuted for a single count of possession with intent to promote 3: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment 4: holding an appeal from conviction for possession and promotion of child pornography that the defendant was not entitled to instruction that whether the content of a photograph constitutes a lewd or lascivious exhibition of a childs genitals depends on the intent of the photographer", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "dictionary/seek (last visited March 27, 2017). Thus the Secretary\u2019s only clear duty under section 7071(c) is to try to get the IMF to implement best practices for getting whistleblower retaliation claimants access to independent adjudicative bodies. That limited duty 'forecloses this Court from issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to \u201crequire the IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the convening of an independent adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal\u2019s] ' complaints.\u201d See SAC, ECF No. 5 at 15 (em phasis added). Accordingly, because this Court lacks the authority to grant a portion of the relief that Mr. Nyambal has requested, he fails to satisfy the redressa-bility prong of the standing inquiry. See Lozansky v. Obama, 841 F.Supp.2d 124, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Second, the Court does not doubt its Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs  lack standing because the court cannot issue the requested writ of mandamus and thus cannot redress the alleged injury 1: holding that a writ of mandamus will not issue under  1361 unless the defendant is under a clear nondiscretionary duty to perform the act requested 2: holding standing cannot be waived and may thus be raised at any time 3: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 4: holding public standing doctrine permitted action for emergency writ of mandamus", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that she provided to Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs multiple revision surgeries. By its motion in limine, Defendant seeks to interview Dr. Carman, an employee of the United States\u2019 government, ex parte, in advance of her deposition. Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact with her treating physician, and proposes that the parties interview Dr. Carman concurrently, before her deposition. II. Standard of Review There is no physician-patient privilege under federal statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2671, state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2674. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, \u201cin civil actions and proceedings, with .1991) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact Holdings: 0: holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action 1: holding that federal common law allows ex parte interviews as discovery tool and controls even when state law supplies the rule of decision 2: holding that ex parte young exception to states sovereign immunity applies only where violation of federal law is ongoing not where federal law was violated only in the past 3: holding that minnesota law prohibiting ex parte interviews was not integral to its privilege law but was merely procedural rule and therefore not controlling in diversity action and the federal rules allow ex parte interviews as method of informal discovery 4: holding that preservation of the integrity of maine privilege law limits defendant to formal mechanisms of discovery provided by federal rules which do not allow ex parte interviews absent consent", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "at 6) (citing Rybarczyk, 235 F.3d at 986; EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Emps. Relief Ass\u2019n, 727 F.2d 566, 579 (6th Cir.1984); Lorenzen v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 236-37 (7th Cir.1990)); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir.1984). COOK, Circuit Judge, joined by MOORE, Circuit Judge. Though we concur with Judge Gwin\u2019s conclusions with respect to the statute-of-limitations, ICCTA-retroactivity, and prejudgment-interest issues, we write separately on the issue of damages. Courts speak through judgments, and the judgment appealed here represents Comerica\u2019s first adverse judgment as opposed to \u201ccalculation\u201d or \u201cfinding\u201d as referenced by the dissent on damages. See California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311, 107 S.Ct. 2852, 97 L.Ed.2d 258 (1987) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Further, the district court incorrectly held Holdings: 0: recognizing that our courts will normally not enforce foreign tax judgments 1: holding that judgments rendered by courts not having authority to enter such are not subject to collateral attack because judges entering those judgments were de facto officers 2: holding that the discovery rule does not apply to  bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments 3: recognizing that judgments of arizona courts on foreign judgments will not be conclusive in the jurisdiction of origin 4: holding that courts review judgments not statements in opinions", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(1984); providing \u201cample room for mistaken judgments,\u201d Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092; shielding officers from liability when the law did not clearly proscribe the ac tions they took, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); and protecting \u201call but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,\u201d Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. The common theme of protecting reasonable judgment calls by officers, such as this one, exists throughout qualified immunity law. It is not inconsistent for an officer to have violated constitutional rights, as the jury found here, but still be entitled to immunity on the various prongs (described below) of the immunity test. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 871-72, 879-80 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 636-37 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that transit authority director was entitled to immunity despite jury verdict for plaintiffs because law was not clearly established at the time that plaintiffs activities were constitutionally protected from employer retaliation 1: holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity 2: holding that officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless at the time of the dismissal it was clearly established that employees in the particular positions at issue in light of the responsibilities inherent in those positions were constitutionally protected from patronage dismissal  3: holding that prison clerks were entitled to immunity despite jury verdict against them because it was not clearly established at the time that mail from the courts was protected legal mail 4: holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "are intended to protect consumers against misrepresentations of material fact; statements of opinion alone are generally insufficient to rise to the level of actionable misrepresentations under the DTPA. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex.1980) (noting that misrepresentations of material fact are actionable under sections 17.46(b)(5) and (7) so long as they are not merely \u201cpuffing\u201d or opinion); cf. Latham v. Castillo, 972 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Tex.1998) (allowing claim for mental anguish damages against attorney under uneonscio-nability section of pre-1995 version of DTPA). Gertrude identified no particular statements by DKW about the settlement agreement\u2019s \u201ccharacteristics\u201d or \u201cbenefits,\u201d or about any \u201crights, remedie 52 (Tex.App.\u2014Eastland 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); see also Humble Nat\u2019l Bank v. DCV, Inc., 933 Holdings: 0: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue 1: holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient 2: holding insurer not liable for misrepresentation based solely on general statement that policy was adequate or sufficient 3: holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend 4: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(2012). The Alleyne Decision In Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum is an element that must be decided by the jury. Alleyne v. United States, \u2014 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 2163-64, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). By newly recognizing this constitutional right, the Supreme Court\u2019s decision satisfies part of \u00a7 2255(f)(3). See In re Payne, 733 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir.2013). But Mr. Hoon must also satisfy the remaining requirement in \u00a7 2255(f)(3): the existence of a past holding that the newly recognized constitutional right is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. No court has treated Alleyne as retroactive to cases on collateral review. See United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210 (3d Cir.2014) (to be published) (<HOLDING>); In re Mazzio, 756 F.3d 487, 489-92, 2014 WL Holdings: 0: holding that batson v kentucky does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review 1: holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review 2: holding that batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review 3: holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review 4: holding booker is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "necessarily constitute bad faith, particularly when the valuation of the injuries and damages of a claim is difficult. Here, in light of the uncertainties regarding [the plaintiffs] future earning power and the inherently subjective nature of much of the plaintiffs\u2019 damages, a reasonable jury could not find [the defendant\u2019s] lower valuation of the claim to be clear and convincing evidence of bad faith. Williams v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 83 F.Supp.2d 567, 576 (E.D.Pa.2000); see also Kosierowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 F.Supp.2d 583, 592 (E.D.Pa.1999) (\u201cEven cases such as Klinger that acknowledge that a refusal to settle may constitute bad faith so hold only when the amount in question is clearly known by the insurer.\u201d (citing Klinger, 115 F.3d at 233)); Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688-89 (<HOLDING>). Defendant\u2019s valuation of Plaintiffs injuries Holdings: 0: holding that an insurer acted in bad faith by failing to keep the insured informed of settlement negotiations 1: holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations 2: holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that defendants low settlement offers were not evidence of bad faith because many factors including medical ambiguities injury severity ear damage and liabilities of each driver were used to determine settlement values and were thus reasonably based", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The judge is not to \u201cweigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.\u201d Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when there is sufficient \u201cevidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.\u201d Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. Brentwood has not waived its 2 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (<HOLDING>); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, Holdings: 0: holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights 1: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 2: holding that a cognovit clause which provided for judgment without notice or hearing was not unconstitutional per se because due process rights are subject to waiver 3: holding that where there is no unequal bargaining power or overreaching debtors can voluntarily intelligently and knowingly waive due process rights by signing a cognovit note which is an agreement by which a debtor consents in advance to a holders obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing 4: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a spouse or parent who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident; (2) has been continuously physically present in the United States for at least three years; (3) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (4) is not inadmissible due to the commission of specified crimes; and (5) establishes that removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien, his child, or to his parent. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229b(b)(2) (2006); Stepanovic v. Filip, 554 F.3d 673, 677 n. 4 (7th Cir.2009). In an appeal of an administrative decision to grant or deny cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229b(b), this court has jurisdiction only over constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D) (2006); see Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475, 479-80 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Obioha v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 400, 405 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that the rules of evidence do not apply when a court is deciding upon preliminary questions dealing with the admissibility of evidence under rule 104 except for questions of privilege 1: holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims 2: holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract 3: holding that under  1252a2bi d court has no jurisdiction over any aspects of denial of relief under  1229b except constitutional claims or questions of law 4: holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "courts routinely dismiss appeals from Rule 736 foreclosure orders for lack of jurisdiction, citing Rule 736.8(c). See, e.g., Wood v. 21st Century Mortg. Corp., No. 05-14-01467-CV, 2015 WL 3866634, at *1 (Tex. App.\u2014Dallas Jun. 23, 2015, no pet.); Moir v. JP Morgan Chase NA, No. 05-14-00899-CV, 2014 WL 6808668, at *1 (Tex. App.\u2014 Dallas Dec. 4, 2014, no pet.); Thweatt v. Deutsche Bank Nat\u2019l Tr. Co., No. 01-14-00261-CV, 2014 WL 2538691, at *1 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] Jun. 5, 2014, no pet.). The Burciagas\u2019 \u201cMotion to Vacate\u201d was an impermissible challenge to the Rule 736 Foreclosure Order. Although Rule 736.8(c) does not include \u201cmotions to vacate\u201d in its list of specific forbidden challenges to foreclosure orders, this absence is not disposi-tive. See Casterline, 476 S.W.3d at 44-45 (<HOLDING>). Rule 736.8(c) makes clear that \u201c[a]ny Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to reconsider and reopen was in substance a motion for rehearing or new trial which is prohibited by rule 7368c 1: holding that unauthorized motion for rehearing to set aside default heard by trial court will be considered as motion for reconsideration 2: holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider 3: holding that there is no authority for a motion for rehearing of an order disposing of a rule 3800 motion to correct illegal sentence and therefore the motion for rehearing did not postpone rendition of the order so as to make the notice of appeal timely 4: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(3) the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert was legally deficient because it did not include all of plaintiffs restrictions, and the ALJ erred in ignoring the vocational expert\u2019s opinion that plaintiff would be unable to work if all her testimony was taken as true; and (4) the ALJ erred in not considering plaintiffs excessive absenteeism rt by a claimant\u2019s physician, he must set forth \u201cspecific, legitimate reasons\u201d for his decision. Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 976 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.1987)) (further quotations omitted). Where, as here, an ALJ does not identify which medical exhibits were rejected and the reason for their rejection, we cannot meaningfully review the ALJ\u2019s determination. See, e.g., Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009 (<HOLDING>); Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that we must uphold any of the aljs factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence and we owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from these facts 1: holding aljs listing of factors he considered was inadequate when court was left to speculate what specific evidence led the alj to his conclusion 2: holding an aljs failure to adequately explain the weight given to treating sources opinions not harmless because the aljs reasoning was not sufficiently specific to make clear that the alj recognized and evaluated the treating relationships 3: holding in the absence of alj findings supported by specific weighing of the evidence we cannot assess whether relevant evidence adequately supports the aljs conclusion and thus the aljs unexplained conclusion was beyond meaningful review 4: holding that the alj is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "trial judge was correct in his analysis. 5 . We note the inconsistency of the phrases \u201cprima facie case\u201d and \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d appearing in the same burden of proof. However, this is the United States Supreme Court's language. Interestingly, it is only used by the federal courts in discussing summary judgment; i.e., presumptions that arise from establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Even the federal courts that have attempted to instruct a jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis do not instruct on prima facie case. 6 . In Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 F.3d 532 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it was error to instruct the jury on the technical elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting ana .3d 207, 221-222 (3rd Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1147, 121 S.Ct. 1086, Holdings: 0: holding that although a jury instruction that included the phrase prima facie case and referred to defendants burden of production created a distinct risk of confusing the jury in certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case 1: holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme 2: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error 3: holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant 4: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee\u2019s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee\u2019s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. (2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship include the following: (b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal; .... 13 . Similarly, Florida courts recognize that an employer\u2019s relationship with its employees constitutes a legitimate business interest. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). 14 . To the extent MacMillan contends that Holdings: 0: holding that sales made to contractor who builds roads for the state are not sales to the state and therefore are not exempt 1: holding that the fact that defendants sales in forum were less than 5 percent of its total sales volume was irrelevant so long as its sales were part of a regular course of dealing and were not isolated or exceptional events 2: holding that agreement prohibiting sales manager from soliciting or influencing other employees to leave automobile dealership for two years following his resignation was presumptively reasonable and necessary to protect substantial investment dealership made in specialized training of its sales staff and furthered legitimate business interests of promoting productivity and maintaining competent and specialized sale team and thus was enforceable 3: holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  4: holding that defendants conduct amounted to substantial and nonisolated activity within florida for purposes of general jurisdiction where its advertising strategy was designed to generate product sales in florida and its dollar volume of sales was substantial", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "numbers of named plaintiffs and putative class members. In Flores, the court issued a protective order preventing defendant\u2019s discovery of the plaintiffs immigration documents, social security numbers, and passports in a suit seeking unpaid wages under the FLSA. 233 F.Supp.2d at 462, 465. The court concluded that the information was irrele vant and its minimal probative value outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Id. at 464-65. See also Zeng Liu, 207 F.Supp.2d at 193 (denying defendant\u2019s request to discover information relating to plaintiffs immigration status because such information is both irrelevant and the need for its disclosure outweighed by the risk of injury to the plaintiffs, even if the parties were to enter into a confidentiality agreement); Cabrera, 695 N.W.2d at 81 (<HOLDING>). In Galaviz-Zamora, the court denied discovery Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs social security numbers are not relevant to determining liability for unpaid wages in a suit under the flsa and state law 1: holding under flsa 2: holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendants collection and publication of highly sensitive personal information including credit card numbers social security numbers financial account numbers and information regarding plaintiffs personal issues including sexuality mental illness alcoholism incest rape and domestic violence 3: holding that social security benefits should not be set off from adea lost wages award 4: holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to Bucheit and Knop, however, his claim suffers an additional problem. Neither defendant was involved personally in the decision to fire him. To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff claiming a violation of \u00a7 1983 must produce evidence that the defendant knew of a deprivation and \u201c \u2018approved it, turned a blind eye to it, failed to remedy it, or in some way personally participated.\u2019 \u201d Johnson v. equired him to report allegations of this nature to his superiors and that he always initiates an investigation when he receives a report of sexual harassment. Furthermore, even if Warden Cowan\u2019s action had been discretionary, Bucheit and Knop were not \u201cinvolved\u201d in that action by virtue of their presence. See Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dep\u2019t of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1040 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). After the meeting at which Knop had informed Holdings: 0: holding that inconsistencies in the summary judgment evidence of a single witness create a fact issue 1: holding that the nonmoving party must come forward with significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact 2: holding that evidence of defendants attendance and active participation in meeting where  1983 violation allegedly occurred did not create triable issue of fact as to personal involvement 3: holding no triable issue of fact existed where employee had not asked for accommodation 4: holding that acts of infringement occurring earlier than three years prior to suit are barred by section 507b but that triable issue of fact exists as to whether acts of copying and distribution occurred thereafter", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of \"harboring\u201d was insufficient to conclude that Congress intended to occupy the field of non-citizen employment and therefore \"to pre-empt all state regulation\u201d in that area. 424 U.S. at 360 & n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 933. While providing shelter can, by contrast, constitute harboring under \u00a7 1324, see United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir.1977), we conclude that the Ordinance is conflict preempted, without reaching field preemption. The Court in De-Canas explicitly based its decision on field preemption grounds and remanded the question of conflict preemption. See id. at 360 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 933 (noting that \u00a7 1324 and other \"cited statutory provisions\u201d would be . -, 131 S.Ct. 2958, 180 L.Ed.2d 243 (2011); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F.Supp.2d 463, 467-68 (D.S.C.2012) (<HOLDING>); Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. 10-1061, 2012 Holdings: 0: holding that  1324 preempted south carolina law creating state crimes for harboring both relating to harborers and aliens themselves 1: holding that  1324 preempted a local ordinance prohibiting renting housing to illegal aliens 2: holding the state law claims were not preempted 3: holding that in south carolina sheriffs and deputies are state officials 4: holding that  1324 preempted georgia law criminalizing harboring of aliens", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "favor because the issue was never raised by either party. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 862, the trial court \u201cshall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.\u201d However, Louisiana jurisprudence has held that \u201c[njothing in Article 862 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to confer jurisdiction on a court to decide controversies 110which the parties haye not regularly brought before it.\u201d Patrick v. Patrick, 227 So.2d 162, 164 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1969); Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 612 So.2d 923, 924 (La.App, 4th Cir,1993); Glover v. Med. Ctr. of Baton Rouge, 97-1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1261, 1262 (<HOLDING>). The petition filed by the Hymans does not Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred as a matter of law by enforcing contract for purchase of real property that had terminated by its own terms 1: holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine 2: holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim 3: holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial 4: holding the trial court erred as a matter of law in adjudicating a claim for relief that was not demanded by the parties", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to the District Council, the Prince George\u2019s County Planning Board, and the County's Department of Environmental Services/Resources as \"County\u201d interchangeably. 3 . The record extract is unclear as to when the sectional map was transmitted. The printed face sheet has a caption which reads: \"July 1991.\u201d We assume that the sectional map is printed or prepared before it is transmitted. Thus, that date, \"July 1991,\u201d was prior to transmittal. At oral argument, counsel for appellee was unable to furnish the actual date of transmittal. [4] 4. Neither party has directed us in their briefs to any provision of the zoning ordinance which would allow appellant\u2019s project to qualify for a special exception or variance permitting the commercial use 94-95, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Prior to Mahon, only direct Holdings: 0: holding that the exercise of police power was valid where an owner was prohibited from operating a liveiy stable business that was not a nuisance per se 1: holding that an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating was a valid exercise of police power wherein it prevented the defendant from further excavation below the water table 2: holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3: recognizing a connection between surface and groundwater even where the water table falls below the stream bed 4: holding that an ordinance passed for the health and comfort of the community that prohibited brickmaking in a designated area was a valid exercise of police power", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the District Court applied the correct version of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Bertoli 40 F.3d 1384, 1403 (3d Cir.1994). The ex post facto clause is violated when a court applies a change in the law which is adverse to the interests of a defendant where that change occurred after the commission of the crime. See U.S. Const., art. I, \u00a7 9, cl. 3. Accordingly, when the court in a criminal case is confronted with post-offense amendments which call for a more severe sentence than th ncealment of assets listed in Count One of the indictment was determined by either the evidence produced at trial, or the date the concealment was detected, both of which he claims point to an end date prior to November 2000. See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stein, 233 F.3d 6, 18-19 Holdings: 0: holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment 1: holding that court should not use ending date of indictment as determination of when continuing violation ended but should look at the evidence introduced at trial 2: recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence 3: holding that an offer to reimburse plaintiff for costs is not a precondition but an important factor for trial court to look at in determining whether it should grant a new trial 4: holding that valuation should occur on the date of the trial at which property issues are determined", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the size of Plaintiff's Exhibit, the Exhibit was designated a \u201cbulky exhibit\u201d by the Clerk's Office such that it is available for public viewing and copying in the Clerk\u2019s Office but is not available electronically on ECF. See Docket Entry [33], Attachment 2. 5 . The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendants have submitted the unsealed transcript of the proceedings in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Samuel L. Alexander (Civil Case No. 622-04) before Judge Gary S. Gasparovic in the District Court for Charles County, Maryland, on April 21, 2004; Plaintiff's various filings in that case; and related orders issued by both the district and appellate courts in that case, all of which may be considered matters of public record. See In re Thomas H., 381 Md. 174, 187 n. 4, 848 A.2d 652 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Warden of Maryland House of Corr., Holdings: 0: holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice 1: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law 2: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner 3: holding that a notice because it was docketed should be considered a matter of public record 4: holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in the plaintiff\u2019s favor, similar to the review of a traditional summary judgment) (citing Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997)). 44 . See Texas Logos, L.P. v. Texas Dep\u2019t of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105, 118-23 (Tex. App.Austin 2007, no pet.): accord Satterfield & Pontikes Constr., Inc. v. Texas S. Univ., 472 S.W.3d 426, 431-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (\"Texas courts have also \u2018regarded these immunity principles as ... barring suits to cancel or nullify a contract made for the benefit of the state.'\" (quoting Texas Logos, L.P., 241 S.W.3d at 120) (citing W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (1958))); Mustang Special Util. Dist. v. Providence Vill., 392 S.W.3d 311, 315-19 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 45 . Texas Logos, L.P., 241 S.W.3d at 119-20. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 1: holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability 2: holding plaintiffs claim seeking to invalidate agreement with water supply district was barred by governmental immunity 3: recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit 4: holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "no evidence that the management agent or any of its employees filed the appropriate information with the Licensing Board as required by statute. Because no reasonable jury could find that Defendants met the requirements for exemption, the Court finds that Defendants violated the MCALA by failing to register with the Licensing Board prior to engaging in debt collection activities. Despite the' MCALA violation by the management agent and its employees, Plaintiffs claims under the MCALA (Counts XXII-XXIII) fail as pled and argued by Plaintiff because the MCALA does not give rise to a private right of action. See id. \u00a7 7-401; see also Bradshaw, 765 F.Supp.2d at 727-28. Violations of the MCALA may, however, support a cause of action under the FDCPA. See Bradshaw, 765 F.Supp.2d at 729, 732 (<HOLDING>). In Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, \u00b6 52, Holdings: 0: holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act 1: holding as a matter of first impression that a violation of the mcala may in some cases support a cause of action under the fdcpa 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: holding that the elements of a cause of action were not subject matter jurisdictional simply because the statute that created the cause of action provided that district courts shall have jurisdiction of such actions 4: recognizing cause of action", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Terses a Macias on April 15, 1996.\u201d Id. at 963 (emphasis added). In support of its conclusion that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the death of Mrs. Macias, the district court cited the Supreme Court\u2019s opinions in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), the dissenting opinion of Justice O\u2019Connor in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 260, 107 S.Ct. 1114, 94 L.Ed.2d 293 (1987), and this court\u2019s opinion in Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, (9th Cir.1981). In each of those cases, the Supreme Court and this court treated the deprivation of a constitutional right as the alleged \u201cinjury.\u201d See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (<HOLDING>); Harris, 489 U.S. at 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 Holdings: 0: holding that  1983 plainly imposes liability on a government that under color of some official policy causes an employee to violate anothers constitutional rights 1: holding that although municipalities are persons within the meaning of 42 usc  1983 no municipal liability lies under that statute unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort 2: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom 3: holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability 4: holding that a defendant can only be sued in his official capacity under  1983 if he acted pursuant to an official policy or custom in causing the constitutional injury", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "fee award, Defendants do not dispute the district court\u2019s calculation of the lodestar\u2014 the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299-1302 (11th Cir.1988). Rather, Defendants contend that the district court was required to reduce the lodestar in proportion to the \u201cpartial and extremely limited\u201d success achieved by Quainoo at trial. We disagree. Because Quainoo\u2019s successful and unsuccessful claims were related, as they arose from a common core of facts, the district court was not required to reduce the lodestar. See Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). And, although the district court had the Holdings: 0: holding despite not finding undue hardship that it would be equitable to reduce the amount of nondischargeable liability by the amount of the accrued interest 1: holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories 2: holding that a liquidated damages amount set by contract is enforceable where the amount bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained 3: holding that where claims  involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories  and the plaintiff obtained only partial or limited success the court may reduce the lodestar amount if it believes that amount is excessive in relation to the plaintiffs relief emphasis added 4: holding that the presumptive amount is rebuttable and that the court may deviate from the presumptive amount if such amount is determined to be unjust or inappropriate in consideration of any relevant evidence pertaining to the factors set forth in code  201072 and 201081", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Virginia Lee requests the setting aside of a final judgment stemming from its decision to settle with the plaintiffs. So as not to be futile, therefore, Virginia Lee cannot simply state a claim or defense to the original collection action filed by the Trustees. The fact of the settlement remains, and it is this legal event that the defendant has to surmount in order to meet its threshold showing. Construction and interpretation of the settlement agreement is not a matter contemplated by the applicable federal statute in this case. Rather, an analysis of the settlement agreement is simply a matter of contract law. Because there is no federal common law of contracts, state substantive law applies. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (<HOLDING>). As to which state\u2019s law applies here, the Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 1: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 2: recognizing that it is an open question whether drpa is a federal agency governed by the apa or a state agency governed by state administrative law 3: holding that ejxcept in matters governed by the federal constitution or by acts of congress the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state 4: holding a state workers compensation regime preempted by erisa to the extent state law applied to pension plans governed by federal law", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "utilizing a governmental entity for either establishing or dissolving the status-based relationship. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-445, 93 S.Ct. 631, 34 L.Ed.2d 626 (1973) (''The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie [Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)] touched directly, as has been noted, on the marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship. On many occasions we have recognized the fundamental importance of these interests under our Constitution ... The Boddie appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their freedom to pursue other protected associational activities.\"); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Of course, a state may possess interests that Holdings: 0: holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right 1: recognizing that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals 2: holding right to be fundamental 3: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental 4: recognizing a fundamental right to marry", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). We do not believe, however, that this is such a case. Vasquez has alleged more than \u201ca mere abstract objection\u201d to Defendants\u2019 removal of the cross from the county seal. See Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086. To the contrary, he has held himself out as a member of the community where the seal is located, as someone forced into frequent regular contact with the seal, and perhaps most importantly, as someone \u201cdirectly affected\u201d by his \u201cunwelcome direct contact\u201d with the seal. If we assume for the moment that the revised seal did, in fact, convey an anti-Christian message, then it is understandable that Vasquez would feel aggrieved by that message. He should, accordingly, be able to seek a legal remedy. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (<HOLDING>); Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1087 (\u201cPlaintiffs who \u2018are Holdings: 0: holding that parents who brought suit challenging certain religiouslyrelated practices in public schools were without standing to challenge religious practices at baccalaureate programs because their children who were enrolled in elementary schools were not adversely affected by the challenged practice 1: holding that the challenged practices were not consumeroriented under  349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents 2: holding that plaintiffs had established an injury in fact because the challenged activity directly affected their recreational aesthetic and economic interests 3: holding that regulations issued by commissioner of food and drugs were ripe for review because they were definitive immediately effective and directly and immediately affected petitioners daily business activities 4: holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980). 6 . The Supreme Court recently held that a break in the custodial interrogation of fourteen days is sufficient to end the Edwards presumption that any statements made by the individual after invoking his right to counsel must be suppressed. Maryland v. Shatzer, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1223,-L.Ed.2d -(2010). 7 . In State v. Smith, 834 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Tenn.1992), in which the voluntariness of a confession was at issue, this Court observed that article I, section 9 of our state constitution may apply more broadly than its Fifth Amendment counterpart \u201cbased upon considerations other than, and in addition to, the difference in terminology.\u201d 8 . See, e.g., State v. Ragland, No. W2008-02065-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 4825182, at *8 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 15, 2009) (<HOLDING>); Nash, 2009 WL 2461178, at *4-5 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person 1: holding that a suspect made an acceptable request for counsel by stating i dont think i want to talk to you anymore without a lawyer 2: holding that statement i think i should call my lawyer was an unequivocal request for counsel 3: holding that request for counsel was not unequivocal when suspect wrote i need a lawyer on the blackboard among several of other statements while alone in the interview room then responded to officers clarifying questions that he did not want a lawyer 4: holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.\u201d Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832. After Pendleton gave reasons for the objection, the district court should have determined whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been shown. See White, 684 N.W.2d at 505. Instead, the court allowed the state to respond and Pendleton to rebut that response. The court\u2019s analysis was not in accordance with our Batson precedent or the Batson procedure set forth in Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6a(3). But we have not reversed a district court\u2019s Batson ruling solely because of its failure to follow the prescribed procedure. See Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832-34 (<HOLDING>); Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 202 (\u201cBecause the Holdings: 0: recognizing that factual findings were clearly erroneous where the record before the court was simply devoid of any basis for the district courts conclusion 1: holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record 2: holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record 3: holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review 4: holding that the district courts application of batson was clearly erroneous but then reviewing the record to make our own determination as to the validity of the objection", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "service of summons, Omni 484 U.S. at 109, 108 S.Ct. 404, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to effectively extend the territorial reach of a federal statute by applying a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction where service is not effected pursuant to that federal statute. In fact, in the only case to directly address the issue, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held, without analysis, that because RICO contains no provision for worldwide service, a plaintiff who attempts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign national served outside the United States \u201cmust rely on the long-arm statute of the state in which he files his suit.\u201d Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.1992); see also Brink\u2019s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. Kolinor Optical Holdings: 0: holding that that foreign corporation that acted as agent for retail customers within the united kingdom had insufficient contacts with florida to permit the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the corporation 1: recognizing that personal jurisdiction of federal courts of course may be grounded in state longarm or other jurisdiction statutes in civil rico cases 2: holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts  ie general jurisdiction  if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state 3: holding that the foreign administrator of a deceased nonresident was subject to jurisdiction under the illinois state longarm statute because dece dent would have been subject to jurisdiction had he lived 4: holding rico plaintiff may resort to state longarm statute to serve foreign defendants abroad and assuming personal jurisdiction question would turn on foreign defendants contacts with middle district of florida", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "ordinarily defer to the legislature\u2019s stated intent, only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.\u201d Id. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The New Mexico Constitution also prohibits the state legislature from enacting ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, see N.M. Const., Art. 2 \u00a7 19, and analyzes ex post facto claims under the same framework, see State v. Druktenis, 135 N.M. 223, 233, 86 P.3d 1050 (N.M.Ct. App.2004). In Smith, the Supreme Court considered the ex post facto implications of an Alaskan sex registration statute that is similar in many ways to NMSORNA. See id. at 235, 86 P.3d 1050 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 103-04, 123 S.Ct. 1140) (<HOLDING>). Alaska\u2019s law was designed to apply Holdings: 0: recognizing the applicability of the mcdonough standard to federal criminal proceedings 1: recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes 2: recognizing the applicability of rule 9b under such circumstances 3: recognizing the applicability of the smith analysis to nmsorna 4: recognizing applicability of discovery rule", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 43 (2d Cir.2004). Reynolds\u2019s first argument fails because it mischaracterizes the district court\u2019s decision. The district court did not find that Reynolds\u2019s intoxication caused his injuries. Instead, it found that although Reynolds was acting in the course of his employment, see 46 U.S.C. \u00a7 30104, his injuries could not be legally attributed to the defendants\u2019 alleged negligence because the defendants did not own the bus that injured Reynolds and otherwise had no duty to provide a safe means of transportation between the M/V Bennett and Reynolds\u2019s chosen venue for shore-leave amusement. We identify no error in that conclusion, which is consistent with the undisputed facts and the law. See Thurnau v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 229 F.2d 73, 74 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>). Reynolds\u2019s second argument fails because of Holdings: 0: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 1: holding no duty and noting that foreseeability bears on the scope of a duty and not whether it exists in the first place 2: holding that employer has nondelegable duty to provide safe workplace 3: holding that shipowner is under no duty to provide a safe means of transportation between the ship and any place of amusement crew members desire to visit while on shore leave 4: recognizing a state law tort claim for negligence arising under a duty to provide a safe work environment", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Damon Skaggs pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Applying the then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Skaggs to 188 months\u2019 imprisonment \u2014 the bottom of the applicable guideline range (188 to 235 months)\u2014 and five years\u2019 supervised release. On appeal, the Government conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (<HOLDING>), the district court erred in imposing Mr. Holdings: 0: holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment 1: holding guidelines to be only advisory 2: holding that the mandatory nature of the united states sentencing guidelines resulted in violations of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial and rendering the guidelines advisory 3: holding unconstitutional the mandatory application of the federal sentencing guidelines 4: holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "easement, i.e., once permission is granted by the landowner there is no longer adverse use or use under a claim of right. Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals correctly cited Williamson as supporting authority for its decision. Rooted in Williamson, the law is well-established that evidence of permissive use defeats the establishment of a prescriptive easement because use that is permissive cannot also be adverse or under a claim of right. See Paine, 400 S.C. at 586, 735 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Williamson and recognizing that a claimant\u2019s permissive use of landowner\u2019s property cannot begin to ripen into a prescriptive easement until the claimant makes a distinct and positive assertion of right hostile to the landowner); Horry Cnty. v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Williamson, 107 S.C. at 401, 93 S.E. at 16 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a temporary use of property does not automatically create an expectation of privacy in that property 1: holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse 2: holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone 3: holding that adverse inference rule is permissive 4: holding that allowing moderate use of the resources on the property was not inconsistent with exclusive use", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "amendment that must be applied retroactively. Id. at 2-3. The district court denied Williams\u2019s motion, concluding that Amendment 709 is not retroactive. Rl-66. II. DISCUSSION On appeal, Williams argues, pro se, that the district court abused its authority by denying his 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3582(c)(2) motion. He contends that the court erroneously assigned him a criminal history category of IV, and that his true criminal history category was II. Accordingly, his guideline range was calculated incorrectly, and his sentence is unjust. Williams\u2019 pro se argument may be liberally construed as a contention that the district court erred in concluding that Amendment 709 did not entitle him to a \u00a7 3582(c)(2) reduction. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We \u201creview de novo a district court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding to ensure substantial justice to the parties the pleadings must be liberally construed 1: holding that pro se pleadings will be liberally construed 2: holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed 3: recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings 4: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 413 (5th Cir.1998). Consequently, an error is deemed harmless if it did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; Munoz, 150 F.3d at 413. The government bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (noting that the inquiry to determine prejudice is the same between plain error and harmless error, but that the defendant, rather than the government, bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice under plain-error review); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (<HOLDING>); Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at Holdings: 0: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding constitutional error may be harmless if court can  declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt  quoting state v napeahi 57 haw 365 373 556 p2d 569 574 1976 3: holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction 4: holding that a constitutional error is harmless where it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n. 3 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 1357 (3d ed. 2004)). Following Miller, we find the district court properly considered the amended partnership agreement and POA because they were contemplated by or expressly mentioned in the complaint. There is no allegation that the amended partnership agreement or POA were inaccurate or fabricated. Instead, Dittmer argues that the district court should not have considered these extraneous documents on the motion to dismiss, or that the court should have given notice that it was considering them and converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 348 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Because these two documents are referred to Holdings: 0: holding that district court should not have considered documents not contemplated by the pleadings on the rule 12b6 motion and the lack of notice that it was doing so was not harmless error 1: holding that by considering matters outside of the pleadings the trial court converted a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion 2: holding that documents filed with rule 12b6 motion to dismiss are not judicial documents because they do not play any role in the adjudicative process 3: holding that a rule 12b6 motion is only converted to a motion for summary judgment when a court accepts and considers matters outside of the pleadings 4: holding that the essential inquiry in conversion of a rule 12b6 motion to a rule 56 motion is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as required by the terms of the Distribution Agreement. IV. CONCLUSION The plain language of the Distribution Agreement compels a conclusion that the right of first refusal does not apply in a dissolution action where the court-appointed receiver is procuring the sale of the corporate assets. The receiver, not the survivor or the personal representative, is the procuring party, and the receiver\u2019s actions are taken under the supervision, and with the approval, of the trial court. Had the parties to the Distribution Agreement intended for the right of first refusal to apply in the context of a corporate dissolution, or where a third party was procuring a buyer, the Distribution Agreement could have so provided. See, e.g., Roof Depot, Inc. v. Ohman, 638 N.W.2d 782 (Minn.Ct. App.2002) (<HOLDING>); Guice v. Sentinel Tech., Inc., 294 Ill. Holdings: 0: holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock 1: holding such intoxication to be voluntary 2: holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act 3: holding that title vii is subject to the transfer provisions of section 1404a 4: holding that a plaintiff generally may not appeal a voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment against him", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction over Indians is coextensive with the state\u2019s jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 119 (1973) (\u201cAbsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.\u201d). In this case, there is no dispute that the crime for which Mathews was arrested occurred in Lewiston, out side of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation. Therefore, there is no question that the State of Idaho possessed criminal jurisdiction over the prosecution of Mathews in this case. See State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 725 P.2d 115 (1986); cf. State v. Youpee, 103 Mont. 86, 61 P.2d 832 (1936) (<HOLDING>); Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 134, 46 P. 636, 637 Holdings: 0: holding state law applicable to an indian accused of statutory rape of an indian minor occurring offreservation 1: holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation 2: holding that the state has no jurisdiction to pursue an indian onto an indian reservation for criminal offenses committed off the reservation 3: holding state law applicable to ute indian murder of another ute occurring offreservation 4: holding that oklahoma police officer was without jurisdiction to arrest indian inside indian reservation when the state has neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction over indian country", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "id. at 71, and Brown made no such request. (iv) Findings adequate to support closure. Before deciding to close the courtroom, the trial judge held a hearing at which he took testimony and allowed each party to present argument. He credited certain testimony and he issued a ruling based upon the record. Specifically, as discussed supra, the judge found that the officer \u201cwas really concerned for his safety.\u201d While the reasons he gave for concluding that this fear was objectively reasonable were neither entirely accurate nor particularly compelling, the strength of the judge\u2019s findings must be evaluated by reference to the very limited scope of the closure that they support; by that standard, the trial court\u2019s findings were adequate. Cf. Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) B. The Propriety of the Remedy Even if the Holdings: 0: holding that the fourth waller factor was satisfied despite the lack of specific findings of fact where the information gleaned from the record was  sufficient to support the partial temporary closure of petitioners trial 1: holding the trial court is not required to make specific findings of fact on the record for each wham factor if the record contains sufficient evidentiary support for the finding of lack of good cause 2: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 3: holding that under waller insufficient space because of the size of the venire and the risk of tainting the jury pool are not compelling reasons for closure 4: holding the trial court must make findings adequate to support a closure", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conditions on defendants\u2019 land.\u201d Wilkerson, 845 S.W.2d at 750. Although the Wilkerson court also noted that the plaintiffs\u2019 claim was \u201cfounded upon the duty of reasonable care owed to a social guest/invitee by a social guest/landowner,\u201d id., in light of the fact that the Statute does not itself distinguish between those duties, the Wilkerson case is best understood for its primary holding that the Statute does not apply where \u201c[t]he condition of the premises where the accident occurred is not at issue.\u201d Id. This holding is borne out by the substantial case law applying the Recreational Use Statute only in situations involving \u201cpremises liability\u201d and \u201cfailure to warn\u201d causes of action. See, e.g., Spence v. Tennessee Valley Authority, No. 3:05-0519, 2006 WL 1416759 at *4 (May 17, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Sumner v. United States, 794 F.Supp. 1358, Holdings: 0: holding that a certificate of correction is not effective for causes of action arising before its issuance 1: holding that a forum selection clause encompassing any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this agreement included all causes of action arising directly or indirectly from the business relationship evidenced by the contract 2: holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted 3: holding that the recreational use statute applied in a case involving failure to warn and premises liability causes of action arising from the daily operation of turbines in the tims ford dam 4: holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of 1988 Act No. 305, \u00a7 1. The 1988 version provided an exemption for \u201ccash surrender value of life insurance in the aggregate amount of not more than fifty thousand dollars.\u201d In 1993, the General Assembly enacted the current version of S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 38-63-40 as part of 1992 Act No. 89, \u00a7 1, which removed the fifty thousand dollar limitation on the cash surrender value exemption and added several key provisions to the statute. Specifically, the General Assembly provided that proceeds and cash surrender values were protected \u201cwhether or not the right to change the beneficiary is reserved\u201d and \u201cwhether or not the policy is payable to the insured if the beneficiary dies first\u201d and added an exception in cases where \u201cthe insured has filed a petition in bankruptcy within two years of 002) (<HOLDING>); In re Henderson, 167 B.R. 67, 73 Holdings: 0: holding that the debtorinsured was entitled to exempt the cash surrender value of her life insurance policy naming her dependent son as a beneficiary under illinois statute providing exemption for all proceeds payable because of the death of the insured and the aggregate cash value of any or all life insurance  policies  payable to a wife or husband of the insured or to a child parent or other person dependent upon the insured 1: holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured 2: holding that a debtor in bankruptcy may claim as exempt the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy insuring the life of the debtor that is payable to a beneficiary other than the debtor under dccode ann  314716a2001 despite the absence of the term cash surrender from the statute 3: holding that the tennessee statute providing an exemption for a life insurance policy made for the benefit of the insureds spouse andor children or dependent relatives allows for the exemption of the cash surrender values of such policies 4: holding that where the debtor is the owner of a policy insuring his own life and listing his wife as the beneficiary upon his death the proceeds of the policy including the cash value thereof are exempt from the claims of the insureds creditors", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as a conservator not as rule-making decisions of a regulator). Furthermore, the Court finds that section 4617(j)(3) comports with the statutory power of FHFA to \u201cpreserve and conserve the assets and'property of [Fannie Mae].\u201d 12 U.S.C. \u00a7 4617(b)(2)(D)(ii). The third argument is that the liens held by the homeowner associations attached before the FHFA\u2019s conservator-ship and thus, preclude the application of section 4617(j)(3). This argument is premised on the contention that, if a lien attached before FHFA\u2019s conservatorship, then FHFA cannot avoid that lien. However, while section 4617(j)(3) does not extinguish liens that attached to property prior to FHFA\u2019s conservatorship, such liens do not exempt lien-holders froni the FHFA consent requirement. See Lowery, 12 F.3d at 996-97 (<HOLDING>). -Thus, while the HOA liens may still attach Holdings: 0: holding that a lien cannot be extinguished through a tax sale without the consent of the fdic 1: holding that while section 1825b2 does not extinguish an earlier lien or excuse the payment of a tax by the fdic it does deny the ability to use a lien on fdic property as a vehicle for collection of delinquent tax 2: holding that a property right that comes into existence by court action such as a judgment lien does not relate back to some earlier date to destroy the priority of a federal tax lien 3: holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset 4: holding that a lien holder who is not served and joined as a party to a tax suit cannot have his lien extinguished by the tax sale", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "University of Alabama v. Calhoun, 514 So.2d 895, 898 (Ala.1987). This case is different from Law, supra, in that there was no proffered testimony to the effect that the Heads intended the correction fluid or the word \u201cVOID\u201d to effect a revocation of the entire will. Because the word \u201cVOID\u201d was written in the margin with two arrows pointing to the obliterated legacy, as opposed to being written over the signatures of the testators or over the entire face of the document, we hold that the revocatory intent of the Heads was directed only to the obliterated legacy, not to the entire will. See Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98 (1900) (stating that a will must be materially mutilated so that intent to revoke the entire will can be inferred); cf. Board of Trustees, 514 So.2d at 898 (<HOLDING>); Franklin v. Bogue, 245 Ala. 379, 17 So.2d 405 Holdings: 0: holding that the obliteration of a signature page effects revocation of the entire will 1: holding that revocation of the harriss parole like revocation of a defendants probation did not subject him to double jeopardy under the united states constitution because of similarities between the two 2: holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that there is no significant conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "for radiologists to or urologists or anybody else of the same specialty. Similarly, Dr. Venegas testified that as a family physician, he does not implant pacemakers and he would defer to the knowledge of a cardiologist on that issue. When Dr. Venegas was asked if he believed Dr. Feldman deviated from the standard of care in her treatment of Mr. Melton, he responded, \u201cI cannot see where from the note[s] that I\u2019ve been given from [Dr. Feldman] that she deviated from the standard of care in her medical treatment of Mr. Melton.\u201d Dr. Gaddy and Dr. Venegas failed to establish the standard of care for implanting ICDs, and therefore, their testimony was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 587, 320 S.E.2d 59, 65 (Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Melton presented no evidence Holdings: 0: holding that expert medical testimony was not necessary to establish negligence where surgeon left a needle in the patients body but stating that proof of proximate cause requires some expert testimony in medical malpractice cases 1: holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment since the physical evidence and unrebutted expert testimony left no genuine issue of material fact 2: holding no issue of material fact as to whether defendant was volunteer because he received no compensation 3: holding expert testimony by an orthopedic surgeon in a case of alleged medical malpractice by a podiatrist failed to create a genuine issue of material fact because 1 the material question in the case was the standard required of podiatrists not orthopedic surgeons 2 the witness admitted he was not familiar with the procedure the defendant performed and 3 when the orthopedic surgeon was asked if he held himself out as an expert he answered no not in podiatry no 4: holding that expert testimony is unnecessary when orthopedic surgeon failed to remove two pieces of cement totaling oneinch in diameter after affixing prosthesis for hip replacement", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "defense of misrepresentation on the policy application is not proper; he had fully cooperated and satisfied all conditions of the i a-contractual claims was improper because: (1) he needed to conduct additional discovery regarding the reasonableness of the denial; and (2) the issue of whether Farmers breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing was a fact issue. In this case, Farmers had a reasonable basis for denying the claim based on Perrotta\u2019s own breach of the policy. See Betco Scaffolds Co., 29 S.W.3d at 348. As such, Farmers did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Perrotta with regard to that denial, and Perrotta\u2019s extra-contractual claims fail as a matter of law. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we affirm summary judgment for Holdings: 0: holding title company liable for bad faith 1: holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint 2: holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule 3: holding there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered 4: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201d Scottsdale Indent. Co., 673 F.3d at 719 (discussing and construing Illinois law). To be sure, that a pollutant escapes into the environment should not automatically trigger a total pollution clause\u2019s applicability. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Potter, 105 Fed.Appx. 484, 497 (4th Cir.2004); cf. Scottsdale Indent. Co., 673 F.3d at 717 (providing hypothetical case of vehicle that skids on wet surface as a result of tanker truck that spills contaminant). Under Molina, however, a pollutant\u2019s containment\u2014 even when it migrates to outside and surrounding areas \u2014 appears to be enough to deem the total pollution exclusion inapplicable. See 166 P.R. Dec. 260 at 276 (certified translation, p. 11); accord Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d at 1184 Holdings: 0: holding lead paint poisoning covered by the pollution exclusion 1: holding that removal of insulation that released asbestos  a thermal irritant  into an apartment was covered by the pollution exclusion 2: holding that pollution exclusion did not apply to claim arising from ingestion of lead paint because exclusion reasonably may be limited to environmental claims 3: holding that a discharge into the environment is necessary for the total pollution clause to be applicable 4: holding that the release of carbon monoxide into an apartment is not the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the pollution exclusion clause", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "19 Estate of Neubert denied probate of the lost will, however, because the proponents there failed to meet the then existing statutory requirement of proving the lost will was in existence at the time of the testator\u2019s death. Estate of Neubert, 59 Wn.2d at 687. That requirement was removed in 1995. Laws op 1994, ch. 221, \u00a7 20 (codified at ROW 11.20.070(2)). 20 The majority offers the possibility Myrna was the third individual in the room, and as such Taylor still could have been merely a notary and nothing more. See majority at 167. Even assuming this to be true, the 1993 will must be admitted to probate. Execution of a will is still valid even if one of the attesting witnesses is interested (i.e., a beneficiary under the will). RCW 11.12.160(2); Estate of Chambers, 187 Wash. at 420 (<HOLDING>). Rather the interested witness would lose his Holdings: 0: holding that njeither the plaintiff nor fellow crewmen are qualified to testify as design experts 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify 2: holding beneficiaries under a will are qualified to testify to execution 3: holding that right to testify not denied where inter alia defendant made no objection to his attorneys statements that defendant would not testify and made no request to testify 4: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "proceed, the parties agreed to seek further guidance from the family court. Husband sought that guidance, and Judge Cate provided it. The pricing scheme Judge Cate established did not conflict with the minimum listing price of $225,300 set by the divorce decree and complied with the goals set out in the parties\u2019 subsequent agreement. In light of Wife\u2019s failed attempt to sell the home for $274,000, a lower initial listing price with small periodic reductions is a reasonable approach to severing this remaining tie between Husband and Wife. Accordingly, the family court did not err. To the extent Wife requests \u201creimbursement for maintaining the marital property,\u201d this issue is unpreserved because she failed to raise it to the family court. See Chastain, 381 S.C. at 306, 672 S.E.2d at 114 (<HOLDING>). IV. Remaining Issues Wife further argues the Holdings: 0: holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate review 1: holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal 2: holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review 3: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 4: holding issues not raised to and ruled upon by the trial court are not preserved for appellate review", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the record, she asked the Chancellor to intervene in Simmons\u2019 retaliatory acts. She argues that the complaints -in her letter and the return phone call from System official Gomez suffice to fulfill the requirement to initiate an appeals process before filing suit. The record lacks information regarding the relationship between the System and Lamar, so it is unclear whether addressing an appeal to the Chancellor of the System suffices to comply with the requirement that the employee provide notice to the employer. Given that Simmons \u2014 the subject of Ward\u2019s grievance \u2014 was president of Lamar, a letter to the System may have been the best informal avenue available to Ward to initiate a grievance. See Upton County, Tex. v. Brown, 960 S.W.2d 808, 813-14 (Tex.App.\u2014El Paso 1997, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In any event, appellees did not offer Holdings: 0: holding in absence of formal procedure a county employees phone call to the county commissioner sufficed  to fulfill whistleblower acts requirement to initiate a grievance procedure before filing suit 1: holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed 2: holding that a claim based on statements made during a formal grievance procedure was preempted 3: holding that a jail inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to an adequate grievance procedure and the ineffectiveness or even absence of a grievance procedure does not give rise to a constitutional claim 4: holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in confinement.\u201d 864 So.2d at 1121. See also Moore. We have held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to split a 20-year sentence so that the defendant serves less than the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The State has established the prerequisites for the issuance of this writ of mandamus. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is due to be, and is hereby, granted. Judge McCormick is directed to resen-tence Gaines. As this Court ordered in Austin: \u201cBecause the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood [v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may split the sentence in compliance with \u00a7 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement, see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), or, it if determines that splitting the Holdings: 0: holding that the newly amended  15188 allows a trial judge to suspend a sentence imposed upon application of the schoolhousing enhancements despite the prohibition against probation in  13a12250 and 13a12270 1: holding that probation is not a sentence 2: holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum 3: holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation 4: holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the sixth amendments guarantee of the right to trial by jury", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction.\u201d See id. at 1502. Quoting the Supreme Court, the panel instructed that: [I]n cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course of administering the bankrupt estate, which would ordinarily be pure cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belonging to the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which the bankruptcy court, which acts as a court of equity, exercises exclusive control. Thus a claim of debt or damages against the bankrupt is investigated by chancery methods. Id. at 1503 (quoting Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) (quotations omitted)). Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the Granfinanciera test and determined that a discharge 578746, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Hutchins, 211 B.R. 322, 324 Holdings: 0: holding that under the hallahan progeny of cases parties are not afforded the right to jury trials in dischargeability proceedings 1: holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials 2: holding that claims under the vrra are equitable and a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial 3: holding that the bankruptcy court has constitutional and implied statutory authority to conduct jury trials in core proceedings 4: holding that dischargeability proceedings are inherently equitable in nature and as such parties are not entitled to jury trials", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(2000). After reviewing the entirety of the evidence appearing in the record, however, we conclude that any error by the trial court in refusing to take judicial notice of the VA\u2019s adjudication was harmless. See Wilder, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 344-45. We reject Paul\u2019s assertion that the adjudication required the trial court to conclude that Paul would be forever unable to work. The VA\u2019s written adjudication was a ruling upon Paul\u2019s request for the payment of benefits under a program administered by that executive department. Thus, the adjudication was a final and conclusive determination of Paul\u2019s right to receive VA disability benefits. This, however, was not the question presented to the trial court for determination. See Rose, 107 U.S. at 629, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 610, 107 S. Ct. at 2036 (<HOLDING>). Instead, the trial court was required to Holdings: 0: holding that section 511a of title 38 did not preclude a state trial court from requiring the payment of child support from va disability benefits because the state court was not reviewing the administrators decision finding the veteran eligible for specific disability benefits 1: holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability 2: holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits 3: holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits 4: holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an error of law,\u201d Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 443 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir.2006), or \"fails to consider the applicable legal standard____\u201d Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir.1997). For instance, in Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105-08 (10th Cir. 2001), we held the district court abused its discretion in decertifying a class of plaintiffs because the court failed to consider the \"pattern and practice\u201d legal framework applicable to the plaintiffs' claim of discrimination. In the same manner, the district court here abused its discretion when it excluded the testimonial evidence based upon its erroneous conclusion that Arambum controlled the fate of the evidence in this case. See also Floyd v. Ortiz, 300 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Sprint lastly argues any error the Holdings: 0: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 1: holding the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs request for rehearing because the district court relied on an erroneous legal premise to do so 2: holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request for counsel 3: holding that district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to file fourth amended complaint 4: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the residual clause. Coronado, 603 F.3d at 708. We held it was not, because the state statute \u201conly requires gross negligence, and crimes with a mens rea of gross negligence or recklessness do not satisfy Begay\u2019s requirement of \u2018purposeful\u2019 conduct.\u201d Id. at 710. Arguably, our decision in Coronado contains language suggesting that only crimes involving specific intent satisfy Begay\u2019s \u201cpurposeful\u201d requirement. See id. at 711. There, we noted that in \u201cother contexts\u201d we have defined \u201cpurposeful\u201d as \u201cdone with a specific purpose in mind; DELIBERATE.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But in those other contexts, we offense satisfies Begay\u2019s purposeful conduct requirement based on the offense\u2019s mens rea of knowingly inflicting cruel and inhuman punishment.\u201d); Almenas, 553 F.3d at 34 (<HOLDING>); United, States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 752 Holdings: 0: holding that north carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline 1: holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed 2: holding that the offender must have the apparent ability to execute the act constituting the assault 3: holding that a prior conviction in a georgia state court was appropriately used to qualify the defendant as a career offender because he failed to prove he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel 4: holding begays purposefulness requirement easily met where crime required the offender to act knowingly", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "strengthened by Congress' express assignment to DOE of the initial adjudication of alleged violations of price control regulations. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 7193(a). TCC points out that this statute was not made effective until October 1, 1977, after the events in issue here had already occurred. However, the statute was passed well before DOE issued its RO in this case. Moreover, Congress' decision to give DOE express authority to issue remedial orders does not automatically mean that the agency lacked the authority prior to passage of the provision. Courts have held both expressly and impliedly that the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), DOE's predecessor, had power to issue remedial orders before October 1977. See Getty Oil Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Energy, 478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Sauder v. Dep't of Energy, 648 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding the fea had authority to issue a remedial order in september 1976 despite plaintiffs contention that fea had no such power until passage of 42 usc  7193 expressly authorized doe to issue remedial orders 1: recognizing that the forest service supervisor had authority to issue orders pursuant to 36 cfr  26150 2: holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue 3: holding that inclusion of failure to mitigate damages as an issue in a final pretrial order saved the issue from waiver under rule 8c even though the defendant had failed to plead the issue 4: holding that the federal action at issue must be authorized", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction and (2) He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2513(a). Further, the statute establishes the means by which a plaintiff must prove his claim: \u201cProof of the requisite facts shall be by a certificate of the court or pardon wherei 1981 WL 1413 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Lucas v. United States, 228 Ct.Ct. 862, 863, Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment 2: holding the court lacked jurisdiction over claim under  2513 without certificate from district court 3: holding that court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction under  2513 when trial courts order dismissing plaintiffs indictment and vacating his sentence failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of  2513 4: holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "313-14, 94 S.Ct. 1105. Conversely, there was nothing deceptive about Moody\u2019s testimony regarding his juvenile adjudication or encounters with law-enforcement officials. On direct examination, Moody explained that his earlier statement to Detective Meriweather was probably more reliable than his trial testimony because he Had been \u201clocked up\u201d for a long time since giving it. Not only did Moody volunteer that he had been placed in a juvenile facility, but he also voluntarily differentiated his juvenile facility from that of the Indiana Boy\u2019s School. Finally, we have held that where a party seeks to impeach a witness with evidence of prior juvenile, delinquency findings, a general challenge to the witness\u2019s character, without more, is not enough. Engle v. State, 506 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Ind.1987) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Roland v. State, 501 N.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error 1: holding that the need to impeach credibility correspondingly increases as the importance of the witness credibility and testimony escalates 2: holding that conviction on appeal is not admissible to impeach witnesss credibility 3: holding that the trial court properly excluded inquiry into a witnesss juvenile record where the defendant attempted to impeach the general credibility of the witness with the finding of delinquency for particular acts in this case theft 4: holding that the trial court did not err in admitting juvenile records where counsel stated in his opening statement that the witness had no record when in actuality the witness had nine juvenile adjudications for burglary", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "At common law, a husband was held responsible for any crimes committed by his wife in his presence, because the law presumed that the wife was coerced or controlled by her husband. See Haning v. United States, 59 F.2d 942, 943 (8th Cir.1932). Modern courts have rejected this presumption. Id. See United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 53, 80 S.Ct. 1589, 4 L.Ed.2d 1563 (1960) (opining that this common-law rule \u201cimplies a view of American womanhood offensive to the ethos of our society\u201d). At common law, a husband was also responsible for his wife\u2019s torts. Modern courts have rejected the idea that spouses are liable for one another\u2019s torts without proof that both spouses' are involved in the tortious misconduct. See Petersen v. Heflin, 163 Mich.App. 402, 408, 413 N.W.2d 810, 812 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Dodson v. Anderson, 710 S.W.2d 510, 512 Holdings: 0: holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy 1: recognizing a privacy interest in the intimacies of the marital relationship 2: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney 3: holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts 4: holding that a wifeis not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands negligent acts", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "To be clear, petitioner \u201cmust make two showings of prejudice.\u201d Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 n.13; see also Bucci, 662 F.3d at 29. First, he must show that \u201ccounsel\u2019s failure to object to the trial closure prejudiced him for the purposes of determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. n.13. That is the inquiry relevant here, when petitioner seeks to use his counsel\u2019s ineffective assistance to demonstrate \u201ccause\u201d for his procedural default. The s\u00e9eond showing of prejudice is the \u201cprejudice to excuse his procedural default.\u201d Id. If petitioner were convicted in federal court and bringing his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255, then he would not need to establish actual prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel, See id. at 64, 66 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the First Circuit explained that it Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice 1: holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted 2: holding the defendant waived his courtroom closure challenge because he both failed to object to the limited closure and agreed to the closure through his attorney 3: holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice and so the court need not require petitioner to prove that his counsels failure to object to the trial closure was actually prejudicial 4: holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "plaintiff agreed to a fixed weekly salary covering unlimited hours, making it unnecessary to apply the FWW method. As the district court not ed in reaching that conclusion as to Banford and McGratty, Banford testified that he expected to receive compensation in some form if he worked more than a certain number of hours in a given week, while McGratty testified that he had no understanding of Entergy\u2019s overtime policy but thought that his pay could be docked for working less than a fixed number of hours. See Banford v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 658, 664-65 (D.Vt.2015). This was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was not an agreement to work unlimited hours for the same fixed salary. See Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 155 (2d Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, a reasonable jury could infer from Holdings: 0: holding that courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor 1: holding courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor 2: holding that for purposes of a class certification motion the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and may draw reasonable inferences therefrom 3: holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor 4: holding in affirming denial of judgment as matter of law for defendants that jury was entitled to credit plaintiffs testimony over defendants and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "one of the central issues in this case \u2014 if not the central issue in this case \u2014 is whether that agreement extends to Google\u2019s current use of Digital Envoy\u2019s technology. Moreover, the forum selection clause in the license agreement is not limited, as Digital Envoy seems to suggest, to claims that are dependent upon the agreement or to those that allege breach of the agreement. Rather, it encompasses \u201c[a]ny lawsuit regarding this Agreement.\u201d License Agreement \u00a7 12. Digital Envoy\u2019s claims in this case clearly \u201cregard\u201d the license agreement, as they regard alleged activities that may or may not be covered by the agreement and, indeed, they will almost certainly fail if Google\u2019s use of its technology is found to be within the scope of the agreement. See also Stewart Org., 810 F.2d at 1070 (<HOLDING>); Bullard v. Capital One, F.S.B., 288 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim  related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause 1: holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching 2: holding that plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim was subject to mandatory forum selection clause requiring litigation in florida of any claims or disputes arising from employment agreement 3: holding valid forum selection clause providing that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under in connection with or incident to this contract shall be litigated if at all in and before a court located in the state of florida quoting underlying contract 4: holding that a forum selection clause encompassing any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this agreement included all causes of action arising directly or indirectly from the business relationship evidenced by the contract", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "accord Benson v. Webster, 593 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Iowa 1999); see also Locate.Plus.Com v. Iowa Dep\u2019t of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609, 619 (Iowa 2 cient facts supporting his contention that Chagra acted as Goodman\u2019s agent when he threatened Wright. Given the presence of only telephonic contacts between Goodman and Iowa (and then through a purported agent), and the lack of evidence showing Chagra acted as Goodman\u2019s agent by making the alleged threat against Wright, the first three factors in the jurisdictional analysis weigh against the existence of personal jurisdiction over Goodman in Iowa. Wright has not submitted any evidence regarding the convenience of the parties. Since he carries the burden of proof, this factor weighs against him. Aylward v. Fleet Bank, 122 F.3d 616, 618 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Finally, even though Iowa has an interest in Holdings: 0: holding the same with respect to an apartment 1: holding that plaintiffs failure to offer any evidence with respect to the convenience of the parties means that this factor militates against him 2: holding that the failure of the parties to follow the adoption provisions in any material respect deprives the court of the power to decree an adoption 3: holding that public policy militates against a judge testifying as an expert witness for one of the parties 4: holding that the clause any dispute that shall arise between the parties  with reference to the interpretation of this agreement or their rights with respect to any transaction involved was broad", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "concluded that all the elements of the claims are found in the Shimura patent. Trial Tr. at 1864:03-08. Motorola urges that Dr. Bovik and others provided testimony regarding the skill and knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time of the invention. See Motorola Reply at 6-7. Motorola also notes that Dr. B ovik\u2019s slides were titled \u201cInvalidity,\u201d not \u201cAnticipation.\u201d Id. But Motorola fails to identify any testimony from the record that connects Shimura to the skill and knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time, of the invention, or that otherwise directly addresses this obviousness theory (or any obviousness theory) involving Shimura. I agree with Fujifilm that Motorola cannot raise the theory now. See Fractus, S.A. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 876 F.Supp.2d 802, 838 (E.D.Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>); Allergan, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 808 Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 1: holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury 2: holding that defendant waived any indefiniteness argument where it failed to present any explicit indefiniteness evidence at trial and did not make a single reference to indefiniteness during trial stating that allowing defendant to revive its indefiniteness defense posttrial deprives plaintiff of any opportunity to substantively respond with its own testimony or evidence 3: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it 4: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of computer distributed \u2018kiddie porn\u2019.\u201d (Press Release dated September 29, 1995, a part of Pit\u2019s Ex. 6.) B. Second, Shasky\u2019s efforts at rehabilitation have been extraordinary. United States v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that \u201c[a]n individual convicted of receiving child pornography may be entitled to a downward departure in light of his or her rehabilitative efforts, provided those efforts are extraordinary,\u201d remanding for further fact finding, and stating that \u201c[i]f the court does find support in the record for its conclusion that Barton\u2019s rehabilitative efforts are extraordinary, reducing Barton\u2019s sentence from a minimum of fifteen months\u2019 imprisonment to probation would not be unreasonable.\u201d) See also United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 813, 819-20 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In this regard I have especially considered: Holdings: 0: holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress 1: recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient 2: holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure 3: holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances 4: holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Dissent to Order by Judge BEA; Opinion by Judge PAEZ; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RESTANI. ORDER The majority opinion is amended as follows: 1. At slip op. 8168, n.15, [607 F.3d at 597 n. 15], the final sentence of the footnote is amended to read: < Furthermore, as discussed above, Malesko also relied on the fact that the plaintiff was not seeking recovery against an individual officer. See id. at 73-74, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456. > 2. At s Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (<HOLDING>), and Holly, 434 F.3d at 294 (stating that Holdings: 0: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery 1: recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law 2: recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights 3: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 4: holding that federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state officers emphases removed", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(\u201cPlaintiffs ask that the Court \u201cdismiss this action without prejudice and with leave to amend so that Plaintiffs can attempt to cure any perceived pleading deficiencies\u201d in the event the Court finds that plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated demand futility.\u201d). 60 . Kenney, 426 F.Supp.2d at 1188 (\"The Court finds no basis for allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint.\u201d). 61 . West Coast, 914 A.2d at 645-46. 62 . Id. at 643-44; see also id. at 646 (\"Thus, the language of the [Colorado plenary court\u2019s] opinion and the decision to deny leave to replead support the conclusion that the without prejudice order was not intended to permit West Coast to relitigate its claim.\u201d). 63 . Id. at 638, 645-46. 64 . See Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 917-19 (Del.Ch.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, Holdings: 0: holding that while the excerpt from the original complaint was competent as evidence as a pleading it was superseded by the amended complaint 1: holding that plaintiff lacked a proper purpose for bringing a section 220 action because the federal judge in kenney had denied plaintiffs request to replead demand futility in an amended complaint 2: holding that plaintiffs wishing to inspect books and records for purposes of pleading demand futility in an amended derivative complaint had a proper purpose 3: holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts 4: holding that amended pleading did not commence a new action for the purposes of cafa because the claims were exactly the same in both pleadings and the replacement representative was a member of the putative class in the original pleading", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Riley was sentenced, as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment. For the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana conviction, he was sentenced, without application of the HFOA, to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The two felony convictions used to enhance Riley\u2019s sentence for the assault conviction were April 6, 1999, guilty-plea convictions. The April 6, 1999, convictions were not used to enhance Riley\u2019s sentences for the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana \u25a0 conviction because those crimes had occurred on January 30, 1999, before Riley had been adjudicated guilty on April 6, 1999. See, e.g., Craig v. State, (Ms. CR-02-0812, March 26, 2004)(<HOLDING>). Because the assault occurred on March 28, Holdings: 0: holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation 1: holding our habitual offender act does not limit enhancement to prior felony convictions within a certain time 2: holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed 3: holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony 4: holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "his parents for injuries for which there is available homeowners insurance coverage as a logical, but limited, extension of our prior holdings in Syllabus point 2 of Lee v. Comer, 159 W.Va. 585, 224 S.E.2d 721, and Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538. See Verdier v. Verdier, 364 Ark. 287, 291, 219 S.W.3d 143, 145 (2005) (\"Broadening the exception to the parental-immunity doctrine to cases where a parent is covered by liability insurance through an existing homeowner\u2019s policy leads to a dangerous slippery slope.\u201d); Sepaugh v. LaGrone, 300 S.W.3d 328, 338 (Tex.App.2009) (rejecting exception to parental immunity doctrine based upon existence of applicable homeowners insurance as contrary to Texas law). Cf. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113, 115-16 (Minn.1983) (<HOLDING>). However, it does not appear that the parties Holdings: 0: recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit 1: holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts 2: holding household exclusion in policy of homeowners insurance to be valid despite parents immunity from suit by child 3: holding that parents who filed a civil rights action following the removal of child by child welfare authorities failed to connect program directors actions to alleged violation of parents constitutional rights 4: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "agree. In the previous appeal, we considered the question of whether prior insolvency negates the possibility of a four-point enhancement and found that it does not. McDermot, No. 93-3603 at 24. Application Note 15 does not define safety and soundness solely in terms of the institution's solvency. A defendant who perpetrates fraud with respect to an already insolvent institution may still \"substantially reduce benefits to ... insureds\" or cause the institution to be unable \"on demand to refund fully any deposit, payment, or investment\u201d over and above the consequences of the initial insolvency. Indeed, the district court so held in the original sentencing hearing, stating that \u201c[w]ithout those [fraudulent securities] going on the books, I believe Presidential would ha (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1865, 128 Holdings: 0: holding that district courts factual findings for purposes of obstruction enhancement are reviewed for clear error 1: holding that enhancement for obstruction of justice which uses similar mandatory language must be applied where factual predicates are satisfied 2: holding that before a court imposes an enhancement for obstruction of justice the court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice  3: holding that obstruction of justice enhancement was properly applied where the defendant provided materially false information to a magistrate judge 4: holding similar language to be a valid disclaimer", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "here, as Judge Woodlock observed: [I]t is apparent that application of a general legislative rule, rather than a specific adjudicative ruling, is involved in the attempted redesignation of [defendants from community confinement to secure facilities]. This is no mere effort at interpretive guidance but rather a rulemaking exercise designed to reshape the scope of a statutory provision through an administrative statement of lawmaking. Mallory, 2003 WL 1563764, at *2; see also Ashkenazi, 246 F.Supp.2d at 7 n. 9 (\u201c[Irrespective of the BOP\u2019s characterization of its policy, the new policy has the force of law and is not merely interpretive .... The new policy is [ ] not flexible and does not permit BOP to exercise any discretion.\u201d); cf. Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In attempting to. classify this rule as Holdings: 0: recognizing that in the absence of a statutory definition statutory terms are construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning 1: holding that congress has expanded eommonlawr definition of extortion to include acts by private individuals 2: holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning 3: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 4: holding that a bop definition of nonviolent offense was legislative because it did not merely explain statutory meaning but expanded the reach of a regulation to bar offenders from early release", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that may arise when a court addresses the issues whether an objective or subjective intent is required for murder and whether voluntary intoxication can negate the requisite intent. See People v Watson, 30 Cal 3d 290; 637 P2d 279 (1981) (a finding of implied malice depends on a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard); People v Whitfield, 7 Cal 4th 437; 868 P2d 272 (1994) (evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder); People v Reyes, 52 Cal App 4th 975; 61 Cal Rptr 2d 39 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In none of the cases before us does evidence Holdings: 0: holding that a refusal to perform field sobriety tests was admissible as evidence of intoxication 1: holding that under florida precedent trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on intoxication as voluntary intoxication was a valid defense to a specific intent crime and expert testimony is relevant to a disputed voluntary intoxication defense 2: holding such intoxication to be voluntary 3: holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense 4: recognizing that the holding of people v whitfield was superseded by a 1995 statutory amendment that provided that evidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer admissible on the issue of implied malice aforethought", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, \u00a7 2:8 (4th ed., 1996). There has also been a substantial change in the legal climate since the judgment in the previous case. The Anticy-bersquatting Consumer Protection Act (\u201cACPA\u201d) was passed into law in 1999 in an effort \u201cto provide trademark owners with stronger remedies against cybers-quatters, who register domain names of well-known trademarks and then try to profit from the marks.\u201d The statute has been found to be constitutionally retroactive, meaning that relief may be sought even if, as in this case, the domain name was registered prior to the enactment of the statute. See Sporty\u2019s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman\u2019s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 502 (2 Cir., 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262, 120 S.Ct. 2719, 147 L.Ed.2d 984 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Holdings: 0: holding that where the address problem is the fault of the alien there is no constitutional problem with the agencys procedures and no basis for judicial relief 1: holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense venue may lie in any district in which the continuing conduct occurred 2: holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long as he has not appeared 3: holding that the acpa presents no retroactivity problem because cybersquatting is a continuing wrong 4: holding there is no continuing duty to repair or recall", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "necessary to operate as [an] MGA under Florida law.\u201d WAG, however, not FLA (or other similarly situated third parties), was the primary and direct beneficiary of the policy. Thus, as a matter of law, TAIC is not liable to FLA for any information upon which FLA may have relied in its business transactions with WAG. See, e.g., Fla. Bldg. Inspection Servs. v. Arnold Corp., 660 So.2d 730, 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding roof inspector, hired by lessee, who certified that roof was watertight and leak free, not liable to sublessee for negligent misrepresentation where roof had multiple leaks because \u201cthe tort liability of a supplier of information is limited to persons \u2018for whose benefit and guidance\u2019 the information was intended to be supplied.\u201d). See also Ragsdale, 770 So.2d at 170 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the expert\u2019s opinions that a Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously 1: holding termination wrongful when employee had a statutory duty to report violations 2: holding county employee with unenforceable contract was atwill employee 3: holding that the employer intended to create a new employee welfare benefit plan 4: holding that although incorrect drug report was detrimental to employee employee had no claim against hospital because the report was not intended to primarily or directly benefit the employee", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "board which carries with it the power of law or authority for enforcement,\u2019 Plaintiffs have failed to present issues which are fit for judicial decision.\" Id. at 13 (citing Underwood v. State, 439 So.2d 125, 128 (Ala.1983)). 31 .The ASB Defendants add that the Eleventh Circuit noted that \"[e]ven when the constitutional minimum has been met, however, prudential considerations may still counsel judicial restraint.\u201d (Doc. 15 at 6-7) (citing Action Alliance, 789 F.2d at 940 n. 12; and, Johnson, 730 F.2d at 648). As such, the ASB Defendants argue that like in Digital, here, the Plaintiffs \"in their haste to preserve their perceived First Amendment rights, rushed prematurely to the courthouse and as a result failed to present ciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). 35 . See e.g., Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109, Holdings: 0: holding continuing controversy not moot 1: holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds 2: holding that claims based on grounds not objected to at trial cannot be considered on appeal 3: holding appeal moot on this basis 4: holding plaintiffs claims moot on similar grounds", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 374; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). An affirmative expression of assent constitutes a waiver. Id. at 378. In contrast, a failure to timely assert a right constitutes a forfeiture. Id. at 379. \u201cA stipulation is an agreement, admission or concession made by the parties in a legal action with regard to a matter related to the case.\u201d People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 385; 741 NW2d 61 (2007). To waive a right, the language of a stipulation must show an intent to plainly relinquish that right. Whitley v Chrysler Corp, 373 Mich 469, 474; 130 NW2d 26 (1964). However, the use of specific key words is not required to waive a right. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564, AFL-CIO v Southeastern Mich Transp Auth, 437 Mich 441, 463 n 16; 473 NW2d 249 (1991) (<HOLDING>). In this case, in November 2013, Mando Holdings: 0: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 1: holding unionnegotiated waiver of employees right to judicial forum for statutory claims must be clear and unmistakable 2: holding that clear and unmistakable standard applied to unionnegotiated waiver of employees statutory right to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination 3: holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver 4: holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "disagree, as we conclude that the parties mutually agreed that there would be no limit on contribution liability regardless of the outcome of Kotecki. Before Kotecki, the question of whether there was a limit on employer contribution liability remained unanswered. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d at 162. For Kotecki, the supreme court granted leave to appeal in September 1989 (127 Ill. 2d 618, 545 N.E.2d 112 (1989)), more than a year before the parties entered into the contract in this matter. Thus, both parties could have known that the supreme court was about to establish a default rule for employer contribution liability, and supreme court decisions generally apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the decision is announced. Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535, 538, 634 N.E.2d 1097 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The parties responded by mutually assenting Holdings: 0: holding that aedpa is not applied retroactively to pending habeas petitions 1: recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively 2: holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent 3: holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively 4: holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "includes \u201cseveral transactions or occur rences, any of which could constitute one of the acts proscribed by the charged statutes.\u201d United States v. Beros, 883 F.2d 455, 460-61 (3d Cir.1987). The Beros court noted that \u201cjust as the sixth amendment requires jury unanimity in federal criminal cases on each delineated offense that it finds a defendant culpable ... it must also require unanimity regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that offense. Absent such certainty, the unanimity requirement would provide too little protection in too many instances.\u201d Id. at 461. The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in a case very similar to Holley. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 471 (7th Cir.1998). But see United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The risks of serious unfairness presented by Holdings: 0: holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction 1: holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found 2: recognizing that delay in indictment may sometimes be a basis for a sentencing departure but holding that district court erred when it decreased sentence based on a delay in an indictment where the offenses were separate crimes distinct in time place and victims 3: holding that the policy considerations behind the unanimity requirement suggest that a single count of an indictment should not be found impermissibly duplicitous whenever it contains several allegations that could have been stated as separate offenses  but only when the failure to do so risks unfairness to the defendant 4: holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 1367(d). Subsection (d) preserved Rothmeier\u2019s opportunity to file his dismissed whistleblower claim in state court because the tolling provision was triggered when he \u201casserted\u201d the claim in federal court pursuant to subsection (a). See id. The federal court need not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim for the statute of limitations to be tolled under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(d). See Obendorfer v. Gitano Group, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 950, 957 & n. 3 (D.N.J.1993); Winn v. North Am. Philips Carp., eded he learned about the suspected violation in this case on March 15, 1993, from an internal IAI memorandum that stated: (1) Rahn and corporate counsel had been alerted about the issue of whether IAV-MI should be registered with t usky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (Del.Ch. 1981) (<HOLDING>). As a threshold matter, IAI and IAICMC owed Holdings: 0: holding that an insurer owes no duty of good faith to thirdparty claimants under the insurance code without reaching the question of a possible commonlaw duty 1: holding that a partner owes a duty to all other partners to exercise the utmost good faith fairness and loyalty 2: holding that the relationship of partners is of a fiduciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and integrity in their dealings 3: holding that an insurer has a duty to act with the utmost good faith towards its insured 4: recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "his federal capital trial, confronts the prospect of losing his key mitigation witness as a result. The government contends the defendant is not entitled to an expert of his choosing. That argument is unassailable. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (\u201cThis is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we have discussed....\u201d); Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 464 (4th Cir.2003) (\u201cWalton had no constitutional right to insist on the appointment of any particular expert.\u201d); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 401-02 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The defendant does not contend otherwise. Holdings: 0: holding that the constitution does not entitle a criminal defendant to the effective assistance of an expert witness 1: holding the sixth amendment right to effective assistance extends to a criminal defendants first appeal as of right 2: holding that witness immunity does not bar a claim against a retained expert witness for negligence performance of his duty 3: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 4: holding a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel during a plea process", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "from the plaintiffs expert that the cost to replace the items taken from the facility \u201cwould have been nearly $300,000.\u201d In addition, the jury cannot be faulted for using replacement cost as the measure of recovery. Evidence of the replacement cost was admitted, and the jurors were simply instructed that, if they determined the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property, they were also to \u201cdetermine the value of that property as of the date of trial.\u201d They were not instructed that \u201cvalue\u201d meant market value, not replacement cost. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the jury\u2019s award of replacement cost at a level proposed by the plaintiffs expert was so far outside the range of evidence as to suggest the jury was motivated by passion. See Schmitt, 170 N.W.2d at 660-61 (<HOLDING>). A similar view can be reasonably taken of the Holdings: 0: holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court 1: holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial 2: holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection 3: holding new trial cannot be based on claim of prejudice arising from jurys reliance on evidence admitted without objection 4: holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "failing to obtain a final ruling on the right to consul issue. We agree. In State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 369, 869 P.2d 43 (1994), the Court held that a defendant who does not seek a final ruling on a motion in limine after a court issues a tentative ruling waives any objection to the exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, in State v. Koloske, the Court noted that \u201c[w]hen the trial court refuses to rule, or makes only a tentative ruling subject to evidence developed at trial, the parties are under a duty to raise the issue at the appropriate time with proper objections at trial.\u201d 100 Wn.2d 889, 896, 676 P.2d 456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988). Cf. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1998) (<HOLDING>). During his CrR 3.5 hearing, Acosta raised the Holdings: 0: holding no right to counsel for capital defendants in state habeas proceedings 1: holding that the vienna convention must be applied in conformity with the laws and regulations of the united states including the rules for federal habeas relief 2: holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review 3: holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief 4: holding that a petitioner should be permitted to seek habeas review in state court even if there were doubt that the states substantive law would permit a habeas petition", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Annual Report, attached to the Complaint as Exhibit D, rather than the bare allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that, for the purposes of resolving this motion, the statements in Exhibit D do not prevail over the allegations in the Complaint. 3 . Arguably, the fact that the chief of police exercises authority \"under the supervision of the City Manager\u201d might indicate that the City Manager has final policy making authority over the police department. However, in light of City Defendants\u2019 failure to dispute the authority of the chief of police and the absence of any indication within the Newport News City Code of the manner in which the City Manager exercises supervision over the chief of police, cf. Lytle, 326 F.3d at 472 (<HOLDING>), the Court concludes that local positive law Holdings: 0: holding that a city manager was the final policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability because of provisions in the norfolk city code requiring that all orders rules and regulations applicable to the entire police department must be approved by the city manager other than some police standard operating procedures 1: holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law 2: holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract 3: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city 4: holding that city managers act of raping a woman that worked for him at the city was done under color of state law reasoning that he intervened with the citys police chief who had offered to give the plaintiff a ride home thus invokeing his authority as city manager to create the opportunity to be alone with the plaintiff to take her home and then to rape her", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "argues that it is not administratively feasible for a court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class. Because the class definition is not sufficient, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, AIMCO\u2019s first and third issues are resolved in its favor. We need not address the other issues. Applicable Law The threshold inquiry in determining class certification must be into the class definition, i.e., the parameters of the proposed class. Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex.2000). Rule 42 implicitly requires the representative plaintiffs to demonstrate not only that an identifiable class exists, but that it is susceptible to precise definition. Id.; see DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); 5 James Wm. MOORE ET AL., MOORE\u2019S FEDERAL Holdings: 0: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 1: holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity 2: holding that a class definition must be precise objective and presently ascertainable 3: holding that for a class action to be maintained all class members must have a common and undivided interest in the property or matter involved 4: holding that it is elementary that in order to maintain a class action the class sought to be represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Law 280 jurisdiction and those states without it is somewhat blurry. In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm\u2019n, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973); and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), there is language indicating that the states have power over Indian affairs whenever Congress has provided for such authority, presumably implying Public Law 280. However, in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976), there is language indicating that even if Congress has granted states the authority to act under Public Law 280, they nevertheless could be disabled from so acting: \u201cAnd not U.S. 685, 85 S.Ct. 1242, 14 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965) (<HOLDING>). As to state assertions of jurisdiction in Holdings: 0: holding state may not impose tax on nonindian trader operating on the reservation 1: holding a state cannot impose an income tax on indians whose income is solely from reservation sources 2: holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation 3: holding that arizona could not impose an income tax on reservation indians 4: holding that state has jurisdiction to prosecute a nonindian for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol within the boundary of an indian reservation", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not persuasive. Under the \u201cactual effects\u201d test, it is clear that Washington\u2019s percentage-based penalty provisions are not primarily imposed to compensate the state. The State\u2019s contention that it incurs costs in the collection of unpaid taxes is irrelevant because the provisions\u2019 \u201cactual effect\u201d has no direct relation to any specific costs incurred by the State. Furthermore, as the district court observed, other courts have held that escalating percentage-based penalties imposed in addition to interest are generally punitive rather than compensatory in effect. A The Tenth Circuit and a bankruptcy court in this circuit have concluded that pereent- age-based penalties for unpaid taxes were punitive rather than compensatory. See, e.g., In re Cassidy, 983 F.2d 161, 164-65 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); In re E.A. Nord Company, Inc., 75 B.R. 634, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan 1: holding that the family courts award to exwife of interest in 387 of debtors military pension payable directly from the plan was not subject to discharge because interest in pension plan was not a debt rather it was considered exwifes separate ownership interest 2: holding that an antiassignment clause in a pension plan is valid under  541c2 and that the pension benefits thus do not become property of the estate and may not be made subject to a pay order under section 1325c 3: holding that irs ten percent assessmentlabelled a taxon premature withdrawal from pension plan funds was nonpecuniary loss penalty and thus not entitled to priority in bankruptcy 4: holding that appropriate remedy was to compute service credit for veterans in accordance with vrra rather than pursuant to employers pension plan and requiring retroactive pension plan payments to be made", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Thus, this Court recognizes that, under Reigel\u2019s specific holding that Section 360k does not prohibit States from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on FDA violations, common law state actions that provide private remedies for violations of FDCA provisions would be permissible. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330, 128 S.Ct. 999; see Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that to the extent that plaintiffs adulteration claim alleged that defendant had not followed FDA requirements, state law did not impose requirements different fro at plaintiffs cannot make an end run around the lack of a private right of action under the FDCA by recasting FDCA violations as violations of state common law); Parker v. Stryker Corp., 584 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1301 (D.Colo.2008) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in Medtronic, the court explicitly Holdings: 0: holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa 1: holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser 2: holding that reference to ordinance is not improper reference to an external document because injunction sufficiently describes the act sought to be enjoined and reference to the ordinance as stated in the injunction is merely to give further notice as to the enjoined conduct but the reference was unnecessary to give the appellants sufficient notice of that conduct 3: holding that the clear language of the iccpr manifests that its provisions are to govern the relationship between an individual and his state 4: holding that plaintiff cannot escape preemption by reference to provisions of the fdca that govern the sale of adulterated and misbranded devices", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Court, however, need not decide the issue on this record. 9 . The two sections may simply reflect legislative changes in the bills. The original bills, S. 830 and S. 788, contained the provisions of \u00a7 633(a), but neither \u00a7 633(b) nor \u00a7 626(d). Those provisions were added subsequent to hearings. Section 633(b), added in response to testimony concerning \u00a7 633(a), is not necessarily intended to be distinct from \u00a7 626. 10 . Current case law has only dealt with \u00a7 626(d) as jurisdictional. (Hiscott, supra; Powell v. Southwestern Bell, 494 F.2d 485 (5 Cir. 1974); Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum, 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)). In addition, there has been some tendency to isolate \u00a7 626(d) as containing the jurisdictional prerequisites. (See Ott v. Midland Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975) (<HOLDING>)). 11 . 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(c) (See fn. 3, Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional 2: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 3: holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional 4: holding that while  626d is jurisdictional  626e is not", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Code, which allows a trustee to sell property of the estate outside of the ordinary course of business \u201cafter notice and a hearing.\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 363(b)(1). Before the Trustee conducted the sale, he provided notice to the Debtor that conformed with Rule 2002(c)(1), and the matter came on for hearing. Nevertheless, the Debtor never raised any objection to the proposed sale of the Corvettes, and so, relying on the Trustee\u2019s assertion that the sale was in the best interest of the estate and the lack of objections, the Court entered an order approving the sale. Having failed to object before the order was entered, the Debtor cannot now, dissatisfied with the outcome of the sale, engage in a collateral attack on the price obtained. See Hendrick v. Avent, 891 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Morgan, 2015 WL 7252206, at *3 (noting Holdings: 0: holding that a bankruptcy courts sale order is a final order for res judicata purposes 1: holding that an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is not a final judgment 2: holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal 3: holding that an order authorizing a sale is a final judgment 4: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a claim for relief and that no exceptions to this obligation would seemingly be authorized. In Borger v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, the Nevada Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, concluded \u201cNRS 41A.071 clearly mandates dismissal, without leave to amend, for complete failure to attach an affidavit to the complaint. This interpretation is consistent with the underlying purpose of the measure, which is to ensure that such actions be brought in good faith based upon competent expert opinion.\u201d 120 Nev. 1021, 1029, 102 P.3d 600, 606 (2004) (emphasis added); accord Collins v. MacArthur, No. 3:05-cv-237-PMP-VPC, 2006 WL 1966728, at *2 (D.Nev.2006); cf. Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nevada ex rel. County of Washoe, 122 Nev. 1298, 1303-04, 148 P.3d 790, 793-94 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Fierle v. Perez, 125 Nev. 728, 219 P.3d 906, Holdings: 0: recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner 1: holding a medical malpractice complaint filed without a supporting medical expert affidavit is void ab initio  and as a consequence it does not legally exist and thus it cannot be amended under rule 15a of the nevada rules of civil procedure 2: holding that a north carolina rule requiring an expert certification in a medical malpractice case applied in a federal tort claims act case sounding in medical malpractice brought in federal court 3: recognizing that a plaintiff must produce a medical expert to testify as to causation in all but the most selfevident medical malpractice actions 4: holding that the ada does not create a remedy for medical malpractice", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "defense, which the defendant can waive\u201d; adopting this view, the court held that \u201cthe statute of limitations is a matter of defense that must be asserted at trial by the defendant\u201d); United States v. Spector, 55 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1992), and holding that the statute of limitations is not a jurisdictional bar but a waivable affirmative defense, and that the failu er in this area. See Benes v. United States, 276 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1960) (construing the criminal statute of limitations as a jurisdictional bar to prosecution, and holding that the statute was not tolled by an agreement between the parties that the government would not seek an indictment during the pendency of a related c 765 N.E.2d 894, 899 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Tennessee v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. Holdings: 0: holding a statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment it is one which can be waived 1: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional 2: holding statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and can be waived by a voluntary plea of guilty 3: holding statute of limitations is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time but noting other ohio appellate courts have held the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and may be waived if not asserted at the trial level 4: holding that the statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment it is one which can be waived", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Ins. Co., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Regarding the difference between the grounds for rescission based on misrepresentations that are material as a matter of law, and misrepresentations that lead an insurer to issue a policy that it otherwise would not have issued if it had known the true facts, we have explained: 'While several of the decisions finding that a misrepresentation was material as a matter of law also address the issue of whether the insurer would have actually issued the policy under the same terms and same premium had it known the true facts, the consideration of that issue [is] not required in making a determination that a misrepresentation was material to the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer. . \u00a1 Id. at 1128; see also Salgado, 22 So.3d at 604 (<HOLDING>). Th\u00e9 determination of materiality under Holdings: 0: holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage 1: holding that the law is well settled that if the misrepresentation of the insured were material to the acceptance of the risk by the insurer or if the insurer in good faith would not have issued the policy under the same terms and premium then rescission of the policy by the insurer is proper emphasis added quoting ny life ins co v nespereira 366 so2d 859 861 fla 3d dca 1979 2: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue 3: holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer 4: holding that if the insured is only partially compensated by the insurer both the insurer and the insured are real partiesininterest", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "For these reasons, we conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and \u00a7 1981 the exclusive remedies for public sector employment discrimination, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under \u00a7 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court\u2019s order denying the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss Johnson\u2019s \u00a7 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's \u00a7 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the ' \u00a7 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)(<HOLDING>). 3 .We review de novo a question of law Holdings: 0: holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law 1: holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution 2: holding that  1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in  1981 by state governmental units 3: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment 4: holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the relative complexity of electrical-distribution systems, resolving the issues of fact presented by the Siewerts is not beyond \u201cthe conventional experience of judges.\u201d City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. The litigants\u2019 expert witnesses will provide sufficient factual information. Minn. R. Evid. 702 (permitting testimony by expert witnesses). And, third, the resolution of fact issues underlying the Siewerts\u2019 claims does not require \u201cthe exercise of administrative discretion\u201d or create an administrative need for \u201cuniformity and consistency.\u201d City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. Deciding whether specific facts meet the elements of a tort claim is not uniquely suited to an administrative agency, but instead is regularly decided by juries. See Steinbrecher, 392 N.W.2d at 712 (<HOLDING>). The claims do not turn on a safety standard Holdings: 0: holding that the question of whether the defendants recording device was an intercepting device was a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 1: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 2: holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question 3: holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 4: holding that in wrongfuldeath action question of appropriate precautions was one for jury", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Kentucky Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, KRS 342.690(1) provides: If an employer secures payment of compensation as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death. KRS 342.690(1) (emphasis added). The statute and Kentucky case law interpreting the statute make it clear that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy where a covered employee is injured by her employer\u2019s negligent actions. See, e.g., Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. v. Maricle, 5 S.W.3d 130 (Ky.1999) (<HOLDING>); Hardin v. Action Graphics, Inc., 57 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusivity of workers compensation is an affirmative statutory defense which must be timely raised or it is waived 1: holding that coal workers claim that mine owner was negligent careless and reckless in its mining operations was barred under exclusivity provision of workers compensation act 2: holding that exclusivity provision of workers compensation act barred wifes loss of consortium claim 3: holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act 4: holding that the coemployee immunity provision in workers compensation law was constitutional", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir.2002); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Sens., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.1988). Thus, in Orr, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court\u2019s decision to exclude, at summary judgment, evidence offered by the non-moving party on the grounds that the evidence was improperly authenticated and constituted hearsay. See Orr, 285 F.3d at 771 (affirming the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff based on the district court\u2019s finding \u201cthat most of the evidence submitted by Orr in support of her opposition to BOA\u2019s motion for summary judgment was inadmissible due to inadequate authentication and hearsay\u201d); see also Los Angeles News Service v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 935-36 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), amended and superceded on other grounds, 313 Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence based upon the defendants noncompliance with the deadlines in rule 412c 2: holding that hearsay evidence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion 3: holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence 4: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s determination that Martinez suffered a 5-percent loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong because it was based upon an analysis which took into account Martinez\u2019 preexisting condition. A preexisting condition cannot be considered in the determination of a claimant\u2019s loss of earning capacity. In addition, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Martinez was previously compensated for a prior loss of earning capacity. Finally, we note that Nebraska\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation statutes do not prohibit a claimant from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by statute. See Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002) (<HOLDING>). This would entitle Martinez to be compensated Holdings: 0: holding that determination of causation in permanent disability hearing not barred by estoppel because wlhether an industrial accident caused temporary total disability or permanent partial disability are two distinct questions 1: holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury 2: holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability 3: holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits 4: holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "also places any child under the age of seventeen within the jurisdiction of the South Carolina Family Court. 7 .As Appellants did not raise the issue on appeal, we will not address the District Court\u2019s finding that the level of force used by the arresting officers to retrieve the baggie from Bell's mouth did not violate Bell's Fourth Amendment rights. 8 . The District Court also correctly concluded that Sheriff Cannon cannot be held liable under Section 1983 in his official capacity. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (\u201cWe hold that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons\u2019 under \u00a7 1983.\u201d); see also Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947 (D.S.C.1988) aff'd 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir.1989) Holdings: 0: holding that a newly elected county sheriff was responsible under applicable texas law for the decision not to rehire sheriffs deputies who had campaigned for the ousted incumbent 1: holding that in south carolina sheriffs and deputies are state officials 2: holding that south carolina waived eleventh amendment immunity where county treasurers empowered to act on behalf of the state litigated state claims in federal court represented by the state attorney general 3: holding that  1324 preempted south carolina law creating state crimes for harboring both relating to harborers and aliens themselves 4: holding that sheriffs deputies were not employed in the service of marshall county and that the county personnel board therefore had no jurisdiction to review their respective terminations ordered by the sheriff", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "be held liable for acts of infringement if that defendant is either contribu-torily or vicariously liable for another\u2019s direct act of infringement. Where those acts of infringement occur within the United States and a plaintiff seeks to hold a foreign defendant contributorily or vicariously liable for those acts, it has been held that subject matter jurisdiction may exist, and that the exercise thereof does not conflict with the doctrine of nonextraterri-toriality. See Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 454, 461-68 (E.D.N.Y.1999); Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670(DLC), 1997 WL 218431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.30, 1997); GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.Supp. 763, 773 (W.D.N.Y.1991); c.f. Metzke, 878 F.Supp. at 760 (<HOLDING>). As the Honorable Lawrence K. Karlton held in Holdings: 0: holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable 1: holding that public entities may be held vicariously hable for the negligent acts of their individual employees 2: holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party 3: holding despite defendants claim that it could not be held hable for infringing acts of thirdparties that defendant could be held liable for foreign third partys infringement if it knew or should have known that third party maru fungs copies of ms metzkes designs would be distributed by nonmay retailers in the united states 4: holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under  1981", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "there is a presumption that the Legislature intended the two to coexist and that it \u201cdid not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.\u201d Id. Therefore, the statute with more specific language \u201crelating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.\u201d Id. ANALYSIS AND DECISION [\u00b6 8.] 1. Whether a guardianship proceeding commenced by a non-parent and based upon allegations of abuse and neglect is a proper proceeding to terminate the custodial rights of a natural parent. [\u00b6 9.] Proceedings instituted under the South Dakota Guardianship Act, set forth in SDCL chapter 29A-5, are not the proper means of transferring custody from a parent to a non-parent without a prior determination of a parent\u2019s unfitness. See Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.W.2d 825 (1953) (<HOLDING>) overruled on other grounds by Matter of Holdings: 0: recognizing that injury is a prerequisite to liability 1: holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention 2: holding that a coa is a jurisdictional prerequisite 3: holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees 4: holding mothers disqualification as custodian is prerequisite to award of custody to any other person", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to the First Complaint except for some minor additional language added to Count II. Majority Opinion \u00b6 3. The modified claims were fully addressed by Judge Robinson and I agree with his analysis and the dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 Second Complaint under Rule 1-012(B)(6). The minor wording modification made to Count II did not establish an issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiffs\u2019 individual loan under Count II was preempted under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with any authority to support their position that a personal loan impacting their business relationships and commercial credit avoids preemption under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Jojola v. Fresenius Med. Clinic, 2010-NMCA-101, \u00b6 7, 149 N.M. 51, 243 P.3d 755 (<HOLDING>). As a result, the rewording of Count II was Holdings: 0: recognizing that where a party fails to provide any authority for an argument we will presume that none exists 1: holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority 2: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 3: holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument 4: holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\u201d TEX. R. EVID. 701. 10 . Detective Reynolds testified that he had worked for the Harris County Sheriff\u2019s Department for over twenty years, had been a detective for twelve years, and had been assigned to the Homicide Division for ten years, where he had been involved in investigating hundreds of homicides. 11 . \u201cInference\u201d has been defined as \"[a] conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them\u201d and\u201d[t]he process by which such a conclusion is reached.\u201d BLACK\u2019S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (8th ed.2004). 12 . The medical examiner w 11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 579 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible 1: holding that although cause of dystonia unknown experts opinion regarding causation based on temporal relationship between plaintiffs workrelated injury and onset of condition was sufficient to support commission s finding that dystonia was caused by compensable injury 2: holding experts demonstration of shaken baby syndrome using infant mannequin was not substantially similar when mannequin had to be shaken harder than in real life and number of oscillations of head needed to cause injury was unknown 3: holding egregious conduct occurred when infant was shaken forcefully enough to break bones 4: holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "thousands of jobs that exist in the national economy. Id. Social Security Ruling 00-4p SSR 00-4p prescribes guidelines for treating VE occupational testimony in conjunction with the information contained in the DOT. The ruling imposes upon an ALJ an \u201caffirmative responsibility\u201d to identify and obtain a reasonable explanation of any conflicts between a VE\u2019s testimony regarding the requirements of a specific job and the information provided in the DOT, which, with the companion publication Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles (\u201cSCO\u201d), is the primary source of job requirements relied upon in making disability determinations. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2, *4; see also Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) The language of the ruling is mandatory, not Holdings: 0: holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss 1: recognizing that ssr 004ps scope is limited to expert testimony concerning the actual requirements of a job 2: holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions 3: holding that recovery is limited to actual compensatory damages 4: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "issue of expenses until counsel provided the court with invoices, receipts, and supporting affidavits (including the descriptions and nature of each expense and the reasons therefore). Sandra Jasso\u2019s counsel filed supplements in the form of spreadsheets showing the amount, date, and description of expenses incurred in this case. The district court ruled that Sandra Jasso\u2019s counsel did not provide adequate documentation in the form of invoices or receipts, as requested, but rather only provided its in-house expense spreadsheet. Thus, the district court denied Sandra Jasso\u2019s counsel all requested expenses. The district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing these . expenses after counsel did not comply with its order. See Glass v. U.S., 335 F.Supp.2d 736, 742-43 (N.D.Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). Counsel for Sandra Jasso also requested Holdings: 0: holding that court was required to award an attorneys billing rate where defendant had submitted no evidence on fees 1: holding that timely filed motion for sanctions which requested an award of over 40000 in attorneys fees requested a substantial change in the judgment 2: holding that failure to produce supporting documentation regarding billing statements of counsel after an order to was a factor in denying requested attorneys fees 3: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 4: holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(applying a formula to divide varying sources of commingled funds because \u201cequity dictates that all ... funds be distributed on a pro rata basis\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 76 (4th Cir.1989); In re Leedy Mortgage Co., 111 B.R. 488, 489 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (disallowing differential distribution of funds based on the \u201cprecept that preferences or priorities to creditors should be carefully assessed and allowed only when legally or equitably justified\u201d); In re Independence Land Title Corp. of Ill, 18 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1982) (\u201c[I]t would thwart the general bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution to creditors of equal status if this court allowed [defendant] to receive all the funds held by the trustee.\u201d); In re Johnson, 121 N.J. 244, 244, 579 A.2d 815, 815 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Cases granting one party distribution Holdings: 0: holding that under 42 usc  407a social security benefits commingled with other nonexempt funds in a bank account remain exempt if the funds are reasonably traceable to social security income 1: holding the commissions recommendation that the attorney be ordered to refund his clients funds could not be adopted because the stipulation failed to detail the amount of such funds and no witness testimony or evidence was taken on the matter 2: holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds 3: holding that in a case where a suspended attorney commingled funds between his attorney trust account and attorney business account and the funds could not be traced claimants state of new jersey and clients security fund reached an amicable agreement to divide the funds equally 4: holding both a party and his attorney liable to repay funds withdrawn in violation of a stay where the attorney violated this courts orders and concealed the fund", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "11. Mattingly v. United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir.1991) (the government is not exempt from Rule 11 sanctions on the ground of sovereign immunity); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668 (10th Cir.1988) (28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2412 waives government sovereign immunity as to Rule 11 sanctions); United States v. Gavilan, 849 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir.1988) (the government is subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure when it enters a claim as a civil litigant); see Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp. 1421, 1537 (N.D.N.Y.1989); Joseph v. United States, 121 F.R.D. 406, 413-14 (D. Hawaii 1988); National Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D.Cal.1987); Larkin v. Heckler, 584 F.Supp. 512 (N.D.Cal.1984); cf. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 21 ERC (BNA) 2153 (N.D.Cal.1984) (<HOLDING>). 79 . There is no evidence that the other Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order 1: holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order 2: holding that even though an executive order mandating agency consideration of environmental justice concerns created no private right of action for an agencys failure to comply with that mandate the court would review the agencys action as an exercise of discretion under the apa and nepa 3: holding that the failure to appear in court pursuant to a court order can constitute direct criminal contempt 4: holding the director of the united states environmental protection agency in contempt for failure to comply with court order", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "under the policy. Thus, the provision would only be upheld under KRS \u00a7 304.14-370 if it gave the party one year from the date of denial to sue. Unfor al limitation provisions under the parameters set by KRS \u00a7 304.14-370. However, these cases provide more confusion than guidance. Both courts considered the same limitation provision in light of KRS \u00a7 304.14-370, and yet, they reached two different conclusions about the clause\u2019s validity and impact on the plaintiffs claims. Compare Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 403 F.3d 401 (6th Cir.2005) (finding that the plaintiffs claim was barred by a KRS \u00a7 304.14-370 compliant provision requiring a party to sue \u201cwithin one year of the inception of loss\u201d) with Tennant v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 04-54, 2006 WL 319046 (E.D.Ky. Feb. 10, 2006) (<HOLDING>). These decisions will be analyzed in detail Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not ripe until the appeal had been exhausted because plaintiffs harm remained speculative until then 1: holding that same limitation provision violated krs  30414370 as to the plaintiffs claim because it did not accrue until denial of the plaintiffs claim for coverage 2: holding that the uscfc did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim because plaintiffs claim of negligence sounds in tort 3: holding similar allegations supported that the plaintiffs negligence claim did not accrue until plaintiffs loan payments exceeded his ability to pay 4: holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir.2006) ] strongly undermines that position. Moreover, we see no reason why considerations relevant to loss causation in a civil fraud case should not ollow the Second Circuit in expressly applying Dura Pharmaceuticals\u2019s civil principle to criminal securities fraud sentencing. We decline to do so for two reasons. First, we believe that the primary policy rationale of Dura Pharmaceuticals for proscribing overvaluation as a valid measure of loss does not apply in a criminal sanctions context. Second, application of Dura Pharmaceuticals\u2019s civil rule to criminal sentencing would clash with the parallel principles in the Sentencing Guidelines, which have persuasive value in federal courts. See United States v. Staten, 466 F.3d 708, 710 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As noted, Dura Pha'rmaceuticals rejected the Holdings: 0: holding that alj committed reversible error in failing to consider whether a claimants failure to seek treatment was due to his financial circumstances 1: holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that any error by a district court in applying a sentencing enhancement is harmless if it did not change a defendants total offense level 3: holding that failure to consider guidelines note in applying sentencing enhancement was reversible error 4: holding that the defendants substantial rights were not affected by a sentencing guidelines enhancement even in the absence of a specific finding by the district court because the evidence amply supported the enhancement", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "orders, were signed on April 28, 1998, August 18, 1998, and December 15, 1998. 75 . The first order (signed in December 1997) did not order the mother to pay any child support, but ordered the father to pay $100. The remaining three orders directed each parent to pay $100. 76 . The parents had undergone individual psychological testing in 1997, before the children were removed, pursuant to the initial Child Safety Evaluation and Plan that CPS had implemented in April 1997. The psychiatric evaluations ordered after removal were to be new, additional evaluations that were distinct from the previous psychological testing. 77 . In re A.R.R., 61 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (Sixth Amendment); In re B.B., 971 S.W.2d 160, 172 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Arteaga v. Tex. Dep\u2019t of Protective & Holdings: 0: recognizing that the statutory right to counsel in parental termination cases requires that the appointed counsel provide effective assistance 1: holding that in parental termination proceedings the parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel 2: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel 3: holding that the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel does not extend to parental termination proceedings without identifying any specific constitutional provision 4: holding that the sixth amendment right does not extend to parental termination cases although the parent contended the right to effective counsel stemmed from tex famcode  107013", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "interlocutory issue. Rule 14(B) states that such a motion \"requesting the Court of Appeals ac-eept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of the trial court's certification.\" Ind.App. R. 14(B)(2)(a). As such, we do not have jurisdiction over this issue and it must be dismissed. See Anonymous Doctor A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (dismissing an appeal when the appellant failed to petition the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(B)). The Guillaumes argue that Appellate Rule 66(B) should allow our court to accept jurisdiction of the issue at this stage. We disagree and have previously declined such suggestions. See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 838 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ind.2005) (<HOLDING>). Because this issue is dismissed, we do not Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 1: holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed 2: recognizing that the waiver rule is wholly consistent with the bias rule of practice as an appellate body 3: holding that a failure to comply with rule 28a10 provides an appellate court a basis for disregarding the appellants arguments 4: holding that appellate rule 66b does not authorize an interlocutory appeal that fails to comply with appellate rule 14", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "does not expressly guarantee any right to counsel as does the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to require that, once a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation, the police apprise the suspect of his right to contact an attorney, and to have the attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a suspect asserts this Fifth Amendment, or Miranda-based, right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel is physically present during the interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Importantly for Teixeria, this Miranda-based Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 1: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings 4: holding that the right to have counsel present means the right to have counsel physically present during the interrogation not merely the right to consult an attorney by telephone", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "those arguments raise constitutional issues).\u201d United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991). Instead of developing his excessive-fines-clause argument, Crespo devoted his brief to attacking our jurisdiction and the ALJ\u2019s initial decision. Crespo\u2019s complete lack of development of this argument is sufficient to find waiver, especially given that this area' of law is quite unsettled. As an initial matter, it is not even clear that the excessive fines clause applies to civil monetary damages. See United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that it is not established that treble damages under False Claims Act are \u201cfines\u201d); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Even if we were to accept that a penalty paid Holdings: 0: holding that punitive damages are not fines 1: holding that the fines imposed by the challenged city ordinances are not excessive even if the excessive fines clause is applicable 2: holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa 3: holding that excessive fines clause does not apply to civiljury award of punitive fines 4: holding a court may not award punitive damages", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not necessarily or immediately result in his earlier release, but would set in motion a process that will have that consequence if he prevails. In Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808-10 (D.C.Cir.1988) (en banc), this court had held that a federal prisoner seeking to challenge his parole eligibility date was required to proceed in habeas, even though success upon his claims would not necessarily result in his earlier release. Later, however, in Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1055-57 (D.C.Cir. 1998), we permitted a District of Columbia prisoner to challenge his parole eligibility date in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. In the latter case, we relied primarily upon two Supreme Court cases, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (<HOLDING>), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that the district court mischaracterized a state prisoners  1983 claim as a petition for writ of habeas corpus because the prisoner did not attack his conviction challenge the fact or length of his confinement or seek immediate release from prison 1: holding that that if the success of a  1983 damages claim brought by a prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been invalidated 2: holding that to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a 42 usc  1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal  or called into question by federal courts issuance of writ of habeas corpus footnote omitted 3: holding that a state prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing he would necessarily prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement 4: holding that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal courts issuance of a writ of habeas corpus", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties.... 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1442. Thus, to invoke the federal officer removal statute, Thornburg must both act under an officer of the United States and have averred a colorable federal defense. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133-34, 109 S.Ct. 959. We address each of these requirements in turn. 1. Whether Thornburg \u201cact[s] under\u201d an officer of the United States such that removal under the federal officer removal statute is available to him Bell argues that this Court should remand her claim to state court because, based on this Court\u2019s decision in Cromelin, Thornburg cannot take advantage of the federal officer removal statute and remove the case under \u00a7 1442(a)(1). See Cromelin, 177 F.2d at 277 (<HOLDING>). Thornburg, however, claims that he is Holdings: 0: holding that a section 1983 suit against an officer in his or her official capacity is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent 1: holding that a bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court appointed by the court directed by the court and paid by the court but is in no sense an agent or employee or officer of the united states 2: holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide 3: holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884 4: recognizing that this court and the united states supreme court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature an appellate court is without power to review the sentence", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "date. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court\u2019s dismissal for a failure to state a conspiracy claim. The Walker court noted that Rule 9 was inapplicable, and held that \u201cit is enough in pleading a conspiracy to merely indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.\u201d Id. The Walker court also distinguished its holding from its earlier holding in Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center, 188 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir.1999), which Sanchez cites in support of his specificity argument, because the plaintiff in Ryan \u201cdid not so much as hint at what role he might have played or agreed to play\u201d in the alleged conspiracy. Walker, 288 F.3d at 1007; see also, Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The other cases cited by Sanchez are also Holdings: 0: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 1: holding that a complaint under section 1983 must contain more than naked improbable unsubstantiated assertions without any specifics 2: holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed 3: holding that complaint alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights cannot survive motion to dismiss based on conclusory allegations of conspiracy which are not supported by references to material facts 4: recognizing that ryan cannot be read to require that a complaint alleging conspiracy under  1983 contain more than notice of time scope and parties involved", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "objectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.\u2019 \u201d Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn.2001) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn.1995)). Component parts of a statute are to be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. See State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.1998). Aiding in our interpretation of legislative intent are the maxims of nosci-tur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, \u201cthe meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1060 (6th ed.1990); see also Hammer v. Franklin Interurban Co., 209 Tenn. 399, 354 S.W.2d 241, 242 (1962) (<HOLDING>). The doctrine of noscitur a sociis permits Holdings: 0: holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation 1: holding that statutory terms should be construed with reference to their associated words and phrases 2: holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words 3: recognizing that in the absence of a statutory definition statutory terms are construed in accordance with their ordinary or natural meaning 4: holding that the meaning of doubtful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words or phrases noscitur a sociis", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an identical regulatory exclusion under similar facts, the court stated: Although the language \u201cbased upon or attributable to\u201d is awkward when used in conjunction with the language \u201cany action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation\u201d the court finds the FDIC\u2019s construction of this exclusion to be strained and unreasonable. (Footnote omitted). Reading the endorsement as a whole, without placing undue emphasis on the words \u201cbased upon or attributable to, \u201d it is clear that the insured\u2019s intent was to exclude coverage for any loss resulting from any action brought by or on behalf of the FDIC in any capacity against a bank director or officer. (Footnote omitted). Accord, Continental Casualty Company v. Allen, 710 F.Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D.Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>). See also, McCuen v. International Insurance Holdings: 0: holding that language almost identical to the language in the policy at issue in this case ie due proof conveys discretionary authority 1: holding that a standard wcel policy with a maritime endorsement is an ocean marine policy 2: holding that the language in an identical endorsement in an mgicissued 1983 d and o liability policy is not ambigu ous 3: holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical 4: holding it is settled that in construing an endorsement to an insurance policy the endorsement and the policy must be read together and the words of the policy remain in full force and effect except as altered by the words of the endorsement", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "unoriginal, and are not entitled to protection. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282 (noting that originality in copyright means that the work \u201cwas independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works)\u201d). Even to the extent that Lyons\u2019s ACVSMR Bylaws cover topics that are required for inclusion by the Manual, however, her choices in expressing and organizing those topics are original. See Situation Mgmt., 560 F.3d at 61. The decision to include those topics in the first instance, however, is not entitled to protection because it was dictated by the Manual\u2019s instructions, and thus did not require independent creativity. See Manual 8-9 (listing topics that must be addressed in a specialty organization\u2019s bylaws); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, 111 S.Ct. 1282 (<HOLDING>). 3. Substantial Similarity Analysis After Holdings: 0: holding that wjhile trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written child custody orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review 1: holding that government officials are provided with qualified immunity so long as their actions could have been reasonably thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated 2: holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review 3: holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently 4: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "this element.by showing either (1) the defendant \u201cis enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise\u201d or (2) \u201cthe.predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise.\u201d App. at 4689-90, see United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir.1980)). The government does not have to show that the defendant\u2019s motive in committing the predicate act was to further the affairs of the enterprise. In fact, a defendant can commit a predicate act that is detrimental to the enterprise so long as the evidence establishes the requisite nexus between the predicate act and the enterprise. Pro-venzano, at 200 (<HOLDING>). D. Evidence of Uncharged Acts. Irizarry Holdings: 0: recognizing that by accepting bribes in exchange for allowing violations of a collective bargaining agreement the defendant was conducting the rico enterprise local union through racketeering activity even though the union was harmed by the racketeering activity 1: holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union 2: holding that union members had standing to bring rico claims for reduced compensation under collective bargaining agreement 3: holding that there was abundant evidence to support the charge against a union member for helping organize a nonaflcio local union of a different name where the union member admitted at the hearing that he contacted local contractors for the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement for new union and serving as the new unions business manager 4: holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the sorts of factors that courts have long charged the Board with balancing. We conclude that the broad legal views outlined in Otis II are reasonably defensible approaches for determining when plant re-locations are mandatory bargaining subjects under the NLRA. IY. Analysis op the Present Case Having determined that Otis II is not fatally flawed on its face, our inquiry is not over. It remains to determine whether the Otis standard, acceptable in its broad outlines, has been properly applied to the particular facts of the case before us. Despite the deference we owe the Board, for reasons that follow, we conclude that its decision in this ease falls short of the standards of reasoned decisionmaking that we customarily require in judicial review. A. The Findings of the 7, 958 (1986) (<HOLDING>); DeSoto, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 788, 789 (1986) Holdings: 0: holding that court did not prejudice defendant by limiting his counsel to preestablished limitations on inter alia the scope of crossexamination 1: holding that a decision to move did not turn upon labor costs but rather was motivated by inter alia a foreclosure action 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying inter alia costs for internal copying of documents by prevailing defendants counsel produced for discovery 3: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 4: holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not constitute ineffective assistance. With regard to Valerie Goins, trial counsel testified that he decided not to call her as a witness because she would have testified that Howard returned home that night around 12:30 a.m., which was inconsistent with the statement Howard provided to law enforcement about being with Patricia and her cousin all night. As previously noted, the determination as to which defense witnesses will be called is \u201cpurely a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.\u201d And given trial counsel\u2019s reasonable explanation for his strategy here, his decision to not call Goins as a witness certainly did not render his assistance ineffective. (b) , 290 Ga. 574, 575 (2) (722 SE2d 763) (2012) (<HOLDING>). 38 Mitchell v. State, 290 Ga. 490, 492 (4) Holdings: 0: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that defendants conclusory allegation that trial counsel failed to object to leading questions without specifying such instances did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 3: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that defendant failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to the states leading questions when there was no evidence that such failure was not based on trial strategy", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the entire cause, including related claims under laws that are not themselves money-mandating. The Court of Federal Claims rejected Mr. Filipczyk\u2019s argument, holding that all claims brought before the Court of Feder al Claims must independently relate back to a money-mandating statute. See Synernet Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed.Cl. 375, 382 (Ct.Cl.1998). It appears to us from the record in this case that the Court of Federal Claims erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain arguments that were not directly based on a money-mandating statute. Claimants in the Court of Federal Claims may argue issues based on violations of the Constitution or of a statute or regulation to support their claims for monetary relief under money-mandating statutes. Holley, 124 F.3d at 1467 (<HOLDING>); see also Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims had jurisdiction to decide an alleged due process violation related to his claim for damages under a moneymandating statute 1: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over an alleged violation of the due process clause because the clause does not obligate the government to pay money damages 2: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 3: recognizing a plaintiffs  1988 claim predicated on an alleged violation of his substantive due process rights 4: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "relief from judgment pursuant to rule 1.540(b)(1), (2), or (3). In support of its argument that the foreclosure judgment is void, Sterling cites Shields v. Flinn, 528 So.2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). In Shields, the Third District declared a judgment void two years after the entry of the judgment because the defendant, over whom the court had personal jurisdiction, had been given no notice of the trial date and had not appeared for the trial. Id.; see also Hammett v. Hammett, 510 So.2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (concluding in a one-paragraph opinion that a party\u2019s failure to receive notice of hearing at which the judgment was entered entitled that party to relief from the judgment pursuant to rule 1.540(b)(4)); Falkner v. Amerifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, 489 So.2d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). These Third District cases, however, predate Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order 1: holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule 2: holding that a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice constituted a final order that was appealable 3: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 4: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "784 F.Supp. at 603.2 When plaintiffs urge a supplemental EIS should be conducted based on effects already adequately considered by-the original EIS, a supplemental EIS is not required. Cronin, 919 F.2d at 449; Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1178; Hickory Neighborhood Defense League, 893 F.2d at 63; and Texas v. United States Forest Serv., 654 F.Supp. 296, 298 (S.D.Tex.1987). The burden is on the plaintiff to show that grounds exist requiring the preparation of an EIS. Robertson, 784 F.Supp. at 606. In Robertson, the district court held that when the timber cutting proposed in a site-specific project did not differ significantly from the timber cutting anticipated and evaluated in the programmatic EIS, no supplemental site-specific EIS was required. Id. See also Cronin, 919 F.2d at 449 (<HOLDING>); Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1180 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case need show only that he is a member of a protected group and whites are a protected group under title vii 1: holding that the forum selection clause at issue encompassed both contract and tort claims 2: holding that plaintiffs statistics did not shed any light on the legally relevant issue because they did not indicate the group of applicants who were interviewed or even the group of applicants found qualified or the group of all applicants 3: recognizing women as a distinct group 4: holding supplemental eis not necessary for sitespecific timber sale where programmatic eis considered effects of both clearcutting and group selection and sitespecific project authorized group selection", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 599171 (Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-958). The Court is not persuaded, as the Commissioner\u2019s argument appears to run contrary to a body of cases involving freestanding claims brought under the Supremacy Clause. For instance, the Supreme Court has reached the merits of a preemption claim concerning a statute enacted pursuant to Congress\u2019s spending clause authority. See PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889 (2003) (plurality opinion) (involving Medicaid Act). Although PhRMA was a plurality decision, \u201cseven Justices assumed both that the federal courts have jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for spending clause preemption.\u201d Planned Parenthood of Houston, & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331-32 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Thompson, 362 F.3d at 819 n. 3 Holdings: 0: holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court 1: recognizing that the statute vesting this court with the supreme judicial power of the territory implicitly repealed 1 vic  4 2: holding that the petitioners federal habeas action accrued when a witness executed an affidavit recanting the testimony he gave during a prisoners murder prosecution not on the date that the state supreme court rejected the prisoners claim 3: recognizing that supreme court implicitly rejected the contention that asserting the preemptive force of federal spending clause legislation is itself no claim 4: recognizing as foreclosed the contention that recent supreme court decisions limit almendareztorres holding to cases where a defendant has admitted the prior convictions during a guilty plea", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "detailed expert reports that were explored at a lengthy deposition. In essence, he compared C & F\u2019s sales and growth rates to comparable competitors. Except in certain respects not relevant here, the admissibility of evidence is governed by the law of the forum. See Restatement (Second), supra, \u00a7 138. Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting \u2014 a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge \u2014 but that is not dispositive. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, Holdings: 0: holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile 1: holding that an engineer whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair could testify in a products liability action involving tractors 2: recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law 3: holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school 4: recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(\u201cThe mere assertion by the petitioner that there was insufficient evidence, without more, cannot support a finding of deprivation of due process.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 . In the complaint, in addition to the specific allegation against defendant Knight, Grinter alleges \"defendants\u201d violated his \"equal rights\u201d in violation of \u00a7 1981. \"This court has adopted the requirement that a plaintiff allege with particularity all material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has violated a constitutional right.\u201d Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Such \"conclusoiy, unsupported statements\u201d are \"insufficient to state a claim.\u201d Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.2001). 3) (<HOLDING>), and Jones Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 807 Holdings: 0: holding that the prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as to each defendant later sued 1: holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim 2: holding that a prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies even though his grievance was untimely 3: holding that an alien must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief from detention 4: holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time limit for good cause", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way ...\u201d Expert Discovery: Pertinent Portions ofMass.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) \u201cDiscovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable . . . and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows: (A)(1) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion ...\u201d Discussion It is well settled that \u201cthe conduct and scope of discove 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, in some instances, if a court Holdings: 0: holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse 1: holding that production of documents without seeking a protective order waives the right to such an order unless there is a showing of good cause for the delay 2: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint 3: holding that to gain a protective order the party must make particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document 4: holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in the area of and similar to Kleinholz\u2019s. United States v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301, 1306 (8th Cir.1984) (\u201cAn anonymous tip from an informer may serve as a basis for probable cause as long as its reliability is established through corroboration.\u201d). Additionally, though neither party or the court below seems to find the fact relevant law enforcement had just arrested Kleinholz\u2019s companion on Klein-holz\u2019s front porch for possession of marijuana and other drug paraphernalia. Most importantly, however, law enforcement smelled ether: a substance known to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. United States v. Francis, 327 F.3d 729, 736 (8th Cir.2003). The smell of ether might alone support a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). But certainly such an odor coupled with other Holdings: 0: holding that an officer had probable cause to search bags in the trunk of the car when he opened the trunk and smelled a strong odor of methamphetamine 1: holding officer developed probable cause for a search based on his immediate perception of an odor associated with methamphetamine production 2: holding the odor of an etherlike substance in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle 3: holding that although pcp has no odor because streetlevel pcp is mixed with other substances that have a distinct odor an officers recognition of that odor was sufficient to establish probable cause 4: holding officer had probable cause after detecting an odor associated with cocaine because of officers experience from prior cocaine seizures", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "however, imposed upon the police the duty to inform the juvenile of that right, and we cannot do so where the statute is silent. Hence, this case is very similar to K.M. v. State, 335 Ark. 85, 983 S.W.2d 93 (1998), where we recently held that a juvenile does not have a right to assert the insanity defense in the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding because no such right could be found in the constitution or the juvenile statute. Although we may question the prudence of giving a juvenile a right without imposing a corresponding duty on the police to inform the juvenile of that right, that is a policy decision properly left to the legislature, and not this court. See Norton v. Hinson, 337 Ark. 487, 989 S.W.2d 535 (1999); McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 989 S.W.2d 9 (1999) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we affirm the trial Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction to decide whether a debt belongs to one of the classes that would bring it within the scope of section 523a3b lies exclusively in the bankruptcy courts 1: holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion 2: recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision 3: holding that the determination of public policy lies almost exclusively in the legislative domain and the decision of the general assembly in that regard will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of palpable error 4: holding that the primary obligation for the disclosure of matters which are essentially in the prosecutorial domain lies with the government", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "its end of their bargain and to deliver what was promised. The striking feature of a typical no-injury class is that the plaintiffs have either not yet experienced a malfunction because of the alleged defect or have experienced a malfunction but not been harmed by it. Therefore, the plaintiffs in a no-injury products liability case have not suffered any physical harm or out-of-pocket economic loss. Here, the damages sought by the Coghlans are not rooted in the alleged defect of the product as such, but in the fact that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain. Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit also noted that \u201cthe determination that there has been no injury in [cases like this] must be an evidentia-ry one.\u201d Id. at 455 (<HOLDING>). Most courts recognize that the failure to Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings 1: holding that district court acted prematurely by dismissing case on the pleadings 2: holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence 3: holding court must have evidence to support dismissal before dismissing a case for fraud on the court 4: holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "obtained [the funds] in the first place, but no longer [has] a valid claim to retain them\u201d because they were \u201cin excess of his fee for the services rendered\u201d in the Oxford actions and (2) that he \u201cwas not found to have himself violated the securities laws and has not been alleged to have committed other acts of fraud by the SEC.\u201d Id. at 24, 27 (citing In re Sherman, 491 F.3d at 959). The SEC argues in contrast that there is no \u201cconsensus\u201d among courts that \u00a7 523(a)(19) applies only when the debt derives from a securities law violation by the debtor. Id. at 10. The SEC contends that none of the cases cited by Sherman involved a nominal defendant and that In re Matthews is the only case presenting similar facts. Id. (citing Case No. 07-10108-BH (Bankr.W.D.Okla. Dec. 12, 2008) (<HOLDING>)). The SEC argues that the court in In re Holdings: 0: holding that puffery is not actionable under the securities laws 1: holding that the defendant was nondisehargeable where the plaintiff estab lished a violation of oklahoma securities laws by showing that defendants were in possession of funds that belonged to other investors 2: holding that the in connection with requirement of rule 10b5 was satisfied where investors were injured as investors through respondents deceptions and the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coineided 3: holding that morrison precludes securities claims brought by us investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange even where those securities are also listed on a us exchange 4: holding that nyseg telling its investors that it would not compromise its financial integrity was not actionable under the securities laws", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the option. Rentrak would not have been prevented legally from selling Dixon registered stock. 6 . The purpose of the holding period prior to resale is to assure that purchasers of unregistered stock \u201chave assumed the economic risks of investment, and therefore are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer.\u201d 17 C.F.R. \u00a7 230.144 (1999), Preliminary Note. 7 . Rentrak also argues that Dixon failed to meet his evidentiary burden in opposing summary judgment on his stock option claim. This argument fails. Rentrak identifies no evidence that it brought forth such that the burden would have shifted to Dixon to produce evidence in support of his claim. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the entire dispute centered on Holdings: 0: holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship 1: holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response 2: holding that nonmoving party need not produce evidence unless moving party first brings forth evidence either tending to prove lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging existence of element of cause of action 3: holding that when the moving party submits a properly supported summary judgment motion the nonmoving party must produce affirmative evidence to demonstrate genuine issue of fact and may not rely simply on denials or allegations in pleadings 4: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "assign all inventions to the University of Washington in which it had an interest: Q. Did you understand that if you were doing research work for Washington using their facilities, that they would own the patents resulting from that work? A. Yes. * * * Q. Was it your\u2014although you didn\u2019t read this document, was. it your understanding that you had assigned to the University all discoveries and inventions in which the University has an interest? A. Y\u00e9s. - (7/1/14 Liu Tr. at 97:9-12; 98:14-18). According to Defendants, Dr. Liu\u2019s employment agreement constitutes an \u201cautomatic\u201d assignment that, upon conception, immediately assigned his inventions to the University of Washington with no further required action on his part. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int\u2019l Trade Holdings: 0: holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness 1: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 2: holding that claims against corporate officers for mismanagement belong to the corporation 3: holding agreement stating inventions shall belong and that employee hereby conveys transfers and assigns to its employer constitutes an automatic assignment 4: holding that whether an employee decides to assist the charging party or refuses to assist the  employer the employer may not retaliate against the employee because this decision of the employee constitutes participation in an investigation or proceeding under title vii", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a February 3, 2011, work injury. Employer contends that simply telling Brian Yoder that he fell, even if true, did not satisfy the Act\u2019s notice requirements. Accordingly, the claim petition should have been denied. The claimant has the burden of proving all elements necessary to support an award of benefits. Inglis House v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 535 Pa. 135, 634 A.2d 592, 595 (1993). Section 311 of the Act requires the claimant to inform his employer of a work injury within 120 days of its occurrence. If he fails to do so, he is ineligible for compensation. 77 P.S. \u00a7 631. This deadline cannot be extended where the claimant asserts that he told a fellow employee of the injury. Canterna v. United States Steel Corporation, 12 Pa.Cmwlth. 579, 317 A.2d 355, 357 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Timely, notice \u201cprotect[s] the employer from Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury 1: holding clear and convincing evidence established that the claimants attempted suicide was the result of a mental injury suffered subsequent to a compensable injury 2: holding claimants status as illegal alien did not preclude entitlement to benefits for workrelated injury 3: holding that limitations period begins to run on date notice was received at claimants residence even if claimant did not receive it until a later date 4: holding a claimants injury report to a fellow employee did not satisfy the act because the claimants supervisor did not learn of the injury until six months later", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "notes that the Secretary has averred that a search for the claims file has been made in the OGC, the Board, and all ROs. Id. at 20; July 17, 1998, Motion at 2; June 17, 1998, Motion at 1. Because, for the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the petition is without merit, the Court will deny as moot the Secretary's motion to strike that petition. \u201cThe remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.\u201d Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976). Before a court may issue a writ, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) a clear and indisputable right to the writ and (2) a lack of adequate alternative means to obtain the relief sought. See In Matter of Fee Agreement of Cox, 10 Vet.App. 361, 370 (1997) (<HOLDING>), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Cox Holdings: 0: holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act 1: recognizing the all writs act gives federal courts authority to issue writs of coram nobis to correct fundamental errors in criminal proceedings where the person is no longer in custody 2: holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under all writs act 3: holding that this court has power under 28 usc  1651 to issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law 4: holding that this court has authority in appropriate circumstances to issue writs under all writs act 28 usc  1651a", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 78dd-l et seq. (2000). 3 . United States v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 686 (S.D.Tex.2002). 4 . United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir.1998). 6 . United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1970) (citations omitted). 7 . United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2000). 8 . Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 9 . Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 . United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). 11 . United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Naranjo, 259 F.3d 379, 383 Holdings: 0: recognizing principle 1: recognizing this as the general rule 2: recognizing this rule 3: recognizing same principle 4: recognizing this principle as a settled rule", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "challenge out-sourcing decisions under statutes that were designed to promote that practice. See Courtney, 297 F.3d at 461; Am. Fed. of Gov\u2019t Emps., Local 2119, 171 F.3d at 471; Nat\u2019l Fed\u2019n of Fed. Emps., 883 F.2d at 1042-54. Subsequent to these decisions, as well as the Federal Circuit\u2019s decision in AFGE, Congress passed a specific provision authorizing certain federal employees to challenge the outcome of public-private competitions conducted under Circular A-76. See Pub.L. No. 108-375, \u00a7 326(a)(2), 118 Stat. 1811, 1848 (codified at 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 3551(2)(B)). There is no comparable provision authorizing the suit by plaintiff here. 23 . For similar rulings involving efforts to enjoin the termination of a contract, see Data Monitor Sys., Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed.Cl. 66, 71-72 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Griffy\u2019s Landscape Maint. LLC v. United Holdings: 0: holding that the awardee of a contract may not challenge the decision to terminate that contract by invoking the courts bid protest jurisdiction 1: holding that a denial of a bid protest without holding a hearing did not deprive a disappointed bidder of any property rights because there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a government contract unless the contract actually is awarded 2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction under the bid protest provisions of section 1491 to enjoin a contracting agencys termination of a contract 3: holding that size protest filed postaward may be controlling if contracting officer decided to reaward the contract 4: holding that in bid protest cases  a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure ", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. See, Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir.2001); Sheikh v. Chertoff, No. C 03-05604, 2006 WL 463506, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10110 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 23, 2006). Federal courts lack jurisdiction to grant habeas relief where the petitioner seeking that relief is not in fact \u201cin custody\u201d at the time the petition is filed. Id. Relevantly, section 2241(c)(3) provides that the \u201cwrit of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless ... [she] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.\u201d Although Petitioner is not, literally, a prisoner of the INS, courts th Cir.2001) (same); Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir.1994) (same); Mustata v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1021 n. 4 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1299 Holdings: 0: holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional 1: holding that no specialized skill or distinctive knowledge was needed to represent an alien at asylum and withholding of deportation hearings 2: holding a final deportation order places an alien constructively in custody1 because of the specialized meaning those words have in the context of an immigrationrelated habeas petition 3: holding that so long as the petitioner is subject to a final order of deportation an alien is deemed to be in custody1 for purposes of the ina 4: holding that habeas review is  for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in human experience\u201d). In the present case, the wife\u2019s right not to become a parent seemingly conflicts with the husband\u2019s right to procreate. The conflict, however, is more apparent than real. Recognition and enforcement of the wife\u2019s right would not seriously impair the husband\u2019s right to procreate. Though his right to procreate using the wife\u2019s egg would be terminated, he retains the capacity to father children. On the . Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1346, 99 L.Ed.2d 565, 576-77 (1988) (finding state action in probate court\u2019s involvement in administration of Oklahoma\u2019s statute requiring decedent\u2019s creditors to present claim within two months of publication of notice) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265, 84 S.Ct. 710, 718, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 697-98 (1964) (<HOLDING>) with Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 Holdings: 0: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law 1: recognizing that a federal habeas court does not rule on errors in the application of state law especially rulings regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence 2: holding that application by alabama courts of alabama rule of law regarding libel constituted state action 3: holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law 4: recognizing district court application of the same rule", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "violated Doyle in his closing argument. First, he impeached Fields\u2019 trial testimony that he did not remember the stabbing by calling attention to his response, \u201cI ain\u2019t saying nothing,\u201d to the question of whether he had stabbed Fodness raised by Officer Mattson during his first post -Miranda warnings interview. See supra note 2. Second, the prosecutor also referenced Fields\u2019 response, \u201cI won\u2019t talk to you about that without an attorney,\u201d to questions by Detective Norlin regarding what happened when Fodness and Fields were in the bushes across the street from the Pomp Room. See supra note 2. Under Greenfield, both of the statements that the prosecutor used to impeach Fields\u2019 trial testimony were invocations of Fields\u2019 Miranda rights. Cf. Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295, 106 S.Ct. at 640 (<HOLDING>). Further, Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. at Holdings: 0: holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible 1: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 2: holding that defendants invocation of miranda rights is inadmissible to prove defendants sanity 3: holding that defendants request to call his mother to get an attorney was an invocation of miranda rights requiring that further questioning must end 4: holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "address challenges raised for the first time on appeal in numerous cases.\" On the particular cireum-stances presented, we decline to do so. 29 This concession \"raises the question of the extent to which defendant is entitled to appellate review of this issue.\" People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, 114, 321 P.3d 557. The Allman division recognized \"two lines of authority in Colorado on this question in criminal cases.\" Id.; see People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 932 (Colo.App.2011) (describing Colorado law on reviewing an unpreserved constitutional challenge as in a \"muddled state.\") (J. Jones, J., specially concurring) 30 The position that a constitutional challenge to a statute should not be entertained for the first time on appeal derives from People v. Lesney, 855 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Colo.1993) (<HOLDING>), and People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 Holdings: 0: holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal 1: holding issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review 2: holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court  cannot be raised  for the first time on appeal 3: holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or practice of the employer ... [which] is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation ...\u201d Abbamont, Barratt and Mehlman clearly involved complaints regarding actions of the employer. In Abbamont, it was the employer\u2019s failure to provide a safe school environment; in Barratt, the employee accused the secondary employer of commercial bribery; in Mehlman, the employer was selling gasoline with an unhealthy benzene content. See also Delran Ed. Ass\u2019n. v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.J.Super. 538, 543-44, 650 A.2d 7 (App.Div.1994) (suggesting that retaliation against teacher for refusing to obey school superintendent\u2019s order to give confidential pupil records to independent contractor would violate CEPA); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J.Super. 451, 460, 566 A.2d 215 (App.Div.1989) (<HOLDING>). Employers, of course, act through their Holdings: 0: holding that retaliation against inhouse attorney for refusing to join a scheme to cheat a competitor is covered under cepa 1: holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii 2: holding that interference and retaliation are two separate theories that can be advanced under the fmla and that termination is evidence of retaliation 3: recognizing exceptions for retaliation against whistle blowers and retaliation against filers of workers compensation claims 4: holding that but for standard applied to retaliation case brought under texas law", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "privilege to avoid liability here. See Petta, 44 S.W.3d at 579-80; see also Salda\u00f1a, 2001 WL 85862, at *1. S. Were the Requirements of \u00a7 9.51(a) Satisfied? Given that the Government can invoke the \u00a7 9.51(a) privilege, we must then ask whether the agents\u2019 conduct conformed to the requirements of \u00a7 9.51(a). The district court\u2019s findings, which are not clearly erroneous, indicate that the agents were (1) \u201cpeace officers\u201d who (2) identified themselves as officers when they entered the Salon, (3) reasonably believed the arrest of Villafi'anca was lawful based on his resistance, (4) made clear their purpose to arrest Villafranca, and (5) used force reasonably believed to be immediately necessary to make the arrest. See also Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Hinojosa, 834 F.2d at 1231 (concluding that a Holdings: 0: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim 1: holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis 2: holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act 3: holding that the right to be free from the use of excessive force has been well established since 1976 4: holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Affirmed. See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Adams v. State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138, 141 Holdings: 0: holding that section 89313 as amended by section 893101 florida statutes 2002 is constitutional 1: recognizing that the 1992 amendment to section 8930216 florida statutes changed the law 2: holding florida sexual predators act section 77521 florida statutes 2000 to be unconstitutional as violating procedural due process 3: holding that arbitration is not a civil action as that term is used in section 76873 florida statutes 1991 4: holding that the legislature amended section 8120142d florida statutes now renumbered as section 8120143c in 1992 to omit habitual offender penalties for the crime of felony petit theft", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "violating the First Amendment. Beyond their general reliance on R.A.V., the defendants are imprecise as to the specifics of their First Amendment contention. Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why the First Amendment does not bar their convictions and sentences on any of the usual grounds: first, the statutes under which the defendants were prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 844(h), and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3631, are facially valid; second, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; and, third, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied in this ease. We will then explain why prosecu-torial comments about the defendants\u2019 racial animus and Klan membership were permissible, and why the district court\u2019s comments on the same subjects at sentencing wer 1 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860, 108 S.Ct. 173, 98 Holdings: 0: holding  3631 not vague or overbroad 1: holding that the prohibition against fighting in fla admin code r 33601314  24 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 2: holding the ordinance as applied to entertainers performing at a sexuallyoriented business is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad 3: holding  241 not vague or overbroad 4: holding  241 and 3631 not vague", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1788, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (\u201cOur recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.\"). 3 . If this case were brought under general maritime law, and no cause of action were available under admiralty statutes, punitive damages would be \"theoretically\" available. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1091 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985). But see Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S, 822 F.Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va.1993) (<HOLDING>); Gaines v. Ampro Fisheries, 836 F.Supp. 347, Holdings: 0: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 1: holding punitive damages not recoverable for retaliatory discharge claim under general maritime law 2: holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions 3: holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law 4: recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "liability under the law of the state where the accident occurred. See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws \u00a7 17.56 (4th ed. 2004) (citing cases showing split of authority whether insureds must prove they are legally entitled to recover under law of state where policy was issued or state in which accident occurred, for purposes of UM or UIM coverage). This application of Crossley is supported by cases from other jurisdictions cited in that opinion. See, Bachman v. American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston, 338 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Kan. 1972) (concluding in action against decedent\u2019s insurer that plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of showing uninsured motorist was liable for injuries to plaintiff\u2019s son); Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. App. 1967) (<HOLDING>). This application of Crossley, supra, is also Holdings: 0: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 1: holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage 2: holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver 3: holding that where missouri insured was injured in missouri when car in which she was riding was struck by separate uninsured vehicle driven by her husband and where missouri law precluded wife from suing husband insured was not entitled to um benefits because coverage was provided only when um motorist was legally responsible for damages noting that action against insurer was upon contract not tort and that the terms of the contract govern 4: holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and support of the child in accordance with their respective means. Until established by a court order, the minimum child support obligation of a parent who fails to furnish maintenance, education, and support for his child, following a continued absence from the home, is the obligor\u2019s share of the amount shown in the support guidelines, commencing on the first day of the absence. 4 . See Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy, 1999 WL 692085 (Del.Fam.Ct.1999) (affording father credit in the amount of $7,571.42 against back child support for mortgage payments made to the mother and/or the mortgage holder); Lynch v. Lynch, 422 So.2d 703, 706 (La.Ct.App.1982) (reversing a circuit court's deletion of father's credit for house payments); Lauria v. Lauria, 45 A.D.3d 535, 845 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Fogarty v. Fogarty, 284 A.D.2d 300, 725 Holdings: 0: holding that it was within the courts discretion to credit fathers arrearages for onehalf of the mortgage payments that he made 1: holding that fathers investment account with stock brokerage firm was not a multipleparty account available for payment of child support 2: holding that the insurer was entitled to credit against the owners claim in the amount paid to the mortgagee 3: holding that the court erred in failing to credit fathers child support account for the entire amount that he paid for the mothers mortgage 4: holding that mortgage payments should not be regarded as child support because it was a contractual legal obligation that built fathers equity", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "determine total loss, restitution victims and restitution amount. J.A. 30113. 2 . As a general matter, restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See United States v. Bu-chey, 810 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir.1987) (\"Criminal restitution ... is part of the sentencing process [and thus] is fundamentally 'penal' in nature.\u201d); see also United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706-07 (9th Cir.1992) (\u201cRestitution imposed as a component of the defendant\u2019s sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy.\u201d); United States v. Satter-field, 1A3, F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that Congress intended \"to treat restitution as one of the options available to the district court in imposing an appropriate sen tence\u201d). In fact, we have previously held that restitution F.3d 969, 973-74 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688, 690 n. 1 (4th Holdings: 0: holding issue waived because it was not mentioned in brief but was only raised in notice of appeal 1: holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived 2: holding argument not raised in opening brief but raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 3: holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal 4: holding an issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Tax Court relied on its previous opinion in Manocchio v. Commissioner, supra, which reached the equal treatment issue. However, at the time that Manocchio was decided by the Tax Court, the Commissioner had not issued Revenue Ruling 83-3 which disallowed the deduction of educational expenses that were allocable to a portion of the veterans\u2019 educational benefits other than flight training. This ruling, however, was prospective only. After the Tax Court had rendered its decision in this case, the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits reached different conclusions as to whether the application of Revenue Rulings 80-173 and 83-3 have resulted in the disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. Manocchio v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1400, 1404 & n.2 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. United States, 748 F.2d 1465 (11th Holdings: 0: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction 1: recognizing this distinction 2: holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification 3: holding rational basis as standard for commerce clause inquiries 4: recognizing heightened rational basis scrutiny", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to Officer Rucker, \"[h]e could have had money and you wouldn\u2019t have\" found it. 10 . Testimony \"so unbelievable, on its face that it defies physical laws\u201d would be \"incredible as a matter of law\u201d. United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086, 106 S.Ct. 861, 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986). 11 . The federal, reasonable-doubt standard is articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 12 . Knox refers here to La.Rev.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 15:438 (West 1981) which states that \"[t]he rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.\u201d 13 . Compare State v. Williams, 423 So.2d 1048, 1052 (La.1982) (<HOLDING>) with State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 468 n. 3 Holdings: 0: recognizing that kotteakos sets out the harmlesserror standard for nonconstitutional errors 1: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 2: holding that larevstatann  15438 west 1981 sets standard above federal law 3: recognizing that section 103 sets forth the standard and so synergism of a known combination is not required 4: holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "ground or theory apparent on the record.\" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, \u00b6 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (emphases, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). ' 51 Whether an employee such as Carsey owed a fiduciary duty to his employer is unclear under Utah law. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, \u00b6 22 n. 2, 94 P.3d 179 (\"We need not, and do not, decide today whether all 'mere employees' owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the employer's legitimate business interests.\"). However, we need not grapple with this issue here, as we agree with Carsey that CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim is preempted by the UTSA. [ 52 Examination of the factual allegations underlying CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim shows that this claim is b 857-58 & n. 3 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 153 NH. Holdings: 0: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was completely dependent on the facts concerning misappropriation of trade secrets 1: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was solely dependent upon misappropriationoftradesecret facts 2: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 3: holding copyright act preempted photographers misappropriation claim when claim did not have extra element such as breach of fiduciary duty 4: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the factual allegations supporting that claim involved only the misappropriation of  information", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Saulpaugh whole, its failure to apply a compound rate of interest to its calculation of damages constituted an abuse of discretion. See Clarke, 960 F.2d at 1153. On remand, however, the district court may wish to deny interest for specific years if it concludes that a delay in the litigation was the result of dilatory tactics by the plaintiff. We leave this determination to the district court in the first instance. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Saulpaugh the remedy of front pay. The award of front pay is discretionary, and where as here the district court makes a specific finding that an award of back pay was sufficient to make a plaintiff whole, no abuse of discretion can be found. Cf. Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). V. Reasonable Attorneys\u2019 Fees Saulpaugh next Holdings: 0: holding that it is within the courts discretion to award both reinstatement and punitive damages for violation of  2114 although finding that the district courts decision not to award such remedies did not constitute an abuse of discretion 1: holding that an award of compensation for future lost earnings or front pay is an equitable matter for the court not the jury 2: holding that failure to award front pay because the district court impliedly found that other relief was sufficient did not constitute an abuse of discretion 3: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "statutes where possible and the legislative history of the Whistleblower Law. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that claims brought under the Whistle- blower Law are torts subject to the OTCA and that whistleblower remedies are not directly in conflict with the OTCA. Dr. Rabkin\u2019s jury award of $500,000 under the Whistleblower Law must accordingly be remitted to $200,000 as set forth in the OTCA. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court in the appeal brought by OHSU. We now turn to Dr. Rabkin\u2019s cross-appeal. VI. ,We review a district court\u2019s ruling regarding equitable reinstatement for an abuse of discretion. Gotthardt v. Nat\u2019l R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.1999); see also Cancellier v. Federated Dep\u2019t Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThe district court abuses its discretion Holdings: 0: holding that reinstatement in an age discrimination case lies within the discretion of the trial court after careful consideration of the particular facts of the case 1: holding that whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court 2: holding that the weight accorded to evidence lies largely within the discretion of the agency 3: holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion 4: holding that the decision whether to grant reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the trial court", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is subjected to the heightened pleading standard of Iqbal and Twombly \u201d). Again, this is a matter of both fairness and common sense. To state a claim of direct infringement, a complaint need allege no more than what is required by Form 18. Confronted with such a claim, a defendant seeking a declaration of noninfringement can hardly be expected to plead facts supporting such a judgment in much detail. The defendant can do little more, at the pleading stage, than deny the plaintiffs allegations. A claim of indirect infringement, on the other hand, will presumably have met the relatively stringent standards of Twombly and Iqbal, and will allege specific facts showing how the defendant is alleged to have induced or cont Inc., No. CV 11-7658, 2012 WL 681765, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 8, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (citing 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 102(a)-(g)). In addition, Holdings: 0: holding that conclusory allegation in complaint was insufficient to demonstrate that defendant offered to sell goods within new york 1: holding that stating that the court erred without advancing reasons why is insufficient appellate argument 2: holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim 3: holding that conclusory allegation of patent invalidity is insufficient and noting that there are at least seven reasons why a patent might be invalid 4: holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182, 184 (1912). 46 . Fla. Stat. \u00a7 726.105(l)(a). 47 . Fla. Stat. \u00a7 726.105(l)(b). 48 . Fla. Stat. \u00a7 726.106(1). 49 . In re Phoenix Diversified Investment Corp., 2011 WL 2182881, *4 (Bankr.S.D. Fla. June 2, 2011). That determination is made on the specific facts of the case and the circumstances relevant to the transaction. In re 21st Century Satellite Communications, Inc., 278 B.R. 577, 582 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2002). 50 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 115-1, SAM Case, Doc. No. 61-1. 51 . Berkman Case, Doc. No. 50. 52 .See Goldberg v. Chong, 2007 WL 2028792, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 11, 2007) (noting that a transferor may not manufacture an illusory debt merely to satisfy the statute). Cf. In re Southmark Corp., 138 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. N.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>). 53 . 138 B.R. at 830. 54 . At the time, the Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment 1: holding that judgment debtor received reasonably equivalent value when judgment creditor received payment under a supersedeas bond and subsequently released its judgment 2: recognizing holding in miner that a judgment creditor can file a new action to seek to pierce the corporate veil of a judgment debtor and hold individual shareholders and directors liable 3: holding llcs were entitled to notice of proceedings supplemental instituted by a judgment creditor to attempt to obtain judgment debtors interests in the companies to pay judgment debt 4: holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "limit their inquiry to the facts stated in the complaint and the documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint\u201d). 8 . See International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264 (5th Cir.1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). 9 . See id. 10 . Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 11 . See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir.1999). 12 . See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(e). 13 . See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(f)(l). 14 . See id. 15 . Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 610 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir.1980). 16 . See Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Ci F.Supp. at 994. 24 . Plt.'s Supp. at Ex. E. 25 . See Gonzalez, 610 F.2d at 245-46 Holdings: 0: holding that the state was estopped to argue that the 90day notice period  expired on a date prior to the expiration date it cited to the claimant 1: holding that the eeoc has the authority to rescind one ntrs and replace it with another but only if it gives both parties notice of its intent to do so within the 90day period provided by the initial ntrs 2: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties 3: holding in the context of the 90day period during which a plaintiff must bring suit after receiving a right to sue letter that in the absence of a recognized equitable consideration the court cannot extend the limitations period by even one day 4: holding that the 90day evaluation period begins to run from the time notice of a claim has been filed even though the public agency requests additional information after that date", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "second accident. [21] Having concluded that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit State Farm to question Woodgett regarding the second accident, we must now address whether this error was inconsistent with substantial justice. We conclude that it was. This exclusion went to the heart of the matter that the jury was asked to decide\u2014the extent to which Woodgett\u2019s accident with Storms caused the headaches experienced by Woodgett and, in particular, the severe migraine headaches. Conclusion [22] The court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of a second automobile accident involving Woodgett, which was inconsistent with substantial justice. We reverse the court\u2019s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Armstrong, 871 N.E.2d at 296 (<HOLDING>). [23] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Holdings: 0: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 1: holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole 2: holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unre lated prior condition satisfied the rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the plaintiffs claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or event unrelated to the defendants negligence 3: holding that when the evidence shows that the railroad customarily does not enforce a safety rule the jury is entitled to consider whether that custom constituted negligence and whether it caused in whole or in part the plaintiffs injury 4: holding that when a possessor knows that a dangerous condition frequently reoccurs plaintiffs had a right to go to the jury on the issue of defendants negligence even where plaintiffs could not show how long the condition remained on the stairs", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "See id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2047-48. A hypothetical illustrates the efficacy of a unitary standard of review. If a district court were to depart upward based upon physical injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5K2.2, p.s., we might conclude that it had abused its discretion if the underlying offense were obstruction of justice, because the guideline applicable to that offense, U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2J1.2(b)(1), provides for an eight-level enhancement \u201c[i]f the offense involved caus[es] ... physical injury to a person.\u201d Our review in such a situation would amount to a de novo review of the applicable guideline to determine whether, as a matter of law, it takes physical injury into account. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that when the determinat (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 956, 136 Holdings: 0: holding that downward departure based on defendants restitution was improper because restitution is taken into consideration in assessing whether acceptance of responsibility adjustment should apply and district court abused its discretion in finding defendants restitution was extraordinary 1: holding apprendi inapplicable to restitution orders because restitution for harm done is a classic civil remedy 2: holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution 3: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing 4: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "given that a search of the digital data contained in a smartphone could reveal private information such as emails, text messages, notes, photographs, recordings, voice mail messages, passwords, financial records, tracking information, web site preferences, calendars, associations and contacts, and other private information. The search of the memory of a smartphone potentially reveals even more information than the search of a home computer. For instance, a smartphone has the ability to track and record the phone\u2019s movements through GPS or geolo-cation technology and me 9-10 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding search incident to arrest of cell phone for its phone number but questioning whether more invasive search would be permissible); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, Holdings: 0: holding that the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest includes the contents of a cell phone found on the arrestees person 1: holding a warrantless search of cell phone contents did not exceed permissible scope of search incident to arrest 2: holding that finley authorizes a police officer to search the electronic contents of a cell phone recovered from the area within an arrestees immediate control 3: holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone 4: holding that while law enforcement officers properly separated and assumed possession of a cell phone from arrestees person during the search incident to arrest a warrant was required before the information data and content of the cell phone could be accessed and searched by law enforcement", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "F.2d at 729. The Eighth Circuit is not alone in finding that although inmates do not have a constitutional entitlement to and/or due process interest in accessing a grievance procedure, they have a First Amendment right to be free from retaliation when they do file. Compare Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding no liberty interest in grievance procedure), with Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing First Amendment retaliation right); compare Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding inmates have \u201cno legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure\u201d), with Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing First Amendment retaliation right); compare Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>), with Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 Holdings: 0: recognizing a parents right to rear his or her children without state interference as a constitutionallyprotected fundamental liberty interest 1: holding that inmates have a property interest in their money 2: holding that there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure 3: holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed 4: holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "because it was not a manufacturer or seller of a product. The court disagrees. First, a finder of fact may determine that for all intents and purposes Deer Valley manufactured a ski equipment system for Ghionis consisting of skis, bindings and boots. To the extent the system was defective, exposing Ghionis to an unreasonable risk of danger, a strict liability claim , may exist. Second, while no technical \u201csale\u201d of equipment to Ghionis took place, the court is persuaded that the Utah courts will extend its rulings on strict product liability to apply to lessors of products such as Deer Valley. See Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 70A-2-312 et seq. (implied warranties exist in leased goods); Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 13-11-1 et seq. (Consumer protection to leases); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (<HOLDING>). Deer Valley\u2019s reliance upon Conger v. Tel Holdings: 0: recognizing trend in the law to protect consumers including lessees 1: holding that purpose of statute is to protect unwary consumers 2: recognizing drug traffickers will commonly possess firearms to protect their product to protect their drugs to protect their cash to protect their life and even to protect their turf alteration in original internal quotation marks omit ted 3: recognizing the ability of corporations to protect property rights in federal court 4: holding that a prosecutor has an obligation to protect not only the public interest but the innocent and to safeguard the rights guaranteed to all persons including those who may be guilty", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "have changed the result of the original criminal case\u201d). The State contends and the trial court apparently believed that the nexus test mirrors the requirements for a substantive claim for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. See Iowa Code \u00a7 822.2(4). To succeed on such a claim an applicant must establish, among other things, that the newly discovered evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, and would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991). Although our prior cases have never equated the requirements for the ground-of-fact exception with a newly-diseovered-evidence claim for relief, the language used in our cases dealing with both concepts is similar. Compare Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 884 (<HOLDING>), with Jones, 479 N.W.2d at 274 (holding Holdings: 0: recognizing that an ohio court should apply local law unless a party meets the burden of showing that foreign law requires a different result 1: holding that conviction will not be reversed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that but for attorneys errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 2: holding section 8223 requires likelihood that result would be different 3: holding claim requires showing that additional evidence would have been produced that might have led to a different decision 4: holding state law governs property interests in bankruptcy proceedings unless some federal interest requires a different result  ", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\"person\" is defined in AS 23.30.045 and 055. 13 . AS 01.10.040(b). 14 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 34 (Apr. 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Scott Ogan). 15 . Id. at 35 (testimony of Jack Miller). 16 . Id. 17 . Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 20 (Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins); Minutes, Sen. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on S$.B. 323, 23d Leg.2d Sess. at 9-10 (Apr. 16, 2004) (statement of Sen. Ralph Seekins). 18 . Cf. Seward Marine Servs., Inc. v. Anderson, 643 P.2d 493, 496-97 n. 8 (Alaska 1982) (noting committee testimony must have been \"endorsed by the legislature or relied on\" to be persuasive evidence of legislative intent). 19 . See Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824, 833-34 (Alaska App.1994) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Mech. Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 1: holding state university is not a person under  1983 2: holding that this statute was the most analogous state statute for purposes of erisa action filed in utah 3: holding kansas public employees retirement system is not as a state agency considered a person for purposes of  1983 liability 4: holding state is person for purposes of judicial recusal statute", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt. Officers Adams and Baxter argue that they are protected from liability for malicious prosecution because they acted in reliance upon the advice of counsel\u2014 namely, the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney\u2019s Office. \u201cProof that a person who institutes a criminal proceeding placed the facts fully and fairly before counsel and acted upon his advice is a good defense to the charge of want of probable cause.\u201d Jarett v. Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C.1964). The burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to an affirmative defense. Cf. District of Columbia v. Sterling, 578 A.2d 1163, 1165 (D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, defendants have not met their burden of Holdings: 0: holding employer has burden of proving employee misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence when disputing a claim for unemployment compensation 1: holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner 3: holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that plaintiffs bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants have failed to adhere to the requirements of nepa", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "so as to prevent ruling on a motion for summary judgment until six months have passed, if the case is otherwise ripe for summary judgment.\u201d Thurmond v. Richmond County Bd. of Ed., 207 Ga. App. 437, 439 (1) (428 SE2d 392) (1993). See also Gray v. Whisenaut, 258 Ga. 242 (368 SE2d 115) (1988) (noting that although USCR Rule 5 establishes a maximum six-month discovery period, the court may change the time allowed \u201cin its discretion\u201d). 6 OCGA \u00a7 9-11-56 (a). 7 OCGA \u00a7 9-11-56 (c). 8 Summers v. Deutsche Seereederei Rostok Grnbh, 220 Ga. App. 125, 126-127 (2) (469 SE2d 289) (1996). 9 There is no transcript of the oral argument in the appellate record, and thus Govindasamy has failed to preserve the issue on appeal. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, 203 Ga. App. 770, 773 (4) (417 SE2d 688) (1992) (<HOLDING>). 10 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel 1: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion 2: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 3: holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment 4: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "REDOIL utilized the administrative appeal process, the sixty-day deadline did not begin to run on February 15, 2007. NSB and REDOIL filed an optional appeal of the agency\u2019s decision with the IBLA on April 13, 2007, pursuant to 30 C.F.R. \u00a7 290.2. This optional appeal was filed within the sixty-day timeline established by 30 C.F.R. \u00a7 290.3. On May 4, 2007, the IBLA declined to exercise its jurisdiction and stayed further proceedings pending the outcome of AWL\u2019s petition, already filed in this court. The statute of limitations was tolled during the administrative appeal process, and the sixty-day period to file a petition for review began to run after the IBLA issued its decision on May 4. See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng\u2019rs, 482 U.S. 270, 284-85, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987) (<HOLDING>). By filing on May 15 and May 22, the Holdings: 0: holding that a timely petition for administrative review stops the running of the statute of limitations 1: holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause 2: holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations 3: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations 4: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "action under Title [9].\u201d N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 112, 23 A.3d 352 (2011) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.P., 408 N.J.Super. 252, 259, 974 A.2d 466 (App.Div.2009), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 153, 988 A.2d 1176 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.M., 136 N.J. 546, 556, 643 A.2d 987 (1994) (\u201c[Termination proceedings, which are brought pursuant to N.J.S.A 30:4C-15, do not require a prior determination of abuse or neglect.\u201d). Additionally, when DYFS has properly assumed \u201ccare or custody\u201d of a child, it may initiate termination proceedings, even if a Title 9 action is pending and no determination of abuse or neglect has been made. A.P., supra, 408 N.J.Super. at 261, 974 A.2d 466 (<HOLDING>). On January 7, 2008, the family court granted Holdings: 0: holding that dyfs was not required to try the title 9 action to conclusion before filing a title 30 action for the termination of parental rights 1: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights 2: holding that election of remedies did not apply because filing a trespass to try title action by the mortgageetrusteedeed grantee was not inconsistent with its successful settlement of claim against the title insurer 3: recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights 4: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "which authorizes use of force to \"defend the national security of the United States ... and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,\u201d 116 Stat. at 1501, excludes any action that is not called for by a Security Council resolution. They support their reading by reference to the October Resolution\u2019s preamble and to legislative history. 6 .While the Supreme Court has not considered a modern war powers case, lower courts have, and they have reached differing conclusions about the applicability of the political question doctrine. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37-41 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that challenge to air campaign in Yugoslavia would not pose a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>); Dellums, 752 F.Supp. at 1150 (rejecting Holdings: 0: holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration 1: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 2: holding that challenge to vietnam war did not necessarily raise political question and remanding 3: holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction 4: holding that the plaintiffs claims against volkswagen and others did not necessarily raise a federal question since they were also based on the assertion that the plaintiffs vehicle did not comply with state law", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to insure that the defendant will not flee the jurisdiction. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 3, 96 L.Ed. 1 (1951) (\u201cThe right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused\u2019s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.\u201d). Further, the statutory presumption that pretrial detention is appropriate in Medina\u2019s case does not violate his constitutional rights. The pre sumption, as applied in Medina\u2019s ease, arose following a determination by the magistrate that probable cause existed to believe Medina committed the crimes with which he was charged. Such a probable cause determination may be alone sufficient to justify detention pending trial. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 863, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. at 2415-16 Holdings: 0: holding under the fourth amendment that a judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of crime 1: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 3: holding that the fourth amendment requires a finding of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty 4: holding that determination of probable cause by detached judicial officer that complies with fourth amendment constitutes all of the process due in order to constitutionally detain an accused pending trial", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the statute of limitations in and of itself cannot operate to 'extinguish\u2019 a tortfeasor\u2019s liability\"-because \"it is subject to certain counter-assertions, such as waiver, tolling, and estoppel.\u201d); cf. Zando, 182 W.Va. at 603, 390 S.E.2d at 802 (\u201cThe touchstone of the right of inchoate contribution is this inquiry: Did the party against whom contribution is sought breach a duty to the plaintiff which caused or contributed to the plaintiff\u2019s damages?\"). 8 . Moreover, none of the disqualifying factors for the contribution claim in Parke-Davis are pres t.App.1991) (\"for such a right of contribution to exist, a nonsettling joint tortfeasor must also have been released from all liability to the injured party for the tort.\u201d); Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Hawaii 417, 5 P.3d 407 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Brockman Mobile Home Sales v. Lee, 98 Idaho Holdings: 0: recognizing necessity of release of joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought 1: holding that a joint tortfeasor may assert a claim for contribution against the plaintiffs uninsured motorist carrier for the torts of an unknown driver 2: recognizing ability of one or more joint tortfeasors to settle on behalf of themselves and another joint tortfeasor and then pursue that joint tortfeasor for its share of the settlement payment 3: recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf 4: holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "these services. We conclude that section 574.037 applied to the trial court\u2019s order for extended outpatient mental health services. The trial court did not comply with this section in designating Evans as the person responsible for the ordered services. Therefore, the trial court lacked authority to order the Bexar County Parties to provide the court-ordered outpatient services. Accordingly, we sustain their second issue, reverse the trial court\u2019s June 30, 2003 order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. C. Should this court conditionally grant Evans\u2019s petition for writ of mandamus? After finding that Evans was willfully disobeying the June 80, 2008 order, the trial court held Evans in contempt and ordered him p.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that Evans is Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant cannot be punished by contempt proceedings for disregarding a void order 1: holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter 2: holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order 3: holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality 4: holding that circuit court that had no jurisdiction to modify georgia custody determination could not enter valid contempt judgment against husband for violating void modification judgment", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "wrongful discharge is administrative). Under Van Baale, it is plausible to assert that to the extent a taxpayer has a dispute with the IDOR or the director with respect to taxes paid to the department, Iowa Code section 423.47 (2013) provides an exclusive remedy to resolve the issues. No one can seriously contest that the regulatory framework is a dense, comprehensive scheme. See Iowa Code \u00a7\u00a7 422.67-.75; Iowa Admin. Code ch. 701 (2013); cf. Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs., 667 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Iowa 2003); Van Baale, 550 N.W.2d at 156 (\u201cWhere the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with a specified kind of dispute, the statutory remedy provided is generally exclusive.\u201d (quoting 1A C.J.S. Actions \u00a7 14 n. 55 (1985))); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2004) (<HOLDING>). Ordinarily, however, a remedy .cannot be Holdings: 0: holding a pervasive regulatory scheme shows that the legislature intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive 1: holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates 2: holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature 3: recognizing that the regulatory scheme created by the ina is so pervasive as to be consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration 4: holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "remedy, of equitable tolling,\u201d an evidentiary hearing would have provided- him the opportunity to present his claims. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must first demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances caused his failure to timely file his petition. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562; LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.2005). Alicia allegedly suffered symptoms from a rota-tor cuff tear from March 1, 2007 to August 17, 2007. He contends he experienced persistent pain from his injury so that daily activities, such as feeding himself, were -painful. But his injury did not necessarily preclude opportunities to file, since prison officials or others could have assisted him in completing the forms. C.f. Arbas v. Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In fact, Alicia filed his habeas petition two Holdings: 0: holding that a petitioners mental incompetency can constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling if it interferes with his ability to communicate with his attorney 1: recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions 2: recognizing the undesirability of prison conditions litigation 3: holding that the failure to articulate  orally that conditions  5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions 4: holding physical conditions justify tolling when those conditions impair cognitive function or the ability to communicate", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not developed at trial.\u2019 \u201d United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172, 116 S.Ct. 1263, 134 L.Ed.2d 212 (1996); see United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cthe presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the extrinsic contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial\u201d); United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable where the contact does not relate to factual evidence not developed at trial, or where the contact pertains to purely legal issues), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027, 120 S.Ct. 1437, 146 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial judge informed the Holdings: 0: holding petitioners reliance on remmer misplaced as statement from restaurant cashier to juror expressing cashiers hope that the juror find the defendant not guilty did not refer to the factual evidence not developed at trial 1: holding that the district courts dismissal of a juror after five weeks of deliberations violated the defendants right to a unanimous jury because the record evidence suggested the juror found the evidence insufficient for a conviction 2: holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence 3: holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "age discrimination, a plaintiff would be required to demonstrate that: (1) he was a member of the protected class [i.e, age-40-and-over]; (2) he was discharged; (3) he was qualified for the position; (4) he was replaced by a younger person. Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir.1982) (citing Marshall v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir.1977)). We have stated that the McDonnell Douglas test is not to be applied mechanically, instead opting for a case-by-case approach that focuses on whether age was in fact a determining factor in the employment decision. See Merkel v. Sco-vill, Inc., 787 F.2d 174, 177 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 990, 107 S.Ct. 585, 93 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1179 (6th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Ackerman, 670 F.2d at 70; Sahadi, 636 F.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff who could not demonstrate every element of the mcdonnell douglas test could nonetheless demonstrate a prima facie case 1: holding that the district court fundamentally misapplied the mcdonnell douglas test when it considered defendantemployers nondiscriminatory reason in assessing whether plaintiffemployee showed that she was qualified for her position under the third element of a prima facie ease 2: holding that whether the case could proceed under a mixedmotive instruction was not relevant because the case could proceed under the more taxing mcdonnell douglas standard 3: holding that a title vii plaintiff need not plead the elements of a mcdonnell douglas prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss 4: holding that federal government employee successfully established prima facie case of retaliation under mcdonnell douglas but failed to prove employers proffered reason was pretextual", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cpublic safety and welfare,\u201d or to \u201ceffectuate public policy,\u201d then the exception applies. On the other hand, if the purpose of the law relates \u201cto the protection of the government\u2019s pecuniary interest in the debtor\u2019s property,\u201d or to \u201cadjudicate private rights,\u201d then the exception is inapplicable, (citations omitted) The Court finds AmeriDebt\u2019s arguments unpersuasive. The obvious purpose of the present action, indeed of the FTC Act itself, is protection of the public welfare and the effectuation of public policy respecting the credit counseling industry. Regardless of whether private rights of consumers may be adjudicated in some fashion, in this proceeding the FTC is operating on behalf of the public interest, not as a creditor seeking to assert its own pecuniary interest. See id. (<HOLDING>) Assuming the liability of Defendants is Holdings: 0: holding that courts must distinguish between situations in which the state acts pursuant to its police power and situations in which the state acts merely to protect its status as a creditor 1: holding that the missouri constitution reserves the power of referendum only to acts of the state legislative assembly and not to acts of a municipality 2: holding that courts must accommodate the contracts clause with the inherent police power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of its people 3: holding that a public corporation in that case a commission created to provide information about the tva is an entity separate from the state and its acts are not acts of the state  within the meaning of the state constitutions prohibition against the state creating new debts 4: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "report constitutes an admission of a party-opponent, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Snizaski counters that she offered the police accident report solely to establish the approximate time of the accident and, therefore, was not an admission of the truth of the substantive statements contained in the report. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless some exception applies. \u201cA police report prepared by an officer who is not a witness to the accident is inadmissible hearsay evidence and should not be admitted into evidence. Nor should a party be able to get such a report into evidence in an indirect manner.\u201d Holland v. Zelnick, 329 Pa.Super. 469, 478 A.2d 885, 888 (1984); See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Company, 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720 (1956) (<HOLDING>); accord Harvey v. Doliner, 399 Pa. 356, 160 Holdings: 0: holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay 1: holding that a report of a police officer who arrived at an accident scene minutes after a collision which contained a statement that one of the vehicles traveled through a stop sign was inadmissible hearsay evidence 2: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible 3: holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident 4: holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "would be presented in a formal motion for a continuance or a change of venue. Cf. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 335-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) (\"Petitioner's argument for his absence is intertwined with his argument for a change of venue\u201d); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986) (concluding that the petitioner did not establish reasonable cause for his absence and that the denial of his motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion). In an emergency situation such as existed here, however, at least a phone call explaining the circumstances was required to preserve a potential challenge to the IJ's authority to enter an in absentia order. We express no view regarding the existence vel non of reasonable cause under the facts of this case. 7 . Cf. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547 (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. INS, 976 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Holdings: 0: holding that the mechanical failure of the petitioners car on the way to the hearing did not constitute exceptional circumstances where petitioners returned home instead of finding transportation to the hearing and made only a cursory effort to contact the court 1: holding that confusion as to a hearing time does not amount to exceptional circumstances 2: holding that the petitioners traffic difficulties did not constitute exceptional circumstances 3: holding that the exceptional circumstances test does not apply to declaratory judgment actions 4: holding that petitioners divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in jordan", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to be credible, id. at 140, and we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. The fact that the sponsors may receive an incidental benefit from the Happy Holidays sign \u2014 in the form of publicity and good will \u2014 does not refute Mr. Hall\u2019s testimony as to the sign\u2019s purpose. Indeed, any benefit that accrues to the sponsors ultimately serves the City\u2019s interests by providing current and putative sponsors with an incentive to contribute to the Keep the Lights Foundation in the future. In this sense, the sign is comparable to the enhanced underwriter acknowledgments in Knights of the KKK. See 203 F.3d at 1088, 1093-94 & nn. 10-11. Second, it is uncontroverted that the City built, paid for, and erected the sign. Aplt.App. at 86-87; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n. 9 (<HOLDING>). Significantly, there is no indication that Holdings: 0: holding that the validity of a collateral waiver is a threshold issue 1: recognizing this rule 2: recognizing the narrow exception created by almendareztorres but noting that it was not directly at issue in alleyne 3: recognizing that the announcements at issue served primarily to identify sponsors but noting that conveyance of this collateral information remains a communicative act of the government 4: recognizing a split of authority on this issue", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "which are not clearly erroneous.\u201d) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). To the extent that Diana Buchanan is attempting to contest the district court\u2019s implicit decision not to depart from the guidelines, we have previously held that the district court\u2019s decision not to depart is unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir.1995). Diana Buchanan, along with John Buchanan, also urges that the vast disparity between the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine, mandated by the guidelines, violates equal protection principles contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have repeatedly rejected this argument and do so again. See United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cherry, 50 F.3d 338, 344 Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that stiffer penalties for cocaine base transactions are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and therefore do not violate eighth amendment 2: holding that the guidelines stiffer penalties for cocaine base do not violate equal protection 3: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 4: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "As we explained in Part II, supra, it is the role of the trial court \u2014 not the jury\u2014 to determine whether a statement made by a defendant is voluntary and therefore admissible. See id.; Coates v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1087, 1093 (Ind.1989). Trial counsel was under no obligation to tender an instruction regarding the voluntariness of Defendant\u2019s statements, and the trial court would not have been obligated to present such an instruction to the jury. See Abbott v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (Ind.1989) (upholding the trial court\u2019s refusal to give an instruction on the voluntariness of a defendant\u2019s confession which specifically instructed the jury to consider the defendant\u2019s intoxication at the time an alleged admission was made); Gibson v. State, 694 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds, 702 N.E.2d 707 Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence 1: holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession 2: holding that trial court did not err 3: holding the determination of the voluntariness of a confession is a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession 4: holding that the district court did not err in refusing to give the defendants requested instruction concerning his mistaken belief about united states citizenship because the court had given an instruction covering the elements of the crime including the mens rea element", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u2018in custody\u2019 for the purposes of the habeas petition. Critical to the disposition of this issue is the principle held in Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290 (9th Cir.1995). There, the Ninth Circuit stated: We have broadly construed \u201cin custody\u201d to apply to situations in which an alien is not suffering any actual physical detention; i.e., so long as he is subject to a final order of deportation, an alien is deemed to be \u201cin custody\u201d for purposes of the INA, and therefore may petition a district court for habeas review. Numerous cases have cited the above principle with approval \u2014 and while the context of those cases may vary; the principle remains the same \u2014 even in spite of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of Congress. See, Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Ramos-Birueta v. INS, 2000 WL 1359593 at *1 Holdings: 0: holding that a final order of removal is sufficient by itself to establish the requisite custody 1: holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct 2: holding that the farr act is expressly limited to claims arising out of a final order of removal and does not confer any legal rights outside of the removal setting 3: holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody 4: holding that term order of removal does not include aliens ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning attorneys actions taken after order of removal becomes final", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201d) (alteration in original). Quite simply, Code requirements that nurses treat others with \u201crespect and compassion\u201d and avoid \u201cany and all forms of prejudicial actions\u201d or \u201cdisregard for the effect of one\u2019s actions on others\u201d could easily be used to restrict protected speech. See, e.g., McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247-52 (concluding that provisions of university\u2019s Code of Conduct that prohibited \u201cconduct which causes emotional distress\u201d and \u201coffensive signs\u201d were unconstitutionally overbroad); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317-20 (3d Cir. 2008) (public university\u2019s policy that sought to forbid \u201cgender-motivated\u201d conduct that had the purpose of \u201ccreating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment\u201d held unconstitutional); Papish, 410 U.S. at 667-70 & n.2, 93 S.Ct. 1197 (<HOLDING>). In addition, when a college applies a Holdings: 0: holding proper remedy when a christian student newspaper was denied student activities funds was to make funds available to the religious paper not to deny funds to nonreligious student groups 1: holding that under fraser there is no first amendment protection for lewd vulgar indecent and plainly offensive speech in school 2: holding that university violated first amendment by expelling student for printing indecent newspaper despite student code prohibiting indecent conduct or speech 3: recognizing obscene and indecent have different meanings and indecent speech may be regulated under some circumstances without transgressing the first amendment 4: holding that free speech clause precludes state university that pays student publications printing costs from denying funding based on publications religious viewpoint", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Kormanik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 5:01CV2122 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 19, 2001), a Scott-Pontzer case with facts substantially similar to those in the instant case. In the wake of Kormanik, a number of other courts in the Northern District, including this one, have adopted similar reasoning when remanding Scott-Pontzer cases. See Butler v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 184 F.Supp.2d 695 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Katz, J.); Stubbins v. Nationwide Agribusiness, 181 F.Supp.2d 805 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Carr, J.) (collecting cases); Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 177 F.Supp.2d 704, (N.D.Ohio 2001) (O\u2019Malley, J.); Kohus v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 1:01CV01179 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 19, 2001) (Matia, C.J.); but see Redmon v. Sumitomo Marine Mgmt. (USA), Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 787 (N.D.Ohio 2001) (Aldrich, J.) (<HOLDING>); Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity 1: holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit 2: holding that scottrpontzer suit was not a direct action 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "submitted to a jury. Hale, like the cases before it, recognized that courts can rule on whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. Even if the Montana Constitution did establish a rule that defamation plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial in state court, that rule would not bind a federal court exercising its diversity jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (\u201cThe Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule [of Civil Procedure].\u201d); see also Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94-95, 51 S.Ct. 383, 75 L.Ed. 857 (1931) (<HOLDING>). And as every trial lawyer knows, federal Holdings: 0: holding that a state law requiring the jury to decide the issue of contributory negligence cannot interfere with authority of a federal court to direct a verdict where there are no facts in dispute 1: holding that in a fela case where the jury found negligence per se the defendant railroad could not challenge the validity of the verdict through postverdict discussions indicating that the jury believed the total award would be reduced by the plaintiffs contributory negligence 2: holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury 4: holding that a federal court must decide an issue regarding the interpretation of a state law according to its anticipation of how the highest state court would hold", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "fear of cancer were not authorized. See. id. 674 A.2d at 239-40. There are two ways to analyze the phenomenon of exposure-only causes of action. First is the monolithic view \u2014 i.e., that there is only a single cause of action based on exposure to asbestos, for which there are multiple remedies (some of which may not be available). Second is the \"polylithic\u201d view (for lack of a better word), that there are multiple causes of action for exposure to asbestos (some of which may not be available) \u2014 i.e., there is one cause of action for increased risk of cancer, one cause of action for medical monitoring costs, etc. It is large (1989); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 744 P.2d 705, 707-11 (Ct.App.1987) (same); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del.1984) (<HOLDING>); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the installation of asbestoscontaining materials caused immediate physical injury to the building because asbestos is ultrahazardous 1: holding dollar amount is not an essential element 2: holding that injury does not occur upon exposure to asbestos but rather upon development of disease 3: holding that present physical injury caused by exposure to asbestos is essential element of claims for mental anguish and medical monitoring costs 4: holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "so requires\u201d and that the amendment is subject to dis-allowance on the trial court\u2019s o t if allowing it would result in actual prejudice to the opposing party or for reasons of \u201cundue delay.\u201d GRE Ins. Group, 822 So.2d at 390. Undue delay can have two different meanings in a case. First, the trial court has discretion to deny an amendment to a pleading if allowing the amendment would unduly delay the trial. Horton v. Shelby Med. Ctr., 562 So.2d 127, 130 (Ala.1989). Second, an unexplained undue delay in filing an amendment when the party has had sufficient opportunity to discover the facts necessary to file the amendment earlier is also sufficient grounds upon which to deny the amendment. Stallings, 388 So.2d at 947; see also Rector v. Better Houses, Inc., 820 So.2d 75, 78 (Ala.2001)(<HOLDING>); Burkett, 607 So.2d at 141 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action 1: holding that since defendant failed to timely remove the original complaint which was removable based on federal question jurisdiction defendant thereby waived its right to file a subsequent removal even though the complaint was amended to add a new federal claim where the amendment to the complaint did not change the nature of the action so as to constitute a substantially new suit since the new allegations and claims were not substantially different from those in the original complaint 2: holding that pleadings could not be amended where no evidence offered during trial was outside the issues in the original complaint 3: holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts 4: holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in striking the amended complaint where the plaintiffs had learned of the facts underlying the new allegations six months before they attempted to amend", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a \u201ccatchall exception\u201d that allows hearsay to be admitted in cases in which the declarant testifies if certain conditions are satisfied, the key one being that there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those surrounding statements fitting within the 23 specific exceptions created by Rule 803. Rule 803(24) is identical to Rule 804(b)(5), which is the corresponding \u201ccatchall exception\u201d to be used when the declarant is unavailable. See State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Minn.1981). We have considered either Rule 803(24) or 804(b)(5) in a number of cases, including: State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984) (admission of hearsay accounts of prior assaults upon homicide victim by defendant under Rule 804(b)(5)); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1981) (<HOLDING>); State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638 (Minn.1981) Holdings: 0: holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution 1: holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either 2: holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant 3: holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest 4: holding that statement that declarant saw defendant outside was admissible under rule 8081 because the statement explained an event or condition", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of law provision in a security agreement or contract is generally enforced. In re Mastercraft Metals, Inc., 114 B.R. 183 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1990); Consolidated Financial Investments, Inc. v. Manion, 948 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo.App. E.D.1997); Tri-County Retreading, Inc. v. Bandag Inc., 851 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). Therefore, we will employ Missouri law in determining whether JODA\u2019s hen was perfected. Skytech\u2019s Lien With the choice of law question decided, we turn to the dispositive question of priority. In order to determine which lien had priority, we must first determine whether each hen was properly perfected. As discussed above, Skytech\u2019s hen must be evaluated according to Texas law. Section 70.301 of the Texas Property Code grants an Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Lien (<HOLDING>). It is uncontested that Skytech relinquished Holdings: 0: holding that a somewhat different indiana state statute imputes liability to absent owner of an aircraft 1: holding that where both vessels had the same owner it was not an abuse of discretion to give 75 of the salvage award to the owner 2: holding that a plea of title was not interposed where the person in possession answered that the party suing for possession was not the established owner of the premises 3: holding that 49 usc  44112 did not preempt state law imposing vicarious liability on an owner of an aircraft 4: holding that once possession of an aircraft was delivered to the owner a repairman had no right to repossess the plane", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "fees are charged is an unearned fee and violates this section.\u201d 24 C.F.R. \u00a7 3500.14(c). Plaintiffs specifically aver that they hired Dolphin, a mortgage brokerage company, and Datro, one of Dolphin\u2019s agents, to find the most favorable financing agreement to fund the improvements to the DeLeon\u2019s house (cplt., \u00b6 28), that these defendants did not seek such terms (id., \u00b6 32), and defendants charged $3,520, or 8% of the mortgage loan taken by plaintiffs, for rendering this sham service (id., \u00b6 42). As we observed in our previous opinion, these allegations are more than sufficient to state a claim that defendants levied a charge for services that were not in fact rendered under \u00a7 2607(b). See DeLeon, 998 F.Supp. at 864; United States v. Gannon, 684 F.2d 433, 437-438 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940, 102 S.Ct. 475, 70 Holdings: 0: holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment 1: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 2: holding some evidence existed that physician incurred fees because services had been performed on the physicians behalf 3: holding that a successful plaintiff in a legal malpractice action may recover initial fees a plaintiff pays or agrees to pay an attorney for legal services that were negligently performed and corrective fees incurred by the plaintiff for work performed to correct the problem caused by the negligent lawyer but not litigation fees which are legal fees paid by the plaintiff to prosecute the malpractice action against the offending lawyer 4: holding that  2607b prevents payment of fees to individuals who performed no service", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "whether the risk of a conflict colored the defendant\u2019s representation, but only when the potential conflict is brought to the court\u2019s attention. Bare allegations of a conflict are not enough. See People v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1990). \u201cIn the absence of an evidentiary record of conflict, one should not be created based on mere speculation.\u201d Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 46-47 (Clark, C.J., specially concurring, joined by Ward, Ryan, and Miller, JJ.). The appellate court here held that \u201ca trial court\u2019s duty to investigate arises only if, at an early stage in the proceedings, a defendant presents facts suggesting a conflict that goes beyond the problem of one public defender having to attack another.\u201d 353 Ill. App. 3d at 527; accord People v. Jones, 210 Ill. App. 3d 375, 378 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the appellate court, but Holdings: 0: recognizing the conflict 1: holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime 2: recognizing conflict 3: holding that the defendant must provide facts to establish what the conflict was 4: holding that the public disclosure must reveal both the true state of facts and that the defendant represented the facts to be something other than what they were", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "MMH was \u201ca substantial motivating factor\u201d in defendants\u2019 decision not to renew his hospital privileges. Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 321 (2d Cir.2004). \u201cTo do so, [he] must aver some \u2018tangible proof demonstrating that [his] protected speech animated [defendants\u2019] decision ...\u201d not to renew his privileges. Id. (citation omitted). Franzon \u201cmay not rely on conclusory assertions of retaliatory motive.\u201d Id. Finally, a plaintiff may establish the required causal nexus by showing a close temporal proximity between his protected statements and the adverse employment action. See Morey v. Somers Centr. Sch. Dist., 06-CV-1877, 2007 WL 867203, at *11-12, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20265, at *38-39 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2007) (citing Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 Holdings: 0: holding that although evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to make a prima facie causation case the opposite is equally true  a lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action  negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that a time lapse of nine months between the filing of a formal grievance and the adverse employment action undercuts any inference of causation 3: holding that a twoweek lapse between the plaintiffs initial complaint to his supervisor and the adverse employment action was sufficient 4: holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "subject to court approval are binding before court approval. See In re Frye, 216 B.R. 166, 173-74 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1997). The Frye court explained that those courts that view such agreements as binding reason that contract formation and court approval require different analyses (the court adopted that view). Id. at 173; see also In re United Shipping Co., 1989 WL 12728, at *5 (Bankr.D.Minn. Feb.17, 1989) (\u201cThe considerations a court looks at in approving a settlement are entirely different than whether or not there was an agreement at all.\u201d). On the other hand, other courts look to the Code and reason that if \u201cjudicial approval [is] necessary to go forward, an agreement could not be binding absent the required approval.\u201d Id.; see also In re Sparks, 190 B.R. 842, 843 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (<HOLDING>). But this split only addresses the parties\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added 1: holding that the creditor did not satisfy the foregoing requirement because it was trying to exercise the avoidance power for itself as a sole creditor not for the benefit of the debtors estate or the creditors as a whole 2: holding creditors lacked standing to file an adversary action asserting the interests of the estate in seeking to prevent a former principal of the debtor from interfering with the chapter 11 reorganization given the lack of showing of the debtors consent and any determination by the bankruptcy court that the suit would be beneficial to the estate and necessary to a fair and efficient resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings 3: recognizing that a court may reverse the pelrbs actions where those actions are arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion    not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole or otherwise not in accordance with law 4: holding that contracts are not binding before court approval because the debtorinpossession operates as a fiduciary any actions taken by the debtor are to be in the best interests of the creditor body as a whole for that reason  the debtors actions are subject to  review by the creditors of the estate and the bankruptcy court", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (interpreting the Commodity Exchange Act in light of preenactment case law). In 2002, the prevailing case law in the lower federal courts interpreted the language of \u00a7 9(e) to mean that the limitations period could be commenced upon some form of inquiry notice. By choosing language nearly identical to the language of \u00a7 9(e), Congress implicitly approved of that case law. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (interpreting Title IX to provide a private cause of action because Congress used language identical to that found in Title VI, which had already been interpreted by the courts to provide a private cause of action); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner 1: holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant 2: holding that the silence of the class action fairness act regarding the burden of proving removal jurisdiction indicated congressional intent to leave intact the common law rule placing the burden on the defendant 3: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 4: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "mortgagor without adhering to the due on sale clause is not permitted to cure the mortgage defaults through the Chapter 13 plan over the objection of the mortgage holder.\u201d In re Tewell, 355 B.R. at 682. Here, the Debtor seeks to do exactly that under the Plan. Wells Fargo has objected to the Plan and argues that it impermissi-bly modifies Wells Fargo\u2019s rights in violation of \u00a7 1322(b)(2). This Court agrees. The Plan allows the Debtor to keep the Property and also keeps the automatic stay in place to prevent Wells Fargo from foreclosing on the Property; meanwhile, the Debtor is supposed to make payments to the Morgans pursuant to the terms of the Second Lien Note, and the Morgans would presumably then turn around and remit payment to Wells Fargo under the First Lien Note. Under th 1) (<HOLDING>); In re Mendoza, 2010 WL 1610120, 2010 Holdings: 0: holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right 1: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 2: holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court 3: holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank 4: holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "rights), and anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familjal relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit at the time of Stephens\u2019 behavior in 1990. The Court therefore holds that Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on McGarr\u2019s familial association claim. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker\u2019s actions, which \u201cdepends on the facts and events of a particular case,\u201d and \u201cevaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe\u201d that his or her actions were lawful, which \u201cdepends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events\u201d); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (<HOLDING>). H. Putnam County Defendant\u2019s only argument Holdings: 0: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 1: recognizing the fourteenth amendment to the united state constitution embodies a right to familial integrity but stating the parameters of the right have never been clearly established and the right is not absolute or unqualified 2: holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act 3: holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in 1983 as any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it because njeither the supreme court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association 4: holding that defendants claiming qualified immunity to  1983 action were entitled to summary judgment where factual disputes were not material", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "decision on appeal. Instead, the Court correctly remands Mrs. Reliford\u2019s claim for accrued benefits to be processed in accordance with section 5121(a). 5 . Additionally, the Board, on remand in this case, should not be confused by the Court\u2019s parenthetical reference to a remand \"for [a] determination of whether [a] claim was reasonably raised, when there was an evidentiary factual bases therefore.\u2019\u2019 Ante at 305. The Court is remanding this matter \"for adjudication of Mrs. Reliford\u2019s claim based on the file as it existed at the time of her husband\u2019s death.\u201d Id. at 304. The Court is not remand ing \u2014 and indeed cannot remand \u2014 this matter for a determination of whether a claim was reasonably raised. See Jarrell, 20 Vet.App. at 331; see also DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56 (2006) Holdings: 0: holding that the proper procedure for a claimant to pursue a claim believed to be unadjudicated and for which there is no final decision that arguably failed to consider the claim is to pursue a resolution of the original claim eg seek issuance of a final ro decision with proper notification of appellate rights and initiate a notice of disagreement 1: holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision 2: holding that a claim before an ro remains pending until a final decision is rendered 3: holding issuance of administrative complaint to initiate proceedings not final agency action 4: holding that once a regional office decision is final a claimant may only attempt to overcome the finality of that decision in one of two ways a request for revision of the decision based on clear and unmistakable error or a claim to reopen based upon new and material evidence", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "accumulated from the knowledge of various individuals, but the proscribed intent (willfulness) depended on the wrongful intent of specific employees.\u201d Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 670 n.6 (D.C.Cir.1996) (finding that \u201c[ijndividual acts of negligence on the part of employees \u2014 without 34 more \u2014 cannot ... be combined to create a wrongful corporate intent.\u201d) ; see also United States v. LBS Bank-NewYork, Inc., 757 F.Supp. 496, 501 n. 7 (E.D.Pa.1990) (\u201calthough knowledge possessed by employees is aggregated so that a corporate defendant is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees, specific intent cannot be aggregated similarly\u201d) (citations omitted); First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor\u2019s Corp., 690 F.Supp. 256, 259-260 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>). At the same time, the courts, including our Holdings: 0: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 1: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law 2: holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a 3: holding that corporation cannot be deemed to have the requisite intent by mere inconsistences in knowledge of various employees 4: recognizing as a matter of federal law that an action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the Bedard residence because they submitted when the defendants, through a show of authority, placed a restraint on their freedom. In response, defendants assert that the request to evacuate was not a seizure, but that in any event, they are entitled to qualified immunity. As a threshold matter, we note that Estate member Laurie does not allege to have been inside the Bedard residence at any point during the day at issue. As a result, Laurie could not have been ordered to leave the Bedard residence by the defendants, and her Fourth Amendment claim premised on these actions fails. With regard to Isabel\u2019s and Arlene\u2019s claims, an order to evacuate through a show of authority may be regarded as a \u201cseizure.\u201d See Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 259 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). It is irrelevant that Arlene and Isabel were Holdings: 0: recognizing that an officers forcible rape of a woman violates her substantive due process rights 1: holding that the vessel owner had a responsibility to correct the positioning of the gangway 2: holding that the discretionary function exception applied where the coast guard had implied statutory authority to order the evacuation of a sinking ship 3: holding forcible extraction of the contents of defendants stomach shocks the conscience and violates due process 4: holding that the coast guards forcible evacuation of a sinking sea vessel constituted a seizure of the persons therein", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23(8). Costs in this Court are taxed to the appellee, EMC Mortgage Corporation. 1 . \"The Supreme Court may, at its discretion, answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, a District Court of the United States in Tennessee, or a United States Bankruptcy Court in Tennessee. This rule may be invoked when the certifying court determines that, in a proceeding before it, there are questions of law of this state which will be determinative of the cause and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.\u201d Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 23, \u00a7 1. 2 . See Manis v. Farmers Bank, 170 Tenn. 656, 98 S.W.2d 313 (1936) (<HOLDING>); See also In re Medlin, 201 B.R. 188, 192 Holdings: 0: holding that the state has the right to elect in which county the offense may be prosecuted where the jurisdiction is concurrent under the statutes and until the final judgment which operates as a bar to further prosecution in either county the states right of selection of the forum continues 1: holding that a notarys error in designating the county in which the instrument was executed did not render the instrument invalid as the acknowledgment and the instrument may be read together to cure the flaw in the acknowledgment 2: recognizing that the acceptance by the grantee of a deed poll signed and sealed by the grantor containing covenants to be performed by the grantee binds the latter to the performance of these covenants as effectually as if he had executed the instrument quotations and citation omitted 3: holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest 4: holding that case involving evidence such as eyewitness testimony placing the defendant at the scene acknowledgment by the defendant of a dispute with the victim and theft of the victims purse and dna evidence suggesting that the defendant had engaged in sexual relations with the victim could not be deemed entirely circumstantial", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for any potential ... overpayments.\u201d Def.\u2019s Reply at 5. In light of the absence of any \u201cmeaningful standard by which a court could review the exercise of [the agency\u2019s] discretion,\u201d Def.\u2019s Mot. at 10, and Congress\u2019s choice of precatory statutory language (\u201cmay compromise\u201d), the court, supposedly, cannot review the defendant\u2019s decision without intruding upon administrative prerogative. A court may not review an agency action where \u201c(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.\u201d 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The APA\u2019s ban on judicial review of such actions is jurisdictional. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm\u2019n, 252 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Patent Office Prof'l Ass\u2019n v. Fed. Labor Holdings: 0: holding that ban on unauthorized practice of law did not implicate the first amendment 1: holding that the faas action in this case was  analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion  and noting that when prosecutorial discretion is at issue the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law 2: holding that judicial actions based upon a misapprehension of law constitute an abuse of discretion 3: holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional 4: recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "523(a)(2)(A) claim, the creditor must prove the following [five] elements: ....\u201d), abrogated cm other grounds by Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); see also In re Maurice, 21 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cUnder 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(2)(A), [the creditor] was required to prove (a) the debtor obtained [money] through representations either knowingly false or made with such reckless disregard for the truth as to constitute willful misrepresentation; (2) the debtor possessed an actual intent to defraud; and (3) [the creditor] actually and reasonably relied on the false representation.\u201d). 19 .In fact, the RTC did not even allege the basic elements of nondisehargeability under \u00a7 523(a)(2)(A) in its \u201cComplaint to Determine F.2d 605, 607 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Halpern v. First Ga. Bank (In re Halpern), Holdings: 0: holding that statecourt consent judgment containing findings of fraud precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding 1: holding that statecourt breach of fiduciary duty judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in dischargeability proceeding 2: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 3: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 4: holding that resolution of issue underlying statecourt fraud judgment precluded relitigation of same issue in nondischargeability proceeding", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept well-pleaded facts as true. Columbia Natural Resources Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir.1995). Thus, a court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based upon its disbelief of a complaint\u2019s factual allegations. Id. A court, however, need not accept as true conclusions of law or unwarranted factual inferences. Morgan v. Church\u2019s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that, \u201c[i]n all averments of fraud ..., the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall. be stated with particularity.\u201d See generally Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, Nat. Ass\u2019n, 214 F.3d 776 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) Holdings: 0: holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed 1: holding that pro se pleadings will be liberally construed 2: holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed 3: holding that under edenfield the act should be liberally construed 4: holding to ensure substantial justice to the parties the pleadings must be liberally construed", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "3. Indeed, this letter explicitly referred to Ms. Nicastro as the former president of A & B, further ratifying her signing the CBA by suggesting that she was president at one time. The Union and the Funds, therefore, reasonably believed that the CBA signed by Ms. Nicastro was a valid and enforceable agreement, while A & B\u2019s failure to repudiate Ms. Nicastro\u2019s signing the CBA and A & B\u2019s actions in accordance with the terms of the CBA ratified Ms. Nicastro\u2019s authority. No reasonable finder of fact could find otherwise. Thus, having failed to meet its burden of establishing that a material issue of fact exists, see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, Defendant\u2019s opposition to partial summary Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Service, Inc., 854 F.2d 1074, 1079-80 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Baldanza Bakery, Inc., 149 B.R. 370, Holdings: 0: holding that the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the persons primarily responsible for plaintiffs termination when coupled with the timing of plaintiffs termination and the conflicting reasons given by defendants agents for the termination might well persuade a jury that defendant fired the plaintiff in retaliation for  the letter sent by her attorney to defendants general counsel 1: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 2: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer 3: holding that oral termination was invalid where cba called for written termination and that termination was effected only when written notice was given to the funds and the union according to the specific date requirements of the cba 4: holding requirement in contract to provide notice for termination but not limiting reasons for termination constitutes atwill employment relationship", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "508 (1993). See also United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir.2005) (\u201ca sentencing error affects substantial rights where it causes the defendant to receive a more severe sentence\u201d (internal quotation and citation omitted)). In the instant case, Defendant claims that she was unaware of the maximum sentence before the plea hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct maximum sentence prior to the plea colloquy. Furthermore, the district court\u2019s error may have caused Defendant to go to prison for longer than she thought possible for the crime she committed. Thus, the court\u2019s error affects Defendant\u2019s substantial rights. See, e.g., Syal, 963 F.2d at 906 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Walsh, 733 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release 1: holding that the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error where njothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release andthere was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned 2: holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release 3: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses 4: holding that courts failure to tell defendant in rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "hand, if the district court concludes, following an evi-dentiary hearing, that Krause forfeited his right to appointed counsel, a new trial is not necessary. c. Because we conclude that the district court denied Krause his due process rights, we do not decide whether the district court erred in its ruling. Instead, we remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with the due process protections outlined above to determine whether Krause engaged in \u201cextremely serious misconduct\u201d warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 5 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct 1: holding that defendant waived his confrontation rights by threatening witness not to testify 2: holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys 3: holding that a habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief from a state courts determination that he had forfeited his right to counsel by physically assaulting his attorney and threatening to put a contract on his attorneys life 4: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in Homer as an agent of its member institutions merely because it lacks statutory authority for its activities. The NCAA is a voluntary organization created by and comprised of the educational institutions which essentially acts as their surrogate with respect to athletic rules. In its construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which contains language identical to that of Title IX in 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681(a) regarding receipt of federal assistance, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress, as in Title IX, did not distinguish between direct and indirect financial assistance. See United States Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 606-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 2711-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 494 (1986) (citing Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564, 104 S.Ct. at 1216 (<HOLDING>)). The Court, however, drew a distinction Holdings: 0: holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds 1: holding that kentucky high school athletic association was an indirect recipient of federal funds because it was created by state law its functions were determined by the kentucky board of education and it received dues from member schools who received federal funds 2: holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds 3: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college 4: holding that kentucky high school athletic associa tion qualified as agent of the state and as recipient of federal funds so as to be subject to title ix when association received dues from member schools which received federal funds", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "A and Candidate B. If a resident of the district strongly favors the election of Candidate A \u2014 and strongly disfavors the election of Candidate B \u2014 the resident may choose to spend his personal funds to advocate the defeat of Candidate B. Under the independent expenditure provision, however, if the amount of the resident\u2019s expenditure of personal funds \u2014 when combined with the amount of Candidate A\u2019s own expenditures- \u2014 surpasses Candidate B\u2019s expenditure limit, the state will provide additional funding to Candidate B to make up for the supposed inequality. In this way, the independent expenditure provision clearly acts as a \u201cpenalty\u201d on the resident\u2019s choice \u201cto spend personal funds for campaign speech.\u201d Id. at 2771; see also Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-62 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). As the resident spends more and more money Holdings: 0: holding that a similar motion to strike under california state law applies in federal court 1: holding mere deviation unconstitutional 2: holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction 3: recognizing similar duties 4: holding unconstitutional a similar law penalizing independent expenditures", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "continue to litigate (and drive up defendant\u2019s costs) once it knew it could not produce an expert and thus could not prove its case. On this basis, plaintiff should have folded its tent no later than the end of 2009 when it was foreclosed from using its expert because she had not provided a timely report ... [T]he EEOC failed to adequately manage the prosecution of this case from the beginning. Notwithstanding that the EEOC knew from the time of its administrative investigation that it would need expert testimony to make its disparate impact case, ... it did not hire its expert until September 2009 ... Thereafter, having already received several continuances, the EEOC sought a further continuance of over one-third of a year to provide the exper 2011 WL 3359622 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 4, 2011) (<HOLDING>). [A]s the magistrate judge aptly noted, Holdings: 0: holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 1: holding failure to timely identify aggrieved parties and reasonably investigate such claims warranted attorney fee award against the eeoc  2: holding eeoc lacked foundation to proceed based on failure to reasonably investigate  3: holding that retaliation arising out of first eeoc filing was reasonably related to that filing obviating the need for a second eeoc charge 4: recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "377 S.E.2d at 597. The defendant agreed that he could renew the motion if, as a result of jury voir dire, there was a problem. Id. Because the defendant never renewed the motion, we refused to consider his contention on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to grant a change of venue. Id. Although Green did not agree to continue his change of venue motion as did the defendant in Hoke, Green, however, did not object to the circuit court\u2019s decision to take the motion under advisement pending the outcome of voir dire. Consequently, it was incumbent upon Green to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it. Cf. Lenz, 78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (<HOLDING>). After voir dire was completed but before the Holdings: 0: holding appellant did not waive right to article 3823 instruction in failing to object to introduction of evidence when he raised a fact issue regarding the legality of the seizure of the cocaine 1: holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue 2: holding that the trial court need not hold a voluntariness hearing where the defendant did not object and no evidence presented raised the issue 3: holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it 4: holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.\u201d Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570 (citations omitted). Faced with facts very similar to those in the instant case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court\u2019s holding that \u201cessentially three incidents of racial animosity by a co-worker spanning over 25 months, with each incident separated by a full year, during which time no racial slurs were made\u201d did not raise a triable issue of hostile work environment harassment. Arroyo v. Westlb Admin., Inc., 2000 WL 562425, *2, No. 99-7942, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 9528, at *6 (2d Cir. May 9, 2000) ; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d. Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 Holdings: 0: holding that to meet his burden the plaintiff must show more than a few isolated incidents and that evidence solely of sporadic discrimination does not suffice 1: holding that to establish a hostile work environment plaintiff must prove more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity and cjasual comments or accidental or sporadic conversation will not trigger equitable relief pursuant to the statute 2: holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims 3: holding that a plaintiff does not make a sufficient showing of a pervasively hostile work environment with a few isolated incidents but must show a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments 4: holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "notices. And the only places that the word \u201ccredit\u201d appears are in the notification that Plaintiff could stop receiving prescreened offers of credit by calling a toll-free number, and in the last sentence of the \u201cPreScreen & Opt Out Notice\u201d on the reverse side of the letter, telling Plaintiff that if she \u201cdid not wish to receive any further promotional offers, please call (888) 567-8688, to opt out of the credit bureau mailing list.\u201d Although Congress chose a broad definition of a \u201cfirm offer of credit,\u201d and courts have been lender-friendly in finding less-than-complete offers to constitute a firm offer of credit, the Court concludes that here, Defendant has not met the minimum requirements of the Act. Cf, e.g., Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 71, 76 (1st Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the Court does not believe that the Holdings: 0: holding that a mailing which stated because of your excellent credit you have been preapproved for a home loan up to 100 of the value of your home  was a firm offer of credit 1: holding that the fcras provision that a lender may only use and obtain consumer credit information for the purpose of making a firm offer of credit requires that the lender offer something of value as an extension of credit alone 2: recognizing statutory credit 3: holding victims with poor credit histories were particularly susceptible to schemes involving offers of preapproved credit cards 4: holding that because the fcra does not require the disclosure in a firm offer of credit of amount of credit and interest rates courts should not imply such additional disclosure requirements explaining that the import of cole was that a firm offer of credit must have economic value rather than which terms must be included", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "savings fund is his separate property. This court has long held that as a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate. See, generally, Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998). Terry argues that because he brought the savings fund into the marriage, the savings fund was solely in his name, and he made the deposits to the savings fund, the entirety of the savings fund belongs to him. We disagree. Terry\u2019s argument ignores the fact that during the parties\u2019 marriage, the savings fund grew as a result of income Terry earned during the parties\u2019 marriage. Terry\u2019s income which accumulated during the parties\u2019 marriage was a marital asset. Compare, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Parde v. Parde, 258 Neb. 101, 602 N.W.2d 657 Holdings: 0: holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital 1: holding income tax liability incurred during marriage is one of accepted costs of producing marital income and should be treated as marital debt for purposes of determining equitable distribution of marital estate 2: holding that in determining whether a substantial change of circumstances has occurred trial court must consider income available to parents new marital community 3: holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property 4: holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that J.C. told her mother the details of the charged offenses. Further, the State informed the trial court at the article 38.072 hearing that J.C.\u2019s mother was under indictment for failing to report appellant\u2019s abuse of J.C., was unavailable to talk to the prosecutor, refused to cooperate with the police, and refused to admit that J.C. made an outcry statement to her. Appellant did not dispute the State\u2019s assertions. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (\u201cThis Court accepts as true factual assertions made by counsel which are not disputed by opposing counsel.\u201d). Urban was the first adult to whom an outcry statement was made who could remember J.C.\u2019s statement and relate it at trial. See Foreman v. State, 995 S.W.2d 854, 858-59 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). 2. Reliability of the outcry Holdings: 0: holding that article 38072 allows the first adult who can remember and relate at trial the childs statement to be the outcry witness 1: holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify 2: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 3: holding that admission of a witness prior identification statement where the witness could not remember the basis for the identification did not violate the confrontation clause or fedrevid 802 4: holding tape recorded statement given to police shortly after criminal incident was inadmissible under section 908035 when witness did not remember its contents and did not testify that it correctly reflected her knowledge or that she tried to be truthful at the time she made the statement", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of Appellant at 14. The VA\u2019s point is well taken; we remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and Remanded. ORDER On April 3, 1992, our decision in United States v. Davis, No. 91-1678, slip op. (7th Cir. April 3, 1992) was published, see page 603, which reversed an injunction entered against the Veteran\u2019s Administration (VA) prohibiting the VA from exercising its federal indemnity right to seek reimbursement for guaranties paid on behalf of veterans participating in its VA home loan program. Additionally, we remand the case for further proceedings, including a determination of whether part of the appellee class may be relieved of liability to the VA on the authority of United States v. Church, 736 F.Supp. 1494, 1497-98 (N.D.Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>). Unbeknownst to this panel until April 6, Holdings: 0: holding a cancellation clause that releases both parties from their obligations does not render contract void for lack of mutuality of obligation 1: recognizing that a divorce decree obligation to hold an exspouse harmless from a debt creates an obligation between the debtor and the exspouse separate from any obligation the debtor may owe to the creditor 2: recognizing that reasonable efforts by the va to obtain records regarding medical history from other federal departments or agencies are an important part of the vas affirmative duties under former section 3007a and 38 usc  5107a 3: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation 4: holding that under 38 cfr  364324f a lenders noncompliance with the vas instructions releases the va from its guaranty obligation to the lender and in turn also releases the veteran from his obligation to the va", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "by guileful, covinous, or fraudulent devices and practices are, must, or might be in any ways distur :06-466-HMH, 2007 WL 39428 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 2007) (unpublished), this court voided a cash transfer of $300,000.00 under the Statute of Elizabeth. In deciding the issue, the court held that \u201c[b]ased on the broad language and equitable nature of the Statute ... the transfer of funds ... is a \u2018transfer\u2019 under the broad and plain language of section 27-23-10(A).\u201d Id. at *3 (citation omitted). Other courts in this district reached analogous conclusions. See In re Hanckel, 512 B.R. 539, 551 (Bankr.D.S.C.2014) (finding an ownership interest in a company subject to the statute and setting aside its transfer as a fraudulent conveyance); In re Hoffman, 194 B.R. 943, 959-61 (Bankr.D.S.C.1995) (<HOLDING>); Future Grp., II v. Nationsbank, 324 S.C. 89, Holdings: 0: holding that an emergency petition by an insurance commissioner in her capacity as liquidator of an insurance company that was whollyowned by the debtor holding company was not an exercise of police and regulatory powers because it sought to take control of the debtors assets to allow certain policyholders and creditors to gain a pecuniary advantage over other creditors of the debtors estate 1: holding that the transfers at issue were not fraudulent transfers because  they did not diminish the debtors estate 2: holding that a debtor in bankruptcy may claim as exempt the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy insuring the life of the debtor that is payable to a beneficiary other than the debtor under dccode ann  314716a2001 despite the absence of the term cash surrender from the statute 3: holding transfers of cash totaling 32350000 made by a debtor to an insider creditors company void under the statute 4: holding that a profit of 35 million in insider trading by the president and ceo of the company was sufficient to plead scienter because that corporate insider sold 40 of his stock holdings in the company and several other corporate insiders sold large positions in the company", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Owens\u2019s lengthy criminal history or because Owens was wearing baggy clothes that could have easily concealed a weapon; and the officer did not testify that the stop of the vehicle occurred in a high crime area. In short, nothing of substance appears in the record to justify the frisk of Owens except for the inarguable fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by someone who possessed a crack pipe. Although further questioning may have revealed that the officer did have, in fact, articulable and independent suspicions that Owens was armed or dangerous, those reasons were not explicitly brought forth during the brief suppression hearing. 21 . United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.1971). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that the automatic companion rule as expressed in benyhill was insufficient to justify a fullblown search of an arrestees companion but the rationale may be sufficient where a search is limited to a pat down  1: holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest  will not do 2: holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee 3: holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest 4: holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "ought to be subject to liability under \u00a7 10:5-12(a) because \u201cpublic officers\u201d are specifically included in the \u00a7 10:5-5(e) definition of \u201cemployer.\u201d Although \u201cpublic officers\u201d is not defined in the LAD, it is difficult to conceive of a definition of that term that does not encompass a police inspector and a police captain, which are, respectively, the second and third highest ranking positions in the Atlantic City Police Department. All of this is to say that, even if we did not have the benefit of New Jersey state court decisions and were completely left to our own devices, the question of whether Rifiee and Madamba could be liable under LAD \u00a7 10:5-12(a) is, as the majority acknowledges, a close one. Maj. Op. at 125. But see Tyson v. CIGNA Corp., 918 F.Supp. 836, 839 (D.N.J.1996) (<HOLDING>). In matters involving state law, however, our Holdings: 0: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 1: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii 2: holding no individual liability under the adea 3: holding that fmla does not impose individual liability 4: holding that  10512a does not provide for individual liability because it does not include any of the phrases that so clearly provide a basis for individual liability under other subparts of lad", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "moves into the realm of res judicata.\u201d). The doctrine of issue preclusion \u201ccomes into play when an issue involved in a prior decision is the same issue involved in a subsequent action.\u201d See Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 (10th Cir.1987). If the bankruptcy court\u2019s turnover order, which the debtors did not appeal, \u201cactually and necessarily decided\u201d the exemption issue, principles of issue preclusion could prevent the debtors from raising this argument in an appeal from a subsequent order. See id. (noting that issue preclusion does not apply unless \u201cthe issue is actually decided in the first action\u201d and \u201cit was necessary to decide the issue in disposing of the first action\u201d); see also In re Albrecht, 233 F.3d 1258, 1260-61 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Turshen v. Chapman, 823 F.2d 836, 839 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order 1: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order 2: holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal 3: holding that notice indicating appeal was from judgment on date of jury verdict was insufficient to preserve appeal from earlier order granting summary judgment 4: holding that under the law of the case doctrine an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "argue that the arbitrator must make that decision. Because the court already determined that the arbitrator must decide whether this matter may proceed on a class or collective basis (doc. 62 at 8), defendants contend that the court also must hold that it is the arbitrator who must decide whether the effective vindication exception applies to invalidate the arbitration agreement. Plaintiffs never respond to this argument in their Reply. Doc. 68. Arguably, their failure to do so amounts to a waiver of this issue. See In re FCC 11-161, 753 F.3d 1015, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting petitioners\u2019 argument because their reply brief was silent on an issue and made no attempt to rebut the respondents\u2019 argument); see also Cayetano-Castillo v. Lynch, 630 Fed.Appx. 788, 794 (10th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Hardy v. City Optical, Inc., 39 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an appellant who does not respond to an argument in its reply brief  waives as a practical matter anyway any objections not obvious to the court to specific points urged by the appellee  because the court is not required to do his work for him and dissect the appellees plausible argument 1: holding that if an appellee raises an argument not addressed by the appellant in its opening brief the appellant may reply  citation omitted 2: holding that a reviewing court must address an appellees reply as to preservation of error and an alternative argument in an appellees reply 3: holding a party waives an argument made for the first time on reply 4: holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "set forth above, the court disagrees. The defendant cites EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1981) in support of its decision. That decision, however, supports this court's conclusion. In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the circuit court rejected the EEOC\u2019s decision to litigate those claims that it did not attempt to conciliate. Id., 650 F.2d at 19. Here, by contrast, the defendant asks this court to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff was unwilling to conciliate as to a specific issue. PL's Opp'n at 24 & n. 16. 5 . Judicial inquiries of this sort run afoul of Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709 (indicating the inappropriateness of judicial intrusion into internal agency actions) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 468 (D.C.Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The defendant argues that the FEC's Holdings: 0: holding that it would offend due process to permit criminal prosecution of an individual for invoking a privilege against selfincrimination in hearings before a state legislative commission after having been assured of his right to do so by the chairman members and counsel of the commission 1: holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did 2: recognizing the commission as an institutional agency not a mere composition of its individual members 3: recognizing standing for an environmental group based on the adverse effect of an international commerce commission decision on its members 4: recognizing an exception allowing parties to raise for the first time on review  challenges that concern the very composition or constitution of an agency", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Moore, 917 F.2d at 221 (quoting United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 154 (6th Cir.1979)). Further, the degree of proof requires \u201ca strong showing of factually specific and compelling prejudice.\u201d United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1469 (6th Cir.1988). Petitioner has fallen far short of presenting sufficient justification for severance. Thus, Petitioner\u2019s claim regarding ineffective assistance must, in turn, be denied. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied. This case is dismissed. The Court finds that based on the record, Petitioner\u2019s arguments and applicable case law, a certificate of appealability should not be issued. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2253(c). See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1064 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). An Order consistent with this Opinion will be Holdings: 0: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254 2: holding that district courts have authority to grant certificates of appealability under the recently amended habeas corpus framework 3: holding a court cannot issue and make returnable to it a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is outside the courts authority 4: holding that order denying relief under fedrcivp 60b in a habeas setting is the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding subject to the certificate of appealability requirement of 28 usc  2253c1a 2000", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to the stop and subsequent search of Scott Brooks\u2019s car and person. Because of his vehicular flight prior to arriving at the checkpoint, Scott Brooks was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes by the show of police authority by virtue of the checkpoint signs or the checkpoint itself. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when a defendant did not acquiesce in the show of police authority); id. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (\u201cAssuming that [the officer\u2019s] pursuit ... constituted a \u2018show of authority\u2019 in enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.\u201d); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Latta v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693, 700 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that for purposes of determining whether the roadblock worked a fourth amendment seizure the controlling considerations are whether 1 the motorist was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock and 2 the motorist was so stopped 1: holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle 2: holding that a fleeing motorist was not seized for fourth amendment purposes until the law enforcement officers were successful in stopping the motorist at a roadblock 3: holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation 4: holding that where the police roadblock was intended to stop brower by physical impact and did so a seizure occurred", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "claims regarding the disciplinary proceeding were not related to the same incident and did not involve common questions of fact or law as in his claims against Niak and Kimich. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Branum\u2019s claims against Niak and Kimich for improper joinder. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 20; Arrington, 414 F.2d at 693. Branum\u2019s appeal is without arguable merit and is frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.1983). As such, his appeal is dismissed. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(g), as does the district court\u2019s dismissal of the complaint. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 108 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir.1996); Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Branum has previously accumulated two Holdings: 0: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations 1: holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint 2: holding prisoner cannot avoid strike by improperly joining claims to complaint 3: holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court 4: holding that where plaintiffs claims are timely on the face of the allegations of the complaint a court should strike the affirmative defense of statute of limitations", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on. Our decision that due process does not require full judicial or trial-type proceedings is far from novel. See Pinnacle, 648 F.3d at 717; Buckingham v. Sec\u2019y of U.S. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 603 F.3d 1073, 1082-83 (9th Cir.2010); United States v. Clifford Matley Family Tr., 354 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir.2004); see also Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 266, 107 S.Ct. 1740, 95 L.Ed.2d 239 (1987) (\u201cWe conclude, however, that as a general rule the employer\u2019s interest is adequately protected without the right of confrontation and cross-examination, again so long as the employer is otherwise provided an opportunity to respond at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (<HOLDING>). ASSE argues that oral cross-examination is Holdings: 0: holding that a verdict form specifying the jurys mitigation findings is not required 1: holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process 2: recognizing the need for judicial economy in family issues as well as  the need to avoid fundamental unfairness 3: holding that the constitutionally required process need not take the form of a judicial or quasijudicial trial 4: holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201c(I)ssue preclusion requires that the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted in the present action was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.\u201d TLT Const. v. A. Anthony Tappe & Assoc., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 5 (1999). M. and J. filed the application for criminal process against Benoit in the Leominster District Court on February 14, 1997, and thus were plainly parties in the district court adjudication. To establish S. was in privity with M. and J., there \u201chas to be a \u2018sufficient legal identity\u2019 between the interest of the person allegedly represented and the prior litigant for the later claim to be precluded.\u201d Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 250 (1980) (citation omitted). See Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-Operative Bank, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 158 (1979) (<HOLDING>). A \u201cnonparty to a prior adjudication can be Holdings: 0: holding that the current party was sufficiently identified with the parties to the prior litigation 1: holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract 2: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 3: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 4: holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "also paying the defending party\u2019s post-offer costs. Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63. Because the Rule 68 offeree does not have the luxury of refusing the offer to assure that she has not bound herself to any terms that may later become unfavorable, she may construe the offer\u2019s terms strictly, see id., and ambiguities in the offer are to be resolved against the offeror, Nordby, 199 F.3d at 393; Nusom v. Comh Woodbwm, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir.1997). Evidence extrinsic to the offer\u2019s terms should not be considered. See Chambers v. Manning, 169 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Conn.1996) (citing cases); Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63 (\u201c[Cjourts should be reluctant to allow the offeror\u2019s extrinsic evidence to affect th[e] construction [of the Rule 68 offer.]\u201d); see also Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We thus reject Appellants\u2019 argument that its Holdings: 0: recognizing that settlement discussions do not constitute an offer of judgment 1: holding that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence 2: holding that defendant has failed to provide any support for the novel argument that plaintiff should be denied fees because in defendants view plaintiffs counsel acted unreasonably in failing to accept defendants settlement offer and that consideration of settlement discussions on a motion for attorneys fees is barred by federal rule of evidence 408 3: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell 4: holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that although states are free to grant citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution, most states that have addressed the use of drug-detecting canines have followed United States v. Place in holding that their use does not constitute a search); see generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog To Detect Narcotics Or Drugs As Unweasonable Search In Violation Of Fourth Amendment,. 150 ALR. Fed. 399 (2001). Those courts reason that dog sniffs are not searches because they are only minimally intrusive and because they occur in places where individuals do not have heightened expectations of privacy. E.g., United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 810 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest 1: holding that there is no intrusion on a legitimate privacy interest where a dog sniff of an automobile reveals only information regarding contraband items and concluding that society does not recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the public airspace surrounding a vehicle where the odor of narcotics escapes from the interi or of a vehicle into that public airspace 2: holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest 3: holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy 4: holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop conducted absent reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity did not violate the fourth amendment because it did not implicate any legitimate privacy interest", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation. 297 F.3d at 703. She testified the 27.6 grams of pseudoephedrine found at the defendant\u2019s residence could theoretically produce \u201cthe highest possible yield\u201d of 25.39 grams of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The Eighth Circuit found this evidence insufficient, stating, \u201cQuantity yield figures should not be calculated without regard for the particular capabilities of a defendant and the drug manufacturing site.\u201d 297 F.3d at 705. See also United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating \u201cthe relevant inquiry is not what a theoretical maximum yield would be, or even what an average methamphetamine cook would produce, but what appellants themselves could produce\u201d); United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); Buelna v. State, 20 N.E.3d 137, 146 (Ind. Holdings: 0: holding record is viewed in light most favorable to verdict 1: holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government 2: holding courts cannot quantify yield figures without regard for a particular defendants capabilities when viewed in light of the drug laboratory involved 3: holding that a probable cause determination must be viewed in light of the observations knowledge and training of the law enforcement officers involved in the warrantless search 4: holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "As noted in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 382, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1778, 26 L.Ed.2d 339, 346 (1970), [t]he doctrine found practical justification in the fact that the punishment for the felony was death of the felon and the forfeiture of his property to the Crown; thus, after the crime had been punished, nothing remained of the felon or his property on which to base a civil action. [Giardina, supra, 111 N.J. at 423 n. 1, 545 A.2d 139.] 3 The issue regarding conscious pain and suffering also arises where an accident victim never regains full consciousness before dying, barring recovery under a survival statute even where the victim survives for a considerable length of time after being injured. See Tri-State Poultry Coop. v. Carey, 190 Md. 116, 57 A.2d 812, 814-18 (1948) (<HOLDING>). GARIBALDI, J., concurring. I agree that Holdings: 0: recognizing as separate from pain and suffering 1: holding conscious pain is necessary element to maintenance of survival action and even survival of injuries for considerable length of time cannot form basis for recovery of damages unless decedent consciously experienced pain and suffering 2: recognizing as an element of pain and suffering 3: holding that claims for pain and suffering are the separate property of a spouse 4: holding that plaintiffs made a sufficient claim for damages for predeath pain and suffering by decedent", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "agreed to withdraw his claim of mental retardation. The PCRA court did not authorize the parties to raise new issues in the written submissions filed in support of the already established claims. Nevertheless, Elliott raised for the first time in his 2010 Supplemental Brief the discrete contention that he was entitled to a new trial pursuant to this Court\u2019s holding in Brooks, i.e., that trial counsel is deemed ineffective if he fails to meet with the defendant in person prior to trial. Because Elliott did not include in his PCRA petition the claim alleging trial counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness for failing to meet with him prior to trial, and did not obtain permission to amend his petition to include the same, the issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 613 Pa. 510, 35 A.3d 4, 14 (2012) (<HOLDING>); Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B) (providing that the Holdings: 0: holding no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely pcra petition 1: holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a pcra petition has no effect on the application of the pcra jurisdictional time bar 2: holding that a pcra petitioner may not raise new claims by merely supplementing a pending pcra petition without court authorization because to do so would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the pcra 3: holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition 4: holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "time before February 23, 2001, because, when he was discharged, there was no order in place and covering this time period that required him to pay child support. \u201cSection 523(a)(5) clearly requires that the support obligation be established by court order.\u201d In re Hutchison, 270 B.R. 429, 433 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2001). The language of section 523(a)(5), however, provides no time limitation on when the order of support must be entered for the support obligation to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Moreover, Husband provides no authority for his assertion that the nondis-chargeability of support obligations is limited only to prospective support payments or to support awards entered before the discharge in bankruptcy. Indeed, there is case law to the contrary. See Hutchison, 270 B.R. at 431 (<HOLDING>). Here, Husband was ordered to pay retroactive Holdings: 0: holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet 1: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation 2: holding that child support should have been made retroactive 3: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 4: holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. We find that Gonzalez\u2019 status as a signatory to the agreements to cure default entered with Wilshire provides her with standing under the CFA. In the circumstances presented, Wilshire\u2019s arguments regarding the lack of privity between Gonzalez and Wilshire arising from the making of the initial loan and the issue of her status as a \u201cconsumer\u201d of that loan are irrelevant. A separate contractual relationship between Gonzalez and Wilshire exists that involves the loan, but does not arise directly from it. Further, we find that the monetary damages that Gonzalez claims to exist as the result of Wilshire\u2019s allegedly unconscionable practices, if proven, constitute the statutorily-required \u201cascertainable loss.\u201d Weinberg v. Sprint, Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 237, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We disagree with the motion judge\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that a deposition is the time for the plaintiff to make a record capable of surviving summary judgment  not a later filed affidavit 1: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 2: holding a ruling on a motion for summary judgment adjudicating the rights of a party is a final judgment subject to appeal 3: holding that to have standing under the cfa a private party must plead a claim of ascertainable loss that is capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment 4: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "than from isolated words. [Citations omitted.] The plain language used in \u00b6 11(A) clearly and unambiguously provides for automatic 10-year renewals \u201cunless an instrument signed by a majority of the then owners of the lots has been recorded. . . .\u201d The covenant prescribed a definite period of 10 years for modification by a majority of the then lot owners. The 10-year automatic extension language would be rendered meaningless if the covenant could be amended by a majority vote (less than unanimous) at any time on or after June 27, 1997. Thus, the plain language of the covenant causes the reference to \u201cperiods of ten years\u201d to be a restriction regarding the frequency of amendment by less than a unanimous vote. See Scholten v Blackhawk Partners, 184 Ariz 326; 909 P2d 393 (Ariz App, 1995) (<HOLDING>); Illini Fed S&L Ass\u2019n v Elsah Hills Corp, 112 Holdings: 0: holding that an amendment of restrictive covenants passed during the running of an automatic 10year extension period was not effective until the end of the 10year extension period 1: holding that amendments of the restrictive covenants passed during the initial 20year term would not take effect until the beginning of the automatic 10year extension period 2: holding that an amendment passed two years into a 10year automatic extension period was not effective until the 10year extension period expired and stating that to hold otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless 3: holding that government was not entitled to extension of time limit under 21 usc  8811 to rectify oneday delay in filing where government was aware of the circumstances contributing to the delay prior to the expiration of the time limit and could have requested an extension before the deadline expired 4: recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives in \u00a7 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) limit that part of the definition to crimes against property. As noted above, that argument is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. It is also contrary to United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2005, 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995). In Mobley, we concluded, \u201c[wjhile it is possible to infer a property restriction into the structure of the statute, a plain reading of the words suggests that it covers any crime of various enumerated types, and also those crimes of whatever variety that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.\u201d Id. at 696. See also United States v. O\u2019Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1372 (9th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>). Our conclusion in Mobley was based in part on Holdings: 0: holding that failure to stop for a blue light is a violent felony under armed career criminal statute because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 1: holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another 2: holding that misdemeanor drunk driving by its very nature involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injuiy to another 3: holding that vehicular manslaughter qualifies as a violent felony under section 924e2bii in that it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another  4: holding that attempted burglary under florida law qualified as a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 18 usc  924e2biihereinafter acca because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not walked away, Pulliam responded that he could have \u201chung on and kept [Yinger]\u201d despite the company\u2019s impending financial collapse, but that Yinger \u201cmade the choice to send [him] unemployment separation papers\u201d instead. Nicholes similarly testified that the company \u201chad no intention of not letting [Yinger] come back on [April 17],\u201d and that he was terminated only because he failed to show up for work following the expiration of his FMLA leave. PPI\u2019s shifting and inconsistent explanations for not holding open Yinger\u2019s job create a genuine issue of fact as to PPI\u2019s undue hardship defense. See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1179 (stating summary judgment should be denied if plaintiff establishes genuine dispute as to employer\u2019s affirmative defense); see also C.R.. Eng., 644 F.3d at 1038-39 (<HOLDING>). Because Yinger has demonstrated multiple Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action 1: holding that a plaintiff may satisfy his burden by demonstrating such weaknesses implausibilities inconsistencies incoherencies or contradictions in the employers proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons 2: holding that pretext for ada discrimination can be shown if proffered reasons for employment action are so incoherent weak inconsistent or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude they are unworthy of belief brackets and quotation omitted 3: holding that if factfinder rejects employers proffered nondiseriminatory reasons as unbelievable it may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination without additional proof of discrimination 4: holding that plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating that an employers proffered reason for an adverse employment action has no basis in fact", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2412(d)(2)(B). The Government argues that Haselwander\u2019s fee claim should be rejected because there is no \u201cevidence\u201d that Haselwander is worth less than $2 million. We disagree. The record in this case is adequate to show that Haselwan-der\u2019s net worth is less than $2 million. In addition to counsel\u2019s uncontested statement to this effect on behalf of his client, the record also includes a letter from Ha-selwander to Senator Lugar, in which he says, \u201cMy wife and I are just mid-level State of Indiana employees, and we cannot afford to pay for the current very high costs of college educations.\u201d Joint Appendix 80. Nothing more is necessary. See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 760 F.2d 305, 309 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Sosebee v. Astrue, 494 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that record documents may show that a plaintiff meets the financial qualifications specified in 28 usc  2412d2b 1: holding that where jurisdiction was based on 28 usc  2201 venue was determined as per 28 usc  1391 2: holding that under 28 usc  1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case 3: holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 regardless of whether defendant was doing business in the district within the meaning of 28 usc  1391 4: holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "long as a \u2018person has obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of undue advantage.\u2019 \u2019 \u201d Id., quoting Newington Ltd. v. Forrester, No. 3:08-CV-0864-G, 2008 WL 4908200, at *4 (N.D.Tex. Nov. 13, 2008), in turn quoting Baisden v. I\u2019m Ready Prods., Inc., No. H-08-0451, 2008 WL 2118170 at\u2019 NO (S.D.Tex. May 16, 2008). Unjust enrichment occurs when a person has wrongfully obtained a benefit or has passively received one which it would be unconscionable to retain. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Mims, 405 S.W.3d 319, 339 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.). Usually if a valid, express contract exists covering the subject matter of the parties\u2019 dispute, a plaintiff cannot recover under a quasi-contract theory such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. d 915, 921 (5th Cir.1957) (<HOLDING>). Cashman\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment (# 86) Holdings: 0: holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine 1: holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate 2: holding that gas company was entitled to restitution of difference between contract rate and price paid under invalid rate order set by regulatory board 3: holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate 4: holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that Plaintiffs Complaint is untimely. As already noted, it is undisputed that the Union convened plant employees at a meeting on December 20, 2001 to discuss the two-year extension to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Plaintiff did not attend that meeting. On May 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB asserting a claim arising out of the same facts alleged here. Obviously, then, Plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to this cause of action by May 17th at the latest. The present Complaint, however, was filed on August 9, 2004, well over two years after that date. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) are untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. See Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20, 30, 372 A.2d 1355 (App.Div.1977) (<HOLDING>), affd, 76 N.J. 284, 386 A.2d 1310 (1978). That Holdings: 0: holding accrual of cause of action for purposes of statute of limitations occurs on the date on which the right to institute and maintain a suit first arises 1: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 2: holding that a single cause of action arises out of the same set of facts 3: holding that for statute of limitations purposes the injury in a section 10b action occurs at the time of plaintiffs entry into purchase agreement not on later date when plaintiffs failed to receive expected payment 4: holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and that he had a right to rely on the representation to him that he did not owe child-support arrearages. DOR appealed this order. DOR argues that the circuit court erred in three ways: (1) by considering the doctrines of laches and estoppel in the absence of an attempt by the father to plead these issues or prove them at an eviden-tiary hearing; (2) by applying the doctrines of laches and estoppel without sufficient evidence; and (3) by vacating the final order establishing arrearages on the basis of a violation of due process. We decline to address the first argument because DOR failed to object to the circuit court\u2019s consideration of the doctrines at issue, even though it had a clear opportunity to do so. See Matar v. Fla. Int\u2019l Univ., 944 So.2d 1153, 1157-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). DOR provided arguments on the applicability Holdings: 0: recognizing that an appeal has never been an evidentiary proceeding so appellate court will not consider evidence not presented to the lower tribunal because function of appellate court is to determine whether lower tribunal committed error based upon the issues and evidence before it 1: holding on appeal the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct and the burden is on the appellant to present to us a sufficient record from which we can determine whether the lower court has erred in the respect complained of 2: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 3: recognizing that the preservation requirement applies even to issues of due process when there has been a clear opportunity to present the argument on appeal to the lower tribunal 4: holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "U.S.C. \u00a7 727 when the evidence showed the existence of a pattern of concealment of assets? 5. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in reaching the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof necessary to deny the debtor a discharge of his debts to the plaintiff pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 523(a)(6) and 523(a)(4) when the evidence showed that the debtor stole accounts receivable from the partnership he maintained with the plaintiff-appellant? II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A district court hearing an appeal from a Bankruptcy Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s findings of fact under the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d standard, see Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8013, while its conclusions of law are reviewed under the de novo standard. See In re AroChem Corp., 176 F.3d 610, 620 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); In re Bennett Funding Holdings: 0: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 1: holding that we review the bankruptcy court decision independently accepting its factual findings unless clearly erroneous but reviewing its conclusions of law de novo 2: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo 3: holding that we review agency determinations of law de novo 4: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see also Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Malley and stating that police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where grounds for probable cause stated in warrant application were objectively reasonable). \u201c[T]he standard for determining the reasonableness of an official\u2019s belief in the existence of probable cause is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have, known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have applied for the war rant under the conditions.\u201d Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092; but see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (3d Cir.1993)) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, Holdings: 0: recognizing that a defendant acts with reckless disregard when he displays a high degree of awareness of  probable falsity 1: holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety 2: holding that in order to prevail on a  1983 claim for unlawful arrest a plaintiff needed to satisfy the test enunciated in franks v delaware 438 us 154 171 98 sct 2674 57 led2d 667 1978 which requires a showing that the maker of the affidavit either stated a deliberate falsehood or acted with a reckless disregard for the truth proof of negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient a plaintiff must  demonstrate that the police officer acted with reckless disregard for the truth as well as prove that the officer made the statements in his affidavits with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity 3: holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause 4: holding trial courts finding omission of information was not intentional or with reckless disregard for truth was not clearly erroneous", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.. 1 . In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs assert that Tabura and Diaz each had 160 hours of paid time off, citing Kellogg\u2019s policy manual. But the parties\u2019 undisputed facts before the district court indicated, instead, that Diaz earned 200 hours paid time off annually. 2 . On appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC\u201d) filed an amicus brief on Plaintiffs' behalf and participated in oral argument. 3 . The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., \u2014 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2031-32, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015), indicated that a \"failure to accommodate\u201d claim is a claim for \"disparate treatment\u201d and thus must ultimately satisfy the general elements of a \"disparate treatment\u201d claim. 4 . McDonnell D r. 1998) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control Holdings: 0: holding that to demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsels deficient performance that caused a defendant to forgo a favorable plea offer a defendant must show that he would have accepted the offer to plead and that there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented 1: holding that it was reasonable that counsel would not anticipate that the prosecution would attempt to offer inadmissible polygraph evidence 2: holding that to prove ineffectiveness where defendant rejected plea offer upon advice of counsel defendant must show he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised correctly the state would not have withdrawn its offer the court would have accepted the offer and the resulting sentence would have been less severe 3: holding police departments offer for officer who objected for religious reasons to being assigned to guard abortion clinic to transfer to another district that would not require such duty was a reasonable accommodation because it would have eliminated conflict 4: holding that in light of the defendants failure to engage in the interactive process liability would be appropriate if  reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Second, \"[o}rderly procedure ... requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory ... of recovery to the trial court.\" Dansie v. City of Herriman, 2006 UT 23, \u00b6 30, 134 P.3d 1139 (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The policy of judicial economy is most directly frustrated when an appellant asserts unpreserved claims that require factual predicates. For this reason, the preservation rule should be more strictly applied when the asserted new issue or theory \"depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial.\" James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982) (<HOLDING>). {16 The second consideration underlying the Holdings: 0: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it 1: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 2: holding that a letter utilized by the appellant in his argument would not be considered on appeal because it was not properly before the trial court 3: holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal 4: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "award of attorney\u2019s fees against DOR in actions to determine paternity and support pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2010). See \u00a7 742.045, Fla. Stat. (2010) (\u201cThe Department of Revenue shall not be considered a party for purposes of this section; however, fees may be assessed against the department pursuant to s. 57.105(1).\u201d); Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.003(2)(b) (\u201c[T]he department shall pay any fees assessed by the court pursuant to Section 57.105(1), F.S.\u201d). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney\u2019s fees against DOR pursuant to section 57.105(1) if the facts support such an award. See State, Dep\u2019t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Cook v. Carr, 501 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. Brodzki, 574 So.2d 1157, 1158 Holdings: 0: holding that removal of suit against physicians employed by a federally funded community health center to federal court by the defendants on the ground that they were covered under the public health service act was improper as the department of health and human services had not yet made a determination whether defendants should be deemed to be employees 1: holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings 2: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 3: holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees 4: holding that section 57105 fees can be awarded against the department of health and rehabilitative services filing a paternity suit on behalf of the mother if there is a proper finding of a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that it did not challenge, in its administrative case brief, the finding of state-ownership or the resulting rate assigned to Shanxi DMD after the Preliminary Results. See CAC Reply Br. at 1. CAC, however, claims that the doctrine of exhaustion does not apply because, relative to the rates assigned to the mandatory respondents and the all-others rate, Shanxi DMD received a more favorable rate in the Preliminary Results and whs therefore not required \u2018to act against its interests by filing a brief contesting Shanxi DMD\u2019s PRC entity-based rate. Id. at 4-10. Congress has granted the court discretion to \u201cwhere appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2637(d); see Hebei Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1185, 1196 (2004) (<HOLDING>). The exhaustion doctrine provides \u201cthat no one Holdings: 0: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement 2: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 3: recognizing that congress inclusion of the phrase where appropriate grants the court discretion thereby clarifying that the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional 4: holding that the ftcas exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Arthur Lee Hairston, Sr., appeals from the district court\u2019s order granting in part his 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3582 (2006) motion for reduction of sentence. On appeal, Hair-ston asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give him a full resentencing hearing and that the district court failed to provide sufficient reasoning for the chosen sentence. We affirm. Hairston\u2019s claim that he was entitled to a full resentencing pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, 251 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 129 S.Ct. 2401, 173 Holdings: 0: holding that resentencing is required 1: holding that proceedings under  3582c2 do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant 2: holding that booker and kimbrough do not apply at resentencing proceedings under  3582c2 3: holding that the rules governing criminal cases apply to  3582c2 proceedings 4: holding that  3582c2 does not authorize a resentencing but merely provides for a sentence reduction within the bounds established by the sentencing commission and that booker does not apply to  3582c2 proceedings", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "railroad employee, brings this action under FELA, which provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiff in this case. 45 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 51, et seq. See Rivera v. Union Pacific jected the argument that FELA is not preempted by the FRSA, based on the analysis that FELA is a negligence based statute and \u201c[l]ike common law negligence claims, FELA negligence claims may not be used to impose duties beyond those imposed by Congress or the FRA\u2014 that is, FELA claims may, indeed, be subject to preemption.\u201d In re Amtrak \u201cSunset Ltd.\u201d Train Crash, 188 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1349 (S.D.Ala.1999) (citing Thirkill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 950 F.Supp. at 1107-08); accord Rice v. Cincinnati New Orleans & Pac. Ry., 955 F.Supp. at 740-41;) see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the question to be determined is Holdings: 0: holding that the meaning of doubtful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words or phrases noscitur a sociis 1: holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract 2: holding that insider transaction did not fall within scope of  547c2 3: holding that declaratory judgments fall outside the scope of the court of claims jurisdiction 4: holding that legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law fall within the scope of these broad phrases", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which was sovereign immunity. While it is true that where the basis of a dismissal is unclear, the jurisdictional ground controls and thus the dismissal does not preclude a future action, see Remus Joint Venture and Envl. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 184 n. 5 (6th Cir.1997); Restatement (First) of Judgments \u00a7 49 cmt. C (1949), it is not clear that a dismissal based on sovereign immunity is sufficiently jurisdictional for the purposes of claim preclusion. Compare Touvell v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir.2005) (\u201cThe Eleventh Amendment provides a type of sovereign immunity, and deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction\u201d), with Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. \\2006) (<HOLDING>). Undoubtedly, this is a point of heavy Holdings: 0: holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity 1: holding that the exercise of judicial power under article iii of the united states constitution requires an actual case or controversy 2: holding that dismissal pursuant to a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity is with prejudice 3: holding that the sovereign immunity defense may be raised for the first time on appeal 4: recognizing that a defense based on sovereign immunity is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in article iii", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of at least ten years, and it could have imposed a sentence of up to thirty-two years. \u00a7 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A), (8)(a), (10)(a), (10)(b)(IX). But had the amendment not been made and had Manyik been convicted of aggravated robbery under section 18-4-802(l)(d), the court could have imposed a prison sentence of as few as four years, and it could not have imposed a sentence over sixteen years. \u2022 \u00a7 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A), (10)(a), (10)(b)(IX). Thus, the amended information charged a more serious offense than that which was originally charged. \u00b6 52 Because an amended information which charges a more serious crime necessarily charges an additional or different offense within the meaning of Crim. P. 7(e), the amendment was impermissible. Cf. People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 259 (Colo.1996) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). \u00b6 53 A division of this Holdings: 0: holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense 1: holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional 2: holding that penetration of anus and penetration of sexual organ although found in same subsection of section 22021a1b are separate offenses 3: holding that medical report was not material for brady purposes where report at best showed lack of vaginal penetration of sexual abuse victim penetration was not necessary for conviction of sexual abuse of a minor under iowa law 4: holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is binding on all municipalities. It is undisputed that Do-Wop\u2019s facility is within 1,000 feet of a residential zone. Do-Wop contends that because the Legislature made its facility non-compliant, it is entitled to protection under the MLUL, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68. That statute permits a use to continue indefinitely after it has been rendered nonconforming by a zoning amendment. The statute more specifically provides that \u201c[a]ny nonconforming use or structure existing at the time of the passage of an ordinance may be continued upon the lot or in the structure so occupied.\u201d N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68. Contrary to Do-Wop\u2019s assertion, that statute does not conflict with N.J.S.A. 2C:34-7. The plain language of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 protects only preexisting noncon uper. 82, 90, 645 A.2d 788 (App.Div.1994) (<HOLDING>). As we observed two years ago, \u201cN.J.S.A. Holdings: 0: holding petition nominating candidate under socialist party violated the act where socialist labor party was entitled to protection of party name protection act 1: holding that preexisting nonconforming use must conform with requirements of subsequentlyenacted freshwater wetlands protection act 2: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 3: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the park system resource protection act 4: holding that pinelands commission regulation adopted pursuant to pinelands protection act act trumped mluls preexisting nonconforming use protection because act expressly provided that its implement ing regulations superseded mlul when there was a conflict", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "remedy is itself unconstitutional; that under Booker we should review his sentence for reasonableness; and that his sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We reviewed Spielvogel\u2019s sentence in Spielvogel II and Spielvogel III, however, and he presented none of these arguments in those appeals. We explicitly said in Spielvogel III that \u201cSpielvogel has abandoned his Apprendi/Blakely/Booker issue.\u201d No. 03-13135, slip op. at 4. Nothing in the \u00a7 2255 court\u2019s order requires that we revisit a sentence we affirmed in Spielvogel II and Spielvogel III, and the sentence before us is the same sentence. These arguments are also barred by the law of the case. See United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560-61 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Spielvogel\u2019s convictions and sentences are Holdings: 0: holding an issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal 1: holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal 2: holding that under the law of the case doctrine an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal 3: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order 4: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "employer might apply a salary retention policy in a discriminatory fashion or use such a policy as a vehicle to perpetuate historically unequal wages caused by past discrimination, these potential abuses do not provide valid bases to adopt a per se rule that declares all salary retention practices inherently discriminatory. Rather, these risks simply highlight the need to carefully examine the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims of unequal pay. In particular, it is important to ensure that employers do not rely on the prohibited \u201cmarket force theory\u201d to justify lower wages for female employees simply because the market might bear such wages. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (<HOLDING>). In addition it is important to ensure that Holdings: 0: holding that to establish a prima facie equal pay act claim the plaintiff must show that the jobs being compared are substantially equal 1: holding that although women may have been willing to work for lower wages than men and market forces therefore dictated that an employer could pay women less than men reliance on such a market force theory nevertheless became illegal once congress enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal work 2: holding that the mere allegation that a female professor was paid less than a male colleague for equal work stated a claim under the equal pay act 3: holding that reliance may be established by proof that securities not traded on the open market could not have been issued at all but for a fraudulent scheme of the defendants the plaintiff still had to prove that he relied on the integrity of the offerings of the securities market 4: holding that  disposable retirement pay  from military pension was equal to gross retirement pay less federal income taxes", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "criminal, formal or informal; where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.\u2019 \u201d \u25a0 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d 409, 418 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973)). When the State \u201ccompels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.\u201d Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 2135, 53 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (1977 t.App.1995) (finding potential violation of Fifth Amendment where defendant refused to take polygraph test as part of court-ordered therapy made a condition of probation); Gilfillen v. State, 582 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>); In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879, 882-84 Holdings: 0: holding that a probationers challenge to a condition of his probation was moot in light of the supreme courts reversal of the underlying conviction and the probationers apparent completion of probation  1: holding that an order requiring the agency to search the records did not constitute courtordered change in the relationship of the parties 2: holding trial court could not make completion of courtordered treatment program requiring an admission of guilt a condition of probation 3: holding state had violated the defendants fifth amendment rights and consequently was prohibited from using any of the information revealed during courtordered treatment program in later separate criminal prosecution 4: recognizing that probation condition required probationer to enter into and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program but finding that no condition of probation was imposed that required him to admit to a counselor the sexual acts charged", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201cgood cause\u201d is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261, 276-77, 868 A.2d 252 (2005) (dealing with good cause for a postponement of trial); ... Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 345-56, 703 A.2d 1267 (1998) (whether to permit filing of a belated insanity plea). Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1224-25 (one citation omitted). I agree with the majority that subpart (b) of Rule 4-326 applies, and so there must be \u201cgood cause\u201d to exclude particular evidence from the jury room. See Majority Op. at 599-602, 4 A.3d 507-09. But videotapes are a special kind of evidence, and certainly replaying one in the jury room runs the risk of overemphasis. See Wright, 72 Md.App. at 218, 528 A.2d at 500; see also Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>); State v. Frazier, 99 Wash.2d 180, 661 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony 1: holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion 2: holding that a trial courts determination that additional viewing of a videotape of an accident scene would overemphasize that such evidence was reasonable and that the court acted within its discretion in refusing to allow the videotape to go into the jury room during deliberations 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver 4: holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trade practices. Whether an act is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of 93A depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. See Glickman v. Brown, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 229, 234 (1985). An act is unfair or deceptive if it is \u201c \u2018within any recognized conception of unfairness\u2019 or is \u2018immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous\u2019 or \u2018causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).\u2019 \u201d Id., quoting PMP Associates, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 596 (1975). Gear claims that Goba\u2019s delay in generating punch lists and misrepresentation of items to be completed that Goba knew or should have known were completed constitute unfair and deceptive acts under 93A. The courts have recognized that \u201ca negligent misrepresentati , 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, Holdings: 0: holding that the owner could maintain a 93a claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor 1: holding that an abutter could not bring a 93a claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant 2: holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties 3: holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages 4: holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "against BLMIS disallowed, and the Petitioners dispute the Objectors\u2019 putative derivative claim pending in the New York State Supreme Court against Sentry\u2019s managers and advisors on the bases that, inter alia, (i) the Objectors lack standing and (ii) the actions were commenced in violation of BVI law. Based on the facts before the Court at this time, these unliquidated, contingent, and disputed claims should be given no greater weight for COMI purposes than any of the Debtors\u2019 other substantial litigations relating to assets that are pending in Ireland and the BVI. In any proceeding for foreign recognition, of great concern to the Court is the potential for mischief and COMI manipulation, as recently expressed by the Fifth Circuit in In re Ran, 607 F.3d 1017, 2010 WL 2106638, at *8 (<HOLDING>). Thus, even courts that have recently Holdings: 0: holding that to reopen a case an alien must show that the new evidence would likely change the result 1: recognizing in dicta that the case before it involving an individual and not an entity did not involve a recent change of domicile by the party in question and a similar case brought immediately after the partys arrival in the united states following a long period of domicile in the country where the bankruptcy is pending would likely lead to a different result 2: holding that in the context of a challenge to a states lethal injection protocol the mere possibility of a trial date in another case involving similar issues does not affect the balancing of the equities in this case 3: holding that a change in personal circumstances in the united states does not constitute a change in country conditions and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen 4: recognizing a change in domicile based on the principle a guardian of an incompetent person acting in good faith has the rightto permanently change the wards domicile to another jurisdiction unless the court having control over the ward objects", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": ". Appellants' own testimony at trial confirms that they experienced various health problems with the dairy herd in 2004, in addition to the unusual fluctuations in milk production which Appellants do not dispute. See supra note 6. We therefore accept the trial court's findings concerning the timing and nature of the property damage sustained by the dairy herd. As the Superior Court admirably noted, it is not the role of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence. 13 . The Superior Court\u2019s discussion of the multiple trigger theory of liability in Consulting Engineers was central to its trigger of coverage analysis in that case, and therefore carries precedential value given this Court\u2019s adoption of that court\u2019s opinion. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Even if we agree with Appellants that Holdings: 0: holding that notwithstanding the above and beyond language on the disposition form the discussion at resentencing revealed that the trial court understood its obligation to and its intent to give the defendant credit for time served 1: holding where an appellate court affirms trial courts grant of summary judgment on a particular ground the appellate court need not discuss the remaining grounds 2: holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point 3: holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment 4: holding that when this court per curiam affirms on the basis of the lower courts opinion it not only signals agreement with the result but also with the rationale employed in reaching its final disposition on matters essential to its holding", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "First, the proposed Second Amended Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was separated from her colleagues before she brought her discrimination claim to HR. See id. \u00b6 17 (alleging that Groff \u201csegregated\u201d Plaintiff \u201c[s]hortly after denying [her] request for a promotion\u201d). Accordingly, there can be no causal relationship between her complaint to HR and that conduct. Second, Plaintiff does not specify when Defendant reduced her break time or subjected her attendance to more scrutiny, so the court cannot infer that those actions arose in response to her protected activity. In any event, even if those acts did commence after Plaintiff first exercised her statutory rights, they do not support a hostile work environment claim. See Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 130-31 (D.G. Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Hussain v. Gutierrez, 593 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 Holdings: 0: holding that a failure to make out a hostile work environment claim effectively disposes of the constructive discharge claim as well 1: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 2: holding defendants belief that his work was unfairly criticized is not sufficient for constructive discharge 3: holding that nonselection for a desirable position assignment to undesirable duties sharing a small office and being criticized did not make out a hostile work environment causing constructive discharge 4: holding that a claim of constructive discharge requires a showing of harassment that is more severe and pervasive than that required to show a hostile work environment", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Moreover, suits against a state, brought in federal court, for violation of a state law, are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even if the court would otherwise have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio ex rel. Montgomery, 226 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir.2000). Plaintiff has not'pointed the Court to any provision of state or federal law that would waive Maryland\u2019s sovereign immunity, and the Court does not find a waiver in any of the state or federal statutes that plaintiff cites as the basis for his claims. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (<HOLDING>), quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, Holdings: 0: holding that a statute shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication 1: holding that courts will only find a waiver of sovereign immunity  by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction 2: holding that indiana courts will only engage in statutory interpretation if the language of the statute is ambiguous 3: holding that we will not grant relief unless the indictment is so obviously defective as not to charge the offense alleged by any reasonable construction 4: holding same as to an easement by implication", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "him that Hill and Russell shot the other girl. Barnes stated he could \u201chear them screaming in his head.\u201d Edwards testified that Russell was present when Barnes made these statements and that Russell did not say anything, but was just \u201csitting there lik ry factor weighs very slightly in favor of the admissibility of the Vogt Street extraneous offense to prove Russell\u2019s intent as the primary actor or as a party to Chapa\u2019s capital murder. 2. Factor Two \u2014 Irrational, Indelible Impression The second Montgomery factor, the potential of the extraneous offense evidence to impress the jury \u201cin some irrational but nevertheless indelible way,\u201d here weighs heavily in favor of exclusion of the Vogt Street offense. See Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 504, 506-07 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); Manning v. State, 84 S.W.3d 15, 23 Holdings: 0: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment 1: holding trial court abused its discretion under rule 403 by admitting despicable story written by defendant about sex enjoyed by men and women with both willing and unwilling young girls in prosecution for possession of child pornography 2: holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial 3: holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion under rule 403 by allowing evidence that provided background for the crime charged 4: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "certain product is encompassed by Comment k have followed two distinct paths. Many Courts have concluded that Comment k is applicable to all prescription drugs. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.1980); Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okl.1982); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 90 Wash.2d 9, 577 P.2d 975, 977-78 (1978). Other Courts, however, have limited the application of Comment k to \u201ccircumstances when it is shown that the product is incapable of being made safe given the present state of human knowledge but possesses such a high degree of social need so that its use is warranted provided warnings are adequate.\u201d Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also, Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 Holdings: 0: holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control 1: holding that plaintiffs infringement claim against defendants laterdeveloped product would be barred by laches and estoppel found applicable to earlier product if subsequent product is equivalent to earlier one under doctrine of equivalents 2: holding that whether a product is within comment k should be determined on a case by case basis where it is shown that the product is unavoidably unsafe and product of exceptional social need 3: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 4: holding statements of product superiority and that product was industry approved were puffery", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "severe or pervasive \u2018to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.\u2019 \u201d Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.1982)). b. Constructive Discharge A constructive discharge occurs when' an employer makes an employee\u2019s working conditions so intolerable and unbearable because of his or her protected status that \u00e1 reasonable person in that employee\u2019s position would have felt compelled to resign. Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, a plaintiff claiming constructive discharge must show more than just a Title VII violation by her employer. Coffman v. Tracker Marine, L.P., 141 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir.1998); Tidwell v. Meyer\u2019s Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 495 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>);. Drake .v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Holdings: 0: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge 1: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract 2: holding although there was some evidence plaintiff subjectively believed conduct he reported violated the law there was legally insufficient evidence this belief was reasonable 3: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination by the employer based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the employer had constructively discharged the plaintiff 4: holding prima facie case of discrimination includes showing of adverse employment action constructive discharge could satisfy element of adverse employment action but there was no constructive discharge where evidence did not support that discrimination rather than actual performance problems prompted reprimands and poor evaluations", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "C.A. No. 16721, mem. op. at 11, 1999 WL 1009210,. Steele, V.C. (Oct. 25, 1999). 45 . Michelson v. Duncan, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d at 224 (quoting Kaufman v. Shoenberg, Del. Ch., 91 A.2d 786, 791 (1952)); see also Saxe v. Brady, Del.Ch., 184 A.2d. 602, 610 (1962); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d at 1115-16, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 62, at *36 (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 368-69 (1998)). 46 . Steiner v. Meyerson, Del.Ch., C.A No. 13139, mem. op. at 2, 1995 WL 441999 at *1, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *3, Allen, C. (Jul. 19, 1995). 47 . Compl. \u00b6 10. 48 . Id. at \u00b6 22. 49 . Id. atV21. 50 . Id. atV21. 51 . In re 3COM Corp. Shareholders Litig., mem. op. at 12-14. 52 . See Steiner v. Meyerson, mem. op. at 13-14, 1995 WL 441999 at *5, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *16-17 (<HOLDING>). 53 .But, of course, the complaint fails to Holdings: 0: holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint 1: holding that a complaint stated an unfairness claim but did not state a claim satisfying the more rigorous waste standard 2: holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied 3: holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference 4: holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "midnight. Thus it was May 27, not May 26, when Harper fell from the tree. 5 . We have considered all of Harper's other arguments and find they lack merit. Harper claims, for example, that defendants could not have heard Perkins alert them to the gun in the tree because both defendants said they saw Harper holding the gun. Yet Harper testified that Gourley tasered him immediately after Perkins shouted the gun\u2019s location. From this testimony, which we must credit at summary judgment, we can only infer that defendants tasered Harper in response to Perkins's cry. The evidence does not support alternative inferences, e.g., that defendants would have tasered Harper even if they knew plaintiff could not reach the gun. See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996) Holdings: 0: holding movant may not raise new grounds for summary judgment in reply to nonmovants response 1: holding that a superior court justice may not choose between conflicting inferences at summary judgment stage 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding court need not withhold summary judgment if nonmovants inferences implausible 4: holding that nonmovants failure to except or respond cannot supply by default the grounds for summary judgment or the summary judgment proof necessary to establish the movants right", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that an employer must also ignore.\u201d Id. (Emphasis added.) Although the Court\u2019s holding was technically limited to the disparate treatment claim before it, one cannot read that opinion without receiving the strong impression that the Supreme Court is suggesting that the ADEA does not encompass a disparate impact claim. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred, noting that \u201cthere are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA\u201d Hazen, 507 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 1710. Fifth, of those courts that have considered the issue since Hazen, there is a clear trend toward concluding that the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding no individual liability under the adea 1: recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact 2: holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea 3: holding that in title vii disparate impact case an employer may rebut prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employment policy at issue is related to the employees job performance and justified by business necessity 4: holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to enter no judgment prior to the close of the evidence.\u201d Id. In light of the substantial evidence supporting the court\u2019s finding of causation, see infra, we cannot conclude that the district court's decision not to rule on the Rule 52(c) motion was an abuse of discretion. Riverboat also asserts that, in reviewing the district court\u2019s decision, we should evaluate the record at the close of the plaintiffs' case^\u2014 the time at which the motion was made\u2014 rather than the record as a whole. Riverboat's position is not supported by our case law nor by Rule 52(c). The defendants can point us to no rule of law that prohibits us, in reviewing the district court\u2019s Rule 52(c) order, from evaluating the record as a whole. See Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 578 F.2d 721, 723-24 (8th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). 30 . See, e.g., Gaffney Test., Tr.I at 260-62 Holdings: 0: holding that when ruling on a rule 50 motion the record should be taken as it existed when the trial was closed 1: holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered 2: holding that the only question on a rule 35a motion is whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face  emphasis added 3: holding that once a defendant introduces evidence on its own behalf it waives the right to dismissal under rule 41b now rule 52c  and stating that in such situations the sufficiency of the evidence is tested on appeal by viewing the entire record even when the trial judge reserved ruling on the motion when made emphasis added 4: holding that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "See McClintic v. McClintic, 39 A.3d 1274, 1279 n. 2 (D.C.2012) (\"[S]ince the District of Columbia derives its common law from Maryland, decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on questions that have not been determined by [this court] are of great weight.\u201d) (first alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . See Durr, 722 So.2d at 135 (stating that in other jurisdictions, \"[cjonsent has been found to be a valid defense when the touching ... does not violate an established rule, such as in athletic events. It may also be a viable defense when the person being touched was made aware of the risks prior to consent, and in professions and occupations involving invasions of one\u2019s physical integrity.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted); Shelley, 929 P.2d at 491-92 (<HOLDING>); Brown, 364 A.2d at 30 (\"There are a few Holdings: 0: holding that punching another person is a statutory assault 1: holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime 2: holding that consent is not a valid defense to hazing 3: holding that consent is not a defense to punching another player during a basketball game because such contact was not foreseeable in the game 4: holding that consent is not a defense to a violation of  5231", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Second, his immediate family is his only tie to this jurisdiction, and his children are currently in his homeland of Venezuela. Third, he does not appear to have any ties to his community based on his short period of residency. For example, the Defendant and his wife own no property on the island, they own two cars, one registered in his spouse\u2019s name and the other in her employer\u2019s name. Fourth, the Defendant has not been employed during his stay in Puerto Rico because he does not have a \u201cwork visa.\u201d Finally, were Defendant to flee to Venezuela, the United States has presented evidence that suggests his extradition would be illegal under the Venezuelan Constitution. Thus, the Court finds that Defendant is a flight risk. See United States v. Perez-Franco, 839 F.2d 867 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The fourth factor that the Court must Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 1: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 2: holding that the defendant cannot overcome this presumption of service merely by denying that he did not receive the complaint 3: holding noncitizen defendant was not entitled to be released on bail pending trial for possession of heroin despite lack of criminal record and strong presence of his family in jurisdiction because he could not overcome the presumption that he would not flee the jurisdiction 4: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1316, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2001). If the specification does not contain an \u201cadequate disclosure\u201d of the structure, the patent violates \u00a7 112, \u00b6 6 and the claim should be found indefinite. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994). The function expressed in the '780 Patent is \u201cmeans for reducing the absorption of laser energy at a wavelength of about 1.4-2.2 micrometers.\u201d CardioFocus submits that the phrase should be construed to cover the following corresponding structure: specially treated fiber that has been purified to reduce the concentration of hydroxyl ions including fused silica optical fiber part no. 822W manufactured by Spectran Corporation and equivalents thereof. That structure is adequately described in the specification, CardioFocus explains, as Holm (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). CardioFocus points to a specific product that Holdings: 0: holding that a claim was not indefinite for using the term selector because it was a standard component and its structure was well known in the art 1: holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term 2: holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art 3: holding that use of term black box did not render the claim indefinite because that term was known in the field to represent video standard detector circuitry 4: holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a statutory argument that Shepard and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) should be applied to a district court\u2019s categorization of a particular prior conviction for purposes of \u00a7 4B1.1 (i.e., whether the conviction was a drug offense, a crime of violence, and not related to the other conviction), or how the district court should arrive at that categorization when sentencing under an advisory guidelines system. Thus, he has waived that argument. See United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1299 n. 1 (11th Cir.2005) (declining to address the Booker implications of firearm and role enhancements because appellant did not challenge those enhancements in his initial brief); see also Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. 1 . Compare United States v. Spell, Holdings: 0: holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned 1: holding that issues not clearly raised in initial briefs are considered abandoned 2: holding that issues not raised in an initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned 3: holding that issues not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned 4: recognizing that we lack jurisdiction to consider issues not raised in the parties briefs", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "331 U.S. at 376. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on two theories in concluding that Kendall\u2019s opinion was a clear and present danger to the fairness of the Ford case. Neither passes muster. According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Kendall\u2019s opinion was punishable because it \u201ccalled the very integrity of [its mandamus] decision into question\u201d by \u201cblatantly accusing], without proof, the Justices ... of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts.\u201d Yet Kendall\u2019s criticism of the decision to issue mandamus \u2014 even if it unfairly impugned the Justices\u2019 motives \u2014 is simply not enough. His after-the-fact critique \u201ccould not affect [the Justices\u2019] ability to [fairly] decide\u201d how to rule on the petition for a writ of mandamus. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 348 (<HOLDING>). And the Virgin Islands Supreme Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that criticism of judicial action already taken even though the cases were still pending on other points or might be revived by rehearings was not enough to satisfy the clearandpresentdanger standard 1: holding the dismissed defendant was not precluded from obtaining its reasonable attorney fees under 1317201 even though the action was still pending against another defendant 2: holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met 3: holding that a remand should be limited to cases in which further action must be taken by the district court or in which the appellate court has no way open to it to affirm or reverse the district courts action under review 4: holding that reinstatement is prospective even though it contemplated changing the result of an action  already taken", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "statute provides that Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee.... 18' U.S.C. \u00a7 1964. The plain language of this statute allows plaintiffs who successfully bring suit under RICO to recover costs and attorney\u2019s fees. It does not, however, provide a remedy for defendants who successfully defend against a RICO suit. Although Hunt argues that case law compels us to find in his favor, the two cases he cites have nothing to do with a defendant receiving costs or fees under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c). See Brandt v. Schal Assocs., 960 F.2d 640 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, 108 F.3d 205 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that a prevailing rico defendant may receive attorneys fees under federal rule of civil procedure 54d 1: holding that a court may award attorneys fees in a successful lmrda action 2: holding that california rule modeled almost word for word on rule 11 of the federal rules of civil procedure does not allow a pro se attorney litigant to recover sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys fees 3: holding that successful rico defendants may receive attorneys fees under federal rule of civil procedure 11 4: holding federal rule of civil procedure 11 motion in abeyance pending resolution of a bankruptcy proceeding", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by this entry that Delgado would return to work after twelve additional months of leave and that AstraZeneca should have understood as much by reading between the lines, Delgado has not told us whether S\u00e1nchez submitted any supporting medical documentation when he faxed the form to AstraZeneca\u2014let alone that any such documentation supported what Delgado views as S\u00e1nchez\u2019s implicit assertion that she would have been able to return to work after twelve more months of leave. This barren record strikes us as a rather meager attempt, in the circumstances of this case, to demonstrate that the requested accommodation would have been effective. Nonetheless, given our obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Helgado, we assume that she ha 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 Holdings: 0: holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation 1: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation 2: holding that request for additional leave after employee had already received nine months of leave was unreasonableaccommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months 3: holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months 4: holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "about a rival anthropologist, are not reasonably interpreted as factual. 9. Made \u201cSome Threat Against the Faculty\u201d {37} The evidence Plaintiff cites for this alleged defamatory statement is Bernstein\u2019s statement that \u201cI believe there was something in there where [Plaintiff] had finished his dissertation or was writing his dissertation and there was some disagreement between he [sic] and his faculty members and there was some threat against the faculty[.]\u201d This may be susceptible to a defamatory meaning, but we hold that it is too vague to be actionable. The nature of the \u201cthreat\u201d is unclear and could refer to a threat of violence, a lawsuit, or any other action. As is noted above, such a vague statement is not actionable as defamation. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618 (<HOLDING>). {38} Even if actionable, there is Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision 1: holding that defendant could not be liable for distributing defamatory statements unless it knew or had reason to know of statements 2: holding that plaintiffs did not plead fraud where the complaint only alleged a breach of fiduciary duty 3: holding statements regarding plaintiffs unsatisfactory job performance not defamatory per se 4: holding that statements at issue were protected expressions of opinion because they lacked specificity and precision and the factual implications concerning such statements were unclear", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "factor seven, the relative bargaining power of the parties, weighs against a finding that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily made the waiver. An absence of evidence of equal bargaining power does not meet Bank of America\u2019s burden to produce prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. In short, in the record before us, Bank of America produced no evidence showing that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily waived their constitutional right to trial by a jury. No evidence exists that Martin and Powell\u2019s waiver of their constitutional right to trial by a jury was an \u201cintelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences\u201d as required by In re Prudential. 148 S.W.3d at 132; RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F.Supp.2d at 814 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Bank of America failed to meet Holdings: 0: holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary 1: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 2: holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act 3: holding under similar facts as a matter of law that a knowing and voluntary waiver of powells right to a jury trial has not been demonstrated 4: holding waiver of right to counsel not voluntary and knowing when defendant terminated counsel and requested another attorney but the trial court would allow delay and appointment only upon waiver of speedy trial right", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not against the public policy of North Dakota. [\u00b6 8] \u201cComity is a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state ... not as a rule of law, but rather out of deference or respect.\u201d Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of County Com\u2019rs of Broward County, 37 P.3d 1093,1098 (Utah 2001). Courts apply comity \u201c.to foster cooperation, promote harmony, and build good will.\u201d Id. This Court has stated comity is \u201ca willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.\u201d Dow v. Lillie, 26 N.D. 512, 529, 144 N.W. 1082, 1088 (1914). A primary concern is whether the forum state\u2019s public policies will be compromised if comity is applied. Idr, Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 129 Ill.2d 372, 135 Ill.Dec. 787, 544 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The United States Supreme Court has held a Holdings: 0: holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana 1: holding comity was appropriate when the forum state could not be sued under its laws in similar circumstances and application of a sister states law was consistent with illinois policies 2: holding that the united states was a statutory loaning employer under illinois law 3: holding that in the event that parties are from different states and the subject matter is national in scope and where the contract states it shall be deemed to be made under the laws of the state of new york and for all purposes construed in accordance with laws of said state new york law applies as the parties choice of law 4: holding that in interpreting a contract we look to the conflict of laws rules of  the forum state  to determine which states laws will be controlling", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from the defendant\u2019s wife regarding a previous felony conviction for attempted sexual battery which made it clear that the defendant not only attempted, but actually completed the crime of sexual battery on the wife\u2019s daughter. See id. at 406-07. On appeal, Anderson asserted that \u201csince he pled to attempted sexual battery, it was error to permit [the wife] ... to describe the details of a completed crime.\u201d Id. at 407. We denied Anderson\u2019s claim holding that \u201c[wjhether a crime constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding circumstances of the prior crime,\u201d and, therefore, \u201cthe trial court did not err in permitting the State to present evidence regarding the details of the attempted sexual batteries.\u201d Id.; see also Morgan v. State, 415 So.2d 6,12 (Fla.1982) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[I]t is appropriate in the penalty phase of Holdings: 0: holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill 1: holding that although premeditation is outside the heartland of seconddegree murder guideline upward departure from seconddegree murder guideline based on premeditation was improper because commission considered the defendants state of mind in assigning a higher base offense level to firstdegree murder than to seconddegree murder 2: holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder 3: holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder 4: holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "relation to interstate commerce.\u201d In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a federal offense knowingly to possess a firearm in a school zone, was an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority because \u201c[t]he act neither regulates a com mercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.\u201d Id. at 551, 115 S.Ct. at 1626. The Court highlighted that the Act contained \u201cno express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or affect on interstate commerce.\u201d Id. at 562, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (<HOLDING>). In United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, Holdings: 0: holding  13981 constitutional under the commerce clause 1: holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that 42 usc  13981 exceeds congresss authority under the commerce clause 3: holding that enactment of the civil remedy provision of the violence against women act of 1994 42 usc  13981 exceeded congresss power under the commerce clause noting that  13981 contained no jurisdictional element 4: holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "type of illegal action that can reasonably be read to preclude coverage. Cf. Lennon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 504 F.3d 617, 621 (6th Cir.2007) (using tort law to inform question of whether a crash caused by drunk driving was an \u201caccident\u201d). Under the majority rule of modern tort law, neither driving without insurance nor driving without a license is by itself even negligent. Fed.R.Evid. 411 (\u201cEvidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.\u201d); Miss. R. Evid. 411 (same); Waugh v. Suburban Club Ginger Ale Co., 167 F.2d 758, 759 (D.C.Cir.1948) (lack of a D.G. driver\u2019s license is not relevant to question of negligence); Myrick v. Holifield, 240 Miss. 106, 126 So.2d 508, 511 (1961) (<HOLDING>); R.P. Davis, Lack of Proper Automobile Holdings: 0: holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant 1: holding that this lack of any reasonable expectation of continued employment suffices to establish the lack of property in the constitutional sense and hence the lack of a viable due process claim 2: holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act 3: holding that the lack of a drivers license is totally irrelevant to the issue of negligence 4: holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "than life\u201d where no other sentence-enhancing facts exist). As discussed above, the district court judge operated under the assumption that this statutory provision applied when he informed Lucas of the potential term of imprisonment. Lucas, however, admitted responsibility for only one ounce, or 28 grams, of crack cocaine. To be consistent with Apprendi, his term of imprisonment based on that quantity of the drug would range between 5 and 40 years. 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(b)(1)(B) (providing that a violation of \u00a7 841(a)(1) involving five grams or more of a mixture than contains cocaine base requires \u201ca term of imprisonment which may not be less than 5 years and not more than 40 years\u201d where no other sentence-enhancing facts exist); United States v. Harper, 246 F.3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Applying these principles to the present Holdings: 0: holding that where the indictment charged drug quantity but drug quantity was not submitted to the jury the district court erred in using drug quantity to increase the penalty beyond the twentyyear maximum of  841b1c 1: holding that apprendi is not implicated where the defendant has stipulated to the amount of drugs for which he was held responsible and the district court did not rely on any fact outside of the plea agreement to determine drug quantity at sentencing 2: holding apprendi does not require proof of knowledge as to type or quantity of drugs 3: holding that apprendi has not affected the district courts authority to determine facts for sentencing at or below the statutory maximum 4: holding harmless any error in district courts drug quantity determination where undisputed quantity of drugs was enough to place defendant at the base offense level calculated by the district court", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "police department. See Cottrell, 42 Fed.Cl. at 148 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 770, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)); Moore v. Public Defenders Office, 76 Fed.Cl. 617, 620 (2007) (explaining the court has no jurisdiction over \u201clocal, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies\u201d). This court may only consider claims properly brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491(a)(1). Fourth, the alleged incident appears to have occurred at least fifteen years ago. See Hicks I, 2011 WL 3319563, at *1. As such, the tort claims are untimely because they fall well outside this court\u2019s general six-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2501; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this court has no authority to Holdings: 0: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional 1: holding sixyear statute of limitations applies to adea actions involving federal employees 2: holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional 3: holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel 4: recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "court has jurisdiction to review an IJ\u2019s decision to deny an alien\u2019s application for voluntary departure. See IIRIRA \u00a7 309(c)(4)(E) (providing that for those cases in which a final order of deportation has entered more than 30 days from the date of IIRIRA\u2019S enactment (i.e. after October 30, 1996), notwithstanding other provisions of the INA in effect as of the date of enactment of IIRIRA to the contrary, \"there shall be no appeal of any discretionary decision under section ... 244-\u2019\u2019). Because a final order of deportation, subject to Kamara\u2019s motion to reopen, was entered on October 27, 1997 \u2014 well after the October 30, 1996 triggering date imposed by the transitional rules \u2014 Kamara\u2019s case is covered by section 309(c)(4)(E). Compare Skutnik v. INS, 128 F.3d 512, 513-14 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); and Meguenine v. INS, 139 F.3d 25, 26 (1st Holdings: 0: recognizing detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process 1: holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional 2: holding that a deportation proceeding commenced after an order to show cause issued 3: holding that so long as the petitioner is subject to a final order of deportation an alien is deemed to be in custody1 for purposes of the ina 4: holding that under section 309c4e the court lacked jurisdiction to review denial of suspension of deportation under section 244 of the ina 8 usc  1254 1996 where final order of deportation was issued on february 27 1997", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3161(h)(1)(D). The government\u2019s interpretation of Bloate\u2019s waiver \u2014 \u201ca motion for leave to waive his right to file pretrial motions\u201d\u2014 has several faults. First, Bloate\u2019s \u201cWaiver of Pretrial Motions\u201d does not appear to be a motion. It states that \u201cthere are no issues he wishes to raise by way of pretrial motions,\u201d and that he agrees, after discussion with his attorney, \u201cnot to raise any issues by way of pretrial motion.\u201d Cf. United States v. Bonilla-Filomeno, 579 F.3d 852, 856-57 (8th Cir.2009) (\u201cmotion to set a specific trial date\u201d is a pretrial motion); United States v. Rojo-Alvarez, 944 F.2d 959, 966 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Second, the district court treated the waiver Holdings: 0: holding that the district court may determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact on summary judgment based on the papers submitted on the motion and such other papers as may be on file and specifically referred to and facts therein set forth in the motion papers 1: holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision 2: holding that when the court is presented with papers styled as a motion whether it ultimately determines that the filing is a pretrial motion or an other proceeding under current  3161h1h  the court is entitled to exclude at least the period of time during which it considers how to treat the filing 3: holding that because the finality of judgment is effectively postponed by the timely filing of a motion under rule 59 the deadline for filing a motion for attorneys fees is tolled until the postjudgment motion is resolved 4: holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "be unmoved by anything the defendant might say during the allocution). In keeping with the importance of this rule, if a sentencing court fails to provide a defendant with the chance to address the court, the reviewing court must remand the case for resentencing, generally without needing to inquire into prejudice. See De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 130. To satisfy the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(C), we encourage the sentencing court to address the defendant personally, see Green, 365 U.S. at 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, and allow the defendant to speak on all topics which the defendant considers relevant. See De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 129. The sentencing judge must be explicit when informing the defendant of her right to allocute. See United States v. Edgecomb, 910 F.2d 1309, 1315 (6th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Navarro-Flores, 628 Holdings: 0: holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error 1: holding it insufficient when the sentencing judge only questioned defendant on certain aspects of the presentence report 2: holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report 3: holding defendants failure to object to the drug quantity assessment in the presentence report at sentencing was a waiver of the issue on appeal 4: holding that sentencing court may not adopt facts from codefendants presentence report that was not disclosed to defendant", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "U.S. Const. amend. II. In Heller, the Court determined that \u201cthe Second Amendment conferred an individu al right to keep and bear arms.\u201d 128 S.Ct. at 2799. The holding in Heller is very limited, however, and the Court did not address whether (1) the Second Amendment applies to the states; (2) the individual right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right; or (3) strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard of review. In assessing the validity of appellant\u2019s claim, we must first address the reach of the Second Amendment. \u201cIt is settled law ... that the Second Amendment applies only to limitations the federal government seeks to impose on this right.\u201d Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58 (2nd Cir.2009). See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai\u2019i 143, 920 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the second amendment fully applies to state and local regulation through the fourteenth amendment 1: holding that the limitation of  1367b applies only to plaintiffs efforts to join nondiverse parties 2: holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant 3: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 4: holding that the second amendment imposes a limitation on only federal not state legislative efforts", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "lawyers bring a lawsuit expecting settlement merely because the cost of settling is cheaper than actually disputing the allegations and proceeding with discovery. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing one purpose of PSLRA as deterring strike suits). (Indeed, by \u201cbottom-line\u201d order issued last week, the Court partially denied defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss the complaint. See Order dated February 14, 2012.) Additionally, the Retirement System\u2019s claim as a common shareholder of Lockheed Martin is not subject to any unique defenses that would make it an atypical or inadequate lead plaintiff or not otherwise satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. See \u00a7 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc), (II)(bb); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, 268 F.R.D. 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>); PI. Br. at 3-4 (asserting Retirement System Holdings: 0: holding that proposed settlement class in asbestos personal injury action did not satisfy federal rule of civil procedure 23 adequacy of representation typicality or predominance requirements where exposureonly futures claimants were not adequately represented and where multiple defendants and widely divergent claims would pose an obstacle to trial 1: holding that plaintiff need only plead damages in rico cases sufficient to meet rule 8s requirements 2: holding that even if a defendant in a proposed class action does not seriously contest whether the rule 23 requirements have been met a court nevertheless has the responsibility of conducting its own inquiry as to whether the requirements of rule 23 have been satisfied in a particular case 3: holding plaintiff seeking lead plaintiff status need only make preliminary showing that it will satisfy the typicality and adequacy requirements of rule 23 4: holding that where it is clear from the allegations on the face of the complaint that the party seeking class certification could prove no set of facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of both civ r 23 a and civ r 23 b the trial court may deny a motion to certify made pursuant to civ r 23 c without first granting the movant an evidentiary hearing pursuant to civ r 23 c 1", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bass, 418 F.3d at 872 (citing Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 278 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir.2002)). Despite her assertion to the contrary, Owens did not present any direct evidence of discrimination. \u201cDirect evidence for these purposes includes evidence of \u2018remarks of the employer that reflect a discriminatory attitude,\u2019 as well as \u2018comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the decisional process or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment decisions.\u2019 \u201d Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health Servs., 528 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.2002)); accord Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 Holdings: 0: holding that  direct evidence is evidence showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action  1: holding that the relevant issue is whether the evidence could support a reasonable factfinders conclusion that a discriminatory animus served as the basis for the employers decision 2: holding that if a reasonable fact finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record then the finding is supported by substantial evidence 3: holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus 4: holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "ICP. Finally, the course of dealings of the parties to the Contribution and Assumption Agreement could also allow a reasonable jury to find Pillsbury did not intend to assign the present cause of action to ICP. Shortly after Pillsbury entered into the Contribution and Assumption Agreement it gave notice to Wells that it assigned all its interest in the production contract between them to ICP. Pillsbury also gave this notice to Nestl\u00e9, the other party to the agreement, and to ICP, the entity created by the agreement. In that notice Pillsbury stated it was not assigning \u201cany claims, rights or remedies of Pillsbury relating in any way to the explosion that occurred at the Wells facility in Le Mars, Iowa in March 1999.\u201d See Miller v. Geerlings, 256 Iowa 569, 579, 128 N.W.2d 207, 213 (1964) (<HOLDING>); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties 1: holding the court will adopt the practical construction placed upon a contract by the parties 2: recognizing that the constitutional right to appeal must be given a practical construction 3: recognizing that when an interpretation upholding the constitutionality of a statute is available to this court it must adopt that construction 4: holding a case becomes moot when a ruling will have no practical effect upon the existing controversy", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "under Texas law, ought to be allowed to do so. See, e.g., id. at 277 (\u201c[I]n cases in which injury occurs often enough before trial that jurors can make a reasonable estimate of the long-term impact of the nuisance on the market value of a property, they ought to be allowed to do so.\u201d). The consequences of the trespass should have been reflected in the market value of the property when plaintiff acquired it. After reviewing the record, the court finds that the trespass was permanent. Thus, the injury occurred in July 1998, before plaintiff owned the property. As the subsequent landowner, plaintiff lacks standing to sue for injuries that occurred before his ownership \u2014 the previous owner was the party who was actually harmed by the prior injury. See, e.g., Denman, 2005 WL 2316177, at *4 (<HOLDING>). Defendant argues that plaintiffs injunctive Holdings: 0: holding that driver was not bound in subsequent personal injury case by prior arbitration decision that plaintiffs injuries were related to auto accident because driver was not in privity with his insurance carrier and did not participate in arbitration 1: holding arbitration decision disallowing insurers coverage defense binding in subsequent personal injury action where the issue was actually litigated and decided in prior action 2: holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties 3: holding that a subsequent landowner lacks standing for injuries before his or her ownership because the prior owner was the party who was actually harmed by the prior injury 4: holding that a civil claim is barred by collateral estoppel even though the prior adjudication was in criminal proceedings and the parties are not the same because the matters were actually litigated and decided in the prior trial", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and successive petitions under \u00a7 2254, as well as of the evolution of habeas law prior to' passage of the AEDPA, we answer this question in the affirmative. Our sister circuits have held that the denial of a first \u00a7 2254 petition for procedural default, which default is not overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice, \u201cmust be regarded as a determination on the merits in examining whether a subsequent petition is successive.\u201d Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.1994); accord Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 546-47 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bates); Howard v. Lems, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (9th Cir.1990) (dismissal for procedural default, unlike dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies, is a disposition on the merits); cf. Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Although these decisions predate the AEDPA Holdings: 0: holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice 1: recognizing that proof of extreme delay establishes prejudice 2: holding that a district court may review successive or abusive claims but only if petitioner establishes cause and prejudice 3: holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive  2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court 4: holding that district court has no jurisdiction to decide unauthorized second or successive  2255 claims", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Wainwright v. Norris, No. 94-3525 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 1997) (order denying motion to recall mandate). We see nothing in the Board\u2019s ruling foreclosing consideration of the merits of Wainwright\u2019s request for mercy now, when the request is truly Wainwright\u2019s last chance. In the second action, Wainwright asserts his equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because the Governor of Arkansas and his executive clemency assistant have actual conflicts of interest. Wainwright also asserts he was denied his due proces k.) (rejecting civil rights claim that clemency decision by biased Governor violates due process or equal protection), aff'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Joubert v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 87 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 Holdings: 0: holding no procedural or fundamental constitutional right creates a protected interest in standardless clemency statute absent a constitutionally protected interest clemency statute only provides a statecreated right to ask for mercy 1: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 2: holding there is no constitutionally protected interest in how the nebraska board of pardons receives a clemency request or in having unbiased decisionmakers on the board right to consideration of clemency not violated when decisionmaker is predisposed 3: holding that the board as constituted on the date that the original complaint was filed is the board for purposes of evaluating whether demand is required or excused 4: holding the issue of use can be necessary to the adjudication by the board of adjustment of the underlying request for a variance when the issue is raised in the context of an issue the board of adjustment is required to decide", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a line for the employee\u2019s signature, a clear disclaimer that the handbook was not intended to form a separate contract as well as a statement that \u201call of the provisions of the handbook ... are only guidelines.\u201d Id. at 53. Massachusetts courts have so recognized the legal effect of employee manuals. See O\u2019Brien v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 422 Mass. 686, 693, 664 N.E.2d 843 (\u201cOf course, the provisions of a personnel manual on analysis may grant no rights. [Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988) ] noted that, if the manual states that it provides only guidance as to the employer\u2019s policies ..., it may not create any enforceable rights.\u201d); cf. Ferguson v. Host Int\u2019l, Inc., 53 Mass.App.Ct. 96, 103, 757 N.E.2d 267 (2001) (<HOLDING>). The Court thus rules that the personnel Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants stipulation to the facts establishing guilt was the functional equivalent of guilty plea 1: holding inconspicuous written disclaimer to be unenforceable absent actual knowledge of the disclaimer 2: holding that where the disclaimer provisions in the employee manual properly could be viewed by the fact finder as the functional equivalent of fine print they did not pre vent the formation of a contract 3: holding that a change in the method of compensation met the consideration requirement of contract formation 4: holding an employee manual did not create contract restricting the employmentatwill relationship", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of service, or disability not compensated under the workers\u2019 compensation law. The remaining subsections of \u00a7 48-628 outline other behaviors or scenarios 2d 804 (Del. Super. 1982); Stafford v. Welltech, 867 P.2d 484 (Okla. App. 1993). The rationale in the cases for permitting recovery under both acts is that the statutory language does not prohibit a dual recovery and is further based upon the beneficent objectives of both workers\u2019 compensation and employment security legislation. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra; Neuberger, supra; Mendez, supra; Stafford, supra. As noted by the defendants, other states deny or reduce unemployment benefits by the amount of workers\u2019 compensation the claimant receives or vice versa. See, e.g., Cuellar v. Northland Steel, 226 Mont. 428, 736 P.2d 130 (1987) (<HOLDING>); St. Pierre v. Fulflex, Inc., 493 A.2d 817 Holdings: 0: holding that in absence of statute prohibiting recovery claimant may receive workers compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously 1: holding that district court had discretion to decline to offset severance and unemployment payments from damages award 2: holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period 3: holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments 4: holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201cat its peril.\u201d Gregory, 705 F.2d at 1123. The Board argues that even though it received this official notice, it could not determine the Joyes\u2019 actual tax liability until after October 15, 2001 because California\u2019s income tax system relies on taxpayers to assess how much they owe and inform the Board of that amount through a tax return. But this does not change the fact that the Board received actual notice of the Joyes\u2019 bankruptcy petition, which had scheduled the Board as a priority creditor for an estimated $10,000. Although this estimate was below the actual amount owed, the estimate certainly put the Board on notice that it may be entitled to some amount of payment from the Joyes\u2019 Chapter 13 estate. Cf. In re Coastal Alaska Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); In re Kragness, 82 B.R. 553, 555 Holdings: 0: holding that the operative fact is whether or not the creditor has notice of the debtors bankruptcy proceeding in time to file a timely proof of claim 1: recognizing that when a creditor does not receive adequate notice the creditor is not bound by the confirmation order 2: holding that despite a lack of any formal notice tulsa requirement was satisfied by a showing that because the creditor was also the executor of the estate the creditor had actual notice of the pendency of the estate proceedings 3: holding that an unscheduled creditor had constitutionally adequate notice of the bankruptcy proceedings because it had sufficient information to evaluate whether to participate in the case and protect its interests 4: holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the D.C. Circuit has explained that because the FTCA waives sovereign immunity only as to claims where the government would be liable under local law, and because that waiver is \"coextensive with the district court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case,\u201d the government\u2019s \"arguments against [a plaintiff\u2019s] proposed local analogs\u201d actually go to the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Hornbeck, 569 F.3d at 512; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (governing motions to dismiss for \"lack of subject-matter jurisdiction\u201d). 12 . Defendant also argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Lewis\u2019s claims pursuant to the Feres doctrine. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (<HOLDING>). Although the Court has serious doubts about Holdings: 0: holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment 1: holding that where the claimants were servicemen injured or killed while on active duty due to the negligence of others in the armed forces they could not seek recovery under the ftca for injuries sustained that arose out of or were incident to their military service 2: holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract 3: holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service 4: holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "she had just awakened and was \u201cwrapped in a blanket,\u201d that the encounter lasted approximately seven minutes, and that she believed she had no choice but to consent. Id. at 19-20. Although we emphasize that our ruling is based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, we will briefly discuss each o elate to Ms. Sugura\u2019s refusal to consent to the search, but only to her statements that Mr. Miles was not in the apartment. The officers never threatened to punish Ms. Sugura for refusing to consent, they merely advised her that harboring a fugitive was itself a crime, for which she could be arrested. Accordingly, the cases in which courts have found an officer\u2019s threats to negate consent are inapposite. See, e.g., United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 559-60 (7th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37, 39 Holdings: 0: holding consent not voluntary where police threatened to arrest defendants girlfriend if he refused to sign consent form 1: holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent 2: holding consent invalid where defendant threatened by officer that everyone in the house would go to jail if he did not sign consent form 3: holding consent invalid where defendant signed consent form while undergoing custodial interrogation and only after he had been impliedly threatened that his girlfriend would be arrested if he did not sign 4: holding defendants girlfriend had authority to consent to search as a joint occupant", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the liquidation proceeding, even if that claim \"may be contingent!.]\" NJ.S.A. I7:30C-28(b). Furthermore, those third-party claims may be allowed if, among other requirements, it may be \"reasonably inferred\" from the proofs that the person \"would be able to obtain a judgment upon such cause of action!.]\u201d Ibid. Unlike the requirement in subsection (a) that claims be \"absolute,\u201d the Legislature adopted a different standard, designed to cover non-final, contingent third-party claims, where it so intended. 3 This conclusion is shared by those states that similarly restrict participation in the assets of liquidated insolvent insurers to liquidated claims, as well as by commentators in this field. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Mission Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.4th 458, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 113 (1996) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of the Liquidation of Am. Mut. Holdings: 0: recognizing that claims against a state under  1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment 1: holding that ibnr claims are barred by statute forbidding payment from insolvent insurers estate of claims founded upon unliquidated or undetermined demands 2: holding that the industrial commission only had subject matter jurisdiction over claims under the payment of wages statute and not contract claims 3: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 4: holding only that the statute does not require insurers to disclose payment logs", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "serves an important state interest. King, 119 N.H. at 221. To that end, \u201c[s]everal statutes demonstrate a legislative intention that counsel fees and expenses of a State official who defends a State interest must be paid by the State.\u201d Id. at 221-22. The principle in King is inapplicable here. In King, the court found statutory support for a legislative intention to award attorney\u2019s fees to a state executive who withstood removal attempts by the executive branch, whereas in the present case, there is no statutory support for a legislative intention to award such fees to a state judge who withstands impeachment by the legislature. Cf. id. Additionally, in contrast to King, there is no evidence in this case of other legislative action indicating such an intention. Cf. id. at 220-21 (<HOLDING>). In this context, we cannot find a legislative Holdings: 0: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 1: holding that no reason existed to create a uniform national rule in admiralty where the case concerned attorneys fees and whether the contractual provision which provided for attorneys fees should allow a party to recover attorneys fees where it succeeded on all but one minor issue 2: holding that tcprc section 380018 authorizing recovery of attorneys fees against individual or corporation does not provide for award of attorneys fees against limited partnership 3: recognizing legislative bill authorizing appropriation for substantial portion of petitioners attorneys fees 4: holding motion for attorneys fees was necessary predicate", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.\u201d Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998). The standards that apply to dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) apply to dismissal under \u00a7 1915A(b)(l). See, e.g., Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.1997) (addressing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(e)(2)(B)). That is, although the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, there \u201cmust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,\u201d and the complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim that is \u201cplausible on its face.\u201d Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Watts v. Florida Int\u2019l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). \u201cIn order to prevail on a civil rights action Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal pursuant to rule 12b6 is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to articulate enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face 1: holding that a complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face 2: holding that a complaint must contain only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face 3: holding that a complaint must plead enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a plausible claim 4: holding that a complaint is sufficient if it identifies facts that are suggestive enough to render the necessary elements plausible", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the government's brief pointed to only three indicia of suspicion, namely Foreman: (1) was stopped \u201con Route 13, a known drug corridor''; (2) made a \u201cvery brief trip to New York, a source city for drugs\"; and (3) \u201cavoided eye contact\u201d and \"exhibited signs of extreme nervousness.\u201d J.A. 24 (Resp. Mot. Suppress at 5). 8 . \"Several\u201d is defined, as \"[bjeing of a number more than two or three but not many\u201d or \"[a]n indefinite but small number; some or a few.\u201d American Heri th Cir.2003) (\"There is no reason why [the officer] should have reasonably suspected that [the suspect's] nervousness was tied to anything other than the fact that he was being momentarily detained by an authority figure with police power over him.\u201d); United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 338-39, 342 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The majority characterizes my reliance Holdings: 0: holding defendants nervousness in part presented officer with reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity 1: holding nervousness is of limited significance in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists 2: holding that inconsistent answers about ownership of the vehicle and travel itinerary were not enough to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was trafficking in drugs 3: holding that extreme nervousness potentially inconsistent stories and other suspicious answers did not amount to a reasonable or articulable suspicion 4: holding that reasonable suspicion existed based on defendants nervousness expired drivers license and suspicious story regarding travel plans", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Mason, 2004 WL 3242339 at **5-7 (concluding that a plaintiffs failure to submit evidence from a medical professional demonstrating that she was unable to work made it impossible for the plaintiff to factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition and, therefore, a prima facie case of FMLA interference); Niese v. Gen. Elec. Appliances, 2001 WL 290382 at *7 (S.D.Ind.2001) (\u201cA release to work without restrictions is not consistent with a request for FMLA leave due to the employee\u2019s serious health condition that makes her unable to perform her job.\u201d). As a result, because Matthys can not factually establish that she suffered from a serious health condition, Matthys can also not legally establish a prima facie claim of FMLA interference. See Darst, 512 F.3d at 910-12 (<HOLDING>); Murphy v. N. Am. Lighting, 540 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that there was no sustainable fmla interference claim wherein a plaintiff could not establish that her daughter suffered from a serious health condition as defined by the regulations 1: holding the district court did not err in denying the defendants rule 60b3 motion where the defendant had an opportunity to cure any prejudice because the plaintiffs failure to disclose evidence did not interfere with the defendants ability to proceed 2: holding that a plaintiffs failure to submit evidence of continuing treatment by a health care provider as defined by the regulations was fatal to a plaintiffs fmla interference claim regardless of the defendants alleged failure to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to cure medical certification deficiencies 3: recognizing that a lack of funds may justify a failure to receive medical care however a plaintiffs case is buttressed by evidence he related an inability to afford prescriptions to his provider and was denied the prescription 4: holding that a plaintiffs failure to obtain evidence of continuing treatment an element of a serious health condition was fatal to a plaintiffs fmla interference claim regardless of the plaintiffs allegations that the defendant failed to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to cure medical certification deficiencies in so ruling the 7th circuit denied the plaintiffs estoppel arguments and instead placed an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to establish a serious health condition as defined by the regulations in order to overcome a summary judgment motion on an fmla interference claim", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(plurality op.). Notably, both forms of analysis derived from social science literature, as did the definition of \u201cracially polarized\u201d voting adopted by the Court. Id. at 53, 106 S.Ct. 2752 nn.20-21. Outside of the voting context, the Supreme Court has embraced new social science theories and empirical analyses to resolve a variety of constitutional and statutory disputes. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82, 889-92, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (2007) (appealing to \u201cthe theoretical literature\u201d and a variety of economic analyses to support its decision to reverse century-old precedent treating vertical price restraints as a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 465, 122 S.Ct. 2191, 153 L.Ed.2d 453 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855, 857, Holdings: 0: holding that census bureaus use of hotdeck imputation to conduct decennial census did not violate census statute or the constitution relying on the technical literature to determine whether hotdeck imputation constitutes sampling 1: holding that the fact that parallel proceedings force a defendant to make a difficult choice as to whether to testify does not of itself violate the constitution 2: holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution 3: holding that central assessment by the unit method of valuation did not violate the equal protection clause of the united states constitution or the uniform operation of laws provision in the utah constitution 4: holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "hearsay rule. In resolving this issue, we initially observe that a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse only when the trial court has abused its discretion. Jones v. State, 800 N.E.2d 624, 626-27 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). An abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court\u2019s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 627. Although Davis contends on appeal that the police report should have been excluded because it was not properly authenticated, we note that Davis objected to the admission of the report at trial only on the grounds that the report constituted hearsay. As a result, Davis has waived this argument. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind.2000) (<HOLDING>). In addressing Davis\u2019s claim that the police Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal 1: holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review 2: recognizing that a defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on appeal 3: holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal 4: holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "opposed was in fact a violation of [the DCHRA]\u201d). Rather, Plaintiff must merely allege, as she does here, that she complained about the sexually degrading nature of the uniforms, i.e. a protected activity, and was terminated in retaliation. See Am. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 15-16. And, in order to complain that the uniforms were sexually degrading, she need not demonstrate that they were unsafe, of poor quality, and inconsistent with generally accepted hotel industry standards. As a result, CBA Article 8.1 would have no impact on Plaintiffs retaliation claim, and is thus irrelevant to the Court\u2019s preemption analysis. Moreover, it is clear that Plaintiffs right against retaliation is not created by the CBA, but is a state-created right under the DCHRA. See e.g., Lingle, 486 U.S. at 412, 108 S.Ct. 1877 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff alleges that she engaged in a Holdings: 0: recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant 1: holding that the statelaw protecting employees from retaliatory discharge was independent from the cba because the statelaw claim could be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself 2: holding that a wrongful discharge claim based on violation of a state public policy is not preempted because it is a nonnegotiable independent statelaw right 3: holding that if the state law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement the claim is independent for  301 preemption purposes 4: holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim under michigan law was not preempted because the statelaw tort of retaliatory discharge creates rights independent of those established by the collective bargaining agreement further holding that discrimination claim was not preempted even though the employer was likely to rely on provisions of the cba in its defense", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "YVMH argues that the regulation\u2019s anti-competitive effects render it hybrid. Third, YVMH asserts that the State delegated market authority to hospitals with CON licenses because they have the ability to perpetuate their local monopolies. These arguments are unpersuasive. First, a regulation that enables private actors to enjoy a monopoly is not necessarily a hybrid restraint. Although allowing only certain hospitals to perform elective PCI\u2019s might drive up cost by limiting supply and inhibiting competition, a regulation\u2019s anti-competitive effects are insufficient to render it hybrid. Those anti-competitive effects are not the result of private action or collaboration given the State seal of approval, but are contemplated by the State\u2019s licensing scheme. Cf. Costco, 522 F.3d at 890 (<HOLDING>). The cases YVMH cites for contrary authority Holdings: 0: holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal 1: holding contract for sale of water which did not specify price was unenforceable because price of water was essence of contract 2: holding that the market price is understood to mean the current market price being paid for gas at the well where it is produced 3: recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself 4: holding that a scheme that enabled price collusion among private actors was hybrid", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. BBC, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 1354, 1357 (S.D.Ohio 1983)). Here, Defendant contracted for employment with an Ohio corporation and performed duties on the corporation\u2019s behalf inside and outside of the state. The status of Defendant as an employee relates directly to the matters at issue in this case. A nexus exists between the business dealings of Defendant and Plaintiff that produced the Agreement and the continuing contractual obligations created by the Agreement. Moreover, Defendant\u2019s breach of the Agreement gives rise to the cause of action. The Sixth Circuit has held that \u201cif the cause of action is for breach of that contract [with an Ohio resident] ... then the cause of action naturally arises from the defendant\u2019s activities in Ohio.\u201d Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Defendant established a significant ongoing Holdings: 0: recognizing that the ohio longarm statute does not extend to the limits of due process and focusing the inquiry on whether defendant established sufficient business contacts with ohio 1: holding that north carolinas longarm statute extends to the limits of due process 2: holding that the defendants contacts with ohio were sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction where defendant consciously reached out from texas to ohio to subscribe to compuserve and sold his software over compuserves ohiobased system 3: holding personal jurisdiction did not exist over the londonbased international amateur athletic federation iaaf despite the fact that its member organization in the usa had minimum contacts with ohio where the plaintiffs contract claim did not arise out of iaafs contacts with ohio 4: holding that a maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over an ohio lawyer when a maryland client initiated five of seven contacts with the lawyer the parties created the attorneyclient relationship in ohio and the attorneyclient relationship involved only events in and the law of ohio", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "proceeding, Plaintiff received more than adequate process in this case. Plaintiff admitted then and admits now that he engaged in the relevant conduct regarding the Big Splash account. He merely contended that his actions were implicitly authorized by Miller\u2019s \u201coff the radar\u201d comments, and the Trustees were aware of this alleged authorization. During the executive session, Trustees heard from Plaintiff and Miller, the only two people privy to the alleged conversation during which Miller instructed Plaintiff to keep it \u201coff the radar.\u201d Under these circumstances, Plaintiff was not denied adequate procedural due process based on his inability to present and cross-examine witnesses. Cf. McClure v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16, Mayes Cnty., Okla., 228 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (explaining that presentation and Holdings: 0: holding that the state courts factfinding procedure was adequate even though it did not hold an evidentiary hearing because  hearing as used in  2254d does not require a trialtype hearing at which live testimony is presented and the accused has the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses 1: holding a due process claim failed because the plaintiff did not seek to require a witnessess attendance at a posttermination grievance hearing and was not inhibited or restricted from doing so 2: holding that plaintiff did not receive adequate process during posttermination hearing because she was not given opportunity to crossexamine witnesses accusing her of drinking on the job and coming to school inebriated 3: holding that doctor who was suspected of drinking on the job posed a direct threat although she had not injured any patients 4: holding that a nameclearing hearing for a terminated city attorney satisfied due process even though he was not allowed to crossexamine witnesses because he had ample opportunity to refute the charges against him", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "332, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1940); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896). 72 . 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1865(b)(2). 73 . Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 6 D.Me.1968) (rejecting attack on insufficient proof of discrimination and not lack of cognizability). 80 . See also United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 1209, 22 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969) prima facie case not established by evidence that while over 50% of eligible population had less than a high school diploma, only 33% were drawn for the petit jury venire and only 21.9% served on grand jury. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970) (<HOLDING>). 81 . See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof 1: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 2: holding that the father had to pay college costs because the agreement provided him no explicit veto over college selection 3: holding that proof that 836 of jury pools had high school diplomas while only 432 of population over 25 did and proof that 181 of pool had college degree as compared with 5 of the population gave rise to inference of discrimination 4: holding that removal from house arrest and return to general prison population was a matter of inmate classification", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to determine the defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel). Specifically, a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel if he has \"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding{[ ] and ... has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\" Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. 117 If a trial court finds that a defendant fails to meet this standard, then the defendant may not waive the right to counsel. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399, 118 S.Ct. 2680. If the defendant satisfies the Dusky competency standard, however, he may waive the right to counsel if his waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (<HOLDING>). 118 A \"voluntary\" waiver, like any voluntary Holdings: 0: holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so 1: holding that accused must competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel 2: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel 3: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 4: holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00b6 30; Adv. No. 03-09315, ECF Doc. #27, Exh. A. As this is the exact language of the clause in JLM that the Second Circuit held to be broad, the clauses in these four adversary proceedings should also be treated as broad form clauses. Therefore, under the Collins decision there is \u201ca presumption of arbitrability.\u201d Collins, 58 F.3d at 23. However, even with a broad form clause, if the claims present \u201cno questions in respect of the parties\u2019 rights and obligations under [the agreements],\u201d they are outside the purview of the arbitration clause and are not arbitrable. Id. B. Are the Preferential Transfer Claims Within the Scope of the Arbitration Agreement? In this Circuit, courts have exempted fraudulent transfer claims from arbitration because they are statutory claims belo (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). However, none of those decisions undermines Holdings: 0: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 1: recognizing district courts authority to dispose of contempt action for violation of automatic stay of bankruptcy 2: holding that a postdischarge claim for violation of the automatic stay was arbitrable because it would not necessarily jeopardize or inherently conflict with the bankruptcy code 3: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay 4: recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . The Feuerbachers joined Sand Canyon Corporation, FNF Lawyers Title of DFW, Inc., and Jill Clay as defendants in their First Amended Complaint before the district court. Any subsequent reference to \"the Appellees\u201d includes Sand Canyon Corporation, the only later-added defendant that remains a party in this suit. 2 . On appeal, the Feuerbachers only contest summary judgment with respect to their quiet title and breach of contract claims. 3 . That said, we panel recognize that it is unclear whether the Feuerbaehers can be judicially estopped from claiming that the lien on their homestead is void. Texas law on this point is not abundantly clear. Sea Hruska v. First State Bank of Deauville, 747 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. 1988) (<HOLDING>). Although a lien that is void (as the Holdings: 0: holding that the attorneys charging lien may be asserted and enforced in the civil action which gave rise to the lien claim or in an independent action 1: holding state courts authority under iowa code section 59821 not the lien created there under prevented debtor from claiming the iowa homestead exemption and therefore the debtor could not avoid the lien because the lien did not impair an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled but for the lien 2: holding that a lien cannot be estopped into existence where the borrowers promised to execute a lien in the manner mandated by the constitution and then failed to do so 3: holding that a property right that comes into existence by court action such as a judgment lien does not relate back to some earlier date to destroy the priority of a federal tax lien 4: holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Moffet, 233 Minn. 330, 332, 46 N.W.2d 792, 793 (1951). In some situations, the necessary part performance may be established by taking possession and making payment. Formanek v. Langton, 271 Minn. 59, 63-64, 134 N.W.2d 883, 886 (1965). The underlying principle is that, when one of the contracting parties has relied on an oral agreement to such an extent that it would be a fraud on the part of the other contracting party to void the agreement, equity will make that agreement an exception to the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Hecht v. Anthony, 204 Minn. 432, 435, 283 N.W. 753, 754 (1939). The mere act of taking possession of land, however, is insufficient to avoid application of the statute of frauds. Hatlestad v. Mut. Trust Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 640, 648, 268 N.W. 665, 669 (1936) (<HOLDING>). The purchaser must also make valuable Holdings: 0: holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession 1: recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession 2: holding that a lessors interest can only be subject to liens arising from improvements performed on the leased property if the lease required the improvements or if under judicial interpretation the improvements were the pith of the lease 3: holding that the doctrine of part performance ordinarily can be successfully invoked if the vendee took possession of the land and made valuable improvements but noting that mere possession is usually insufficient 4: holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "curative instructions during the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument. The law is clear that a party\u2019s failure to object to improper prosecutorial comments will preclude appellate review, unless the comments are so prejudicial as to constitute fundamental error. See Street v. State, 636 So.2d 1297 (Fla.1994), cert, denied, -U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); Fuller v. State, 540 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The control of prosecutorial comments to the jury is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. Absent a contemporaneous objection, Jones\u2019 attorney was required to demonstrate that the prosecutor\u2019s comments constituted fundamental error. See Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963, 972 (Fla.1993) (<HOLDING>); Pacifico v. State, 642 So.2d 1178, 1182 (Fla. Holdings: 0: recognizing exception to preservation rules for fundamental error that is highly prejudicial 1: holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error 2: holding that appellate review is precluded when the error is invited 3: holding that since prosecutorial comments did not constitute fundamental error absence of preservation of issue by defense counsel precluded appellate review 4: recognizing fundamental error as an exception to the general rule of preservation", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "judgment was entered on May 2, 1995. The court agreed with the chapter 7 trustee that \"the time for filing the [\u00a7 502(h) ] proof of claim was June 11, 1995, 30 days after May 12, 1995, the date that the judgment of May 2, 1995, became final.\u201d 211 B.R. at 194. 8 . H & H's brief actually concludes with a suggestion that finality as used in Rule 3002(c)(3) could refer to any of four separate dates. Doc. No. 40 at 4. That the Rules would contemplate, or that they should be construed to accommodate, such confusion is not plausible. 9 . H & H\u2019s brief asserts payment was made October 13. See Doc. No. 40 at 2. H & H\u2019s Objection previously asserted it was made October 12. See Doc. No. 37 at 1. 10 . Accord Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) Holdings: 0: holding defendants could not be guilty as parties when the state failed to show they knew the criminality of the conduct they assisted 1: holding deadlines may lead to unwelcome results but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality 2: holding that even though the government had not strictly complied with the statutory requirements the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because they failed to challenge that noncompliance in a prompt fashion 3: holding that a literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results 4: holding that a narrow interpretation of the word fraud in tolling statute would lead to absurd and unjust results", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "843; Roberts v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 803. In this case, the prosecutor's argument was improper in several ways. Further, we are persuaded that this misconduct placed Johnson in a position of grave peril, so that the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. The prosecutor stated that a defense attorney's job is to \"get his client off\" by bringing out \"insignificant facts\" and \"legal technicalities.\" Our courts, finding no grave peril, have held that such remarks do not always mandate a mistrial. Hubbard v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 176, 313 N.E.2d 346; Drossos v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 1. Nevertheless, such comments are irrelevant to the issues to be decided by the jury and should not be allowed. See Craig v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 359, 370 N.E.2d 880 (<HOLDING>). Further, the prosecutor asked the jury to Holdings: 0: holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement 1: holding prosecutors statement that he had duty to all society including accused while a correct statement of the law was unfair and highly improper 2: holding prosecutors statement that defendant and defense counsel were lying when they pleaded not guilty was improper 3: holding that the district courts improper admission of an unauthenticated registration statement was harmless because the proponent of the registration statement later properly authenticated the statement in a motion to reconsider 4: holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "construing \u201crelatively low\u201d to mean that further increases would \u201creduce the ion signal.\u201d Thus, the court will construe \u201crelatively low level\u201d and \u201crelatively low value\u201d to mean \u201cthe level or value of kinetic energy below the level at which the ion signal is reduced by further increases of the kinetic energy.\u201d This construction is consistent with the whereby clause in claims l(k) and 14(h) discussed next. 4. \u201cwhereby to provide improved transmission of ions through said inter-chamber orifice\u201d Micromass argues at length that the two \u201cwhereby clauses\u201d at the end of claims l(k) and 14, are claim limitations because they describe the \u201cnecessary result\u201d or \u201ccritical property\u201d of the claimed invention. See EX Indus., L.P. v. Culligan Water Techs., Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 461, 487-88 (D.Del. 1999) (<HOLDING>). This is in contrast to the general rule that Holdings: 0: holding that the recitation of a quantitative drop rod test rendered definite a claim limitation 1: holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous 2: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 3: holding that a whereby clause that was substantially amended to overcome prior art was sufficiently definite to constitute a claim limitation and did not simply announce the inventions result 4: holding that the current party was sufficiently identified with the parties to the prior litigation", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Code.\u201d Id. As the Court directed, we must determine \u201cwhether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the relevant statute as it stood prior to December 1, 1990, or whether her claims necessarily depend on a subsequent amendment.\u201d Id. at 384, 124 S.Ct. 1836. To answer that question, we return to the VRRA, which Congress passed in 1974. The VRRA provided veterans with certain rights and protections upon their return to the workforce, and it barred employment discrimination based on a reservist\u2019s military service. See Pub.L. No. 93-508, sec. 404, \u00a7 2021(a)(B), (b)(3), 88 Stat. 1578, 1595-96 (1974). The only remedy available under the VRRA was injunctive relief and recovery of lost wages and benefits. Id. sec. 404, \u00a7 2022. In 1994, Congress replaced the VRRA with USERRA \u201cto th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d 1000, 1003 Holdings: 0: holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award 1: holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 2: holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla 3: holding that actions seeking liquidated damages under a different statute are suits at common law for purposes of the seventh amendments right to a jury trial 4: holding that liquidated damages under userra are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "110, 113 (1993)). The Court essentially held that even though the action was termed a breach of contract, the action had elements of tort because the plaintiff had to prove that the construction was substandard or negligently performed. Therefore, it seems that there cannot be a blanket prohibition of the application of the collateral source rule to contract claims as the defendant suggests. Even if such a claim could be sustained, it is not clear that there is not an element of tort in Plaintiffs claim, despite its title as a \u201cBreach of Contract\u201d. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1). Violations of section 1220 or 658 generally sound in tort, and therefore, there is an element of a tort claim to Plaintiffs action. See Stokes v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. 06-1053, 2007 WL 1875847 (E.D.La. June 28, 2007)(<HOLDING>)(citing Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 694 Holdings: 0: holding that section 1220 provides an exclusive remedy for tort like actions against an insurer 1: holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer 2: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment 3: holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy 4: holding that it is not enough that an employees job provides an opportunity to commit an intentional tort", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "organization differs from its for-profit cousins in its treatment of net earnings does not prevent its buildings or property from being used in interstate commerce or in an activity affecting interstate commerce. As the Supreme Court has explained, \u201c[n]othing intrinsic to the nature of nonprofit entities prevents them from engaging in interstate commerce,\u201d particularly because \u201cthey purchase goods and services in competitive markets, offer their facilities to a variety of patrons, and derive revenues from a variety of sources, nt institutions in particular, can serve in both a sovereign/regulatory capacity and a market capacity, and their actions as either can affect interstate commerce. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725, Holdings: 0: holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence 1: holding that the first amendment does not protect the use of racial invective by a public official against a member of the public in a bar 2: holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation 3: holding that the doorway of the home is a public place for purposes of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment 4: holding that a municipal transit vehicle is not a public forum for first amendment purposes because the city is engaged in commerce and the advertising space in question although incidental to the provision of public transportation is part of a commercial venture", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in favor of the plaintiff[ ].\u201d Id, (quoting Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17 A.3d 566, 572 (D.C.2011)). \u201cTo pass muster,\u201d a complaint must \u201callege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.\u201d Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). B. CPPA With respect to appellant\u2019s CPPA claims, this court has previously addressed the question whether the CPPA applies to landlord-tenant relations. See Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276, 1286 (D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). In Gomez, we found that although the Council Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively 1: holding that the cppa does not apply to landlordtenant relations 2: holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing 3: holding that  1447c does not apply to counsel 4: holding that title ii does not apply to the states", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "if it is clear that no one was misled or placed at a disadvantage by the error. Mantis v. Resz, 5 S.W.3d 388, 391 (Tex.App.\u2014Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); see also Orange Grove Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rivera, 679 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex.1984); Ealey v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 660 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex.1983); Baker v. Charles, 746 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Tex.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Cockrell v. Estevez, 737 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex.App.\u2014San Antonio 1987, no writ). The theory of \u201cmisnomer\u201d is therefore not \u201cany other law\u201d that extends or tolls limitations in contravention of section 10.01\u2019s prohibition. Instead, misnomer treats a misnamed party as a properly sued party relating back to the time of the filing of the suit with the misnomer. Cf. Chilkewitz v. Hyson, 22 S.W.3d 825, 830 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff must correct the misnomer Holdings: 0: recognizing that although provision of municipal service is not fundamental right inequitable provision of that service is subject to equal protection analysis 1: holding that materiality necessary element of section 1001 2: holding rule 28 which allows for service on a defendant under its common name is not a tolling provision in contravention of section 1001 3: holding that equitable tolling is available for petitions filed pursuant to 28 usc  2255 4: holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "officers\u2019 testimony that she exited Jose\u2019s room screaming,' \u201cIt. was self-defense!\u201d That statement was ambiguous though. It did not attribute Jose\u2019s killing to any particular actor when the evidence showed that the actor could have been Samuel individually,, appellant individually, or both acting in concert. Second, the possibility that Samuel was the true killer meant that the jury did have a vehicle to acquit. Indeed, that vehicle remained possible in part because appellant did not take the stand and admit to the killing herself. Likewise, defense counsel could have invoked a claim of Self-defense in an opening statement, but by waiving an opening statement, counsel left the jury with the more difficult task of deciding for itself who was responsible for the killing., See id. at 455 (<HOLDING>). Third, the evidence weighed heavily against' Holdings: 0: recognizing an innocent possession defense though the defense in that case is more properly considered a justification defense as life and limb were arguably at stake 1: holding that the erroneous omission of a justification defense was harmless where counsel did not invoke the defense during either voir dire or opening statements and where the defense did not appear to be the primary focus of the defensive theory at trial 2: holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity 3: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 4: holding that the government did not waive an affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer because it raised the defense at a pragmatically sufficient time by listing the defense in the joint pretrial order", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "F.Supp.3d 700, 703, No. 3:14CV200 (JMM), 2014 WL 5088230, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2014) (\u201cwe hold that the TCPA can impose Lability directly or vicariously upon any person or entity on whose behalf a third party places a call in violation of \u00a7 227(b)(1)(A)\u201d); Bridgeview Health Care Ctr. Ltd. v. Clark, 09 C 5601(MV), 2013 WL 1154206, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) (\u201cThus, the TCPA creates a form of vicarious liability making an entity liable when a third party sends unsolicited communications on its behalf in violation of the Act.\u201d) (citing Glen Ellyn Pharmacy v. Promius Pharma, LLC, No. 09-C-2116 (BMM), 2009 WL 2973046, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11,2009)); Account. Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless, 329 F.Supp.2d 789, 805-06 (M.D.La.2004) (same); but see Mais, 944 F.Supp.2d at 1243-44 (<HOLDING>). These courts have relied on multiple and Holdings: 0: holding that fmla does not impose individual liability 1: holding that takings claim does not ripen until a permit application is denied 2: holding that tcpa does not permit vicarious liability 3: holding that preemption under  1144a does not permit removal if the plaintiffs claim does not fall within the scope of  1132a 4: holding that  1964c does not permit recovery for personal injuries", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 107(a) of CERCLA. Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424. Before a court may award contribution under \u00a7 113(f)(1), the court must first find that the defendant is liable under \u00a7 107(a). The court must then determine the proper allocation of response costs in an equitable manner. The burden of proof for both of these requirements rests with Durham, the party seeking contribution. Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 168. 33. A plaintiff need not prove that a specific defendant\u2019s waste caused a specific incurrence of clean-up costs. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.1993). 34. CERCLA further permits a declaratory judgment allocating future response costs between PRPs. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9613(g)(2); see Gussack Realty Co. v. Xerox Corp., 224 F.3d 85, 91, 92 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246, Holdings: 0: holding that the proper remedy for future response costs is not a present lumpsum payment of anticipated expenses but instead a declaratory judgment award dividing future response costs among prps 1: holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken 2: holding that declaratory relief only appropriate once some expenditure has been made toward necessary response costs 3: holding that expenses refers to costs 4: holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "H.W. Arant, Rationale of the Rule that an Obligee\u2019s Premature Payment Discharges His Surety, 80 U. Pa. L.Rev. 842, 851 (1932): The function of the surety is to secure the creditor in the enjoyment of the performance promised by the principal. It seems reasonable to assume that his undertaking is intended to operate as a security so long as the creditor acts with good faith and reasonable prudence. Advancing percentages [that] might be retained, under some circumstances, is consistent with both. 27 . See Argonaut Ins. Co., 699 F.2d at 420 (concluding that, where unauthorized advances are expended for the purposes of completing a bonded contract, the amount at risk to the surety is, therefore, unaffected); Ramada Dev. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 626 F.2d 517, 522 (6th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); accord Nat\u2019l Sur. Corp. v. United States, 118 Holdings: 0: holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors 1: holding that a plaintiff surety had to pay all outstanding claims owed by the contractor or it otherwise would not be permitted to share in any retained funds held by the government 2: holding that the surety was not released to the extent of improper ly paid funds because the contractor had applied the released funds to progress on the contract 3: holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety 4: holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "him to follow the proceeds into the hands of third parties, without regard to any settlement before or after judgment. The lien operates as security, and if the settlement entered into by the parties is in disregard of it and to the prejudice of plaintiffs attorney, by reason of the insolvency of his client, or for other sufficient cause, the court will interfere and protect its officer by vacating the satisfaction of judgment and permitting execution to issue for the enforcement of the judgment to the extent of the lien, or by following the proceeds in the hands of third parties, who received them before or after judgment impressed with the lien. Id. (Emphasis added.) An attorney\u2019s lien follows the judgment into whatever form it may assume. See Porter v. Taylor, 36 Ark. 591 (1880) (<HOLDING>). We have also noted that an attorney\u2019s lien Holdings: 0: holding that even though the complaint sought money damages and land was actually recovered the attorneys lien attached to the land 1: holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages 2: holding that if respondents suit is one for permanent damages to the land the measure of damages is the decreased value of the land 3: holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land 4: holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was evidence of contrary intent. The lien, once executed, remained in force during the life of the debt. Id. (citing Ploeger v. Johnson, 26 S.W. 432 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1894, no writ) and cases ff.) A mere renewal did not affect the lien. However, a renewal could amount to a novation. If, for sufficient consideration, the parties executed a renewal intending a satisfaction of the old debt or lien, it had that effect and the rights of the parties were governed by the new contract. Id. (citing Helmke v. Uecker, 161 S.W. 17 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Austin 1913, no writ). While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has not spoken to this precise question, it has been squarely addressed and answered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mat , supra); In re Wandler, 77 B.R. 735 (Bankr.D.N.D.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Challinor, 79 B.R. 19 Holdings: 0: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods 1: holding that under colorado law refinancing of a purchase money loan whereby an old note and security agreement were canceled and replaced by a new note and security agreement did not automatically extinguish the creditors pmsi in the debtors furniture the parties did not intend the new note to extinguish the original debt and security interest in that identical collateral remained almost no new money was advanced and the document specifically stated an intent to continue the pmsi 2: holding that a note which was a consolidation of the debtors previous notes did not give rise to a pmsi 3: holding that under north dakota law consolidation of a note secured by a pmsi in farm machinery with other goods resulted in a novation destroying the creditors pmsi 4: holding that under michigan law when debtors paid off the initial loan with the proceeds of refinancing the creditors pmsi in stereo expired", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "things such as \"day care, doctor visits [and] food.\u201d Id. at 503, 505, 489 S.E.2d at 703, 704. ANNUNZIATA, Judge, with whom BENTON and BRAY, JJ., join, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In Acree v. Acree, 2 Va.App. 151, 342 S.E.2d 68 (1986), we found that equitable considerations may support the award of credits against child support payments otherwise due where the obligated parent has fulfilled the purpose and function of the award, albeit in a way that deviates from the express order of the court. Id. at 157, 342 S.E.2d at 71; see also Carper v. Carper, 228 Va. 185, 189, 319 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1984) (granting father credit where he had fulfilled purpose of mortgage payment requirement); Commonwealth v. Skeens, 18 Va.App. 154, 158, 442 S.E.2d 432, 435 (1994) (<HOLDING>); accord Meyer v. Meyer, 493 S.W.2d 42, 45 Holdings: 0: recognizing general enforceability of plan provisions reducing benefits by amount of any social security benefits 1: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits 2: holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits 3: holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation 4: holding noncustodial parent not entitled to an automatic credit and court could order child support in addition to social security disability dependency benefits", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is a weighing State or a nonweighing State. I would hold that the fact that a State is a nonweighing State may make the possibility of harmful error less likely, but it does not excuse a reviewing court from ensuring that the error was in fact harmless. Our cases in this area do not require a different result. IV The Court reaches a somewhat similar conclusion. It, too, would abolish (or at least diminish the importance of) the weighing/nonweighing distinction for purposes of harmless-error analysis. But then, surprisingly, it also diminishes the need to conduct any harmless-error review at all. If all the evidence was properly admitted and if the jury can use that evidence when it considers other aggravating factors, any error, the Court announces, must be harmless. See ante, at 220 (<HOLDING>). Common sense suggests, however, and this Holdings: 0: holding that resentencing hearing in capital case is not barred by double jeopardy when appeals court rejects sole aggravating factor found by sentencer failure of sentencer to find other alleged aggravating factors is not an acquittal of these factors for double jeopardy purposes 1: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave aggravating factors considerable weight 2: holding that when one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances that underlie the invalidated aggravating factor areviewing court need not apply harmlesserror review 3: holding that the grand jury need not find nonstatutory aggravating factors 4: holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "this clause, Lefever contends that the trial court considered Hargrave\u2019s motion before it entered its order. Relying upon North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966), Lefever asserts that the Mother Hubbard clause disposes of all issues that were before the trial court prior to its April order, including Hargrave\u2019s motion. Aldridge stands for the general rule that for appeal purposes, it is presumed a trial court intended to dispose of all parties and issues before it when a judgment is rendered and entered in a case. See 400 S.W.2d at SOT-OS. However, the presumption does not apply to a judgment that affirmatively reserves some ultimate issues or decisions for future adjudication. See Zellers v. Barthel, 727 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In the instant matter, the record and the Holdings: 0: holding that an order addressing each parents motion to modify but failed to reference wifes motion to enforce an out of state judgment was not a final appealable order 1: holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment 2: holding that an order denying a motion to correct reduce or modify a sentence under rule 3800 is not appealable 3: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 4: recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "rate). Rather, SES seeks the difference between its actual costs and the prevailing rates specified in the contract capped at a rate the City never asked SES to pay. SES received the benefit of its bargain; it was required to pay a prevailing wage to its workers as a minimum in exchange for the lump sum amount under the contract. That SES paid its workers amounts that exceeded both of those minimums is a separate matter that the contract leaves to SES\u2019s discretion, and it does not obligate the City to assume the cost of those rates. In response, SES points out that the contract relieved it of any duty to verify that the prevailing wage rates that the City provided were correct. It cites section 3.12.3 of the agreement: \u201cIt is not the Contractor\u2019s responsibi 1106, 1121-22 (S.D.Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Mas-Tec N. Am., Inc. v. El Paso Holdings: 0: holding that contractor could recover damages from owner for misrepresenting site conditions despite contractors right to investigate site before bidding because owner represented that data it included in contract was sufficient information for contractor to prepare its bid 1: holding that if contractor is hable to sub that liability though not yet satisfied by payment might well constitute actual damages to the contractor and sustain their suit under rule that contractor may only sue to recover its own damages 2: holding that contractor could recover damages from owner for losses due to delay although contractor agreed to assume responsibility for timely completing work for agreed compensation because owner agreed to be liable for causing delays in contractors work schedule 3: holding a premises owner is a general contractor for purposes of the statutory employer provision 4: holding that where owner and contractor frequently discussed progress of construction project and advancement of money by owner to contractor and contractor misappropriated some of the money debt was not excepted from discharge under bankruptcy code  523a2 because owner did not show that contractor had intent not to perform when the agreement was made", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "arbitration agreement or contract\u2014\u201cwhether any agreement between the alleged obligor and obligee was ever concluded\u201d\u2014and expressly reserved ruling on which decision maker was to decide such a challenge. Id. at 444 n. 1, 126 S.Ct. 1204. The Court reaffirme that alleges there was never an agreement between the parties to form a contract (and therefore no agreement to form the arbitration clause contained therein) in the first place. To date, the United States Supreme Court has not expressly ruled whether that third category should be decided by the' trial court or the arbitrator, but lower court decisions\u2014both state and federal\u2014 have largely agreed that this third category must be decided by the trial court. See, e.g., Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Lepisto v. Senior Lifestyle Newport Ltd. Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court must determine whether there was ever an agreement when the party resisting arbitration alleged that its signature was a forgery 1: holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement 2: holding that the trial court must determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate when the party contesting arbitration claimed she had never signed the contract or intended to be bound 3: holding that a party who has not expressly or implicitly agreed to be bound by an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate 4: holding that the trial court must determine whether an agreement to arbitrate was reached when several contracts the subject of a class action allegedly did not contain an arbitration provision", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "adult male; siblings may or may not amount to \"substantial family ties,\u201d and if one of his brothers in San Diego was a citizen, two were not. Although the phone number belonged to Awadallah at a former address, it is hard to see why that matters to the investigation. Whether Awadallah was in fact cooperating was surely as unknown to Agent Plunkett as it was to the district court and as it is to us. As to the \"box-cutter,\u201d the tool is multi-purpose, and Agent Plunkett expressed no view as to why Awadallah had one. 21 . We assume for purposes of this discussion, without deciding, that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from a material witness arrest warrant as well as from a search warrant. See United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). 22 . In arguing that a Holdings: 0: holding that where an arrest was premised on both legally and illegally obtained evidence the validity of the arrest would depend on whether the untainted information considered by itself establishes probable cause 1: holding that the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime the mere fact that the subject is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest 2: holding in the alternative that even if handcuffing a suspect did convert the detention into an arrest the arrest was justified by probable cause 3: holding that arrest was unsupported by probable cause but granting qualified immunity to defendants who made the arrest in reliance on communications with other officers 4: holding that hearsay evidence is considered valuable evidence in testing probable cause to arrest", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Police Dep\u2019t v. United Reporting Publ\u2019g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999). For instance, a state law placing conditions on public access to arrestees\u2019 home addresses is not subject to a facial challenge on free speech grounds because the government is under no obligation to make those addresses public at all. Id. Here, however, CNS asserts its First Amendment right of access to judicial and other public proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). It is highly doubtful that \u201cCalifornia could decide not to give out [the complaints] at all without violating the First Amendment.\u201d Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Though the government may sometimes withhold Holdings: 0: holding that the rigorous first amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case 1: holding that the first amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings 2: holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports 3: recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings 4: holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of services other than a lawyer at state expense. \u00b610 The specific provision at issue here, CrR 3.1(b)(2), broadly describes the various stages of a criminal proceeding to which the right to counsel attaches, \u201cincluding sentencing, appeal, and post-conviction review.\u201d But the right is not limitless. We must also discern the plain meaning of CrR 3.1(b)(2), while taking into account related court rules and controlling case law. \u00b611 The various stages of a criminal proceeding listed in CrR 3.1(b)(2) are more specifically covered elsewhere. For example: (1) CrR 3.1( to counsel under CrR 3.1 or CrRLJ 3.1 beyond what is constitutionally required. That stage is at the beginning, and our motivation was the preservation of evidence. See State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 211, 59 P.3d 632 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Robinson argues the plain language of CrR Holdings: 0: holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel in collateral attacks 1: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 2: holding crrlj 31b1 extended right to counsel beyond the constitution pursuant to rulemaking authority regarding preservation of evidence 3: holding that agency has the authority to issue regulations prohibiting deceptive practices pursuant to its general rulemaking authority and noting in the statute indicates that statutory cease and desist proceedings were intended to be exclusive 4: holding that there is no right to counsel beyond the initial direct appeal and thus no right to counsel on discretionary review", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1991). We are dubious whether this is such a case. However, even upon scrutiny, we find no basis to conclude that section 924(e)(1) violates the Eighth Amendment. Although Mitchell\u2019s sentence is a severe punishment for felony gun possession, when viewed in the context of his three burglaries, it is no more severe than that found acceptable in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence with the eligibility of parole after twelve years for a defendant who had obtained $120.75 by false pretenses, and who had previously committed two similar crimes), and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accord United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 846, Holdings: 0: holding that the four year sentence imposed by the district court was appropriate as it was comparable to the five year sentence for perjury or obstruction of justice 1: holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment 2: holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence 3: holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment 4: holding in a five to four decision that a twentyfive year minimum sentence for stealing three golf clubs pursuant to californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment and that any criticism for the statute is properly directed at the legislature", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and that appellant complained of chest and wrist pain. All of the officers testified that there were no other pedestrians in the area, and Officer Berry testified that there were no bars or establishments that sell alcohol in the area. All three officers testified that appellant appeared intoxicated, and Officer Slight testified that appellant smelled of alcohol and failed all three field sobriety tests that were administered to him. Even without knowing the exact time span between when the accident occurred and when Officers Garcia and Berry arrived on the scene, this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that appellant was intoxicated while he was driving the vehicle. See Kuciemba, 310 S.W.3d at 462 (<HOLDING>); Weems v. State, 328 S.W.3d 172, 177 Holdings: 0: holding that circumstantial evidence may support temporal link between defendants intoxication and his driving 1: holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence 2: holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation 3: holding in driving under influence case that circumstantial evidence may serve to establish operation of vehicle 4: holding that the link between a defendants property and a plaintiffs childhood exposure to lead paint and dust may be established through circumstantial evidence even if expert opinion testimony is not available", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the instigation of the insured and/or his employees; 3) assault/battery at the direction of the insured and/or his employ ees; and 4) assault/battery due to an omission by the insured and/or his employees. Hudson asserts that the use of the word \u201comission\u201d in the exclusion means \u201cin this context is that the assault and/or battery was caused by something the insured or his employees neglected or failed to do, which is significantly broader than merely saying the assault and/or battery was actively done by the insured or his employees.\u201d (Doe. 47 at 4). Hudson references Seventh and Second Circuit case law as support for its claim that the exclusion applies via use of the word \u201comission.\u201d See generally United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Entertainment Group, Inc., 945 F.2d 210, 212-215 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) and United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New Holdings: 0: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 1: holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party 2: holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured 3: holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for claim against insured by third party arising out of insureds damage to third partys property 4: holding that the exclusion in liability policy for any claim asserting cause of action arising out of assault andor battery if caused by omission by insured andor his employees precluded coverage in negligence action alleging that minor customer was sexually assaulted in insured theaters washroom due to theaters failure to take certain precautions", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the evidence does not support the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine discussed in Herring. Nonetheless, the intrusion into the motel room was justified by the objective of law enforcement to detain, if not arrest, Wright and Powell for their involvement in the Victim\u2019s murder. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (\u201c[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.\u201d (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, I concur in upholding the trial Holdings: 0: holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause 1: holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place 2: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 3: holding the petitioners act of retreating into her house could not thwart a warrantless arrest when it was set in motion in a public place upon probable cause 4: recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "ORDER Petitioner Beniamino Baldi, a native and citizen of Italy, seeks review of the June 7, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Beniamino Baldi, No. A012 099 608 (B.I.A. June 7, 2011). We assume the parties\u2019 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. While we generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued against an alien, such as Baldi, who was found removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Baldi argues that the BIA abused its Holdings: 0: holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders 1: recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration 2: holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief 3: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 4: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "11. Courts have adopted different definitions. Stranz v. Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. (In re Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc.), 281 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr.D.Conn.2002) (citing cases). Some courts adopt the narrow view that a personal injury tort claim is \u201ca tort [claim] with[ ] trauma or bodily injury.\u201d Id. at 160 (citing In re Atron Inc. of Mich., 172 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1994); Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 B.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y.1989)). Other courts adopt the broader view and define a personal injury tort claim as one that arises out of \u201cany injury which is an invasion of personal rights.\u201d Id. (quoting Leathem v. von Volkmar (In re von Volkmar), 217 B.R. 561, 566 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1998)); see also Thomas v. Adams (In re Gary Brew Enters. Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616, 619-20 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (<HOLDING>). After comparing the narrow and broad Holdings: 0: holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983 1: holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim 2: holding that claim brought under section 1983 of the civil rights act constituted a personal injury tort claim because section 1983 confers a general remedy for injuries to personal rights 3: holding that a civil rights deprivation is a personal injury tort 4: holding that a defamation claim is a personal injury tort claim", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to personalty is an injury to, or interference with, possession, unlawfully, with or without the exercise of physical force.' \u201d Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Constr. Co., 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1960) (quoting 87 C.J.S. Trespass \u00a7\u00a7 8, 9). Thus the intentional entry of a scraper into a space lawfully occupied by a cable was held to be a \"violation of a property right which gave rise to a cause of action regardless of negligence.\u201d Id. Because we focus on an element common to all of the Palmas\u2019 claims, we need not determine whether the Palmas\u2019 claim for negligent trespass differs from the type of trespass claim recognized in Mountain States. 3 . The cases on which the Palmas rely concerning lay opinion are Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 667-70 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, Holdings: 0: holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the promise was made 1: holding that where a patient is in possession of his faculties and in such physical health as to be able to consult about his condition and where no emergency exists making it impracticable to confer with him his consent is a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician 2: holding that the question presented is whether he adduced sufficient evidence from which a factfinder reasonably could conclude that the nature and severity of his injury significantly restricted his ability to walk as compared with an average person in the general population 3: holding that an attorneys twentyeight years of experience appearing before courts should have served to heighten his knowledge as to the appropriateness of his representations 4: holding that nonexpert evidence of the plaintiffs state of general health before the wreck as compared to his physical condition afterwards was sufficient to allow a layperson of common knowledge and experience to conclude that his wreck made it necessary to transport the plaintiff to an emergency room and be physically examined while there", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "than one central reason, and \u201can asylum applicant need not prove which reason was dominant.\u201d Parussimova, 555 F.3d at 741 (9th Cir.2009). Because mixed motive analysis exists in cases governed by the REAL ID Act, a petitioner may have been persecuted both because of legitimate investigatory reasons and because of his political opinion (imputed or actual), his religion, or other protected ground. The dissent seemingly fails to grasp this point. In short, even if a petitioner\u2019s persecution occurs during the course of a legitimate investigation or prosecution, neither -Dinu nor any of our other cases requires that the BIA or our court ignore direct or indirect evidence that a persecutor was also motivated to harm the applicant on account of a protected ground. Cf. Li, 559 F.3d at 1109 (<HOLDING>). If a petitioner has presented evidence that Holdings: 0: recognizing that police may be motivated by both prosecutorial aims and religious hatred in a prereal id case 1: holding that extortion motivated in part by political opinion could qualify as persecution 2: recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration 3: holding that harm purely motivated by wealth is not persecution 4: holding that a police officers words during an assault make clear that he was motivated by a protected ground", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the supervision of a Sergeant and told her to clean the basement. (Pl.\u2019s 56.1 Stmt. \u00b6 39; PL\u2019s Opp\u2019n 22.) Although she does not identify the times when she was denied overtime opportunities, she claims that, at least between 2004 and 2006, she was offered fewer overtime opportunities than other lieutenants. (PL\u2019s 56.1 Stmt. ,\u00b6 49.) She also alleges that being placed at the busy front desk interfered with her ability to complete substantive work. (PL\u2019s 56.1 Stmt. \u00b6\u00b6 62-64, 70-71.) Upon considering all of Plaintiffs allegations and examining them based on the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable juror could find them to rise to the level of a hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII or NYSHRL. See, e.g., De la Cruz v. City of New York, 783 F.Supp.2d 622, 644 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>); Gibson v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., No. 07 Civ. Holdings: 0: recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context 1: recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims 2: holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the statute 3: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 4: holding that allegations of work reassignment schedule changes increased scrutiny of plaintiffs work and a supervisors stray remarks were insufficient to establish hostile work environment", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "claim and argued that his constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated because the sentence he received was different, and more onerous, than the sentence he bargained for with the State. We explained that the defendant\u2019s argument was rooted in the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971), where the Supreme Court held that the defendant\u2019s due process right was violated when the State promised to refrain from making a sentencing recommendation at the defendant\u2019s trial as part of the plea agreement and then failed to honor that promise. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 185. Citing approvingly to Santobello, and our decision in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326-27 (1996) (<HOLDING>), we declared that a defendant has a due Holdings: 0: recognizing ambiguous terms of plea agreement are construed against government 1: holding that both the state and the defendant are bound to the terms of a plea agreement under santobello 2: holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities 3: holding that a federal habeas court may grant specific performance of a plea agreement in the face of evidence that the state has breached the terms of such an agreement 4: holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "based upon legally sufficient evidence. To the extent that Moye is claiming that the verdicts were against the \u201cweight of the evidence\u201d under People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y.1987) (citations omitted), such an argument raised only-issues of New York state law and accordingly cannot provide a basis for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(a) (permitting federal habeas corpus review only where the petitioner has alleged that he is in state custody in violation of \u201cthe Constitution or a federal law or treaty\u201d). Federal courts routinely dismiss claims attacking a verdict as against the weight of the evidence on the basis that they are not federal constitutional issues cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir.1922) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 263 U.S. 255, 44 S.Ct. 103, 68 L.Ed. Holdings: 0: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence   1: holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 2: holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 3: holding a court cannot issue and make returnable to it a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is outside the courts authority 4: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "proceeds among actual damages, interest, and punitive damages. 1 . Federal Insurance Company, the station\u2019s insurer for liabilities in excess of $22 million, denied coverage on the ground that the station had not suffered liability in excess of $22 million. This court upheld that decision. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Srivastava, 2 F.3d 98 (5th Cir.1993). 2 . For the law governing the taxable years in question, see 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 104(a)(2) (West 1988) (excluding from gross income the \"amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness\u201d). 3 . See 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 61(a)(4) (including interest within gross income); O\u2019Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 117 S.Ct. 452, 136 L.Ed.2d 454 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The 1992 deficiency represents the Holdings: 0: holding that back pay awards are not excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 1988 because the overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that an award of back pay under title vii does not constitute the legal remedy of damages 1: holding that punitive damages are excludable from gross income under 26 usc  104a2 2: holding that money received in compensation for emotional injuries is taxable income pursuant to  61a because the 1996 amendments to  104a2 would make little sense if  61a did not include compensation for personal injuries 3: holding that punitive damages are not awarded on account of personal injuries or sickness pursuant to 26 usc  104a2 and therefore constitute gross income 4: recognizing that recklessness or even gross negligence is insufficient to support punitive damages", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court. 1 Some state constitutions at the time of the founding lacked just compensation clauses and took property even without providing compensation. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1056-1057 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Framers of the Fifth Amendment apparently disagreed, for they expressly prohibited uncompensated takings, and the Fifth Amendment was not incorporated against the States until much later. See id., at 1028, n. 15. 2 Compare ante, at 479, and n. 8 (majority opinion) (noting that some state courts upheld the validity of applying the Mill Acts to private purposes and arguing that the \u201c \u201cuse by the public\u2019 test\u201d \u201ceroded over time\u201d), with, e. g., Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 338-339 (1877) (<HOLDING>); Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 204 Holdings: 0: holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act  of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege 1: recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public 2: holding that the words and provisions of a statute must be construed in a harmonious way 3: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 4: holding it essential to the constitutionality of a mill act that the statute should require the use to be public in fact in other words that it should contain provisions entitling the public to accommodations", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to violence and to a breach of the peace. Syl. Pt. 1, Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 167 W.Va. 332, 280 S.E.2d 216, 217-19 (1981). Insulting words which tend to violence and to a breach of the peace include \u201cvituperative epithets\u201d and \u201ctraditional racial slurs.\u201d Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219. Here, Penn invokes the second cause of action articulated by the Mauck court, namely, that Kidder\u2019s comment constituted insulting words which tend to violence and to a breach of the peace. Kidder\u2019s comment, however, while a crude sexual remark, was neither a vituperative epithet nor traditional racial slur of the type which the Supreme Court of Appeals have held to be actionable under section 55-7-2. See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to make out prima facie case for mere department status of foreign corporation defendant 1: holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits 2: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 3: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position 4: holding that plaintiff tendfed to make out a prima facie case under section 5572 where testimony was given to the effect that defendant had accused plaintiff of having a yellow streak up his back a foot wide and that defendant threatened to either pound or grind plaintiffs head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting  accused plaintiff of participating in homosexual and oedipal dalliances and attributed to him a canine lineage  and impugned plaintiffs wifes chastity and virtue in a gross manner", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of section 13-305 of the Consumer Protection Act. The court was notified that the same legal issue was one of several issues that would be subject to the Division\u2019s authority to provide injunctive relief after the determination of the administrative action. Thus, even after obtaining declaratory judgment in its favor as to the validity of the proposed advertisement, Luskin\u2019s could still be subject to an adverse administrative order enjoining the implementation of the proposed advertisement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court should not have granted declaratory judgment because it would not \u201cserve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.\u201d Id.; see, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Primary Jurisdiction Additionally, we Holdings: 0: holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding that in a declaratory judgment action it is the character of the impending action not the plaintiffs defense that determines whether there is federal question jurisdiction 3: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 4: holding that filing of infringement action twelve days after complaint for declaratory judgment obviated the need for a declaratory judgment in this case", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "rule of general immunity applies only in the co-employees context, and application of the provision does not result in the loss of general immunity by an employer\u201d). 11 . Vallejos\u2019 own expert did not state in his affidavit that use of the makeshift rope, without the safety features or warnings, constituted an imminent or clear and present danger. The affidavit simply stated that Infinity failed to maintain a safe workplace. This is not helpful in distinguishing between negligence and gross negligence. See, e.g., Marquez v. Heim Corp., 632 So.2d 85, 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (reversing summary judgment because plaintiff\u2019s expert testified that using the machine without a guard created a clear and present danger to the operator). 12 . See Bakerman v. Bombay Co., 961 So.2d 259, 265 (Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>). 13 . When Lawton was decided in 1986, the Holdings: 0: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 1: holding that the statute is mandatory 2: holding the connection is an element 3: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of  one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 4: holding that concealment is just one factor to consider and is not a mandatory element", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "then assessed liquidated damages against plaintiff by unilaterally modifying the contract to reduce the total contract price. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking the remission of the liquidated damages in the Coast Guard\u2019s possession, which the contracting officer denied. In such circumstances, there is both a government claim against plaintiff for liquidated damages and a claim by plaintiff against the government for the remission of retained liquidated damages. See K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 107 Fed.Cl. at 587-88 (citing Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 480-82 (1991)). And, there is both a final decision on the government\u2019s claim for liquidated damages, see Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), and a final decision on plaintiffs claim for Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim 1: holding that a contractor must provide the contracting officer with adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim 2: holding that the contracting officer effectively made a final decision on the government claim for set off by declining to pay the contractor the balance due on the contract 3: holding that the finality of a contracting officers determination was suspended during his review of a request by the contractor to reconsider the final decision 4: holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim ", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "stimulant in question was possessed or distributed in sufficient quantity to have a stimulant effect on the central nervous system. 21 C.F.R. \u00a7 1308.12(d) lists methamphetamine as follows: (d) Stimulants. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on t effect on the central nervous system\u201d as limiting the provision to cases where methamphetamine appears in a quantity or concentration proven to have the prohibited effect. We disagree. 21 C.F.R. \u00a7 1308.12 is a list of those drugs that Congress and the Attorney General have determined to be controlled substances and \u201cwhere Congress intended the quantity of a substance to be dispos .1975) (<HOLDING>). These decisions date back over thirty years, Holdings: 0: holding that similar language evidences a congressional determination of the actual depressant effect of the listed substances 1: holding that similar language provided a sufficient general jurisdiction allegation 2: holding similar language to be a valid disclaimer 3: holding that language similar to the above did not exclude other methods of notice 4: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a white BMW. Appellant was not driving a white BMW at the time he was stopped. In fact, Sergeant Kasper could not identify any characteristic that Appellant had in common with Powell aside from his race, a trait that is shared by all African-American males in the City of Wilkes-Barre. \u00b6 11 \u201cDriving while black\u201d is not among the violations identified in the Motor Vehicle Code. Because the officer\u2019s identification of Appellant was predicated solely upon a vague racial description, we agree with Appellant that articulable and reasonable grounds for the stop did not exist. Consequently, the stop was invalid and all evidence flowing therefrom should have been suppressed as fruits of the unlawful stop. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 543 Pa. 612, 618-620, 673 A.2d 915, 918-919 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, Holdings: 0: holding that trial court properly suppressed evidence where officer did not possess articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant violated motor vehicle code the officer did not see defendant drive erratically commit a traffic violations or engage in any conduct indicating that he was under the influence of alcohol 1: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger 2: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 3: holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol 4: holding that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for obstructing traffic because there was no evidence of intent to impede or hinder traffic where the vehicle was only briefly stopped in the roadway and the officer approaching the vehicle from behind did not have to stop or drive around the defendants vehicle", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is a matter of consent between the parties, and one cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to submit to arbitration.\u201d) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Service Agreement, unlike the APA and Employment Agreements, does not contain a broad arbitration clause in its \u201cRemedies\u201d section; rather, the Service Agreement contemplates arbitration only of disputes regarding the narrow issue of a new compensation arrangement in the event of certain regulatory changes. If the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the Service Agreement, they could have easily included the same broad arbitration provision in that agreement. See Alticor, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Although we rejected a similar argument in Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy 1: holding that claims against a broker under the securities laws and rico were subject to arbitration pursuant to a provision requiring the arbitration of any dispute relating to the customers accounts 2: holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision 3: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added 4: holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Felipe Lugo, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court\u2019s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. We review de novo a district court\u2019s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.1982). We affirm. The district court correctly dismissed Lugo\u2019s complaint because he failed to allege that the defendants were acting under color of state law. See O\u2019Guinn v. Lovel-ock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because Lugo has failed to explain how the Holdings: 0: holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim 1: holding that a defendants personal involvement in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is a necessary element of a  1983 complaint 2: recognizing such a claim under  1983 3: holding an allegation of damages is a necessary element of any claim under  2605 4: recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "inference, however, is totally lacking because the corrective work contained three important elements that were not present in the original plans: (1) a waterproofing agent was added, (2) expanding foam insulation sealed any gaps between the structural support and the Styrofoam block, and (3) butyl caulk sealant was applied to the top of all T superstructures. A party claiming a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there was a contract, (2) that the other party breached the contract and, (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered damages as a result of the breach. Stevenson v Brotherhoods Mut Benefit, 312 Mich 81, 90-91; 19 NW2d 494 (1945); Residential Ratepayer Consortium v Pub Serv Comm, 198 Mich App 144, 149; 497 NW2d 558 (1993) (<HOLDING>); see M Civ JI 142.01. This standard means the Holdings: 0: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 1: holding the fedrevid 801d2e requires proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence and allows consideration of the offered declaration as part of the proof of the conspiracy 2: recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases 3: holding that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "it must be the latter. Any different approach would impose an impossible burden on the police. It would mean that they could never search closed containers within a dwelling ... without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every item they might encounter. We note that there is no possibility of such a rule for automobile searches, because the Supreme Court has already authorized this type of container search in that context. See Ross, supra; Houghton, supra. Our conclusion here rests in part on the discussion in Houghton that indicates that the container rule rests on general principles of Fourth Amendment law that do not depend on the special attributes of automobile searches. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis in original); see also Ladell, 127 F.3d at 624 (<HOLDING>). Reinforcing these traditional principles, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom 1: holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom 2: holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom 3: holding that a mother had apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed vinyl bag found in the bedroom 4: holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "3. Victim of extortion Relying on Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206 (1932), and cases from other circuits, Fernandez requested an instruction that the government prove he was not a victim of extortion: In general, a victim of extortion is not a participant (co-conspirator or aider and abettor) in the extortion, even though payment may facilitate the activities of a RICO organization. Thus, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt any defendant charged in this case was not a victim of extortion. This instruction was not supported by law. No case cited by Fernandez suggests that a low-level member of a RICO conspiracy can escape conviction simply because high er-ups exacted payment from him. See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 119-23, 53 S.Ct. 35 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762, 766-71 Holdings: 0: holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide 1: holding that a womans consent to be transported for prostitution does not amount to a conspiracy with her transporter to violate the mann act 2: holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept 3: recognizing that  2422a liability does not require a defendant to create out of whole cloth a womans desire to travel to engage in prostitution 4: recognizing that the pregnant womans ability to assert her own rights is beset with obstacles including her desire to protect her privacy", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rule 9(b) was applicable to RICO claims. See Tr. at 30 (Court). Mr. Bird, Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, and Mr. Bregman, Leslie Robins\u2019 counsel, both thought rule 9(b) applies. See id. at 43 (Bird), 44 (Breg-man). It appears, however, based on the Court\u2019s own research, that the standards of rule 9(b) do not apply to RICO claims in this situation. The Tenth Circuit has applied rule 9(b) only to RICO cases where the underlying racketeering acts were themselves acts of fraud that would be subject to rule 9(b) if pled independently as causes of action. See Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1362 (10th Cir.1989). In other areas of RICO, however, the standard, more generous requirements of rule 8 apply. See Robbins v. Wilkie, 300 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>). In defending the sufficiency of their Holdings: 0: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 1: holding that plaintiffs cannot claim that a conspiracy to violate rico existed if they do not adequately plead a substantive violation of rico 2: holding that plaintiff need only plead damages in rico cases sufficient to meet rule 8s requirements 3: holding that district court properly dismissed a complaint containing a purported one thousand causes of action for failing to meet rule 8s requirements 4: holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "under the Fourth Amendment. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we hold that probable cause to arrest the appellant did not grow stale. Accordingly, his seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the circuit court did not err in denyi asive authority to support his argument that probable cause to arrest for an observed offense dissipates based merely on the passage of time. 6 . The Supreme Court of Virginia reached a similar conclusion in a case involving a search warrant for blood and hair samples. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 529 S.E.2d 769 (2000). The Court tested the warrant \"for 'staleness\u2019 by considering whether the facts alleged ... provided probable cause to believe, at the time the search actually was conducted,\u201d that it \"would lead to the 1 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 8 . On the facts of this case, we need not Holdings: 0: holding that probable cause to believe certain individuals were members of a conspiracy did not give probable cause to search the contents of the room in which they were arrested 1: holding that probable cause did not fade away merely because the police arrested the defendant the following day 2: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 3: holding that even though the plaintiff was incarcerated for only one day before his extradition hearing the complaint was sufficient to establish a due process violation at the pleadings stage because it alleged among other things that the defendants falsely arrested the plaintiff without probable cause and with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs rights 4: holding that probable cause to stop a vehicle was supported by the fact that the defendant had previously been arrested for illegally transporting liquor", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to understand how someone who believed that he became the \u201clead man\u201d in September 2000 should not reasonably have been aware that he was not actually in that position or being paid commensurately until February 2001. Sixth Circuit precedent is clear that in Title VII actions, \u201cthe starting date for the 300-day limitations period is when the plaintiff learns of the employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff learns that the employment decision may have been discriminatorily motivated. Indeed, this focus on the discriminatory act is consistent ... with Supreme Court precedent and the statutory language of Title VII.\u201d Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir.2001); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Thus, February 2001 is clearly not the Holdings: 0: holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations 1: holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period  is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful  2: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 3: holding that the court may only consider the discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period 4: holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\"best practices\u201d model, PL's Opp\u2019n at 42, he offers nothing to support this assertion, see geiterally id. at 40-41. 17 . The plaintiff's individual EEO complaint, which he filed in 1997, was dismissed and subsumed by the class action, at which point he became a named plaintiff in the case. Pl.'s Opp'n at 41-42. The parties eventually settled the Conanan litigation under a consent decree in 2001. Id. at 42. 18 . Although the defendant briefly suggests that the January 2004 e-mail does not qualify as protected activity, Def.'s Mot. at 25, the email contains allegations of discrimination against the African-American members of the Task Force in receiving foreign assignments, and thus likely does constitute protected activity. See Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted); see also Sumner Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination 1: holding that a title vii cause of action is limited to those discrimination allegations in the complaint that have been under the scrutiny of a formal eeoc complaint 2: holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii 3: recognizing ageplusgender discrimination claim when complaint brought claims under adea and title vii 4: holding that not every complaint garners its author protection under title vii  the complaint must in some way allege unlawful discrimination not just frustrated ambition", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "legal standard.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir.2011) (same); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 249-51 (4th Cir.2008) (finding that because alien was removable by reason of an aggravated felony conviction, \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(C) prohibited evaluation of the factual merits of his CAT claim and alien could not \u201crepackage[ ] his ... argument ... in an attempt to create a reviewable legal question where there is none\u201d); Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir.2007) (same); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir.2006) (\u201cPursuant to \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), our review of Tran\u2019s CAT claim is limited to questions of law or constitutional issues.\u201d). But see Issaq v. Holder, 617 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1081, Holdings: 0: holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to the denial of deferral of removal under the cat 1: holding that preemption under  1144a does not permit removal if the plaintiffs claim does not fall within the scope of  1132a 2: holding a decision under the cat to deny even deferral of removal does not fall within the jurisdictionstripping provisions of either  1252a2b or  1252a2c 3: holding that the jurisdiction stripping provision found at 8 usc  1252a2c applies only to removal orders not to applications for asylum withholding of removal or cat relief 4: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that there was evidence that Johnson attempted to correct his course after losing control). But a defendant can be deemed negligent for failing to take an action that she should have taken, just as she can be deemed negligent for taking an action that she should not have taken. In this instance, as the majority points out, \"[the evidence here showed that Johnson lost control of his vehicle upon encountering the snow patch.\" Maj. op. at 118; see also id. at 18 (\"An investigation of the scene revealed that Johnson lost control of his vehicle when he hit an icy patch of snow on the road.\"). Thus, the question is whether Johnson acted reasonably-either in taking or failing to take action-after he hit the ice patch and lost control of the vehicle See, eg., Kendrick, 252 P.3d at 1059 (<HOLDING>). The Jury said yes. {88 Second, the majority Holdings: 0: holding that the attorneys conduct must be viewed in light of the totality of the cireumstances to determine whether that conduct constitutes a violation of colo rpc 8ah 1: holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary 2: holding that the jury must determine whether the partys conduct was reasonable under the cireumstances 3: holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that jury instructions must allow the jury to determine the issues presented intelligently", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "raise a substantial question regarding the appellant\u2019s guilty plea. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008). \u201cBy pleading guilty, an accused does more than admit that he [committed] the various acts alleged in a specification; \u201che is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.\u2019\u201d United States v. Campbell, 68 M.J. 217, 219 (C.A.A.F.2009) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)). During the plea inquiry, Appellant admitted under oath each of the elements of the offense of indecent exposure, including that he exposed himself to public view. When an accused pleads guilty, there is no requirement that the government establish the factual predicate for the plea. United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F.1996) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThe factual predicate is sufficiently Holdings: 0: holding that in a guilty plea ease the court would not speculate as to the true victim of larceny with respect to copayees on a check 1: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 2: holding that the defendant remains the master of his case particularly with respect to the entry of a guilty plea 3: holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea  emphasis added 4: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to be drawn in his favor. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). I. TITLE IX Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that \u201cno person in the United States shall on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.\u201d 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681(a). A \u201cprogram or activity\u201d includes \u201call the operations of ... a college, university, or other post-secondary institution, or a public system of higher education .. any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.\u201d 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1687(2)(A). In most Title IX cases, the plaintiff attempts to demons 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Yellow Springs, etc. v. Ohio High Sch. Ath. Holdings: 0: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds 1: holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds 2: holding that kentucky high school athletic associa tion qualified as agent of the state and as recipient of federal funds so as to be subject to title ix when association received dues from member schools which received federal funds 3: holding that ohio high school athletic association was not a recipient of federal funds because it did not receive direct federal assistance and it did not receive money from local schools who were recipients of federal assistance 4: holding that kentucky high school athletic association was an indirect recipient of federal funds because it was created by state law its functions were determined by the kentucky board of education and it received dues from member schools who received federal funds", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and tops that conclusion with the assumption that the judge determined the amount \u201cas somewhat larger.\u201d The term \u201cunderproved\u201d appears to be another way of saying that Wife has proved her reasonable needs to a certain extent but failed to prove any need beyond that point. As such, the trial court would be engaging in speculation as to Wife\u2019s needs beyond the expenses she had been able to prove. An award of maintenance cannot stand without evidence to support it. Wofford v. Wofford, 858 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Mo.App. 1993). Because Wife testified that she did not know how much she would incur for electricity, car maintenance, or rental insurance, the trial court could not have considered these expenses in determining maintenance. M.A.Z. v. F.J.Z., 943 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Mo.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The majority properly points out if Wife \u201chad Holdings: 0: holding that income and expense statement did not constitute substantial evidence to support maintenance award when wife conceded her lack of knowledge about actual expenses 1: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 2: holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted 3: holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied 4: holding that a wife could be held liable for the negligent failure to prevent or warn the victims about her husbands sexually abusive behavior when the wife had actual knowledge or special reason to know that the husband was likely to abuse a particular person or persons", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a comparison of Lentz\u2019s handwriting exemplars with the questioned handwritten documents in the government\u2019s possession would have revealed that Lentz was indeed the author of the questioned documents. Although the Fourth Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, published authority from other circuits is divided on this question, but the better reasoned, ap posite decisions favor Lentz\u2019s \u201cauthorship\u201d argument over the government\u2019s \u201cconsciousness of guilt\u201d argument in the circumstances presented here. To be sure, several circuits have allowed the government to present evidence of a defendant\u2019s refusal to provide a handwriting exemplar as evidence of that defendant\u2019s consciousness of guilt for the offense charged, as the government here requests. See, e.g., Askew, 584 F.2d at 963 (<HOLDING>). These decisions, however, are inapposite, as Holdings: 0: holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line  the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus 1: holding in a prosecution for the interstate transportation of forged securities that the government was permitted to prove and comment on a defendants refusal to produce exemplars as tending to prove his guilt of the offense charged 2: recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence 3: holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause 4: holding that the government need not prove that interstate transport was foreseeable in order to obtain a conviction under 18 usc  2314 which prohibits the interstate transportation of stolen goods", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Even if an updated psychological evaluation had been conducted at the time of the original posteonviction hearing, the results would in all probability be invalid at the time of a second hearing well over one year later. Consequently, such evidence could not have been discovered at the time of the original 1981 hearing and should have been allowed one year later at the 1982 hearing. The state argues that the report should have been obtained and offered at the first hearing, and argues that if petitioner believes his counsel erred in failing to do this, the petitioner ought to pet ffirming a dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus seeking to relitigate issues decided against petitioner in a previous habeas corpus proceeding); State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Ware v. State, 284 Minn. 525, 169 N.W.2d 16 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant could not raise in a  2255 motion an issue previously decided on direct criminal appeal 1: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived 2: holding that where the fourth amendment question was raised at trial but not preserved on direct appeal in the state court the defendants failure to raise the issue on appeal in the state courts did not suffice to avoid stone 3: holding that petitioner in posteonviction proceeding may not raise matter that he raised and which was decided against him on direct appeal 4: holding in part that a convicted defendant is not entitled to raise in a posteonviction proceeding any matter which he raised on direct appeal or which he knew about but did not raise in his direct appeal", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "who are in the habit of making such judgments. Yet, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have admonished hearing officers and reviewing courts alike when they substitute personal opinions or judgments as to proper educational policy, and best placements for the disabled student, in the place of the local educators\u2019 expert judgments. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1000-01. These courts have also reminded hearing officers and reviewing courts that school districts are not required to provide a disabled child with the best possible education. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The result reached here is properly deferential to Jane\u2019s educators\u2019 unanimous determination that the Interlude placement was appropriate. See Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the hearing officer\u2019s conclusion Holdings: 0: holding that whenever the local agency refuses or wrongfully neglects to provide a handicapped child with a free appropriate education that child can be best served on the regional or state level 1: recognizing that a parent can petition for postminority support for a disabled child 2: holding that local educators deserve latitude in determining the iep most appropriate for a disabled child 3: holding that the situs of the alleged tortious conduct is relevant in choosing the most appropriate forum 4: holding that review of nonfinal orders determining child custody in child dependency proceedings is not encompassed by rule 9130a3ciii which permits review of nonfinal orders determining child custody in domestic relations cases", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Sixth Amendment concern addressed in Justice Stevens\u2019 opinion, see supra, the Court nevertheless believes that, under a \u201creasonableness\u201d standard, it has the obligation to take any Sixth Amendment concerns it has into account in order to reconcile the holdings in both parts of the majorities of the Booker deci sion. In this case, while Defendant believed he was sending child pornography to a minor, he actually distributed such pornography to an adult undercover police officer. Under Justice Stevens\u2019 opinion in Booker, the Court would have held that the Government had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant distributed child pornography to a minor, as the police officer was not a minor. See United States v. O\u2019Daniel, 328 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1183 (N.D.Okla.2004) (<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe it may ignore this Holdings: 0: holding the same under blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 1: holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531159 led2d 403 2004 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 2: holding that after blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 statutory maximum is the maximum that this particular defendant can face in light of his criminal history and the facts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant 3: holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 and state v schofield 2005 me 82 895 a2d 927 do not retroactively apply to cases on collateral review 4: holding that the safety valve provision of 18 usc  3553f is not unconstitutional under apprendi 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 or blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "who have taken authorized maternity leave. See, e.g., Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1207, 113 L.Ed.2d 158, 178 (1991); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 1996). When interpreting' discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm\u2019n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998) (\u201cIn deciding gender discrimination disputes, we adhere to the Title VII analytical framework. ...\u201d); Fuller v. Iowa Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998) (\u201cIn considering a disability d 00 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Nelson v. Wittem Group, Inc., 140 Holdings: 0: holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness 1: holding federal statute covers situation where employer refused to rehire employee because she might become pregnant again 2: holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment 3: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 4: holding that where employer acknowledges respondeat superior liability for the conduct of its employee direct negligence claims become duplicative", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "have been raised in one of these conversa tions, particularly given Li\u2019s testimony that she intended to let her mother know about her pregnancy. Further, the BIA and IJ appropriately faulted Li because the record was \u201cbarren of reliable corroboration.\u201d Li failed to submit a statement from her father, aunt, sister, or mother. See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 164 (indicating that an applicant\u2019s failure to corroborate her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question). In addition, the IJ was not required to show that this evidence was reasonably available to Li before relying on a lack of corroboration to support the adverse credibility finding. See id. at 164 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the IJ accurately observed that, Holdings: 0: holding that a claimants claim is barred when administrative remedies that are clearly required under an erisa plan are not exhausted 1: holding that strict compliance is not required 2: holding that resentencing is required 3: holding that these steps are not required when the applicant is not otherwise credible 4: holding that it is not", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Reginald Wilkerson seeks a writ of mandamus regarding a motion for postconviction relief filed in 2001. We grant the petition. In his petition, Wilkerson states he filed his motion in February 2001, and, that after the trial court denied relief, he moved for rehearing. Wilkerson claims that the trial court never ruled on the motion for rehearing. At our request, the State filed a response which confirms the filing of the motion for rehearing. In response to Wilkerson\u2019s 2010 motion to hear and rule, the trial judge apparently wrote a memo denying rehearing. We agree with the State\u2019s concession, however, that this memo does not constitute a properly filed written order. See State v. Wagner, 863 So.2d 1224 (Fla.2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand Holdings: 0: holding that signed court minutes are not proper orders 1: holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders 2: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 3: holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 4: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "any mention during cross examination of his dishonorable discharge from the Marines. The court granted defendant's motion. Despite the ruling, the State's attorney asked a question about the circumstances of his leaving the Marines and he replied, \"I deserted.\" State v. Smith, supra at 427. Defendant did not object to the question, did not move to instruct the jury to disregard the answer, and did not move to strike the answer. The Supreme Court held that defendant's motion to exclude the evidence was sufficient to preserve the error for appeal, concluded the error was prejudicial and ordered a new trial. As Smith demonstrates, a ruling on a motion to exclude evidence is not necessarily merely advisory and tentative. Accord, State v. Brooks, 20 Wn. App. 52, 59-60, 579 P.2d 961 (1978) (<HOLDING>) (citing State v. Smith, supra). If such a Holdings: 0: holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal 1: holding that a defendants failure to object or join in a codefendants objection to an issue bars the defendant from raising the issue on appeal 2: holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered 3: holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial 4: holding that failure to object does not preclude raising the issue on appeal where erroneous evidence is offered in violation of an order in limine", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "states, in pertinent part: \u201cAffirmed by Memorandum. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. The appellant, Addie Lee Thomas, appeals her conviction and her subsequent sentence of twenty years\u2019 imprisonment for the murder of her common law husband. Thomas raised two issues on appeal. Thomas first contends that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing a Batson hearing following the state\u2019s use of nine of its ten peremptory strikes against black members of the venire. The original veni-re pool consisted of 47% black members and the final empaneled jury was 50% black. The trial court did not make a clearly erroneous ruling by finding that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established against the state. See Harrell v. State, 571 So.2d 1270 (Ala.1990) (<HOLDING>).\u201d In Harrell v. State, 555 So.2d 263 (Ala. Holdings: 0: holding that blacks who were not subjected to racial discrimination had standing under title vii to sue over discrimination against other blacks 1: holding that while proper statistical evidence can be the most important vehicle for showing class discrimination the plaintiff failed to compare the percentage of blacks hired for given jobs with the percentage of blacks qualified for those positions and it was not sufficient to merely show that black managers formed a smaller percentage of the manager pool than did managers of other races 2: holding that the prosecutors use of four of his five peremptory strikes to remove blacks was sufficient to establish a prima facie case 3: holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case 4: holding that a prima facie case of discrimination is not established merely by the number of peremptory strikes against blacks in cases where the percentage of blacks on the empaneled jury is higher than the percentage of the venire pool", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "such as evaluations of all of KT.\u2019s IEP goals, may also be useful. (Def.\u2019s Mot. at 8-10.) \u201c[T]he record in an IDEA case is supposed to be made not in the district court but primarily at the administrative level[.]\u201d Reid, 401 F.3d at 527 (Henderson, J., concurring). Thus, although the Court is \u201ctroubled at the prospect of further delay,\u201d Nesbitt I, 532 F.Supp.2d at 125, it will remand this case to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings that should be conducted as expeditiously as possible. The Officer should supplement the record with the information needed to \u201cbest correct\u201d KT.\u2019s educational \u201cdeficits,\u201d Reid, 401 F.3d at 526, and to \u201cdetermine an appropriate award of compensatory education\u201d based on the District\u2019s failure to provide K.T. with an FAPE. Brown, 568 F.Supp.2d at 54 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 1: recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years 2: holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action 3: holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits 4: holding that plaintiff was entitled to an award but remanding to the hearing officer to gather further evidence because plaintiff miscalculated the relevant time that the student had been denied a fape", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "names reduce[d] their ability to obtain satisfactory commercial affiliation by licensing agreements.\u201d Id. at 459. Upon finding in favor of the golfers, however, the court in Palmer relied upon the defendant\u2019s use of the golfers\u2019 pictures and cited cases wherein recovery was permitted for an invasion of privacy where a picture of a famous person was used. Id. at 461 (\u201cWhere defendant sold lockets with removable photographs of plaintiff in each one, it was held that plaintiff-actress could recover for this invasion of her privacy.\u201d) (emphasis added) (citing Lane v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N.Y.S.2d 199 (S.Ct.1939)); (\u201cWhere defendant inserted pictures of plaintiffs, widely known baseball players, in containers of popcorn and chewing gum, recovery was permitted.\u201d r.2005) (<HOLDING>); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants use of players likenesses in parody trading cards violated the right of publicity 1: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that the right of publicity is descendible 3: recognizing protection against appropriation for the defendants advantage of the plaintiffs name or likeness 4: holding that the defendants use of a models likeness in connection with the packaging and promotion of its hair care product violated the right of publicity", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "standards, the decision whether to submit lesser offense instructions is not a decision for the defendant, but rather for defense counsel after consultation with the defendant. Recent cases analyzing the effect of this change have concluded that under the current ABA standards, the decision whether to request lesser offense instructions is for defense counsel. See Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir.2004) (based on change in third edition, \"(whether to argue a lesser-included offense is a matter to be decided by counsel after consultation with the defendant\"); Simeon, 90 P.3d at 184 (relying in part on the change in the ABA standards to hold that the decision to request lesser offense instructions rests with counsel); Mathre v. State, 619 N.W.2d 627, 629-31 (N.D.2000) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we note that several Holdings: 0: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 1: holding that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to consult with defendant about seeking lesser offense instructions because under current aba standards the decision is not one that must be made by defendant 2: holding that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think that a rational defendant would want to appeal 3: holding that counsel may not be deemed ineffective under strickland for failing to object to jury instructions where this court previously upheld validity of those instructions 4: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "have observed that DCF is \u201cprobably the most prominent and frequently used post-Weinberger method of appraisal.\u201d Wer-theimer, 47 Duke L.J. at 628. In different legal contexts, Arizona courts have long recognized DCF as a viable valuation method. See, e.g., Pima County v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 115 Ariz. 175, 177, 564 P.2d 398, 400 (App.1977); Crystal Point Joint Venture v. Ariz. Dep\u2019t of Revenue, 188 Ariz. 96, 101, 932 P.2d 1367, 1372 (App.1997). Although the DCF method is by no means the only appropriate corporate valuation method, the trial court did not err by relying on the DCF method evidence presented at the valuation hearing on the record presented by the parties in this case. See Maricopa County v. Barkley, 168 Ariz. 234, 239, 812 P.2d 1052, 1057 (App.1990) (<HOLDING>). \u00b634 Appellants do not so much contest Raben\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that experts may rely in part on internet research 1: holding that a trial court has discretion to qualify experts and rely on various methods in making a valuation determination 2: holding that presumption of correctness defeated when taxpayer alleged assessors valuation was discriminatory and presented evidence of discriminatory valuation methods 3: holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for  trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis 4: holding that appellate court in affirming trial courts decision may rely in part on a ground not presented to trial court", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "bound by the rules and regulations in the MHSAA\u2019s handbook. Trail, 163 So.3d at 276. Although the MHSAA is a private, voluntary association, it is uniquely situated due to its substantial entwinement with government. By statute, the local school boards are empowered to regulate athletic programs. Miss.Code Ann. \u00a7 S7-7-301(q). (Rev.2013). But the school-boards have delegated their statutory authority to regulate athletics to the MHSAA. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass\u2019n. v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768, 774 (Miss.1994). And because the MHSAA\u2019s authority is derived from statutory authority, its actions are \u201cstate action for the purpose of constitutional analysis.\u201d Id.; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass\u2019n, 531 U.S. 288, 291, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In Trail, we recognized that, because student Holdings: 0: holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act 1: holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide 2: recognizing the irony that a state officials conduct may be considered  state action for fourteenth amendment purposes yet not for purposes of the eleventh amendment 3: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 4: holding that regulatory enforcement by a highschool athletic association was state action for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment due to the pervasive entwinement between the athletic association and public schools and officials", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "claim. VI. State Law Claims The Report recommended the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims because it recommended summary judgment on the AD\u00c1 claim. However, because the court does not grant summary judgment on the ADA claim, the state law claims must be addressed. a. Violation of Public Policy Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for \u201cviolation of public policy,\u201d arguing the District breached its own policies when it failed to accommodate Plaintiffs disability. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 26-29. To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, such a claim is not available because a statutory remedy exists. See Barron v. Labor Finders of South Carolina, 393 S.C. 609, 713 S.E.2d 634, 637 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Further, Plaintiff was not terminated; Holdings: 0: holding that where statutory or regulatory provisions which evidence the public policy themselves provide a remedy for the wrongful discharge provision of a further remedy under the public policy exception is unnecessary 1: holding that public policy claims are unavailable where the statute in question provides the employee with a wrongful discharge remedy 2: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for a tort action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy applied to the plaintiffs erisa  510 claim 3: holding a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is not available where the employee has an existing statutory remedy 4: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the EAJA for determining whether a party is entitled to fees. Id. at 456. Accordingly, in Claro, we discussed at length when a party has \u201cincurred\u201d fees for purposes of the EAJA. Id. Because the EAJA does not provide a definition of the term \u201cincurred,\u201d we examined the term\u2019s ordinary meaning. 579 F.3d at 464. After examining the definition of \u201cincurred\u201d in Webster\u2019s Dictionary \u2014 \u201cto become liable or subject to,\u201d or to \u201cbring down upon oneself\u2019 \u2014 and Black\u2019s Law \"Dictionary \u2014 \u201cto suffer to bring on oneself a liability or expense,\u201d id. at 456 (citations and brackets omitted), we concluded that the general rule is that fees are incurred \u201cwhen the litigant has a legal obligation to pay them.\u201d Id. at 464-65 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm\u2019n v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1414-15 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1164 Holdings: 0: holding that under the eaja a litigant did not incur fees when his former employer agreed to pay his legal fees and expenses 1: holding that under the eaja a prevailing party with an unconditional right to be indemnified for his legal expenses by a solvent third party had not incurred attorneys fees 2: holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees 3: holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja 4: holding that a court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees under the eaja but is not required to make an award in all cases where a party seeks supplemental or increased fees", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Garmon doctrine is applicable subject to the existing exceptions. If it involves the NLRA and another federal statute, then the Garmon doctrine is inapplicable as a general rule unless the underlying federal claim is illegal only by way of the NLRA. That is, if the defendant\u2019s conduct is perfectly legal but for the proscriptions of the NLRA, then those determinations of potential illegality should be left to the expertise of the NLRB. Likewise, if the conduct in question is federally chargeable independent of the NLRA (even if it is also arguably covered by the NLRA), then the Garmon doctrine does not apply because the two implicated federal statutes may both be given their intended purpose. See, e.g., Smith v. Nat\u2019l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 125 F.3d 751, 754-57 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. International Brotherhood of Holdings: 0: holding that garmon preemption is inapplicable in eases involving the americans with disabilities act 1: holding that a private party may bring an action in a federal district court seeking injunctive relief on the basis of garmon preemption for only arguably protected or prohibited activity 2: holding that  502a may serve as an independent basis for preemption where  514a the blanket erisa preemption provision is inapplicable 3: holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists 4: holding that garmon preemption provides no basis for removal jurisdiction in federal court and observing that the lower courts are uniform in finding that garmon preemption under the nlra does not completely preempt state laws so as to provide removal jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "have found a scar sufficient to constitute serious physical injury. See State v. Nival, 42 Conn.App. 307, 678 A.2d 1008 (1996)(where jury observed the victim\u2019s one-half-inch facial scar and evidence was presented that the scar was permanent there was sufficient evidence to create jury question as to whether the victim had suffered a serious physical injury); State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 708 (Minn.Ct.App.1985)(a long scar present two and one-half years after the injury was a serious permanent disfigurement); State v. Bledsoe, 920 S.W.2d 538 (Mo.Ct.App.1996)(a one- and-one-half-inch cut on the victim\u2019s chin leading to scarring, a one-and-one-half-inch scar on lower lip, and a sear between her eyes constituted serious disfigurements); State v. Pettis, 748 S.W.2d 793 (Mo.Ct.App.1988)(<HOLDING>); People v. Wade, 187 A.D.2d 687, 590 N.Y.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury 1: holding that serious physical injury as applied to firstdegree assault would include a fourinch permanent scar as a result of a knife wound 2: holding that variance between indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim and proof that the knife fell out of the defendants hand as he was stabbing the victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault 3: holding that victims injuries went beyond serious injury necessary to indict for an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill or inflict serious injury and constituted the permanent disfigurement contemplated by ncgs  14324 4: holding that variance between indictment alleging that defendant held knife to victims neck and proof that defendant only pointed knife at victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of tolling. Id. at 1474. Accordingly, the Court finds that federal law, not state law, governs whether the limitations period in this case was tolled; and \u00a7 657-13 does not operate to toll t rom other jurisdictions are sharply divided on this issue. One line of cases holds that mental incompetency may not toll federal statutes of limitations. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 635 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D.Mo.1986) (and cases cited therein) (mental incompetency does not toll DelCostello six month period on hybrid claims). However, most of the decisions relied upon in Harris involved claims against the federal government and therefore are called into question by the Supreme Court\u2019s recent ruling in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, another line of eases Holdings: 0: holding that equitable principles apply to child support proceedings 1: holding tolling principles do not apply because the purpose of the statute of repose is clearly to serve as a cutoff 2: holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations 3: holding that we lacked jurisdiction to review the veterans courts determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the case before it 4: holding that equitable tolling principles apply to suits against the united states in the same manner as they apply to private parties", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": ". . . .\u201d Rich, 39 N.H. at 336. In Little we said: [An act] mak[ing] the parties to pending suits, not excepted from its operation, competent witnesses on the trial thereof,... is not unconstitutional as being retrospective . . . inasmuch as it establishes no new rule for the decision of those causes, and violates no vested rights of the parties thereto, but is a mere regulation of the proceeding for enforcing remedies, by prescribing a rule for the admission of existing evidence therein \u2014 an exercise of the acknowledged powers of every government. Little, 39 N.H. at 509. Thus, we affirm our prior holdings and conclude that the statutory and other similar evidentiary privileges abrogated by RSA 135-E:10, I, are creatures of public policy and subject to retrospective alteration or e 3) (<HOLDING>). Even if such a right did exist, it would not Holdings: 0: recognizing right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security 1: recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 2: recognizing that state constitution provides mentally ill persons with certain fundamental liberty interests such as the right to be free from unjustified intrusion upon their personal security 3: holding that terminally ill patients do not have a fundamental liberty interest in committing suicide 4: holding right to be fundamental", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not dealing with what the law calls sexual penetration. He admits to Detective Herrick that she was defending herself. He says that his fingers may have gone in her vagina. And you, again, you get to decide whether that can happen inadvertently, especially under the circumstances urider which this would admittedly perform. Because he said \u201cI talked about Chris from Barrow and that was a sexual matter.\u201d 1 . Op. at 774. 2 . See Op. at 774 (citing AS 12.45.045(a) (\"In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree, ... evidence of the complaining witness\u2019 previous sexual conduct may not be admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the jury....\u201d)). 3 . 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985). 4 . See id.; Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska App.1995) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Covington, 703 P.2d at 442. 6 . Op. at Holdings: 0: holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence 1: holding corporate officer liable as aider and abettor in filing of false reports even though reports were not authorized or approved of by officers 2: recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial 3: holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence 4: recognizing that we have consistently held that a party who wishes to introduce evidence of past false reports of sexual assault bears the threshold burden of establishing the falsity of the past reports", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "proceeding. See, e.g., San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir.1996). Even if that were a holding and the law of the circuit, it would not resolve this case, because here the INS never filed the order to show cause to commence removal proceedings. This case is about an order to show cause that was served on the alien but never filed with the immigration court. 14 . It appears that a few district courts have reached the same conclusion as the First Circuit in Wallace, that a removal proceeding has effectively begun when an order to show cause is served upon the alien. See Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999); Dunbar v. INS, 64 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D.Conn.1999); see also Mercado-Amador v. Reno, 47 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1224 (D.Or. 1999) (<HOLDING>). 15 . To the extent that Congress contemplated Holdings: 0: holding that a deportation proceeding commenced after an order to show cause issued 1: recognizing that aliens whose proceedings are commenced with a notice to appear on or after april 1 1997 are subject to removal proceedings under iirira while aliens whose proceedings were commenced with an order to show cause before april 1 1997 were subject to deportation proceedings under prior law 2: holding that summons issued nearly seven months after the show cause order was entered was not issued immediately as required by statute 3: holding that lawful domicile terminates when show cause order is issued 4: holding that because petitioners proceedings commenced after the enactment of iirira petitioner was statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "2000e-5(f), which qualifies the statutory right to intervene, refers only to cases brought by the U.S. Attorney General. That clause is not grammatically connected to the words \u201cthe Commission,\u201d making it inapplicable to actions filed by the EEOC. Moreover, because the EEOC is precluded by the same subsection of this statute from bringing suits against a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, that phrase could not have been intended to apply to suits that were filed by the EEOC. Thus, the statute provides an unconditional right of intervention to aggrieved persons in cases brought by the EEOC. EEOC v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 384 F.Supp. 1264 (D.S.D. 1974); see also Truvillion v. King\u2019s Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that court may intervene in arbitration proceeding by invoking equitable powers 1: recognizing this as the general rule 2: recognizing this presumption 3: recognizing the right to intervene in cases like this 4: recognizing this rule", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "See 2006 Haw. Sess. Laws at 28-30; 2006 Haw. Senate Journal of 23rd Legislature at 1200 & 1277; 2006 Haw. House of Representatives Journal of 23rd Legislature at 1497 & 1653. However, proceeding to the second step of the Sacks framework, it appears that application of \u00a7 134-7(a) would not have an impermissible retroactive effect in this case. Specifically, the Lautenberg Amendment was enacted in 1996 and, therefore, defined gun rights at the time Plaintiff was convicted in 1997. Accordingly, it appears that the application of \u00a7 134-7(a) would not have an impermissible retroactive effect because the state law does not take away or impair rights Plaintiff had before the law was enacted. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-270, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the Court concludes that Holdings: 0: holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment 1: holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases 2: recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively 3: recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment 4: holding that a court examining if a law should be applied retroactively should consider whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "interest in the proper application of the election laws being upheld. Plaintiffs argue that appellants\u2019 status as voters is irrelevant because they have suffered no harm that the general public did not suffer. However, this Court has recognized that \u201c[ejection cases are special... because without the process of elections, citizens lack their ordinary recourse.\u201d Deleeuw v Bd of State Canvassers, 263 Mich App 497, 505-506; 688 NW2d 847 (2004). Because the improper implementation of election laws affects the process by which citizens normally exercise their collective voice to uphold the status quo or effectuate change, \u201cordinary citizens have standing to enforce the law in election cases.\u201d Id. at 506. See also Helmkamp v Livonia City Council, 160 Mich App 442, 445; 408 NW2d 470 (1987) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[T]he right to vote is an implicit \u00a3 Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs in an election case were not required to show a substantial injury distinct from that suffered by the public in general 1: recognizing that the government not the relator must have suffered the injury in fact required for article iii standing 2: holding that in order to be compensable consequential damages must affect some right or interest that is different in kind not merely in degree from that suffered by the public in general 3: holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets 4: holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in Florida, his ongoing medical treatment in Florida, and the location of multiple witnesses in Florida. Plaintiff also emphasizes that consent to voluntary dismissal has been obtained from all but two Defendants. In response, the objecting Defendants argue that re-filing this case in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which is Plaintiffs admitted intention should the case be dismissed, would unfairly impose upon them the costs associated with submitting motions and other documents which have already been filed with this Court. These Defendants, however, apparently overlook the Court\u2019s power to levy costs and, furthermore, fail to demonstrate that they would suffer legal prejudice in the event of a dismissal. See, e.g., Manshack, 915 F.2d at 174 (<HOLDING>). Considering the totality of the circumstances Holdings: 0: holding that merely subjecting the defendant to another lawsuit does not amount to plain legal prejudice where the nonmoving party does not complain of excessive litigation costs resulting from discovery 1: holding under plain error standard of review that apprendi does not apply to restitution because the statute does not prescribe a maximum amount 2: holding that the nonmoving parly must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question 3: holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit 4: holding that the nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the Guidelines. In Galarza-Payan, the sentencing court stated that the defendant\u2019s circumstances would have to \u201cfall outside the heartland\u201d to support a depar ture, or downward adjustment. Id. The defendant argued on appeal that the court\u2019s statement suggested that it applied the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion. We affirmed the sentence, noting that \u201cthe district court, while using pre-Booker Guidelines terminology, did not sentence [the defendant] in a mandatory fashion.\u201d Id. After looking at the sentencing hearing as a whole, we were able to conclude that the district court \u201cunderstood its discretion and considered [the] \u00a7 3553(a) factors.\u201d Id.; see also United States v. Valgara, 223 Fed.Appx. 799, 803 (10th Cir.2007), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 385, 169 L.Ed.2d 270 (2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 219 Fed.Appx. 765, Holdings: 0: holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level 1: holding that an arithmetical error that increased a defendants base offense level pursuant to the sentencing guidelines affected his substantial rights 2: holding that the sentencing courts conclusion that there was simply no way to avoid the base offense level did not indicate mandatory application of the guidelines 3: holding that the mere mandatory application of the guidelines  the district courts belief that it was required to impose a guidelines sentence  constitutes error 4: holding unconstitutional the mandatory application of the federal sentencing guidelines", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is so excessive that it violates due process can involve consideration of whether the punitive damages award exceeded the amount necessary to accomplish the goals of punishment and deterrence. Murray v. Laborers Union Local No. 324, 55 F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991)). The Supreme Court did not reject deterrence as a legitimate factor in the consideration of whether or not an award is unconstitutionally excessive in either BMW or State Farm. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (noting only that deterrence could not justify a punitive damages award without considering whether less drastic measures could be expected to achieve that goal); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in a post-BMW case, the Ninth Holdings: 0: holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages 1: holding prebmw that deterrence is relevant to the determination of constitutionally permissible punitive damages 2: recognizing that deterrence relates to reprehensibility in that the conduct must be so reprehensible as to warrant imposition of punitive damages as a further sanction to achieve punishment and deterrence 3: recognizing the conduct giving rise to punitive damages must be a proximate cause of the harm inflicted 4: holding that perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendants conduct", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "387, 391-92 (3d Cir.1986) (noting that attorney disciplinary rules \u201care mandatory\u201d because attorneys are subject to discipline for violating them). Thus, despite the Board\u2019s position \u2014 insofar as the Executive Director\u2019s letters represent it \u2014 that the inquiry provision constitutes a recommendation rather than a mandate, the fact that the Act provides for disciplinary action against Plaintiffs in case of a violation provides evidence that Plaintiffs\u2019 fear that they may face discipline is objectively reasonable for standing purposes. Notably, this is not a generalized fear of disciplinary action, but rather a specific apprehension by a specific group \u2014 physicians-whose conduct the Act targets. But cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int\u2019l USA \u2014 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1143, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we note that Board has not been Holdings: 0: holding that where the defendants  107 claim was based on remediation costs they incurred and may incur in the future as the result of a lawsuit instituted under  107a they did not demonstrate that they incurred necessary costs of response within the meaning of  107a 1: holding that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show that the arbitration agreement prevented them from vindicating their statutory rights because they did not file affidavits or assert in their briefs that the costs were prohibitively expensive instead plaintiffs provided only the barest assertions that the fees and costs clause  makes the arbitration provision unconscionable 2: holding that although plaintiffs claims were masked in various legal theories they were premised on a single claim of product liability and therefore fell under north carolinas product liability statute 3: holding that because plaintiffs failed to prove that their incurred fuel characterization and loading costs would not have been incurred in the nonbreach world plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery for these costs 4: holding that attorneys and various human rights labor legal and media organizations cannot manufacture standing to challenge a provision of the foreign intelligence surveillance act of 1978 by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm where plaintiffs merely speculate that the government will target their communications and so the costs they incurred were a product of their generalized fear of surveillance", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "without notice, and against all subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded or whose mortgage shall have been first duly recorded or registered; but my such deed or instrument shall be valid and operative, although not recorded, except as against such subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees. [N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 (emphasis added). See also Tobar, supra, 293 N.J.Super. at 413, 680 A2.d 1121 (noting that \u201cactual or constructive notice is n the position that it is among the protected classes generally entitled to recording notice under N.J.S.A. 46:22-1. See C.D. v. Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 93 N.J.A.R.2d 91,1993 WL 471193 (Div. of Med. Assistance) (<HOLDING>). As noted previously, with the promulgation of Holdings: 0: holding that limitations period on employment discrimination claim triggered on date of discharge not on date of discovery of discriminatory intent 1: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act 2: holding that dmahs is not among classes protected by njsa 46221 and concluding that property was transferred on date that deed was signed not on recording date 3: holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective 4: holding that the date of transfer should be measured by the date that the transfer was good as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or judgement holder which in accordance with applicable state law was the date of recordation as opposed to the date the deed was signed", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "had not been discharged from the hospital at the time of the suicide. See Bramlette, 302 S.C. at 74, 393 S.E.2d at 917 (affirming the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s directed verdict motion on basis of proximate cause when patient committed suicide while on a recreational outing with other patients and occupational therapist employed by hospital); see also Hoeffner v. Citadel, 311 S.C. 361, 368, 429 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1993) (\u201cBramlette does not impose strict liability on those with a duty to prevent suicide\u201d \u201cbecause health care professionals are subject to liability for failure to prevent suicide only when departure from the standards of their profession proximately causes their patient\u2019s suicide\u201d); Sloan v. Edgewood Sanatorium, Inc., 225 S.C. 1, 13, 80 S.E.2d 348, 353 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Other states have recognized that same duty Holdings: 0: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave 1: holding that the disputed issue with respect to the state law bar was properly submitted to the jury 2: holding the issue of negligence was properly submitted to the jury and its finding of negligence was a reasonable inference because decedent had known suicidal tendencies and committed suicide while a patient at a psychiatric hospital 3: holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action 4: holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe coumadin and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.1993) (\u201cWithin the totality of circumstances, there is neither a threshold \u2018magic number\u2019 of harassing incidents that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim.\u201d) (emphasis added); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n. 4 (7th Cir.1991) (recognizing that single, isolated incident of harassment can give rise to employer liability for racial harassment under Title VII). 119 F.3d at 873. While there is no minimum number of incidents, where a plaintiff alleges few incidents, they must be severe to establish a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Lowe v. Angelo\u2019s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Creamer v. Laid-law Transit, Inc., 86 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a single offensive racist comment was not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment 1: holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims 2: holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus 3: holding that isolated remarks are insufficient to prove discriminatory intent 4: holding that one isolated comment and the use of the term girlie although regrettable do not demonstrate that the work environment  was permeated with discriminatory intimidation ridicule and insult ", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Cronic was a companion case-to Strickland; however, in Cronic the question before the Supreme Court was whether counsel\u2019s representation was such that, even without a showing of prejudice, it might be presumed to have occurred. See id at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Under the analysis developed in Cronic, such would be the case when counsel was absent during a critical stage of the trial. See id. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Case law has developed to instruct us that a determination of whether the absence of counsel has occurred at a critical stage is dependent upon whether the evidence presented during counsel\u2019s absence was directly inculpa-tory of the defendant. See U.S. v. Russell, 205 F.3d 768, 772 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Our review of the record leads us to conclude Holdings: 0: holding the absence of defense counsel during jury reinstruction to be a deprivation of counsel during a critical stage under clearly established federal law 1: holding cronic not applicable where counsel conceded his clients guilt to protect his own credibility and avoid conviction on other charges 2: holding that the cronic presumption should apply where counsel was absent for two days during which the probability of his guilt increased during the governments presentation of evidence against his coconspirators 3: holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence 4: holding that where defense counsel is absent for even a portion of voir dire reversal under cronic is required in the absence of a waiver", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "ago the Wrongful Death Act was recognized as remedial legislation, Turon v. J. & L. Construction Company, 8 N.J. 543, 555, 86 A.2d 192 (1952), but was limited to \u201cpecuniary injuries\u201d sustained by qualified beneficiaries. N.J.S.A. 2A:31-4 and -5. The legislative remedy \u201cpermits recovery only of a survivor\u2019s calculable economic loss.\u201d Smith v. Whitaker, 160 N.J. 221, 232, 734 A.2d 243 (1999). A common form of pecuniary loss is future earnings that the \u201cdecedent would have contributed to his ... survivors had he lived.\u201d Johnson v. Dobrosky, 187 N.J. 594, 607, 902 A.2d 238 (2006) (citing Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 567-68, 417 A.2d 15 (1980)). However, pecuniary loss enc reported opinion of a state court comes from Florida. See Lindsay v. Allstate, 561 So.2d 427 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). Although these decisions support the Law Holdings: 0: holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child 1: holding that a cause of action for wrongful death is an asset of an estate 2: holding that the loss of prospective federal estate tax credits as a consequence of an insureds premature death is not an element of damages under the florida wrongful death act 3: holding that federal estate tax credits that the decedent would have received had he lived longer could not be recovered in a wrongful death action absent express legislative authority 4: holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Law \u00a7 3105 and breaches of warranties under N.Y. Insurance Law \u00a7 3106,\u201d see Second Am. Compl. \u00b6 78, now seeking as relief, not only the right to disclaim coverage for the Heschel incident but also to void the CGL and UMB policies ab initio \u201cbased on Adas Yereim\u2019s material non-disclosures.\u201d Id. at pg. 17 (emphasis added). Incredibly, it was not until approximately ten months after the latest date GuideOne learned of the material facts concerning Adas Yereim\u2019s alleged misrepresentations did it finally seek to exercise its claimed right to void its policies. With respect to GuideOne\u2019s right to rescind, only Rip Van Winkle slept longer. Such delay is unreasonable as a matter of law. See Saitta v. New York City Transit Auth. et al., 55 A.D.3d 422, 423, 866 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1st Dep\u2019t 2008) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, concluding that the delay is Holdings: 0: holding that a five month delay was unreasonable 1: holding that a five month delay is unreasonable 2: holding that after learning the information justifying rescission an insurers four month delay in seeking it was unreasonable as a matter of law 3: holding that a six month delay was unreasonable 4: holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a theory not authorized by law. This difference sufficiently distinguishes the opinion in Arteaga from the facts of this case and renders application of Bowen and its progeny inappropriate. In this case, the verdict rendered by the jury was a general one\u2014meaning, we are unable to determine whether some or all of the jurors believed Appellant was guilty of murder based upon a theory authorized by law (intentional or knowing conduct) or upon a theory not authorized by law (reckless or criminally negligent conduct). Because the record supports both possibilities, the appropriate remedy is not to acquit or to reform the judgment of conviction. The appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-70, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (<HOLDING>). Therefore,- we believe the appropriate remedy Holdings: 0: holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence 1: holding that remand for resentencing is appropriate when sentence for reversed conviction appears to have influenced trial courts sentence for the affirmed conviction 2: holding remand for a new trial to be the appropriate remedy when conviction was based on a general jury verdict encompassing both a constitutional and an unconstitutional theory of conviction 3: holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation 4: holding that the appropriate remedy for a trial courts refusal to consider an indigent defendants request for new counsel is to remand for a hearing", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201cguilty\u201d as Chambers is here, for there is no doubt that Congress could \u201cproperly reach\u201d the conduct there at issue \u2014 bribery in Guam. There, as here, we faced only the question whether Congress had done so through a valid statute. Even though the defendants in Sood had engaged in prohibitable and morally blameworthy conduct, we granted collateral relief because Congress had not prohibited their conduct through a valid enactment. Similarly, even if we assume that Chambers\u2019 conduct fell within the core of the child pornography exception to the First Amendment, there is no valid statute on the books in this circuit that prohibits it. While perhaps morally \u201cguilty,\u201d he is legally innocent. There is d Cir.1982) (same) with Williams v. United States, 805 F.2d 1301, 1303-07 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1039, 107 S.Ct. 1978, Holdings: 0: holding frady applicable 1: holding frady inapplicable 2: holding rule applicable to witness 3: holding that the penalty is applicable 4: holding rehabilitation act applicable", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "August 2008 complaint regarding being written up for excessive idle time and absences from his desk. Although Gardner generally testified that Elliott regularly subjected him to more excessive scrutiny than other employees and regularly harassed him and that other employees agreed that Gardner was being harassed or \u201cpersecuted,\u201d such conclusory statements and allegations are insufficient to raise a fact issue: \u201cIf a witness provides a conclusion but does not provide underlying facts to support the conclusion, then the witness\u2019s testimony is conclusory and legally insufficient to support a judgment.\u201d Ortega v. Cach, LLC, 396 S.W.3d 622, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (Frost, J., dissenting); see also Ryland Group v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex.1996) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Texas Div.-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 Holdings: 0: holding affiants statement that certain conduct constituted intentional or willful misconduct by defendant was conelusory because it stated conclusion and did not provide supporting facts 1: holding that a refusal to make false statements that no misconduct occurred is a very different circumstance  than an affirmative statement of misconduct 2: holding that the affiants statement  based upon his belief  did not demonstrate the personal knowledge required by fedrcivp 56e 3: holding that an employees purposeful violation of established safety rules despite instruction and warning constituted willful misconduct 4: holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "liability,\u201d as well as steep civil fines, \u201con a broad range of ordinary industrial and commercial activities.\u201d Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, because the amount of jurisdictional wetlands existing on a tract of land has a significant impact on the value of that tract, evidence regarding jurisdictional wetland amounts is relevant and material to fixing just compensation. Accordingly, we conclude that the master was authorized to make a ruling as to the amount of jurisdictional wetlands existing on the parcel as of the condemnation date so that the just compensation owed to Normandy could ultimately be determined. Cf. State v. St. Charles Airline Lands, Inc., 871 So.2d 674 (La.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). B. Corps\u2019 Authority to Make Jurisdictional Holdings: 0: recognizing that publicly targeting a property for condemnation resulting in economic damage to the owner generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property 1: holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property 2: holding that landowners testimony based on lot method was properly excluded in condemnation case involving property  that owner proposed to develop as mobile home park where subdivision development was speculative 3: holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property 4: holding that the trial court was allowed to consider for the purpose of determining just compensation in a condemnation action expert testimony regarding whether the owner of the condemned property would have received permits to develop wetlands existing on the property", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the child because of incarceration, hospitalization, or other physical or mental incapacity; [or] (x) who is regularly exposed to illegal drug-related activity in the home. 2 . The house was owned by the great-grandmother of De.S. and occupied also by various aunts and uncles. 3 . In a related argument, appellant complains that the magistrate judge improperly permitted several witnesses to testify as rebuttal witnesses. Since the primary object of this proceeding is to determine the best interests of the child, we reject such a crabbed application of the rules of evidence. We have recognized previously the duty of the judicial officer to obtain a wide array of information in order to assure that the best interests of the child are served. See In re M.D., 758 A.2d 27, 33-34 (D.C.2000) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Holdings: 0: holding that where the case is technically not closed and the ends of justice may best be served by the admission of crucial evidence it is an abuse of the trial courts discretion to deny the introduction of such evidence 1: holding that paramount consideration in terminationofparentalrights proceeding is best interests of the child 2: holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority 3: holding that the trial court must specifically consider whether it would be in the best interest of the child for the case to proceed before a putative father may be permitted to seek blood tests in an attempt to rebut the presumption of paternity 4: holding that the trial court in a neglect proceeding has the paramount obligation  to protect the best interests of the child  and ought not to be passive in the face of what it recognizes is a deficient presentation of evidence in such a case the court may and should take affirmative steps to ensure that it has enough evidence before it to make an informed decision", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "ability to use and enjoy the cottages, that limitation was not a deprivation of any property right. The Town\u2019s actions here were all legitimate government actions intended simply to enforce its nuisance ordinances. \u25a0 Such regulatory actions do not constitute a deprivation of property because they represent limitations on the use of property that \u201cinhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State\u2019s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.\u201d Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. 2886. Abating public nuisances and protecting the public trust have long been part of governmental authority in North Carolina. See, e.g., Ward v. Willis, 51 N.C. 183, 185 (1858) (discussing the public trust doctrine); Dunn v. Stone, 4 N.C. 241, 242 (1815) (<HOLDING>). By acting to abate what it believed was a Holdings: 0: recognizing that the government generally has the right to insist on performance in strict compliance with the contract specifications 1: recognizing a states interest in representing the interests of their citizens in enjoining public nuisances 2: holding that when the government acts to enforce public rights the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts 3: recognizing that a private citizen cannot sue to abate a public nuisance unless he has received an extraordinary and particular damage indicating that generally the government has the authority to act to abate such nuisances 4: holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that Mr. Tompkins was aware of smoking risks since the 1950s when his wife began urging him to quit. A manufacturer has a duty to warn \u201cthe appropriate audience of all potential dangers of which it, through the exercise of reasonable care, knows or should know.\u201d Ellis v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., No. 96-CV-0535E(F), 1998 WL 401682, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jul.17, 1998). Yet there is no duty to warn consumers of \u201cobvious risks and dangers,\u201d which is defined to mean \u201cthose risks and dangers which could have been or should have been appreciated by the user or that can be recognized as a matter of common sense.\u201d Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 248 A.D.2d 840, 842, 669 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dep\u2019t 1998); see also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 700 N.E.2d 303 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Butler v. Interlake Corp., 244 A.D.2d 913, Holdings: 0: holding that the airline had no duty to warn passengers of the potential hazards of flying with a head cold 1: holding that no duty to warn exists when hazards are known through general knowledge 2: holding that such a duty exists 3: holding that no legal duty exists to warn of the health risks of alcohol consumption because such risks are common knowledge 4: holding a duty to warn arises only when the potential victim is known and foreseeable", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the prosecutor referred not once but twice to the Supreme Court\u2014 both mentioning \u201cautomatic review\u201d and that the interrogatory to be completed by the jurors also \u201cgoes to the Supreme Court.\u201d We are unwilling to treat lightly the prosecutor\u2019s pointed references to appellate review of this crucial decision. Statements, like those made by the prosecutor here, \u201ccan be literally true but quite misleading by failing, for example, to disclose information essential to make what was said not misleading.\u201d Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1285. As a result, a Caldwell violation may be established where a technically accurate statement describing the state appellate review process nonetheless \u201cmisled the jury to minimize its role in the sentencing process.\u201d Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 713 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Given the limited nature of the Delaware Holdings: 0: holding that under the alabama death penalty statute because the judge did not consider the jurys recommendation the statute which forced the jury to sentence the defendant to death whenever aggravating circumstances existed was not unconstitutional 1: holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced 2: holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant 3: holding that private individuals who conspired with judge could be sued even though judge could not 4: holding that prosecutor had violated caldwell by emphasizing that the trial judge could disregard the jurys recommendation of death even though no state judge had in fact ever done so", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Woodruff, 735 F.3d at 449 (emphasis add ed, quotation marks omitted). There is no meaningful distinction between possessing narcotics with intent to \u201cmanufacture, deliver or sell,\u201d and possessing them with intent to \u201cmanufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.\u201d Section 39-17-417 is a categorical controlled substance offense. With the predicate questions resolved, we can finally turn to the actions of the district court. At sentencing, the district court had before it a PSR stating that Defendant had violated one of two crimes \u2014 one a categorical controlled substance offense and one not. If Defendant had objected, the district court could not have decided which statute Defendant had violated based on the PSR\u2019s vague description of the offense. Cf. Wynn, 579 F.3d at 576-77 (<HOLDING>). Defendant, however, did not object. In fact, Holdings: 0: holding that the categorical approach applies to  924c 1: holding that application of the modified categorical approach did not establish a covered conviction where the judgment of conviction did not contain the factual basis for the crime 2: holding that courts may consider a plea agreement and other documents contained in the record of conviction when applying the modified categorical approach 3: holding that a district court cannot use the psrs factual statements when applying the modified categorical approach 4: holding modified categorical approach unavailable where the statute of conviction was missing an element of the generic definition", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "mootness doctrine, one of which involves issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review. See, e.g., Quinn v. Webb Wheel Products, supra; Robinson v. Arkansas State Game & Fish Comm\u2019n, 263 Ark. 462, 565 S.W.2d 433 (1978) (authority of courts to enter temporary orders despite expiration of the particular orders being litigated); Cummings v. Washington County Election Comm\u2019n, 291 Ark. 354, 724 S.W.2d 486 (1987) (addressing question of candidate\u2019s eligibility to run for office despite completion of election cycle). The other mootness exception concerns issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation. This exception arose early in our caselaw and continues today. See, e.g., Forrest Constr., Inc. v. Milam, supra (<HOLDING>); Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 1: holding that an issue is a matter of substantial public importance where it involves the use of property in a large subdivision and involves the rights of a large number of people 2: holding that no public policy stated where employee and not public at large would benefit from employees whistleblowing actions 3: holding that because of the boards special competence in the field of labor relations its interpretation of the act is accorded special deference and noting that whether a bargaining unit is appropriate involves a large measure of informed discretion vested in the board and is rarely to be disturbed 4: holding that the court will not consider an issue not raised in the district court unless 1 it involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice 2 the party raising the issue had no opportunity to do so before the district court 3 the interest of substantial justice is at stake 4 the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or 5 the issue presents significant questions of general impact or great public concern", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "testimony just generally describes the limitation caused by her condition. When asked whether her congenital heart disease causes any restrictions on her day-today activities, Plaintiff responded that she was instructed to \u201cstay off her feet as much as possible.\u201d (First Reis Depo. at 16-17). In contrast, the deposition testimony of Plaintiff shows that she was able to perform activities involving standing. Plaintiff testified that she was able to feed herself, bathe herself, and prepare her own meals. (Id. at 16). She also testified that she was able to walk and go up and down escalators and elevators. (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff acted as a substitute teacher of young children without special consideration or assistance. (Id. at 14-15, 17). She testified th 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity 1: holding that a permanent lifting restriction of no more than twentyfive pounds on a continuous basis is not substantially limiting 2: holding that a lifting restriction did not substantially limit a computer technicians ability to engage in the major life activity of working 3: holding that a twentyfive pounds lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities 4: holding that restriction limiting continuous lifting of containers weighing fortyfour to fiftysix pounds does not substantially limit any major life activity", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "adjudication. The Puerto Rico high court has at least discussed, and has seemingly signaled, the existence of an inverse condemnation remedy.... We think [that the appellants] must pursue that remedy before they can maintain a federal damages claim.... Id. at 514-15. So it is here. If the plaintiff were to pursue the inverse condemnation remedy, the local courts would be presented with an issue of first impression under Puerto Rico law. Until he travels that road, the availability vel non of the inverse condemnation remedy remains open to question. It is the claimant\u2019s burden to prove that the potential state remedy is unavailable, and uncertainty prevents him from carrying that burden. Consequently, his section 1983 takings claims are unripe. See Gilbert, 932 F.2d at 64-65 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs second argument focuses on the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 1: holding that due process is not violated when a state employee intentionally deprives an individual of property or liberty so long as the state provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy such as an article 78 proceeding 2: holding that as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority a court should not vacate his decision 3: holding as long as the defendant has an adequate opportunity to impeach the reliability of a scientific test and the qualifications of the person administering the test due process is not implicated by a states good faith failure to preserve a sample for independent testing 4: holding that as long as the state provides an arguably adequate process for securing compensation for a taking federal intervention un der section 1983 before the claimant has resorted to that procedure is premature", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "held that the \u201cstandard Severance\u201d referenced in the RIAs was the West Gulf Bank Schedule and that these two documents could be analyzed independently of the ERISA Plan. But as discussed above, the West Gulf Bank Schedule was an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan\u2019s schedule of benefits, which was subsequently incorporated by formal amendment to the Plan. Accordingly, even if the \u201cstandard Severance\u201d to which the RIAs refer is the severance benefit described in the West Gulf Bank Schedule, that Schedule itself relates to and is an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan. See 365 S.W.3d at 777 (Mas-sengale, J., concurring). In turn, any benefits must be calculated pursuant to the ERISA Plan, which, as amended, sets out the 6-and-26 schedule described above. See Epps, 7 F.3d at 45 (<HOLDING>). We thus agree with the concurring justice in Holdings: 0: holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted 1: holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed 2: holding that an employees claim for wrongful discharge based on the employers desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employees pension fund is preempted by erisa even though the claims are asserted under tort theories not erisa and seek damages only in the form of lost wages mental anguish and punitive damages not benefits under the plan 3: holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa 4: holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "some two and a half years later, no violent acts had occurred on her property or in the general vicinity of her property. The record also shows that the police had no knowledge of any threats being made against the employees of the massage parlor, nor did the victim\u2019s own husband. In addition, the victim never expressed any concern over her safety or security at the massage parlor. Since there is no evidence in the record of any previous incidents of violence or threats against the victim which would have placed the Defendant on notice of the likelihood of the victim\u2019s murder, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the victim\u2019s murder was foreseeable. See Napper v. Kenwood Drive-In Theatre, 310 S.W.2d 270, 272 (1958) and Grisham v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 929 F.Supp. 1054 (E.D.Ky.1995) (<HOLDING>). As such, Defendant Seawright is entitled to Holdings: 0: holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm 1: holding that 8 incidents of assault theft robbery or burglary on the premises and 80 similar incidents within a 2bloek area within the prior 3 years did not constitute special circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect 2: holding that walmart was not under a duty to protect a patron from a criminal assault absent prior similar incidents at their facility or in the general area 3: holding that jury could conclude from prior incidents involving breaches of the peace  that the assault in the parking lot was a significant foreseeable possibility which defendant had a duty to guard against 4: recognizing drug traffickers will commonly possess firearms to protect their product to protect their drugs to protect their cash to protect their life and even to protect their turf alteration in original internal quotation marks omit ted", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and the proposed order together constituted the motion for injunctive relief, the district court properly treated the two documents as a signed motion. Carman next argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the defendants\u2019 motion for sanctions. Carman\u2019s signature indicated that \u201cto the best of ... [his] knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [his motion] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law ... and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.\u201d Fed.R.Civ. Pro. 11. Carman\u2019s pro se status did not entitle him to disregard the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the district court gave Carman Holdings: 0: holding that when the administrative procedure is not empowered to achieve the end sought in the legal action the procedure is unavailable because it cannot accomplish the purpose of the legal action 1: holding that ignorance of the law or legal procedure is no excuse for filing a frivolous action 2: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations 3: holding that proof of willfulness in criminal tax cases requires negating a defendants claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law he had a goodfaith belief that he was not violating the law 4: holding petitioners alleged ignorance of aedpas statute of limitations is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to that before us. See, Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7 288.040 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 282-A:14 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. \u00a7 4141.31 (Anderson 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. \u00a7 61-6-20 (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 50-7-303 (Supp. 1995). However, it does not appear that these states have addressed the issue presented by this case. A review of the opinions from states with dissimilar statutes shows that they are split on the issue of whether the receipt of either workers\u2019 compensation or unemployment benefits bars or causes an offset from the receipt of the other. As urged by Porter, some states allow awards of both workers\u2019 compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Laymance, 38 Ark. App. 55, 828 S.W.2d 356 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Mendez v. Southwest Com. Health Services, 104 Holdings: 0: holding that in absence of statute prohibiting recovery claimant may receive workers compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously 1: holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability 2: holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury 3: holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits 4: holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to alter or amend judgment did not fill the gap. With the case already on appeal, the district court denied Experian\u2019s motion on jurisdictional grounds but suggested that it would grant Experian\u2019s motion if it still had jurisdiction, staying its prior order to file the documents in the public record pending our resolution of the appeal. According to the district court, Phillips would govern the motion and good cause existed for placing Experian\u2019s documents under seal. Because the documents at issue here were attached to a dispositive motion, however, Phillips does not provide the proper standard. A determination by the district court that good cause exists for sealing Experian\u2019s documents does not establish that there are \u201ccompelling reasons\u201d to do so. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (<HOLDING>). Instead, the court must decide whether Holdings: 0: holding that a good cause showing  will not suffice to fulfill the compelling reasons standard that a party must meet to rebut the presumption of access to dispositive pleadings and attachments 1: holding that to gain a protective order the party must make particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document 2: holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness 3: holding that once a court has found good cause to protect material from public disclosure there is no longer any commonlaw right of access to this material and the party seeking disclosure must present sufficiently compelling reasons why the sealed discovery document should be released 4: holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure is on the party that seeks nondisclosure rather than on the party that seeks access", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "See Padilla, 122 N.M. at 97, 920 P.2d at 1051 (noting that showmp identification lacked reli ability where witness had no opportunity to see the perpetrator\u2019s face). {24} A second factor is the accuracy of the pre-identification descriptions the witnesses gave. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. Petitioner is African-American, and only one of the two witnesses identified the perpetrator as African-American prior to the showup identification. The other witness described the perpetrator as Hispanic. A description of the race of the perpetrator that does not match the race of the defendant casts doubt on the reliability of the subsequent showup identification. See United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 678 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The witness whose description of the Holdings: 0: holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case 1: recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination 2: holding that showup identification should have been suppressed where witnesss description of the perpetrators race did not accurately describe the defendants race 3: holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant 4: holding that custody decision based on race is not justified", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "should be strictly construed. Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in awarding IOV2 percent interest on the judgment rather than the statutory rate, and reverse and remand this portion of the judgment with instructions to amend the award by applying the statutory rate. Prejudgment interest on costs Appellants maintain that the district court order can be read to require prejudgment interest on the award of costs since it provides that interest on the entire judgment should be awarded from the date of service of the complaint. First, appellants argue that interest should not be awarded on costs at all. See National Educators Life Insurance Company v. Apache Lanes, Inc., 555 P.2d 600, 602 (Okla. 1976) (<HOLDING>); Cajun Electric Power Cooperative v. Holdings: 0: recognizing general rule that prejudgment interest may be awarded in claims for liquidated amounts 1: holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings 2: holding that no interest is paid on benefits awarded based on a finding of cue 3: holding that in the absence of statutory authorization interest cannot be awarded on costs 4: holding that credit cannot be awarded for time served on community control", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a specific intent statute that requires proof that a defendant had knowledge of an alleged violation? Minn.Stat. \u00a7 340A.503, subd. 1(a)(1), provides that it is unlawful for any \u201c[r]etail intoxicating liquor or 3.2 percent malt liquor licensee, municipal liquor store, or bottle club permit holder under section 340A.414, to permit any person under the age of 21 years to drink alcoholic beverages on the licensed premises or within the municipal liquor store[.]\u201d Appellant argues that the term \u201cpermit,\u201d as used in the statute, must incorporate a requirement of proof of knowledge or specific intent on the part of a defendant, otherwise a licensee will be unconstitutionally held vicariously criminally hable for the acts of its employees. See State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn.1986) (<HOLDING>). The current statute, MinmStat. \u00a7 340A.503, Holdings: 0: holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment 1: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 2: holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights 3: holding vicarious liability imposed on employers whose employees served alcohol to minors violates substantive due process provision of minnesota constitution 4: holding that a conflict of interest on the part of the prosecution violates the due process clause of the virginia constitution", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "potential liabilities and whether the purchasing corporation has \u201csubstantial ties\u201d to the selling corporation. See Mexico Feed & Seed Corp., 980 F.2d at 489; Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 909 F.2d at 1265-1266; Elf Atochem North America v. United States, 908 F.Supp. 275, 282-283 (E.D.Pa.1995); United States v. Peirce, 1995 WL 356017 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.21, 1995); United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chemicals, Inc., 824 F.Supp. 46, 51 (E.D.Pa.1993). The Court agrees with the district court in Peirce that these factors, while not dispositive, should be considered along with the other factors set forth in Carolina Transformer Co. in determining whether successor liability should attach under the substantial continuity test. Cf. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F.Supp. 1261 (E.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>). Although the appropriateness of these two Holdings: 0: holding that strict compliance is not required 1: holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute 2: recognizing cercla successor liability 3: holding that apportionment of cercla liability is  a matter of federal common law 4: recognizing strict product liability actions", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "GAJARSA, Circuit Judge. Alejandrino Manangan responds to the issue whether his petition for review should be dismissed. Manangan petitioned this court for review of a Merit Systems Protection Board decision denying his request for a deferred retirement annuity under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). In the initial decision, the administrative judge determined that Manangan was not entitled to a Civil Service Retirement Act (CSRA) annuity because his service was pursuant to excepted temporary or indefinite appointments. See Rosete v. Office of Personnel Management, 48 F.3d 514 (Fed.Cir.1995) (upholding OPM\u2019s interpretation that an indefinite appointment is excluded from CSRS coverage); see also Casilang v. Office of Personnel Management, 248 F.3d 1381, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Manangan argues in his response that his case Holdings: 0: holding that the appeal was properly before the court where the appellant appealed from an order amending a prior order without appealing from the prior order 1: holding that the revocation of executive order no 10180 in 1955 did not automatically convert indefinite excluded appointments into appointments covered by the csra because executive order no 10530 kept in place the exclusion of nonpermanent employees from coverage by the csra effected by executive order no 10180 until the civil service commission promulgated new regulations which it did in 1956 2: holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits 3: holding that when the executive branch defaults a district court has the authority to appoint a prosecutor for contempt proceedings in order to preserve respect for the judicial system itself 4: holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified ....\u201d Rule 37(a)(4), M.R.Civ.P. \u00b655 We agree with the District Court that Ribi should have been allowed to discover the drafting history of the CGL policy\u2019s pollution exclusion and that Travelers, as the party seeking protection, failed to show good cause for its omission. Although the issues were ultimately adjudged in its favor, Travelers was not substantially justified seeking a protective order at the time due to the substantial case law relying on the drafting history in interpreting the \u201csudden and accidental\u201d clause and its potential relevancy in aiding the court\u2019s determination. See, e.g., Textron v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (R.I. 2000), 754 A.2d 742, 751 (<HOLDING>); Nestle Food Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. Holdings: 0: holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage    a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work    as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present 1: holding that a discharge continuously or even sporadically over a period of time cannot be considered sudden within the meaning of the pollution exclusion 2: holding that the drafting history of the sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion clause of a cgl policy facilitated an interpretation of sudden to include unexpected 3: holding that the release of carbon monoxide into an apartment is not the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the pollution exclusion clause 4: holding accidental rupture of insureds oil tanks during a flood subject to pollution exclusion clause", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "officer to enter the bedroom to conduct a search during the interview. Id. No officers restrained Perrin or positioned themselves so as to inhibit his exit. Id. at 721. Like Officer Goodman, the officer there did not raise his voice or threaten Perrin; and like Perrin, Huether had no trouble \u201cunderstanding or answering questions about internet use and child pornography.\u201d Id. at 720. The circumstances were such that Perrin would have considered himself free not to answer the officer\u2019s questions and leave the premises, and therefore not in. custody when he confessed to possessing child pornography. Id. at 721. Perrin reiterates that this court has held \u201ccircumstances more dominated by police were not custodial.\u201d Id. (citing United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 825, 830 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>)); United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 721 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not in miranda custody during knock and talk interview at his residence 1: holding a defendant was not in custody for purposes of miranda after he consented to go to police headquarters 2: holding that two beatings which were four years apart lasted only a few hours each and did not result in serious injury did not constitute persecution 3: holding that a chiropractor was not in custody for miranda purposes despite an ensuing interview which lasted nearly seven hours 4: holding miranda inapplicable because defendant not in custody", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "doctrine \"is based on the recognition that EEOC charges frequently are filled out by employees without the benefit of counsel and that their primary purpose is to alert the EEOC to the discrimination that a plaintiff claims he is suffering.\u201d Deravin, 335 F.3d at 201 (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted); cf. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 1160, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008) (\u201cDocuments filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to the extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the employee\u2019s rights and statutory remedies.\u201d). 7 . This is not a case in which the plaintiff alleges retaliation for filing the very EEO charge that served to exhaust the plaintiffs other claims. See Terry, 336 F.3d at 151 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff did not file an EEO complaint Holdings: 0: recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement 1: holding that the ftcas exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional 2: recognizing that the exhaustion requirement is relaxed in such cases 3: holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile 4: recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to assist the judge in fixing an appropriate punishment. Id. It is well-settled that \u201c[i]f the sentence was within the range set by the Legislature [for the crime with which the defendant was convicted], an appellate court will not interfere with the judgment.\u201d Hudson v. Commonwealth, 10 Va.App. 158, 160-61, 390 S.E.2d 509, 510 (1990).\u2019 \u201cThus, under Virginia\u2019s corresponding provision to \u00a7 12-25-35(f), Ala.Code 1975, an appellate court\u2019s review of a sentence, imposed under the initial standards is \u2018limited to whether the sentence fell within the permissible statutory range.\u2019 Smith v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 620, 626, 496 S.E.2d 117, 120 (1998).\u201d State v. Jones, 13 So.3d at 919-20 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). See also Sistrunk v. State, 109 So.3d 205, 207 (Ala.Crim.App.2012) (<HOLDING>), and State v. Crittenden, 17 So.3d 253, 259 Holdings: 0: recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard 1: recognizing that congress instructed the sentencing commission that the sentencing ranges could not include sentences in excess of the statutory maxima 2: holding presumptive sentencing standards applied retroactively where defendant objected at sentencing hearing on the basis that the presumptive sentencing standards applied to his case 3: recognizing the limited appellate review of sentences imposed under the initial voluntary sentencing standards 4: holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.\u201d). Given that none of the Board precedents discussing the impact of a public-to-private change on the issue of successorship addresses the right-to-strike point, there was no reason for the Board to suspect that this was the objection Dean was raising. Dean\u2019s general reference to the different statutory schemes was therefore insufficient to put the Board on \u201c \u2018adequate notice\u2019 of the argument [the company now] seeks to advance on review,\u201d and we are barred from considering it. Highlands Hosp. Corp., Inc. v. NLRB, 508 F.3d 28, 33 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. NLRB, 370 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C.Cir.2004)); cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Ill Dean also maintains that the unit of Holdings: 0: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient 1: holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing 2: holding that a petitioners generalized reference to the excessive breadth of a remedy with multiple parts was insufficient to put the board on notice that the petitioner was challenging the adequacy of the justification for an affirmative bargaining order 3: holding that petitioners reliance on a case which concluded that a defendants right to a fair trial was violated was insufficient to place court on notice that petitioner was advancing a constitutional due process claim because the decision was based on state law 4: holding that generalized notice of copyright infringements was insufficient to establish knowledge for the purpose of contributory liability", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "285 P.3d 860 (2012). Because the City did not charge the public a fee for using the 1-90 trail, the only question is whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the trail was open for recreational purposes. I. A landowner cannot \u201copen\u201d land that is already open to the public and that the landowner lacks authority to close \u00b629 The recreational immunity statute applies only to those landowners with \u201clawful possession and control\u201d over land who \u201callow members of the public\u201d to use it \u201cfor the purposes of outdoor recreation.\u201d RCW 4.24.210(1). A landowner has \u201clawful possession and control\u201d over land if it holds \u201ccontinuing authority to determine whether the land should be open to the public.\u201d Tennyson v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 73 Wn. App. 550, 557-58, 872 P.2d 524 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Absent that authority, a landowner cannot Holdings: 0: holding that whether the public invitee may have some commercial purpose in mind was irrelevant to recreational immunity instead by opening up the lands for recreational use without a fee the landowner brought itself under the protection of the immunity statute 1: holding that the court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff states a claim of a constitutional violation at all and then must determine whether the claimed right was clearly established before proceeding to the qualified immunity question 2: recognizing that a landowner cancontrol who uses his land for recreational purposes and that sjuch discretion should not result in the forfeiture of the immunity that thehrus provides 3: holding contractors could not claim recreational immunity because they had no continuing authority to determine whether the land should be open to the public 4: holding that so long as seattle city light opened up the diablo dam to the public for recreation immunity applied despite a contractual provision compelling it to open land for public recreational purposes", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "807 F.2d 359, 368 (4th Cir.1986) (\u201cFrom beginning to end, it is obvious that Appellants proffered [the person] as an expert witness to testify in substantial part to the meaning and applicability of [law]. This flies squarely in the face of the precedent \u2014 and the logic of that precedent ....\u201d). Courts make one exception to this strict rule \u2014 when interpreting foreign law, expert legal opinion may be allowed. See Nieves-Villanueva, 133 F.3d at 99; Marx & Co., 550 F.2d at 510. Experts may also give limited testimony on mixed questions of law and fact, but the testimony must remain focused on helping the jury or judge understand particular facts in issue and not opine on the ultimate legal conclusion. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 826-27 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Specht, 853 F.2d at 809-10 (discussing the Holdings: 0: holding that experts testimony that defendants engaged in fraud and deceit was admissible because the words were used in colloquial fashion but statement that defendants violated federal regulations was inadmissible as a legal conclusion 1: holding an affidavit statement referring to the notice required for a binding contract was inadmissible as a legal conclusion 2: holding that engineers testimony that defendant was negligent was an improper legal conclusion 3: holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible 4: holding that the victims statement was inadmissible when made two to three hours after victim was allegedly raped because the victims testimony supported the conclusion that her statement was made with conscious reflection", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "suffered as a result of an intrusive security search during the embarkation process. Id. Although plaintiff had no cause of action under the Convention' \u2014 because she had not suffered any bodily injury \u2014 she was nevertheless prohibited from circumventing its restrictions by bringing an action to recover under local law. Id. In the case at bar, Plaintiff admits that she is suing to recover damages only for emotional injuries suffered as a result Richer\u2019s alleged discrimination. (Doc. # 41, 43:9-144:3). Consequently, although she cannot maintain a cause of action under Article 17, her claim is nonetheless preempted because it arose from events that took place during embarkation of an international flight. See, e.g., King v. American Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 355 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Waters v. Port Auth, 158 F.Supp.2d 415, 429 Holdings: 0: holding that federal common law is the law that would govern in the absence of the warsaw convention 1: holding the state law claims were not preempted 2: holding that passengers discrimination claims brought under 42 usc  1981 fell within the substantive scope of and were preempted by the warsaw convention because the claims arose from events that occurred during the course of embarkation of an international flight 3: holding plaintiffs breach of contract claims fell outside the scope of the montreal convention because the plain language of article 19 of the montreal convention indicates that it governs claims for delay not nonperformance 4: holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the montreal convention", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "petition when the case was remanded to the circuit court from the federal court. As such, the appellant was blindsided by the trial court\u2019s judgment in that, prior to the judgment entry, it was never put on notice as to a Rule 55.09 justification for granting summary judgment. This would have been true even if the appellant had been given the requisite 30 days to respond. Without such notice, the appellant\u2019s due process right to respond to the respondent\u2019s motion was effectively denied by the trial court\u2019s failure to confine itself to the alleged undisputed facts of the summary judgment record made, providing an additional basis for us to reverse the court\u2019s grant of summary judgment. Mothershead v. Greenbriar Country Club, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 80, 85 (Mo.App.1999) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). II. In Point II, the appellant claims that Holdings: 0: holding that motions to dismiss should have been converted into motions for summary judgment where the district court relied upon contract documents submitted by the defendant 1: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 2: holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto 3: holding summary judgment motions in abeyance for possible evidentiary hearing 4: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Millman v. Brinkley, 2004 WL 2284505, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 1, 2004) (appointing lead plaintiffs on the basis of: (1) continuous ownership of stock by the selected plaintiffs; (2) failure to file a verified complaint by another applicant for lead plaintiff; and (3) the strength of their lawyers' pleadings); Dollens v. Zionts, 2001 WL 1543524, at *5-6 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 4, 2001) (evaluating the plaintiff's financial stake in the defendant-corporation, status as institutional investors, quality of pleadings, and vig-orousness of prosecution). 67 . See Kenney v. Koenig, 426 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1187-88 (D.Colo.2006) (denying plaintiff's request to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend); see also West Coast Mgmt. & Capital LLC v. Carrier Access Corp., 914 A.2d 636 (Del.Ch.2006) (<HOLDING>). If (counterfactually) King had brought his Holdings: 0: holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts 1: holding that plaintiffs wishing to inspect books and records for purposes of pleading demand futility in an amended derivative complaint had a proper purpose 2: holding that if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate he is able to amend his complaint in a manner which would survive dismissal opportunity to replead is rightfully denied 3: holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action 4: holding that plaintiff lacked a proper purpose for bringing a section 220 action because the federal judge in kenney had denied plaintiffs request to replead demand futility in an amended complaint", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of showing insufficient service. Internet Solutions, 509 F.3d at 1165. Here, whether Defendant had notice of the proceeding before default was entered is a disputed issue of fact. (See Hearing Transcript at 6:21-7:1.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has proven that notice was properly served, it need not determine whether Defendant had actual notice and should bear the burden of proof for this Motion. 7 . See, e.g., Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (finding declarations of defendant and her co-habitant that process was not served properly insufficient to defeat presumption created by signed return of service); Holmes v. Plath, No. 1:01-cv-06359-AWI-GSAPC, 2011 WL 864301, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 10, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. AZGrafix, No. Holdings: 0: holding that the presumption that rule 45 does not apply to the federal government can only be overcome by affirmative evidence 1: holding that the defendant cannot overcome this presumption of service merely by denying that he did not receive the complaint 2: recognizing this presumption 3: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 4: holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "also claims that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument concerning his prior convictions. According to defendant, the State\u2019s comment was improper in that it called attention to the fact that his prior convictions were of the same crime with which he was charged here. Defendant waived this argument. In order to preserve an error for review, a defendant must both object to the alleged error at trial and renew the objection in his written posttrial motion. People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029 (2002); People v. Bennett, 304 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71 (1999). In this case, defendant failed to preserve this error for review because he did not object to the State\u2019s comment at the time it was made and he abandoned his posttrial motions. See Land, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 256 (<HOLDING>). Defendant claims that any failure to object Holdings: 0: holding that failure to file a postjudgment motion on alleged error of law relating to ruling on exception to the statute of frauds that was committed for first time in the judgment waives any objection to that ruling and that in the absence of any other formal objection the issue is not preserved for appellate review 1: holding issues not raised to and ruled upon by the trial court are not preserved for appellate review 2: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion 3: holding that appellants failure to obtain a ruling at the trial level even on a constitutional issue precluded review on appeal 4: holding that the failure to obtain a ruling on a motion for new trial waives the issues raised for appellate review", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "conducting new NEPA analyses. See 668 F.Supp.2d at 1333. Although the Court determined that the USFS was not required to conduct new NEPA analyses, nothing in the Court\u2019s decision prevents the USFS from exercising its discretion to conduct new NEPA analyses for five of the twenty-six chai lenged allotments to reach a favorable settlement pending appeal. The Court gave the NMCGA an opportunity to present evidence and have its objections heard at a hearing that the Court held on February 1, 2011. After careful consideration of the applicable authorities, the Court is not inclined to recognize a special right on intervenors\u2019 behalf to participate in and/or approve all settlements negotiated during the pendency of the litigation. See San Juan County, Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d at 1189 (<HOLDING>). While the Court recognizes that a certain Holdings: 0: holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim 1: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties 2: holding that a district court has the inherent power to summarily enforce settlement agreements  in a pending case 3: holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties 4: holding that minor differences in opinion between the parties and proposed intervenor fail  to demonstrate inadequacy of representation", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from wages that Gray and her husband earned during their marriage and are thus community property. See id. \u00a7\u00a7 3.001, 3.002. More specifically, a portion of each overpayment is Gray\u2019s sole management community property, and a portion is her husband\u2019s sole management community property. See id. \u00a7 3.102. As Gray acknowledges, the IRS is entitled to offset against her husband\u2019s separate tax liability (1) all joint management community property; (2) all of his sole management community property; and (3) half of Gray\u2019s sole management community property. See id. \u00a7 3.202(c) (providing that a creditor may satisfy a debt from all community property subject to the liable spouse\u2019s sole or joint management, control, and disposition); Medaris v. United States, 884 F.2d 832, 833-34 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The only issue the parties dispute is how to Holdings: 0: holding that employee spouses accrued but unvested retirement benefits are a contingent property interest and a community asset 1: holding that the irs may reach half of a nonliable spouses sole management community property to satisfy a liable spouses tax debt 2: holding that the tax was not direct even though it encompassed a spouses joint interest in the decedents property 3: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate 4: holding that a judgment debt against both spouses can be satisfied by selling the entireties property", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "away from Oklahoma, we believe this is outweighed by the inconvenience to a Georgia resident who would be forced to sue in a foreign forum on a cause of action allegedly arising from that nonresident\u2019s introduction of defective or negligently maintained goods into our stream of commerce. J. C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 230 Ga. 140 (196 SE2d 145); and (4) Our legislature has given the courts of this state through enactment of our long arm statute the authority to entertain litigation against nonresidents who commit a tortious injury in this state. We find, on the balance, it to be \"reasonable\u201d to subject Rebel Aviation to Georgia\u2019s personam jurisdiction, even though its sole \"contact\u201d with Georgia is this single activ . 178 (201 A2d 387) cert. den. 380 U.S. 907 (13 LE2d 795, 85 SC 888) (<HOLDING>). But see Terasse v. Wisconsin Feeder Pig Holdings: 0: holding that in analyzing whether a limited public forum has been created we consider the nature of the property or means of communication the governments purpose in permitting whatever limited access it has allowed and the conditions of access eg whether permission is required 1: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 2: recognizing a university campus as limited public forum 3: holding in mcgee limited to suits involving contracts in which the forum has a unique interest 4: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "this hearing on behalf of Claimants and Claimants have not contacted the Court to explain this absence. The Court has since learned that Claimants\u2019 attorney of record is no longer licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois. Claimants were ordered to have another attorney enter an appearance within sixty days, but have failed to do so. It is hereby ordered that this cause is dismissed for want of prosecution. 1 The contract record before us, consisting of nine compiled volumes of documentation, was filed by the Respondent only as a result of the Courts insistence (order of November 26, 1996) in the face of the Respondents foot dragging and the Claimants\u2019 cavalierly passive discovery efforts. We have been tolerant of the Claimants, who recog 967), 38 Ill. 2d 31, 230 N.E.2d 173 (<HOLDING>). Claimants do not cite other prominent Holdings: 0: recognizing implied private action under the collection agency act 1: recognizing implied private action under the plat act rejecting implied private action under the national flood insurance act of 1968 2: recognizing implied private action under federal safety appliance act 3: recognizing private right of action 4: recognizing implied private action under the xray retention act", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "argue that grounds exist to toll the statute of limitations from the time their cause of action accrued until they knew that LFUCG failed to report Berry\u2019s abuse and continued funding Micro-City despite knowledge of his abuse. On remand from the Sixth Circuit decision in Doe, the district court made two rulings regarding tolling. First, the district court tolled the statutes of limitation for claims by putative class members against LFUCG from the time of Guy\u2019s filing \u2014 October 15, 1998 \u2014 as ordered by the Sixth Circuit in Doe. The district court tolled the statutes of limitations only for claims against LFUCG (and not the individual defendants), because LFUCG was the only defendant in Guy. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 567-68 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Second, the court tolled the statutes of Holdings: 0: holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case 1: holding that tolling does not apply to additional defendants who were not named in the class action 2: holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement 3: holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent 4: holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist  between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that Davis only began writing the local editorials after Jeffery Prosser, the former owner of the Daily News, lost control of the newspaper. Further, it is uncontroverted that Times-Shamrock did not purchase the Daily News from Prosser until June 2008. And Ariel Melchoir, Jr., the publisher of the Daily News from 1977 to 2008, testified that on April 17, 2007, when the editorial was published, Prosser controlled what editorials were being published in the Daily News. Thus, all the evidence presented at trial tended to show that Crouch was the author of the editorial, and Judge Kendall failed to present any evidence that Crouch either knew the statements in the editorial were false or recklessly disregarded the truth. See Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918, 924-25 (D.C. 2001) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the Superior Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding failure to investigate before publishing is not sufficient to prove actual malice 1: holding plaintiff failed to prove actual malice when author was never called as a witness to confirm that he wrote the article 2: holding when defamatory statement involved issue of public concern that private individual was required to prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages against media defendant 3: holding plaintiff failed to present evidence of actual malice because defendants explanation of the mistaken statement shows negligence but no more than that 4: holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "suggested in Ruth has remained unanswered for nearly a quarter of a century, and the presumption that such orders are not immediately appealable in this jurisdiction has continued to govern state practice. See, e.g., People v. Berreth, 13 P.3d 1214 (Colo.2000) (issuing rule pursuant to C.A.R. 21 and barring retrial following erroneous declaration of mistrial); Sweaney v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 914 (Colo.1986) (issuing rule following denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss alleging violation of speedy trial provisions of Interstate Agreement on Detain-ers); Marquez v. Dist. Court, 200 Colo. 55, 613 P.2d 1302 (1980) (issuing rule following denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for violation of statutory right to speedy trial); Hampton v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 104, 605 P.2d 54 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Brutcher v. Dist. Court, 195 Colo. 579, 580 Holdings: 0: holding original proceeding appropriate vehicle for resolution of defendants pretrial claim that he has been denied a speedy trial 1: holding that even where the case has been called for trial the trial is not deemed to have commenced for speedy trial purposes until the jury is empaneled voir dire has occurred or some other substantial step of trial begins 2: holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendants pretrial motion is pending 3: holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act 4: holding that aggressiveness with which defendant asserted his speedy trial right was lacking because he merely filed one demand for speedy trial and opposed his original counsels withdrawal", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "721 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The accused\u2019s mere presence in the company of the informant before, during, and after the commission of the offense is insufficient by itself as corroboration, but evidence of such presence coupled with other \u201csuspicious circumstances\u201d may tend to connect the accused to the offense. See Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (interpreting accomplice witness corroboration requirement); Brown, 159 S.W.3d at 711; Torres, 137 S.W.3d at 196. Even apparently insignificant incriminating circumstances may sometimes afford satisfactory evidence of corroboration. Brown, 159 S.W.3d at 711; Jefferson v. State, 99 S.W.3d 790, 793 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, pet. ref'd). Cumulative evidence of suspicious circumstanc mont 1999, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). In this case, article 38.141 applies. The Holdings: 0: holding remedy for lack of sufficient corroborating evidence is acquittal 1: holding that evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for acquittal where the threateninglanguage was not ambiguous 2: holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available 3: holding trial court properly overruled defendants motion for judgment of acquittal where corroborating evidence existed 4: holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (\u201cCAT\u201d). In re Zhiyun Thang, No. A094 798 077 (B.I.A. Apr. 14, 2010), af'g No. A094 798 077 (Immig.CtN.Y.City May 2, 2008). We assume the parties\u2019 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). The BIA reasonably concluded that Thang failed to demonstrate past persecut hang and his wife will have additional children in China is speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the State Department\u2019s Profile Holdings: 0: holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be subjected to persecution his fear was speculative at best 1: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that she would be persecuted the bia did not err in denying asylum because her fear was speculative at best 2: holding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks solid support in the record and is merely speculative at best 3: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that he will be persecuted his fear is speculative at best 4: holding that absent solid support in the record that a fear is objectively reasonable a claim of future persecution is speculative at best", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Sappington, 512 F.3d at 448 (noting Rule 702\u2019s liberalization of expert testimony admission standard). Then in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court expressly extended its Daubert reasoning to all expert testimony, not simply that which was considered \u201cscientific.\u201d 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Interestingly, the liberalization of the standard for admission of expert testimony creates an intriguing juxtaposition with our oft-repeated abuse-of-discretion standard of review. While we adhere to this discretionary standard for review of the district court\u2019s Rule 702 gatekeeping deeision, cases are legion that, correctly, under Daubert, call for the liberal admission of expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Finch, 630 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Robinson v. GEI-CO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that federal evidentiary rules control on questions of admissibility of expert medical witness testimony even in diversity cases 1: recognizing that it is the proponents burden to demonstrate the admissibility of expert scientific testimony 2: holding that the burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 4: holding that we resolve doubts about the usefulness of expert testimony in favor of admissibility", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "CANTERO, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority that any violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), would be harmless error in this case. I write to express my belief that whether Apprendi and Blakely can even be applied at the resentencing of a defendant whose conviction and original sentence became final before those cases were decided depends on whether a new jury can be empaneled to decide facts relevant to sentencing. We already have held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively. See Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005). Presumably, neither does its offspring, Blakely. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 905 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA) (<HOLDING>), review denied, 917 So.2d 193 (Fla.2005); Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively to claims raised in a  2255 motion 1: holding that apprendi does not retroactively apply to  2241 petitions 2: holding that because apprendi does not apply retroactively neither does blakely 3: holding that blakely does not apply retroactively to  2255 motions 4: holding that apprendi does not retroactively apply to  2255 motions", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "delivering the machine on the one hand, and accepting and paying for it on the other. \u00b6 12. The indemnity provision, according to Image, was thus introduced after the formation of the parties' contract, and because it was never discussed or negotiated, it cannot be a part of the contract and is invalid. For support of its contention, Image relies on Wis. Stat. \u00a7 402.207 and several cases applying its provisions. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 214, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973) (concluding that a proposed additional term which \"materially alter[s]\" a contract requires an \"express conversation between the parties over its inclusion or exclusion in the contract\"); Resch v. Greenlee Bros. & Co., 128 Wis. 2d 237, 244-45, 381 N.W.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1985) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 13. Deminsky, on the other hand, maintains Holdings: 0: holding as a matter of law that an indemnification provision contained in an invoice shipped with a machine constituted a material alteration under sec 4022072b and thus could not be deemed a part of the parties contract absent express agreement between the parties concerning its inclusion or exclusion 1: holding that even if the parties had formed a contract under  2207l the arbitration clause materially altered the contract and therefore did not become part of the parties agreement 2: holding that in the event that parties are from different states and the subject matter is national in scope and where the contract states it shall be deemed to be made under the laws of the state of new york and for all purposes construed in accordance with laws of said state new york law applies as the parties choice of law 3: holding that nolostprofits clause in parties agreement was not unconscionable as a matter of law in part because similar clause had been in the agreement between the parties for years 4: holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the trial, which is scheduled to begin in several weeks. Wells Fargo\u2019s request to redepose Mr. and Mrs. Brush is denied. IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, this court orders that: \u2022 Wells Fargo\u2019s motion for reconsideration is denied; \u2022 Wells Fargo\u2019s motion for leave to file additional counterclaims and affirmative defenses is denied; \u2022 Wells Fargo\u2019s supplemental motion for leave to file additional counterclaims and affirmative defenses is denied; \u2022 Wells Fargo\u2019s motion for leave to take the plaintiffs\u2019 depositions is denied. 1 . Wells Fargo makes this challenge in its Rule 12(c) motions but not in its summary judgment motion. In considering this argument, the court looks only to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Brushes' amended complaint. See Wolcott, 635 F.3d at 763 (<HOLDING>). Unless otherwise noted, the parties' Holdings: 0: recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice 1: recognizing that a court is permitted to rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice 2: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint 3: holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 4: holding that in considering a rule 12b6 motion a court may only rely on the complaint its proper attachments documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(Doc. 21 at p. 8 n.6 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1158-59 (10th Cir.2013) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). In Hobby Lobby, three of the eight judges sitting on the en banc court determined the AIA is non-jurisdietional. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1152, 1157-59. Defendants are correct in arguing such a determination is not binding on this Court and does not alter prior Tenth Circuit (and Supreme Court) case law that held the AIA is a jurisdictional bar where it applies. (See Doc. 27 at p. 7.) See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 434, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (describing the AIA as \u201cdepriving courts of jurisdiction over [certain] suits\u201d); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1126 (the majority Holdings: 0: holding the fourth circuit did not err in holding that  7421a the aia deprived the district court of jurisdiction 1: holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court 2: holding that trial court did not err 3: holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment 4: holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "514 U.S. at 561 and n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31 and n. 3. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court \u201cwould have [had] to pile inference upon inference\u201d to find a rational basis for concluding the statute \u201csubstantially affected] any sort of interstate commerce.\u201d Id. at 567, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. This the Court declined to do, and so declared \u00a7 922(q) unconstitutional. Id. In contrast to the congressional silence in Lopez, Congress made voluminous findings when it enacted VAWA. Accordingly, we can begin where the Lopez Court could not, by \u201cevaluating] the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.\u201d Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563, 115 S.Ct. at 1632; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, \u2014 U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2169-2170, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (<HOLDING>). ' In doing so, we recognize that discerning a Holdings: 0: recognizing the importance of historical analysis in determining whether legislation is punitive 1: recognizing the diminished importance of the state policy factor 2: recognizing the importance of the employers knowledge of the disability 3: recognizing prosecutors task to attempt to convince the court of the appropriateness of the recommendation 4: recognizing the importance of congressional findings in determining the appropriateness of congresss remedial measures", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "district court, the USPS relies more heavily on a different argument: that the Award is improper because it requires the discharge of an employee who was not a party to the arbitration proceeding. But this argument also was not raised in arbitration and thus is also waived. The USPS urges that this argument is not waivable because it is based on due process and the civil service statutes; thus, if upheld, this argument would render the CBA and the Joint Statement unenforceable on public policy grounds. Our precedent does not support this position, however. See Dist. 17, 179 F.3d at 140 (finding waiver of First Amendment claim not raised during arbitration); see also AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass\u2019n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int\u2019l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981-82 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold that the decision of the Holdings: 0: holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration 1: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief 2: holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief 3: holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal 4: holding that a party abandoned an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(1986). While Burgunder is formally the employee of plan sponsor PNG, he performed his activities for the plan on behalf of the plan administrator defendants, and not on behalf of the plan sponsor. The conclusion that Burgunder performed these tasks on behalf of the plan administrator, the named fiduciary with respect to the plan, is clear from the regulations. These provide that \u201c[i]n discharging fiduciary responsibilities, a fiduciary with respect to a plan may rely on ... persons who perform purely ministerial functions for such plan,\u201d such as \u201cadvising participants of their rights and options under the plan.\u201d DOL Reg. \u00a7 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 2509.75-8, Q & A D-2 & FR-11 (emphasis added); see also 2 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, Employee Benefits Law: ERISA and Beyond \u00a7 12.06[4] (1993) (<HOLDING>). The defendants concede, as we have noted, Holdings: 0: recognizing the dol opinion letter as the source of the nonstatutory factor 1: recognizing cause of action for damages against federal agents acting under their authority who allegedly violated plaintiffs fourth amendment rights 2: holding that when acting pursuant to a valid warrant the police did not violate the fourth amendment by acting outside their jurisdiction in violation of state law 3: recognizing that pursuant to dol reg  2509758 a committee acting as plan ad ministrator can select  agents to perform ministerial functions 4: holding that the bank trustee of a relevant plan was not a fiduciary in regard to real estate interests because it performed only administrative and ministerial functions", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "innovative, such that it could not be readily duplicated by others in the industry. See USA Power, 2010 UT 31, \u00b6 45, 235 P.3d 749 (listing \"the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others\" as a relevant factor in determining whether information is a trade secret (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor does CDC cite any record evidence that the pricing information required great time or financial investment to develop. See id. (listing \"the amount of effort or money expended by the business in developing the information\" as a relevant factor for determining whether information is a trade secret (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 700 (Utah 1981) (<HOLDING>); Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman, No. Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proving that its customer list was a trade secret in part because the sole evidence in regard to the customerlist concerned the expenditures in an unidentified sum 1: holding that a customer list may be protectable as a trade secret if it is secret and the court examines and determines if it is protectable based on three factors 1 what steps if any an employer has taken to maintain the confidentiality of a customer list 2 whether a departing employee acknowledges that the customer list is confidential and 3 whether the content of the list is readily ascertainable 2: holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that its customer list was a trade secret because the plaintiff presented evidence that the list took ten years and great expense to the company to develop 3: holding former employee could properly use recollection of customer information where he did not otherwise misappropriate an actual customer list 4: holding that the plaintiffs customer list was not a trade secret in part because there was no evidence that by the nature of the plaintiffs business extraordinary effort was involved in compiling the customer list", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "case here, where part of the merchandise is fragile glass. 14 . Both GRI 2(a) and GRI 3(b) employ the term \"essential character,\u201d but in rather different contexts. As explained above, GRI 2(a) provides that \"[a]ny reference in a heading to an article shall be taken to include a reference to that article incomplete ..., provided that, as entered, the incomplete ... article has the essential character of the complete ... article.\" GRI 2(a) (emphasis added). In contrast, GRI 3(b) provides, in relevant part, that mixtures, composite goods, and sets \"which cannot be classified by reference to 3(a), shall be classified as if they consisted of the material or component which gives them their essential 20 CIT 793, 800-01, 932 F.Supp. 1499, 1504-05 (1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1446 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, if the test for \"essential Holdings: 0: holding that where the gri 3a rule of relative specificity adequately resolved proper classification of merchandise customs erred in reaching gri 3b essential character analysis 1: holding that where the parties fail to reach an agreement as to the character nature or type of release to be used an essential element of the agreement is not established 2: holding that even though an agreement was approved by the family court it retained its character as an agreement for purposes of legal analysis 3: holding that for purposes of gri 2a essential character analysis it is the ability to process data that gives the essential character to articles under a tariff provision covering automatic data processing machines and units thereof 4: holding that for purposes of gri 2a essential character analysis incomplete merchandise as imported does not have the essential character of the complete or finished article  the ability to strain salt from water and thus cannot be classified as straining cloth", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "33 . Dissent at 1052. 34 . See Julsen, 741 P.2d at 649 n. 10. 35 . Id. 36 . See Dissent at 1052. 37 . Dissent at 1053. 38 . Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d at 138; see also Julsen, 741 P.2d at 649 n. 10. 39 . Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d at 137; see also Duffus, 932 P.2d at 779. 40 . Park, 986 P.2d at 210. 41 . Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76, 82-83 (Alaska 1982). 42 . The fact that Joseph later reimbursed Kathey for the November house payment does not contradict the court's finding. 43 . See Davila v. Davila, 876 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Parker v. Northern Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881, 892 (Alaska 1988)) (\"[I]t is the function of the trial court, not of this court, to judge witnesses\u2019 credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence.\u201d). 44 .See Long v. Long, 816 P.2d 145, 157 (Alaska 1991) (<HOLDING>). 45 . See Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802, Holdings: 0: holding that psychological parent was not entitled to custody or visitation 1: recognizing right of fit parent to prevent visitation by grandparents which right can only be overridden by court based on evidence that the prevention of the visitation would harm the child 2: holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decisionmaking forcing parents to prove visitation not in childs best interest 3: holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation  award 4: holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the circumstances was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the ultimate finding that Hamilton negligently operated the boat was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, this finding is consistent with decisions in other circuits finding a boat operator negligent when, along with other factors, he failed to familiarize himself with the area by consulting charts, notices to mariners, or approved light lists. See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 801 F.2d 644, 649 (3rd Cir.1986) (evidence that recreational boaters were \u201cpiloting their boats in wholly unfamiliar waters without the benefit of personal experience, navigational charts, or even the ability to recognize the standard maritime road symbols\u201d supported finding of negligence); Albinder v. United States, 685 F.Supp. 45, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion is not affected by the fact Holdings: 0: holding that hired boat pilot who was unfamiliar with the area was negligent in not having available uptodate navigational guides made available to the public by the us government and in selecting a route which departed from the plainly indicated channels and resulted in the accident 1: holding that the area of concern raised by appellant is exempted from public rulemaking procedures because the rules of practice which appellant claims the university should be required to promulgate would affect only the staff and faculty of the university and not the private rights of or procedures available to the public 2: holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment 3: holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government 4: holding that a certain loan transaction was not merchandise and not available to the consumer in the popular sense where it was not advertised to the public available to consumers in the ordinary market place mass produced or available in large quantities but that it was more accurately characterized as a rare specialized and complex transaction whose availability is restricted to a small number of corporate insiders who hold a significant volume of corporate stock", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of such an available remedy, this case will be heard in federal courts rather than state courts whether or not this Court concludes that the complaint constitutes a challenge to processes of state and local taxation.' Ah appropriate regard for the delicate balance between state and national judicial authority counsels that, insofar as feasible, decisions relating to the jurisdiction and remedial capacity of the Delaware state courts \u2014 decisions central to the resolution of this case \u2014 be made by the Delaware courts themselves. (c) Our concern about the remedy available in the Delaware courts arises in part from the potential tension between the decision of the Court of Chancery in Delaware Bankers Ass\u2019n v. Division of Revenue of the Dep\u2019t of Finance, 298 A.2d 352, 356 (Del.Ch.1972) (<HOLDING>), and that of the Superior Court in Tatten Holdings: 0: recognizing that in some circumstances an afterthefact remedy under state law may be adequate 1: holding that in some rcases there is an adequate remedy at law for an attack on an illegal or unconstitutional tax through the tax appeal board 2: holding that the granting or denial of an urban renewal tax exemption is reviewable by tax appeal 3: holding refund of discriminatory tax required because predeprivation remedy not clearly available for tax years at issue 4: holding that massachusetts provides an adequate remedy for challenging a real estate tax assessment", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "$2500 fine, noting that \u201cthe penalty is particularly needed because of the perjury that I\u2019ve been alluding to.\u201d \u00b6 5. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by basing her sentence, without advance notice, on her suborning perjury when there was no evidence that her husband gave perjured testimony or that, even if he did, she suborned such testimony. \u00b66. A number of general principles guide our decision. A judge presiding at a trial may rely upon observations made during the trial in sentencing a defendant who was convicted by the jury. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 55 (1978) (reaffirming trial court\u2019s authority to take into account willfully false testimony in determining appropriate sentence); State v. Loveland, 165 Vt. 418, 423, 684 A.2d 272, 276 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Noyes, 157 Vt. 114, 119, 596 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that when a defendants sentence has been set aside on appeal a trial court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendants postsentencing rehabilitation 1: holding that appellate court could not consider objection to testimony when defendant objected at trial on different grounds 2: holding district courts may consider rehabilitation when deciding whether to impose a more lenient sentence at a defendants resentencing 3: holding that trial court could consider defendants testimony and demeanor at trial in fashioning sentence because defendants truthfulness at trial is probative of attitude towards society and prospects for rehabilitation 4: holding inter alia that a jury may consider a defendants appearance at trial in conjunction with the evidence submitted at trial in order to resolve conflicts in the testimony presented", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(citing Supreme Court cases noting the permissibility of limitations on speech, privacy, and self-incrimination protections where a citizen works for a government agency). As noted below, such limitations have been expressly considered when ascertaining the exercise of a right of intimate association. Here, the FBI\u2019s conduct regulations limited certain conduct on government property, including cohabitation or sleeping in a room at the FBI Academy other than one to which the NAT is assigned. (See Def.\u2019s Ex. 1 at 23.) A regulation that may implicate certain aspects of relationships between fellow NATs is rationally related to the government interest of instilling and maintaining a certain code of conduct. See Mercure v. Van Buren Tp., Mi., 81 F.Supp.2d 814, 827 (E.D.Mich.2000) (<HOLDING>); cf. LaVergne, 371 F.3d at 882 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that an officers use of force against a plaintiff was objectively reasonable considering the force the plaintiff herself exercised in resisting police custody 1: holding that concerns of cohesiveness among members of a police force justified prohibitions on relationships between the plaintiff and a fellow officer 2: recognizing that the fellow officer rule functions to include officers outside the common investigation 3: holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded 4: holding that discharge of a police officer for the choice to enter into a relationship with the wife of his superior officer on the force was rational", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "shield to justice.\u201d We find no authority on which to do so and Plaintiff provides us with none. {33} This Court previously indicated, although not specifically addressing an argument concerning conflicting public policies created by the Legislature, that negligence arising out of the violation of a statutory duty does not change the immunity granted under the Tort Claims Act. See Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (Ct.App.1987) (denying education malpractice claim based on duties under the Certified School Personnel Act, stating the claim was \u201ca form of negligence and the courts of this state would have no jurisdiction over the claim unless there was a waiver of immunity\u201d); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 487-88, 723 P.2d 252, 256-57 (Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>), rev\u2019d on other grounds by Smialek v. Begay, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment 1: holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute 2: holding state medical examiner immune from alleged violation of autopsy statute stating even if the statute does create a private cause of action it does not override the medical investigators grant of immunity under the tort claims act 3: holding that the ada does not create a remedy for medical malpractice 4: holding at least under the facts of the case that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action did not begin to run until the plaintiff secured a specific medical diagnosis", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and effective administration of justice, particularly when a change of counsel is sought on the eve of trial, primarily for the purpose of delay, and without making any effort to obtain substitute counsel.\u201d Whitlow, 2016 Ark. App. 510, at 7-8, 506 S.W.3d at 276. And this court has explained that \u201c[t]he constitutional right to counsel is a shield, not a sword, and a defendant may not manipulate [the] right for the purpose of delaying trial or playing \u2018cat-and-mouse\u2019 with THE COURT.\u201d Coakes v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 298, at 5 n.1, 2014 WL 2011804; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (noting that the trial court may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct); Brown v. Gibson, 2012 Ark. 285, 423 S.W.3d 34 (<HOLDING>); Burns v. State, 300 Ark. 469, 780 S.W.2d 23 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants pro se status may be terminated if he or she has demonstrated disruptive behavior or used the right as a tactic for delay disruption distortion of the system or manipulation of the trial process 1: holding that a public employee who is defamed in the course of being terminated or constructively discharged satisfies the stigmaplus test even if as a matter of state law he or she lacks a property interest in the job that he or she lost 2: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial 3: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right 4: holding that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if after a warning by the judge he continues his disruptive behavior", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Lankford was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Court will not address the merits of the summary judgment motions between Webco and HCC as the issue of HCC\u2019s payment of the claim under the stop-loss policy is now moot. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants\u2019 Webco, Inc. and the Plan Administrator for the Webco Employee Group Health Plan Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 63) is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED, and the remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT: Third-Party Defendant\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) and Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In accordance with Local Rule 56.1(a), \"[a]ll facts set forth in the statement o 947-48 (8th Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>) with Chronister v. Baptist Health, 442 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that when the insurer is also the plan administrator we have recognized something akin to a rebuttable presumption of a palpable conflict of interest 1: holding that plan administrator that was also insurer operated under conflict of interest 2: holding that when an entity both funds and administers the plan there is a rebuttable presumption that a palpable conflict of interest exists 3: holding that a structural conflict of interest exists when an insurer acts as both the plan administrator and the funding source 4: holding that it is wrong to assume a financial conflict of interest from the fact that the plan administrator is also the insurer", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "189 Colo. 173, 538 P.2d 110 (1975), and White Cap Mining Co. v. Resurrection Mining Co., 115 Colo. 396, 174 P.2d 727 (1946), for the proposition that a party should not have to search property titles before resorting to service by publication is misplaced. Both cases involve a county treasurer's obligation to ascertain the current addresses of delinquent property taxpayers before issuing tax deeds. Under section 39-11-128, C.R.S$.2015, a county treasurer must make \"diligent inquiry\" into information available in county records. Neither Siddoway nor White Cap Mining Co. say that a treasurer has no duty to search county records; they merely state that a treasurer need not search beyond county records to ascertain taxpayers' addresses. See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (<HOLDING>); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 Holdings: 0: holding that this court need not address the merits of an argument raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding appellate court need not address issues unnecessary to its decision 2: holding that an administrator need not address each piece of evidence 3: holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the countys records 4: holding that where a party does not adequately brief an argument we need not address it on appeal", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for searches under the Maine Constitution than is provided under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In State v. Patten, 457 A.2d 806, 811 (Me.1983) and State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 801-02 (Me.1983) we refused to hold that the Maine Constitution mandated a result different from that required by the Fourth Amendment for the search of closed containers in a vehicle. In State v. Wallace, 333 A.2d 72, 74 (Me.1975) the defendant argued that we should not permit consent as an exception to the warrant requirement, but we disagreed and said: \"We are not persuaded, in cases involving consent searches, that we should adopt more rigid Fourth Amendment standards than those acceptable to the United States Supreme Court.\u201d See also State v. Heald, 314 A.2d 820, 829 (Me.1973) (<HOLDING>). We are not persuaded that the prohibition Holdings: 0: holding that the state must prove juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that as both a state and federal constitutional matter we conclude that due process requires that the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt citing utah const art i  7 us const amends v xiv other citations omitted 2: holding that because of its civil nature section 881 does not require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal violation occurred 3: holding that me const art 1  5 does not require the state to prove probable cause for a search beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding state must prove voluntariness of confession beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "2d 353, 361 (1995). The term \u201cwrongfully caused\u201d refers to the point in time in which \u201cthe injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.\u201d Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416 (1981). Historically, the limitations period for bringing a wrongful death action has been regarded as a condition precedent, not modified or affected by the general statute of limitations. Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1978). However, as plaintiff correctly notes, the discovery rule has been applied to wrongful death actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 525, 529 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Fure, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259 (same). Holdings: 0: holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action 1: holding that a surviving spouse can bring a wrongful death action based on medical malpractice 2: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death 3: holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute 4: holding that discovery rule applied to wrongful death action predicated on medical malpractice", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "7 through October 4. Bloate, 130 S.Ct. at 1358. On remand, this court ordered supplemental briefs on the periods (1) from September 25 through October 4, and (2) from February 23 through March 5. II. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant\u2019s trial begin within 70 days from the indictment or the defendant\u2019s initial appearance. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3161(c)(1), (h). If not, the district court must, on the defendant\u2019s motion, dismiss the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3162(a)(2). The Act automatically excludes \u201cdelay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3161(h)(1)(D); see United States v. Tinklenberg, \u2014 U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2016, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011) (<HOLDING>). This court reviews de novo the district Holdings: 0: holding subsection h1d stops the speedy trial act clock upon filing of a pretrial motion regardless of whether the motion has any impact on the trial setting 1: holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendants pretrial motion is pending 2: holding that a delay of 8 months is enough to provoke a speedy trial inquiry 3: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant 4: holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "fact subject to independent appellate review); Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238, 247-48 (Fla.1999) (requiring cumulative analysis of Brady material). The second issue is whether the trial court erred in denying relief based on erroneous jury instructions as to the CCP and HAC aggravators. The trial court properly denied relief as to appellant\u2019s claims regarding the CCP and HAC instructions. First, the State\u2019s argument (based on the trial court\u2019s ruling) that appellant failed to preserve the error as to the CCP instruction is supported by the record. On direct appeal, appellant failed to specifically argue that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague, even though he advanced the argument with respect to the HAC instruction. See Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 90 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>); see generally Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d Holdings: 0: holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review 1: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague 2: holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal 3: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   4: holding that issue of unconstitutionally vague instruction relative to aggravating factor was properly preserved for postconviction review where the defendant objected to the vagueness at trial and raised the issue on direct appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that behavior. See 1414(d)(3)(B). Finally, an IEP team, \u201cperiodically, but not less than annually must determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved.\u201d See 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). The IDEA does not require that a school either maximize a student\u2019s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.1997). The Act requires only that a student receive sufficient specialized services to benefit from his education. Id. See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (IDEA\u2019S goal is \u201cmore to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.\u201d). See also Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In regard to placement of a disabled child in Holdings: 0: recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea 1: holding idea requires transportation of disabled child only to address his educational needs and does not require school district to accommodate a parents unrelated noneducational preferences 2: holding that the idea requires a school district to provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable chevrolet  not  a cadillac 3: holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea 4: holding that school districts provision of teaching materials in a tardy fashion had an educational source and educational consequences", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "170 N.C. App. 100, 105, 612 S.E.2d 172, 175-76, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 640, 617, S.E. 7). Accordingly, we must examine the other evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State. The State points to the fact that the marijuana seized from defendant was separated into three smaller packages. Officer Bunt testified that marijuana is typically sold \u201cin bags in different sizes.\u201d Based on his training and experience, Officer Bunt believed that each bag of marijuana found in defendant\u2019s pocket would sell for between $5.00 and $10.00 each. \u201cThe method of packaging a controlled substance, as well as the amount of the substance, may constitute evidence from which a jury can infer an intent to distribute.\u201d State v. Williams, 71 N.C. App. 136, 139, 321 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss 1: holding that the trial court did not err in denying defendants motion to dismiss where the evidence at trial showed that the 276 grams of marijuana  was packaged in seventeen separate small brown envelopes known in street terminology as nickel or dime bags  2: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible 3: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 4: holding that trial court did not err", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "swamp any common issues and defeat predominance.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir.1996)). It is settled that in reviewing a class certification order, we must evaluate \u201c \u2018the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law.\u2019 \u201d Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435 (quoting Castano, 84 F.3d at 744). In so doing, we have required \u201ctrial courts [to] abandon the practice of postponing choice-of-law questions until after certification, as courts can hardly evaluate the claims, defenses, or applicable law without knowing what that law is. \u201d Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 672 (citing Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, 108 S.W.3d 349, 351-52 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)) (emphasis added); see also Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 Holdings: 0: holding that we lacked jurisdiction to review the veterans courts determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the case before it 1: holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court 2: holding that where the party does know that the filing and signing is sic wrongful and the attorney reasonably should know then sanctions against both are appropriate 3: holding that the district court is required to know which law will apply before it makes its predominance determination 4: holding that role in the offense is a factual determination albeit complex a district courts decision not to apply an adjustment based on such a determination is reversed only for clear error", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes.\u201d Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973) (citation omitted). Before defendants in the instant case can invoke legislative immunity, they have the burden of establishing both of the following: (1) that the acts giving rise to the harm alleged in the complaint were undertaken when defendants were acting in their legislative capacities under the functional test set forth in Bogan; and (2) that the particular relief sought would enjoin defendants in their legislative capacities, and not in some other capacity in which they would not be entitled to legislative immunity. See State Emp., 494 F.3d at 89; see also Canary v. Osborn, 211 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Here, Defendants argue that by issuing the Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity 1: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 2: holding that city council is entitled to absolute legislative immunity from claim under the age discrimination in employment act 3: holding that the burden is on defendant as the party invoking removal jurisdiction to establish the existence of a sufficient amount in controversy 4: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "per se to violation of OSHA regulation because statute provided that regulations were not to enlarge, diminish, or affect common law rights, duties, and liabilities). When a legislative enactment or regulation does not define the applicable standard of care, it may nonetheless \u201cbe relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 288B (1965). This is particularly true in the case of administrative regulations, whose violation courts commonly regard as evidence of the applicable standard of care. See id. cmt. d. We therefore conclude that violations of commission rules are valid, but not conclusive, evidence that a lessee breached a duty owed to the surface owner. See Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 591-92 (Colo.1984) (<HOLDING>). Because commission rules are only evidence of Holdings: 0: recognizing right to privacy in receipt of health care services to the extent consistent with providing adequate medical care and the safety and good order of the facility 1: holding whistleblower protections available under the washington health care act rcw 4370075 adequately promoted workplace safety ensured compliance with the accepted standard of care and prevented fraudulent billing in the health care industry 2: holding that although compliance with administrative safety regulations did not establish due care it was evidence of due care 3: recognizing that missouri courts have often held that regulations may establish the appropriate standard of care in a negligence case 4: holding that a general acute care hospital may not delegate its duty to provide physicians for emergency room care because the law imposes a duty on hospital to provide that health care", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "stolen enclosed trailer, the snowmobile, the Polaris ATV, and the Honda ATV, contrary to Section 30-16D-4(A). {38} IT IS SO ORDERED. JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 1 NMSA 1978, Section 66-1-4.19 (B) (2005) defines \u201cvehicle\u201d as \u201cevery' device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway].]\u201d A \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d is defined as \u201cevery vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from batteries].]\u201d NMSA 1978, Section 66-1-4.11(H) (2007). State v. Richardson, 1992-NMCA-041, \u00b6 5, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (\u201c[A] \u2018motor vehicle\u2019 is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category \u2018vehicle\u2019].]\u201d); cf. State v. Natoni, 2012-NMCA-062, \u00b6 14, 282 P.3d 769 (<HOLDING>). 2 Sanchez involved a trial court\u2019s dismissal Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle 1: holding that to be convicted under dwi statute a person must be driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle but motion of the vehicle is not necessary 2: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  3: holding that an atv qualifies as a vehicle for purposes of section 661419b and the motor vehicle codes dwi statute nmsa 1978  668102a 2010 4: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Cir.2011). A sentencing court first calculates the applicable Guidelines range and only then does it consider the \u00a7 3553(a) factors in making an \u201cindividualized assessment based on the facts presented.\u201d Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). It is eminently reasonable to weigh a defendant\u2019s criminal history and the efficacy of prior sentences when selecting the appropriate sentence, regardless of whether it is within or above the Guidelines range. See Canning, 633 F.3d at 477; see also United States v. Dunn, No. 12-3566-cr, 529 Fed. Appx. 30, 2013 WL 3368875, at *2 (2d Cir. July 8, 2013) (\u201cIn [defendant\u2019s] case, it would make no sense to ignore his criminal history and imperviousness to rehabilitative treatment in de . 811, 812 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 415, 418-19 Holdings: 0: holding district court did not impermissibly engage in triplecounting when it relied on prior convictions to calculate criminal history category enhance the offense level and impose an upward variance 1: holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category 2: holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history 4: holding district court did not impermissibly engage in triple or quadruplecounting when it relied on prior convictions to determine that the sixteenlevel enhancement applied in calculating the criminal history category in departing upward and in varying upward", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of contract claim is based on the same facts as its default claim. Consequently, FSIA\u2019s commercial activity exception to immunity applies to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim for the same reasons it is applicable to the default claim. See DRFP, 622 F.3d at 515-18 (outlining how Venezuela\u2019s refusal to pay the promissory notes caused a direct effect in the United States). 21 .The Court recognizes the potential application of other bodies of law, such as Swiss law, to the Notes in question. In analyzing the breach of contract claim, however, both parties appear to presume that Ohio law applies. Specifically, neither party advocates for the application of foreign law nor do the parties contend that applying foreign law would impact the outcome. See Wendy\u2019s Intern., 2007 WL 710242, at *5 (<HOLDING>). For the reasons described below, Plaintiff's Holdings: 0: recognizing that an ohio court should apply local law unless a party meets the burden of showing that foreign law requires a different result 1: holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum 2: holding that a party relying on foreign law must plead and prove it and partys failure to do so entitles court to assume that foreign law is the same as forum law 3: holding state law governs property interests in bankruptcy proceedings unless some federal interest requires a different result   4: holding that a states law is materially different from california law if application of the other states law leads to a different result", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the knowledge or consent of that owner.\u201d 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 881(a)(6) & (7) (brackets conform to subsection (7)). \u201cInnocent owners are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the illegal activities.\u201d United States v. One Single Family Residence, 995 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. 15603 85th Ave. North, Lake Park, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir.1991)). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Calero-Toledo standard for purposes of defining the innocent owner exceptions contained' in \u00a7 881(a)(6) and (7). United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 963 F.2d 1496, 1504 (11th Cir.1992) (applying the Calero-Toledo standard to \u00a7 881(a)(7) proceeding); United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The court stresses that the innocence of the Holdings: 0: holding  2254 applies to administrative proceedings 1: holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies in removal proceedings 2: holding that the reasonably possible language of calerotoledo applies to  881a6 proceedings 3: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 4: holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "recognition proved to be the answer to the question presented in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 17 V.I. 623 (3d Cir. 1980): If a defendant\u2019s right to due process can be violated by strict rules of evidence that prevent a defendant from presenting clearly exculpatory evidence to the jury, can that same right also be violated by the failure to affirmatively grant immunity to an available defense witness who will not testify under grounds of self-incrimination when the witness is likely to offer clearly exculpatory testimony? Smith said \u201cyes,\u201d observing that the latter violation is \u201cnot different in substance than the violation found in Chambers.\u201d Id. at 970. Indeed, cases like Chambers; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963) (<HOLDING>) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that the appropriate remedy for a trial courts refusal to consider an indigent defendants request for new counsel is to remand for a hearing 1: holding that a conditionally suspended sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed on an indigent in a misdemeanor case who is denied counsel 2: holding that rational basis analysis applies to an indigent defendant seeking the assistance of an investigator for trial 3: holding that an indigent defendant cannot have a fair trial without being provided counsel 4: holding that an indigent party has the right to courtappointed counsel in a private child custody proceeding in which the other parent is represented by counsel provided by a public agency", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "raised in state court that McGee labored under a conflict because he hoped to secure a new trial in which Wisdom likely would be a witness. In any event, Beaty's claim is without merit. Beaty has not shown that McGee labored under an \u201cactual conflict.\u201d Specifically, Beaty has not demonstrated how these circumstances inhibited McGee from zealously advocating the award of a new trial. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, -, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir.1995). 8 . While Beaty contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he has not shown with any specificity that the factual record is inadequately developed to assess whether he was interrogated. See, e.g., Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). 9 . While Beaty did not receive an Holdings: 0: holding that a formal offer of proof was not required to challenge an evidentiary ruling because the substance of excluded testimony was apparent from the context 1: holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required 2: holding that an adequate offer of proof is normally required to preserve error when a trial court excludes evidence 3: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner relies solely upon conclusory unsworn statements unsupported by any proof or offer or proof 4: holding that an unsworn letter is not proper summary judgment proof", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and its agents. The pressure exerted against Naifeh to falsify records was no less intimidating because it was asserted by a fellow employee. Tanja had the power to terminate Naifeh and did so because she would not become a party to a criminal enterprise. Her conduct constitutes the very essence of the common law tort created by Sabine Pilot Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 1 . Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.1985). 2 . Other jurisdictions take varied approaches to claims of individual liability for wrongful termination. At one end of the spectrum, California, Illinois, and Kansas do not recognize liability for wrongful-discharge claims against individual non-employers. See Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal.4th 640, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Cal.1998) (<HOLDING>); Buckner v. Atl. Plant Maint., Inc., 182 Holdings: 0: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge 1: holding that supervisors may not be sued individually under californias fair employment and housing act and stating that this holding also applies to common law actions for wrongful discharge 2: recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge 3: holding that the test for preclusion of a common law wrongful discharge claim is disjunctive 4: holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM: Robert Holland Koon seeks to appeal the district court\u2019s order dismissing without prejudice his 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 (2000) petition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). The district court\u2019s order stemmed from Koon\u2019s request that the court dismiss his petition without prejudice in order to allow him to exhaust his state remedies. A Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable. See Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), overruled in part on other grounds by Moore Holdings: 0: holding borough could not appeal dismissal of complaint without prejudice because  dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit under the former practice of lavf  1: holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim should generally be without prejudice but if the plaintiff has been given an opportunity amend his complaint and fails to do so the dismissal may be with prejudice 2: holding that this court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a stipulated voluntary dismissal with prejudice unless it was intended to settle the case 3: holding that a plaintiff generally may not appeal a voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment against him 4: holding appeal improper since the dismissal was voluntary", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with the Canadian law governing the dispute.\u201d Both of these concerns are overwrought. As the majority noted, where a foreign defendant is forced to litigate in the United States, \u201cgreat care and reserve should be exercised before personal jurisdiction is exercised\u201d because of the heightened burden on the defendant. OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. However, as the Supreme Court noted nearly a half century ago, \u201cmodern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.\u201d McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Since that time, transportation has become even more convenient. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Aristech Chem. Int\u2019l Ltd. v. Acrylic Holdings: 0: recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant 1: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 2: holding that a robbery defendant was not entitled to a compulsion instruction in the absence of a claim that he or the victim was the target of a specific threat forcing the defendant to participate in the robbery 3: recognizing burden 4: holding the burden of forcing a canadian defendant to litigate in florida was uncompelling", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "characterization of southbound Route 13 as \u201ca frequented corridor for illegal narcotics flowing from New York and other points north\u201d equally hollow as a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion. First, the district court gave no indication that it accepted Trooper Wade\u2019s testimony on this issue, and the government presented no statistics or other objective evidence regarding Route 13\u2019s status as a \u201cdrug corridor.\u201d Moreover, even if the factor was supportable, every southbound car that passed Trooper Wade on that corridor was, by the government\u2019s logic, suspicious. Such a broad generalization does nothing to eliminate the overwhelming number of innocent travelers on that corridor. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752; United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citation Holdings: 0: holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion 1: holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop conducted absent reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity did not violate the fourth amendment because it did not implicate any legitimate privacy interest 2: holding that the facts that defendant had outofstate license plates and was traveling on a highway that was a known drug trafficking corridor alone cannot justify the stop 3: holding that merely traveling with drug dealers did not create probable cause at time of defendants arrest 4: holding that travel on a known drug corridor did not create reasonable suspicion because the factor was one of several applicable to a considerable number of those traveling for perfectly legitimate purposes", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "court must use the filing date of March 24, 2005, in its calculations. 2 . The number of days between November 19, 2001, and September 20, 2002, is actually 306 days when including September 20, 2002, in the calculation. 3 . The Fifth Circuit has considered 28 U.S.C. 04) (stating that the petitioner could have learned of his counsel\u2019s potential conflict of interest with the exercise of due diligence given that his lawyer\u2019s affiliation with the assistant district attorney was widely known in the small legal community); Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.2000) (stating that a prisoner does not fail to act with due diligence when he does not learn of a new case until it is accessible in the prison law library); Downes v. Carroll, 348 F.Supp.2d 296, 301 (D.Del.2004) (<HOLDING>); Small v. Miller, No. 03 Civ.240 DC, 2003 WL Holdings: 0: holding that a prisoner had failed to demonstrate diligence for purposes of equitable tolling for the same reason that he had failed to show diligence to invoke the statute of limitations under  2255f4 where he had waited several years before pursuing expungement of his disciplinary actions 1: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 2: holding that the petitioner could have learned of the factual predicate for his claims before the date of the affidavits in question if he had exercised reasonable diligence given that he was able to obtain the affidavits without any problems while in prison 3: holding that the plaintiffs assertion that he neither knew nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known about the governments possible liability for his injury was irrelevant to accrual of his ftca claim 4: holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "unnamed plaintiffs are the real parties in interest. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461, 100 S.Ct. 1779. A court may not consider a plaintiff-State a \u201ccitizen\u201d for diversity jurisdiction purposes if the State is a real party in interest. Nuclear Eng\u2019g Co., 660 F.2d at 250 (citing Ford, 323 U.S. at 464, 65 S.Ct. 347). A State is a real party in interest when it \u201carticulate[s] an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.\u201d Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)) (emphasis added); see also SDS West Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (<HOLDING>). Advancing a quasi-sovereign interest is Holdings: 0: recognizing that a narrow reading of missouri would suggest that the state is the real party in interest for diversity purposes only when the relief sought inures to the benefit of the state alone but noting that cases have only required a real interest pecuniary or otherwise in the outcome of the litigation 1: recognizing as a quasisovereign interest that the state and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow fiom participation in the federal system 2: holding that when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state the state is the real substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants 3: holding that the state would be the real party in interest with respect to its claim for restitution even under the claimbyclaim approach because it has a quasisovereign interest in seeking recovery on behalf of a wide range of consumers and aiming to deter future antitrust conduct by corporations in the state 4: holding that when a state sues on behalf of its residents without a sovereign or quasisovereign interest it is only a nominal party and thus not the real party in interest", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "must have been \"informed that, if he or she refused to submit to such test, his or her privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for a period of 1 year or, in the case of a second or subsequent refusal, for a period of 18 months.\" \u00a7 316.1939(l)(c). The defendant must also have been \"informed that a refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath, ... if his or her driving privilege has been previously suspended for a pri- or refusal to submit to a lawful test ... [constitutes] a misdemeanor.\u201d \u00a7 316.1939(l)(d). 4 . Busciglio also contended below that the Miranda warnings given at the scene were deficient because they did not properly advise him of his right to have counsel present \"during\u201d questioning. See Powell v. State, 969 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). The trial court agreed and suppressed other Holdings: 0: holding that any time is insufficient to warn accused of right to counsel during questioning 1: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 2: holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning 3: holding because the svp is civil the accused has no constitutional right to counsel 4: holding that a defendant need not be advised of the right to terminate questioning at any time", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was that the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecutor\u2019s objections to defense counsel\u2019s questions to Petitioner\u2019s motion concerning a telephone call that Petitioner allegedly made to her mother while she was being interrogated by the police. The motion court rejected the claims based on the mandatory procedural rule set forth in C.P.L. \u00a7 440.10(2)(c), finding that \u201c[sufficient facts appear in the record to have permitted review of [this] issue[] on direct appeal.\u201d C.P.L. \u00a7 440.10 Order at 3. Because Petitioner failed to raise the evidentiary issue before the Appellate Division, the motion court found, she was \u201cnot entitled to collateral review[.]\u201d Id. (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law \u00a7 440.10(2)(c)); People v. Cooks, 67 N.Y.2d 100, 103, 500 N.Y.S.2d 503, 491 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y.1986) (<HOLDING>) As noted above in this Decision and Order, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants oral motion challenging the venire was insufficient to preserve the issue for review 1: holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal 2: holding a general ruling by the trial court is insufficient to preserve a specific issue for appellate review 3: holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal 4: holding that dismissal of claim attacking sufficiency of a plea allocution by defendants failure to preserve the issue otherwise available on direct appeal for such review", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "parent is poor, uneducated, and without sufficient financial resources to care for her children in the manner the Department deems advisable-\u201d T.C.B. v. Dep\u2019t of Children & Families, 816 So.2d 194, 197-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Best Interests of the Child Finally, we acknowledge that we have not addressed whether termination is in the best interest of the child, and we de- dine to do so. We find that where the Department has not provided competent, substantial evidence to prove that Appellants pose a substantial risk of significant harm to V.B., and thus failed to show that termination is the least restrictive means of protection, we need not decide whether termination would be in the child\u2019s best interests. See J.J. v. Dep\u2019t of Children & Families, 994 So.2d 496, 503 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we REVERSE and REMAND for further Holdings: 0: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 1: holding that though the mother admitted that there were grounds to support termination of her parental rights the benefits of allowing the mothers relationship with her teenage daughter to continue were too palpable and the benefits of severing it too speculative for us to agree that the state had shown by clear and convineing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child 2: holding that it need not discuss the trial courts findings concerning the manifest best interests of the children because it was reversing termination due to the departments failure to prove that the mother posed a substantial risk of significant harm and that termination was the least restrictive means 3: holding that in cases involving severe or continuing abuse or neglect the termination of parental rights without the use of plans or agreements is the least restrictive means 4: holding that a superior court properly considered the childrens need for permanency a crucial need for young children in evaluating the best interests of the child in a termination proceeding", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "plaintiff can show that the third party breached a duty recognized by law. Id. In the absence of affirmative conduct such as an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, negligence law generally does not impose affirmative duties, such as the duty to preserve evidence. Id. The question \u201c \u2018[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk and the public interest in the proposed solution.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Cruet v. Certain-Teed Corp., 432 Pa.Super. 554, 639 A.2d 478, 479 (1994)). There are two possible duties to consider in the context of this case: 1) duty of a third-party company to its customers, and 2) duty of a third-party employer to its employ d 615 (Ala.1983) (<HOLDING>). On remand from the Eighth Circuit Court of Holdings: 0: holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties 1: holding that an employer through its employees did not breach an independent duty to power company not to come in contact with power companys transmission lines because such a duty is a general duty not an independent one 2: recognizing that the compensation that an employer pays may exceed an employees recovery from third parties 3: holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties 4: holding that such a duty exists", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "funds that is required for the imposition of the statutory trust. Cucinotti next contends that the trial court erred in holding him personally liable. He points out that Reliance rested its theory of personal liability on several grounds, each of which was essentially abandoned in favor of the participation theory as articulated by the Supreme Court in its decision in Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 170 N.J. 297, 788 A.2d 268 (2002), a decision released while the Reliance summary judgment motion was pending. While there are other reported decisions that hold that corporate officers who participate in fraud or conversion can be held personally liable for the losses occasioned thereby, see, e.g., Charles Bloom & Co. v. Echo Jewelers, 279 N.J.Super. 372, 382, 652 A.2d 1238 (App.Div.l995)(<HOLDING>); Robsac Indus., Inc. v. Chartpak, 204 Holdings: 0: holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity 1: holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity 2: holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract 3: holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity 4: holding that state officials may be personally liable for actions taken in their official capacity", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to Virginia jurisdiction, but also more than passingly familiar with the Commonwealth\u2019s court system. (Dkt. No. 45 \u00b6 7.) Furthermore, the parameters of United\u2019s own contract with the decedents stipulate that, upon issuance of a ticket, United consented to \u201cconditions of carriage upon which [United] agree[d] to provide Domestic and International Carriage.\u201d (Dkt. No. 15-1 at 24.) Pursuant to its contract of carriage, United was bound to provide air transportation for decedents from an airport in Virginia to their destination in Europe. Thus, even absent United\u2019s other numerous and substantial connections to Virginia, United\u2019s express agreement that certain contractual duties be performed in the forum is sufficient to demonstrate purposeful availment. See Peanut Corp., 696 F.2d at 314 (<HOLDING>). Because United engaged in long-term business Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant must have created a substantial connection to the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of the state 1: holding that by advertising and offering its products for sale via the internet the defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state even though only two sales had been consummated with forum residents both of which were to plaintiffs president and his friend after the motion to dismiss the complaint had been made 2: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 3: holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts 4: holding that a defendants agreement that a substantial performance of contractual duties take place in the forum state is dispositive on whether defendant purposefully availed itself of that forum", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "marijuana patch, (2) the defendant t Ryan, who has substantial expertise and training in investigations relating to marijuana cultivation, that marijuana and other indicia of marijuana cultivation would be located at defendant\u2019s residence. This court has \u201crecognized that courts often rely on the opinion of police officers as to where contraband may be kept.\u201d $14.9,44243 in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d at 874. In short,- contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, the totality of these facts do provide a reasonable, common-sense basis for believing that marijuana and related contraband would be found in his residence. The decision of the district court denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress is AFFIRMED. * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines o 896 (10th Cir.1992) Holdings: 0: holding court will generally not consider arguments presented for the first time on appeal 1: holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal 2: holding that generally appellate courts will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal 3: holding that subject to limited exceptions this court will not consider issues not presented to the district court but raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that courts of appeals will generally not consider arguments raised on appeal for first time in reply brief", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on, or after September 30, 1996. 2 . Singh also challenges the BIA\u2019s procedure for affirmance without opinion. We approved these streamlining regulations in Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir.2003) (en banc), which was decided after Singh filed his opening brief. Although Dia may not dispose of Singh's nondelegation and judicial economy arguments against the streamlining regulations, those arguments would be better addressed to the Court en banc. At all events, our resolution of this case on alternative grounds avoids the need to confront the novel questions raised in Singh\u2019s challenge to the streamlining regulations. 3 . Two of these cases -Lee and Patel -turn on whether certain federal criminal offenses are directly identified in 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(43). See Lee, 368 F.3d at 224 (<HOLDING>); Patel, 294 F.3d at 470 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax 1: holding that when the united states held a senior tax lien it was an indispensable party under the controlling federal tax law 2: holding that 8 usc  1101a43mii is the exclusive category for federal tax offenses and thus that federal tax offenses are not covered by 8 usc  1101a43mi 3: holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts 4: holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that was not his writing. Contrary to Overton\u2019s assertion that the cross-examination was insufficient, Overton\u2019s counsel attacked the alleged broken chain of custody with regard to both the brown paper bag and the envelopes that contained the clippings. Finally, we conclude that the decision by Overton\u2019s counsel to not address a potential degradation of the DNA evidence during the Frye hearing on the basis of an alleged broken chain of custody was reasonable. First, notwithstanding that Over- ton\u2019s counsel had not conceded at the time of the Frye hearing that the DNA evidence taken from the scene belonged to Overton, the location of DNA evidence matching Overton would be consistent with his theory that his DNA had been planted there. See McDonald v. State, 952 So.2d 484, 495 (Fla.2006) (<HOLDING>). Second, an expert (Dr. Litman) with whom Holdings: 0: holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless 1: recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion 2: holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue 3: holding that admission of evidence that defendants dna profile was consistent with dna profiles from mixed blood samples was plain error warranting reversal because no testimony was provided to explain the statistical significance of a potential match 4: holding that retroactively applying new version of dna act authorizing collection of defendants dna as a condition of supervised release did not constitute a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to the government.\u201d United States v. Diaz, 679 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1153, the prosecution must prove to the jury that the defendant is an Indian. United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir.2009). The term \u201cIndian\u201d is not defined by the statute; thus, we use a two-pronged test, asking whether \u201cthe defendant (1) has some Indian blood; and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a tribe or by the federal government.\u201d United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 1280 n. 2 (<HOLDING>). The first prong is met when the defendant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that 18 usc  3742e applies to downward departures 1: recognizing that the twopart test applies to prosecutions under 18 usc  1152 and 1153 2: holding that crimes subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years under 18 usc  924e1 are properly characterized as class a felonies under 18 usc  3559 3: holding this twopart test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based upon ineffectiveness of counsel 4: holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that continued to fall for the duration of the storm\u201d and \u201ca pool of rain that had gathered at the bottom of the stairwell.\u201d (Gould Aff. \u00b6 8; Pl.\u2019s Opp\u2019n \u00b6 7; PL\u2019s Opp\u2019n Mem. at 2, 5.) Liberty does not dispute that these were the causes. (Def.\u2019s Reply at 2.) Accordingly, the parties\u2019 textual arguments center around whether these sources of water constitute \u201cwater damage\u201d as defined in the policy. Liberty argues persuasively that a pool of rainwater constitutes \u201csurface water,\u201d which the policy included under its definition of \u201cwater damage.\u201d (Id. at 2-3.) Maryland courts have held that \u201csurface wa ter [is] caused by rain or melting snow.\u201d City of Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138, 1878 WL 6579 at *6 (1878); see also Mateer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 247 Md. 643, 233 A.2d 797, 799 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Other jurisdictions have also defined Holdings: 0: holding issues of fact in dispute are solely for the jury 1: holding that driver exclusions which are clear unambiguous and supported by consideration are enforceable and do not violate public policy or compulsory insurance laws 2: holding funds received by plaintiff from an insurance policy that was procured by the defendant and for which a premium was paid are not a collateral source 3: holding in an insurance policy dispute case that surface waters are those which are produced by rainfall melting snow or springs 4: holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978); Uniforce Temporary Personnel, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc., 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir.1996); and TEC Cogeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1563 n. 1 (11th Cir.), modified, 86 F.3d 1028 (1996). Based on the aforementioned order, this appeal was presented to this court for decision on the merits. II. DISCUSSION The issue presented here is whether this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Defendants sought a certificate for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b) , but were denied. Thus, this court has juri , 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943) (<HOLDING>). The inquiry becomes whether the Act grants a Holdings: 0: holding that state could not assert sovereign immunity defense where the state had waived immunity in state court and agreed to remove suit to federal court 1: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine 2: holding that a district courts order is final and immediately reviewable under mitchell if the appellants properly raised a claim of qualified immunity in the district court 3: holding that stateaction immunity issues immunity from federal statutes not intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state  are immediately appealable under cohen and mitchell 4: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to the defendant\u2019s insurance if such evidence has some independent probative value. In this case, Nevarez denied that he or his vehicle were involved in the accident. Thus, one of the primary issues for the jury\u2019s determination was the identification of the driver and the owner of the vehicle which allegedly caused injury to Friskney. Accordingly, the insurance information, as well as the defendant\u2019s name, address, and driver\u2019s license number, was relevant to the jury\u2019s determination of the driver\u2019s identity. We find no error in the trial judge\u2019s decision to allow the jury to learn the name of the defendant\u2019s insurer and policy number as that was the only information Friskney could not have otherwise obtained from public records. See Carlton v. Johns, 194 So.2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (<HOLDING>); Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate 1: holding that circumstantial evidence may create a fact issue if from the evidence a reasonable person could conclude that the existence of the ultimate fact in dispute is more reasonable than its nonexistence 2: holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law 3: holding that the insureds liability has been established by the settlement and the insurer may not later relitigate the issue 4: recognizing that the fact that a defendant has liability insurance can be established at trial where the issue of ownership is in dispute", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to cases brought under the APA, as the test was \"most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of \u00a7 702.\u201d Clarke, 107 S.Ct. 758 n. 16. The Court did not purport to speak beyond cases brought under the \"generous review provisions\" of the APA, id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156, 90 S.Ct. at 831), an act to be construed as \"serving a broad remedial purpose.\u201d Id. at 755 (quoting Data Processing). When a court adjudicates a case brought under a specific statutory private right of action it may need to analyze more carefully what actions Congress contemplated in creating that cause of action. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Water Transport Ass\u2019n v. ICC, 819 F.2d 1189, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff seeking injunction under clayton act  16 must allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent  1: holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts 2: holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit 3: holding that the fcc was not given the power to decide antitrust issues and that its actions do not prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts 4: holding that to have standing to bring a  2a robinsonpatman claim a private plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1956), dealing in counterfeit goods and services (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2320), and interstate transportation of misappropriated property (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2314). While all three of these crimes connote some element of dishonesty, they do not necessarily involve fraud per se. So, as a general matter, they would be subject to the general notice pleading standard. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 356 (3d Cir.1989) (\u201cThus, the suggestion that \u2018[a] charge of racketeering, with its implications of links to organized crime, should not be easier to make than accusations of fraud appears unwarranted.\u2019 \u201d) For that reason, each would not be subjected to the higher pleading standard required of fraud. See Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America, Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365, 382 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (<HOLDING>); see Muscletech Research and Dev., Inc., v. Holdings: 0: holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b 1: holding a complaint failed to satisfy rule 9b where the allegations were lacking in detail 2: holding plaintiffs speculations did not satisfy rule 9b requirements 3: holding that specific details about time place and substance of the fraud satisfy rule 9b 4: holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Incorporated in June 2001, approximately six months after the judgments for bad faith litigation were entered against Fischer, MBI was formed to acquire substantially all of the assets of Montgomery Doughnuts, Inc., a bankrupt bakery. On October 8, 2001, Paley Rothman served a writ of attachment directing MBI to withhold \u201c25% of [Benson Fischer\u2019s] disposable wages for each workweek or other pay period.\u201d MBI filed an answer, see D.C.Code \u00a7 16-551 (2001), stating that it did not employ Fischer and had paid no salary or wages to him. MBI also answered interrogatories, and Paley Roth-man requested a traverse hearing pursuant to D.C.Code \u00a7 16-553. After hearings were held on July 18, 2002, and October 22, 2003, the court found that MBI \u201cis owned by Benson Fischer, his wife Mona Fischer (<HOLDING>) and his parents Sheldon and Ann Fischer (each Holdings: 0: holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest 1: holding that a married couple filing a joint return can deduct interest paid on 1 million of acquisition indebtedness 2: holding that there was no community of interest because the alleged joint venturers did not have an equal proprietary interest and only one of the alleged joint venturers bore the risks and paid the expenses 3: holding that joint employment determination was a complex mixed question of law and fact properly determined by jury 4: holding a 50 joint interest", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of $4,500.00 for \u201cdiminution in value\u201d. Following the jury verdict, Plaintiff moved for an award of $8,964.50 in attorney fees and $1,701.00 in costs. On 24 August 2004, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $500.00, but denied Plaintiff\u2019s request for costs. Plaintiff first argues that the trial court failed to make findings to support the award of attorney fees in the amount of $500.00 under North Carolina General Statute section 6-21.1. We agree. Preliminarily, we note that the issue on appeal concerns the amount of the attorney fee award, not whether attorney fees should be awarded which the trial court in this case, in its discretion, elected to do after considering the factors under Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App. 347, 351, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1999) (<HOLDING>). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1 (providing that Holdings: 0: holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court 1: holding that the decision to allow attorney fees rests with the trial judge and that decision may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion 2: holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion 3: holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court 4: holding that the determination of whether statements are excited utterances is within the trial courts discretion and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cnot situated similarly to his co-defendants\u201d because \u201c[h]e was the only defendant charged with the special circumstance of a previous murder, and he was the only one who physically participated in both California homicides.\u201d Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 579-80 (9th Cir.2004). This case is distinguishable because, here, the prosecution specifically acknowledged that Morris, Eckstrom, and Barrett were equally guilty of Van Zandt\u2019s murder; unlike the defendant in Beardslee, Morris is situated similarly with respect to his guilt in Van Zandt\u2019s death. There would be no legal imposition of the death penalty without the ability of juries to consider mitigating evidence proffered by the capital defendant. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (<HOLDING>); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 603, 98 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that a new york city family court judge had no constitutionally protected property right to reappointment after her tenyear term expired and the mayor decided not to reappoint her and explaining that the fact that many or even most incumbent judges have been reappointed cannot operate to raise appellants subjective expectation to a constitutionally protected right  appellant has failed entirely to demonstrate any mu tually explicit understanding sufficient to establish a property right citing perry 408 us at 601 92 sct 2694 bd of regents of state colls v roth 408 us 564 577 92 sct 2701 33 led2d 548 1972 1: holding that under the alabama death penalty statute because the judge did not consider the jurys recommendation the statute which forced the jury to sentence the defendant to death whenever aggravating circumstances existed was not unconstitutional 2: holding that georgias revised death 4356 penalty sentencing scheme differed from that ruled unconstitutional in furman v georgia 408 us 238 92 sct 2726 33 led2d 346 1972 because it focused the jurys attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant 3: recognizing that the first amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict incidentally or intentionally the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens citing perry v sindermann 408 us 593 597 92 sct 2694 33 led2d 570 1972 4: holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the same outcome even absent the flaws identified. See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 159-65. Even though Liu did not exhaust his withholding of removal claim before the BIA, the BIA considered and decided that claim. See Xian Tuan Ye, 446 F.3d at 296-97 (stating that the Court has jurisdiction to review a claim that was not argued before the BIA if the BIA nonetheless addressed it); Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 515 n. 7 (2d Cir.1994). However, because the only evidence of a threat of future persecution to Liu depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes success not only on Liu\u2019s claim of a well-founded fear of persecution, but also on his claim for withholding of removal. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 275 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that where the ij finds the petitioner to be credible his testimony must be accepted 1: recognizing that a withholding of removal claim necessarily fails if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same 2: holding that for an applicant who has been determined to be incredible to prevail on a future persecution claim the predicate of that claim must be independent of the testimony that the ij found to be incredible 3: holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals 4: holding that a claim including a constitutional claim must have been asserted to the trial court to be raised on appeal", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that it was ready, willing, and able to perform because the contract characterized the deposits as liquidated damages, and a party seeking liquidated damages need not prove actual damages. We are not persuaded. \u201cTo bring an action for the breach of the contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of the contract, its breach and the resulting damages.\u201d Graham v. Asbury, 112 Ariz. 184, 185, 540 P.2d 656, 657 (1975). A liquidated damages clause relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving the amount of actual damages caused by the breach. Mech. Air Eng\u2019g Co. v. Totem Constr. Co., 166 Ariz. 191, 193, 801 P.2d 426, 428 (App.1989). But it does not establish whether a breach suffi cient to support damages has occurred. See Bowen v. Korell, 587 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1978) (<HOLDING>). Although the contract stipulated the amount Holdings: 0: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 1: holding that no reporters record was required in suit to recover damages for breach of employment contract because the claim for damages was liquidated and proved by the employment contract attached to the petition 2: holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract 3: holding that when a contract contemplates liquidated damages only for a specified breach the provision will have no force and effect except upon proof of the breach provided for by the agreement 4: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "For example, interrogation in a police station does not amount to custody per se. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Ashe, 125 Md.App. at 551, 726 A.2d 786. As the Supreme Court explained in Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Another established rule is that police do not violate Mira th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>); State v. Patterson, 146 N.C.App. 113, 552 Holdings: 0: holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation 1: holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview 2: holding that a defendant who was told several times he was not under arrest and who never asked to leave during an interview with investigators was not in custody 3: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave 4: holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "made by Midland in its July 14, 1995, letter were true when made. In its July 14, 1995, letter, Midland stated that the monthly contribution for health insurance benefits \u201cis\u201d $41.67, and, according to the complaint, that is the amount Hardy paid monthly from the date of his retirement until January 1, 2000. The letter, which was attached to the complaint, did not state that Hardy\u2019s health care insurance premium would never change or would not change until he was sixty-five. Moreover, the letter was not inconsistent with Midland\u2019s official health care plan document, which Hardy received and which explicitly provided that Midland \u201creserve[d] the right to terminate, amend or modify the Plan for any reason, at any time.\u201d See Weiner v. Klais and Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The district court properly found Hardy\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint 1: holding that a court may consider a document submitted by a defendant in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity 2: holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim 3: holding court could consider a mortgage agreement not attached to the complaint in ruling on motion to dismiss because the complaint refers to the mortgage numerous times the mortgage is attached to this motion and is central to plaintiffs claims 4: holding that a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider a document that is referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claims", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201carbitrary and unjustified\u201d without precise figures to draw upon. However, the New Mexico statutes provide a default interest rate that allows \u201cprivate lenders to charge interest on money debts at the legal rate where the contract is silent on the issue.\u201d Martinez v. Albuquerque Collection Servs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1495, 1508 (D.N.M. 1994) (citing 47 C J.S. Interest & Usury \u00a7 11 (2014) \u201c(promise to pay interest at the legal rate implied at law)\u201d). Fifteen percent is the maximum allowable default interest rate. Section 56-8-3(A) (\u201cThe rate of interest, in the absence of a written contract fixing a different rate, shall be not more than fifteen percent annually ... on money due by contract.\u201d); Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque, N.A. v. Colucci, 1994-NMSC-027, \u00b6 24, 117 N.M. 373, 872 P.2d 346 (<HOLDING>). The default rate under Section 56-8-3 is Holdings: 0: holding that section 5683 fixes the maximum rate that can be awarded by the district court 1: holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate 2: holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract 3: holding that a utility can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the commission 4: holding that the petitioner can claim no rate as a legal right  other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the agency commission", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that a defendant has committed a felony while released pending adjudication of a prior charge, so that the court may revoke the defe t both hearings was similar because his motivation was to discredit Puckett\u2019s testimony. Certainly appellant sought to discredit Puckett\u2019s testimony. However, appellant\u2019s lack of a similar opportunity to develop the testimony at the bond hearing, in order to so do, is particularly evident in this case. Here, the trial court was notified by appellant\u2019s counsel at the bond hearing that he would not represent counsel on the other criminal charges. Therefore, the trial court was clearly on notice that appellant\u2019s counsel was not prepared to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect exam. Compare Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993)(<HOLDING>). The State\u2019s assertion that appellant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant an opportunity to recall a witness who had already testified and been subject to crossexamination 1: holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors 2: holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial 3: holding that a mistrial was not required after a police officer testified that he had once chased the defendant after the defendant had fired a gun where the testimony was a logical response to the prosecutors questions the statement was not made maliciously the evidence against the defendant was great and the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony 4: holding prior testimony was admissible where the witness who first testified during a suppression hearing was murdered after he testified where the defendant was represented by counsel who had extensively crossexamined the witness", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the property damage occurred during a Liberty policy period. I. What Constitutes One Occurrence In Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in cases where different parties are damaged by a series of events, the damage to each party is a separate \u201coccurrence\u201d for purposes of an insurance c 1225-26 (La.Ct.App.1995) (\u201cThe differential settlement resulted from each home\u2019s continuous or repeated exposure to the injurious conditions over a course of time, but the effects of the excessive settlement did not become \u2018damage\u2019 until it was discovered by the homeowners.\u201d); see also, e.g., New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., Nos. Civ.A. 01-2171, Civ.A. 02-974, 2002 WL 32121257, at *2-3 (E.D.La. Sept.12, 2002) (Feldman, J.) (<HOLDING>). \u201cUnder the manifestation theory, insurance Holdings: 0: holding that property damage occurred when mold contamination first manifested 1: holding that continuous trigger will be applicable when environmental contamination claimant is able to show that damage like asbestosis occurred on continuing basis 2: holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed 3: holding groundwater contamination is continuous process in which the property damage is evenly distributed over the period of time from the first contamination to the end of the last triggered policy 4: holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "368, 376 (2008) (\u201cAn employer may be found directly liable for discrimination under G. L. c. 15 IB, \u00a7 4, if it is notified of sexual harassment in its workplace and fails to take adequate remedial action\u201d). See also Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination Guidelines: Sexual Harassment in the Workplace \u00a7 VI.6 (2002) (\u201cWhen an employer concludes that sexual harassment has occurred, the employer must take prompt remedial achon designed to end the harassment and prevent future harassment. What constitutes appropriate remedial action depends upon the circumstances\u201d). Title VII similarly requires employers to take remedial achon when they become aware that one of their employees has engaged in sexual harassment. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e; Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (<HOLDING>). See also 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1604.11(d) (1999) Holdings: 0: recognizing that an employer is liable for an employees action if the employer knew or should have known about an employees acts of harassment and fails to take appropriate remedial action 1: holding that summary judgment was properly granted in an employers favor because the employer promptly took remedial action  reasonably calculated to end the harassment  once it knew or should have known about a harassing coemployees behavior citing kopp v samaritan health sys inc 13 f3d 264 269 8th cir1993 2: holding that employer has affirmative defense to vicarious liability for supervisors conduct if 1 employer acted promptly and reasonably to prevent and correct the alleged harassment and 2 employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities offered to her 3: holding that employers are vicariously liable for harassment of employees unless employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior emphasis supplied 4: holding that employers are liable for failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which managementlevel employees knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "citation with a .demand for more trial-like procedures, much less a jury trial. . The point, rather, seems to have been that while.fhe Cabinet acquiesced in the court\u2019s informal manner of proceeding, it did, so only with the- understanding that such proceedings could not give rise to a \"serious\u201d penalty. ... 15 . The Cabinet provides no authority for this assertion, but the claim is certainly plausible. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 671(a)(15)(C) (\u201cIn order ' for a state to be eligible for payments under this Part [Part E of Title 42, Chapter 7, Sub-chapter IV, Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which ... provides that ... reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the perma (<HOLDING>); United States v. Droganes, 728 F.3d 580 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity 1: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 2: holding that sovereign immunity was implicated and violated by the bankruptcy courts criminal contempt citation against a government agency the irs 3: holding that district courts award of monetary sanctions for contempt violated the sovereign immunity of the united states but also reversing on other grounds 4: holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "stating that Bill\u2019s Forestry owed the IRS $161,502.69. By May 1989, Bill\u2019s Forestry had collected approximately 94% of the crew members\u2019 signatures on 4669 Forms, and it filed those with the IRS. Thereafter, negotiations between Bill\u2019s Forestry and the IRS broke down. Relying on Agent Brown\u2019s report and before reviewing the 4669 Forms, the IRS issued a letter to Bill\u2019s Forestry \u201cproposing adjustments\u201d (an increase) in the amount of $161,502.69 to Bill\u2019s Forestry\u2019s taxes. Bill\u2019s Forestry appealed. Bill\u2019s Forestry, through counsel, notified IRS Appeals Officer Steve Cantrell that it considered the IRS\u2019s position to be contrary to Grady Felder Trucking Co. v. United States, 218 Ct.Cl. 645 (1978), and Jones v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cases (CCH) \u00b6 9,120, 1978 WL 1245 (E.D.Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>), rev\u2019d in part, 613 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir.1980) Holdings: 0: holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act 1: holding that a tree cutter was an independent contractor not an employee for purposes of the taxpayers withholding of income fica and futa taxes but denying the taxpayer attorneys fees incurred in litigating the action 2: holding that under the mwa the question of whether an employee was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of statutory interpretation 3: holding that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys fees for time spent litigating the fees issue on appeal under title viis attorneys fee provision 4: holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002), and In re Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002), do not require that the hardship be \u201csubstantially beyond the ordinary hardship\u201d (as each expressly states). She argues that those decisions require instead only a \u201chardship that would place the Petitioner in a small select group of persons suffering a unique form of hardship that is selective rather than too substantial or unconscionable.\u201d (Petr.\u2019s Br. at 8.) Whatever that standard might mean, there is no support for it in the BIA\u2019s decisions. In re Andazola-Rivas and In re Reci\u00f1as expressly reaffirmed the standard set forth in In re Monreal-Aguinaga, and Jimenez\u2019s argument to the contrary \u201cdoes not even reach the level of being colorable.\u201d Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Jimenez argues that the IJ Holdings: 0: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 1: holding that a judge did not act in clear absence of all jurisdiction where he had colorable authority to take the action in question 2: recognizing that appellate counsel is under no duty to raise every colorable claim suggested by a client 3: holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction 4: holding that government lost right to raise lack of expectation of privacy argument on appeal when it failed to raise argument below", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.\u201d Fed.R.Evid. 403. Regarding Defendant\u2019s arguments that various statistical calculations should be held inadmissible under Rules 401, 402, or 403, the Court observes that Defendant himself acknowledges that \u201cstatistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis.\u201d Davis, 40 F.3d at 1075. The Court finds that statistical calculations accompanying DNA evidence are relevant and \u201cof consequence,\u201d under Rules 401 and 402. Careful presentation of statistical evidence, with explanations by experts \u2014 either the Government\u2019s or Defendant\u2019s \u2014 can ensure that the jury is not misled or confused, and that there is no other type of unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1158 (<HOLDING>). To the extent that Defendant disagrees with Holdings: 0: recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing 1: recognizing the possibility but denying relief 2: recognizing possibility of problems but holding there was no rule 403 violation in admitting statistics 3: holding that an error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction 4: recognizing rule", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "make a deal for her client, not that there was a fully integrated cooperation agreement on the table for acceptance. This is best illustrated by the paucity of detail regarding the terms of the \u201cagreement\u201d Bicknese allegedly reached with Meyer. Bicknese and Meyer never discussed such critical details as what level of cooperation would be required of Kozak in order for her to satisfy the purported cooperation agreement nor who would determine whether Kozak had fulfilled her part of the cooperation agreement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the court concludes that no meeting of the minds can be found to have existed between Meyer and Bicknese for a cooperation agreement for Kozak. Because the court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds necessary for the creation ir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Fourth Street Pharmacy v. United States Dep\u2019t Holdings: 0: holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes 1: holding that confession was voluntary although agents had promised to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation 2: holding that county officers were neither agents of the united states nor did they have any duty to investigate federal consequences of actions before securing defendants cooperation 3: holding that united states attorney was not required to abide by a secret service agents promise to a defendant to drop federal charges in exchange for defendants cooperation where the united states attorney never sanctioned the agreement and the promise was clearly outside the agents authority 4: holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for purposes of placing surveillance equipment. The only jurisdictional limitation the government acknowledges is that the listening post must be located in the issuing court\u2019s jurisdiction. Of course, the statute does not refer to a \u201clistening post,\u201d and none of the cases cited by the government addresses the jurisdiction of the issuing court to authorize law enforcement officers to covertly place a listening device on private property. All of those cases addressed phone taps, and as the Seventh Circuit explained, \u201ca tap is not placed in the telephone handset itself; it is attached to the telephone line at some distance from the handset.\u201d United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.1997); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (<HOLDING>), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not 1: holding that a wiretap was not a search because tjhere was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants 2: holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find  that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred  was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house 3: holding that the defendants entry into the foyer of a fraternity house was an entry into a dwelling 4: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "its citizens the rights and privileges of United States citizenship. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F.Supp. at 1296; Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 434 (3d Cir.1966) (stating that Puerto Rican citizens are also citizens of t cognized that \u201cPuerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that has no parallel,\u201d neither the Court nor Congress has suggested that Puerto Rico should not be considered part of the United States for purposes of predicate offenses in our criminal justice system. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 596, 96 S.Ct. 2264. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the contention that when \u201cPuerto Rico became a commonwealth its courts ceased to be within our system of government.\u201d Americana, 368 F.2d at 438-39 (<HOLDING>); see also Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 Holdings: 0: holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit 1: holding that texas is required to extend full faith and credit to valid judgments from other states 2: holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state 3: holding that constitutional error was waived even though petitioner repeatedly used the phrase full faith and credit because petitioner did not cite to the federal constitution or to any cases relying on the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution 4: holding that puerto rican judgments are entitled to full faith and credit", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "likewise was entitled to summary judgment); Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738, 748 (8th Cir.2001) (en banc) (declaring \u201cwhere arresting police officers are absolved of liability to arrestees, the City ordinarily is not liable\u201d); Thomas v. Dickel, 213 F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir.2000) (reasoning \u201c[b]ecause we have found that the officers\u2019 stop of the plaintiffs\u2019 car did not violate their fourth amendment ] rights, it follows that the plaintiffs\u2019 claim against the city (inadequate training and municipal custom) must likewise fail\u201d); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 628 (8th Cir.1996) (declaring decision that officers\u2019 conduct did not violate plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy disposed of related claims against the city); Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We have reviewed Tennessee v. Garner and Holdings: 0: holding city cannot be found liable on either a failuretotrain theory or a municipal custompolicy theory unless a defendant police officer is found liable on an underlying substantive claim 1: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 2: holding that where no underlying constitutional violation occurred the city cannot be liable under monell 3: holding that a party can be held liable for securities fraud on an agency or a respondeat superior theory 4: holding that a municipality cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "new contract to which conventional contract principles apply, construed in accordance with relevant state law.\u201d). One such restriction is that a reaffirmation agreement is enforceable only if \u201cthe debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior to discharge or within 60 days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving notice of recision to the holder of such claim.\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 524(c)(4). Although the method for giving notice of rescission under \u00a7 524(c)(4) is not statutorily provided or defined, at least two courts have concluded that a reaffirmation agreement may be effectively rescinded by giving oral notice of the recision to the creditor. See In re Polkus, 2008 Bankr.LEXIS 3223, at *4, 2008 WL 5099967 at *2 (Bankr.D.Ariz. Dec. 3, 2008) (<HOLDING>); Booth v. Nat\u2019l City Bank (In re Booth), 242 Holdings: 0: holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived 1: holding that failure to include in writing requirement violated  1692ga4 2: holding that jones act claims can be brought either in admiralty or at law 3: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city 4: holding that  notice can refer to transmitting a fact either orally or in writing", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "exact point in time and circumstances that the deposit may have become refundable, Monroe was not proven to have had the fraudulent intent necessary for embezzlement. Larceny under \u00a7 523(a)(4) necessitates a showing that the debtor wrongfully took property from its rightful owner with fraudulent intent to convert such property to its own use without the owner\u2019s consent. In re Rose, 934 F.2d 901 (7th Cir.1991). Larceny was not proven by preponderance of evidence; certainly there was no proof taking the case out of an ordinary commercial issue as to contract deposit monies potentially returnable but subject to claimed offset rights for asserted breach of contract. Monroe\u2019s lack of fraudulent intent also supports a finding that Monroe did not engage in larceny. In re Rose, 934 F.2d at 903 (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION The Debtor-Defendant prevails on Holdings: 0: holding that a rico plaintiff must allege at a minimum the time place and content of the alleged misrepresentations on which he or she relied the fraudulent scheme the fraudulent intent of the defendants and the injury resulting from the fraud 1: holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner 2: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 3: holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer 4: holding that larceny requires that the debtor wrongfully and with fraudulent intent takes property from its owner", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "employment action complained of\u2019). Consequently, it is difficult to gauge the full significance of Reeves\u2019s remark. See Bennett v. Solis, 729 F.Supp.2d 54, 68-69 (D.D.C.2010) (emphasizing the importance of the context in which allegedly discriminatory remarks were made to their probative value in establishing pretext). Ultimately, the Court must conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Hyson\u2019s non-promotion was based to some extent on her gender. Although, as described above, the facts that Hyson was interviewed while Celin was not and that Hyson had a higher score than Celin on the online test do not give rise to an inference of discrimination by themselves, they might do so in combination with Reeves\u2019s remark. Cf. Pederson v. Mills, 636 F.Supp.2d 78, 84-85 (D.D.C.2009) (<HOLDING>). Such a determination would likely come down Holdings: 0: recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment 1: holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination 2: holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination 3: holding that biased remarks by decisionmakers in combination with evidence of a minor qualification gap in favor of the plaintiff were sufficient to support  an overall inference of discriminatory preference and preclude summary judgment for the defendant 4: holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201cprotracted\u201d is \u201cto draw out or lengthen in time; prolong.\u201d Id. Following the same logic, we held in Fleming v. State that the word \u201cimpairment\u201d means \u201c[t]he fact or state of being damaged, weakened, or diminished\u201d for purposes of the aggravated battery statute. 833 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Smith argues that Officer Wheeler\u2019s injury cannot fall under the second prong of the aggravated battery statute because \u201cthe tooth was neither a bodily member or organ.\u201d Appellant\u2019s Br. p. 8. While there is no Indiana precedent for the notion that a tooth is a bodily member or organ for purposes of our aggravated battery statute, several other jurisdictions have analyzed similar statutes and arrived at that conclusion. See, e.g., Rivers v. State, 255 Ga.App. 422, 565 S.E.2d 596, 597 (2002) (<HOLDING>); McBeath v. State, 739 So.2d 451, 455 Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth 1: holding that aggravated battery of peace officer encompasses both insulting or provoking contact and battery resulting in bodily harm 2: holding that tooth was a member and loss of tooth consti tuted serious bodily injury for purposes of aggravated battery statute 3: holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter 4: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the plaintiff. [Cit.]\u201d Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene, 231 Ga. App. 130, 135 (6) (498 SE2d 537) (1998). A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress will not succeed where the defendant uttered \u201cmere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. [Cit.]\u201d Jenkins v. General Hospitals of Humana, 196 Ga. App. 150, 152 (395 SE2d 396) (1990). Additionally, we have held that neither the filing of a lawsuit or threat to file a lawsuit is sufficient to establish humiliating, embarrassing, or frightening conduct which will give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rolleston v. Huie, 198 Ga. App. 49, 51 (2) (400 SE2d 349) (1990). See also Moses v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 222 (369 SE2d 541) (1988) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the evidence Holdings: 0: holding that theft from the person of another under wisconsin law is not a crime of violence as a matter of law and can only qualify as such if there are sufficient facts in the indictment to indicate that a serious threat of violence occurred 1: holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence 2: holding that threat occurring 36 days before possession of firearm not present threat 3: holding that a telephone threat to resort to physical violence and to litigation does not state a claim 4: holding that confession was coerced because it was prompted by a credible threat of physical violence where official told defendant that defendant was in danger of physical harm at hands of other inmates and offered to protect defendant in exchange for a confession", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to avoid arrest or prosecution, then he could not have used it to take the wrecker and could not have committed a robbery with a firearm. In Oklahoma, however, the intent to rob and the intent to eliminate a witness can exist simultaneously and not be inconsistent. See Spears v. State, 900 P.2d 431, 440 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) (\u201ckilling may precede, coincide with or follow the robbery and still be done in the commission of a robbery with a dangerous weapon\u201d); see also Wackerly v. State, 12 P.3d 1, 14 (Okla. Crim.App.2000) (robbery and murder can be contemporaneous and evidence may be sufficient to support finding murder was committed to avoid arrest or prosecution), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1028, 121 S.Ct. 1976, 149 L.Ed.2d 768 (2001). See generally Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475 (<HOLDING>). Here, the evidence of one gunshot wound to Holdings: 0: recognizing that federal courts are bound by pronouncements of the california supreme court on applicable state law 1: holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state 2: holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts 3: holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law 4: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the division of authority between federal and state governments,\u2019 the inquiries under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment \u2018are mirror images of each other.\u2019 Specifically, the Court noted as follows: \u201c \u2018If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.\u2019 \u201cId \u201cThus, even if plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that \u00a7 601 intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states, it is constitutional as long as it falls within the commerce power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 [ (1991) ] (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 Holdings: 0: recognizing that constitution grants authority for congress to enact  4248 as necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority a court should not vacate his decision 2: holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution 3: holding that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from an action arising from the states breach of that contract 4: holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Plaintiffs, this Court concludes that the Leases remain in full force and effect and that the title to the oil and gas in place remains vested in MSB. Therefore, the Plaintiffs\u2019 trespass to try title suit and suit to quiet title necessarily fail. E. The Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover their attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to chapters 37 or 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Because the Court has concluded that the Plaintiffs\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied in its entirety, the Court further concludes that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover their attorneys\u2019 fees under chapter 37 of the Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Code. City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Ass\u2019n, 732 S.W.2d 42, 56 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 7, 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). The Court also concludes that the Plaintiffs Holdings: 0: holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees 1: holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered 2: holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged 3: holding that attorneys fees are not recoverable for a nonprevailing party in a declaratory judgment action 4: holding that while the nonprevailing partys financial condition is not appropriate to consider in determining whether to award attorneys fees it is appropriate to consider when determining the amount of the attorneys fees", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "life and death for Fields. Beyond Officer January\u2019s and Tichenor\u2019s testimony, the list goes on and on. III. Conclusion Sherman Lamont Fields was sentenced to death based on testimony that he was never able to confront. That is precisely the evil that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against. That troubling fact cannot be remedied by categorizing the testimony as speaking to selection as opposed to eligibility factors. The jury\u2019s difficulty in agreeing on a sentence and the number of mitigating factors found highlight how artificial that distinction can be. I would find that the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencing as it is structured under the FDPA and remand this case for resentencing. 1 . Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mills, 446 F.Supp.2d 1115, Holdings: 0: holding that the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings 1: recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings 2: holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings 3: holding no right to crossexamine in grand jury proceedings 4: holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "decision and whatever the significance attributed to Bun\u2019s youth, the trial court found it was outweighed by the severity of his crimes, his criminal history, and his lack of remorse. 6 We note that trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he made a conscious decision not to object to Lawson\u2019s testimony because he believed the testimony was admissible and he did not want the judge to think he was \u201chiding anything.\u201d Under Georgia law, a defendant\u2019s juvenile court records can be considered by a trial court in the sentencing phase after conviction of a felony, and in fact, Bun\u2019s juvenile records were admitted at the sentencing hearing for the trial court\u2019s consideration. See OCGA \u00a7 15-11-703. See also Burrell v. State, 258 Ga. 841 (7) (376 SE2d 184) (1989) (<HOLDING>). BENHAM, Justice, dissenting. For the reasons Holdings: 0: recognizing that all evidence admitted during merits phase of a contested trial can be considered in sentencing 1: holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase 2: holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase 3: recognizing that former ocga  151138 b now codified at ocga  1511703 specifically provides that a defendants juvenile records may be introduced during the sentencing phase of trial 4: recognizing that an inquiry into the conduct underlying a defendants juvenile adjudication may be admissible under rule 11608b nmra if the prosecution does not specifically question the defendant about the juvenile adjudication and does not otherwise present any evidence regarding the defendants juvenile adjudication", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1103(c)(5) and section 1109(b)); In re Jones, 37 B.R. 969 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1984) (section 1109(b)); In re Chemical Separations Corp., 32 B.R. 816 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1983) (section 1109(b)); In re Joyanna Holitogs, Inc., 21 B.R. 323 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (section 1109(b)). Cases in the courts of appeals are scarce, but this Court has indicated approval of that view. See Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1363 (5th Cir.1986) (suggesting that section 1109(b) provides a basis for the standing of a creditors\u2019 committee); Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corp., 762 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir.1985) (expressing approval of bankruptcy cases such as In re Toledo Equipment and In re Joyanna Holitogs); see also In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); see generally Blain & Erne, Creditors\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy courts can authorize creditors committees in chapter 11 proceedings to sue derivatively to avoid fraudulent transfers for the benefit of the estate notwithstanding hartford underwriters 1: holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor 2: holding that  1103c5 and 1109b imply a qualified right for creditors committees to initiate suit with the approval of the bankruptcy court 3: holding that contracts are not binding before court approval because the debtorinpossession operates as a fiduciary any actions taken by the debtor are to be in the best interests of the creditor body as a whole for that reason  the debtors actions are subject to  review by the creditors of the estate and the bankruptcy court 4: holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the trial court erred in listing McCracken on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between him and Rowell. We agree. Appellants correctly argue that McCracken\u2019s act of committing suicide by jumping in front of a fifty-thousand pound tractor-trailer traveling at seventy miles per hour was an intentional, rather than a negligent, act. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1998) (affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to -include the name of a teenage boy who committed suicide on the verdict form because the boy\u2019s suicide constituted an intentional act). Therefore, McCracken\u2019s name should not have been, and should not be, included on the verdict form. See id.; see also Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232, 233-34 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 723 Holdings: 0: holding that section 319s mandate that the employer is subrogated  to the extent of compensation payable does not mean that the sole right to recover from the tortfeasor is in the employer rather the right of action against the tortfeasor remains in the injured employee and suit is to be commenced in his name 1: holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered 2: holding that right of one joint tortfeasor to implead a second joint tortfeasor and have the jury apportion the damages according to their relative degrees of fault was not merely a procedural right but a substantive right 3: holding that it was error to permit the name of a nonparty intentional tortfeasors name to appear on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between the nonparty and the negligent tortfeasor 4: holding that it would be inequitable to allow a town to deny a permit based on a new ordinance after the property owner was denied a permit three times and brought suit to determine the validity of the prior ordinance", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Trust Claims Under California state law, a constructive trust may be imposed on property as. a remedy for things \u201cwrongfully detain[ed],\u201d Cal. Civ.Code \u00a7 2223 (West Supp. 1996), or \u201cgain[ed] ... by .fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act,\u201d id. \u00a7 2224. Taylor advances two arguments for why its payments from Advent came from funds held. in constructive trust. r First, Taylor claims that the payments came from wrongfully diverted Coastal funds which Advent held in constructive trust for Coastal\u2019s benefit. This claim is without merit. Under California law, Taylor has no right to seek the imposition of a constructive trust on Coastal\u2019s behalf. Sobel Bldg. Dev. Partners v. Broach (In re Sexton), 166 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (<HOLDING>). Second, Taylor claims that the payments came Holdings: 0: recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy 1: holding plans suit against law firm for constructive trust was a suit for appropriate equitable relief 2: holding that under california law a constructive trust may be sought only by the equitable owner of the trust res not by a creditor of the equitable owner 3: holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed  because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute 4: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 3553(a)(7) to justify the magistrate\u2019s decision to depart. Guideline \u00a7 5K2.0 permits departure based on \u201c \u2018mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.\u2019 \u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(b)). The sentencing judge may not depart unless he or she has legal authority under the Guidelines to do so. United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (notmg that \u201clegal authority\u201d is first of three-part test for departure under the Guidelines). Although in United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.1993), and United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1991), we analyzed the related question of the scope of \u00a7 3E1.1 departures based on pre-trial restitution Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Guideline \u00a7 5K2.0 requires that the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward 1: holding that this court does not review decisions of a district court not to depart downward unless the record reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a departure 2: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart 3: holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution 4: holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(Tex.1986). Those decisions \u2014 which do not involve mortgage assumptions \u2014 are inapplicable here because Mrs. Brush\u2019s assumption of her father\u2019s mortgage was not a modification of Wells Fargo\u2019s prior agreements with him. As Wells Fargo notes, a transf\u00e9ree\u2019s agreement to assume a loan is a new promise and does not necessarily extinguish the transferor\u2019s personal obligation under the loan. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgage) \u00a7 5.1(b)(2) (\u201cWhen mortgaged real estate is transferred with assumption of liability ... the transferor remains personally liable for the covenants in the mortgage and for the obligation secured by the mortgage, to the extent such liability existed prior to the transfer.\u201d); Shockey v. Page, 354 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Helge v. Am. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 124 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine is only applicable if there is an unconditional sale and that private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of sale 1: holding that an original obligor is personally liable if there is no unconditional acceptance of the assuming party as the sole principal obligor by the holder of the indebtedness nor was there any agreement to release the original obligors 2: recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct 3: holding there was no error in refusing to charge accessory after the fact because there is no exclusionary situation which eliminates one defendant or the other from having participated in the murder as a principal 4: holding that where the parties fail to reach an agreement as to the character nature or type of release to be used an essential element of the agreement is not established", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "possible solutions while the other side simply awaits the arrival of an offer to its liking\u201d). Further, the accommodation was reasonable. See id. at 595-96. 5 \u201cIn an action for wrongful interference with contract the plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff had a contract with a third party, the defendant knowingly induced the third party to break that contract, the defendant\u2019s interference was improper in motive or means, and the plaintiff was harmed by the interference.\u201d Abramian, 432 Mass at 122. 6 See also Comey v. Hill 387 Mass. 11, 19-20 (1982) (action based on age discrimination supported jury verdict for plaintiff on intentional interference claim); Draghetti v. Chimielewski, 416 Mass. 808, 817 (1994); Martins v. University of Mass. Medical Sch., 75 Mass.App.Ct. 623, 634 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Steranko v. Irforex, Inc., 5 Mass.App.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference 1: holding that a breach of settlement claim should have been brought in the court of federal claims pursuant to the tucker act 2: holding that interference claim against supervisors should have been submitted to jury in conjunction with discrimination claims 3: holding that wifes tort claims should have been presented in conjunction with the divorce action to lay at rest all their legal differences in one proceeding and avoid the prolongation and fractionalization of litigation 4: holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "courts have exonerated individuals post-conviction have been single assailant DNA cases). 6 . Cherrix\u2019s confession does not preclude a person's actual innocence of a crime. See Bruce M. Lyons, New Committee Looks at DNA and the Death Penalty, Crim.Jusx, Spring 2000, at 1 (reporting that, among May 16, 2000) (affirming its order for release of the habeas petitioner after DNA evidence showed he was actually of the murder); People v. Dabbs, 154 Misc.2d 671, 675-76, 587 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1991) (ordering post-conviction DNA testing and vacating conviction based on DNA evidence test results in a rape case). 10 . The need to prevent a miscarriage of miscarriage will be explored more fully below. See infra section IV. 11 . See also Commonwealth v. Reese, 444 Pa.Super. 38, 663 A.2d 206, 207 (1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hicks, 195 Wis.2d 620, 536 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a new trial was warranted and stating that the defendant was entitled to have dna testing done on vaginal swabs taken from the victim 1: holding that dna test results warranted a new trial of a postconviction petitioner who was convicted of rape and kidnaping 2: recognizing that enhancement for results obtained may be warranted 3: recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion 4: holding that there is no postconviction due process right to biological evidence for purposes of dna testing", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "471, 476 (6th Cir.2008). In other words, the government must \u201cprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would have at least attempted to seriously harm or kill the driver if that action had been necessary to complete the taking of the car.\u201d Id. at 477 (quoting Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11-12, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999)). In order to satisfy this requirement, the government sought to use the assault of Marshall to show that Clay had the specific intent to cause serious bodily harm or death to White. As a threshold matter, we have approved of the admission of other acts evidence to show specific intent in certain circumstances. See United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186,1192 (6th Cir.1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910, 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Most frequently, we admit this evidence in Holdings: 0: holding there was no rule 404b violation where the evidence was admitted to show knowledge and knowledge was an element of the crime charged 1: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime 2: holding that where there is thrust upon the government either by virtue of the defense raised by the defendant or by virtue of the elements of the crime charged the affirmative duty to prove that the underlying prohibited act was done with a specific criminal intent other acts evidence may be introduced under rule 404b 3: holding that although the specific underlying felony is an essential element of felonymurder the government is not required to include the elements of the underlying felony or state the specific means by which it alleges the defendant committed the underlying felony 4: holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "very helpful in establishing personal jurisdiction. See Kato-pothis v. Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-380, 211 F.Supp.3d 1, 23, 2016 WL 5374081,. at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 26,. 2016) (\"[Ejmail and telephone communications sent into the District of Columbia are not sufficient to [confer personal jurisdiction] in themselves, even if they are made pursuant to an underlying contract between a resident [plaintiff] and a nonresident [defendant .... After all, such communications are incidental to nearly every business relationship; they are not indicative of any desire to do business in D.C. and do not suffice to show purposeful availment or minimum contacts.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Dove v. United States, No. 86-0065, 1987 WL 18739, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1987) (<HOLDING>). 12 . \u25a0 Furthermore, the court in Johnson Holdings: 0: holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction 1: holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 2: holding that mere reference to a collective bargaining agreement does not confer federal question jurisdiction under section 301a 3: holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services 4: holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the trial court granted Bauer a new trial, found that the City had no title in the parkland, and vacated the prior judgment. The trial court then retained jurisdiction \u201cfor the purpose of making a final determination of relief consistent with the request of [Bauer\u2019s] petition, the applicable law and evidence to be submitted upon further hearing.\u201d The defendants have appealed the trial court\u2019s vacation of the final judgment in favor of the defendants and the trial court\u2019s granting of Bauer\u2019s motion for a new trial. Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 25-1315.03 (Reissue 1989) provides in part that \u201c[a]n order entering judgment, as provided in section 25-1315.02, or granting or denying a new trial, is an appealable order.\u201d See, also, Morford v. Lipsey Meat Co., Inc., 179 Neb. 420, 138 N.W.2d 653 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Hence, the district court\u2019s order of March Holdings: 0: holding that mandamus is appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable 1: holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages 2: holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action 3: holding that an order granting a new trial in a civil action is appealable 4: holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to carry out the agent\u2019s express powers.\u201d (citation omitted)). The authority to sell Philadelphia insurance, subject to Philadelphia\u2019s ultimate approval, would not also impliedly include the ability of Wortham to accept notice of a claim on Philadelphia\u2019s policy several years after Wortham had completed the brokering transaction. The claims process is distinct from policy brokering, and even though Wortham may have had authority to broker policies, this authority did not impliedly include authority to accept notice of claims. See Landry v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 428 F.Supp.2d 531, 534 (E.D.La.2006) (\u201cThe distinction between handling and procurement is well-supported by case law....\u201d); see also Elkins v. Am. Int\u2019l Special Lines Ins. Co., 611 F.Supp.2d 752, 766-67 (S.D.Ohio 2009) (<HOLDING>)- Thus, implied authority did not exist for Holdings: 0: holding that legal injury occurred for purposes of negligence action against insurance agent when insurance company rejected the claim 1: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 2: holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims 3: holding that insurance broker is generally agent of insured 4: holding that a broker may be a statutory agent for an insurance company pursuant to section 626842 florida statutes 1989 or be clothed with actual or apparent authority so that the brokers acts may be binding on the insurance company", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "rules of parliamentary procedure, and . . . that common law or parliamentary law regards a tie vote on an affirmative resolution or action as a rejection.\u201d); Crossgates Inc. v. Board of Comm\u2019rs, 145 Pa. Commw. 339, 603 A.2d 276, 278 (1992), aff\u2019d, 635 A.2d 1040 (Pa. 1994); Young v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 144 Pa. Commw. 16, 600 A.2d 667, 669 (1991) (\u201cEqually divided votes . .. have been deemed to constitute a denial of the action requested from the Board, rather than the absence of a decision.\u201d), appeal denied, 609 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1992); Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223, 237 (1996) (tie vote does not sustain moving party\u2019s burden), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1167 (1997); but see Cobb County v. Jones, 179 Ga. App. 240, 345 S.E.2d 917 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 9 84 Wn.2d 25, 523 P.2d 1181 (1974). 10 84 Holdings: 0: holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision 1: holding that a board affirmance of an ro decision subsumes that decision 2: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision 3: recognizing that the reeves decision modified the combs decision 4: holding that tie vote equals no decision", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "until amended motion for new trial); Short v. State, 995 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd)(failure to raise in pari materia claim before trial waives the complaint for appellate review); Haywood v. State, 344 S.W.3d 454, 465 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pet. ref'd)(same). M.L.M. would not have had any occasion to raise this issue before, or even during the adjudication hearing, as there was no suggestion that the State was asking for a finding under a lesser included offense. But the bifurcated nature of the juvenile proceedings provided M.L.M. the opportunity to object to the referee\u2019s finding on the lesser included offense before or dur ing the disposition hearing held sixteen days later. See In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)(<HOLDING>). By that time, it was clear the referee had Holdings: 0: holding that defendant waived ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsels failure to emphasize certain evidence where amended motion for new trial did not assert claim of ineffectiveness on that ground and no argument related to the asserted ground was made at the motion for new trial hearing 1: holding that claims raised by appellant for first time in motion for new trial were untimely and therefore waived 2: holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action 3: holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial 4: holding complaint made first in amended motion for new trial when juvenile had notice of the issue before trial and during both phases was untimely", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Bath, the court erred by rejecting the evidence. [150] This issue may have been rendered moot by our holding that unsuccessful claimants, including Mr. Bath, may establish the \"reasonable time\" factor by demonstrating due individual diligence to utilize reserved waters once project facilities were made available to their properties. Because it cannot be determined from the extant record whether Mr. Bath did exercise such individual diligence, we will consider the matter. [151] It is well established that \" 'the burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of any issue. Morrison v. Reilly, Wyo., 511 P.2d 970 (1978)\" \" Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 90 (quoting Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Wyo.1984)); see, e.g., Younglove v. Graham & Hill, 526 P.2d 689, 693 (Wyo.1974) (<HOLDING>); Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Apodaca, Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense 2: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 3: holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence 4: recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Richard Sumpter, his co-defendant, go to trial immediately, and made reference to some \u201cthing\u201d in his past where he \u201cfought for 18 months,\u201d but a \u201cguy\u201d got caught with an ounce of pot and \u201cscrewed everything up.\u201d Through Diana\u2019s assistance, the government taped this conversation and offered the conversation as evidence at trial. Prior to trial, the district court denied Free\u2019s motion in limine to strike the conversation, concluding the tape \u201c[did not] say he got convicted,\u201d and thus presented no Rule 404(b) issue. Assuming the taped conversation presents evidence of a prior criminal act, the evidence is nonetheless admissible under Rule 404 to demonstrate Free\u2019s knowledge of the conspiracy, and not his prior misconduct. United States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285, 1289 (6th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). It is not clear whether Holdings: 0: holding 404b evidence admissible under intent exception but not motive exception where motive not contested 1: holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial 2: holding that evidence of prior criminal misconduct is admissible under rule 404b to prove motive opportunity intent preparation plan knowledge identity or absence of mistake or accident 3: holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal 4: holding other acts evidence that was permissible to demonstrate a plan to defraud was also admissible to establish intent knowledge and absence of mistake", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of those claims under a theory of equitable recoupment. See id. at 29. Finally, Pran-sky claims that since his challenge to the 1987 tax assessment necessarily involves the \u201coffset\u201d of the 1984 and 1985 overpay-ments and that challenge would not be defeated even if plaintiff failed to file refund claims for 1984 and 1985. See Appel-lee\u2019s Sur-reply at 3. a. Right to Assert Time Barred Tax Claims as Counterclaim The Court is not persuaded by appellee\u2019s argument that in the context of his bankruptcy, the debtor may raise otherwise time barred issues as a defense or counterclaim to the government\u2019s proof of claim. It is clear that the statute of limitations created by specific provisions of the tax code are applicable to bankruptcy proceedings. See e.g. Custom Distribution, 224 F.3d at 244 (<HOLDING>); In re Constable Terminal Corp., 246 B.R. 181, Holdings: 0: holding that district court had discretion to decline to offset severance and unemployment payments from damages award 1: holding that court sitting in bankruptcy may allow a taxpayer to use overpayment of taxes as offset of debt to the irs but only if that offset request is timely 2: holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments 3: holding that a debt discharged in bankruptcy could not be used to offset a statutorily imposed penalty against a national bank for changing usurious interest 4: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "complaint has been filed and, as such, there is no civil action. Ms. Shepard cites to a number of cases in her brief which support the longstanding rule in North Carolina that the Clerk of Superior Court has original jurisdiction in an estate matter, while the Superior Court Judge has derivative jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Estate of Parrish, 143 N.C. App. 244, 251, 547 S.E.2d 74, 78 (noting that the estate proceeding at issue \u201cwas not a civil action, but a proceeding concerning an estate matter, which was exclusively within the purview of the Clerk\u2019s jurisdiction, and over which the Superior Court retained appellate, not original, jurisdiction.\u201d) (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 69, 553 S.E.2d 201 (2001); In re Green, 9 N.C. App. 326, 328, 176 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we find the phrase \u201call actions Holdings: 0: holding that the cause of action under fela vests in the personal representative of the estate not in the beneficiaries 1: holding that the amount of a commission to be awarded to the personal representative requires the exercise of judicial discretion and judgment by the clerk who has original jurisdiction in the matter 2: holding in part that the right of removal is given only to a defendant who has not submitted himself to that jurisdiction not to an original plaintiff in a state court who by resorting to that jurisdiction has become liable under the state laws to a crossaction 3: holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity 4: holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "arising out of the same criminal episode for traveling to meet a minor under section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and unlawful use of a two-way com-njunications device under section 934.215, Florida Statutes (2013), violate double jeopardy. Holt v. State, No. 5D14-3269, 173 So.3d 1079, 2015 WL 4768997 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2015). Furthermore, our sister courts have recently determined that, when the charged conduct arises out of. the same criminal episode, a charge for unlawful use of a two-way communications device under section 934.215 is subsumed within a charge of solicitation under section 847.0135(3) and subsumed within a charge of travelling to meet a minor after solicitation under section 847.0135(4). Hamilton v. State, 163 So.3d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (<HOLDING>); Mizner v. State, 154 So.3d 391, 399 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that an indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged fairly inform a defendant of the charge and enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense in a future prosecution for the same offense 1: holding that two offenses are separate for the purposes of  4a12a1 where all the elements of the first offense occurred before any activity forming the basis of the second offense 2: holding that when state charges defendant with both unlawfully using twoway communications device and traveling during same time period state charges single criminal episode regardless of whether evidence could support finding of separate criminal episodes and double jeopardy considerations require that  communications charge be subsumed within traveling charge 3: holding that the offense of unlawful use of a twoway communications device does not contain any elements that are distinct from the offense of traveling to meet a minor 4: holding that for conduct arising out of the same criminal episode the elements for the offense of unlawful use of a twoway communications device  are subsumed within the soliciting and traveling offenses", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "A & M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979) (\u201cAmong the more important requirements of estoppel are that the party to be estopped has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed some material fact and that this party acted with the intention that the asserting party rely to his detriment on his misunderstanding.\u201d) (citing cases). Blake argues that because Farrington commissioned the Harrigan map, that map constituted a representation by Farrington. However, commissioning another to create a map is not in itself a representation for equitable estoppel purposes. Rather, a commissioned map or document constitutes a representation in equitable estoppel where a party uses the document to induce another party to act. See, e.g., Slagle v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Minn. 1992) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Tipton, 18 B.R. 803, 806-10 (Bankr. Holdings: 0: holding that the united states corps of engineers publication of maps of navigable waters did not constitute affirmative misconduct for equitable estoppel purposes 1: holding that it was unreasonable for a party to rely on maps drafted by the united states corps of engineers that bore the heading waters covered by section 10 of the 1899 rivers and harbors act under the jurisdiction of the st paul district corps of engineers  and the caption that all other waters and wetlands not shown on this map should be considered to be covered by section 404 of the 1972 act to determine whether bodies of water outside the scope of the map were considered navigable 2: holding that the evident breadth of congressional coneern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems supported the army corps of engineers interpretation of waters of the united states to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined 3: holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states 4: recognizing that the supreme court has indicated that affirmative misconduct is a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the united states", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "agents to exercise unfettered discretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution). Consistent with these purposes, the conditions governing the warrant\u2019s execution should be \u201cexplicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents.\u201d Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04; accord Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. The particularity with which the magistrate should specify the conditions, however, will vary based on the individual facts of each case. Although the conditions precedent ensure that an anticipatory warrant will not be executed prematurely, such conditions do not serve as a substitute for the magistrate\u2019s probable cause determination. See United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-56 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). If an anticipatory warrant is based solely on Holdings: 0: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home 1: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no assurance at time warrant was issued that defendant would take suitcase to his home 2: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because contraband was picked up by defendant rather than being delivered to his home and affidavit failed to provide facts establishing a nexus between contraband and defendants home 3: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no information indicating defendant would take suitcase home or otherwise linking defendants residence to illegal activity 4: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because affidavit provided no assurance that defendant would take package to his home after collecting it at the airport despite fact that warrant contained condition that it was not to be executed until package arrived at defendants house", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that Andrew breached his fiduciary duties. It rather, presents an issue for trial. IV. CONCLUSION The Arrearage Claim is a valid claim against the Estate. Otherwise, the competing motions for summary judgment are denied. This court will retain jurisdiction going forward. 1 . This decision refers to multiple members of the Farren family, so it uses their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 . See, e.g., Alexander Indus., Inc. v. Hill, 211 A.2d 917, 918-19 (Del.1965); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del.1962); Phillips v. Schifino, 2009 WL 5174328, at *1 (Del.Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 731660, at *3 (Del.Ch. Oct. 9, 1998). 3 . See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82 (1944) (<HOLDING>); Fid. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Holdings: 0: holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit  the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment 1: holding that a federal court must enforce a state court judgment under the full faith and credit statute where diversity jurisdiction exists 2: holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to apply another states law in violation of its own legitimate public policy 3: holding that for federal court to grant full faith and credit to state court judgment state proceedings must satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendments due process clause 4: holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "tort claim against defendant notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Act. In other words, the Virginia Act would in no way foreclose the availability of a federal maritime tort claim to plaintiff until plaintiff himself elected to subject himself to the Virginia Act\u2019s exclusivity provision by affirmatively availing himself of its benefits. Such a mode of analysis might not implicate federalism and Supremacy Clause concerns so much as questions of the limits of contract, release, and waiver: i.e., whether an injured worker may contract effectively to waive his right to bring a federal maritime tort claim in exchange for access to supplemental state disability benefits. But see, e.g., Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 131, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, it is not necessarily Holdings: 0: holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act 1: holding that acceptance of payments under the louisiana state compensation act does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law precluding recovery under the longshoremens act 2: holding that in the absence of an adequate state remedy one whose constitutional rights are violated has a direct claim against the state under the state constitution 3: holding that under illinois law silence can constitute acceptance under the terms of the restatement of contracts 4: holding the privacy act to constitute a special factor precluding a bivens remedy", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "sentenced ..., does not constitute service of that sentence\u201d). B. Motion for Reduction of Sentence Nancy Melody also appeals the district court\u2019s decision to deny her request for probation in lieu of incarceration. In her motion for reduction of sentence, Nancy Melody admitted that \u201cthe time for modifying [her] sentence under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [had] ... elapsed_\u201d See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 826 F.2d 507, 507-08 (7th Cir.1987). Nevertheless, she asserted that the district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3651 to suspend her sentence and impose probation prior to execution of her sentence. She then argued that her sentence was more severe than that imposed upon her husband and that dramatic changes in her circumstances had o h Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). However, we need not decide this issue Holdings: 0: holding time limitation on statement of costs is not jurisdictional and late filing is within courts discretion 1: holding  1498 to be jurisdictional regardless of defendant type 2: holding that rule 35bs time limit is absolute regardless of whether the motion for reduction of sentence is framed under rule 35b or 18 usc  3651 3: holding that a court has authority to order probation under 18 usc  3651 at any time before the defendant is incarcerated regardless of rule 35bs 120day jurisdictional limitation 4: holding that the plra only applies to plaintiffs who are incarcerated at the time an action is commenced", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "District Court Approval). No mention is made of conditional discharge or deferred sentencing in these forms, and no form indicates the possibility of being found not guilty or of having the charges dismissed for any one of the myriad other reasons that can result in dismissal. {12} Nonetheless, because of the ubiquitousness of the language that a defendant must be informed of the permissible range of sentences, see Boykin v. Ala., 395 U.S. 238, 245 n. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), Petitioner claims that his plea was involuntary because the officer did not advise him that he could appear in court and request a deferral of the prosecution or a deferred sentence. As a result, Petitioner claims he has \u201can absolute constitutional right to withdraw his -56 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Krantz, 58 Ill.2d 187, 317 Holdings: 0: holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard 1: holding with respect to a general motion for directed verdict that it raised the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence on venue an essential part of the governments case internal quotation marks and citation omitted 2: holding that notice on ticket that required payment of fine or contacting traffic bureau but did not specifically set forth right to hearing did not violate due process because the elements required to be included in the notice are to be tailored to the circumstances of the case and depend upon an appropriate accommodation of the competing private and governmental interests involved internal quotation marks and citation omitted 3: holding a replevin action did not comply with the notice requirement under lgtca because it only communicated to the city that it sought return of the vehicles and lossofuse damages rather than putting the city on notice to start an investigation into  whether the officers acted with actual malice or the nature and extent of the actual injuries sustained the causal relationship of the injuries to the alleged misconduct the likelihood of an award of compensatory andor punitive damages and litigation strategy that would be later in issue in the second case internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "plaintiff with a private cause of action. However, the Kansas Act does not provide a private cause of action. For these reasons, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss is granted. A. The Kentucky Act (Count Two) \u201cERISA comprehensively regulates, among es insurance\u201d under the new legal standard announced by the Supreme Court in Miller. However, while Miller announced a new legal standard for determining whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA\u2019s savings clause, Miller involved an \u201cany willing provider\u201d statute, not a state judicial remedy for a claims processing cause of action. Thus, Miller did not modify the body of case law regarding so-called \u201cconflict preemption\u201d in which a state law adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. See Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1147 (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Nguyen v. Healthguard of Holdings: 0: holding the conflict preemption principle announced in pilot life and clarified in rush prudential remains in force 1: recognizing same principle 2: recognizing principle 3: recognizing the conflict 4: recognizing conflict", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in (1) \u201cmak[ing] determinations about the nature and extent of its various educational and social services programs\u201d; (2) \u201cits revenue regardless of its source\u201d; (3) \u201cits appropriation prerogatives\u201d; and (4) \u201cits authority to fashion an appropriate remedy in law enforcement actions.\u201d None of these qualifies as a special sovereignty interest in this case. The first two asserted .interests can be dismissed straightforwardly on the basis of our precedent. First, the state has no special sovereign interest in ordinary aspects of its social programs, because \u201cmost government policies do not affect core aspects of a state\u2019s sovereignty.\u201d Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 495 n. 6 (10th Cir.1998); cf. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 632 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). More to the point, a \u201cstate\u2019s interest in Holdings: 0: holding that article 10 section 8 of the arizona constitution did not create greater restrictions than the enabling act on exchanges of trust lands because section 8 provided that every disposition of or contract concerning trust lands would be null and void if not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of the enabling act 1: holding that a state can require firebreaks around housing on trust property adjacent to forest lands 2: holding that the state has no special sovereign interest in managing lands held in trust 3: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust 4: holding that a wife could claim a homestead exemption even though she only had a beneficiary interest in the property held in trust", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at the time they sought the warrants. Such a claim, however, is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Horton v. California. See 496 U.S. at 138-42, 110 S.Ct. at 2308-11 (upholding the seizure of weapons used in an armed robbery, notwithstanding that, although the officer expected to find the weapons, his warrant application only listed the proceeds); see also United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir.1994). 4 . See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375, 113 S.Ct. at 2137 (indicating that the \u2018\u2018immediately apparent\u201d requirement is satisfied if the police have \"probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object\u201d). 5 . See also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 69, 113 S.Ct. 538, 547, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown, 460 U.S. at 733, 742-43, 103 S.Ct. at Holdings: 0: holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view was lawful search incident to arrest where appellant was handcuffed but sitting within a few feet from where the gun was located 1: holding that the fourth amendment permits seizure of property in plain view where 1 the officer has a lawful right to access the object itself and 2 the propertys incriminating character is immediately apparent 2: holding that a seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine where there was probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity 3: holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment 4: holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "accounts to her. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s decision to deny maintenance to Wife is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court to hear evidence regarding the factors listed in Hill. The trial court should then determine whether, based upon those factors, income from Wife\u2019s interest in Husband\u2019s retirement accounts should be imputed to her and, if so, in what amount. After making that determination, the court should consider whether Wife has sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs. If the court finds that Wife does not have sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs, the court should then consider, as required by section 452.335.1, whether Wife\u2019s reasonable needs can be met through appropriate employment. The court should also consider a 88) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Wife's monthly income would be an Holdings: 0: holding that home purchased with separate funds and titled in one spouses name was transmuted into marital property because home was used as marital residence and the other spouse contributed to payments and repairs on home 1: holding that one spouse may be entitled to a portion of the equity in home purchased with nonmarital funds 2: holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments 3: holding that home purchased with spouses separate funds prior to marriage was transmuted into marital property because mortgage payments made from joint account home was used as marital residence and both parties devoted resources and energy into home 4: holding that furniture and furnishings for marital residence purchased with separate funds were transmuted into marital property because they were acquired and treated as communal property", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Defendants Heiser and Spencer in both their official and individual capacities. He sued Defendant McClure only in his individual capacity. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court assumed, solely for the purpose of its decision, that Mr. Umbehr \u201cwould have been protected from termination in retaliation for his statements\u201d had he been a government employee, that his \u201ccomments did motivate the votes in favor of terminating [Mr. Umbehr\u2019s] contract with Wabaunsee County,\u201d and that he suffered damages as a result of the termination. Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F.Supp. 837, 839 (D.Kan.1993). It then granted Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the ground that \u201cthe First Amendment does not prohibit defendants from considering p 843 F.Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>); Inner City Leasing and Trucking Co. v. City Holdings: 0: holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment 1: holding that independent contractor claiming loss of and denial of contracts because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment 2: holding that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment 3: holding that it was not clearly established that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was protected under first amendment 4: holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "expect criminal defense lawyers to be seers, but we must demand that they at least apprise themselves of the applicable law and provide their clients with a reasonably accurate description of it. Id. at 355. This element of gross misinformation was also present in Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.1979), where defense counsel provided, prior to his client\u2019s guilty plea, notably inaccurate information regarding a parole eligibility date and, as was the case later in Ostrander, the defendant relied upon the advice in deciding to plead guilty. Consequently, the Court said, \u201cWhen the erroneous advice induces the plea, permitting him to start over again is the imperative remedy for the constitutional deprivation.\u201d 611 F.2d at 65. See also Richardson, 397 U.S. at 772, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 465-66 Holdings: 0: holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari 1: holding that plea of guilty admits all facts well pleaded and sentence imposed and is not subject to collateral attack on ground that as factual matter accused was not guilty of the offense charged 2: holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence 3: holding that previous crimp 35 attacks on the voluntariness coercion and adequacy of advisement of defendants guilty plea precluded raising a similar attack alleging that defendant did not understand the nature of the charge 4: recognizing incompetent advice from attorney as proper ground for federal habeas attack on voluntariness of guilty plea in state court", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "removal and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (\u201cCAT\u201d). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252. We review the denial of asylum for substantial evidence and may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the IJ\u2019s finding that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Any mistreatment that petitioner received from his classmates at school who harassed him in a \u2018joking way\u2019 and pressured him to join the Shining Path did not rise to the level of past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016-18 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 1: holding that refusal to join guerrilla group is itself not affirmative expression of political opinion 2: holding that guerrilla groups attempt to recruit alien did not establish persecution based on political opinion 3: holding that attempted conscription by a guatemalan guerrilla group did not constitute persecution on account of a political opinion where petitioner failed to show that the group was motivated by his political opinion 4: holding that a guerrilla organizations attempt to coerce a person into performing military service does not necessarily constitute persecution on account of  political opinion ", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "any officer of the state, or of a country, or of a city or other municipality, could follow them only when he saw fit. If by estoppel such salutary provisions, enacted with wise foresight as checks upon extravagance and dishonesty, can be utterly abrogated at will by any officer, such provisions then subserve no purpose, and the public corporation has no earthly protection against either greed or graft .... Equitable estoppel is impotent to purge transactions of the fatal infirmity of being in violation of law. Id. (citations omitted); see also Stewart, 165 S.W.2d at 629 (\u201c[T]he doctrine of es-toppel cannot be applied to a municipality where it has no power under any circumstance to make the contract in question.\u201d); Sager v. State Highway Comm\u2019n, 349 Mo. 341, 160 S.W.2d 757, 763 (1942) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted); Fleshner v, Kansas City, Holdings: 0: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 1: holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound 2: holding that the state even though receiving a benefit from performance cannot by estoppel become bound by the unauthorized contracts of its officers 3: holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts 4: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of CBS\u2019s. As the district court recognized, one company\u2019s minority ownership interest in another company is not sufficient by itself to make the owner a competitor, for purposes of the antitrust laws, of the subsidiary\u2019s rivals. To be a competitor at the level of the subsidiary, the parent must have substantial control over the affairs and policies of the subsidiary. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d. Cir.1978) (finding no violation of \u00a7 8 of Clayton Act where interlocked parent corporations had competing subsidiaries, but reserving issue whether statute would cover \u201cparent corporation that closely controls and dictates the policies of its subsidiary\u201d); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 658 F.Supp. 1061, 1084-85 (D.Del.1987) (<HOLDING>); J.E. Rhoads & Sons, Inc. v. Ammeraal, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 1: holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary 2: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations 3: holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control 4: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is a necessary element of a computer-based corresponding structure. See WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. The '930 Patent describes what result the A/D Converter and Microprocessor 24 in combination with the switch 28 accomplish, which is increasing the current to a higher level from the low level initially applied to the data signaling pair. See '930 Patent, fig 1. The' '930 Patent also gives a generalized indication as to the way the control means performs the function, which is detecting a varying level voltage drop across resistors 26 and 30. Id. However, there is insufficient disclosure of the details of a particular algorithm, so that the scope of the control means limitation and where the boundary of infringement and non-infringemen .Supp.2d 512, 518 (E.D.Tex.2006) (Clark, J.) (<HOLDING>); Gobeli Research Ltd. v. Apple Computer, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite 1: holding that claim that included control means for automatically operating said valving limitation was indefinite as the specification merely disclosed a diagram with a box labeled control and a stated the invention may be controlled automatically by known differential pressure valving and control equipment 2: holding claim that included database editing means  for generating  and embedding  limitation was indefinite where the specification merely restated that software performed the recited function 3: holding claim indefinite as the specification did not disclose sufficient structure where disclosure stated one of ordinary skill in the art could program a computer with appropriate programming to perform a control means function 4: holding improper reading into claims a limitation appearing only in the specification", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "CONST. art. I, \u00a7 15 (requiring the Legislature to maintain \"purity and efficiency\u201d of right to trial by jury); id. art. V, \u00a7 31 (\"The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch .... \u201d). 14 . See id. art. VII, \u00a7 1; id. art. VII, \u00a7\u00a7 17(h), 18(h) (allowing legislation \"[t]o assure efficient use of construction funds and t p. Comm\u2019n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex.1995) (\"Because the other plaintiffs, except for Fuller, bring the same facial challenges and seek the same declaratory relief as the Texas AFL-CIO, we need not address their individual standing and we express no opinion thereon.\u201d); Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915, 917 (1925) (\"There being parties plaintiff who a 41 n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) (<HOLDING>). 36 . 620 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Tex.1981). 37 . 755 Holdings: 0: holding school board members had standing to complain that statute required them to distribute books in violation of constitution 1: holding that members of the board of trustees of an elementary school had standing to challenge the actions of the county board of education because they suffered an actual injury when the county board nullified their unanimous vote to reject a candidate for principal of the elementary school 2: holding that plaintiff had standing to sue a board even though board was far from sole participant in the application of the challenged statute 3: holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal 4: recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "While these observations by Hines \"express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of [a] disputed issue,\" the testimony does not eross the line drawn by rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 1993). Hines's testimony was relevant in \"help{ing] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,\" see Utah R. Evid. 702(a), by explaining what concerns may drive an investor's decision to purchase a security. Compare Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1861 (determining that an expert's opinion testimony \"that some of the material that [the defendant] had omitted from the securities documents could have been important or significant to an investor\" was admissible), with State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse Holdings: 0: holding that such information is not material under securities law 1: holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time 2: holding that under certain conditions a bank assumes a duty to disclose facts material to a transaction 3: holding that purely factual material may be withheld from disclosure under exemption 5 if that material would expose the deliberative process of an agency 4: holding inadmissible expert testimony that included statements that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under utah law that the material actually provided to investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the act and that the agreements at issue were securities under utah law", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for the sale. Generally speaking, \u201c[a]n escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to [an escrow] contract.\u201d Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added). Likewise, \u201c[t]he title insurance agent may not inten-tionaHy or recklessly deceive the parties to a real estate transaction.\u201d Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990, writ denied) (emphasis added). An escrow agent and closer like HTC does not owe a duty \u2014 and thus has no negligence HabiHty \u2014 to the non-party creditor of a party to the escrow agreement. Cf. Rove v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-96-01783-CV, 1998 WL 696880, at *4 (Tex.App.-DaHas Oct.8, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for pubHcation) (<HOLDING>). Compare Zimmerman, 790 S.W.2d at 694-95 Holdings: 0: holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment 1: holding that summary judgment against escrow agent to closing was properly granted when fraud was alleged basis of conspiracy and when nothing in the noevidence summary judgment record supports the borrowers claim that american title was a party to a plan to defraud them 2: holding that escrow agent owed duty only to parties to escrow agreement not to party to tangential contract further holding that trial court correctly rendered summary judgment on neghgence claim against escrow agent on this ground 3: holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment on ground not presented by movant in writing 4: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "this constituted fraud and inequitable conduct on the PTO. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Warner Chilcott knew that the \u2019394 patent was not valid, as it was \u201canticipated and obvious in light of the prior art\u201d before listing the patent in the Orange Book. (Id. \u00b6 94.) Plaintiffs allege that \u201cWarner Chilcott\u2019s listing of the \u2019394 [p]atent was objectively and subjectively baseless because Warner Chilcott did not believe and could not reasonably have believed that the \u2019394 [pjatent could be asserted against manufacturers of generic versions of Loestrin 24.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 97.) It was listed to create an obstacle to generic competition. (Id.) Defendants argue that this claim only survives if Plaintiffs\u2019 Walker Process fraud or sham litigation claims survive. See Solodyn, 2015 WL 5458570, *12 (<HOLDING>). Because the underlying conduct has survived' Holdings: 0: holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing 1: holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation 2: holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim 3: holding that listing presumptively valid patents in the orange book and enforcing them against infringers are not bases for an antitrust claim quoting in re lipitor antitrust litig no 312cv2389 pgs 2013 wl 4780496 at 21 dnj sept 5 2013 4: holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "bears the burden of establishing that the claims are patent-ineligible, and the Court will construe the patent claims in a manner most favorable to Plaintiff. See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2014). Previously, the Federal Circuit and courts in this district have presumed that issued patents are valid, and have required defendants to prove patent-ineligibility by clear and convincing evidence. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P\u2019ship, 564 U.S. 91, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2242, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011); see also Ultramercial, Inc, v, Hulu, LLC, (\u201cUltramercial I\u201d) 722 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed.Cir.2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds by WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 134 S.Ct. 2870, 189 L.Ed.2d 828 (2014) (<HOLDING>); CMG Fin, Servs., Inc, v. Pac. Trust Bank, Holdings: 0: holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard 1: holding that where the new york times clear and convincing evidence requirement applies the summary judgment inquiry will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either plaintiff or defendant 2: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 3: holding that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to section 101 challenges 4: holding that the presumption of validity  and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard  does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss  it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard  a burden of proof  to such motions citation omitted", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "devised a scheme to defraud Gron-gie, defendants, and other African Americans by charging higher premiums and systematically depriving them of benefits. (Id. at \u00b6 185.) According to defendants, plaintiff effectuated its scheme through a combination of RICO-prohibited theft, mail fraud, and wire fraud. (Id. at \u00b6\u00b6 187-88, 190-91.) Under Georgia\u2019s civil RICO provision, defendants can only recover for injuries incurred as a result of predicate acts directed towards themselves, as opposed to predicate acts directed towards third parties. Nicholson v. Windham, 257 Ga.App. 429, 430, 571 S.E.2d 466, 468 (2002) (upholding dismissal of RICO claim based on predicate acts that were not directed towards plaintiff). See also Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga.App. 707, 709, 340 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1986) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original) (quoting Sedima, Holdings: 0: holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation 1: holding that to the extent plaintiffs present action is based on conduct subsequent to the original action it is not barred by the prior litigation 2: holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 3: holding that a plaintiff in a bivens action must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation 4: holding that plaintiffs must allege and can only recover to the extent that they have been injured  by the conduct constituting the violation  ", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "security, the trial court must hear evidence of \u201cthe value of the property interest\u2019s rent or revenue.\u201d Cf. Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1989, writ dism\u2019d w.o.j.) (\u201cremand[ing] to the trial court with instructions that the trial court shall conduct a hearing and consider evidence relating to the sufficiency of the supersedeas bond, including the present value of the consideration required of Brodsky by the contract and the value of the rent and/or hire of the property\u201d). The trial court thus erred in setting the amount of security without conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, since Reyes does not argue this error harmed him in any way, I would hold the error is harmless. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; see Nabelek, \u2014 S.W.3d at -, 2005 WL 2148999, at *6 (<HOLDING>). And, since it is undisputed that the trial Holdings: 0: holding brief hearing not part of trial proper in defendants absence subject to harmless error standard 1: holding law requires court to consider full record of any evidentiary hearing even if hearing held by different judge 2: holding that where defendants counsel objected to the trial judges evidentiary rulings in evidentiary hearing but did not object to the defendants absence any claim of error due to defendants absence had been waived 3: holding that error harmless because appellant failed to identify any specific harm from improper introduction of evidence 4: holding absence of record harmless when hearing was not evidentiary and appellant failed to argue harm", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "also provides that aperson commits the crime of telephonic harassment if the caller \u201cintentionally harasses or annoys another person: \u201c(c) By sending to, or leaving at, the other person\u2019s telephone a text message, voice mail or any other message, knowing that the caller has been forbidden from so doing by a person exercising lawful authority over the receiving telephone.\u201d The state did not charge defendant with telephonic harassment under paragraph (c) for leaving a \u201cvoice mail or any other message.\u201d 3 See State v. Blair, 287 Or 519, 524-25, 601 P2d 766 (1979) (declaring ORS 166.065(1)(c) (1979), to be constitutionally inadequate because it did not require an \u2018effect\u2019 on the listener and the prohibited conduct was not narrowly defined); State v. Ray, 302 Or 595,600-01,733 P2d28 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 4 See State v. James, 266 Or App 660, 667 n Holdings: 0: holding that state express advocacy definition without an electioneering communication limitation was not vague 1: holding that threat as used in the coercion definition as that definition is incorporated into section 3605s witnesstampering prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague because nature of threat was informed by the harms enumerated in the definition in that case hatred contempt and ridicule 2: holding that ors 1660651e 1985 was unconstitutional because it potentially reached areas of communication that would be constitutionally privileged and it incorporated a definition of obscenity that was unconstitutionally vague 3: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague 4: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Brungardt objected to Teague\u2019s investigation of Wess Jones because this evidence is hearsay, irrelevant, and prejudicial. The complaints of irrelevance and prejudice are waived because they were not raised at trial. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a). Regarding the Town\u2019s hearsay complaint, Chief Brungardt was the Town\u2019s agent or employee, and his authorization of Teague\u2019s investigation into the Wess Jones incident was in the course and scope of his employment as chief of police. Accordingly, Teague\u2019s testimony that Chief Brungardt did not object to Teague\u2019s investigation of Wess, but actually authorized it, was an admission by a party-opponent and was not hearsay. See Tex.R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(D); see also Excel Corp. v. Porras, 14 S.W.3d 307, 314 n. 1 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); McEwen v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 975 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding intentional assault by coworker to be outside the course and scope of employment 1: recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact 2: holding that statement is admission by partyopponent if made by partys agent or servant concerning matter within course and scope of the agency or employment and made during existence of agency or employment relationship 3: holding that statements of a company vice president were admissible against the principal owner of the company under fedrevid 801d2d as an admission made by the partys agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment 4: holding that municipal police officers are immune from personal liability for decisions acts or omissions that are 1 made within the scope of their official duties while in the course of their employment 2 discretionary rather than ministerial and 3 not made in a wanton or reckless manner", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "defendants. Id. at 615, 117 S.Ct. 2231. Hence, the district court must engage in a rigorous analysis of whether the Rule\u2019s requirements have actually been met. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). At times the issues may be plain enough for the court to make its determina tion only on the pleadings. If need be, however, the district court may probe behind the pleadings and forecast what kind of evidence may be required or allowed at trial. See id. Of course, the court must bear in mind that plaintiffs are not required to prove their case at the certification stage. Thus, certification is not an appropriate time to examine the merits. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (<HOLDING>); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Holdings: 0: holding that while it is not appropriate to consider the merits in determining certification the admissibility of all evidence which has relevance to the merits is not barred if it is relevant to the purpose of refuting or supporting the existence of a class 1: holding that the court has no authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of an action to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action 2: holding certification is not an occasion for inquiry into the merits 3: holding that an employers inquiry into the reason for an employees work absences was a permissible jobrelated inquiry under the ada 4: holding that the court may only make a facial inquiry into the validity of the certification", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "file additional motions, he may move for extensions of time when necessary. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The Supreme Court has granted certiorari sub nom United States v. Ursery, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 (1996). 2 . Chevron\u2019s three-factor analysis still applies when a court announces a new rule but does not apply it to the litigants before it. Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 380 n. 3 (9th Cir.1994). 3 . Dowell ultimately refused to grant relief because the movant had not appealed the judgment in question. He had essentially waived his right to relief. 4 . In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989), followed this rule in the bankruptcy context, holding that a clarification of the law may, in conjunction with other c . 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Two cases have found that the 1989 case, Holdings: 0: holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act 2: holding that unlike under the federal constitution a civil forfeiture is punishment under the new mexico double jeopardy clause 3: holding that the double jeopardy clause prohibits courts from imposing greater penalties than the legislature intended 4: holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "made to Ms. Cobb, and the complaints of other teachers regarding Krystal\u2019s behavior, are amply supported by the testimony of various witnesses, including Krystal\u2019s own testimony. W. Va.Code \u00a7 18A-5-1, which governs a teacher\u2019s authority, provides, in part: (a) The teacher shall stand in the place of the parent(s), guardian(s) or custodian(s) in exercising authority over the school and shall have control of all pupils enrolled in the school from the time they reach the school until they have returned to their respective homes[.] * :H * (c) The teacher shall have authority to exclude from his or her classroom or school bus any pupil who is guilty of disorderly conduct; who in any manner interferes with an orderly educati a. 700, 705, 347 S.E.2d 220, 226 (1986) (Neeley, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we hold, West Virginia public school Holdings: 0: recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children 1: holding that although parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children they have no fundamental right to allocate support to their children as they see fit 2: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children 3: recognizing that teachers are not merely instructors in sciences and letters they are authority figures role models behavioral examples surrogate parents after a fashion teachers stand in loco parentis children learn much more from their teachers than the quadratic equation and the proper spelling of dirndl  they learn important values and morals one of the most important values children learn from their teachers is respect for the law 4: holding that teachers stand in loco parentis toward a pupil in matters of discipline and security", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "provides: (a) A person commits the offense of distributing material ere are not \u201cwords of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter,\u201d we look to the ordinary meaning of those words at the time the General Assembly enacted the statute in deciding whether the sending of an intangible text message comes within the scope of the statute. See OCGA \u00a7 1-3-1 (b) (\u201cIn all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.\u201d); Collins, 198 Ga. at 22. See also Sandifer v. U. S. Steel Corp.,_U. S._,__ (134 SCt 870, 187 LE2d 729, 738) (2014) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, under the canon of noscitur a Holdings: 0: holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning 1: holding that  unless otherwise defined words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning  at the time congress enacted a statute and reviewing dictionaries from the era of the statutes enactment to assist in determining its meaning citation omitted 2: holding that bribery must be given its ordinary meaning at the time of the enactment of the relevant statute 3: holding that courts give the words of a statute their ordinary contemporary common meaning absent an indication congress intended them to bear some different import 4: recognizing that undefined words in a statute ordinarily should be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the number of hours reasonably expended for purposes for calculating the lodestar, the district court should exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours ...\u201d Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir.1999); See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Sea Spray does not challenge the hourly rates charged by the various attorneys and legal assistants retained by Buyers. In any event, this Court finds the rates charged by Buyers\u2019s individual attorneys and legal assistants to be within the range of reasonable fees. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 84 F.Supp.2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (awarding paralegals between $75/hr and $130/hr depending on experience); Ramos v. Patrician Equities Corp., No. 89 Civ. 5370, 1993 WL 58428, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. March 3, 1993)(<HOLDING>). But see In re WICAT Securities Litigation, Holdings: 0: holding that attorney hourly billing rates between 150 and 450 are in line with other new york city firms and that rates between 98 and 280 are modest 1: holding that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in considering the prevailing hourly rates in the southern district of new york when awarding attorneys fees 2: holding that absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district judge may establish a reasonable rate based on his familiarity with the prevailing rates in the area 3: recognizing the time honored practice of applying new york city rates in calculating attorneys fees throughout the southern district of new york including in counties north of the city 4: holding that a carrier has a property interest in telecommunication rates and therefore is entitled to due process in the calculation of said rates", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Count Twenty-Two alleges a single scheme to defraud the Sheriffs Office and the citizens of Page County of its right to honest services, and it identifies a use of the mail in furtherance of that scheme. The fact that only one mailing is identified in the indictment does not render Count Twenty-Two invalid. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. \u2014, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008), \u201c[t]he gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any \u2018mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element.\u2019 \u201d Bridge, 128 S.Ct. at 2138 (quoting Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989)); see also United States v. Bradshaw, 282 Fed.Appx. 264, 269-270 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the defendant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecution may establish the intent element of mail fraud by proving that the defendant was reckless 1: holding that mailing of titleregistration forms satisfied mailing requirement because they contributed to success of the scheme 2: holding that the first element of mail fraud  knowing participation in a scheme to defraud  can extend beyond the specific mailing and that the loss calculation for a mail fraud conviction may include any loss from the fraudulent scheme that the mailing furthered 3: recognizing that where the looting is complete before the mailing is made a claim for mail fraud will not lie 4: recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Inc., 94 N.M. 59, 607 P.2d 597 (1980); Sanchez v. Bernalillo County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953). Moreover, our courts have held that the Workman\u2019s Compensation Act is sui generis. It creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedures. Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (1980). In at least one instance, the court refused to create a new cause of action for employer subrogation tangential to the act. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975). The Courts in New Mexico have not hesitated to recognize the existence of new causes of action or to abolish certain common law defenses where public policy or statutory grounds are found to warrant such judicially sanctioned change. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 597 P.2d 745 (1979), (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. New Mexico Highway Comm., 88 N.M. Holdings: 0: recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention 1: recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention 2: holding that a cause of action or negligent hiring training and retention can proceed only if the alleged negligence leads to the commission of one of the torts enumerated in the tort claims act 3: holding that a negligent retention claim was properly dismissed when there was no underlying tort upon which it could have been based 4: holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was found to have retained any privacy in the room after his eviction, the degree of privacy retained would not be significant under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, while a hotel room may differ slightly from an in-home situation, Defendant and Nishimura still had the opportunity to hide weapons in the room just as they would have in a home. Because Nishimura was tasked with packing her belongings, the officers believed it necessary to secure the area from any danger posed to them. The Government argues that in the instant case, it would have been unreasonable for Special Agent Nutter to have left the drawer unsearched and jeopardized the safety of all present should Nishimura have gained access to a loaded gun. See United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Defendant counters that, here, a search for Holdings: 0: holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone 1: holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole 2: holding that when fleeing felon tossed a mesh bag weighing four or five pounds toward the officer the officer would have been justified if he fired at that moment out of fear that the bag might knock his firearm out of his hand but that he was not justified in firing after bag hit him and fell to the ground without injuring him and suspect turned and ran 3: holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment 4: holding an officers reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed was sufficient justification for seizure of suspects makeup bag and exigent circumstances justified the subsequent warrantless search of the closed bag", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Id. If there is evidence in the record, including affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions, as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. See Lane v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 18 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1994). Notably, \u201cthe trial court\u2019s task at the summary judgment motion state of litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to decide them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding, it does not extend to issue resolution.\u201d Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994); see Donahue v. Windsor Locks Board of Fire Commissioners, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). B. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act FDCPA Holdings: 0: holding that on a motion for summary judgment the court cannot try issues of fact it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried 1: holding that under florida law a court hearing a case on a motion for a summary judgment can only consider those issues raised by the pleadings 2: holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves 3: holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues 4: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "United States v. O\u2019Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1024 (1st Cir.1992) (\u201c[w]e decline to engage in a construction of the language of foreseeability that requires such a forced linguistic volte-face\u201d). But Edwards ignored the language of the Guidelines- on \u201cthe scope of the agreement.\u201d The Second Circuit picked up this language and wrote a gloss on it, holding that the latecomer to a conspiracy was liable for drugs earlier distributed, of which he \u201cknew or reasonably should have known.\u201d United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991). This gloss introduces a kind of negligence standard into conspiracy law. It goes beyond the terms of the . Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Navarro, 979 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). An approach closer to the Guidelines was Holdings: 0: holding that the district court made sufficient factual findings and adequately determined the scope of defendants participation in a conspiracy under  1b13 even though the district court did not expressly determine the scope of the defendants participation 1: holding that the sentencing court erred in failing to make a factual determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant after his participation in the charged conspiracy 2: holding that defendant is liable for entire quantity of drugs attributable to conspiracy in circumstances where defendant is one of conspiracys central figures 3: holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction 4: holding that when a district court determines drug quantity for the purpose of sentencing a defendant convicted of participating in a drugtrafficking conspiracy the court is required to make an individualized finding as to drug amounts attributable to or foreseeable by that defendant", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "claim are (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2089, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir.1984). In common with a claim for attempted monopolization, a \u00a7 2 claim based on monopolization requires proof that the defendant has engaged in predatory, or anti-competitive, behavior. See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Telegraph Co., 651 F.2d 76, 85 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1438, 71 L.Ed.2d 654 (1982) (<HOLDING>). The court has concluded that the ground of Holdings: 0: holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute 1: holding that fraudulent joinder required a finding that either there was no possibility that the plaintiff could prove a cause of action against the resident defendant or that the plaintiff fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts in order to subject that resident defendant to the jurisdiction of the state court 2: holding that the plaintiff must demon strate that the defendant engaged in anticompetitive behavior to prove either monopolization or an attempt to monopolize 3: holding the defense of legal impossibility does not bar  prosecution for either attempt or conspiracy 4: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to rebut the inference of discrimination came not from a misuse of statistics, but from the inexorable zero.\u201d); see also NAACP, Inc. v. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir.1995) (vacating denial of preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from hiring any town employees in light of failure to ever hire a full-time black employee, which, by itself, supports an inference of discrimination); EEOC v. O & G Spring and Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir.1994) (finding of intentional discrimination was supported by statistical showing that defendant failed to hire any African-Americans); Loyd, 25 F.3d at 524 n. 4 (where promotional procedure maintained the inexorable zero it is strong evidence of intent to bring about that result); Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 867 n. 7 (<HOLDING>); Bethlehem Steel, 635 F.2d at 1015 (reversing Holdings: 0: holding circumstantial evidence that defendant former employer was providing negative employment reference to plaintiffs prospective employers was sufficient to defeat summary judgment on the causation element of prima facie case 1: holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons 2: holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation 3: holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext 4: holding reliance on statistical evidence of inexorable zero was sufficient to establish prima facie case notwithstanding plaintiffs failure to reference appropriate workpool", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "restitution was set, the court was required to evaluate an inmate\u2019s individual ability to pay. See State v. Haines, 360 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1985) (noting that it is the \u201creasonable ability to pay\u201d standard which allows \u00a7 910.2 to pass constitutional muster). In addition, the plan of restitution and plan of payment were both subject to modification by the court. See Iowa Code \u00a7 910.7. Once this initial deprivation occurred, the inmates\u2019 interest in their money was diminished, much like the limitations on the freedom to spend money suffered by any person who incurs a debt. When the Department took the next step of designating specific procedures for the repayment of an inmate\u2019s restitution, the procedural requirements diminished. See, e.g., Scott v. Angelone, 771 F.Supp. 1064 (D.Nev.1991) (<HOLDING>). At this second stage of proceedings, the Holdings: 0: holding that defendants are estopped from raising nonexhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmates ability to utilize grievance procedures 1: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 2: holding that notice and postdeprivation grievance procedures are sufficient process to freeze an inmates prison trust account until the prisoner pays for medical expenses he has incurred 3: holding that threats to an inmates safety after his use of the prison grievance system supported a retaliation claim 4: holding california postdeprivation recovery procedures satisfy due process despite lack of notice to claimant of recovery procedures", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "issue of sanity even if the testimony discloses or is based on the defendant\u2019s statements to psychologists during a compelled examination and without counsel present. 7 . Cf. D.C.Code \u00a7 14-307 (b)(2) (1986) (privilege does not cover \"evidence relating to the mental competency or sanity of an accused in criminal trials where the accused raises the defense of insanity\u201d); United States v. Byers, 239 U.S.App.D.C. at 10, 740 F.2d at 1113 (observing that while court should respect defendant\u2019s \"private enclave of the human personality,\u201d when he \"appeals to the nature of that enclave as the reason why he should not be punished for murder, and introduces psychiatric testimony for that purpose, the state must be able to follow where he has led\u201d); Carr, 141 U.S.App.D.C. at 230, 437 F.2d at 663 (<HOLDING>); Developments in the Law \u2014 Privileged Holdings: 0: holding in insanity defense case that full scrutiny of defendants mental state overrides the claims founded upon the attorneyclient relationship that might block production of defense psychiatrists examination notes 1: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 2: holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity 3: holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge 4: holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "role of the courts is to distinguish between biting criticism that merely suppresses demand and copyright infringement, which usurps it.\u201d) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Potential market harm due to the blemished reputation of the politician depicted in the Photograph is not protected by Plaintiff Galvin\u2019s copyright. See New Em Publications, 904 F.2d at 160 (stating that \u201ceven if [an unfavorable biography] ultimately harms sales of the authorized biography, this would not result from unfair infringement ... but rather from a convincing work that effectively criticizes [the subject of the biography], the very type of work that the Copyright Act was designed to protect and encourage.\u201d); Dhillon v. Does 1-10, No. C 13-01465 SI, 2014 WL 722592, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (<HOLDING>); Katz v. Chevaldina, No. 12-22211-CIV-KING, Holdings: 0: holding that the fair use defense is available only so long as such use does not lead to customer confusion as to the source of the goods or services 1: holding that unauthorized use of politicians headshot to criticize her polities is precisely what the copyright act envisions as a paradigmatic fair use 2: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 3: holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense 4: holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "211, 213 (1979). The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify because the duty to defend is triggered by arguable, as opposed to actual, coverage. See Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Wis.2d 824, 834-35, 501 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1993). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that where an insurer is not named in the underlying lawsuit, insurance coverage may be determined either by a separate declaratory judgment action or by the insurer\u2019s intervention in the underlying action followed by a bifurcated trial. See Fire Ins. Exchange v. Basten, 202 Wis.2d 74, 89, 549 N.W.2d 690, 696 (1996). Acuity\u2019s interest in the underlying lawsuit is significant because of the severe consequences if it breaches its duty to defend. See, e.g., Newhouse, 176 Wis.2d at 835, 501 N.W.2d at 5 (<HOLDING>); Patrick v. Head of Lakes Cooperative Electric Holdings: 0: holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend 1: holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend 2: holding that because the insurer had a duty to defend it was beyond peradventure that it breached the insurance policy in not doing so thereby causing defendant to incur unnecessary legal expenses 3: holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits 4: holding on summary judgment before the question of the insurers obligation to indemnify was decided that the insurer was liable for the costs of the insured in defending the declaratory judgment action because it breached its duty to defend", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "probably would result in an acquittal or life sentence on retrial. 1. Evidence In determining whether newly discovered evidence would probably result in an acquittal or a lesser sentence, the new evidence must be viewed in conjunction with the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the Court evaluates all the admissible newly discovered evidence, including any admissible newly discovered evidence presented in prior postconviction proceedings, and compares it with the evidence that was introduced at trial. Marek erroneously contends that the Court also must consider all of the evidence he presented in his prior postconviction proceedings in an effort to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Marek overlooks that throughout the extensive Holdings: 0: holding that to demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel petition must establish that the alleged error was prejudicial in fact 1: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 2: holding that to demonstrate deficient performance a petitioner must show counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed a defendant by the sixth amendment 3: holding that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must demonstrate that counsel was constitutionally deficient and as a result defendant was prejudiced 4: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "under \u00a7 523(a)(4). Cobham appeals. We review the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standards of review that were applied in the district court. In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the bankruptcy court\u2019s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013; In re K & L Lakeland, Inc., 128 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1997). We have reviewed the record included on appeal, and the parties\u2019 briefs, and find that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that LeCann met her burden of establishing that the debt at issue is non-dischargeable under \u00a7 523(a)(6). See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm on the bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury 2: holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that a creditor objecting to the dischargeability of a debt under  523a must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "indemnification claim. V. Beazer challenges on two grounds the court\u2019s entry of judgment against it and in favor of Agrico on Agrico\u2019s equitable indemnification claim. First, Beazer contends that under controlling .South Carolina law, equitable indemnification lies only between parties having a contractual or special relationship that did not exist between Beazer and Agri-eo. Second, Beazer contends that equitable indemnity does not lie in favor of a party that itself is at fault in causing the injury for which indemnification is sought and that here Agrico was so at fault. We disagree on both points and find no error in this part of the court\u2019s judgment. Judgment was entered only for litigation costs incurred by Agrico in defending against Dent\u2019s 22, 301 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Here, the jury, answering an interrogatory Holdings: 0: holding that an indemnitee must be proven to be free of negligence in order to receive indemnity either under a general indemnity agreement or under implied indemnity 1: holding that a shoulder purse carried by a person at the time he is stopped lies within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of his person 2: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one 3: holding that equitable indemnity lies where one person is exposed to liability by the wrongful act of another in which he does not join 4: holding that duty not to cause injury to another by ones negligent act is too broad to serve as a basis for permitting indemnity", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "287 F.3d at 873; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If a trademark that is descriptive lacks secondary meaning, it is invalid. Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970). To acquire secondary meaning, section 1052(f) requires that the mark must have become \u201cdistinctive of the applicant\u2019s goods.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1052(f); Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. \u201cThe basic element of secondary meaning is a mental recognition in buyers\u2019 and potential buyers\u2019 minds that products connected with the [mark] are associated with the same source.\u201d Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). A mark has acquired secondary meaning if buyers and potential buyers automatically associate the mark with Plaintiff. Self-Realization Fellowship, 59 F.3d at 911-12 (<HOLDING>). There are many ways to establish if a Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff failed to establish selfrealization acquired secondary meaning because members of the american hinduyoga community believed the mark was a spiritual state of mind and did not automatically associate a selfrealization product with plaintiff 1: holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark 2: holding that mark had not acquired secondary meaning even with advertisements costing 4400000 over five years because it did not lead consumers to associate plaintiffs mark with its products 3: holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false 4: holding that copying is only evidence of secondary meaning if the defendants intent in copying is to confuse consumers and pass off his product as the plaintiffs in that situation the defendants belief that plaintiffs trade dress has acquired secondary meaning  so that his copying will indeed facilitate his passing off  is some evidence that the trade dress actually has acquired secondary meaning", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1011 et seq. in interpreting ERISA's saving clause. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48, 107 S.Ct. at 1553. 13 . See S.C. Police Officers Retirement System v. Spartanburg, 301 S.C, 188, 391 S.E.2d 239 (1990) (requiring municipal employer to contribute to retirement program to enable employee to upgrade his benefits despite the fact that employee had failed to file a written request and pay a special contribution prior to retirement in strict compliance with the governing statute); Wright v. Southern Ry, 74 S.C. 27, 54 S.E. 211 (1906) (finding substantial compliance with provisions relating to service of notice upon the magistrate). Substantial compliance has also been applied in the insurance context. Home v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 277 S.C. 336, 287 S.E.2d 144 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 14 . In Wilkie, the court analyzed a Holdings: 0: holding that a contractor who had substantially complied with the building specifications substantially performed 1: holding that an insured has substantially complied with the change of beneficiary provisions of a life insurance policy when he has done all that he could to comply with the provisions 2: holding that insured substantially complied with the manner of changing the beneficiary as required by the policy 3: holding that insured had not substantially complied with the policys change of beneficiary provisions when the hospitalized insured was physically unable to leave her bed and was unable to retrieve the policy from her lock box at the bank to return to the company for endorsement as required by the terms of the policy 4: holding that the named insured was using an automobile when changing its tire", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "leave at \u201c[her] doctor\u2019s request.\u201d Thomas Aff. \u00b6 31. If a jury were to conclude that Plaintiff left such voicemail\u2014a fact that Defendant contests\u2014it could find that Plaintiff satisfied the content of notice requirement under 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 825.303(b). Defendant\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiffs FMLA and DCFMLA unlawful denial claims is therefore denied. B. Plaintiffs Retaliation Claim under the FMLA and DCMLA Defendant also has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff\u2019s claims for retaliation under the FMLA, Am. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 81-88, and the DCFMLA, Am. Compl. \u00b6\u00b658-65. Def.\u2019s Mot. at 15-17. Both statutes prohibit retaliation against an employee who (1) exercises, or attempts to exercise, any right provided under the statute, see 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 2615(a)(1); Gordon, 778 F.3d at 161 (<HOLDING>); D.C. Code Ann. \u00a7 32-507(a); or (2) \u201copposfes] Holdings: 0: holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix 1: holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation 2: recognizing a retaliation claim arising under  2615a1 3: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 4: holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the guideline offense level for a drug offense), he was a potential government witness at sentencing, and Cogswell did not know whether Lewis would be called to testify at sentencing. See United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 218-19 (1st Cir.1997) (finding enhancement applicable when defendant threatened someone who \u201cremained a prospective government witness\u201d in further proceedings against defendant); see also United States v. Boyd, 574 Fed.Appx. 878, 879-80 (11th Cir.2014) (unpublished) (upholding enhancement where defendant threatened a witness after defendant had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing because defendant \u201cdid not know whether [the witness\u2019s] testimony would be used against him at sentencing\u201d); United States v. Rubio, 317 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Cogswell\u2019s other contention \u2014 that 'the Holdings: 0: holding that we are not persuaded by defendants contention that an assault did not take place because he never made physical contact with the weapon in light of the evidence showing that the gun was only inches from defendants outstretched hand and that defendant was actively forcefully and to some degree successfully resisting the officers attempt to arrest him we do not believe in light of our states definition of assault that defendants failure to physically touch the weapon precludes the commission of an assault with the firearm 1: holding that an assault that occurred immediately after the employee was discharged was in the course of the employment 2: holding that an obstructionofjustice enhancement was appropriate based on the defendants assault on a witness after trial and rejecting the defendants argument that because the assault occurred after trial it could not impact the prosecution of his case 3: holding that the trial court in a sexual assault case erred by refusing to allow evidence of prior testimony by the complainant in an unrelated rape prosecution 4: holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "likely to cause material harm to the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\u201d Id., at 8. It further pointed out that the news media in that case had been allowed access to materials considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment and that this was consistent with \u201ca public right of access to materials considered in rulings on dispositive pre-trial motions . . .\u201d Id., at 8. The Court held, however, that the right to public access \u201cdoes not extend to documents submitted to a court in connection with discovery proceedings,\u201d id., at 11, and concluded that \u201cdiscovery proceedings are fundamentally different from proceedings to which the courts have recognized a public right of F.2d 139, 146-48 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In doing so, the Court stressed that (unlike Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified 1: holding that a publishing company had no constitutional or other right of access to pretrial documents not filed with the court and declining to overturn the district courts denial of a motion to vacate a protective order to which the parties had stipulated 2: holding that issuance of a protective order or other probable cause of abuse precludes court ordered mediation 3: holding that protective orders in the landlord and tenant branch are distinguishable from ordinary prejudgment security devices because protective orders are not statutory creations and because a tenant who fails to pay a protective order may suffer the irreparable consequence of losing possession of the property 4: holding that court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants a protective order where plaintiff failed to request discovery until nine days before the deadline", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Let us say we have a trial against the asbestos companies and the plaintiffs lose because the plaintiff is found to have not been exposed to asbestos in a way in which exposure was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Now, what happens in a case where we proceed against the tobacco companies? Are we collaterally estopped from asserting a synergy argument against the tobacco companies because a jury has formerly held that the plaintiffs injury was not caused by asbestos? And despite that, can the tobacco companies nonetheless proceed and enter a defense and argue to a jury that in fact it's asbestos that caused the injury and not. tobacco? 9 . In Forbes v. American Tobacco Co., 37 F.R.D. 530 (E.D.Wis.1965), the court severed claims again 9, 641-42 (N.D.Ga.1993) (<HOLDING>); Hanes Dye and Finishing Co. v. Caisson Corp., Holdings: 0: holding joinder of two defendants was proper where plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against general motors and a negligent roadway design claim against a local government for injuries caused by an automobile accident 1: holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile 2: recognizing that limitation of coverage in automobile liability policy to  accident s  was founded on the elemental proposition that injuries will not be deemed caused by accident where the injuries are intentionally inflicted this generally being considered a risk which it would be against public policy to insure 3: recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law 4: holding joinder of a hospital medical malpractice claim and a drug manufacturer products liability theory was proper in claim alleging injury from administering a drug", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "insufficient to justify reversal.\u201d Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 44, 519 A.2d 336. Only after evaluating the specific claims asserted at the PCR hearing may we determine whether counsel\u2019s failure to introduce mitigating evidence prejudiced defendant. Although the lack of sufficient time to prepare for trial can support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant generally may support that claim with proof of specific evidence adduced at a post-conviction hearing, but not at the original trial. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (finding prejudice in sentencing proceedings where counsel failed to present pertinent evidence of mental history and mental capacity discovered at post-sentencing hearing); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); State v. Tokman, 564 So.2d 1339, 1345 Holdings: 0: holding that mayfield was prejudiced by his defense counsels failure to present all the available mitigating evidence although the aggravating evidence against mayfield was strong and the mitigation evidence presented  was substantial 1: holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that mental health evidence could be mitigating at the penalty phase even though it is insufficient to establish a legal defense to conviction in the guilty phase 3: holding that defendant was prejudiced at sentencing phase by counsels failure to discover and present any available mitigating evidence concerning defendants impoverished childhood epileptic seizures and organic brain damage 4: holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1979) (<HOLDING>). GRIFFIN, THOMPSON and MONACO, JJ., Holdings: 0: holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings 1: holding that it is the duty of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial courts judgment by demonstrating some reversible error 2: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error 3: holding that in appellate proceedings where no transcript is provided a trial courts decision has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error 4: holding that appellate review of hearsay issues is de novo with no presumption of correctness", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "habeas federal district court failed to consider the substance of the statutory defense coded at ... \u00a7 25 ... when [it] deferred to the state [court\u2019s] ... dismissal .... \u201d); and 3 (\u201cThe federal district court[\u2019s] procedural ruling erred in determining that the State courts had made an \u2018adequate\u2019 determination within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d).\u201d). We therefore deny COA on this argument. B. Allegedly Perjured Testimony Mr. Clark argued in his habeas petition that his due process rights had been violated because a witness falsely testified that she attended school with him. The district court held that such an allegation of state trial error did not present a federal question cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. See Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The court held that Mr. Clark had failed to Holdings: 0: holding that an error pertaining to a mixed question of law and fact under state law is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding 1: holding that claims of mere state court procedural or trial error not resulting in a deprivation of fundamental rights were not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action 2: holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense 3: holding that consideration of a claim in a petition for habeas corpus can be barred by failure to comply with state procedural rules 4: holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and try to keep him from being an interruption to operations.\u201d (Doc. 122-3 at 9). In making this argument, the Plaintiff fails to appreciate that less than one hour before Stanfill was placed in the restraint chair, he had tied a tourniquet around his arm, somehow removed a metal button from his prison jumpsuit, cut his wrist or arm, and sprayed blood across his cell. Even discounting Wheat\u2019s claim that Stanfill expressly threatened suicide on July 2, given Carrick and Wheat\u2019s familiarity with Stanfill\u2019s history of self-mutilation, coupled with his most recent cutting incident on July 2, there was a need for the application of some force. Carrick and Wheat\u2019s decision to use force was not unreasonable under the circumstances. See Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374-77 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). b. Relation Between Need and Amount of Force Holdings: 0: holding that the decision of a police officer to preserve public safety and order through use of commands backed by threat of force or actual use of physical force is a matter of discretion 1: holding that an officers use of force against a plaintiff was objectively reasonable considering the force the plaintiff herself exercised in resisting police custody 2: recognizing that use of l shaped restraint and straightjacket was a permissible use of force on prisoner who had taken affirmative acts towards harming herself and posed a serious threat of further selfharm 3: holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm 4: holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "failure to establish requirements or policies has allowed private driver education schools to be inaccessible. Thus, the DOJ\u2019s interpretative guidance indicates that the TEA is not accountable for the driver education schools\u2019 inaccessibility because the TEA\u2019S requirements and policies have not caused it. Finally, as to case law, the named plaintiffs cite two lottery cases as their primary authority for finding that driver education is a program of the TEA. In those state supreme court cases, each court held that the state lottery was a program of the state lottery commission, so the ADA relationship, courts have routinely held that a public entity is not hable for a licensed private actor\u2019s behavior. See, e.g., Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm\u2019n, 687 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Bascle v. Parish, No. 12-CV-1926, 2013 WL Holdings: 0: holding that public entity is not liable for inaccessible taxi companies it licenses and regulates 1: holding that city is not liable for inaccessible restaurants and liquor stores it licenses 2: holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program 3: holding that public utility company is not liable for inaccessible bus company it licenses where there is no contract between them 4: holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "lawful arrest. Regarding the \u00a7 1983 claim, they were instructed that appellant had to establish that the officers used \u201cexcessive and unnecessary force to arrest him and hold him thereafter.\u201d The jury\u2019s verdict can be reconciled only if a distinction can be made between unreasonable force and excessive or unnecessary force. Although appellant argues that the jury could have found a \u00a7 1983 violation based on the denial of medical assistance, the jury was not instructed on this theory, nor was it argued by appellant\u2019s counsel, and appellant did not object to the lack of such an instruction. Similarly, there was no instruction on negligent misuse of authorized force, nor any claim that the officers\u2019 actions were other than intentional. Cf. Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342, 350 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). A jury\u2019s answers in a special verdict should Holdings: 0: holding an agents false statements reckless because she was aware of the true facts surrounding the suspects arrest 1: holding a suspects request for some time to think alone was not an invocation of the right to silence 2: holding that a suspects ability to proffer an innocent explanation for the facts does not negate probable cause 3: holding cocked pistol to suspects head showed reckless disregard for suspects rights 4: holding that an officer may search a suspects vehicle incident to a lawful arrest", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in granting summary judgment in favor of the Newmont Defendants. Defendants also fail to establish that Plaintiffs could not have survived a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), nor do they present certain facts which would permit this Court to enter into a more detailed analysis of the law. Although Defendants do not adequately brief this Court with regard to whether or not the issue of law on which the state court granted summary judgment was \u201cwell-settled,\u201d the Court has considered the state court\u2019s opinion carefully. The decision primarily relies on a 1983 ease where a landowner-contractee was sued by an employee of the landowner\u2019s contractor while working on a job on the property. See Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Rinehart, 665 P.2d 270, 99 Nev. 557 (<HOLDING>). This Court notes, however, that several Holdings: 0: recognizing duty of care owed by business invitor to invitee 1: recognizing that a construction contract implicitly imposes a duty on contractors to perform work according to the standard of due care 2: holding that the citys acceptance or nonacceptance of the contractors work would have no bearing on the issue of the contractors liability since it was his primary and active negligence that created the dangerous situation and the citys negligence in failing to remedy the situation would be only secondaiy and passive 3: holding that a landowner owed no duty of care to a contractors employee in the situation posed by the parties 4: holding that a landowner may be liable for injuries to an independent contractors employee if the hazard ous condition was not open and obvious if the condition was not a necessary consequence of the construction and if the landowner maintained possession and control of the premises", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that only rules of damages are substantive. Prior to Monessen, the United States Supreme Court had already decided that prejudgment interest is a form of \u201cactual damages\u201d and that damages are substantive. See id. Thus, no further analysis was needed to determine that prejudgment interest was substantive. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has found other state laws that have no relationship to damages to be substantive in FELA cases. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363, 72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398 (1952) (concluding that the right to have a jury decide factual issues of fraud is \u201ctoo substantial a part of the rights accorded by [FELA] to permit it to be classified as a mere local rule of procedure\u2019 \u201d); Brown, 338 U.S. at 299, 70 S.Ct. 105 (<HOLDING>); White, 238 U.S. at 511-12, 35 S.Ct. 865 Holdings: 0: holding that state courts must apply the federal pleading standard in fela cases 1: holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law 2: holding that litigants may enforce fela in state courts as a matter of right but also observing that state courts are free to apply their own modes of procedure to fela cases 3: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 4: holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "there is consensus about a starting point. Courts agree that a \u201cmarket\u201d rate of interest should apply. See Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 874-75; In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214; In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 63; GMAC, 999 F.2d at 66-67; United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1129-30; In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 859-60; Arnold, 878 F.2d at 927-28; see also Pearson, supra at 40-41; Epstein, supra at 443. There is disagreement, however, about what rate of interest will adequately ensure that the creditor receives full value of his secured claim. 1. Under one approach, known as the \u201ccost of funds method,\u201d the interest rate is set at the rate the creditor would have to pay to borrow the amount equal to the collateral\u2019s value. See In re Valenti 105 F.3d at 64 (<HOLDING>); 8 Lawrence P. King et al., Collier on Holdings: 0: holding that although cost of funds approach more appropriately reflects the present value of a creditors allowed claim it is difficult to administer and therefore the interest rate should be fixed at the rate on a united states treasury instrument with a maturity equivalent to the repayment schedule under the debtors reorganization plan 1: holding that bankruptcy plan of reorganization rather than  1961 controlled the setting of the interest rate 2: holding that the petitioner can claim no rate as a legal right  other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the agency commission 3: holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate 4: holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Joint neither withheld nor paid payroll taxes or employment taxes for Mr. Weaver, and Mr. Weaver was issued an IRS Form 1099 at the end of each year. Joint, however, maintains that it considered Mr. Weaver to be an independent agent for tax purposes only. In May 2011, Mr. Weaver terminated the Agreement. Joint filed the First Lawsuit two months later. Mr. Weaver moved for summary on Joint\u2019s contract claims. He asserted the Agreement was illegal (and therefore unenforceable under Oklahoma law) because Joint paid him as an independent contractor to induce patient referrals for the furnishing of Medicare/Medicaid-covered equipment, in violation the Medicare Anti-Kickback Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A). See United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Joint countered that the Agreement was legal Holdings: 0: holding that the person who travels as an agent of person defrauded is a victim 1: holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence 2: holding that a person who offers or pays remuneration to another person violates the act so long as one purpose of the offer or payment is to induce medicare or medicaid patient referrals 3: holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent 4: holding that a state was embraced within the meaning of the word person  where the word person was defined as meaning and including a partnership association company or corporation as well as a natural person", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "cannot remember from one moment to the next what has previously transpired in the proceeding can not fairly preside over the cause. It is the intuitive recognition of this precept that frequently generates alarm among the parties when a substitution of judges occurs during or immediately after trial. Thus, a judge\u2019s recollection of previous proceedings in the cause cannot be characterized as \u201ctestimony.\u201d Third, Tyler dealt with a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus which rests directly upon a constitutional foundation. Here, the trial judge was presiding over a motion for new trial derived from rules of appellate procedure. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.1\u201421.9; see also Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Fuentes v. State, 960 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Thus, any constitutional error occurring here Holdings: 0: holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right 1: recognizing tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case 2: holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal 3: holding that there is no federal constitutional right to a bifurcated criminal trial 4: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the crimes were not \u201ccontinuing offenses\u201d and the alien was \u201cfree to cease his purposeful acts\u201d at any time. Id. at 385-86. Again resorting to analogy, the Board stated that [r]obbery involving separate persons at different times, false pretenses involving distinct offenses, forgery and uttering of different checks at different times, after conviction, have been held as not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. On the other hand, we feel that a single scheme of criminal misconduct is present, if in the preformance [sic] of one unified act of criminal misconduct several criminal offenses (for example, breaking and entering followed by larceny or an attempt to escape after an assault) are committed. Id. at 386 (citation omitted). In In re Adetiba, the Board uphe ) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985, 97 S.Ct. 1683, 52 Holdings: 0: holding a defendant found in possession of three or more copies of the same article of child pornography during a single episode may only be prosecuted for a single count of possession with intent to promote 1: holding that two separate incidents of rape were perpetrated against the same victim where an appreciable period of time elapsed between the incidents and intervening events occurred during the interim 2: holding two instances of violating  148 were two offenses because thirty minutes elapsed between the two incidents and in the intervening space of time the defendant had completely calmed down and ceased his criminal activity 3: holding that two breaking and entering incidents that were separated by two days of time were not pursuant to a single scheme even though both may have occurred during a continuous drinking binge the court equated single scheme with a temporally integrated episode of continuous activity 4: holding that when two penetrations were separated by a short period of time two independent assaults occurred", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute on July 3, 2002, and approximately thirty-nine grams of cocaine was seized that day. An offense involving 25-50 grams of cocaine has a base offense level of 14, USSG \u00a7 2Dl.l(c)(14), while a base offense level of 26 applies when the offense involved 500 grams to two kilograms of cocaine. USSG \u00a7 2Dl.l(c)(7). However, in her presentence interview, Turner admitted to facts that justified the base offense level of 26. Turner told the probation officer that she and Spence began buying a kilogram of cocaine every other week in October 2001 and, before their arrest in July 2002, were distributing a kilogram of cocaine every other week. Therefore, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. United States v. Evans, 416 F.3d 298, 300-301 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We review the district court\u2019s decision that Holdings: 0: holding that there is no sixth amendment error when the sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized by facts the defendant admitted 1: holding that a defendant could not assert an error under apprendi v new jersey because his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum 2: holding no sixth amendment violation occurred because the defendant chose to testify at sentencing and admitted the facts upon which the court imposed sentence 3: holding apprendi is not implicated where sentence does not exceed statutory maximum sentence authorized for the offense in its simplest form 4: holding that where the defendants sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and the district court applies the guidelines as advisory the district court does not err by enhancing the defendants sentence based on facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by him", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "537 A.2d at 615. In reviewing the appellants\u2019 claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, this Court concluded that: [Wjhile appellants\u2019 counsel\u2019s assertion that the appellants were \u201cinvitees\u201d did not constitute evidence, it was confirmatory of the apparent earlier concession by the prosecutor that the appellants were in the apartment at the invitation of the lessee. Moreover, there was an indication ... that on several occasions ... appellant Ricks, used a key to gain entrance, either to the building in which the apartment was located, or into the apartment itse 82, 383 (2002) (stating that \u201cdefendant, at best a transient squatter, had no constitutionally-reasonable expectation of privacy.\u201d); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Pa.Super. 492, 561 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Peterson, 408 Pa.Super. 22, Holdings: 0: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied solely for the business of packing for distribution for narcotics 1: holding that squatter had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no fourth amendment standing to challenge search of abandoned structure 2: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying 3: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment because hardly more than a fugitive presence would not be one that could be accepted by society 4: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in addressing jury questions. But we know that \u201canalytically correct\u201d answers to a jury may unnecessarily \u2014 and improperly \u2014 influence a jury. See Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir.2003); see also id. at 994-98 (discussing cases). Furthermore, even if not improper, we recognize that some influence on the jury\u2019s deliberations is difficult to avoid when the jury is troubled enough to seek advice. \u201cThe influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight.... Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge\u2019s last word is apt to be the decisive word.\u201d Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. United States v. Sacco, 869 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1469 Holdings: 0: holding that sufficiency of the evidence review should be independent of the jurys determination that evidence on another count was insufficient 1: holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material 2: holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper 3: holding that defendant failed to preserve for appeal argument that trial court inadequately recharged the jury after jury requested a written definition of a charge when after discussing the issue defendant explicitly agreed with trial courts response to the jurys request 4: recognizing that a careful response to a jurys request for specific pieces of evidence can keep the jury from overvaluing any one piece of evidence", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the reasonableness inquiry into his unavailability,\u201d the district court appropriately concluded that there was no Ninth Circuit precedent directly addressing the key issue raised in this appeal. V Several of our sister circuits, as well as a district court in our own circuit, have however, \u201caddressed the issue of whether the government\u2019s conduct in a case involving alien witnesses who subsequently left the United States was reasonable and in good faith.\u201d See, e.g., Wilson, 36 F.Supp.2d at 1181-82 (surveying cases from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, before concluding that the government has a duty to make reasonable and good faith efforts to procure the witness\u2019s attendance at trial before the witness leaves the United States); see also Mann, 590 F.2d at 368 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 1: holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness 2: holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness 3: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 4: holding that though the government acted reasonably and in good faith in trying to convince a witness to return to testify for trial the witness was not unavailable under rule 804a5 because the government made the witnesss departure from the country possible", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "has the right, and the ready ability, to obtain copies of documents gathered or created by its attorneys pursuant to their representation of that client, such documents are clearly within the client's control.\"); 7-34 James C. Francis & Robert M. Bloom, Moore's Federal Practice-Civil \u00a7 84.14 (2011) (\"Documents in the possession of a party's attorney may be considered to be within the control of the party within the meaning of Rule 34.... In addition, 'if an attorney comes into possession of a document as attorney for that party his [or her] possession of the documents is the possession of the party'\" (footnotes and citations omitted)). Because this court has similarly defined \"control,\" see Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Colo. 450, 454, 334 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1959) (<HOLDING>), I would hold that such documents are within a Holdings: 0: holding that possession custody or control in crcp 26 and 34 requires the production of doeuments which are obtainable by the order or direction of the litigant 1: holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession 2: holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station  has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute 3: holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession 4: holding that ownership or possession or actual control is needed", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and impose a prison term up to the statutory maximum, Ra-gin\u2019s revocation sentence is not clearly unreasonable. Therefore, we conclude that Ragin\u2019s sentence is not plainly unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court\u2019s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED. * Even assuming that over-service of Ragin\u2019s sentence was not a proper basis for the downward variance, consideration of this factor benefited Ragin. Under the \"party presentation principle ... an appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party.\" Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244-45, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008) Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to charge an essential element of a crime in the indictment is an error which should be noted by an appellate court sua sponte as plain error 1: recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff 2: holding that in the absence of a government crossappeal an appellate court may not sua sponte correct a district court error if the correction would be to the defendants detriment 3: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error 4: holding in a case considering whether the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing sua sponte that an appellate court may only consider those facts which were before the court when the trial commenced", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has been \u201cofficially declared\u201d in a statute or municipal regulation, or in the Constitution, that a new exception [to the at-will doctrine] is needed.\u2019 \u201d Fingerhut v. Children\u2019s Nat\u2019l Med. Ctr., 738 A.2d 799, 803-04 (D.C.1999) (quoting Carl, 702 A.2d at 164 (Terry, J., concurring)). The employee must then show \u201c \u2018a close fit between [that] policy ... and the conduct at issue in the allegedly wrongful termi nation.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 803 n. 7 (quoting Carl, 702 A.2d at 164 (Terry, J., concurring)). Critically, we have repeatedly acknowledged the limited reach of this tort and indicated that a plaintiff seeking recovery thereunder must show that her protected activity was the predominant cause of her termination. See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 886 (D.C.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Fingerhut, 738 A.2d at 803-04 & n. 7 Holdings: 0: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 1: holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine 2: recognizing such an exception 3: holding that it takes more than the plaintiff has alleged to invoke a public policy exception to the atwill doctrine and that plaintiffs wrongful termination claim failed where her own complaint reveals that she was not terminated solely or even substantially for engaging in conduct protected by such an exception footnote omitted 4: recognizing exception to atwill employment doctrine where employee is terminated by employer for refusing to violate municipal regulation", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201csucks\u201d is inappropriate for children when used in the phrase \u2018WAR SUX\u201d is also an issue requiring factual development. As DeVarti notes, some children\u2019s literature uses the popular slang \u201csuck,\u201d and given its popular usage, it is at least unclear whether any viewer of the phrase WAR SUX\u201d would interpret the word in a sexual manner. See Seth Stevenson, Suck It Up: A defense of the much-maligned word, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/life/ the_good_word/2006/08/suck_it_up.html. Finally, the Court has serious doubts that the \u201ccaptive audience\u201d doctrine applies in this case. The Supreme Court has \u201capplied the captive audience doctrine only sparingly to protect unwilling listeners from protected speech.\u201d Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1220, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Courts generally apply the doctrine only in Holdings: 0: holding that a funeral attendee who observed the tops of protest signs when driving to the funeral was not captive to the message 1: holding that a law prohibiting signs on public property in order to preserve aesthetics could be applied to politicalcampaign signs 2: holding that statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated applied to defendant driving on a private parking lot 3: holding that there was probable cause to arrest defendant for dui where among other factors the officer observed defendant driving erratically and defendants eyes were glassy 4: holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "under this section there shall be no authority after September 1, 1959[,] ... (2) to make an award to any person of gratuitous benefits based on any period of military, naval, or air service commencing before the date of commission of the offense. 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 6104(a), (e)(2). B. Application of Law to Facts 1. New and material evidence. The July 1977 final RO decision forfeiting the veteran\u2019s benefits was made under 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 3504(a), which has been recodified as 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 6104(a). R. at 137-41. Under 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 20.1106 (1994), a survivor\u2019s claim for death benefits is usually to be decided without regard to any prior dispositions of the pertinent issues during the veteran\u2019s lifetime, because the survivor\u2019s claim is new. See, e.g., Landicho v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 42, 52 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Zevalkink, supra. However, \u00a7 20.1106 provides Holdings: 0: holding that veterans disabilitycompensation claims died with him 1: holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal 2: holding that the interpretation of a veterans filings is a factual inquiry 3: recognizing that the veterans benefit system is uniquely proclaimant 4: holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "did not. The fundamental character of the work was the same\u2014 harvesting trees. There were no material changes in the way the work was to be performed. Seaboard II, 48 Fed.Cl. at 822. In Axman, the government contracted with Axman to dredge part of San Pablo Bay. 234 U.S. at 39, 34 S.Ct. 736. The contract called for Axman to deposit the spoil in a certain location. Id. Axman mistook the nature of the work, and to reduce his costs requested that the government allow him to dump elsewhere. Id. at 40, 34 S.Ct. 736. The government refused, Axman failed to perform, and the government re-let the contract. Id. at 40-42, 34 S.Ct. 736. In the new contract, however, the government gave the contractor the option to deposit spoil in the location that Axman r t.Cl. 206, 225-26, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, where the changes in the resale Holdings: 0: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where the governments specifications were impossible to meet government changed the specifications but did not change the price to be paid original contractor refused to perform and new contractor was paid more to meet new specifications 1: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate 2: holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor 3: holding original contractor not liable for additional cost of relet contract where significant changes were made to the construction specifications 4: holding that the burden to show that reprocurement did not subject the government to excess costs was on the plaintiff contractor", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "fees exceeded $100,000. 88 F.3d 368, 371-72, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1996). On balance, we conclude that $30,000 is the minimum amount needed to deter similar misconduct. ; 2. Part of the attorney fees were not caused by the violations of rule 1.4-13. Anoth\u00e9r reason the $145,427 sanction is unreasonably excessive is because that sum includes' substantial fees that were not caused by the sanctionable filings. Rule 1.413 provides that a- sanction \u201cmay include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing.\u201d Iowa R.- Giv. P. 1.413(1) (emphasis added). This codifies a \u201cbut for\u201d causation reqdirement, limiting a fee-based' sanction to the fees that would have been avoided but for the improper filings. See Everly, 774 N.W.2d at 495. (<HOLDING>); see also Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. v. Holdings: 0: holding the district court abused its discretion by imposinga sanction that included fees expended before the sanctionable filings 1: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 2: holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 3: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact 4: holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award attorneys fees based on the objective unreasonableness of plaintiffs complaint", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "crime of violence under the elements clause. As a result, there is no need to reach the constitutionality of Section 924(c)(3)(B)\u2019s residual clause. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (\u201c[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.\u201d). The determination of whether a predicate offense is a crime of violence under the elements clause is not made on the facts of the specific allegations against a defendant, but is instead made categorically based on the elements of the offense. See Aguilar v. Att\u2019y Gen. of the United States, 663 F.3d 692, 695 (3d Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Butler, 496 Fed.Appx. 158, Holdings: 0: holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 1: holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 2: holding that the categorical approach applies to  924c 3: holding dui causing serious bodily injury is not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16 4: holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Chamberlayne, Hand Book on the Law of Evidence 424 (Arthur W. Blakemore and Dewitt C. Moore eds., Matthew Bender & Company) (1919)). In the present case, there were indictments issued on 29 March 2004 and superceding indictments issued on 27 February 2006. Sergeant Wyrick testified that defendant failed to appear for a court date on 6 February 2006. A warrant was issued for defendant\u2019s arrest for the failure to appear. An electronic database confirmed that defendant had been arrested in Ohio, after which the district attorney\u2019s office had defendant extradited back to North Carolina. The fact that defendant left the state and failed to appear for court can be construed as evidence of flight in this case. See State v. Williamson, 122 N.C. App. 229, 232, 468 S.E.2d 840, 843 (1996) (<HOLDING>). As for the argument that the flight was not Holdings: 0: holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction 1: holding that a defendants statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his sixth amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses 2: holding that a reasonable view of this evidence is that defendant by failing to appear for trial attempted to avoid prosecution for the offenses charged 3: holding that trial court erred by failing to compel prosecution to turn over witnesses prior statements relating to their trial testimony 4: holding attorney violated rule 3213 when he neglected clients dissolution of marriage proceeding by failing to make filings and by failing to appear at the scheduled trial", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "conclude that any of the Reports\u2019 non-g'overnment contributors directly observed the matters that were the subjects of the Reports, or much less had a \u201cduty to report\u201d such observations (as the statute requires). See \u00a7 90.803(8), Fla. Stat.; Yisrael, 993 So.2d at 959. The Lee case is dispositive of this issue. There, a party used as evidence an investigative report prepared by a government employee containing \u201cstatements of witnesses, as well as [the employee\u2019s] opinions and conclusions.\u201d 698 So.2d at 1197. The Florida Supreme Court found that this report was inadmissible \u201cunder , the public record and reports exception to the hearsay rule.\u201d Id. at 1200. After addressing the two categories of the public, records exception, the court explained that \u201c[i]n adopting this ex . 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). This case also draws, parallels with Holdings: 0: holding that agency reports ofgovernment investigations containing witness interviews were not admissible under public records exception because statements in reports were not based upon personal knowledge of government agent 1: holding corporate officer liable as aider and abettor in filing of false reports even though reports were not authorized or approved of by officers 2: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 3: holding that expert reports were not required to mention the defendant hospital because reports were based upon the actions of hospital physicians 4: holding that police report containing victim affidavit was not admissible under public records exception", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Dale Grayson, one of Mr. Duncan\u2019s co-defendants, provided an interview to the press before Mr. Duncan\u2019s trial. In addition to the \u2018presumed prejudice,\u2019 there was also actual prejudice. Twenty-eight of the jury venire members responded affirmatively when asked if they had heard about this case from the media.\u201d (C.R. 218-19.) In its order dismissing the petition, the circuit court found as follows: \u201cDuncan has failed to include any facts in his petition to show that his trial counsel could have presented evidence sufficient to warrant a change of venue. Rather, he has simply [made] bare allegations that there was prejudicial publicity and that this publicity biased the jurors, such that he could not receive a fair trial. See Henderson v. State, 612 So.2d 1256, 1258 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). Further, newspaper articles or widespread Holdings: 0: holding that the presence of four uniformed state troopers in the front row of the gallery was neither inherently nor actually prejudicial to the defendant 1: holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice and so the court need not require petitioner to prove that his counsels failure to object to the trial closure was actually prejudicial 2: holding that a trial courts refusal to allow the defendant to attend the jury view was not prejudicial 3: holding that a bare allegation is not sufficient to prove that the defendant was actually prejudiced or that the community was so saturated with prejudicial publicity as to render the trial setting inherently suspect 4: holding that fingerprint evidence coupled as it was with attendant circumstances was sufficient to prove that the defendant was the criminal agent", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "first-degree burglary under California Penal Code \u00a7 459 is categorically a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 16(b) because the crime inherently involves a substantial risk of physical force: Any time a burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or larcenous intent there is a risk that in the course of committing the crime he will encounter one of its lawful occupants, and use physical force against that occupant either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to escape apprehension. Id. at 571. Although Becker involved a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines, at the time the relevant Guidelines section defined \u201ccrime of violence\u201d by reference to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 16. Becker, 919 F.2d at 569; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Park, 649 F.3d 1175, 1178 Holdings: 0: holding that we need not remand to the bia so that it may apply the categorical approach 1: holding that the categorical approach applies to  924c 2: holding that the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury in the ordinary case 3: holding that application of the modified categorical approach did not establish a covered conviction where the judgment of conviction did not contain the factual basis for the crime 4: holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "2 . Because the district court adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendation in full, we use 'the term \"district court\u201d to refer to both the district court\u2019s and the magistrate's conclusions. 3 . Section 1447(d) provides an exception to this prohibition on appellate review, for \u201can order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title....\u201d The cited section, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1443, refers to certain civil rights cases, and therefore does not apply in this case. 4 . Because we decide on this ground, we do not reach appellees' argument that we lack subject matter jurisdiction because the parties are not completely diverse. See Sinochem Int\u2019l Co. v. Malay. Int\u2019l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) Holdings: 0: holding that there is no mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues  and we have leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits  quoting ruhrgas ag v marathon oil co 526 us 574 584 585 119 sct 1563 143 led2d 760 1999 1: holding that steel co does not dictate a sequencing of jurisdictional issues and stating that it is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits 2: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 3: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 4: holding that appeals from district court orders entered prior to the effective date of northern pipeline construction co v marathon pipe line co 458 us 50 102 sct 2858 73 led2d 598 1982 reviewing interlocutory orders from bankruptcy courts are appealable inter alia under  1291 rather than  1293", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "held that the scope of any waiver by virtue of disclosure was to be defined by the so-called \u201cfairness doctrine\u201d, which'\u201caim[s] to prevent prejudice to a party and distortion of the judicial process that may be caused by the privilege-holder\u2019s selective disclosure during litigation of otherwise privileged information.\u201d Id. at 101. Thus, the extent of any waiver by implication turns on the circumstances of the disclosure. Since the disclosure in von Bu-low had occurred in an \u201cextrajudicial\u201d setting\u2014by publication of a book\u2014the court there held that the unfairness to which the waiver doctrine was addressed was not implicated. As a result, the publication waived the privilege only with respect to the particular communications or portions of communications actually disclosed. Id. at 103 (<HOLDING>) Both dictum in von Bulow and a substantial Holdings: 0: holding that matters actually disclosed in public lose their privileged status because the cat is let out of the bag 1: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern 2: recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca 3: holding that trial court properly refused to permit disclosure of privileged communications in part because use of the privileged information was not essential to the defense 4: holding that a document which is given to an attorney in the course of seeking legal advice is privileged in the hands of the attorney only if it was privileged in the hands of the client", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that he told the same story before the motive or influence came into existence or before the time of the alleged recent fabrication. [In those circumstances], the prior consistent statement is defined as not hearsay . . . and thus is admitted into evidence. Unless a witness\u2019s veracity has affirmatively been placed in issue, the witness\u2019s prior consistent statement is pure hearsay evidence, which cannot be admitted merely to corroborate the witness, or to bolster the witness\u2019s credibility in the eyes of the jury. Woodard, 269 Ga. at 320 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). Put another way, \u201cto be admissible to refute the allegation of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive, the prior statement must\u2018predate the alleged fabrication, in 05 SE2d 649) (2011) (<HOLDING>); Duggan, 285 Ga. at 366 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding testimony that defendant had no response to question during police interview was not impermissible comment on his constitutional right to remain silent where defendant had voluntarily waived his miranda rights 1: holding that the defendants cellmates statement given to the police in a pretrial interview did not predate the cellmates alleged motive to fabricate his testimony to obtain a plea deal on his pending federal drug charges 2: holding that a defendant who has successfully challenged his plea in one ease should be allowed to withdraw his plea in a second case when both cases were part of one negotiated settlement of his charges 3: holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state 4: holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "defendant, it is a stretch to describe the jail mate's inquiries of the defendant as \u2018government interrogation.' \u201d). In the present case, the government never asked Bender to embark on an open-ended fishing expedition in the D.C. Jail to collect incriminating evidence from any inmate he could hook. And as we discuss below, the government did not sanction such a mission implicitly. 13 . Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (\u201c[Kjnowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.\u201d). 14 . Cf. Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>) (quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, Holdings: 0: holding that the sixth amendment is violated when the state obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accuseds right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent 1: holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions 2: holding that the state intentionally created a situation likely to induce ayers to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel  in violation of his sixth amendment rights when it returned hutchinson a police informant to ayers jail pod and he thereafter deliberately elicited incriminating admissions from ayers 3: holding that sixth amendment not violated when defendant makes incriminating statements after indictment to persons who are not related to the government 4: holding that states use of informant to obtain incriminating evidence from defendant about pending charges violated defendants sixth amendment right to counsel notwithstanding that state was also investigating other charges as to which the sixth amendment right to counsel had not attached", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 882, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). Any statements obtained in violation of this precept are presumed involuntary, unless the suspect himself initiat (noting that, in normal parlance, \u201cI think I\u2019m going to get a lawyer\u201d constitutes an affirmative request for the assistance of an attorney); Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 331 (1985) (concluding that a suspect did not invoke his right to counsel with the remark, \u201cIt\u2019s beginning to sound like I need a lawyer\u201d); Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 387 (1984) (finding that, \u201cI guess I\u2019ll have to have a lawyer for this,\u201d was not an unambiguous request for an attorney); Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 675, 681 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Neither \u201ca mere inquiry regarding the need Holdings: 0: holding that statement i think i should call my lawyer was an unequivocal request for counsel 1: holding do you think i need a lawyer to be ambiguous 2: holding that a suspect made an acceptable request for counsel by stating i dont think i want to talk to you anymore without a lawyer 3: holding i might want to talk to an attorney to be ambiguous 4: holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "must have commenced, which, under Arkansas law, occurs when the plaintiff files the complaint and completes timely service on the defendant. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Lyons (Lyons II), 315 Ark.173, 866 S.W.2d 372, 373 (1993). To perfect service under the Arkansas rules, \u201ccompliance must be exact\u201d because the \u201cservice requirements are strictly construed.\u201d Rettig, 362 S.W.3d at 262. If the plaintiff fails to perfect service within 120 days of filing the complaint, the action is subject to mandatory dismissal. Lyons v. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. (Lyons I), 301 Ark. 559, 785 S.W.2d 220, 222-23 (1990). Completing service for purposes of \u201ccommencing]\u201d the action and triggering the savings statute, however, does not require perfecting service. Compare Lyons I, 785 S.W.2d at 222-23 (<HOLDING>), with Lyons II, 866 S.W.2d at 374 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that the statutory requirement that a defendant serve any apportionment complaint within 120 days of the return date of the original complaint is mandatory and implicates a courts personal jurisdiction 1: holding that noncompliance with general statutes  52102b which requires service of apportionment complaint within 120 days after return date of original complaint implicated personal jurisdiction 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the case without prejudice because the plaintiff failed to properly serve the defendant within 120 days after filing the complaint 3: holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal 4: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "reopen, see 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Neither the newly submitted country reports nor Mehanna\u2019s expert report are \u201cquantitatively different\u201d from the reports Mehanna submitted in 1998, when Mehanna originally appeared before an Immigration Judge. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that more recent country reports describing conditions similar to those found in previous report failed to show sufficient change in country conditions). The newly submitted evidence shows the continuing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but does not support Mehanna\u2019s assertion that changed circumstances in Lebanon and his former membership in the Lebanese Special Forces \u201cwill imperil him upon his return to Lebanon.\u201d See also Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). 2. Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in Holdings: 0: holding that substantial evidence supported the bias determination that a lebanese petitioner persecuted in the late 1990s for antisyrian views had failed to show a probability he would be tortured if returned to lebanon after the syrian militarys withdrawal from lebanon and the emergence of an antihezbollah majority in the legislature 1: holding that the state failed to meet its burden when the record failed to show that the jurors would or would not be available after a weeks continuance 2: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 3: holding that substantial evidence supported determination that petitioners failed to show that fear of sterilization was objectively reasonable 4: holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "See N.C. Gen.Stat. \u00a7 160A-175(c); see also Nags Head, N.C., Code \u00a7 l-6(c)(6) (authorizing the Town to impose fines of no more than $500 per day for violations of Chapter 16, Article II of the Town Code); id. \u00a7 1 \u2014 6(f) (authorizing the Town to seek a court order to enforce the Town's ordinances). 8 . Although we resolve this issue by focusing on the Town\u2019s authority to enforce its nuisances ordinances, we note that the nuisance declaration did not cloud the Owners' tide. Compare Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12, 111 S.Ct. 2105, 115 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (observing that \"attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances ... are sufficient [deprivations] to merit due process protection\u201d) with Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15, 104 S.Ct. 2187, 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The Owners appear to conflate fee simple Holdings: 0: holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur 1: holding that a civil rights deprivation is a personal injury tort 2: holding that garnishment of wages is a deprivation 3: holding that a lis pendens does not result in a deprivation 4: holding that deprivation of increased compensation as the result of a failure to train constitutes an adverse employment action", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Appellant Kenneth Dana Brewton, by and through his counsel David L. Dunagin, moves this court for leave to file a belated brief. Brewton\u2019s brief was due in this court on October 14, 2008. After no brief was filed, the State filed a motion to dismiss on December 8, 2008. Thereafter, Brewton tendered his brief and filed the instant motion requesting to file the belated brief. We will accept a criminal appellant\u2019s belated brief to prevent an appeal from being aborted. See Brown v. State, 373 Ark. 453, 284 S.W.3d 481 (2008) (per cu-riam). However, good cause must be shown to grant the motion. See Strom v. State, 356 Ark. 224, 147 S.W.3d 689 (2004) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Brewton accepts full responsibility and Holdings: 0: holding that failure to brief an argument constitutes waiver 1: holding an appellate brief may serve as a notice of appeal 2: holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived 3: holding failure to brief argument constitutes waiver 4: holding that appellate counsels admitted failure to timely file the brief constituted good cause to grant motion for belated brief", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Court is skeptical that section 6 is properly read as broadly as the government urges. But because the matters alleged by the plaintiffs are, as we will discuss, subject to the state secrets privilege, we need not definitively determine the thorny issue of the proper scope of section 6. b. Section 102A(i)(l) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Section 102A(i)(l) states that \u201c[t]he Director of National Intelligence shall pro tect intelligence sources and methods from disclosure.\u201d 50 U.S.C. \u00a7 403-1(0(1). Plaintiffs concede this statute allows the Director of National Intelligence to withhold information covered by the statute when it is requested of him or agencies under his control. See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 Holdings: 0: holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents 1: holding that precursor to  102ail could shield against foia request 2: holding that a foia request should be read to seek all documents covered by a catchall 3: holding that when a plaintiff has no pending foia request with an agency and has not averred that he intends to make foia requests to the agency in the future any claim of future injury is simply too speculative and remote to give him standing 4: holding that a response to a foia request falls within the scope of  3730e4as administrative  report provision", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and dozing in public place); Franklin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex.App. \u2014 Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.) (illegal use of shrimping equipment); Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 810, 811-812 (Tex.App.\u2014 Amarillo 1983, no pet.) (driving with suspended license); Diggles v. State, 641 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.App. \u2014 Dallas 1982, pet.ref\u2019d)(illegal voter assistance); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1254-1255 (5th Cir.1995) (city ordinance prohibiting touching between customers and nude employees at adult cabarets); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 563 (5th Cir.1988) (statute prohibiting picketing accompanied by slander, libel or public misrepresentation). But see Zulauf v. State, 591 S.W.2d 869, 872-873 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (<HOLDING>). In other circumstances, courts have found Holdings: 0: holding that phrase no person shall drive a vehicle on the highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing  is clear command that legislature intended to make speeding a strict liability offense 1: holding that officers observations of the speed of the truck coupled with the sound of the engine racing and the bouncing of the truck as it passed through the intersection gave officer probable cause to believe that truck was exceeding a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions 2: holding that the double jeopardy clause prohibits courts from imposing greater penalties than the legislature intended 3: holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense 4: holding no liability existed under the circumstances", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and holds that federal common law governs the question of whether Ms. Prescott may recover damages for Kyler\u2019s emotional distress. As such, she can recover for emotional distress damages under the ACA. 2. California\u2019s Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim RCHSD argues that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim on behalf of Kyler and herself. Because she does not seek to bring an action as an individual, the Court need only address her ability to assert an Unruh Act claim on behalf of Kyler. RCHSD relies on cases that address an organization\u2019s standing under Unruh to argue that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert a claim on behalf of Kyler. See Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1377, 1386, 271 Cal.Rptr. 99 (1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Bowden v. Redwood Inst. For Designed Holdings: 0: holding that the association of home builders lacked standing to seek relief in damages for alleged injuries to its members because whatever injury may have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member concerned and both the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof 1: holding that a contractor lacked standing because it failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error 2: holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury 3: holding that a nonprofit organization lacked standing under unruh because its civil rights had not been personally violated and it failed to show that any of its members would suffer injury 4: holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. 7 . Additionally, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege how the individual Community Defendants actions, by themselves, caused their injuries. Plaintiffs' quarrel lies with Community and Business Council's membership determinations. It is the official action following the individual Community Defendants' votes with which the Plaintiffs dispute, and it is upon these votes that the Plaintiffs have predicated their federal claims. However, the votes themselves have no legal effect. It is the official action of the Community and the Business Council, as legal entities authorized to act pursuant to these votes, that allegedly has caused the Plaintiffs' injuries. See Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Although the Plaintiffs have submitted an 87 Holdings: 0: holding that sovereign immunity barred a suit against state officials when the relief sought required state officials to retroactively pay federal benefits 1: holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities 2: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 3: holding that summary judgment for defendant officials on the basis of qualified immunity was improper given officials indefinite refusal to treat plaintiffs cavity 4: holding that plaintiffs complaint against tribal officials was barred under doctrine of sovereign immunity because the officials votes individually had no legal effect and it was the official action of the band following the officials votes that caused plaintiffs injuries", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "vacancy); W. Va. Const, art. VII, \u00a7 8 (same).\u201d Devlin, at 1238 n. 116. 40 . \"... A more common method of granting effective power to the legislature is for the state constitution to provide that the governor may appoint subordinate officials only insofar as he is authorized to do so \u2018by law\u2019 or, alternatively, that the governor enjoys the power to appoint unless the legislature provides by law for some other methods of election or appointment of that official. See, e.g., Del. Const, art. Ill, \u00a7 9 (providing exception for vacancies that occur within two months of election); Ind. Const, art. 15, \u00a7 1 (appointments not provided for in constitution must be appointed as prescribed by law); Kan. Const, art. 15, \u00a7 1 (same); Me. Const, art. V, pt. 1, \u00a7 8 (same); Md. Const, art. II 4, 668 (1910) (<HOLDING>); see also Caldwell v. Bateman, 252 Ga. 144, Holdings: 0: holding that employees grievance regarding the nonrenewal of his appointment was not precluded from grievance procedure as appointment referred only to initial appointment 1: recognizing power of appointment does not rest exclusively in any one branch 2: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 3: recognizing that immigration policy is the clear purview of the legislative branch 4: holding that a commission is a body with special and limited power and it can only exercise the power expressly or impliedly granted to it and any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted to be true for purposes of these motions, and all reasonable inferences are drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.2003). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995). III. Statute of Limitations A. Police Defendants This Court first examines the timeliness of the Plaintiffs claims. Section 1983 claims arising in the State of New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the question is when a plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries 1: recognizing that wilson v garcia requires all  1983 actions to be characterized as personal injury tort actions for statute of limitations purposes 2: holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions 3: holding that warranty actions for personal injury damages or tortious injury to personal property are governed by general nonucc limitations periods 4: holding that in actions brought under 42 usc  1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the terms Chase offered and either adjusted his travel plans or used other forms of payment such as bank-issued check cards. Third, Stinger\u2019s unfair surprise argument is without merit. Under Delaware law, a credit card issuing bank may unilaterally add or alter an arbitration provision to a credit card agreement by sending notice and giving the cardholder an opportunity to send notice to the bank of a rejection of the amendment. Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1257-1260 (Del.Super.Ct.2001); see also Del.Code. Ann. tit. 5 \u00a7 952(a). We also note that courts applying Delaware law have consistently rejected claims that arbitration clauses in credit card agreements are unconscionable. See, e.g., Heiges v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 521 F.Supp.2d 641, 649-50 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (<HOLDING>); Carmack v. Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), 521 Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitration provision in a credit card cardholder agreement was not unconscionable 1: holding arbitration provision of automobile installment sales agreement unconscionable 2: holding that cardholder is bound by arbitration agreement upon factual determination that she received it and that subsequent use of card demonstrates assent 3: holding that a credit card arbitration provision presented in a takeitorleaveitmanner was not unconscionable 4: holding arbitration clause in credit card agreement unconscionable", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in support of my June 1, 2009 Medico-Legal Report concerning Robert T. Pritchard, Sr. ----, by way of rebuttal to the reports and testimony of Marshall Lichtman, M.D., Seymour Grufferman, M.D. and Michael I. Greenberg, M.D.\u201d). More importantly, counsel were also advised at the outset of this case and upon the finalization of the Fourth Amended Case Management Order that the Court would permit live testimony of experts at any Daubert hearing. (Docket No. 142, Tram. Hr\u2019g 9/22/09 at 25). Instead of proceeding in this fashion, Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Dr. Omalu for the purpose of rebutting the assertions of the defense experts regarding Dr. Omalu\u2019s opinions. See Fisher v. Clark Aiken Matik, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-1976, 2005 WL 6182824, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 26, 2005) (<HOLDING>). The Court fails to see how the facts set Holdings: 0: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery 1: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 2: holding that there is neither a violation of the applicable discovery rules nor sanetionable conduct in the submission of a supplemental expert report to rebut the daubert motion 3: holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence 4: holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1983 assault trial in Baltimore City defined assault, under Maryland law, as \u201ca threat by words or acts or both to do bodily harm to another, coupled with the apparent present ability to carry out the threat.\u201d In light of that instruction, the jury, in finding Wardrick guilty of common-law assault, convicted him of a violent felony; i.e., the guilty verdict had \u201cas an element the ... threatened use of physical force against the person of another.\u201d See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(e)(2)(B). The district court also properly characterized Wardrick\u2019s 1984 Maryland conviction for escape as a violent felony. As we have indicated, felony escape and attempted escape constitute violent felonies under ACCA- \u2014 even if accomplished by stealth. See generally United States v. Hairston, 71 F.3d 115 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1313 Holdings: 0: holding walkaway escape under north dakota statute a crime of violence 1: holding felony escape in north carolina to be crime of violence under acca because escape presents risk of injury to others 2: holding that in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody we hold that for purposes of  2k21b5 every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being in connection with the escape 3: holding that an escape from custody under minnesota law is a crime of violence 4: holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "with the use of reasons and standards, the court will uphold its findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the agency\u2019s path may reasonably be discerned, though of course the court must not be left to guess as to the agency\u2019s findings or reasons. Greater Boston, 444 F.2d at 851. For instance, in Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 872-73 (D.C.Cir.1989), we held that an involved explanation was not required where a Labor Department rule did not appear to be inconsistent with prior labor certification decisions. We relied on two additional cases holding that the circumstances of a prior agency decision were sufficiently different that the agency was entitled not to follow them even without a detailed explanation. See United Mun. Distributors Group v. FERC, 732 F.2d 202 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); West Coast Media, Inc. v. FCC, 695 F.2d 617 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of appeals erred in declining to apply supreme court precedent even though the reasoning of that precedent had been eroded by subsequent decisions 1: holding that ferc precedent was readily distinguishable and did not require elaborate discussion 2: holding a prior case was not precedent on an issue when the issue was not contested 3: recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority 4: holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for an employer\u2019s liability. An employer is directly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment if it knew, or upon reasonably diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.1982). Under this theory of direct liability, the City can be held liable for its own negligence or recklessness, but not for the conduct of its supervisors or employees. In contrast, an employer is indirectly, or vicariously, liable for the wrongful conduct of its agent, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the agent\u2019s 6-07 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, Holdings: 0: holding that the proper inquiry is whether the individual defendant served in a supervisory position in which he exercised significant control over the plaintiffs hiring firing or conditions of employment and if not whether employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a hostile work environment and took no prompt and adequate remedial steps 1: holding that agent part of title viis definition of employer includes someone who serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over  hiring firing or conditions of employment 2: holding that the plaintiff must prove that management level employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually  hostile environment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action 3: holding board had jurisdiction when employer had final authority over the essential terms and conditions of employment including wages benefits hiring firing promotion discipline and grievances although employer was subject to various governmentimposed restrictions 4: holding that while town counsel had final supervisory authority over the hiring and firing of employees in plaintiffs position it did not have supervisory authority over the mayors constructive discharge of plaintiff", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1985) (interpreting a provision insuring against embezzlement and employee fraud in the subrogation context); First Nat\u2019l Bank of Fort Walton Beach v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 416 F.2d 52, 57 (5th Cir.1969) (interpreting a provision requiring the bank act \u201cin good faith and in the usual course of business\u201d); Eglin Nat\u2019l Bank v. Home Indem. Co., 583 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting a provision insuring against \u201cdishonest or fraudulent acts\u201d by employees). These cases are inapposite. Courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have interpreted Exclusion H\u2019s \u201ccaused by an Employee\u201d language in widely differing fashions. Compare Empire Bank, 27 F.3d at 335 (\u201c[T]he bond language excludes losses caused by a bank employee, whether negligent or not.\u201d), with Manitowoc, 485 F.3d at 980 (<HOLDING>). The bond itself does not define the term. The Holdings: 0: holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile 1: holding an employees actions in disregarding his doctors warnings were negligent 2: holding exclusion h does not apply where employees were merely negligent 3: holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn 4: holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "lima M. Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 (\u201cBIA\u201d) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge\u2019s (\u201cIJ\u201d) order denying suspension of deportation and voluntary departure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1105a. Where, as here, the BIA conducts a de novo review of the record, we review the BIA\u2019s decision. See De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 393 (9th Cir.1997). We deny the petition. The BIA properly denied suspension of deportation because Rodriguez, who was deported in 1992, did not accrue the requisite seven years\u2019 continuous presence in the United States. Cf. Barragan-Sanehez v. Rosenberg, 471 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1972) (<HOLDING>). The BIA properly denied voluntary departure Holdings: 0: holding that an aliens continuous physical presence is broken if the alien was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw an application for admission 1: holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel 2: holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure 3: holding that aliens continuous presence in the country was interrupted by voluntary departure under threat of deportation proceedings 4: holding that because aliens two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not therefore strictly voluntary they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years continuous presence in the united states under a rule that excused absences that were brief casual and innocent", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "U.S.C. \u00a7 7425(b). 4 .\"We look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or 'rights to property\u2019 within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.\u201d Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58, 120 S.Ct. 474, 145 L.Ed.2d 466 (1999). Montana law makes clear that the purchaser under a land sales contract holds an equitable interest in real property, although legal title remains in the seller. Kern v. Robertson, 92 Mont. 283, 12 P.2d 565, 567 (1932). Under 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6321, a federal tax lien may attach to \"all property and rights to property\u201d belonging to a taxpayer in default. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 58-60, 120 S.Ct. 474 (<HOLDING>). 5 . Under 26 U.S.C.\u2019 \u00a7 7425(c)(4), the Holdings: 0: holding that the right to disclaim property under state law does not defeat a federal tax lien because the taxpayer exercised control over the disposition of the property 1: holding that a federal tax lien properly attached to a slatelawcreated right to property that had pecuniary value 2: holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of  522f 3: holding that  522f1 requires a debtor to have possessed an interest to which a lien attached before it attached to avoid the fixing of the lien on that interest 4: holding that a property right that comes into existence by court action such as a judgment lien does not relate back to some earlier date to destroy the priority of a federal tax lien", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the class are tainted with the mischief, but there are others also tainted whom the classification does not include.\u201d Joseph Tussmann and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 341, 348 (1949). See also Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech \u00a7 2.06[B] (1984 & Supp.1992 (Rodney A. Smolla, Ed.)). In First Amendment cases that involve the differential treatment of speakers, \u201c[a]s in all equal protection cases ... the crucial question is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.\u201d 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (striking down prohibition on disclosure of sexual offense victims\u2019 names where prohibition applied only to instruments of mass communication); Carey, 447 U.S. at 465, 100 S.Ct. at 2292 (<HOLDING>). Second, the Court has consistently held that Holdings: 0: holding that defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in common area of residential building 1: holding that governments asserted interest in protecting the privacy of arrestees is substantial under central hudson 2: recognizing the public interest exception 3: holding unconstitutional prohibition on residential picketing in part because exception for peaceful labor picketing was unrelated to asserted interest in promoting the privacy of the home 4: recognizing an overwhelming public interest in promoting improvement in health care through the mechanism of physician peer review", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "be limited to newly discovered evidence. Scroggins based his motion on the interest of justice and not expressly upon newly discovered evidence. Therefore, the district court erred in limiting its analysis of the motion, and the exercise of its discretion, to newly discovered evidence while not considering the primary basis of Scroggins\u2019s motion\u2014 the interest of justice. Further, the district court\u2019s failure to analyze the motion based on the interest of justice was not harmless to Scroggins. In contrast to motions made within the seven-day period, new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence are subjected \u201cto an unusually stringent substantive test.\u201d United States v. Ugalde, 861 F.2d 802, 808 (5th Cir.1988). See also United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>); 3 Chaeles \u00c1LAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony 1: holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed 2: recognizing the heavier burden which the movant must carry in a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence in contrast to motions based on other grounds which must be made within seven days after verdict 3: holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted 4: holding that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence the defendant must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the defendant", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is \u201ccommon knowledge\u201d that Superintendent Rounds is racist. Zamora points to: (1) comments al legedly made by Superintendent Rounds that New Mexico\u2019s Governor (an Hispanic woman) is inept; (2) Rounds\u2019 hiring a man who had authorized a social experiment at a New Mexico high school that gave the appearance of race discrimination; (3) the reassignment of Zamora\u2019s duties in 2007 and 2008 to Caucasians; and (4) comments made by two co-workers in conversations surreptitiously recorded by Zamora following his termination in which they opined that Superintendent Rounds had engaged in racially discriminatory practices. To establish pretext from such comments or actions, Zamora must tie them to his termination, which he has not done. See Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1218 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Ill The judgment of the district court is Holdings: 0: holding  2254d authorizes federal court to review state courts decision only and not explanation of decision 1: holding that without any meaningful connection in either time or topic to the employment decision the alleged comments and actions cannot give rise to an inference that the defendants explanation for that decision is pretextual 2: holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision 3: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision 4: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "receive sufficient advance written notice of the charges against him. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The notice provided to Mr. Firth was quite extensive and detailed. It stated generally that Mr. Firth was recommended for termination from treatment because he had \u201cdemonstrated a lack of progress in treatment, a lack of motivation for treatment, and a failure to meet program expectations.\u201d R. at 567. The notice then included five single-spaced pages of detailed facts supporting these conclusions. Mr. Firth argues that the notice nonetheless provided insufficient factual detail because it failed to cite program rules or standards upon which the charges were based. But he cites no authority for this proposition. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Nor does he explain why he was unable to Holdings: 0: holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument 1: holding party must support argument with legal authority 2: holding appellate court need not consider argument where party has failed to support it with any authority legal or otherwise 3: holding that an appellant waived a claim where he failed to cite any legal authority in support of an argument in his appellate brief 4: holding an argument waived for failure to cite authority", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). \u201cThe question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the [concealed] evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.\u201d Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The defendant does not have to demonstrate by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted in an acquittal. Id. at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566. The \u201cBrady rule is not an evidentiary rule that grants broad discovery powers to a defendant.\u201d United States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, Holdings: 0: holding in camera review by trial court to determine whether crime stoppers information contained brady information would meet the balance of defendants constitutional rights against the states interest in fostering law enforcement 1: holding that the information contained in the police files with regard to other possible suspects was not brady material 2: holding that where government does not intend to disclose grand jury materials in camera proceedings are appropriate to protect govern ments interest in secrecy 3: holding that the government was not required to disclose the contents of personnel files of testifying officers or submit them for in camera review simply based on the defendants unsupported contention that they might contain information of significance to his ease 4: holding party seeking disqualification waives attorneyclient privilege as to the court so the court may assess the contents of allegedly confidential information and the party may present the information either in a hearing out of the presence of the party against whom confidentiality is to be protected or in camera inspection", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that issue shortly, but we turn first to the issue of whether the contract provision at issue was sufficiently clear to absolve the Yacht Club of liability for its own negligence, for it is universally agreed that exculpatory clauses, whether fully exonerating a party from its own negligence or not, must \u201cbe clearly and unequivocally expressed.\u201d Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 905 (5th Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted). See also Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig & Assocs., Inc., 785 F.2d 877, 889 (11th Cir.1986) (recognizing that courts will enforce red letter clauses if \u201cthe contractual language at issue is clear and unequivocal and clearly indicates the intentions of the parties\u201d); M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Const. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1488 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). A. Is the Exculpatory Clause Sufficiently Holdings: 0: holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear 1: holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties 2: holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract 3: holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent 4: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "states was universally accepted.\u201d Hale, 308 Or at 513 (footnote omitted). The doctrine was adopted in the Oregon Territory and was not modified; thus, \u201csovereign immunity was a part of this state\u2019s law at the time of statehood.\u201d Id. at 514. When they adopted Article IV, section 24, of the Oregon Constitution \u2014 at the same time that they adopted Article I, section 10 \u2014 its drafters ensured that \u201c[provision may be made by general law, for bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities originating after, or existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution [.]\u201d Thus, \u201c[o]ur Constitution is framed on the premise that the state is immune from suit and that if immunity is lifted it shall be done so by the action of the legislature.\u201d Vendrell v. School District 95 (1892) (<HOLDING>)). Hale illustrates this principle. In Hale, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the state enjoys sovereign immunity in regard to tort actions unless the legislature waived immunity pursuant to a specific statute 1: holding the contract was not authorized by law 2: recognizing the unique status of counties and cities that enables the legislature to regulate their tort liability 3: holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity 4: recognizing the immunity of counties unless an action is authorized by the legislature", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "However, Pe-trohawk filed suit against J.P. Morgan, a corporate trustee, and we have already concluded that based on the plain language of section 115.001, any proceeding brought against a trustee falls within section 115.001. Therefore, sections 115.001 and 115.002 are applicable. We conclude mandamus relief is appropriate in this case. Chapter 15 authorizes parties to seek mandamus relief to enforce its mandatory venue provisions. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 15.0642. Although section 115.002 of the Texas Property Code is found outside Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, it is still a mandatory venue provision for which mandamus relief is available to enforce the provision. In re Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). \u201cIn seeking mandamus under section 15.0642, a Holdings: 0: holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory 1: holding that the statute is mandatory 2: recognizing that due on sale clauses are enforceable in texas 3: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 4: holding that section 21013 of the texas property code is a mandatory venue statute and is enforceable by mandamus", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "makes alternative arguments regarding the images taken from his computer and introduced by the government at trial. Proceeding on the premise that the activities in question were purely intrastate, Kinder contends that the statute, as applied, is an unconstitu tional exercise of the Commerce Clause power because: (a) there was no evidence that interstate commerce was substantially affected, and (b) the mere fact that he had internet access, without more, cannot satisfy the interstate commerce count of the statute, citing for both propositions, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 181 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir.2001); Un 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Kimler does not contest the fact Holdings: 0: holding that congress could regulate an instant message that was both sent and received in utah where there was evidence that en route from the sender to the recipient the message traveled to virginia over ordinary telephone lines 1: holding that there could be no risk of spillover evidence where there was significant proof that both defendants participated in all the transactions 2: holding that where notice was sent via constitutionally adequate method petitioner must present substantial and probative evidence that there was improper delivery or that nondelivery was not due to the petitioners failure to provide an address 3: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties 4: holding that there was sufficient evidence of innocent intent where both the states and defendants evidence showed that the defendant was coerced at knifepoint to enter", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "be subject to legal issues\" is unverifiable. 70 . See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.1986) (\"A statement regarding a potentially provable proposition can be phrased so that it is hard to establish, or it may intrinsically be unsuited to any sort of quantification.\"); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Insofar as a statement lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe that the statement has specific factual content.\"). 71 . See State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 48, 51-52 (Alaska 2007) (reasoning that sexual insults made during a radio show known for its lewdness \"were not factually verifiable\" and therefore, although \"offensive to any rational person,\" the statements \"were not defamatory\"); Sands, 34 P.3d at 960 (<HOLDING>); see also Ollman, 750 F.2d at 981 (\"In Holdings: 0: holding statements that a church was a cult and its pastor a cult recruiter were not factual statements capable of being proven true or false and therefore could not support a defamation action 1: holding that prosecutors statements were not evidence and could not support restitution order 2: holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading 3: holding that false statements are constitutionally protected 4: holding that statements in proof of loss are not conclusive claimant could explain statements", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Inc., 966 F.Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y.1997) is therefore misplaced, because that case imposed a contempt sanction for the violation of the court\u2019s injunctive order to make payments into an escrow account. Ecopetrol also contends that the Judgment is not a money judgment because it contains personal commands for performance of an act within a specified time period. Although it is true that a personal command may usually be enforced by contempt, a personal command to render payments may nevertheless fall within the meaning of a \u201cmoney judgment\u201d under Rule 69. See, e.g., Indus. Prof'l & Tech. Workers Int\u2019l Union, SIUNA, AFL-CIO v. Worldtec Grp. Int\u2019l, 25 Fed.Appx. 527, 529 (9th Cir.2001) (unpublished); Jou v. Adalian, No. CIV. 09-00226(JMS), 2015 WL 477268, at *5 (D.Haw. Feb. 5, 2015) (<HOLDING>). ' In cases where contempt is appropriately Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order 1: holding that rule 63 applies to pleadings filed within seven days of summary judgment proceedings 2: recognizing a courts inherent authority to initiate a criminal contempt proceeding for disobedience of its order 3: holding that a difference between 384 days prepreference average number of days to payment and 547 days preference average number of days to payment did not make the payments out of the ordinary course of business 4: holding contempt proceeding inappropriate to enforce the trial courts order requiring payment of a sum certain within seven days", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the appellant\u2019s motion to suppress. Consequently, we affirm the convictions. Affirmed. 1 . In ruling on the propriety of a trial court\u2019s decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court considers the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing and at trial. See, e.g., Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va.App. 381, 385 n.1, 728 S.E.2d 499, 501 n.1 (2012). The Court views that evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed below, in this case the Commonwealth. E.g., id. 2 . As Land approached, the appellant \"jump[ed] out ... of the car.\u201d The officer \"instructed him to get back into the vehicle,\u201d and the appellant complied. 3 . The appellant\u2019s assignment of error also notes that Detective Fraser observed the traffic inf 258, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The appellant cites no controlling or Holdings: 0: holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety 1: holding that it is reasonable  that a police officer at the scene of  an investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement 2: holding that police officer did not exhibit reckless disregard for safety and wellbeing of others by negligently causing auto accident where officer looked both ways at intersection even though view was partially blocked 3: holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others 4: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "category of crimes involving moral turpitude rather than acts that are \"base, vile, or depraved.\" Id. 2 . The majority relies on Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2008) and United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.2007) for the principle that a subsequent panel is not bound by statements in prior decisions relating to an issue that had not been \u201cpresented for review,\u201d but neither case supports that principle. In both cases, the prior decision in question had acknowledged that its passing remarks were not precedential. See Chen, 524 F.3d at 1033 (\u201cWe acknowledged, however, that [our observation in He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2007) about the potential relief available to the petitioners] was not before us.\u201d); see also Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d at 1015 (<HOLDING>). Here, the Navarro-Lopez en banc panel Holdings: 0: holding that our use of the subjunctive in mentioning an argument in passing suggests that we knew that we were not addressing and that we could not address that argument 1: holding that where a party does not adequately brief an argument we need not address it on appeal 2: holding where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants remaining arguments 3: recognizing that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the alj  4: holding that where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants other arguments", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the eases were tried.\u201d Id. at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042. Cabina-tan\u2019s ease was tried months before Cabagbag was decided. Therefore, we examine Cabi-natan\u2019s claim under the ^re-Cabagbag standard. Under the pve-Cabagbag standard, \u2018\u201cwe must examine all aspects of the trial, including the opening statements, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court, to determine whether the jury\u2019s attention was adequately drawn to the identification evidence.\u2019 \u201d Cabagbag, 127 Hawai'i at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405, 894 P.2d at 102). The jury\u2019s attention must be adequately drawn to the identification evidence such that specific instructions are unnecessary. See Pahio, 58 Haw. at 331, 568 P.2d at 1206 (<HOLDING>). Here, we cannot say that the arguments of Holdings: 0: holding that an identification instruction was unnecessary because of the crossexamination of the prosecution witnesses and the arguments to the juiy 1: holding in a tax fraud case that a goodfaith instruction was unnecessary because the trial judge adequately instructed the jury on willfulness 2: holding that the defendants failure to call the insufficiency of the evidence to the trial courts attention rendered the issue not preserved 3: holding that the requested instruction was not required under rule 4325c because even assuming that the requested instruction was a correct statement of law the trial judge exercised his discretion properly 4: holding that various aspects of the trial adequately directed the jurys attention to the identification evidence and made defendants requested instruction unnecessary", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "discriminated against him based on a psychiatric disability, in violation of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12131 et seq., when it dismissed him from its medical program. Title II prohibits discrimination against a disabled individual regarding access to public services. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12132 (\u201cNo qualified individual with a disability shall ... be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.\u201d). The public entities defined in the ADA are state or local governments and their instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12131(1). The United States, its agencies, and employees are not public entities under the ADA. Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Aquino v. Prudential Life & Cas. Ins. Co., Holdings: 0: holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government 1: holding that title ii does not apply to the states 2: holding that prudential limitations on standing do not apply to title ii ada claims 3: holding the ada and the rehabilitation act applicable 4: holding that title ii of the ada was a valid use of congress power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "phase of the criminal process.\u201d Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). A prosecutor is granted only qualified immunity, however, if he or she is performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a police officer or detective. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). A court may grant a Cir.1978) (per curiam) (extending absolute immunity to a prosecutor\u2019s actions in \u201cinitiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the state\u2019s case ... even where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information, or failed to make full disclosure of all facts\u201d); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344, Holdings: 0: holding that a prosecutors decision whether or not to give defense counsel evidence alleged to be materially exculpatory which was either discovered after the  1983 plaintiffs arrest but before his conviction or while the prosecutor was still functioning as an advocate for the state in posttrial motions and preparations for appeal is clearly part of the presentation of the states case and therefore a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure to turn over evidence 1: holding prosecutor absolutely immune from suit for deciding to investigate and conspir ing to present false charges to the grand jury 2: holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a suit claiming that he destroyed and falsified evidence 3: holding that notwithstanding acts and omissions of state prosecutor in withholding certain information and in failing to prevent or correct deceptive and misleading testimony  deprived the state defendant of her constitutional right to a fair trial  prosecutor was absolutely immune 4: holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir.1984). It is not there. Clark, to be sure, rejected a challenge to a legislative veto provision as unripe because the provision had not been exercised. But Clark involved a naked attack upon the provision itself and not, like the present case, a challenge to present use of the statutory powers to which the provision was attached. And Muller, which did address a challenge comparable to the present case, implicitly rejects rather than supports intervenors\u2019 ripeness argument, deciding on the merits a claim that the existence of an unexercised legislative veto provision in a statute rendered actions taken under that statute unconstitutional. Muller, 743 F.2d at 388. See also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3394 Holdings: 0: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute 1: holding on the merits that the existence of an unexercised legislative veto provision in a statute would render invalid actions taken under the statute unless the legislative veto provisions were severable from the portion of the statute pursuant to which the challenged actions were taken 2: holding onehouse legislative veto unconstitutional 3: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity 4: holding that insofar as the university actions were taken in an attempt to comply with the requirements of title ix plaintiffs attack on those actions is merely a collateral attack on the statute and regulations and is therefore impermissible", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "grounds. Thus, in United States v. Marolda, 648 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.1981), the Ninth Circuit considered a case exactly like this one. The defendant had been convicted. On his first appeal, he asserted both trial error and insufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The court of appeals reversed on the trial error but did not address the sufficiency issue. On remand, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The motion was denied, and he brought an Abney appeal. The court, noting that it was \u201cnot a case in which the trial error leading to [the first] reversal may have prejudiced the prosecution,\u201d held that double jeopardy barred the defendant\u2019s retrial. Id. at 624. Accord United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 600 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 175, 62 Holdings: 0: recognizing this principle in the failure to hire context 1: recognizing principle 2: recognizing this principle as a settled rule 3: recognizing principle but finding evidence at first trial sufficient 4: recognizing same principle", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "post office box and planned to maintain surveillance over the post office box to determine that Rowland picked up the package. The affidavit also indicated that Rowland had been observed on several occasions collecting his mail from the post office box and then walking back to work. Because the controlled delivery was made to Rowland\u2019s private post office box and not to his residence, however, establishing probable cause that the delivery would take place does not mean there was probable cause that the video tapes would be at Rowland\u2019s residence when the search took place. Therefore, this court must determine whether the affidavit supporting the anticipatory warrant contained evidence establishing a nexus between the contraband and Rowland\u2019s residence. See Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654-55 (<HOLDING>). Only an oblique reference was made in the Holdings: 0: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no assurance at time warrant was issued that defendant would take suitcase to his home 1: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because contraband was picked up by defendant rather than being delivered to his home and affidavit failed to provide facts establishing a nexus between contraband and defendants home 2: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid when defendant was required to pick up suitcase containing contraband at airport and there was no information indicating defendant would take suitcase home or otherwise linking defendants residence to illegal activity 3: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because affidavit provided no assurance that defendant would take package to his home after collecting it at the airport despite fact that warrant contained condition that it was not to be executed until package arrived at defendants house 4: holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "factual allegations as to the events or the participants.\u201d Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20. Courts should grant leave to substitute if \u201c(1) the defect in the named plaintiffs plausibly resulted from mistake (\u2018mistake\u2019 prong), and (2) correcting this defect would not unfairly prejudice defendants by changing the particulars of the claims against them (\u2018prejudice\u2019 prong).\u201d Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). A mistake is plausible \u201cabsent evidence of bad faith or intent to deceive.\u201d Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). Further, an attorney\u2019s ignorance, incompetence, or lack of diligence is not evidence of bad faith. Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *11 (<HOLDING>). The prejudice analysis focuses on whether the Holdings: 0: holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard 1: holding that although plaintiffs had shown carelessness and a lack of diligence there was no evidence that they acted in bad faith and thus plaintiffs met the mistake prong 2: holding that bad faith andor prejudice must be shown by clear and convincing evidence 3: holding that if the town acted in bad faith in negotiations and litigation which prevented construction then the plaintiffs on remand cannot be deemed to have lost any rights to vest that they would have been able to exercise in the absence of bad faith 4: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that Congress shall have the power \u201cto exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever\u201d over the District of Columbia and \u201cto exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful buildings.\u201d U.S. Const, art. I, \u00a7 8, cl. 17. The then-governor of Texas signed two deeds ceding exclusive jurisdiction of more than 18,000 acres of land to the United States, with the reservation that the State of Texas retains concurrent jurisdiction only for service of civil and criminal process on the premises. The ceded land remains physically located within the geographic boundaries of Texas. See Adams v. Calvert, 396 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex.1965) (<HOLDING>). The Depot currently remains under the Holdings: 0: recognizing howard holding that fiction of a state within a state has no validity to prevent exercise of power by state over federal area within its boundaries so long as there is no interference with federal jurisdiction 1: recognizing federal enclave remains within geographic boundaries of state 2: holding that the determination of the boundaries of a political subdivision of the state is a political question solely within the power prerogative and discretion of the legislature and not subject to judicial review 3: holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage 4: holding a 1 signature requirement as within the outer boundaries of support the state may require before affording political parties ballot position", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "suspension period is extended, and the Commission has failed to make its final determination within 150 days from the proposed effective date of the change, the utility may put a changed interim rate into effect to cover the remainder of the suspension period by filing a bond with the Commission. PURA \u00a7 43(e). Finally, if the Commission determines that the proposed rates are impermissible, the Commission shall determine the \u201clevel of rates to be charged or applied\u201d by the utility and \u201cshall fix the same by order to be served on the utility; these rates are thereafter to be observed until changed.\u201d PURA \u00a7 43(f). 2 . Apparently, in Texas no one can have a vested right in a utility rate until the rate is administratively and judicially final. Southwestern Bell v. PUC, 615 S.W.2d at 957 (<HOLDING>); but see New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Holdings: 0: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act 1: holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996 2: holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity 3: holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective 4: holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "We review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir.2007). An application for asylum must be filed within one year of entering the United States. See INA \u00a7 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(2)(B). Section \u00a7 208(a)(2)(D) of the INA, in turn, provides for the filing of untimely applications, upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing the asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(2)(D). The INA makes clear that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Attorney General\u2019s extraordinary-circumstances determination. See INA \u00a7 208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(a)(3) (\u201cNo court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).\u201d); see also Ruiz, 479 F.3d at 765 (<HOLDING>). To the extent Cala seeks review of whether he Holdings: 0: holding that  1158a3 divests the court of jurisdiction to review decisions of whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or whether extraordinary circumstances were present to justify untimely filing of the asylum application citing mendoza v us atty gen 327 f3d 1283 1287 11th cir2003 1: holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the attorney generals decision as to timeliness of an asylum request pursuant to 8 usc  1158a3 the attorney generals decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances such that the time limit should be waived is not reviewable by any court 2: holding that filing of appeal to federal circuit divests this court of jurisdiction to consider motion to stay court order pending appeal 3: holding that section 1158a3 divests our court of jurisdiction to review a decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances that would excuse his untimely filing 4: holding that because the ij denied an asylum application as untimely we lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the final order of removal as it pertained to the asylum claim", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "cannot be sustained, as the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Here, the EEOC letter of determination states that the charging party \"alleges discrimination based on race and/or national origin.\u201d Consequently, the plaintiffs are barred from alleging gender discrimination. See Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992) (\"an aggrieved employee may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination\u201d). Likewise, the plaintiffs\u2019 gender discrimination claim under the FCRA is barred. See Trumbull v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 756 F.Supp. 532, 535 (M.D.Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>), aff\u2019d, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1991). The Holdings: 0: holding that substantive aspects of claims under federal discrimination statutes and fcra are identical 1: holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law 2: holding that statutes of limitations are considered substantive matters for purposes of the erie doctrine 3: holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law 4: recognizing that the two statutes are nearly identical", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "medical condition, or (b) bade farewell to the patient (whether by turning her away, discharging her, or improvidently transferring her) without first stabilizing the emergency medical condition.\u201d Correa, 69 F.3d at 1190 (citing Miller v. Medical Ctr. of S.W. La., 22 F.3d 626, 628 (5th Cir.1994); Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir.1990)). (B) Application of State Law Privilege in Federal Court Pursuant to Federal Rule 26, the scope of discovery is limited to \u201cany nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party\u2019s claim or defense.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Generally, privilege claims in federal question cases in federal court are governed by Fed.R.Evid. 501 . See e.g. Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hosp. Found., Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>); Everitt v. Brezzel, 750 F.Supp. 1063, 1066 Holdings: 0: recognizing privilege under federal rules 1: holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law 2: holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law 3: holding that 5 usc  301 does not grant authority to assert an evidentiary privilege not recognized by the federal rules of civil procedure or the law of evidence 4: holding that in federal cases partys right to assert a privilege is dictated by federal law", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "J. Christopher Merkt appeals the order revoking his community control and the sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines. We affirm the order revoking community control. However, we remand for reconsideration of sentencing in accordance with Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>). See also Battle v. State, 761 So.2d 1177 Holdings: 0: holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless 1: holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal 2: holding that motion raising heggs claim was insufficient because it failed to allege sentence imposed could not have been imposed under 1994 guidelines 3: holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines 4: holding that persons challenging a sentence imposed under the 1995 sentencing guidelines have standing to do so if the relevant criminal offense occurred on or after october 1 1995 and before may 25 1997", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the [employer] had notice of his disability; (3) that with reasonable accommodation he could perform the essential functions of the position ...; and (4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.\u201d Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n. 11 (4th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 933, 122 S.Ct. 1309, 152 L.Ed.2d 219 (2002). The burden to provide notice of a disability is \u201cnot a great one .... Adequate notice simply informs the employer of both the disability and the employee\u2019s need for the accommodations for that disability.\u201d EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 513 F.3d 360, 369 n. 5 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 814, 129 S.Ct. 343, 172 L.Ed.2d 22 (2008); see Schneider v. Giant of Md., LLC, 389 Fed.Appx. 263, 270 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Huppenbauer v. May Dep\u2019t Stores Co., 99 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a notice recommending termination of an employee to the board without notice to the employee of employees right to attend and dispute the claims violated due process 1: holding as a matter of law that the existence of an expense reimbursement policy alone did not create an implied contract limiting the employers right to terminate an employee atwill 2: holding that an employers knowledge that an employee was diabetic did not equate to notice that the employees diabetes was so limiting as to be disabling and to require special accommodations 3: holding that employers knowledge of employees criminal conviction for intoxication did not put employer on notice that employee might be a thief 4: holding that if all of an employees coworkers knew that he had a heart condition such knowledge would not amount to notice to the employer that the employee was so limited by a disability as to require special accommodations", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "compensatory damages arises not from the absence of any appreciable injury to Robbins, but from the fact that her instantaneous death precluded any damages award for pain and suffering. We recognize that an award of at least nominal damages ordinarily is required to sustain a punitive damages award. See O\u2019Connor, supra, 111 N.J.Super. at 29, 266 A.2d 605. Even where a plaintiff has suffered a harm inestimable in terms of dollars and cents, an award of nominal damages serves to confirm the jury\u2019s finding that plaintiff has suffered a harm cognizable at law. That deficiency is not significant in these circumstances, however, where the elements of causation and defendant\u2019s negligence were established in the related wrongful death action. See Alfone, supra, 87 N.J. at 110-11, 432 A.2d 857 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the only additional finding by the jury Holdings: 0: holding the plaintiffs action was one for wrongful death and not survival where damages listed in complaint were identical to damages listed in the wrongful death act 1: holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions 2: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death 3: recognizing that substantive issue of liability may be litigated in the same action for wrongful death and survival actions 4: holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "into evidence true and accurate copies of the Note and Allonge. Petitioner asserts this evidence \u201cplainly evidences the transfers\u201d of the Note to Petitioner. We cannot agree. Under the UCC, as adopted by North Carolina, \u201c[a]n instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-3-203(a) (2009). Production of an original note at trial does not, in itself, establish that the note was transferred to the party presenting the note with the purpose of giving that party the right to enforce the instrument, as demonstrated in Connolly, 63 N.C. App. at 551, 306 S.E.2d at 125, and Smathers v. Smathers, 34 N.C. App. 724, 726, 239 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1977) (<HOLDING>) In Connolly, determining who had possession of Holdings: 0: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 1: holding that creditors could not seek relief from a bankruptcy stay because they were not the real parties in interest and lacked standing as they were not holders of the notes and failed to establish that mers was the holder or had authority to transfer the notes 2: holding that where a promissory note had never been made payable to plaintiff or to bearer nor had it ever been indorsed to plaintiff    defendants established that plaintiff was not the owner or holder of the note 3: holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes 4: holding that despite evidence of voluntary transfer of promissory notes and the plaintiffs possession thereof the plaintiff was not the holder of the note under the ucc as the notes were not drawn issued or indorsed to her to bearer or in blank the plaintiff testified to some of the circumstances under which she obtained possession of the notes but the trial court made no findings of fact with respect thereto", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "weave through the labyrinth of criminal statutes, administrative code provisions, and not-yet-codified agency rules is inconsistent with the \u201cprocess\u201d our Founding Fathers believed we were due before being charged with criminal offenses. No person of ordinary intelligence could determine what he is prohibited to possess or deal by the term \u201csynthetic drug\u201d in Ind. Code \u00a7\u00a7 35-48-4-10(a) and 11, based on Ind.Code \u00a7\u00a7 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. Therefore the portions of Ind.Code \u00a7\u00a7 35-48-4-10(a) and 11 in effect at the time of Ashfaque\u2019s alleged offenses are void for vagueness to the extent they rely on definitions, including unnamed substances \u201cstructurally derived\u201d from other substances, found in Ind.Code \u00a7\u00a7 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. See Health-script, 770 N.E.2d at 816 (<HOLDING>). [19]We distinguish our holding here from Holdings: 0: holding such statutes are not analogous statutes of limitation for erisa purposes 1: holding the requirement that a person search through multiple statutes then through the administrative code lacks the sufficient definiteness that due process requires for penal statutes 2: holding the voidforvagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited 3: holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that the statutes abrogated the common law", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "most favorable to the Plaintiff, does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rather, it continues to represent the quintessential shotgun pleading as this Court has ruled before, by wholly incorporating all paragraphs of the complaint into the second and final count. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriffs Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir.2015); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955, 979 n. 54 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). Failure to correct such pleadings, given ample opportunity, supports dismissal. See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the failure to correct the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the plaintiffs third amended complaint with prejudice for failure to abide by rule 8 which requires that each averment of a pleading be simple concise and direct 1: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time 2: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to permit filing of third amended complaint for repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments and quoting bryant v dupree 252 f3d 1161 1163 11th cir2001 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint where the plaintiff had already been given opportunities to amend and did not indicate what additional facts he could plead to correct the deficiencies in his complaint", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a defective pleading within the deadline, and where a plaintiff was prevented from bringing suit by war\u201d). Here, Strong did not file her complaint only one minute late. She was not misled by the Secretary to miss the filing deadline, nor did war prevent her from bringing suit timely. Nor is Strong proceeding pro se; she is represented by Plitt. While Plitt regrettably suffered through a period of personal hardship, \u201ca lawyer\u2019s duty of diligence transcends both upheaval at work and personal tragedy.\u201d Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P\u2019ship, 507 U.S. 380, 398, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Cf. also, Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator, 201 F.3d 894, Holdings: 0: holding that trial counsels failure to call defendants family members as witnesses during penalty phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 2: recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense 3: holding that counsels abandonment of the case during discovery  cannot be excused by the deaths in his family 4: holding that the effects of the victims deaths upon the families is part of the circumstances of the crime and is properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to its federal question jurisdiction. Collateral attacks on court-martial proceedings are not confined to habeas petitions. Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C.Cir.1969). A district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a noncustodial plaintiffs collateral attack based on federal question jurisdiction. Sanford v. United States, 586 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C.Cir.2009). Thus, while habeas review is appropriate for convicted military personnel who are still in custody, for non-custodial individuals such as plaintiff, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331 is the appropriate avenue for a service member to seek collateral review of the outcome of a military court-martial proceeding. United States ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d 403, 406 (D.C.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) {\u201cNew II \u201d); Williamson v. Sec\u2019y. of Navy, 395 Holdings: 0: recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack 1: holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petitioners collateral attack under  1331 2: holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue 3: recognizing that only void judgments are subject to collateral attack and that a judgment is void only when court had no jurisdiction of the parties or property no jurisdiction of the subject matter no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment or no capacity to act 4: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "does business as University Medical Center. The Court will refer to this single entity as \"Defendant Hospital.\" 2 . Although Plaintiff had not served Defendant Texas Tech at the time of removal, she eventually did so. The Court recently remanded all claims against Defendant Texas Tech to Texas state court. See Order Granting in Part and Den. in Part Pl.\u2019s First Am. Mot. to Remand, Apr. 12, 2016, ECF No. 88 [\"Remand Order\u201d]. 3 . Plaintiff does not specify which intentional torts she is asserting in this lawsuit. 4 . Plaintiff does not make any specific factual allegations against Dr. Laks. See infra part III.C.l. 5 . For municipal immunity, the Fifth Circuit has analyzed counties in the same manner as municipalities, See James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 619-620 (5th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court will refer to Holdings: 0: holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed 1: holding that a policy for purposes of municipal liability may be established by an officials single decision 2: holding that a county was not liable when plaintiff failed to satisfy an element of municipal liability 3: holding that county of delaware was not a person for purposes of fca liability 4: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "age, race and sex discrimination are completely unrelated to Reno\u2019s allegations that she was harassed by Moorer, that Moorer \u201cfrequently makes rude, disparaging remarks about women and twists every innocent comment into one with sexual over tones\u201d and that Moorer \u201capproached Ms. Reno from behind and intentionally pressed himself against her with his lower body while she is sitting at her desk.\u201d (P.\u2019s Sec. Am. Compl., Instr. No. 18 at 6). Moorer was not involved in any of Metro\u2019s decisions not to promote Reno nor is it reasonable to assume that his allegedly unlawful conduct would have been uncovered during the course of an EEOC investigation aimed at discovering whether Reno had been improperly denied certain promotions. See Torriero v. Olin Corp., 684 F.Supp. 1165, 1170 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, Reno argues that the claim of Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs eeoc charge alleging sex discrimination did not encompass claim of sexual harassment subsequently asserted in title vii action in federal court because the facts underlying sexual harassment claim could not be inferred from the factual assertions made in the eeoc charge nor would they have been uncovered absent specific allegations to indicate such a cause of action existed 1: holding that a charge that alleged discrimination on the basis of sex did not support a complaint for hostile environment sexual harassment 2: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 3: holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination 4: holding that a title vii cause of action is limited to those discrimination allegations in the complaint that have been under the scrutiny of a formal eeoc complaint", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "never waived or accepted process, and never made an appearance in the suit before the expunction order was entered. Nothing in the record establishes that Google stands in privity to the Commission or to Jackson. Accordingly, we hold that Google was not a party to the suit and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders against Google. Id. When a party is served but there are technical defects in the judgment, the judgment is voidable. PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275. However, when \u201cthe defects in service are so substantial that the defendant was not afforded due process,\u201d the judgment is void. Id. Here, there was no identification of Google as a party or attempt to serve it with process. Accordingly, the judgment against it is void and must be vacated. See id. at 272 (<HOLDING>). We sustain Google\u2019s second issue. Because Holdings: 0: recognizing that a default judgment based on improper service is void 1: holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular 2: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 3: holding that void order must exceed courts authority to act and not be merely erroneous 4: holding void judgment must be vacated", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a public factor that weighs in favor of granting defendant\u2019s motion, this factor does not overcome the deference due to the plaintiffs choice of forum and the other factors favoring retention of jurisdiction in Massachusetts. Samsung argues that \u201c[t]o burden the courts of the United States and engage the services of jurors who are from Massachusetts with South Korean law for an accident which occurred in South Korea would confound common sense [and] therefore [there is] no \u2018local interest\u2019 in having a \u2018local controversy\u2019 decided here.\u201d (Def. Mem. at 8-9). This court disagrees. There is a local interest in providing a convenient forum for a resident citizen claiming that a foreign corporation negligently caused him harm. See Gross v. British Broad. Corp., 386 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); GT Solar Inc. v. Goi, No. 08-cv-249-JL, 2009 Holdings: 0: holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum 1: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 2: holding that the defendant must have created a substantial connection to the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of the state 3: holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts 4: holding that extreme delay in the alternative forum can render that forum inadequate", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "333 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir.2003); cf. United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 82 (2d Cir.1999). At the time of Wells\u2019s trial, New York courts \u201cregularly employed the 'clear link' standard to review trial court determinations that excluded evidence of third-party culpability.\u201d People v. Primo, 96 N.Y.2d 351, 355-57, 728 N.Y.S.2d 735, 753 N.E.2d 164 (2001) (abandoning the \"clear link\u201d phraseology). Under that standard, \"evidence of third-party culpability must do more than raise a mere suspicion that another person committed the crime; there must be a clear link between the third party and the crime in question.\u201d Id. at 355, 728 N.Y.S.2d 735, 753 N.E.2d 164 (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). See, e.g., People v. Sparman, 202 A.D.2d 452, 453, 608 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1994) (<HOLDING>); People v. Brown, 187 A.D.2d 662, 663, 590 Holdings: 0: holding in rape case that no clear link existed between father of victims and their rapes even where defense proffered evidence of fathers previous conviction for sexual abuse 1: holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim 2: holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim 3: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 4: holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "rights of action that have not been clearly legislated because of its regard for the state legislature as a \u201crepository of sovereign powers, whose dispensation must in any context be strictly construed.\u201d A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 674 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 577, 232 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1977) (\u201cthe rule is clear that, where a power is conferred and the mode of its execution is specified, no other method may be selected; any other means would be contrary to legislative intent and, therefore, unreasonable\u201d)). These principles have been used to foreclose litigants from pursuing private rights of action in a number of contexts including (i) teacher contract renewals, Giannoutsos, 238 Va. at 147 (<HOLDING>); (ii) materialmen and workmen seeking damages Holdings: 0: holding the only remedy available to the teacher fired without notice was entitlement to a contract for the ensuing year as provided in the code 1: holding that one year warranty was not an exclusive remedy for defective construction where the contract did not so state 2: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 3: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 4: holding that a thwarted remedy is not available", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "case, Defendant established legitimate reasons for its actions, and the record does not permit an inference of pretext. See id. (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that once the employee makes its prima facie showing the burden then shifts to the employer to prove that legitimate reasons supported the termination 1: holding that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case the defendant employer must then articulate some legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action and the employee must then have a fair opportunity to show pretext that is that a discriminatory intent motivated the employers action 2: holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge 3: recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons 4: holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1966)). The Court does not specifically limit the rule to admi ralty cases, see id. at 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, and the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws supports the application to mandatory forum-selection clauses in contracts, except in limited circumstances such as where the application would be unfair or unreasonable. See Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws, 2d \u00a7 80 cmt. c (1988 Supp.). Furthermore, the same legal concerns once relevant only to admiralty matters are now commonplace in other international ventures, especially those involving the type of electronic communication and computer integration involved in this dispute. The M/S Bremen rule applies soundly to the contract between Evolution and Koninklijke. See also Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 11 . A court's discretion to apply the Holdings: 0: holding that forum selection clause applied to tort claims that arose out of a contractual relationship and noting that if forum selection clauses are to be enforced as a matter of public policy that same public policy required that they not be defeated by artful pleadings of tort claims  internal citation omitted 1: holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state 2: holding enforceable forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements 3: holding in contractual action that ms bremen controls the enforceability of forum selection clauses in diversity cases 4: holding order dismissing action without prejudice based on contractual forum selection clause is final and appealable because it terminates the litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the psychological evaluation and home study, obtain documentation of their completion, and translate the results. CYFD also argues that it sought the Consulate\u2019s assistance in using the Consulate\u2019s mail system to facilitate Father\u2019s communication with Child and that CYFD for nine months at the time CYFD moved for termination, and CYFD ended its contact with Father less than twelve months after CYFD took custody of Child. This time period expired well before the fifteen-month period of time-limited reunification services established by ASF A. We acknowledge \u201cCYFD\u2019s duty to expeditiously handle [termination] cases,\u201d id., but its actions suggest that it did not properly assist Father in ameliorating the causes and conditions of Child\u2019s neglect. See Natural Mother, 1981-NMCA-103, \u00b6 14 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that substantial Holdings: 0: holding preparation and administration of service plan showed that department made reasonable efforts at reunification 1: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims 2: holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith 3: holding that the human services department failed to make reasonable efforts and acted in bad faith when it disregarded the mothers efforts and rejected a favorable home study 4: holding that in case where child was removed from mothers care and placed in the custody of the cabarrus county department of social services under north carolina law the reasonable efforts and best interest determinations are conclusions of law because they require the exercise of judgment", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "have investigated his own case prior to filing suit. Ver-kin, 784 S.W.2d at 95-96. Farmers denied Perrotta\u2019s claim a year and a half before Perrotta filed this suit. A March 1999 scheduling order afforded notice to both parties that trial of the contractual claims was set for November 8, 1999. Additionally, the trial court\u2019s denial of an agreed motion for continuance, on September 13, 1999, alerted Perrotta to the unlikelihood \u2022that the November trial date would be continued. This case had been on file for over seven months when Farmers filed its summary judgment motion, and the hearing on the motion took place nineteen days before the scheduled trial date. Hence, the length of time this case had been on file does not suggest an abuse of discretion. Cf. Levinthal, 902 S.W.2d 508, 512 (<HOLDING>). Perrotta asserted in his motion for Holdings: 0: holding trial court abused its discretion when case had been on file for only three months the discovery sought was material to the plaintiffs claims and the plaintiff exercised due diligence in obtaining discovery 1: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that adequate time for discovery had passed because movant successfully resisted nonmovants attempts to obtain discovery 2: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 3: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period 4: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by entering a dismissal where the plaintiffs were at sea when the trial court granted its discovery order and were therefore unavailable to be renoticed for their depositions", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Based on the presumption that an owner is familiar with his property and its value, the Property Owner Rule is an exception to the requirement that a witness must otherwise establish his qualifications to express an opinion on land values. Under the Rule, an owner\u2019s valuation testimony fulfills the same role that expert testimony does. See, e.g., Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Riverway Holdings, L.P., No. 14-09-00786-CV, 2011 WL 529466, at *5, 2011 Tex.App. LEXIS 1047, at *13 (Tex.App.-Houston.[14th Dist.] Feb. 15, 2011, pet. denied) (observing that the Property Owner Rule \u201ctreats valuation testimony from a property owner as the functional equivalent of expert valuation testimony insofar as the owner\u2019s own property is concerned\u201d); cf. Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee\u2019s note (<HOLDING>). Like expert testimony, landowner valuation Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecution could not retain as a testifying expert for trial a nontestifying expert the defendant had previously retained 1: holding that public policy militates against a judge testifying as an expert witness for one of the parties 2: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 3: holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial 4: holding that expert testimony rule includes  skilled witnesses such as  landowners testifying to land values", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Rather, the jury was restricted to answering three questions relating to intent, provocation and future dangerousness. Id. The Court found that Penry\u2019s \u201cmitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse ha[d] relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope\u201d of the three questions posed to the jury. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Thus, the jury instructions were unconstitutional because they precluded the jury from acting upon the mitigating evidence Penry introduced. Id. at 319-22, 109 S.Ct. 2934. The Supreme Court noted that, under Lockett and Eddings, the \u201csentencer must ... be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.\u201d Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934; see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Penry IP) (<HOLDING>). When considering challenges for cause, a Holdings: 0: holding that the sentencing procedure was inadequate in failing to allow jury to give mitigating effect to defendants mental retardation and abusive background 1: holding that the sentencing structure allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to petitioners prison record 2: holding that the key under pewy i  is that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a defendants mitigating evidence in imposing sentence 3: holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence 4: holding that a defendants sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time he committed the offense", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "insurance carriers mentioned in section 14 are the confidential communications with Horizon\u2019s legal counsel and Horizon\u2019s insurance carriers referred to in section 3.10. Under the plain meaning of the contract between Aon and Horizon, Aon is not Horizon\u2019s agent except when Aon communicates with Horizon\u2019s legal counsel or passes on these communications with counsel to Horizon\u2019s insurance carriers. However, relative to the alleged acts or omissions at issue in this case, Horizon\u2019s claims ai*e not based on any such communications. Therefore, we conclude that Aon was not acting as Horizon\u2019s agent under the unambiguous language of the Agreement. See Environmental Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 626-29, 2009 WL 237063, at *16-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.) (<HOLDING>); Ramco Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) Holdings: 0: holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty 1: holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm 2: holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law 3: holding law enforcement owed duty similar to that owed by dshs under rcw 2644050 4: holding that relationship between executor and estates beneficiaries is one that gives rise to fiduciary duty as matter of law", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "this reasoning is flawed. \u201cYoung does not apply if, although the action is nominally against individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.\u201d Id. at 506. Lucas names no individual officers. The Ex Parte Young exception applies only in actions against individual state officers, and not to state agencies. See id. Therefore, the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable here, thus barring action against the Board. For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the dismissal of the declaratory judgment by the District Court. 1 . On appeal, Lucas cites two exceptions to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young. See Idaho v. Coeur d\u2019Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 Holdings: 0: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 1: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law 2: holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state 3: holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state 4: holding that an action against an officer was not an action against the state because the relief sought would not take away any property of the state or fasten a lien on it or interfere with the disposition of funds in the treasury", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "it fails to pay its employees promptly, see Biggs v. Wilson, 828 F.Supp. 774, 780 (E.D.Cal.1991), aff'd, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994), any subsequent failure in this regard could not constitute an action taken under an objectively reasonable belief that the State was in compliance with the FLSA. An employer\u2019s failure to heed administrative rulemaking or precedent with respect to the FLSA deprives the employer of the good faith defense. See, e.g., Joiner v. City of Macon, 814 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir.1987) (in view of Department of Labor regulation, the City of Macon could not reasonably believe that its mass transit system employees were excluded from FLSA requirements); Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 Holdings: 0: holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it 1: holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense 2: holding that widely circulated 1974 opinion letter of the wage and hour administrator which apparently was not addressed specifically to defendant put defendant on notice of proper procedure for crediting tips against the minimum wage depriving defendant of ability to assert good faith defense to liquidated damages 3: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 4: holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant where the complaints in both lawsuits involved similar allegations that defendant failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a murder is heinous or depraved. 135 Ariz. 42, 52-53, 659 P.2d 1, 11-12 (1983). Three years later, we noted that \u201c[i]n addition to th[ose] five factors ... we have also found that depravity is indicated where defendant admitted he committed the murder to prevent the victim from testifying against him concerning a felony that occurred contemporaneously with the murder.\u201d State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 481, 715 P.2d 721, 734 (1986) (citing State v. Smith, 141 Ariz. 510, 511-12, 687 P.2d 1265, 1266-67 (1984)); see also State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 529, 809 P.2d 944, 954 (1991) (killing five-year-old daughter \u201cfor no reason other than to eliminate her as a witness\u201d to her mother\u2019s murder supports finding of depravity); State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 570, 691 P.2d 655, 661 (1984) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 28 In State v. King, although finding that Holdings: 0: recognizing witness elimination as supporting finding of heinousness or depravity 1: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 2: holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary 3: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 4: recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "rule that where the record is sufficient to allow appellate review of a claim, the failure to raise that claim on appeal precludes subsequent collateral review of the claim, applies to bar collateral review where the facts underlying an ineffective assistance claim appear on the record. See, e.g., People v. Cooks, 67 N.Y.2d 100, 103-04, 500 N.Y.S.2d 503, 491 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y.1986); People v. Jossiah, 2 A.D.3d 877, 877, 769 N.Y.S.2d 743 (App.Div.2d Dept.2003); People v. Skinner, 154 A.D.2d 216, 221, 552 N.Y.S.2d 932 (App.Div. 1st Dept.1990). Federal courts in turn have denied habe-as review on the basis of similar state court rulings that ineffective assistance claims were procedurally barred by C.P.L. \u00a7 440.10(2)(c). See, e.g., Reyes v. Keane, 118 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Witt v. Walker, No. 92 CIV.2085(MBM), 1993 WL Holdings: 0: holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims 1: holding that the failure of defense counsel to object to erroneous punishment charge authorizing an illegal sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding where defendant challenged jury instruction and also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his counsels failure to object to instruction because we find no error in the instructions defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must also be rejected 3: holding that cpl  440102c was adequate and independent state ground to deny ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to object to jury charge 4: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "argues that because the suicide exclusion in the supplemental policy lacks the specific phrase \u201cwhether sane or insane\u201d it is not a valid defense to coverage. PL\u2019s Mem in Supp. at 19. ERISA has no bearing on this question of validity as suicide exclusions fall under the so-called \u201cinsurance exception\u201d to ERISA preemption and accordingly are governed by state law. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 742 n.18, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) (\u201cNearly every court that has addressed the question has concluded that laws regulating the substantive content of insurance contracts are laws that regulate insurance and thus are within the scope of the insurance savings clause.\u201d); Hoeflicker v. Cent. States. Se. & Sw. Areas Health Welfare Fund, 644 F.Supp. 195, 199 (W.D.Mo.1986) (<HOLDING>). Because no Virginia case has directly Holdings: 0: holding that a law which regulates what terms insurance companies can place in their policies regulates insurance companies 1: holding that a suicide exclusion regulates insurance and therefore falls within the insurance savings clause 2: holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract 3: holding that notice and a hearing were required before the commissioner of insurance could require an insurance company to change its definition of at fault in order to secure approval of an increase in insurance rates 4: holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "argue that their claim for fraud did not accrue until at least September 25, 1992, the date of the consent judgment for civil forfeiture. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on September 23, 1998. Under Michigan law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff can allege each element of the asserted claim. Moll v. Abbott Labs., 444 Mich. 1, 506 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich.1993). Further, Michigan courts apply the discovery rule, whereby a claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, an injury and causal connection between his injury and the defendant\u2019s conduct. Id. (discussing discovery rule in the context of a products liability action); Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236-38 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the record suggests that Holdings: 0: recognizing applicability of discovery rule 1: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 2: holding that the time of discovery of fraud is not a proper matter for summary judgment 3: recognizing that the heck deferred accrual rule applies to fourteenth amendment equal protection claims 4: holding that discovery accrual rule applies to causes of action under michigan law for fraud", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "re UAL Corp.), 346 B.R. 456, 467 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2006) (emphasis in original, citations omitted) (denying enforcement of cross-default provision in lease of airport terminal space and separate agreement to make payments on certain bonds). Just as the cum onere rule prevents the estate from avoiding obligations that are an integral part of an assumed agreement, so the cross-default rule prevents the nondebtor party from imposing on the estate the costs of substantially unrelated agreements. Id. at 468 n. 11. Shaw argues that the Offset Provision is virtually indistinguishable from cross-default clauses which have been held unenforceable in other contexts. See, e.g., EBG Midtown S. Corp. v. McLaren/Hart Envt\u2019l Eng\u2019g Corp. (In re Sanshoe Worldwide Corp.), 139 B.R. 585, 597 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 993 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.1993); In re Holdings: 0: holding that a covenant not to compete for two years was enforceable 1: holding that crossdefault provision of two leases of separate floors was not enforceable and rejection of one lease did not prohibit assignment of the other 2: holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms 3: holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term 4: holding that a leases waiver of trial by jury for any matters whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with this lease did not extend to a tort claim", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "it construed the claim. The court will address these arguments in turn, and then will turn to whether there was substantial evidence presented at trial to support the jury\u2019s verdict. The court finds Honeywell\u2019s argument that Sundstrand\u2019s evidence was legally insufficient to support a conclusion of non-infringement to be unpersuasive. Even considering that Shinskey said at one point that, \u201cI believe that claim C and claim D must both apply at the same time,\u201d Tr. 1407-08, this does not render Sundstrand\u2019s entire case legally insufficient. Although Shinskey may have made this statement, it is clear that his opinion as to why the APS 3200 did not literally infringe each element of Claim 4 of the \u2019194 patent did not depend on this statement. But see LNP Eng\u2019g Plastics, 77 F.Supp.2d at 549 (<HOLDING>). Specifically, before making this statement, Holdings: 0: holding that a patentee was entitled to jmol where the thrust of the defendants noninfringement argument was that it did not infringe the patents at issue because it was practicing the prior art 1: holding that because the appellant did not present to the administrative agency the argument it raised before this court the issue was not preserved and holding that even if preserved the argument failed 2: holding that despite the merits of the argument the appellant raised on appeal the issue was not preserved for judicial review because it was not raised before the administrative agency 3: holding a prior case was not precedent on an issue when the issue was not contested 4: holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the full retirement benefits, once he retired, and thus denying his former wife her twenty percent interest in those benefits. Id. Similarly, the record shows Mary Blomdahl\u2019s ninety percent interest in Russell Blomdahl\u2019s retirement benefits was awarded by the parties\u2019 1993 divorce judgment and was not made contingent upon obtaining a QDRO. \u201cA QDRO is a judgment, decree, or order, relating to child support, spousal support, or marital property rights, which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee\u2019s right to receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan.\u201d Id. The ultimate responsibility of the entry of a necessary QDRO lies with the trial court, not the parties. Fry v. Fry, 18 Neb.App. 75, 775 N.W.2d 438, 444 (2009) (<HOLDING>); see also 2 Equit. Distrib. of Property 3d \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding that the jurisdiction of the divorce court with regard to support and maintenance is statutorily determined unless otherwise provided by agreement incorporated into the divorce decree 1: holding the ultimate responsibility that a proper divorce decree is entered and for entry of a qdro if the court determines the situation so requires rests upon the trial court 2: holding a motion to revise an enrolled divorce decree because of a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the decree filed more than 5 years after entry of the enrolled decree was properly denied 3: holding that the trial court in a declaratory judgment action abuses its discretion when it determines any of the ultimate facts upon which recovery is predicated in the underlying case 4: holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Pressure is secondary when its target is some employer other than the one engaged in a labor dispute with the union applying the pressure. To make this distinction, courts inquire into the \u201cobject\u201d of a union\u2019s activity. If \u201cthe object of the union\u2019s conduct, taken as a whole, is to bring indirect pressure on the primary employer by involving neutral or secondary employers in the dispute, the conduct is secondary and prohibited.\u201d Abreen Corp. v. Laborers\u2019 Int\u2019l Union, 709 F.2d 748, 754-55 (1st Cir.1983). A plaintiff need not prove that the union\u2019s sole or primary object is to employ secondary pressure, only that one of its objects is the use of secondary pressure. See Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1023 (1st Cir.1995); see also Abreen Corp., 709 F.2d at 755 (<HOLDING>). Intent, therefore, is the first necessary Holdings: 0: holding that plain tiff must show that the secondary pressure is not merely incidental  to the pressure imposed on the primary employer 1: holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative 2: holding that government must merely show that defendant knew that it was a bank that he intended to influence 3: holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge 4: holding a parsonage taxable where the use of the property to accomplish religious purposes was only incidental or secondary to the primary purpose of providing a residence for the pastor and his family", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in first degree assault cases. In its discussion, the court held that first, second, and third degree assault are all general intent crimes, meaning that the actor need only intend the assault, not the injury which results. In State v. Swigart, 233 Neb. 517, 446 N.W.2d 216 (1989), an appeal of the defendant\u2019s first degree assault conviction, the court rejected the defend ant\u2019s claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction because the defendant said he did not intend to cause serious bodily injury. Similarly, Parks claims that he did not intend to hurt the baby or break his leg. The Williams court said that the assault statutes prohibit conduct consisting of acts which cause injury of various seriousness. See, also, State v. Duis, 207 Neb. 851, 301 N.W.2d 587 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The assault statutes, Neb. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding that assault with dangerous weapon is general intent crime and that it is only necessary to prove that defendant did act of injuring another with dangerous instrument in intentional manner 1: holding that separate sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob were barred 2: holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument used is a firearm as defined by section 7900016 then that instrument is a deadly weapon as a matter of law  regardless of whether it is loaded or capable of being fired and holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument is not a firearm then courts are to apply an objective test and look to the nature and actual use of the instrument and not to the subjective fear of the victim or intent of the perpetrator in determining whether the instrument is a deadly weapon 3: holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime 4: holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "time in their reply papers that all claims against them under the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed and that Plaintiffs \u00a7 1983 claim in Count 11 of the Complaint should be dismissed as against Doe 1 because he is not a final policy maker for the City. The purpose of reply papers is to \u201caddress new material issues raised in the opposition papers so as to avoid giving unfair advantage to the answering party.\u201d Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 226-227 (2d Cir.2000). Accordingly, the court is within its discretion to disregard such arguments submitted with Defendant\u2019s reply papers. See Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Banc One Acceptance Corp., No. 05-CV-1260, 2008 WL 5423262, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2008) (citing Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>)). Nonetheless, because Plaintiff is not Holdings: 0: holding that arguments raised for the first time in the reply briefs on appeal were deemed waived 1: holding a party waives an argument made for the first time on reply 2: holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited 3: holding that we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief 4: holding that arguments cannot be made for the first time in reply papers", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "are no cases in this circuit holding that a defendant is eligible for the safety valve reduction under these circumstances, and we decline to extend other circuits\u2019 precedents here. Compare United States v. Sherpa, 110 F.3d 656, 660-62 (9th Cir.1996) with United States v. Reynoso, 239 F.3d 143, 149-50 (2d Cir.2000). Our case law makes clear that the burden is on the defendant to prove his eligibility for the safety valve reduction. United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir.1996). With the record before this court, we find that Moreno-Gonzalez has failed to meet that burden, and that the district court finding that he did not provide truthful information was not clearly erroneous in light of the jury verdict. See United States v. Ridgeway, 321 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION While a jury could have found the Holdings: 0: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 1: holding that a district courts determination as to the applicability of a privilege is reviewed for clear error 2: holding that factual findings in sentencing context are reviewed for clear error 3: holding that a determination as to a defendants credibility for a safety valve reduction is a factual finding that is reviewed for clear error 4: holding that the district courts good faith finding is reviewed for clear error", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not challenging the manner in which the Commission promulgated the Rules, the legality of the Rules in terms of US West\u2019s supposed contractual rights, or the facial validity of the Rules. Instead, US West argues that the Commis sion applied the rules unlawfully because, in failing to require fair value rate base determinations from the Competitors, it violated express provisions of the Arizona Constitution. In addition, US West argues that the Commission acted unconstitutionally by treating the Competitors differently than it treated US West. Thus, the validity of the Commission\u2019s decisions was \u201cdirectly placed in issue\u201d by the results of its actions in implementing the Rules, not by its promulgation of them. Cf. JV-132324 v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 337, 344, 890 P.2d 632, 639 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, US West\u2019s appeal is not an Holdings: 0: holding that the validity of an administrative order is properly before the court when it has been directly placed in issue 1: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it 2: holding that an issue first argued in a reply brief is not properly before a court of appeals 3: holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged 4: holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "reasonable regulations, to process for witnesses .... \u201d State v. Wilcox, 21 S.D. 532, 114 N.W. 687 (1908) (emphasis added). [\u00b6 17.] Crawford cites Washington v. Texas in support of his argument that his right to compulsory process was violated. 388 U.S. 14, 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1925, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In Washington, the United States Supreme Court decided the defendant\u2019s right to compulsory process was denied because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to have a witness testify who had relevant and material testimony. Id. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-73, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (the government may not deport witnesses who have material and relevant testimony); Fountaine v. State, 460 So.2d 553, 555 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1984) (<HOLDING>), petition for review denied, 464 So.2d 554 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 1: holding that despite district courts restriction on crossexamination of government witness concerning the sentencing benefits he would earn through testifying for the government it did not violate defendants confrontation rights because of defense counsels effective impeachment of the government witnesses credibility and sentence reduction 2: recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury 3: recognizing the right to compulsory process only requires that the government may not prevent an otherwise willing defense witness from testifying 4: holding that evidence of a threat to a witness by the defendant is relevant as showing an attempt to prevent a witness from testifying and avoid punishment for the crime", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Petitioner\u2019s claim that his sentence violated his due process rights. III. EiToneous Factual Basis for Sentencing Petitioner next contends that his sentence was based, in part, on an erroneous understanding of the facts. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the Government erroneously informed the court that Petitioner told the probation officer that he had previously transported drugs into the State of Hawaii. Petitioner further claims that the court relied on this false information in determining Petitioner\u2019s sentence. Petitioner did not raise this argument when he appealed his conviction. Where a defendant fails to raise a non-constitutional challenge to his sentencing on direct appeal, the claim is deemed waived. See United States v. Schlesinger, 49 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In such a circumstance, the court may only Holdings: 0: holding that errors not raised before the trial court will not generally be considered on appeal 1: holding that this court follows the rule that nonconstitutional sentencing errors that have not been raised on direct appeal have been waived and generally may not be reviewed by way of 28 usc  2255 2: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived 3: holding ineffectivetrialassistance claim may be brought in 28 usc  2255 proceeding regardless of whether claim could have been raised on direct appeal 4: holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by a plausible basis in the record. Secretary\u2019s Br. at 7-8. Furthermore, the Secretary argues that a remand for readjudication in light of the enactment of the VCAA is not required because \u201cthe record fails to reveal the necessity for additional development ... [and the a]ppellant has been given adequate notice which detailed the law and evidence necessary to establish his claim.\u201d Secretary\u2019s Br. at 10. In his reply, the appellant argues that the BVA decision should be vacated and the matters remanded because of \u201cthe Board\u2019s failure to make a finding on the question of whether the VCAA applies.\u201d Appellant\u2019s Reply at 1. Initially, the Court notes that it will address only those arguments adequately raised by the appellant in his briefs. See Ford v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 531, 535-36 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 136, 138 (1994); Holdings: 0: holding that the court has discretion not to consider an issue abandoned on appeal 1: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 2: holding that claims presented to bva and not pursued on appeal are considered abandoned 3: holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned 4: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "racial discrimination which justifies this classification\u201d). Even when a classification is appropriately related to the regulation\u2019s purpose, we must weigh and evaluate the state\u2019s interest in accomplishing the regulation\u2019s purpose. Under the current equal, protection jurisprudence, the adequacy of the state\u2019s purpose varies with the nature of the classification. Thus, a classification based on race or national origin or which affects fundamental rights secured by the Constitution is examined most closely because the classification is deemed inherently suspect. Only a compelling state interest, advanced by the least restrictive means, will justify the classification on these bases. See, e.g., Palamore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, classifications based on Holdings: 0: holding that custody decision based on race is not justified 1: holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck 2: holding that an employers decision to terminate and individuals employment based on race is a violation of title vii regardless of whether that person is white or black 3: holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race 4: holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of showing entitlement to a preliminary injunction. See Reebok Intern., Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir.1994) (citing H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 388 (Fed.Cir.1987)). While the Court must weigh all the aforementioned factors, Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1219 (Fed.Cir.1996), the first two factors in this inquiry (i.e., the likelihood of success and irreparable harm factors) are \u201c[cjentral to the movant\u2019s burden,\u201d and the Court \u201cmay decline to issue a preliminary injunction if the movant does not prove either of these factors.\u201d Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., Inc., 205 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2000); see also Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed.Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). The Court will address each of the Holdings: 0: holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success 1: holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm 2: holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction 3: holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest 4: holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Their related KCPA claims are individual as well. That is, the claims are brought in plaintiffs\u2019 individual rather than corporate capacities. Amoco argues that because the corporations, not plaintiffs themselves, made payments to Amoco under the DSAs and Lease Agreements, any alleged injury was borne solely by the plaintiffs\u2019 corporations, not by plaintiffs individually. The court disagrees. Plaintiffs\u2019 corporate logo may have been on the check that paid for the gasoline, Amoco-branded products, and rent, but plaintiffs were individually liable for the cost of those items. In the court\u2019s view, the nature of the liability undertaken, not who \u201cpicked up the tab,\u201d should determine the nature of plaintiffs\u2019 KCPA claims. See Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 830 F.Supp. 557, 566 (D.Kan.1993) (<HOLDING>). B. Are the purposes for which plaintiffs Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs claim was moot because the construction project which was the subject of the dispute had been completed 1: holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee 2: holding that the funds in the privatelyheld corporations account belonged to the corporation not to the individuals who owned the corporation and expressly stating that directors officers and shareholders of a corporation do not have standing to claim an ownership interest in corporate property in their individual capacities they must state a claim in the corporate name 3: holding similarly that because lear business jet was titled in corporate name the kcpa claim belonged to the corporation not the individual plaintiffs even though the lear jet had been purchased with plaintiffs personal funds 4: holding that a corporate plaintiffs claims must be dismissed on the ground of failure of any attorney to appear for the corporation", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "appearing both in the record and in the briefs, we restrict our statement of the underlying facts of the case to facts alleged in TCI\u2019s complaint that do not appear to be disputed by the parties. 2 . Greer v. Spock, it should be noted, did not hold that any military base falls automatically into the \"nonforum\u201d category. Rather, Greer held simply that, based on the facts in that case, which established that the base there had not been opened generally by the military to the public for expressive or other purposes, the base commander could constitutionally place certain content-neutral restrictions on speech on the base. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 837-838, 96 S.Ct. at .1217-1218 (distinguishing Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 92 S.Ct. 1842, 32 L.Ed.2d 653 (1972) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The precise basis for the Ninth Circuit\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that civilian distributing leaflets on military base could not constitutionally be convicted of unlawfully entering the base where the military had abandoned any right to exclude civilian vehicular and pedestrian traffic from the avenue greer 424 us at 835 96 sct at 1216 1: holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act 2: recognizing that suit against the government for alleged negligence of military club bartender would require questioning of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions 3: holding that a challenge of the press ban during the military action in grenada was moot after the military action ended because plaintiffs failed to allege ongoing conduct 4: holding that a former spouse is a proportionate owner of the other spouses future military retirement pay and is thus entitled to onehalf of the percentage of such pay representing the number of military marriage years relative to the total length of military service", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.\u201d Cal. Civ.Code \u00a7 1760. Relief under the CLRA is available to \u201cany consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment\u201d of any unlawful \u201cmethod, act, or practice.\u201d Cal. Civ.Code \u00a7 1780(a). Such damage may result \u201cthrough the materiality\u201d of an alleged omission. See Parkinson v. Hyundai Mot. Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 595-96 (C.D.Cal.2008). Upon a sufficient showing at the certification stage, whether an omission is \u201cmaterial ]\u201d presents a \u201ccommon question of fact suitable for treatment in a class action.\u201d Mass. Mut., 97 Cal.App.4th at 1294, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 190; Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1022 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Steroid Hormone Prod. Cases, 181 Holdings: 0: holding that materiality is established if a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question 1: holding that the only relevant inquiry to determine whether a suspect was in custody is how a reasonable man in the suspects position would have understood his situation 2: holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question 3: holding that the only relevant inquiry in an in custody determination is how a reasonable man in the suspects position would have understood his situation 4: holding that contractor complaints that late or no payments are affecting performance is a significant factor in determining materiality", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "considering all factors, the Court finds this factor pivotal under the circumstances of this case. See Deans v. O\u2019Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir.1982). The parties have stipulated that there is no equity in the home and that it would require significant expense, representing the vast majority of Debtors\u2019 disposable income, to retain it. In fact, the payment dedicated for the home exceeds Debtor\u2019s personal net income. Utilization of the vast majority of Debtor\u2019s net disposable income to retain an expensive asset while depriving his other creditors of payment indicates a lack of good faith. This Court has previously denied confirmation for lack of good faith when a debtor proposes to retain an expensive piece of secured property and make a minimum distribution to unsecured cr 03) (<HOLDING>). Debtor presented no testimony or other Holdings: 0: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 1: holding that the state has no obligation to provide adequate housing 2: holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence 3: recognizing provisions of the fair housing act that forbid false statements that housing is unavailable to a person because of his race 4: holding debtors must bear the burden of paying for improvident expenses by giving up a home that had no equity and finding replacement housing", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "record provides independent support for the enhancement, we need not determine whether Judge Russell erred by failing to bring forward evidence to substantiate his exchange with Judge Friot. Under plain error review, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice to his substantial rights. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1208 (10th Cir.2008). Even assuming Judge Russell erred by relying on his conversation with Judge Friot, Bishop cannot succeed because the result of the proceeding would not change on remand. The conversation with Judge Friot notwithstanding, Judge Russell could have supported the enhancement by simply noting Judge Fri-ot\u2019s remarks during Bishop\u2019s first sentencing hearing. See United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1252 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks Holdings: 0: holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 1: holding that party asserting plain error must show a reasonable probability that but for the error claimed the result of the proceeding would have been different 2: holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 3: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 4: holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "less clear but likely that she would have a separate claim for misrepresentation either in equity for restitution or at law for negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation. See ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska 1988); Great Western Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 580-81 (Alaska 1989); Turnbull v. LaRose, 702 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Alaska 1985) (non-disclosure). The United States has not consented to be sued for such claims. The issue is whether St. Denis has a tort claim separate from misrepresentation. The applicable law is the law of Alaska because, under Alaska law, the government\u2019s obligations are measured by the obligations of a private party. Bell, 755 F.Supp. at 271-72. The line between tort and contract has received signifi P.2d 1173 (Aaska 1993) (<HOLDING>). In order to place St. Denis\u2019 claims in the Holdings: 0: holding that no products liability claim lies in admiralty when commercial party alleges injury only to product itself resulting in purely economic loss insofar as the tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself 1: holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action 2: recognizing that substantial change is a defense to a products liability claim 3: holding that negligent breach of a duty assumed in a contract does not give rise to a separate tort claim 4: holding that products liability cases only give rise to a tort claim where product failure harms public safety", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to which Buyer has received the professional advilele and expertise of a certified public accountant retained by Buyer. Defendants argue that this provision (the Satisfaction Clause) is sufficient to preclude Plaintiffs from asserting mistake as a basis for rescinding the contract. 1 38 The Satisfaction Clause may well have been an attempt to allocate to Plaintiffs the risk that the value of the Kendall Agency might be lower than either party believed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 154(a). Alternatively, this clause may evidence an acknowledgment by Plaintiffs that they deemed their limited knowledge on this issue sufficient, thereby negating any later claim of mistake. See id. \u00a7 154(b); see also Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 8, 118, 178 P.3d 886 (<HOLDING>)'s subsequent approval); Klos, 829 P.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that the office of recovery services of the utah dept of social services was free to collect its postpetition debt for child support from a tax refund that was not dedicated to the plan and therefore vested in the debtors upon confirmation 1: holding that under contract armory assumed the risk as to utah general services agency 2: holding that nonsignatories to a contract have no rights under the contract and thus no standing to assert claims under the contract 3: recognizing this as the general rule 4: recognizing utah counties as legal subdivisions", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621, the ADEA incorporates enforcement provisions of the FLSA, including the collective action provisions of 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 216(b). 9 . Some courts refer to the process of opting in to a collective action as \"joinder.\u201d See Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996) (Garth, J.) (referring to a certification of an ADEA collective action as \"permitting opt-in joinder of \u2018similarly situated\u2019 plaintiffs\u201d). But opt-in plaintiffs are held to a lesser standard than FLSA named plaintiffs or other plaintiffs who jo.in in .civil actions. For instance, ADEA opt-in plaintiffs do not need to exhaust administrative remedies, while ADEA named plaintiffs do. See Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1078 (3d Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, opt-in plaintiffs are held to a Holdings: 0: recognizing that in other contexts the optin class action has been analogized to permissive joinder and intervention but concluding that optins in adea suit need not satisfy exhaustion requirements where named plaintiffs have done so 1: holding that where one plaintiff has standing we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit 2: holding that tolling does not apply to additional defendants who were not named in the class action 3: holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist  between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot 4: holding that a class action is not mooted by the intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "however, is limited to conspiracies based upon racial or some other class-based invidious discrimination. See Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.1996). There is no evidence of any such conspiracy here. The class for which the plaintiff claims protection is \u201cdivorced or otherwise single women parents.\u201d Pl.\u2019s Mem. in Opp\u2019n to Def. Scott Losciuto\u2019s Reply Mem. at 6. That is not a recognized class. To the extent that the plaintiff is stating a separate claim against Scott or Janet Losciuto under 42 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1983 (the Complaint is unclear), it fails for lack of state action on the part of Scott or Janet Losciuto, who are private parties. See Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2000). Town Of Windham And Pol 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, Holdings: 0: holding that police officer was not required to eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before effectuating arrest for animal cruelty 1: holding that police officer is not required to explore and eliminate all theoretically plausible claims of innocence 2: holding police officer is a public official 3: holding that petitioners challenge to jury instructions in light of some new cases did not demonstrate his actual innocence because petitioner only asserts legal innocence not actual innocence 4: holding police are not required to explore and eliminate every potentially plausible claim of innocence as part of their prearrest investigation", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "this court held that Rule 11(e)(2) \u201cdirects counsel to provide this court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal.\u201d Id. at 1002. When the appellant does not do so, we \u201cpresume the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by competent and sufficient evidence.\u201d Id.; see also Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah 1990); State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988). In this case, defendant failed to provide this court with a transcript of the March 8 entrapment hearing, which it was his responsibility to do. See Utah R.App.P. 11(e)(2). \u201cTherefore, our review is strictly limited to whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law and judgment.\u201d Sampson, 770 P.2d at 1002; accord State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 938-39 (Utah App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Section 76-2-303 of the Utah Code sets forth Holdings: 0: holding that as a general rule this court will not consider an issue that was not raised below 1: recognizing general rule that an appellate court cannot address claims that were not raised below 2: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review a legal claim not presented in administrative proceedings below 3: holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below 4: holding court cannot consider proceedings below without adequate record", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "first factor under Wright, the location of the train, we note the UP 9484 was located on the Diesel Service Track when Johnson\u2019s Engine made contact with it. All the evidence established this was a service area under blue flag protection. This fact was supported by the affidavit and subsequent deposition testimony of Mr. Valley. In addition, Johnson admitted he was told \u201cto put [the engines] in the engine service track.\u201d Moreover, the UP 9484 was not simply located in a service area, it was sitting dead on the track, where it had been since its inspection the day before and had not yet been released for service. These facts alone strongly weigh in favor of finding the UP 9484 was not \u201cin use\u201d at the time of the accident under the first factor in Wright. See Wright, 574 F.3d at 619-22 (<HOLDING>). Considering the second factor under Wright, Holdings: 0: holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse 1: holding use of gps device to track suspect for 65 days was search 2: holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees 3: holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone 4: holding locomotive was not in use when it was parked on a repair track for inspection was in a blue flag area and had not yet been released for use following the inspection", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Immigration Appeals\u2019 (\u201cBIA\u201d) order summarily affirming an immigration judge\u2019s (\u201cIJ\u201d) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252. We review for substantial evidence. Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.2007). We grant the petition for review and we remand. Because there is no evidence that the BIA reviewed the petitioners\u2019 asylum and withholding claim, as requested by petitioners in their brief to the BIA, pursuant to the disfavored group analysis set forth in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2004), we remand to the agency to determine Sael\u2019s application in this case. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We also remand for consideration of pattern Holdings: 0: holding that this court must remand to the bia to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not yet considered 1: holding deference to agency methodology appropriate unless agency failed to address an essential factor 2: holding that this court has discretion to either address or remand arguments presented to it in the first instance provided it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim 3: holding that when an agency has not reached an issue the proper course is to remand to the agency in the first instance to address 4: holding that a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "given multiple opportunities to do so. 2 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 3 . Sanders does not assert the Government was in contact with the victim at some point prior to the day before the start of the trial, nor does Sanders allege the Government in any way delayed informing him regarding its meeting with the victim, during which the victim was shown the photographic lineup. Moreover, we need not consider Sanders' claim the photographic lineup was \"unduly suggestive,\u201d as he raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Contrary to Sanders' contention, the Holdings: 0: holding argument not raised in opening brief but raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 1: holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief 2: holding argument is waived when raised for first time in reply brief 3: holding an appellant who raised an issue for the first time in his reply brief waived the claim 4: holding that a contention raised for the first time in a reply brief was waived", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to consider the addi tional facts, and to rule on the additional claims, presented in his amended petition. Boyd has failed to preserve this issue for review. It would appear from a review of the record that Boyd is correct in maintaining that the circuit did not consider, or rule on, the additional facts and claims presented in his amended petition. However, the record also reflects that Boyd never objected to the circuit court\u2019s failure to rule on the amended petition. As noted above, Boyd never moved for leave to file the amended petition, and the circuit court never entered an order granting Boyd leave to do so. Moreover, the circuit court never took any action indicating that it was granting Boyd leave to file an amended petition or that it would consider claims rim.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Because Boyd never objected to the circuit Holdings: 0: holding that claim that the circuit courts order was deficient because it did not include specific findings of fact regarding each is sue was not preserved for review where it was not raised in the circuit court 1: holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court failed to make specific findings of fact relating to issues raised at an evidentiary hearing on the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not raise the issue in the circuit court 2: holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court improperly adopted the states proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order denying the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant never objected to the circuit courts order 3: holding in an appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in not ruling on his motion to subpoena a transcript of his guilty plea proceedings was not preserved for review because the circuit court never ruled on the motion and the appellant never objected to the circuit courts failure to rule on the motion 4: holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact as to all claims in the appellants rule 32 petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not first present the claim to the circuit court", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to pursue a declaratory judgment action against an insurer. Id. at 137-38, 142 N.W.2d at 647. The intermediate appellate court has no authority to overrule a decision by the supreme court. Mueller v. Theis, 512 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn.App.1994) (citing Principal Fin. Group v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 338, 343 (Minn.App.1991) (Davies, J. concurring specially)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 1994). b. Continental argues that it should not be liable for Domtar\u2019s attorney fees incurred in this action to address the indemnity issues, because the jury did not find a breach of a duty to indemnify. Rather, Continental argues that it is solely liable for Domtar\u2019s attorney fees incurred to establish a duty to defend. See Lanoue v. Fireman\u2019s Fund Amer. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn.1979) (<HOLDING>); Morrison, 274 Minn. at 137-38, 142 N.W.2d at Holdings: 0: holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer 1: holding that chapter 38 permits an insured to recover attorney fees from the insurer 2: holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured 3: holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer 4: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "an enforceable contract, a party must provide evidence that demonstrates that the parties reached a mutual understanding, they exchanged consideration, and they understood the essential terms of their bargain. Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 333 (Pa.Super.2005) (stating that proof of an enforceable contract is necessary to prove a breach of claim); Weavertown Transport Leasing, Inc. v. Moran, 834 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa.Super.2003) (discussing the elements necessary to prove the existence of an unenforceable contract); CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.1999) (stating what elements a party must pled to state a viable breach of contract claim); Estate of Rodgers v. Morris Chapel Missionary Baptist Church, No. 04-1577, 2005 WL 3602536 (Pa.Ct. Com.Pl. Dec. 14, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Petitioning Creditor\u2019s Claim is Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim 2: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract 3: holding summary dismissal of breach of implied employment contract claim inappropriate where factual issue over existence of oral policy 4: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Meadow, 2005 UT App 294, \u00b6 36, 118 P.3d 871; Peters, 2005 UT App 295U, para.6, 2005 WL 1530644. 4 . Forest Meadow, 2005 UT App 294, \u00b6\u00b6 3 & n. 2, 30, 118 P.3d 871. 5 . 2000 UT 9, 994 P.2d 201. 6 . Utah R.App. P. 24(k). When the briefs in these cases were filed in January 2006, this language was found in rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules have since been amended; however, this language remained the same and thus we cite to the current numbering of the rule. 7 . Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1042 (10th ed.1998) (defining \"scandalous\u201d as \"libelous, defamatory\u201d and \"offensive to propriety or morality\u201d). 8 . Utah R. Prof'l Conduct 8.2(a). 9 . Utah Standards of Professionalism & Civility 3. 10 . Id. 1. 11 . See In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo.1991) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Utah Standards of Professionalism & Holdings: 0: holding that counsels statements directed specifically at deciding judges motivation and integrity were personal attacks 1: holding that statements at issue were protected expressions of opinion because they lacked specificity and precision and the factual implications concerning such statements were unclear 2: holding vague and conclusory allegations of nefarious intent and motivation are insufficient to state a claim 3: recognizing that motions for directed verdicts are not normally directed to bits and pieces of an action 4: holding that objection made at directed verdict stage and in motion for new trial were timely", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is clear for both exchanges. We have an independent obligation to address standing regardless of any position the government has taken in the case. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, \u2014 U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012). 12 . See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Rep\u00fablica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848-50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (a subsidiary, corporation was not the agent of its parent because, the parent did not exercise \u201ccontrol over the subsidiary in a manner more direct than by voting a majority of the stock in the subsidiary or making appointments to the subsidiary\u2019s Board of Directors\u201d); Johnston v. Warren Cty. Fair Ass\u2019n, 110 F.3d 36, 38 (8th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Carolin Paxson, 938 F.2d at 598-99 Holdings: 0: recognizing that statements made by agent on behalf of principal to principals attorney may be protected by principals attorneyclient privilege 1: holding that defendant was not an agent because alleged principal did not control means by which the defendants accomplished their duties 2: holding that the lack of evidence of the alleged principals control over the alleged agent precludes the finding of an agency relationship 3: holding that agency is provable only by principals conduct and not by subjective beliefs of those dealing with alleged agent 4: holding plaintiffs payment of a renewal premium to the alleged agent did not establish an apparent agency", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "non-disclosure. In addition, the trial court does not explain how suppression of Dr. Privette\u2019s or Detective Robinson\u2019s testimony remedies the non-disclosure. Therefore the order does not bear any indication that the trial court \u201cconsider[ed] both the materiality of the subject matter and the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the] alleged failure to comply\u201d prior to finding suppression of their testimony \u201cappropriate.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-910(b) (2011). Therefore, because the lesser discovery sanctions rest upon (1) actions that are not discovery violations; or (2) a flawed prejudice analysis, we must vacate the portions of the trial court\u2019s order suppressing related evidence as a discovery sanction. See Blitz v. Agean, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 296, 312, 677 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2009) (<HOLDING>). However, our decision with respect to the Holdings: 0: holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion 1: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 2: holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional 3: holding that judicial actions based upon a misapprehension of law constitute an abuse of discretion 4: holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "diversity jurisdiction exists in fact. 4 . Coury, 85 F.3d at 249. 5 . E.g., Griffin v. Lee, 621 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir.2010). 6 . See Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir.1985). 7 . See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408-09 (5th Cir.1995) (\"Unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.\u201d) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938)). 8 . Cf. Greenville Imaging, LLC v. Washington Hosp. Corp., 326 F. App\u2019x 797, 798 (5th Cir.2009) (resolving jurisdictional question on the basis of citizenship information requested sua sponte from the parties). 9 . Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Cf. Lee v. Vill. of River Forest, 936 Holdings: 0: holding that a limited partnership is not itself a citizen and that courts must instead look to the citizenship of its members to determine if diversity jurisdiction exists 1: holding that defective allegations of citizenship may be amended to establish diversity jurisdiction 2: holding that a limited liability companys citizenship is that of its members 3: holding that the citizenship of lloyds is determined by that of all names 4: holding that for diversity purposes the citizenship of a llc is determined by the citizenship of all of its members", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "plan, indicating no intention to repay any of his debtors. (Bankr.Ct. D.I. 82, at 7.) Failure to propose repayment to any of his creditors was a failure to submit a confirmable plan. Furthermore, Mr. Dye will not be given another chance in this court to submit a confirmable Chapter 13 plan. See Wolstein v. Docteroff (In re Docteroff), 133 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir.1997) (refusing to give \u201clitigants who abuse the processes and dignity of the court a second bite at the apple.\u201d) Even if the Dyes had provided a plan to repay some of their creditors, the plan could not have been confirmed because of a refusal to file tax returns. Accurate tax returns are important for a Bankruptcy Court to confirm a Chapter 13 plan. See Whitehead v. United States, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11458 (D.Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>). Unmistakable manifestations of bad faith need Holdings: 0: holding that failure to file correct tax returns constitutes bad faith and makes it difficult for the court to confirm a plan 1: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 2: holding on an objection to confirmation of plan that the debtors failure to file tax returns before filing the chapter 13 plan and debtors failure for six months to comply with federal law constituted a lack of good faith sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case 3: holding that the lawyers failure to file tax returns and pay taxes over three years constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 4: holding the conduct element satisfied where debtor failed to timely file tax returns and failed to pay taxes for those years", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the court should not have imposed an offense level of 34. He also contends that the breaking and entering charge cannot be used as the predicate violent crime because there is an insufficient \u201cnexus\u201d between the firearm and the alleged state offense. Making a determination under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) involves a two-step inquiry. First, the court must decide whether the predicate offense is a violent felony. Second, the court must consider whether the defendant used or possessed a firearm in connection with that violent predicate offense. In making the first inquiry, the court is to employ \u201ca formal categorical approach\u201d irrespective of the actual factual circumstances of the underlying offense. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To determine what constitutes a violent crime Holdings: 0: holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling 1: holding that the guidelines definition of consolidated offenses was not applicable to a statutory minimum sentence imposed under 841 2: holding that court must look to statutory definition of acc a predicate offenses 3: holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 4: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that was printed on the reverse side of the Consent Form. Further, although the Consent Form generally allowed defendant to make unilateral changes to any of its policies, the arbitration policy was explicitly excluded from this provision: \u201cI agree and understand that AIMCO has the right to and may modify, rescind or cancel all or any part of these policies, or add new rules of conduct, at any time, in its sole discretion ... except the Arbitration policy, which can only be amended by AIMCO\u2019s and my mutual agreement.\u201d Because an employer\u2019s unilateral act of making changes to an employment handbook does not constitute mutual consent, the court finds that the arbitration agreement is still in full force. Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Comm. Services, Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because the arbitration agreement is still in Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitration agreement in an employee handbook was illusory where the employer expressly reserved a right to unilaterally rescind any provisions of the handbook 1: holding that contractual relationship between student and university did not include terms of the handbook because university retained right to unilaterally modify terms of handbook without notice plaintiff neither negotiated for nor assented to terms of contract and relevant correspondence did not call special attention to handbook 2: holding that no modification of the original employment contract occurred when the employer unilaterally issued a new handbook 3: holding that an agreement to arbitrate is illusory if as here the employer can unilaterally modify the contract 4: holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(1) plans which are subject to ERISA; (2) plans which are subject to I.R.C. \u00a7 401(a) ; (3) plans which contain enforceable anti-alienation clau ted pursuant to 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001 et seq. of the Labor Code and 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, and must include a restriction on alienation\u201d) 148 B.R. 930, 934 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1992), aff'd, 163 B.R. 614 (9th Cir. BAP 1994). But see In re Hanes, in which the court did not consider \u201ctax qualification\u201d as in Hall, Sirois, and Witwer, stating: \u201c[W]e conclude for purposes of \u00a7 541(c)(2), a plan is \u2018qualified\u2019 under ERISA if it is (1) governed by ERISA and (2) includes a non-alienation provision that is (3) enforceable under ERISA.\u201d 162 B.R. 733, 740 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1994). See also In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, 691 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1993) (<HOLDING>). I find the best view to be that a plan is Holdings: 0: holding that state law relates to an employee benefit plan and is therefore preempted by erisa if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan 1: holding that a plan is qualified if it complies with erisa and the irc 2: holding that it is not necessary to ascertain whether a plan is tax qualified but only that it is covered by erisa 3: holding that the relevant question is not whether risk is involved or assumed but rather whether that or something else to which it is related in the particular plan is its principal object and purpose 4: holding that it is not", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201ccharges,\u201d \u201camount\u201d, and \u201cbalance due.\u201d The Owners argue this evidence is insufficient to establish either the property class used to allocate assessments or whether they are special or annual assessments. However, Wilson specifically states in his affidavit that he calculated the amounts due and owing in the course of his duties to \u201ctrack[ ] assessments owed by various commercial entities within the Sonterra and Stone Oak subdivisions\u201d; and the schedules list the nature of the charges, whether \u201cassessment,\u201d \u201clate fees,\u201d \u201clegal fees,\u201d \u201cmowing,\u201d etc. We therefore hold Wilson\u2019s affidavit is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s summary judgment on the amount of past due assessments. See FFP Mktg. Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 411 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Hudspeth v. Investor Collection Serv. Ltd. Holdings: 0: holding that an affidavit  consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment 1: holding affidavit by bank president was sufficient to support summary judgment where it established plaintiff bank owned the note and the amount due on the note and defendant failed to offer controverting evidence 2: holding that affidavit setting forth total balance due on note is generally sufficient to sustain summary judgment and detailed proof of balance not required 3: holding that bank employees affidavit setting forth total balance due sufficient to support summary judgment 4: holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "this issue in the trial court where his appointed attorney argued against the termination of his parental rights. \u201cWhen the record is silent, as here, [a] trial court may be presumed to have taken judicial notice of the records in the court\u2019s file without any request being made and without an announcement in the record that it has done so.\u201d In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d 864, 869-70 (Tex. App.\u2014San Antonio 2012, no pet.). \u201cAssertions of fact, not plead in the alternative, in the live pleadings of a party are regarded as formal judicial admissions.\u201d Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). \u201cA judicial admission that is clear and unequivocal has conclusive effect and bars the admitting party from later ort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Because we assume the trial court took Holdings: 0: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se 1: holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel 2: holding statements in pro se letter filed with the trial court constituted admissions of paternity 3: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 4: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Inc., 752 F.Supp.2d 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (determining that, \u201calthough the relative means of [individual] plaintiffs in contrast to a national company clearly favors plaintiffs,\u201d plaintiff failed to demonstrate that travel to the transferee forum would pose a significant burden relative to traveling to the transferor forum). Here, plaintiff is opposing transfer to his home forum and arguing that his means prohibit him from prosecuting his lawsuit there because his attorney would need to travel from New York to New Jersey (or he would need to find another attorney, which he has not been able to do thus far). The Court finds that the additional burden that would be imposed on counsel to travel to the District of New Jersey carries SI), 2002 WL 523568, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2002) (<HOLDING>). The Court concludes that the transfer of this Holdings: 0: holding that the debtorinsured was entitled to exempt the cash surrender value of her life insurance policy naming her dependent son as a beneficiary under illinois statute providing exemption for all proceeds payable because of the death of the insured and the aggregate cash value of any or all life insurance  policies  payable to a wife or husband of the insured or to a child parent or other person dependent upon the insured 1: holding the appellant needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her husbands death fell within the terms of the insurance policy 2: holding in case where plaintiff sought to recover benefits from an accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy issued to her mother transfer to southern district of california warranted because among other things the transactions giving rise to plaintiffs action have no connection to the northern district and the life insurance policy was purchased by the insured in the southern district she received all medical care there and her death occurred there 3: holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth 4: holding in an action to recover premiums paid on a life insurance policy where plaintiff alleged she had been informed she was paying premiums toward a retirement annuity contract that where the record was devoid of any facts suggesting that defendant exercised any wrongful control over the monthly payments voluntarily made by plaintiff or took any action with respect to such payments other than providing her with the life insurance coverage which the documents establish that she purchased there was no basis for a claim of conversion", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "we give your treating source\u2019s opinion.\u201d). Dr. DePhillips concluded that Ulloa should be restricted from prolonged sitting or standing and from lifting more than ten pounds. (R. 105-106). Dr. Segura instructed him to keep his trunk straight and not bend forward, twist, or lift more than twenty pounds. (R. 127). These restrictions conflict with the wide range of light work the ALJ found Ulloa capable of performing. However, the ALJ never explained why Dr. DePhillips\u2019 or Dr. Segura\u2019s opinions were not entitled to controlling weight. Because the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to the opinions of Dr. DePhil-lips and Dr. Segura, the ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. Therefore, remand is appropriate. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>). On remand, the ALJ must reevaluate whether Holdings: 0: holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician 1: holding that failure to provide good reasons to discredit a treating physicians opinion requires remand 2: holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations 3: holding that errors such as failing to provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting a claimants subjective complaints rejecting a treating physicians opinion in favor of a nontreating physicians opinion without providing clear and convincing reasons and erring in assessing the claimants residual functioning capacity are fundamental 4: recognizing that failure to provide good reasons for discrediting a treating physicians opinion is grounds for remand", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Nor is there any indication that Diatek intended to be bound by any particular offer prior to finalizing the contracts on September 14, 2001. Jon Wilson, who engaged in talks with potential distributors during the summer of 2001, characterized those talks as \u201cpreliminary discussion[s].\u201d He summarized his message to the distributors as: \u201cWe have a new dialysis catheter. We are looking for distribution. It is going to be pretty much a standard deal.\u201d The Federal Circuit has distinguished between language that suggests a legal offer \u2014 such as \u201cI offer\u201d or \u201cI promise\u201d \u2014 and language that merely suggests preliminary negotiations' \u2014 such as \u201cI quote\u201d or \u201care you interested.\u201d Group One, 254 F.3d at 1048; see also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Mircrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1050 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Wilson\u2019s characterization places his talks Holdings: 0: holding that speaking to potential customers to determine an appropriate price does not constitute an offer for sale 1: holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added 2: recognizing that settlement discussions do not constitute an offer of judgment 3: holding that a price quotation can amount to an offer creating the power of acceptance  if it appears from the price quote that assent to the quote is all that is needed to ripen the offer into a contract 4: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "914 P.2d 1246, 1249 n. 4 (Alaska 1996). 14 . Park v. Park, 986 P.2d 205, 206 (Alaska 1999). 15 . Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 n. 10 (Alaska 1987). 16 . The dissent similarly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not explicitly addressing these factors. See Dissent at 1051. 17 . See Park, 986 P.2d at 207 (stating that \"[w]hile a court determining custody must always consider each of these statutory factors, it need not refer to all of them in explaining its custody decision\u201d); Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 137-39 (Alaska 1997) (noting no error in trial court\u2019s failure to expressly address those factors not disputed by the parties and those not favoring the parent to whom the court denied custody); Duffus v. Duffus, 932 P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska 1997) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Park, 986 P.2d at 207 (citing Holdings: 0: holding that while the parties may choose to renegotiate their agreement they are under no good faith obligation to do so 1: holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review 2: holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors 3: holding that even though defendants response does not affirmatively state in the document itself that they are competent to testify as to the facts to which they swore does not necessarily doom their testimony  so long as the record taken as a whole demonstrates that their testimony meets the requirements of rule 56 4: holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "apart from any procedural shortcoming, Mr. McPherson is not entitled to relief on the merits. Two claims from Mr. McPherson\u2019s collective Issue D remain: 1) his allegation that the trial judge made remarks reflecting bias constituting misconduct under New Mexico\u2019s Code of Judicial Conduct; and 2) his allegation that he was denied access to the courts by jail personnel, due to a one-time refusal to allow him use of the jail\u2019s law library, as well as his related allegation challenging the general adequacy of the jail\u2019s law library. With regard to Mr. McPherson\u2019s judicial misconduct claim, the district court correctly ruled that alleged violations of state codes of conduct are not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (<HOLDING>). And as for his claims regarding access to the Holdings: 0: holding that gardenvariety errors of state law do not warrant federal habeas relief 1: holding that federal habeas relief is not available to correct errors of state law 2: holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law 3: holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief 4: holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "testified, but states that without the benefit of discovery cannot admit or deny the factual allegations contained therein. Pl.\u2019s Resp. 11 \u00b6 49. 11 . Plaintiff filed an amended complaint two days later. See PL\u2019s Ex. 4, at 8. 12 . This regulation states: Prior to a request for a hearing in a case, the agency shall dismiss an entire complaint: (3) That is the basis of a pending civil action in a United States District court in which the complainant is a party provided that at least 180 days have passed since the filing of the administrative complaint; or that was the basis of a civil action decided by a United States District Court in which the complainant was a party[.] 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1614.107(a)(3). 13 . But see Clayton v. Rumsfeld, 106 Fed.Appx. 268, 271 (5th Cir.2004) (unpub. op.) (<HOLDING>); Hornsby v. Conoco, Inc., 777 F.2d 243, 247 Holdings: 0: holding that additional consideration is a factor in determining whether there is an implied contract of employment 1: holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion 2: holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision 3: holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement 4: holding that additional charges were barred in an employment discrimination case when the additional charges did not reflect the essence of the other charges", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and consideration by the trial court. Also, counsels\u2019 discussion with the trial judge regarding the disqualification covers approximately ten pages of the reporter\u2019s record. From the information provided by the prospective juror of his theft conviction, the trial court concluded that the juror was disqualified, but notwithstanding the constitutional implications, proceeded to mistakenly impanel him concluding that the disqualification could be waived. Moreover, this contention is analogous to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, see generally Givens v. State, 26 S.W.3d 739, 740 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); Flanary v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. 495, 316 S.W.2d 897, 898 (1958), or error based on an ex post facto claim. See generally Ieppert v. State, 908 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). See also Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 Holdings: 0: holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court 1: holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal 2: holding that the sovereign immunity defense may be raised for the first time on appeal 3: holding that claims which were not presented to the motion court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that an ex post facto claim may be presented for the first time on appeal because a categorical prohibition may not be waived", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was transferred back to DCXOM because Defendants wanted to get rid of him. 1. Individual Liability Wilson alleges claims of race discrimination pursuant to Title VII, the ELCRA, and 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 against Budco and Raymond. As Wilson conceded during a hearing on the motion, an individual who does not qualify as an \u201cemployer\u201d is not subject to individual liability under Title VII. Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir.1997) (\u201cWe now hold that an individual employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an \u2018employer\u2019 may not be held personally liable under Title VIL\u201d). Individual liability may, however, be imposed pursuant to \u00a7 1981 and the ELCRA. See Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (6th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted) (<HOLDING>); Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 472 Mich. 408, Holdings: 0: holding that employer may be held liable under  1981 for discrimination by supervisory employee 1: recognizing that individuals may be held liable under  1981 for intentional ly discriminatory acts including those giving rise to a hostile work environment 2: holding that individuals can be held liable under  1981 only when they have been personally involved or directly participated in the discrimination 3: holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under  1981 4: holding that individuals may be held liable under  1981 provided there is affirmative link connecting actor with discriminatory action", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "requirements for public agency employers. Id. \u201cSection 207k give's employers of fire protection and law enforcement personnel greater leeway in structuring wage and time calculations.\u201d Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir.1992). Reviewing courts have uniformly noted that the effect of the section 207(k) partial exemption is to temper the impact of the FLSA\u2019s overtime provisions on public employers by raising the average number of hours law enforcement and fire protection personnel may be required to work without triggering the overtime requirement and accommodating the inherently unpredictable nature of those professions by permitting public employers to adopt work periods longer than one week. See Wellington v. City of Montgomery, 935 F.2d 222, 224 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Application of the section 207(k) provision Holdings: 0: holding that in enacting flsa amendments of 1974 congress recognized that certain jobs are not easily susceptible to the workweek method of wage and time calculations and therefore provided special calculation methods for some trades including fire protection and law enforcement 1: holding customer list and pricing information of fire extinguisher business not a trade secret where service was commonly used so potential clients could be easily recognized and market was well established 2: holding that the public duty doctrine applied to claims against the town and fire chief for negligence in responding to a fire call although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show the special duty exception applied 3: holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire 4: holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Claims and Disputes \u00a7 11:9 (5th ed. 2007) (emphasis added). Another standard treatise notes the \u201cmany courts holdfing] that the term \u2018intent\u2019 r rrington, 565 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Mich. 1997) (affirming lower court holding that the exclusion \u201crequires a subjective inquiry into the intent or expectation of the insured\u201d); Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moll, 50 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (\u201ca subjective standard must be used for determining whether the injuries were expected or intended\u201d); McCoy v. Coker, 620 S.E.2d 691, 695 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (in determining whether the injury was expected or intended by the insured \u201c[t] y did not exclude harm expected or intended \u201cfrom the standpoint of a reasonable person\u201d); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 538 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 565 N.W.2d 839 (Mich. 1997); Cook, 557 Holdings: 0: holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy 1: holding that the policy language expected or intended by an insured person is unambiguous and requires a subjective intent on behalf of the insured 2: holding that the standard policy exclusion of injuries expected or intended by the insured refers only to bodily injury that the insured in fact subjectively wanted intended to be a result of his conduct or in fact subjectively foresaw as practically certain expected to be a result of his conduct 3: holding that the use of the phrase any insured rather than the insured the same language used in the employers liability exclusion here meant that the exclusion was not limited to injuries sustained by the employees or contractors of one insured party 4: holding that under pennsylvania law the reasonable expectations of an insured may overcome unambiguous policy language only when the insured is a noncommercial entity", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.\u201d). It is not clear to the court that there is any basis for subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs declaratory judgment action. Of the nine defendants named in the complaint, four are citizens of Virginia. Plaintiff seeks a declaration of \u201ceach party\u2019s respective rights, status and other legal relations and obligations under the applicable law and insurance policies.\u201d (Compl. at 6.) Thus, whether any of the Virginia defendants is a party-in-interest to the declaratory judgment is, at a minimum, a difficult question. However, because even if there were diversity in this case the court would decline jurisdiction, the issue need not be reached. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584-85, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) (<HOLDING>). When a case is removed from state to federal Holdings: 0: holding that riggins does not present novel constitutional issues 1: holding that there is no mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues  and we have leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits  quoting ruhrgas ag v marathon oil co 526 us 574 584 585 119 sct 1563 143 led2d 760 1999 2: holding that steel co does not dictate a sequencing of jurisdictional issues and stating that it is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits 3: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 4: holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trying to collect, and, therefore, interpretation which treats the two claims as arising from distinct events turns a blind eye to reality); Taborski v. U.S., 141 B.R. 959 (N.D.Ill.1992) (debtor\u2019s claim against IRS and IRS\u2019 claim against debtor arose out of same transaction and occurrence, which was IRS\u2019 attempt to collect the taxes); In re Lile, 103 B.R. 830, 835 (Barrkr.S.D.Tex.1989) aff'd 161 B.R. 788 (S.D.Tex.1993) (IRS claim for unpaid taxes and debtor's claim for damages for post-petition levy arose out of same transaction or occurrence). Contra In re Rebel Coal Co., Inc., 944 F.2d 320 (6th Cir.1991) (concluding that claim for attorneys\u2019 fees did not arise out of same transactions as a tax collection claim); In re Academy Answering Service, Inc., 100 B.R. 327, 330 (N.D.Ohio 1989) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Accord In re Boldman, 157 B.R. 412 Holdings: 0: holding that a decedents tax settlement with the irs did not establish the value of his estates claim against the irs as a matter of law 1: holding that irs claim for taxes and claim of debtor against irs for violation of automatic stay did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence 2: holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay 3: holding that irs was bound by plan and bankruptcy codes method of determining amount of nondischargeable claim where irs had filed proof of claim for nondischargeable tax debt 4: holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which  it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "clerk\u2019s practice of almost always granting deferrals to jurors who requested them introduced a substantial element of voluntariness into jury service, and meant that the pool of K jurors consisted of individuals who had decided for various reasons not to serve at the time that their names were drawn from the divisional qualified wheels. As the former Fifth Circuit explained, \u201cThat the introduction of predilections of prospective jurors affects the random nature of the selection process cannot be gainsaid. Surely a district would be in substantial violation of the statute [JSSA] if it selected all its jurors by randomly drawing names from the qualified wheel and allowing those selected to opt in or out at will.\u201d Id.; see also United States v. Branscome, 682 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Arguably, then, when the clerk almost always Holdings: 0: holding the connection is an element 1: holding that use of volunteer jurors introduced an impermissible subjective element into jury selection 2: recognizing that observations made during a psychiatric examination contain a subjective element 3: holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error 4: holding that knowledge element could not be deemed in favor of plaintiff where defendant objected to the omission of that element from the jury charge", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "witnesses was held to be violative of accepted grand jury practice, therefore requiring dismissal of the indictment. Similarly, in United States v. Bowdach, 324 F.Supp. 123 (S.D.Fla.1971), it was held that the presence of a witness who played audio tapes for the purpose of refreshing the memory of other witnesses constituted a violation of Rule 6(d). It has likewise been held that Rule 6(d) is violated where an attorney for the government testifies before the grand jury and then, having resumed his prosecutorial role, remains in the grand jury room in the presence of other witnesses. See United States v. Gold, 470 F.Supp. 1336, 1351 (N.D.Ill.1979); United States v. Treadway, 445 F.Supp. 959, 962 (N.D.Tex.1978); contra, however, is United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3rd Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>). The government\u2019s position that the Holdings: 0: holding that an agreement in which one party promised to make monthly payments to the other partys attorney as part of an asset sale contract was for the direct benefit of the attorney 1: holding that the attorneys presence is authorized under rule 6d as that of a witness on the one hand and as an attorney for the government on the other 2: holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection 3: holding that defendant is under an obligation to give the government notice of an alibi witness even if defendant is unable to locate the witness 4: holding depends on the policy language at hand", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.\u201d City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989). We think the confinement of sexually violent predators who \u201cwill engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility,\u201d Iowa Code \u00a7\u00a7 229A.2(8), .7, serves a compelling state interest\u2014 protection of the public. In addition, the statute is narrowly drawn to encompass only those individuals who, because of a \u201cmental abnormality,\u201d are predisposed to sexually violent behavior. See id. \u00a7 229A.2(3), (8) (defining \u201cmental abnormality\u201d and \u201csexually violent predator\u201d). Therefore, chapter 229A does not violate Garren\u2019s right to the equal protection of the law under the state or federal constitutions. See In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 675 (<HOLDING>). IX. Summary. We hold that the Sexually Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 2: holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause 3: holding that nearly identical kansas statute did not violate equal protection clause when subjected to strict scrutiny 4: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u2014 and it was so conceded on the argument of this case \u2014 that the remedy given by this provision, and other sections following in the same chapter, was intended as a substitute for a creditor's bill....\"); Graham v. La Crosse & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 10 Wis. 403 (*459), 406 (*462) (1860) (\"[T]he proceedings supplemental to execution, established by the code, are a substitute therefor, and constitute the only manner of obtaining the relief formerly had under a creditor's bill.\"); Seymour v. Briggs, 11 Wis. 204 (*196), 213 (*204) (1860) (\"[T]he remedy by creditor's bill was abrogated by the code, and that the proceedings supplementary to an execution provided by that enactment, were intended as a substitute therefor.\"); Second Ward Bank v. Upmann, 12 Wis. 555 (*499), 561-562 (*504-05) (1860) (<HOLDING>). 15 In Wisconsin, supplemental proceedings are Holdings: 0: recognizing common law privileges 1: holding that the common law principle of absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts has neither been abrogated nor been modified in maryland emphasis added 2: holding that the right to bring a wellestablished common law cause of action cannot be effectively abrogated by the legislature absent a showing that the legislative basis for the statute outweighs the denial of the constitutionallyguaranteed right of redress 3: recognizing that new mexico has adopted the common law unless otherwise abrogated by specific statutory provisions and that the power of a trial court to change venue on its own motion if necessary to assure the defendant a fair trial is part of that common law 4: holding that the statutes abrogated the common law", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "bench trial before the Honorable Frank M. Davis, which was concluded September 30, 1986. Defendant, \u201cThe Shining Mountains,\u201d a California limited partnership, is the owner-developer of property known as the \u201cShining Mountains Subdivision\u201d located in Madison County, Montana. A dispute arose between defendant and individuals purchasing parcels within the subdivision as to the extent and nature of defendant\u2019s commitment to construct roadways within the subdivision. The plaintiff-landowners filed suit alleging defendant represented that roadways would be provided as part of the development and constructed by defendant. This Court previously reversed a partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Majers v. Shining Mountains (Mont. 1986), [219 Mont. 366,] 711 P.2d 1375, 43 St.Rep. 16 (<HOLDING>). Following a subsequent trial, the District Holdings: 0: holding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine 1: holding that the original pto declarations create a genuine issue of material fact 2: holding that subsequent affidavit contradicting prior sworn testimony does not create genuine issue of fact 3: holding that a genuine issue of fact remained in determining what representations were made by defendant to plaintiffs as to the construction of roadways and that roadway easement designations on the plat maps did not alone create a promise to construct roads 4: holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized.\u201d See 28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 994(h) (West Supp.1992). The career offender scheme of using a defendant\u2019s criminal record in considering both his offense level and his criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose \u2014 \u201cto prevent repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.\u201d John, 936 F.2d at 766-67 n. 2. Consequently, Johns\u2019 due process claim lacks merit. Id.; see also United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.1989) (rejecting both procedural and substantive due process attacks on sentencing guidelines); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Defendant\u2019s equal protection claim is equally Holdings: 0: holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the armed career criminal act 1: holding that the armed career criminal designation based on prior convictions does not violate the sixth amendment under booker 2: holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 3: holding sentencing enhancement scheme in armed career criminal amendment to 18 usca  1202a constitutional 4: holding that application of armed career criminal enhancement falls within exception for prior convictions where facts were undisputed making it unnecessary to engage in further fact finding about a prior conviction", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "bring an individual action under \u00a7 1132(a)(3). See 516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996). Although Varity interpreted \u00a7 1132(a)(3) to authorize individual suits, its holding is not as broad as Wilson contends. The Supreme Court ruled that an individual can sue under \u00a7 1132(a)(3), but he or she must: (1) only seek equitable relief, and (2) have no more specific means of relief available. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 508-15, 116 S.Ct. 1065; Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1997). Wilson\u2019s claim seeks damages in the amount of the rehabilitation expenses, not injunctive relief. Furthermore, the remedy for a claim that a plan participant\u2019s benefits were improperly denied is specifically provided for in \u00a7 1132(a)(1)(B). See Turner, 127 F.3d at 200 (<HOLDING>). Thus, even if Wilson amended Count V, he Holdings: 0: holding that an individual who brings a lawsuit pursuant to  1132a1b to challenge a denial of disability benefits does not also have a right to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under  1132a3 1: holding that  1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under  1132a3 is thus not appropriate 2: holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under  1132a1b 3: holding plaintiff had no claim under  1132a3 because his grievance that benefits were denied is specifically addressed in  1132a1b 4: holding that no ada violation was shown because the disabled were not denied benefits that were otherwise available", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a five-year-old paternity order had not been properly challenged). 2 . We note that the 21-year-old child whom the court ordered to submit to a DNA test \\vas not a party below, nor apparently given notice of the proceedings. With paternity not in controversy, the adult child possesses his own legal rights related to the ordered testing, including notice. See \u00a7 760.40(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (\"DNA analysis may be performed only with the informed consent of the person to be tested, and the results of such DNA analysis, whether held by a public or private entity, are the exclusive property of the person tested, are confidential, and may not be disclosed without the consent of the person tested.\u201d). Cf. Chavez v. J & L Drywall & Travelers Ins. Co., 858 So.2d 1266, 1268-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) Holdings: 0: holding that the substitution of a party acts as a modification discharging the replaced party and substituting the new party with the same rights and liabilities 1: holding that the court should look to the actions of the relevant party and determine whether that party fails to insist on its contractual rights or acts inconsistently with such rights 2: holding that a district court has the power to raise the aedpa limitations period sua sponte because the defense implicates values beyond the interests of the parties 3: recognizing a difference between a partners economic rights and voting rights with the former typically being freely assignable to a third party 4: recognizing that a compelled medical examination implicates the rights of the party being examined", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "557 A.2d 1012. William Cook, another corrections officer, was also injured when an inmate, whose arm Cook was holding, suddenly jumped and dragged him down a flight of stairs. Id. at 218, 557 A.2d 1012. We distinguished those eases from Maynard and Ciecwisz; held that each officer sustained his injuries as the result of a great rush of force or uncontrollable power; and recognized the \u201cactions of an unruly inmate\u201d as the necessary qualifying external force distinct from an employee\u2019s \u201cown conduct.\u201d Id. at 222, 557 A.2d 1012. Confusion over the Kane standard continued, however, and, despite their best efforts, courts remained unable to deploy it to reach consistent results. Compare Fawcett v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees\u2019 Ret. Sys., 307 N.J.Super. 378, 704 A.2d 1041 (App.Div. 1998) (<HOLDING>), with Pino v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding the conflict preemption principle announced in pilot life and clarified in rush prudential remains in force 1: holding that police officer plaintiff who was injured approaching a vehicle he had stopped from the rear which lurched backward was an occupier of a motor vehicle under either a geographic perimeter or vehielerelatedtask test 2: holding force to be an element of pre1994 amendment  111 which may be satisfied by proof of force or threat of force 3: holding whiplash from malfunction of seat which lurched backward and forward was great rush of force 4: holding invasion of broom bristles in sensitive organ like eye can be great rush of force", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "him to resign. As such, Olmsted argues that his resignation is revocable. Under Minnesota law, it is \u201cundisputed that duress is coercion by means of physical force or unlawful threats which destroys the victim\u2019s free will and compels him to comply with some demand of the party exerting the coercion.\u201d Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950). \u201cAs a rule, duress will not prevail to invalidate a contract entered into with full knowledge of all the facts, with ample time and opportunity for investigation, consideration, consultation and reflection.\u201d Am. Nat\u2019l. Bank of Lake Crystal v. Helling, 161 Minn. 504, 202 N.W. 20, 23 (1925) (quotation and citations omitted); see also St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co., 411 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Minnesota does not recognize \u201ceconomic Holdings: 0: holding that a claim of duress will not be sustained when the claimant entered into the contract with full knowledge of all the facts advice from an attorney and ample time for reflection citing helling 202 nw at 23 1: holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal 2: holding that duress or coercion would invalidate a contract if the coercion comes from the opposing party not the claimants attorney 3: holding that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from an action arising from the states breach of that contract 4: holding that retention of an attorney to investigate an insurance claim and make a coverage determination under a policy is a classic example of a client seeking legal advice from an attorney", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that overall lessen the State\u2019s burden of proof violate due process. B. Medina contends that the instruction improperly diminished the State\u2019s burden of proof. When explaining reasonable doubt to the jury, the trial court stated: \u201cwhen we talk about a reasonable doubt we mean doubt from which a reason can be given, a doubt which arises from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or perhaps the lack of evidence, it means a doubt as would cause a man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when called upon to act in the most important aspects of life.\u201d This portion of the charge was incorrect. It erroneously implies that the jury must find an articulable reason to support its doubts about the State\u2019s case. See State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 115, 98 A.2d 299 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Jurors may harbor a valid reasonable doubt Holdings: 0: holding that a court must allow the defendant to ask in voir dire whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty and suggesting that such a juror should be disqualified for cause 1: holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated 2: holding that the statement contained in a juror pamphlet that a reasonable doubt is one for which should he be called upon a juror can give a reason was obviously erroneous under our law 3: holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence 4: holding phone call to defendant from purported juror saying we were pressured into making our decision inadequate to permit juror interview", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the facts and the law. See Ex parte Kunkle, 852 S.W.2d 499, 506 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Unlike Burger and Ex parte Kunkle, in this case, based on Durant\u2019s own testimony that he made no investigation into potential witnesses, no such investigation of the facts or evaluation of available testimony was made. While we have found no Texas case that has found an attorney to be ineffective for failing to investigate or call witnesses at the punishment phase, other courts have not been reluctant to do so. See, e.g., Austin v. Warden, 126 F.3d 843, 848 (6 th Cir.1997) (the failure to present mitigation evidence when several relatives, friends, death penalty experts, and a minister were available to testify was an abdication of advocacy); Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6 th Holdings: 0: holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a particular mitigating factor where despite a reasonable investigation by counsel counsel was not put on notice of any such mitigating evidence 1: holding defense counsel was ineffective at sentencing when he failed to make a significant effort based on reasonable investigation and logical argument to ably present the defendants fate to the jury and to focus the attention of the jury on any mitigating factors 2: holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence 3: holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing because the trial record clearly indicated that the sentencing judge was aware of many of the mitigators that counsel was presenting to this court on appeal 4: holding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an effort to collect on the mortgage loans notwithstanding plaintiffs\u2019 representation by counsel. Countrywide seeks summary judgment as to plaintiff William Croye\u2019s claims in Count IV. Inasmuch as Mr. Croye did not execute the loans at issue, Countrywide contends that he does not meet the definition of a \u201cconsumer\u201d under \u00a7 46A-2-122(a) of the WVCCPA wherein the term is defined as \u201cany natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt,\u201d and, thus, has no standing to bring a claim of illegal debt collection under \u00a7 46A-2-128. While it is unlikely that Mr. Croye was ever legally obligated to pay the mortgage loans, plaintiffs have established a question of fact as to whether Mr. Croye was allegedly obligated to pay. See Arnold, v. Palmer, 224 W.Va. 495, 686 S.E.2d 725 (2009) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Croye claims that Countrywide telephoned Holdings: 0: holding that fraudulent collection on promissory note was reasonably related to breach of contract claim 1: holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes 2: holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given 3: holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan 4: holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on his restitution payments. Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a witness t\u00f3 be questioned about any felony conviction or any conviction of a crime involving \u201cdishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.\u201d The district court in this case limited cross-examination on Stout\u2019s deferred adjudication because deferred adjudication is not a \u201cconviction\u201d under Texas law. Although \u201cconviction\u201d status for the purpose of Rule 609 is properly determined by federal law rather than state law, we hold that the district court\u2019s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The few Fifth Circuit cases touching on this issue have indicated that when adjudication of guilt is deferred, there is no \u201cconviction.\u201d See United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dotson, 555 F.2d 134, 135 Holdings: 0: holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida 1: holding it was proper for the state to crossexamine testifying defendant about prior convictions for purpose of impeaching his credibility 2: holding that rule 609 was violated when prosecutor attempted to crossexamine defendant about his deferred adjudication for felony check fraud 3: holding that defendant truthfully stated on firearm purchase form that he had no felony convictions given the fact that adjudication of guilt was deferred and sentence suspended on his prior offense of felony receipt of a stolen car 4: holding that attempted felony murder was abolished", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The trial court denied the request to require the Department to pay travel costs that \u201care made to foster the attorney/client relationship.\u201d Although not requested by the Attorney Ad Litem, the court ordered the Department to \u201cfund any visits [by the pro bono Attorney Ad Litem] that are therapeutically recommended by the therapeutic staff of the Alexander Youth Network.\u201d The Department appealed. ANALYSIS The issue presented is whether the trial court\u2019s order violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring the Department, an executive agency, to pay for the travel of the pro bono Attorney Ad Litem for the purpose of facilitating the minor child\u2019s therapy. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. Dep\u2019t of Children & Families v. Y.C., 82 So.3d 1139, 1141 n. 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>); Dep\u2019t of Corrs. v. Harrison, 896 So.2d 868, Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review 1: holding in a similar case that certiorari was the proper vehicle for review 2: holding that discovery of financial information was not in and of itself the type of irreparable harm necessary for certiorari review 3: holding that certiorari petition is appropriate to review nonfinal pretrial evidentiary order in criminal case 4: holding that previous legal ruling granting certiorari was law of the case in subsequent proceedings", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977). Defendant\u2019s knowledge of specific documents is certainly conceivable because she had access to transcripts from Robert Kelly\u2019s trial that may have disclosed the existence of specific documents relevant to her own defense. We agree with defendant, however, that she was denied her right to due process under the Federal Constitution when the trial court ' failed to conduct a review of the privileged materials brought forth for in camera Ritchie review pursuant to Judge Tillery\u2019s pretrial order applicable to all defendants. We take judicial notice of materials referred to in Kelly for purposes of the present appeal. See Barker v. Agee, 93 N.C. App. 537, 378 S.E.2d 566 (1989), aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part, 326 N.C. 470, 389 S.E.2d 803 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in the event of a retrial, the Holdings: 0: holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings 1: recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket 2: recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice 3: holding that appellate court may judicially notice its own records 4: holding that a trial court may take judicial cognizance of records on file in its own court punctuation omitted", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as far as I can surmise, is to bar successive petitions when lower courts, but not the Supreme Court, have held a rule not to be \u201cnew\u201d under Teague because dictated by their own precedent, cf. Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F. 3d 970, 993-995 (CA9) (en banc) (O\u2019Scannlain, J., dissenting) (rejecting proposition that lower court decisions can establish rule for Teague purposes), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1033 (1998); Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F. 3d 944, 955, n. 11 (CA8 1997) (assuming, without deciding, that only Supreme Court precedent may dictate rule so that it is not new for Teague purposes), cert, denied, 523 U. S. 1088 (1998), or when lower courts have themselves adopted new rules and then determined that the Teague retroactivity factors apply, see Smith v. Groose, 205 F. 3d 1045, 1054 (CA8) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied sub nom. Gammon v. Smith, 531 U. Holdings: 0: holding prosecutions suppression of favorable material evidence violates due process 1: holding that use of inherently factually contradictory theories violates the principles of due process 2: holding that circuit rule that prosecutions use of contradictory theories violates due process would fall within teagues watershed exception 3: holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process 4: holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Amendment. Berge alleged that Shatto, Milburn, and Lamack \u201cwere all [adequately] involved in this case as well.\u201d Berge was detained three months until charges were dropped. The district court held that Berge failed to state a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, and dismissed his complaint. The district court did not rule on Berge\u2019s pending motion for appointment of counsel. A complaint must include only \u201ca short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u201d See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Here, Berge\u2019s complaint can fairly be read as alleging that VanLangen knew the information provided in the affidavit was false and thus a violation of Berge\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights. See Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Moody v. St. Charles County, 23 F.3d 1410, Holdings: 0: holding that the fourth amendment protects people not places 1: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 2: holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause 3: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 4: recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and Powell negotiated any aspect of the sales contract or the waiver provision. Both the sales contract and the addendum were pre-printed forms labeled as Bank of America documents. Accordingly, factors four and five, the parties\u2019 negotiations concerning the entire agreement and concerning the waiver provision, weigh against a finding that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily made the waiver. An absence of evidence of negotiation does not meet Bank of America\u2019s burden to produce pri-ma facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. And the waiver provision here was not conspicuous. It was set forth exactly as the other paragraphs in the addendum; it was not in larger or bolder font than the remainder of the addendum. Cf. In re Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); see also Tex. Bus. & Holdings: 0: holding contractual jury waiver provision that was in all capital letters and was bolded was conspicuous 1: recognizing that contractual jury waiver provision that was conspicuous  because it was in bolded font and in all capital letters  met burden of party seeking to enforce provision to make prima facie showing that waiver was knowing and voluntary 2: holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal 3: holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption 4: holding the jury waiver invalid where waiver was inconspicuous appeared to be nonnegotiable and there was unequal bargaining power", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the debtors to several different federal government agencies against the debtors\u2019 rights to IRS excise tax refunds); In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1294, 1296, 1298 (10th Cir.1996) (permitting setoff of a debt owed by the debtors to the SBA against the debtors' right to payments owed to them by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service). 5 . See Alexander v. Commission, Internal Rev. Serv. (In re Alexander), 225 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (listing cases and siding with the majority position); but see In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752-54 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2001) (listing cases on both sides of the issue). 6 . See In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn.2001). 7 . Id. (citations omitted). 8 . 262 B.R. at 756; see also In re Shortt, 277 B.R. 683, 692 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Pigott, 330 B.R. 797 Holdings: 0: holding that an anticipated tax refund was property of the bankruptcy estate as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed 1: holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted 2: holding that the trial court lacked authority to order a refund where the defendants case did not meet the specific statutory requirements authorizing a refund 3: holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim 4: holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Sunday in the visiting room or in the dining hall in the event the visiting room was not available. 8 . The record reflects that the film shown inmates at Christmas was the classic \"It's a Wonderful Life,\u201d which Blagman contends is burdened with Christian overtones. The record shows the film was followed by a group discussion, not on religion, but on such topics as personal accountability, responsibility, obligations to others and moral obligations gener e Muslim year, \"during which all Moslems must fast during the daylight hours. Indulgence of any sort is forbidden during the fast. There are only a few who are exempt, e.g., soldiers and the sick.\u201d See Th .1997) (inmate's First Amendment rights not violated by Christmas party). Cf. Bridenbaugh v. O\u2019Bannon, 185 F.3d 796 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 780 (9th Holdings: 0: holding no violation of federal establishment clause 1: holding that tax exemption for church property does not violate establishment clause 2: holding that the endorsing requirement does not violate the establishment clause 3: holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause 4: holding that recognition of good friday as a legal holiday did not violate establishment clause", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Burns for the tel-sell position. 3 . In support of its position, KCC relies on the Fourth Circuit\u2019s decision in Williams that a twenty-five pound lifting restriction could not, as a matter of law, substantially limit the major life activity of working. Williams, 101 F.3d at 349. However, the Fourth Circuit\u2019s decision on this issue conflicts with the ADA\u2019s directives that the determination whe .3d at 349; Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 724-27 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that \u201d[o]ther major life activities could include lifting, reaching, sitting, or standing\u201d). The Supreme Court has, however, questioned in dicta whether \"working\u201d should be considered a major life activity under the ADA. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (<HOLDING>). In Sutton, the Court entertained on the Holdings: 0: holding that disability determinations must be made with reference to corrective measures 1: holding that an employers awareness of an employees impairment without more is insufficient to demonstrate that the employer regarded the employee as disabled 2: holding that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that miti gate the individuals impairment including in this instance eyeglasses and contact lenses 3: holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act 4: holding that monocular vision is not invariably a disability but should be analyzed on an individual basis taking into account the individuals ability to compensate for the impairment", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Silverman, No. Civ.00-2274 JRT, 2004 WL 2066778, *4 (D.Minn. Aug. 26, 2004) (finding any award of fees was \u201cclearly inappropriate,\u201d because the respondent was \u201cunable to absorb the necessarily minimal expenses for her family in addition to any fee award, [so that] an award of fees would impair significantly her ability to care for her children\u201d); but see Neves v. Neves, 637 F.Supp.2d 322, 345 (W.D.N.C.2009) (concluding that an award of fees and costs was not \u201cclearly inappropriate,\u201d even though the respondent was then unemployed and had no assets in the United States, where he owned a two-story building in Germany that he estimated would rent for about $2,000 per month). After careful consideration of equitable principles and pertinent factors in this case, see Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375 (<HOLDING>), I conclude that it is \u201cclearly inappropriate\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set 1: holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency 2: holding proper basis for award of fees 3: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 4: recognizing that an award of fees and expenses under the convention and icara involves equitable principles", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of devices with whom one communicates. Nor does it raise novel issues distinct from those long since resolved in the context of telephone communication, with which society has lived for the nearly forty years since Smith was decided. Like telephone companies, Internet service providers require that identifying information be disclosed in order to make communication among electronic devices possible. In light of the Smith rule, no reasonable person could maintain a privacy interest in that sort of information. We therefore join the other circuits that have considered this narrow question and hold that collecting IP address information devoid of content is \u201cconstitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register.\u201d Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510; see, e.g., Wheelock, 772 F.3d at 828 (<HOLDING>); Christie, 624 F.3d at 573 (holding that there Holdings: 0: holding that state officials cannot have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional law internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their bulletin board subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person 2: holding that the defendant cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the governments acquisition of his subscriber information including his ip address and name because it had been revealed to a third party internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that information from reliable entity confirming that defendant was the internet subscriber associated with the ip addresses at issue and used screen name involved in crime supported probable cause for warrant 4: holding bank clients had no legitimate expectation of privacy in banking information revealed to a third party", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "failure to inform the plaintiff of the tumor on February 23, 2002, resulted in any actual injury to the plaintiff before February 24, 2002, the first day of the four-year period in question. Rather, this Court concluded that, although the complained-of negligent act occurred beyond the four-year period of repose in 6-5-482(a), the plaintiff may have been able to prove a set of facts indicating that the actual legal injury occurred within the four-year period of repose. In this case, the trial court explained in its order dismissing Cutler\u2019s medical-malpractice action that the primary difference between Crosslin and the instant case is that Crosslin alleged in his complaint only that his injury occurred at a point after February 24, 2002, and, thus, \u201cCrosslin may [have been] able (<HOLDING>). The key fact in this case is the time at Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality 1: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 2: holding that a plaintiffs  1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure 3: holding that plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date the ophthalmologist performed the initial surgery and left the gauze at the surgical site 4: holding that under the rule against splitting a cause of action a new claim for damages is not barred if the underlying cause of action had not accrued at the time of filing the previous lawsuit", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 111 S.Ct. 2038, 114 L.Ed.2d 122 (1991). The Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if each element of the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The fact that the evidence was circumstantial does not render it insufficient. Spalla v. Foltz, 788 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 410, 93 L.Ed.2d 362 (1986). Furthermore, \u201c[i]t is the province of the factfinder ... to weigh the probative value of the evidence and resolve any conflicts in the testimony.\u201d Neal v. Morris, 972 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir.1992); see also Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The elements of second-degree murder are (1) Holdings: 0: recognizing great deference due district courts credibility findings because it alone can observe variations in demean or and voice bearing on witness veracity 1: holding the resolution of questions regarding credibility and the weight given to testimony is a function of the family court judge who heard the testimony 2: holding that the jurys resolution of questions of credibility and demean or  is entitled to special deference  3: holding that the credibility determinations of hearing officers are afforded special deference 4: recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in question was equipped with two emergency stop buttons, located at the top and bottom of the escalator, respectively. When either button is pushed, if the escalator is functioning as intended, the escalator will stop. The buttons are safety devices designed to stop the escalator quickly should a hand, foot, or article of clothing become caught; thus, ready accessibility to the buttons is only sensible. We cannot say that the escalator would not stop in the absence of Appellees\u2019 negligence because the escalator would also stop whenever any person pushed one of the emergency stop buttons. The record is silent as to whether anyone did, in fact, push one of the stop buttons, but this is of little concern. The facts need not show that a stop button definitely was pushe 81-82 (1967)(<HOLDING>). In the present case, we must necessarily Holdings: 0: holding authority to control limits duty to control 1: holding defendants control not exclusive where customers had access to soda bottles for approximately two months before one bottle inexplicably shattered 2: holding defendants control not exclusive where thousands of customers had access to revolving stools every week 3: holding defendants control not exclusive where customers had access to selfservice washing machines 4: holding that the remedies are exclusive", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "outbreak of gout, a chronic condition from which he suffered, and that this was the cause both of the pain he was experiencing and his difficulty in putting weight on the leg. At most, prior to the day of his release, a reasonable jury could only find that defendants did not contact medical professionals to examine plaintiffs gout outbreak \u2014 a condition with which plaintiff, as a chronic gout sufferer, would probably have been more familiar than the jailers. The court has scoured the federal reporters and has found not a single case in which a gout outbreak, alone, was held to constitute a serious medical condition requiring jailers to afford a detainee immediate medical attention. Cf. Moore v. Bennette, 97 Fed.Appx. 405, 407 (4th Cir.2004), as modified by 517 F.3d 717 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis supplied); Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff had sufficiently stated such a claim of deliberate indifference to his medical needs with regard to his hepatitis c condition his pancreatic condition and the gout in his hand 1: recognizing a state doctor may violate a detainees right to substantive due process by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs 2: holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity 3: holding that deliberate indifference to prisoners medical needs is cruel and unusual punishment 4: holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to be vigilant in the protection of its own interests; that party must bring its action in a timely fashion or run the risk of forfeiting the opportunity to obtain redress. In sum, we are satisfied that the Commission\u2019s view of \u00a7 45-2516(e), and its application to rent ceilings, is consistent, well-established, and reasonable. Because petitioners did not file a timely challenge to the June 1986 rent ceiling adjustment, their present action is foreclosed. Affirmed. 1 . The Rental Housing Act confers primary jurisdiction over rent overcharge petitions upon the Rent Administrator, the designated head of the Rental Accommodations and Conversion Division (RACD). See D.C.Code \u00a7\u00a7 45-2513(a), - 2514(c), -2526(a) (1996); Drayton v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 462 A.2d 1115, 1120 (D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Petitioners asserted, \u201cthe record shows Holdings: 0: holding that where a superior court judge was named a defendant in an action for a writ of mandamus the prosecuting attorney is the proper court representative of the superior court judge 1: holding the fact remains however that such standard appears to be the law of this state as enunciated in the decisions of the court of appeals discussed previously unless those decisions are either explained away or overruled by the court of appeals itself this court must follow what a majority of its members discern to be the precept to be drawn from them ie proof of fraud in a civil action either in law or in equity must be clear and convincing only the court of appeals could disabuse of that notion 2: holding that superior court judge may not undertake to adjudicate the validity of a rent increase but rather must stay any pending action to await the rulings of the rent administrator and if appeals are taken of the commission and this court 3: holding superior court lacked authority to remand to commission 4: holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that claim 1 is broader than its dependent claims and does not contain the dependent limitations. See RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2003). Bosch relies on the preferred embodiment described in the specification for its proposed construction. Bosch, however, does not point to any specific language in the specification requiring that the \u201cpower conversion circuit\u201d contain the limitations of the preferred embodiment. Nor does Bosch point to any express disclaimer or disavowal of \u201cpower conversion circuits\u201d other than those taught in the preferred embodiment. The Court declines to incorporate limitations from the preferred embodiment into the plain claim language. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The prosecution history of the \u2019059 patent Holdings: 0: holding that the district court should have quashed an indictment without requiring the target to show prejudice because the district attorney improperly exercised control over the selection and excusal of grand jurors and the defendant brought this to the attention of the district court before trial 1: holding that the district court is limited to considering the administrative record in reviewing the denial of benefits under an erisa plan 2: recognizing that the power of disallowance of claims conferred on the bankruptcy courts embraces the rejection of claims in whole or in part according to the equities of the case and emphasizing that a bankruptcy court may therefore limit the amount of claims in view of equitable considerations 3: holding that when a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal the scope of appellate review is not limited to the precise question certified by the district court because the district courts order not the certified question is brought before the court 4: holding that the district court improperly limited the claims according to the preferred embodiment", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of Water and Soil Resources (BWSR). The district\u2019s licensing requirement was considered and approved by the BWSR, the state entity with oversight authority. Based on this record, the water shed district\u2019s decision to adopt a licensing requirement was a policy-based decision protected by statutory discretionary immunity under Minn.Stat. \u00a7 466.03, subd. 6. II. A municipality is also immune from liability arising from \u201c [a]ny * * * act or omission of an officer or employee, exercising due care, in the execution of a valid or invalid * * * rule.\u201d Minn.Stat. \u00a7 466.03, subd. 5 (1996). Landview argues that due care is a fact question that precludes summary judgment, relying on Boop v. City of Lino Lakes, 502 N.W.2d 409 (Minn.App.1993), review denied (Minn. Sept. 10, 1993). See id. at 411 (<HOLDING>). However, there is no conflicting evidence in Holdings: 0: holding that the reasonableness of a defendants efforts in discharging a duty of care is a question for the trier of fact when the record does not permit summary judgment 1: holding that estoppel was a question of fact 2: holding question of citys exercise of due care in enforcement of ordinance was question of fact and inappropriate for summary judgment 3: holding it is a question of fact 4: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to consider evidence of Clemons\u2019s IQ when sentencing him to death. Counsel stated that the Supreme Court of the United States' holdings in Tennard and Smith require the circuit court to investigate and find as mitigating any evidence indicating that a capital defendant has a low IQ. Clemons did not raise this claim in the circuit court. In his Rule 32 petition, he asserted only that the \"jury did not hear and was therefore unable to consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence of low intelligence and mental retardation.\" (C. 20.) Because Clemons\u2019s allegation that the circuit court was required to find and consider mitigating evidence relating to his IQ was not raised in his Rule 32 petition, that claim is not properly before this Court. See Ex parte Clemons, 55 So.3d at 351 (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Linnell, 484 So.2d 455, 457 Holdings: 0: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition 1: holding that because the petitioner had already filed a rule 371 petition he was barred from submitting a subsequent petition under that rule and his petition was subject to dismissal on that basis regardless of the label he placed on it 2: holding that where the petitioner alleges that he failed to receive notice of the dismissal of his rule 32 ala rcrim p petition in time to effect a timely appeal therefrom and the events about which the petitioner complains all occurred before june 1 2005 the effective date of the amendment to rule 32 providing a different remedy for obtaining an outoftime appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition a petition for a writ of mandamus is the only appropriate remedy 3: holding that a similar claim in a rule 32 petition was procedurally barred because it was raised at trial and because it was raised on direct appeal 4: recognizing that rule 32 is a postconviction remedy", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "motion to dismiss was decided \u2014 the estate tax legal landscape continued unchanged, but it was undergoing intense political scrutiny. However, when the reconsideration motion was decided in February 2011, the estate tax consequences for 2011 and 2012 were firmly (if newly) adjusted. Given the narrow window of Mr. Kellogg\u2019s life expectancy, it was not unduly speculative to recognize that but for defendants\u2019 alleged tortious conduct he might have survived to a point that his estate\u2019s tax liability was eliminated, resulting in a tangible economic advantage to his heirs. The amendatory provisions control the disposition of this case. Stancil v. ACE USA, 418 N.J.Super. 79, 82, 12 A.3d 223 (App.Div.) (citing Pizzo Mantin Grp. v. Twp. of Randolph, 137 N.J. 216, 235, 645 A.2d 89 (1994) (<HOLDING>)), certif. granted, 207 N.J. 66, 23 A.3d 338 Holdings: 0: holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing 1: holding that under the timeofdeeision rale courts ordinarily apply the statute in effect at the time of the decision in order to effectuate current policy 2: holding that a defendants sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time he committed the offense 3: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 4: holding that the court of appeals in applying state law on appeal of a diversity action must apply law of the state as it existed at the time of its decision rather than as it stood at the time the case was decided in district court", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of evidence\u2019 is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.\u201d); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) (\"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....\u201d). 8 .U.S. Bank Nat\u2019l Assoc. v. U.S. Rent a Car, Inc., 2011 WL 3648225 at *3 (D.Minn. Aug. 17, 2011) (not reported) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 9 . Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). 10 . Nessan v. Lovald 932) (<HOLDING>); Feucht v. Pierce, 2006 WL 3354507 at *4 Holdings: 0: holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand 1: holding that the appellant had failed to overcome the rule regarding abandonment for this reason 2: holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period 3: holding that removal for temporary employment with intent to return was not abandonment 4: holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a year from sentencing, by January 31, 2005, will require him to save from his monthly income, draw as much as he can from available sources, perhaps gather funds which he earlier transferred to his companion, son or daughter, or perhaps liquidate assets. Jaffe argues that he will certainly have to sell his Florida condominium, even though Florida\u2019s homestead exemption prevents creditors from distraining residential properties, however lavish. Fla. Const. Art. X, \u00a7 4(a). But that is not my order. While he may determine that he will satisfy his restitution obligations by selling his homestead, I do not require that, and instead I leave him free to choose his manner of making restitution. See United States v. Kalani, 2003 WL 21222546, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8762 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Jaffe argues that he will have no choice but Holdings: 0: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 1: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not 2: holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement 3: holding that a lumpsum restitution order is valid where it does not specify the source of the restitution or direct liquidation of specific assets and the defendant may have other sources of payment 4: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "premised on the requirement that some voters pay a poll tax. Id. The Court emphasized that the issue was not whether Virginia could require all voters to file a certificate of residency each year, but that voters were required to file such certificate only if they refused to pay a poll tax. Id. at 542, 85 S.Ct. 1177. Thus, their right to vote was \u201cabridged ... by reason of failure to pay the poll tax.\u201d Id. Here, voters do not have to choose between paying a poll tax and providing proof of citizenship when they register to vote. They have only to provide the proof of citizenship. Nor does Arizona\u2019s new law \u201cmake[ ] the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.\u201d Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have demonstrated little Holdings: 0: holding that state may not compel political party to allow nonmembers to vote in its primary elections 1: holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax 2: holding that ujnder the plain meaning of the voting rights act the state of south dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the attorney general or bring a declaratory judgment action for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties 3: holding that state may not compel political parties to allow nonmembers to vote in primary elections 4: holding that the twentyfourth amendment abolished the poll tax as a requirement for voting in federal elections", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "line of cases for an expert \"to express an opinion as to whether a child was truthful when making statements to the expert about sex abuse,\" Ramsey, 782 P.2d at 485, defense counsel was objectively deficient in eliciting testimony from Johnson indicating that he believed Daughter's allegations against Marble were truthful. At the core of Marble's argument is the notion that the presumption of adequate assistance is rebutted by a mere showing that defense counsel's acts or omissions amounted to plain error. We disagree. An inquiry into whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective is a separate and distinet inquiry from plain error review, especially where the defendant has conceded that trial counsel invited the alleged errors. See State v. Dumn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1998) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah Holdings: 0: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 1: holding where defendant challenged jury instruction and also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his counsels failure to object to instruction because we find no error in the instructions defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must also be rejected 2: holding that counsels assistance was not ineffective even though counsel used the wrong version of the federal sentencing guidelines because counsels performance was based upon a reasonable decision to offer a guilty plea in exchange for a lighter sentence 3: holding that where counsels decision in leading the court into error falls below the standard of reasonable professional practice we may find that counsel was ineffective 4: recognizing in ineffective assistance of counsel claims a presumption that counsels conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "DOH Defendants \u201cdeprived [her] of her First Amendment right to associate with persons of her own choosing\u201d by \u201cillegally transferring\u201d her to the Homestead House. Complaint \u00b6 144, at 36. A.M. characterizes this transfer as a violation of her First Amendment right to expressive association. See Response at 4. The Individual DOH Defendants argue that A.M.\u2019s expressive-association claim must fail, because A.M. did not properly allege \u201cthat she has been deprived of her right to association based on the pursuit of speech or advocacy of political, social, economic, religious, or cultural values.\u201d Reply at 3-4. The First Amendment protects political expression manifested through conduct as well as through speech. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted)(internal quotation marks Holdings: 0: holding that a law did not violate the first amendment because it did not burden the exchange of ideas and noting most laws restricting a states initiative process would not implicate the first amendment 1: holding that the burning of an american flag is conduct sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to implicate the first amendment 2: holding that withdrawal of aclus paralegals contact visits with inmates even if retaliatory was not sufficiently adverse to the aclu to implicate first amendment right to petition 3: holding that burning the american flag was protected expressive conduct and stating we have not permitted the government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot but have instead required careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression  emphasis added 4: holding that ban on unauthorized practice of law did not implicate the first amendment", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "oil transactions do not negate good faith. Regardless of any alleged ulterior motive to the transactions, the Downstream Purchasers were legally bound to pay for the oil purchased from the Debtors on the 20th of the following month pursuant to their respective agreements. Had the oil derivatives market stabilized, the Downstream Purchasers might not have been able to offset or net liabilities against receivables owed to the Debtors because the Debtors would not have defaulted. Instead, the Downstream Purchasers would have been legally obligated to provide payment in full for the oil purchased, and there is nothing in the record to suggest they would not have done so. Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that these transactions were a sham. See CIT Group, 2012 WL 4603049, at *8 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no Holdings: 0: holding that unequivocal examples of racial animus included instances when plaintiff was instructed to keep his black ass off the phone and was called a black son of a bitch and a black motherfucker 1: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 2: holding that articulable facts sufficient to support a stop included a telephone call that two black males were selling drugs at a particular location discovery of the juvenile at that location with another black male and the juveniles nervous body reflexes 3: holding that commodities was a good faith purchaser and stating that commodities arrangement was not a sham black diamond delivered coal to commodities and commodities faithfully paid nearly fiftymillion dollars for its purchases until black diamonds bankruptcy 4: holding that the white defendants association with a black defendant was not sufficient to give them standing to join in the black defendants batson challenge", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "931 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.1991); Stanley v. United States, 140 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed.Cir.1998) (dicta); Bilzerian v. United States, 86 F.3d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (dicta); Clark v. United States, 63 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.1995) (dicta); O'Bryant v. United States, 49 F.3d 340, 345-47 & n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) (dicta). Because only tax liabilities may be assessed as a deficiency, Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375, 1379, 1381-83 (Fed.Cir.2005); United States v. Frontone, 383 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir.2004), Beer necessarily held that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability. See also Brookhurst, 931 F.2d at 557-58 (recognizing that an erroneous rebate refund makes a previously paid tax liability \u201cunpaid\u201d); Frontone, 383 F.3d at 657, 659-61 (<HOLDING>); cf. IRC \u00a7 6211 (counting (presumably Holdings: 0: holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full 1: holding refund of discriminatory tax required because predeprivation remedy not clearly available for tax years at issue 2: holding that after the then twoyear limitation period for the filing of a refund application had passed the state was entitled to assume that its tax revenues need not be refunded under any circumstance 3: holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted 4: holding that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability because the ultimate source of the irss claim to the amount erroneously refunded is a tax owed", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "[I]t has long been settled that when a trustee in breach of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has purchased the property for value and without notice of the fiduciary\u2019s breach of duty. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250, 120 S.Ct. 2180, 147 L.Ed.2d 187 (2000) (applying common-law principles in the interpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Cardwell v. Cheatham, 39 Tenn. (2 Head.) 14 (1858) (stating that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a breach of trust takes free of the trust) (citations omitted); Covington v. Anderson, 84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 310 (1886) (<HOLDING>). On the facts presented, which indicate that Holdings: 0: holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust 1: holding that a constructive trust had arisen on a third partys house due to her use of trust assets which had been diverted by the paca trustee to pay the mortgage and finding that the trust beneficiary plaintiffs are entitled to a lien on the property in the amount of the diverted funds 2: holding that a trustee properly withheld trust payments owed to a prior trustee who had misappropriated trust funds 3: holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust 4: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 . 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 483a (1976). 2 . 30 U.S.C. \u00a7 185 (1976). 3 . 43 C.F.R. \u00a7 2802.1-2 (1976). 4 . Alaskan Arctic Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 723 (1986). 5 . Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 240, 624 F.2d 1005 (1980) (Alyeska I). 6 . 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 483a (1976). 7 . 30 U.S.C. \u00a7 185(l) (1976). 8 . 43 C.F.R. \u00a7 2802.1-2 (1974). 9 . 43 C.F.R. \u00a7 2802.1-2 (1976). 10 . See Brant v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 65, 597 F.2d 716, 718 (1979); Carrier Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 678, 534 F.2d 244, 249 (1976). 11 . See Reid v. Department of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 281-82 (Fed.Cir.1986) (citing examples of literal statutory interpretation that lead to incongruous results); Barber v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 287, 676 F.2d 651, 655 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See South Corp. v. United States, 690 Holdings: 0: recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear 1: recognizing that a court may turn to legislative history when literal statutory language is unclear 2: recognizing that courts can look beyond an unambiguous statute and consult legislative history to divine its meaning if the literal application of the statutory language produces an outcome that is demonstrably at odds with clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary or if the literal application of the statutory language results in an outcome that can truly be characterized as absurd ie that is so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense  3: recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result 4: holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(factor one: Individualized on the basis of assessment and performance); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (IDEA requires schools to provide \u201ceducational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child.\u2019\u2019); 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 300.114(a)(2) (factor two: Least Restrictive Environment); DeVries v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cMainstreaming of handicapped children into regular school programs ... is not only a laudable goal but is also a requirement of the Act.\u201d); 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 300.321-322 (factor three: collaborative, mandating the IEP team include the parents and representatives from the school); Sch. Comm, of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep\u2019t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 368, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985) (<HOLDING>); 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 300.324(b)(1)(h) (factor four: Holdings: 0: holding that the childs proximity to the initial reported disturbance the childs dress in gangattire and the childs gangwhistle and the fact that another juvenile in the area had been found carrying a concealed weapon did not provide the necessary individualized suspicion to justify the search of the child in the school parking lot 1: holding that the idea repeatedly emphasizes the participation of the parents in developing the childs educational program and assessing its effectiveness 2: holding that the emotional benefits to the parents resulting from the childs birth could be applied to offset any damage award 3: holding the foster parents responsible for support where the childs natural parents are unknown and noting that an earlier new york case held that an agreement to adopt did not terminate the natural parents duty of support but that in that earlier case the natural parent was alive and capable of providing for the child 4: holding that a childs interest supercedes that of its natural parents", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute because neither Fall Grain nor Agriservices was a member of the NGFA at the time the contracts were entered. This argument fares no better than the argument made in Argiris. There is nothing in the language of the NGFA\u2019s arbitration rules to suggest that one party must be a member of the organization at the time of contract formation. The language simply provides that the NGFA \u201cmay properly consider a case involving a dispute between ... [ajctive members of the National and nonmembers, by consent of both parties.\u201d In the absence of explicit language to the contrary, NGFA\u2019s jurisdiction could reasonably be established at the point when The Andersons commenced arbitration. See Asadourian v. Kuni German Motors, LLC, 2007 WL 4388490, at *4 (D.Or.2007) (<HOLDING>). There is no factual dispute that The Holdings: 0: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary 1: holding that a parent company was not liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by its subsidiary because the parent company was not a stranger to the business relationship between its subsidiary and the plaintiff giving rise to and underpinning the contract 2: holding that american subsidiary of a japanese parent had no treaty defense because the subsidiary was not a company of japan 3: holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary 4: holding that in employment dispute where corporate subsidiary no longer existed at the time arbitration complaint was filed the plaintiff was bound to arbitrate with the parent company that survived", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "24.035 motion, however, the alleged Brady violation must be such that it supports a conclusion that the movant would not have pled guilty had he been provided with the undisclosed evidence. 1. Nondisclosure of mere impeachment evidence is insufficient to invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea. Although \u201c[t]he principles of Brady are applicable to the entry of a plea of guilty,\u201d Scroggins, 859 S.W.2d at 707, they are applicable only to the extent that the nondisclosed evidence is both exculpatory and material; a post-guilty-plea claim involving the nondisclosure of mere impeachment evidence (even if it might have been material in the context of a trial) is insufficient to invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea. U.S. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628-33, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, the prior conviction evidence Wallar Holdings: 0: holding that a criminal defendant can waive important constitutional rights by entering into a plea bargain 1: holding that defendant had ample opportunity to crossexamine government witness including the terms of a plea agreement and that further impeachment was speculative and minimal at best 2: holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant 3: holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness 4: holding that the constitution does not require the government to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "He did not provide all of the documents responsive to the request until August 27, 1993, more than seven months after the demand was made. Moskowitz therefore violated his duty of disclosure under ERISA and his conduct gives rise to liability under \u00a7 1132(c)(1). Because the award of penalties is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, I must determine whether Moskow-itz\u2019s conduct warrants imposition of such a penalty. In determining whether to assess a penalty under \u00a7 1132(c)(1) courts have considered such factors as bad faith or intentional conduct on the part of the administrator, the length of the delay, the number of requests made and documents withheld, and the existence of any prejudice to the participant or beneficiary. See Ziaee v. Vest, 916 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied 499 U.S. 959, 111 S.Ct. 1581, Holdings: 0: holding that in exercise of its discretion district court may consider factors such as number of requests made and number of documents withheld 1: holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim 2: recognizing that district court in exercise of its rule 16b discretion may consider other relevant factors including in particular whether allowing the amendment of the pleading at this stage of the litigation will prejudice defendants 3: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 4: holding that a district court may depart upward based upon a significant number of fraudulent schemes conducted by the defendant", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "erred by failing to follow the dictates of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c). Specifically, Marckman argued that the court failed to (1) determine if his plea was voluntary, (2) fully state the charges to which Marckman was pleading, (3) inform Marckman of the maximum penalty for the crimes, and (4) discern whether Marckman understood the meaning of the habitual offender designation. The postconviction court summarily denied relief on this claim based on its finding that claims alleging trial court error are not cognizable under rule 3.850 because they could have been raised on direct appeal. On appeal, Marckman correctly argues that his challenges to the voluntary nature of his plea are cognizable under rule 3.850. See Mungen v. State, 932 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); Youngblood v. State, 930 So.2d 852, 852 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion 1: holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues 2: holding that claim that plea was involuntary because the court failed to comply with rule 3172c was cognizable in a rule 3850 motion 3: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 4: holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b)(1). However, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 72(b), \u201c[ajbsent objection by the plaintiffs, the district court had a right to assume that plaintiffs agreed to the magistrate\u2019s recommendation.\u201d Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 571, 88 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985). Moreover, \u201c[Failure to raise objections to the Report and Recommendation waives that party\u2019s right to review in the district court and those claims not preserved by such objection are precluded on appeal.\u201d Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992). See also Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-151 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25, 27 Holdings: 0: holding that failure to object timely to a magistrates report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrates decision 1: holding that objections are required to challenge magistrate judges findings as well as magistrates failure to make additional findings 2: holding an argument waived on appeal for failure to raise the issue in objection to the magistrates recommendation 3: holding that errors of law in a magistrates findings and recommendations pursuant to section 636b1b can be challenged on appeal even in the absence of the filing of objections in the district court 4: holding that objections are required when challenging findings actually set out in magistrates recommendation as well as magistrates failure to make additional findings", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "exists and, if so, (2) whether the specific dispute falls within the scope of that agreement. Dean Witter [Reynolds, Inc. v. McDonald], 758 So.2d [539,] 542 [ (Ala.1999) ]. \u201cProcedural arbitrability,\u201d on the other hand, involves questions that grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition, e,g., defenses such as notice, laches, estoppel, and other similar compliance defenses; such questions are for an arbitrator to decide. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002) (\u201c \u2018 \u201cprocedural\u201d questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide\u2019 \u201d); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964)(<HOLDING>).\u2019 \u201cBrasfield & Gorrie, L.L.C. v. Soho Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitrator should decide whether the steps of a grievance procedure were completed where those steps were prerequisites to arbitration 1: holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy 2: holding that upon vacating an arbitration award the court has the discretion to remand to the same arbitrator or different arbitrator 3: holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator 4: holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "decision. C. Whether the RFC accounts for all of Mr. Candelario\u2019s limitations. Mr. Candelario testified that, about one year prior to the June 2002 hearing, he began to need to lie down five or six times a day for up to one hour each time. See Aplt.App. at 374. When the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person had to lie down five or six times a day for up to one-half hour, a lesser limitation, the VE testified that none of the jobs he identified would be available. As the ALJ recognized, however, the asserted limitation began after the relevant time period. Even if it was relevant, the ALJ explained that the limitation was inconsistent with the record evidence. Accordingly, he properly disregarded the VE\u2019s testimony on this point. See Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Candelario also takes issue with the Holdings: 0: holding that an alj is entitled to rely on vocational experts testimony that is based on assumptions that are supported by evidence in the record 1: holding that testimo ny premised on limitations unsupported by the evidence is not binding on an alj 2: holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations 3: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties 4: recognizing that the findings of the circuit court on factual issues arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction are binding on the appellate court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "losses ... without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3663A(f)(l)(A). At this first stage, the district court lacks \u201cany discretion to contemplate the defendant\u2019s financial situation.\u201d United States v. Jones, 289 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002). Second, after the district court establishes the total amount of restitution owed, the district court considers the defendant\u2019s financial resources to create a schedule for restitution payments. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3663A(f)(2). At this second stage, the court should consider the defendant\u2019s finances. However, even then, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating his financial condition, and the court can rely on the probation report and need not make independent findings. See Jones, 289 F.3d at 1266 (<HOLDING>). In contrast to Edwards\u2019s contention, the MVRA Holdings: 0: holding that it was not wrong for the administrator to rely on the findings of an independent reviewing physician 1: holding that a district court can rely on the probation report and is not required to make independent findings regarding the defendants financial resources 2: holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation 3: holding that judge could rely on presentenee report to determine that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense but declining to base this holding the theory that probation is derivative of criminal history 4: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "selling airplanes. Id. at 448. Citing comment f to section 402A, the court held that Ozark Airlines was an intermediate owner engaged in the business of providing scheduled commercial air transportation. Id. As such, its sale of surplus aircraft was merely incidental to its business. Id. at 448-49. See also Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., et al., 680 F.Supp. 1343, 1347 (E.D.Mo.1988), aff'd 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir.1988) (section 402A liability does not extend to occasional seller). Other jurisdictions that have codified or adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have routinely found that the isolated sale of a product by an occasional seller is not subject to the rule of strict liability. See Lancaster v. W.A. Hartzell & Associates, Inc., 54 Or.App. 886, 637 P.2d 150 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. Nicole, Inc., 172 N.J.Super. 442, Holdings: 0: recognizing strict product liability actions 1: recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability 2: holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute 3: holding that strict liability did not apply to the isolated sale of a gallon of wood stain by a merchant that sells cabinets 4: holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "responded by commenting on his state of inebriation). That Goulet mentioned the connection between the drugs and the money and indicated that there was other evidence tying the defendant to the drugs did not turn his explanations of administrative and other routine matters into the functional equivalent of interrogation. See Spencer, 149 N.H. at 625-26 (showing defendant bank surveillance photographs in response to defendant\u2019s claims of innocence and repeated questions about the basis for her arrest was not the functional equivalent of interrogation). Similarly, Goulet\u2019s responses to the defendant\u2019s direct questions about what the police were going to do with him and about the bail process did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent. See Gribble, 165 N.H. at 12 (<HOLDING>); Briggs, 273 F.3d at 740-41 (holding police Holdings: 0: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 1: holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation 2: holding that an officer engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation when he asked a suspect to identify clothing found at a crime scene after the suspect was in custody and had invoked his right to silence regardless of the officers intentions 3: holding it was not the functional equivalent of interrogation when police officer answered defendants questions about his job the death penalty or murder charges in general 4: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Election Agreement. Plaintiff\u2019s Amended Complaint, Exhibit D. Plaintiff also contends that \u201cthere exists a federal basis for recovery when a party breaches [a Stipulated Election Agreement] entered into for purposes of furthering [the] federal policy\u201d of supporting free and fair representation elections. Plaintiff\u2019s Objections at 5. As the Report explains, a union and an employer may enter into a Stipulated Election Agreement as part of the representation election process. Report at 14. Because the Stipulated Election Agreement is part of the election process, disputes regarding the Agreement implicate representational issues and therefore fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Report at 13-14; see NLRB v. Paper Manufacturers Co., 786 F.2d 163, 167 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff cites no authority for the Holdings: 0: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law 1: holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds 2: holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator 3: recognizing in a takings case that issues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment 4: holding that issues decided by an intervening supreme court case need not be identical to be controlling", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party.... Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee to the prevailing party as part of the cost. 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 505. The Supreme Court has provided a list of non-exclusive factors a court may consider in determining whether either party should receive attorney fees, including, \u201cfrivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.\u201d Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (citing with approval Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>)); see also Quinn v. City of Detroit, 23 Holdings: 0: holding rookerfeldman inapplicable where the district court could and did find that the plaintiffs constitutional claims had merit without also finding that the state court erred 1: holding that there would be no exception to american rule on attorney fees for legal malpractice claims 2: holding that district court could impose attorney fees where plaintiffs lawsuit patently had no legal merit 3: holding that the plaintiffs claims for assault and battery were patently without merit since the officers actions under the circumstances were justified 4: holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "disclosure of its content and by failing to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. We apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm\u2019n, 329 F.3d 700, 709 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, for procedural due process claims, the Mathews test is \u201ca general test that applies in all but a few contexts\u201d); Nat\u2019l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep\u2019t of State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.2001) (applying the Mathews test in a similar context); Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (ADC), 70 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir.1995) (same); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality) (<HOLDING>). Under the Mathews balancing test, we \u201cmust Holdings: 0: holding that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a persons due process rights is the mathews balancing test 1: holding that in performing the pickering balancing test the district court was proper in first assessing the value from the first amendment perspective of the employees speech 2: holding admissibility of polygraph evidence should be resolved under fedrevid 403 balancing test but reliability of polygraph test may be included to determine how probative particular polygraph test is 3: holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law 4: holding that m  m produce properly applied the lear balancing test", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "shooting in Sabana Seca, the community in which Mill\u00e1n resided and in which a number of people were killed \u2014 without following the procedure for \u201cbring[ing] [a defendant\u2019s] uncharged conduct into play.\u201d United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1990). But the record makes clear that the District Court was not suggesting that Mill\u00e1n was in any way responsible for the massacre, and so Mill\u00e1n\u2019s argument rests on a mistaken premise. Moreover, we have made clear that, in considering the need for deterrence, see 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a)(2)(B), district courts may take into account not only the need for individual deterrence, but also the need for community deterrence within the defendant\u2019s particular community. See United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>); Lozada-Aponte, 689 F.3d at 793 (noting that Holdings: 0: holding that the existence of racial bias in the community is relevant to a  2 claim 1: recognizing that district court in exercise of its rule 16b discretion may consider other relevant factors including in particular whether allowing the amendment of the pleading at this stage of the litigation will prejudice defendants 2: holding that only relevant factors must be considered 3: holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony 4: holding that a sentencing judge may consider communitybased and geographic factors and explaining that the incidence of particular crimes in the relevant community appropriately informs and contextualizes the relevant need for deterrence", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "this case raises important issues of intergovernmental tax immunity. See Bank of New England, 986 F.2d at 602 n. 4.; see also Federal Reserve, 499 F.2d at 64 (emphasizing the federal nature of question being litigated). Defendant asserts that, even if the RTC/ FDIC itself could have brought suit in federal court, SN-1 is a private assignee of the RTC\u2019s rights and interests, and does not inherit its federal instrumentality status. The Seventh Circuit, struggling with the interplay between FIRREA and the TIA, concluded that the TIA precluded federal jurisdiction over claims brought not by the RTC or a successor of the federal agency, but by a private party assignee of the federal government. See RTC Commercial Assets Trust v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 169 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also North Georgia Elec. Membership Corp. Holdings: 0: holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption 1: holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 2: holding that assignee of rtc could not assert exemption from tia 3: holding that there is no need to consider exemption 6 separately if information was compiled for law enforcement purposes because exemption 7c constitutes broader protection so any information falling under exemption 6 is covered by exemption 7c 4: holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to reject the claim, noting that it fails not on the evidence but on the law. The requirements of activity beyond the scope of employment, malice, and personal gain invoked by Cohen are referenced out of context. That heightened standard applies when a corporate officer is accused of tortiously interfering with, or inducing the breach of, a contract between that officer\u2019s employer corporation and a third party. See, e.g., Maillet v. Frontpoint Partners, L.L.C., No. 02 Civ. 7865(GBD), 2003 WL 21355218, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2003) (\u201cUnder ... New York law, officers and directors are only hable for interfering with their own, company\u2019s contracts if they exceed the scope of their authority.\u201d (emphasis added)); The High View Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 F.Supp.2d 420, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>); Petkanas, 303 A.D.2d 303, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 2 Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference 1: holding that corporate law should apply because key question was legal effect of contracts between corporations 2: holding that a director of a corporation may be held hable for tortious interference with the corporations contracts if she exceeds the scope of her corporate authority in causing the breach of those contracts emphasis added 3: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous 4: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "S.W.3d at 638; Gutierrez-Gomez, 321 S.W.3d at 682. When the record is silent regarding the consequences of conviction in the context of a guilty plea, we must infer that the defendant did not know the consequences of his plea. VanNortrick, 227 S.W.3d at 710-11; Gutierrez-Gomez, 321 S.W.3d at 682; Kelley v. State, 237 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd). A reviewing court may also consider record facts from which one would reasonably infer that a defendant did know the consequences of his plea. Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 638; Gutierrez-Gomez, 321 S.W.3d at 682. Only a few Texas cases outline the sort of record evidence that would support an inference that appellant was aware of the consequences of his guilty plea. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Gomez, 321 S.W.3d at 682-84 (<HOLDING>); Hwang v. State, 130 S.W.3d 496, 500-01 Holdings: 0: holding record insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea when record is silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation 1: holding that absence of defendants from part of voir dire discussing trial publicity with prospective jurors was error under rule 43 2: holding that the extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judges discretion 3: holding statements during voir dire and oral motion in limine were merely opaque references to deportation but  silent about whether appellant was actually informed that a guilty plea could result in his deportation and insufficient to support inference appellant knew consequences of his plea 4: holding trial judges statement during voir dire that appellant likely would be automatically deported if released on probation along with references to deportation by defense counsel and prospective jurors supported inference that appellant knew consequences of plea", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "OPINION AND ORDER HUVELLE, District Judge. On September 27, 1999, a Missouri jury awarded more than $20 million to a plaintiff injured in an August 29, 1997 collision between the vehicle in which she was a passenger and an Amtrak train. Following the verdict, National Railroad Passenger Corporation (\u201cAmtrak\u201d) notified its excess insurers \u2014 defendants Lexington Insurance Company, St. Paul Reinsurance Company Limited ., 357 F.Supp.2d 287 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). At issue here are the requirements of the Holdings: 0: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 1: holding in the alternative that plaintiffs establishment clause claims were barred by laches 2: holding that amtraks second suit seeking reimbursement under the policies covering the period from october 1 1996 to september 30 1997 was neither barred by the relevant statute of limitations nor the doctrine of laches 3: holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply 4: holding that constitutional claim that paternity suit should not be barred by statute of limitations is waived by failing to raise the issue before the trial court", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the protest in question here. Accordingly, Plaintiff\u2019s protest fails to present a timely, valid challenge to Customs\u2019 acceptance of MPF tender, as Plaintiff filed that protest more than ninety days after Customs\u2019 decision. Based on the analysis above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff\u2019s protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely filed, as Plaintiff failed to file it within ninety days of the Customs decisions that it seeks to challenge. Plaintiff, however, sets forth one additional argument to support its contentions that it filed a timely protest. CRMC appears to argue that its subsequent actions cured the defects of the untimely prot\u00e9st. Plaintiff claims that it properly filed, on February 10, 2000, a request for accelerated disposition t. App. 113, 117, 603 F.2d 850, 853 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Everflora Miami, Inc. v. United States, 19 Holdings: 0: holding that although the jurisdiction limitation also works to make decisions final and conclusive upon the government unless it acts to revise them within the limitations period there was no such decision that triggered the ninetyday period and consequently a failure to invoke jurisdiction 1: holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period  is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful  2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over customs allegedly erroneous duty assessments because the importer failed to timely protest liquidation which thereby made the customs decision final and conclusive upon the parties 3: holding that refusal by customs officials to reliquidate entries became final and conclusive upon the importer when it failed to file a protest within the previously mandated sixtyday limitations period 4: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a discretionary support trust when the purpose of the trust is to furnish the beneficiary with support, and the trustee has the discretion to pay the income or principal to the beneficiary, as the trustee deems necessary for the support of the beneficiary. In re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2004). The county argues that because our court of appeals held that a county could consider the assets of a discretionary support trust to \u2022 determine a beneficiary\u2019s eligibility for county funding of mental health services, the county should be able to reach those same assets to reimburse it for the funds it expended on Anderson\u2019s behalf for community-based mental health services under chapter 225C. See Strojek v. Hardin County Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Generally, in a discretionary support trust, Holdings: 0: holding the assets of a discretionary support trust could be considered when determining a mentally handicapped beneficiarys eligibility for living expenses 1: holding that a public trust that exercised control over the beneficiarys employment did not change the benefit plan into a government plan because the trust did not establish the plan or control it 2: holding that necessary expenses such as living expenses are not considered a squandering or secreting of marital property such that reimbursement or a setoff should be ordered 3: holding that a trust beneficiarys state law claims concerning investment of trust assets in affiliated mutual funds satisfied the in connection with a purchase or sale of security requirement of slusa 4: holding that the wifes testimony outlining the family living expenses constituted evidence from which the trial court could find that  the needs of the children exceed  the maximum support pursuant to the guidelines ", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "for ten years and public policy forbids an attack based upon informalities and irregularities in the procedure which led to the adoption of the ordinance, when ... property owners affected by it have conformed to its provisions, and have fixed their status accordingly.\u201d (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). 11 . It is also possible that mandatory minimum sentences have been imposed pursuant to Section 9719 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 9719 (requiring a three-year minimum prison sentence for certain offenses committed while impersonating a law enforcement officer), albeit we observe that the Superior Court has declared Section 9719 unconstitutional on substantive grounds based on Alleyne v. United States, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (<HOLDING>). See Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 117 Holdings: 0: holding that any fact other than fact of prior convictions which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt 2: holding any fact other than prior conviction that increases statutory mandatory minimum is element of offense that must be submitted to jury and found beyond reasonable doubt 3: holding that any fact that increases mandatory minimum is element that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt 4: holding that under the sixth amendment any fact which increases the penalty for a crime  eg by triggering a mandatory minimum sentence must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "specifically named two of its Texas employees and its accounting department, made factual statements about its provision of financial services that RSL contends were false and defamatory, and solicited participants in a class action lawsuit against the company. Wilkerson made his comments on websites that included a map and photograph of RSL\u2019s Houston offices and that would be of particular interest to Texas residents investigating local firms that provide financial services, like RSL. Wilkerson complained of RSL\u2019s acts undertaken in Texas, and\u2014 as the allegedly defamatory posts indicate \u2014 Wilkerson was aware that RSL is a resident of and has its principal place of business in Texas, where any harm was suffered. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). I would hold that Wilkerson\u2019s \u201cinteraction\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if party has sufficient minimum contacts 1: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in texas though not determinative is important consideration in establishing minimum contacts 2: holding that sufficient minimum contacts exist when nonresident defendant purposefully directed action toward texas 3: holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant 4: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "it effectively reduced the rate of future benefit accruals. Foot Locker submits that the version of ERISA in effect at the time of the challenged notice did not require such disclosure, that any deficiency was cured by subsequent summary plan descriptions, and, in any event, that Osberg\u2019s \u00a7 204(h) claim is time-barred. Here, we need not determine whether Osberg\u2019s \u00a7 204(h) notice claim is either timely or valid because \u00a7 204(h) does not, in any event, afford him the remedy he seeks, i.e., a pension benefit calculated under the cash balance plan but \u201cwith an opening balance equal to the value of the retirement annuity he had already earned under the old formula.\u201d Appellant\u2019s Reply Br. 5. See 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). This is because insufficient notice in Holdings: 0: recognizing this court may affirm for any reason supported by the record 1: holding that we may affirm a district court if its holding was right for any reason 2: recognizing that the court of appeals can affirm a grant on summary judgment on any basis made apparent by the record 3: recognizing that this court may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record quotation omitted 4: recognizing ability to affirm for any reason that finds support in record", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the General Counsel alleged both a \u00a7 8(d) contract modification and a \u00a7 8(a)(5) unilateral change, and that the Board therefore erred in failing to apply the clear and unmistakable waiver standard to their unilateral change claim. Alternatively, the Unions argue that the sound arguable basis standard incorporates the clear and unmistakable waiver standard. A. The General Counsel\u2019s Allegations As a preliminary matter, the Board contends that the Unions are barred under Section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 160(e), from arguing that the General Counsel alleged a \u00a7 8(a)(5) unilateral change violation because the Unions did not move for reconsideration of the Board\u2019s sua sponte holding. See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-66, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Int\u2019l Ladies\u2019 Garment Workers\u2019 Union v. Holdings: 0: holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration 1: holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the board had erred in finding that certain picketing was lawful because no party had raised the issue to the board either during the initial proceedings or on motion for reconsideration 2: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 3: holding that the denial of enforcement on the basis that the board lacked a proper quorum did not deprive the board of jurisdiction to consider the case anew 4: holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "explanation that any such discrepancy was a result of miscommunication with his lawyer. See Majid,i v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Hariyanto argues that he corrected the error regarding his religion with the asylum officer during his asylum interview, but he failed to exhaust this contention before the BIA and the Government has raised this failure to exhaust in its brief; we therefore decline to consider this issue. See Lin Zhang v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007) (describing the issue exhaustion requirement as an \u201caffirmative defense subject to waiver\u201d). The adverse credibility finding was also based on Hariyanto\u2019s failure to submit sufficient evidence corroborating his claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, Holdings: 0: recognizing that an applicants failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question 1: recognizing distinction made in maynard that one accomplices outofcourt statement may corroborate the incourt testimony of another accomplice but outofcourt testimony of a testifying accomplice cannot be used to corroborate his own testimony 2: holding that a failure to corroborate ones testimony with supporting evidence cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility determination 3: holding that when the ij has reason to question an aliens credibility material and easily available corroboration may be required 4: holding that an ij may not use general information contained in a state department report to discredit specific testimony regarding an applicants personal experience", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of marine corporal). Moore argues that this administrative remedy cannot bar her Bivens action because Congress has not declared that such a remedy is a substitute for recovery under the Constitution or that it views it as equally effective. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19, 100 S.Ct. at 1471-72. Moore is correct that judicial review of her claim under the APA does not automatically preclude her Bivens claim. But she is wrong in asserting that the adequacy of the remedy determines when an administrative remedy precludes a Bivens claim. A finding of preclusion is premised only on an alternative scheme and some indication that Congress deliberately elected not to include complete relief. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 2467-68; Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 837 (9th Cir.l991)(<HOLDING>). We have held that administrative remedies Holdings: 0: holding that the csra precludes even those bivens claims for which the act prescribes no alternative remedy because it found no inadvertence by congress in omitting the remedy 1: holding that rendition is remedy for no evidence 2: holding the privacy act to constitute a special factor precluding a bivens remedy 3: holding that the courtcreated bivens remedy is unavailable when congress through the social security act provided an alternative mechanism for a plaintiff to vindicate his due process rights 4: recognizing a bivens remedy for undocumented immigrants who were subjects of a raid by federal immigration officials reasoning that if a bivens remedy were precluded the present plaintiffs would have no forum in which to seek a remedy for the defendants alleged constitutional violations", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "law of the case.\u201d); Wollan v. U.S. Dept. of Int. Bureau of Land Management, 997 F.Supp. 1397, 1403 (D.Colo.1998)(finding reliance on expert report improper stating that an expert\u2019s \u201clegal opinion as to what the homestead laws say or do not say ... in inappo-site .... Where the ultimate issue is a question of law, the opinion of a legal expert, even a lawyer, interferes with the judge\u2019s role as \u2018sole arbiter of the law\u2019 and should not be allowed.\u201d). In addition to prohibiting legal expert testimony which defines the governing law, courts have also prohibited legal expert opinion which applies the law to the facts. Many courts have held that the judge is the sole arbiter of the law and its application to the facts. See, Marx & Co. v. Diners\u2019 Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 508-11 (2d Cir.1977)(<HOLDING>); Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, Holdings: 0: holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue 1: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo 2: holding that under the facts of that case the action primarily involved a custody dispute and therefore that the trial court erred in determining the case by applying the dependency statute 3: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision 4: holding that the trial court erred in permitting a lawyer to offer his opinions concerning securities law and the application of that law to the contract in dispute", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Appellant's interpretation of the CDCA unlicensed lenders, like Appellant, would be permitted to charge exorbitant fees, while at the same time lenders licensed under the CDCA are limited to charges of $50 annually. See 7 P.S. \u00a7 6217.l.D. The Department and the amici reason that lenders would have no incentive to obtain a license in order to charge higher interest rates, because they could capture that increase by charging high fees, thus rendering the statute useless at protecting the public against usury. 9 . Moreover, this Court has recognized that choice-of-law agreements can be avoided when the terms offend Commonwealth public policy even in disputes between contracting parties. See McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (States), 570 Pa. 662, 672-73, 810 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Pennsylvania courts have consistently held Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act 1: holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period 2: holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act 3: holding that the provisions of the workers compensation act must be satisfied or the action is not maintainable in the courts 4: holding that provisions of section 40115102 are applicable to the determination of the status of truck drivers as employees or independent contractors under the workers compensation act and discussing legislative history indicating intent to apply these provisions both to workers compensation and unemployment compensation matters", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "into at Plaintiffs urging. Lastly, Plaintiff does not allege, nor do the facts suggests the existence of fraud or undue influence at the time the Agreement was drafted and signed. After considering all the relevant factors, this Court concludes that the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties is reasonable and appropriate in this particular matter. Therefore, under Bremen, and its more local progeny, this Court holds that, pursuant to the Agreement, proper venue for resolution of this matter is in Salt Lake City, Utah. TRANSFER As noted above, having upheld the forum selection clause, this Court finds that in the interest of justice transfer of this matter to Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1406(a) is most appropriate. Janko v. Outboard Marine Corp., 605 F.Supp. 51 (W.D.Okla.l985)(<HOLDING>), See also Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 Holdings: 0: holding that a forum selection clause should control absent a strong showing that it be set aside as unreasonable unjust or invalid 1: holding that a forum selection clause should not be enforced where a consumer is told by a corporate agent to ignore boilerplate contract language containing a forum selection clause where there is a material difference in bargaining power and where the forum designated by the contract has little to do with the transaction and is gravely inconvenient for the parties and witnesses 2: holding that corporations owned and controlled by the party signing the contract containing the forum selection clause may be bound by the clause 3: holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching 4: holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as in the present cases, the debtors have not claimed the entire amount of their interests in property exempt but instead have claimed a precise value amount of their interests exempt. See In re Shoemaker, 155 B.R. at 555. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded that: Taylor simply does not address whether a debtor\u2019s valuation of property becomes conclusive in the absence of a timely objection pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 522(i) and Rule 4003(b). A number of courts have addressed this issue, however. Some courts have concluded that no challenge to the value of the property may be asserted after the period for objections to a debtor\u2019s exemptions has expired. See In re Okoinyan, 135 B.R. 691 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1991); cf. In re Wiesner, 39 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1984) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Walsh, 5 B.R. 239 Holdings: 0: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 1: recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack 2: holding that bill of review brought in wrong court constitutes collateral attack 3: holding that a collateral attack on exemptions by means of an application for appraisal outside the court ordered fifteen day period for objections is barred 4: recognizing collateral attack on void order", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Maine People\u2019s Alliance and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting S.Rep. no. 98-284, at 59 (1983)). Thus, the operative word in section 6972(a)(1)(B) is \u201cmay\u201d and a plaintiff need not establish an incontrovertible \u201cimminent and substantial\u201d harm to health and the environment. The existence of a potential harm to health and the environment is enough, when \u201cthere is a reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the environment exists.\u201d Id. at 279. Other courts have determined that passive migration at an inactive disposal site constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under the RCRA. See United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3rd Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 Holdings: 0: recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc  1983 for denial of access to the courts 1: holding that  13611 authorizes an attorney fee award even when nominal damages are recovered 2: holding that 42 usc  1988 authorizes the grant of attorneys fees for services on appeal though statute does not specifically so provide 3: holding that  1132a3b authorizes the award of appropriate equitable relief to a beneficiary for violations of erisa 4: holding that 42 usc  6972a authorizes relief restraining further leaking of waste from a landfill and noting that it also authorizes a general cleanup of even dormant waste sites if necessary to cure a present threat to public health or the environment", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to a broad class or range of jobs. Indeed, she believes that she can perform the dealer job, despite her disabilities, as evidenced by her attempt to obtain employment as a dealer following her termination. She just cannot perform the job at nighttime (or apparently between the hours of 4 a.m. and noon). Such a schedule-specific job restriction is not sufficient to qualify as a substantial impairment on her ability to work. See Cotter v. Ajilon Services, Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that doctor\u2019s order that the plaintiff needed to take frequent breaks to avoid stress and to avoid prolonged overtime demonstrated a substantial impairment of the plaintiffs ability to work); see also Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Chiles Holdings: 0: holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled 1: holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled 2: holding that an employer did not regard an employee with an impaired ankle as disabled where it encouraged her to work in a position that required walking 3: holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job 4: holding that an employer did not regard the employee as disabled because it called the employee back from disability leave to work on a special project", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "other evidence; (in) the seriousness of the litigation and the issues involved; (iv) the role of the government in the litigation; and (v) the possibility of future timidity by government employees who will be forced to recognize that their secrets are violable. Dairyland Power, 77 Fed.Cl. at 338 (quoting In re Subpoena Served Upon Comptroller of Currency, 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C.Cir.1992)); see also Sikorsky Aircraft, 106 Fed.Cl. at 579. B. Procedural Requirements To assert the deliberative process privilege, the government must meet several procedural requirements. First, the agency head (or her delegee) must personally consider the documents and \u201cassertf ] the privilege in the form of a declaration or affidavit.\u201d Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 134 n. 8; see also Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1308 (<HOLDING>). The purpose of this requirement is to ensure Holdings: 0: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 1: recognizing privilege 2: holding that an agency may not delegate its public duties to private entities 3: holding that the head of a state administrative agency was protected by executive privilege and could not be forced to appear in court and answer questions about funding of the agency 4: holding that an agency head may delegate authority to assert the privilege when carefully undertaken", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "standard to be applied, therefore, it would provide an additional basis for concluding that the Government Defendants are not arrangers under \u00a7 9607(a)(3). 278 . Carson Harbor objects that the Partnership Defendants' motion is based on new arguments that were not raised in their initial motion for summary judgment in 1997. It asserts the court should refuse to consider these arguments because they should have been raised in the initial motion. The Partnership Defendants\u2019 position has changed materially because of the prior proceedings in this case. All but one of the claims against these defendants has now been dismissed. Accordingly, the court finds that it is appropriate to consider any new arguments raised in the motion. See F.D.I.C. v. Kooyomjian, 220 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 279 . First Amended Complaint, Ex. C, \u00b6 4 Holdings: 0: holding that where the plaintiff is pro se the court must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of plaintiffs contentions offered in motions and pleadings where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and where plaintiff attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering successive motions for summary judgment when each of fdics motions reflected material changes in the posture of this litigation and was grounded on meritorious contentions 2: holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto 3: recognizing that the district court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on motions for relief from judgment 4: holding that motions to dismiss should have been converted into motions for summary judgment where the district court relied upon contract documents submitted by the defendant", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine governs a large portion of the property at issue, is \"whether it constitutes an uncompensated taking to require [Plaintiffs] to construct and maintain the Walkway and its- landscaping to facilitate the public\u2019s enjoyment of its public trust right.\u201d See Def.-Int. Reply at pp. 13-14. In this regard, Plaintiffs assert that the public trust doctrine does not extend to the State\u2019s requirement that Plaintiffs, and others, construct and maintain a walkway on the \"public trust property\u201d along the Hudson River. See PI. Response at p. 3. However, such requirements are well within the State's police power in the area of land use regulation. See, e.g. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 929, 117 S.Ct. 299, Holdings: 0: holding that the measure of damages for breaching a building construction contract is ordinarily such sum as is required to make the building conform to the contract 1: recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions 2: holding that the requirement to provide art or a cash equivalent is more akin to traditional land use regulations imposing minimal building setbacks parking and lighting conditions landscaping requirements and other design conditions such as color schemes building materials and architectural amenities such  conditions have long been held to be valid exercises of the citys traditional police power and do not amount to a taking merely because they might incidentally  impose a cost in connection with the property 3: holding that the failure to articulate  orally that conditions  5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions 4: holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction as to certain Defendants, premised upon section 379(a), would violate the Ex-Post-Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. I, \u00a7 9, cl. 3. Nonetheless, we do not base our finding of federal jurisdiction upon section 379(a) and, therefore, there is no constitutional violation. 2 . A few of the Defendants make a final argument concerning the container in which the salt was transported. This argument is baseless and not supported by the allegations. The issue concerning containers is whether the containers which held the adulterated milk were in interstate commerce. Defendants misunderstand the issue and we, therefore, decline to discuss their contention. 3 . As we find the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement is satisfied by Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>); Cf. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n. Holdings: 0: recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce 1: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce 2: holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute 3: holding that tavern that  purchased beer from outofstate vendor satisfied interstate commerce requirement in criminal explosives statute 4: holding that interstate commerce nexus is established where defendant stole less than 100 from bar that imported beer from outofstate", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "motion would stand alone for the trial court's consideration. 3 . For example, as with the Holubs\u2019 and HTC's post-abatement summary-judgment pleadings, the Law Firm\u2019s post-abatement, traditional summary-judgment motion sought the same relief that its traditional motion for partial summary judgment had, albeit for different reasons. Additionally, the post-abatement motion\u2019s prayer requested a ruling only on that motion; it did not request a ruling on the Law firm's pre-abatement motion for partial summary judgment on which the trial court had not yet ruled. Finally, the post-abatement motion incorporated evidence, implicitly indicating that it would stand alone for the trial court\u2019s consideration. 4 . See In re Estate of Swanson, 130 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 5 . One of our sister courts of appeals has Holdings: 0: holding that defendant bore burden of establishing right to summary judgment on basis of statute of repose defense 1: holding that a defendant who fails to raise statute of limitations defense in a pretrial motion to dismiss or by requesting a jury instruction on limitations if there is some evidence that the prosecution is limitationsbarred waives that defense 2: holding that defendant cannot raise the statute of limitations defense in a noevidence summary judgment motion which otherwise shifts the evidentiary burden 3: holding that the defendants waived their affirmative defense of unenforceability by failing to raise the defense in response to the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted 4: holding defense of statute of limitations not waived when asserted in a motion for summary judgment rather than in the answer", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Padron v. Long Island Ins. Co., Fla. Dist.Ct.App., 356 So.2d 1337, 1338-39 (1978)). \u201cAdditionally, the phrase, \u2018injury arising out of has within the context of no-fault statutory schemes been read to mean an injury which originates from, is incidental to, or has some connection with the use of a motor vehicle.\u201d Id. (citing to Padron, 356 So.2d at 1338-39). This Court has also interpreted the word \u201coccupying\u201d as used in \u00a7 2118(a)(2)(c) several times. Messick v. Reliance Ins. Co., C.A. No. 94C-07-188, 1995 WL 465181, Barron, J. (July 26, 1995) (Mem.Op. at 6); see also Carter v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Del.Super., C.A. No. 92C-01-016, 1992 WL 240479, Steele, J. (Aug. 26, 1992); Adamkiewicz v. Milford Diner, Inc., Del.Super., C.A. No. 90C-JA-23, 1991 WL 35709, Steele, J. (Feb. 13, 1991) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. M & G Convoy, Inc., Del.Super., Holdings: 0: holding that police officer plaintiff who was injured approaching a vehicle he had stopped from the rear which lurched backward was an occupier of a motor vehicle under either a geographic perimeter or vehielerelatedtask test 1: holding that plaintiff who slipped on ice while approaching her car lacked the necessary nexus with the yehicle and therefore was not an occupier of a motor vehicle 2: holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether plaintiff who was approaching a car to enter it as a passenger was occupying a motor vehicle 3: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  4: holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "any person or the United States from pursuing any other remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of any law prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status in the selection of persons for service on grand or petit juries. The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits read \u00a7 1867 to mean a defendant pursing a constitutional challenge to a jury pool need not comply with its provisions. See United States v. De Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 5 (5th Cir.1973) (citing the plain language of the statute and the legislative history in holding the procedures set forth in the Act are not applicable to constitutional challenges to a jury venire); United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit, meanwhile, applies \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding failure to comply with  851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with  851c procedures for challenging prior convictions 1: holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures 2: holding that plaintiffs failure to exhaust available grievance procedures does not bar her title vii claims 3: holding that failure to include an issue in statement of issues did not bar the appellant from raising the issue in its opening brief 4: holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a covenant not to compete, and in fact, the document is entitled \u201cAGREEMENT FOR COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE.\u201d Therefore, the question is: does the description contained in Orix\u2019s security agreement sufficiently identify the right of Stephens to receive payments under the covenant not to compete so as to give Orix a valid security interest? Indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, Orix, we hold that under \u00a7 9.110 the description \u201cproperty of every kind and nature, wherever located, now or hereafter acquired\u201d is insufficient as a matter of law to cover the right to receive payments under the covenant not to compete. The phrase used in the security agreement \u201cproperty of every kind and nature, wherever located\u201d c.2d 780, 315 N.Y.S.2d 937, 8 U.C.C.Rep.Serv. 738 (1970) (<HOLDING>); In re JCM Coop. Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. Holdings: 0: holding that an unpaved public street a short distance from the policyholders home was not part of the insured premises because it was not used in connection with the residence premises 1: holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction 2: holding tila applies only to credit transactions secured by real or personal property used or expected to be used as the principal dwelling of the debtor 3: holding description which used phrase articles of personal property now or hereafter attached to delivered for use installed in or used in connection with said premises sufficient to cover air conditioning and heating equipment 4: holding that the phrase return of income used in 26 usc  6012 is synonymous with the phrase return of tax used in 26 usc  6151", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u2014 a variety of their people to get all the documents for \u2014 reference the fish pond together. And it took some time. I mean, he\u2019s not \u2014 he\u2019s not the only reporter that we end up having to do work for. Although MacPherson testified that the reason for the delay was that assembly of the eleven pages \u201ctook some time,\u201d she could not remember when she first asked that the documents be assembled or when she received the assembled documents. In the 108 days it took to fill the request, she only remembers making three phone calls to two people in an effort to get the request filled. \u00b6 31 Although a request for voluminous documents that are not all located in the same place might justify some delay in responding to a document request, cf. Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F.Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C.1976) (<HOLDING>), similar delays have been upheld only with Holdings: 0: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 1: holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents 2: holding that the duty of disclosure affects not only the prosecutor but the government as a whole including its investigative agencies 3: holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca 4: holding that the failure of two government agencies to process a disclosure request within the time provisions of the foia was not in effect a denial of the request because those agencies were faced with an unpredictable backlog of requests that were being processed in chronological order", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "prior convictions, and that he initially lied to the police because he did not think that they would believe him due to these convictions. The defendant\u2019s defense to the charges was self-defense and his credibility was a critical aspect of the case. The jury was specifically instructed that in weighing the testimony of a witness, one of the factors they should consider was whether the witness had ever been convicted of a crime. Thus, the nature of the defendant\u2019s prior felony convictions, which would have included the fact that the defendant had never used a weapon, threatened, or harmed anyone during the commission of these felonies, was relevant, and therefore, the trial court erred in precluding the defendant\u2019s testimony. See Lawhorne, 500 So.2d at 522; Williams, 730 So.2d at 779 (<HOLDING>). The defendant also contends that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that it was error for the trial court to allow the state to question the confidential informant on direct examination about her lack of felony charges when there was no prior attack of the witnesss credibility 1: holding that stipulation of the appellants undisputed prior convictions was harmless error and reasoning that blakely v washington which does not require a jury determination of prior convictions provides implicit support for the conclusion that a harmless error analysis is appropriate 2: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 3: holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present 4: holding that the trial courts error in not allowing defendant to testify on direct examination as to nature and circumstances of prior convictions was not harmless error where credibility of the defendant was critical to the deliberations of the jury", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the investigation of the house fire. Fatchett and Kalman moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and the district court granted the motion. On appeal, Gavitt maintains that the dismissal was premature. Count II alleges that Fatchett and Kal-man misrepresented evidence in reports and testimony, resulting in a denial of due process and contributing to Gavitt\u2019s wrongful conviction and imprisonment. R. 1, Complaint at 41-42, Page ID 41-42. In essence, the claim is that Fatchett and Kalman misrepresented that \u201cthey had considered and excluded all accidental causes of the house fire, when in fact they had not even attempted to consider and eliminate all accidental causes of the house fire before they erroneously presumed that the fire was caused by incen (7th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). Gavitt does not challenge the above Holdings: 0: holding that under oklahoma law a bad faith claim  premised on inadequate investigation must be supported by a showing that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant information 1: holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights 2: holding investigation was not deficient in part because counsel hired an experienced death penalty investigator who conducted a thorough investigation into defendants history 3: holding that an insurer has a duty to conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances 4: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "because the notice of appeal mentioned both the district court\u2019s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs action and the district court\u2019s decision denying Plaintiffs Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for relief from that decision, we have jurisdiction to review both of those decisions. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (construing pro se litigant\u2019s pleadings liberally). In his appellate brief, however, Plaintiff also challenges the district court\u2019s decision to deny his later-filed Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiff never filed a separate notice of appeal from that denial, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. See Bowles v. Russell, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, Holdings: 0: holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding timely notice of appeal under fed rapp p 4a is jurisdictional 2: holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional 3: holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue 4: holding that the appeal was timely filed because federal rule of appellate procedure 4a provides inmates with sixty days to appeal the denial of a  2255 motion", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "also explained herein. 7 . The Court considers Plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of a Fifth Amendment right to privacy as analogous and indistinguishable from the courts have recognized as a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. See Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 385 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that intimate association and privacy rights find protection in the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003))). Courts have recognized that there are associational freedoms attached to the First Amendment. Christensen v. County of Boone, Il., 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). However, the freedom to enter into Holdings: 0: holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force 1: holding that regulating the location of adult films does not violate the first amendment and citing as support the proposition that reasonable regulations of the time place and manner of protected speech where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests are permitted by the first amendment 2: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 3: recognizing a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the first amendment citing jaycees 468 us at 618 104 sct 3244 4: recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201cunless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense,\u201d id at \u00a7 2D1.1 cmt. n.ll(A). To determine the applicability of this enhancement, the district court may consider all relevant conduct. Id. at \u00a7 lB1.3(a)(l)(A)-(B). Since .the court may consider all relevant conduct, it follows that the court\u2019s assessment is not \u201climited to the charged conspiracy.\u201d See, e.g., United States v. Shippley, 690 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that \u201ca \u00a7 2Dl.l(b)(l) enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon was present or possessed during uncharged drug trafficking activity that constitutes relevant conduct under \u00a7 1B1.3\u201d (citing United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993))); see also United States v. Mitchell, 528 Fed.Appx. 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Further, we have held Holdings: 0: holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement is not limited to the charged conspiracy 1: holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement was proper where a firearm and drugrelated items were found in the defendants residence where he had also engaged in conspiratorial conversations 2: holding that the defendant on remand may show his eligibility for the safety valve reduction by a preponderance of the evidence even where a  2d11b1 enhancement applied 3: holding that heightened evidentiary standard of proof is not required where the sentencing enhancement is based entirely on the extent of the conspiracy to which the defendant pled guilty 4: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "pg. 21.) These symptoms were all noted by Dr. Rumore and are consistent with the Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (AR at 267-69.) See also SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012.) (noting that the symptoms of fibromyalgia can include widespread pain as well as \u201cfatigue, cognitive or memory problems (\u2018fibrofog\u2019), waking unre-pressed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome ... \u201d). Moreover, numerous courts have agreed that fibromyalgia is a medical condition which can reasonably be expected to cause pain. See Green-Yownger, 335 F.3d at 108 (2d Cir.2003) (\u201c[The plaintiffs] complaints of pain in her back, legs, and upper body, fatigue, and disturbed sleep are internally consistent and consistent with common symptoms of fibromyalgia.\u201d); Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306 (<HOLDING>); Johnston v. Barnhart, 378 F.Supp.2d 274, 281 Holdings: 0: recognizing that one of fibromyalgias principal symptoms is pain all over 1: holding that the principal must have control and supervision over the details of the agents work 2: recognizing that one of the many symptoms of bipolar disorder is the denial that anything is wrong 3: holding that agency relationship existed where principal paid plaintiff directly and written agreement stated agent was signing on behalf of principal 4: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "when he rejects a settlement offer for full relief on the specific claims he asserts.\u201d). B On appeal, Fitzgerald contends that the VA\u2019s settlement proposal was not an offer of full relief because it did not offer him compensatory damages for emotional injuries that allegedly led to his hospitalization. Although Fitzgerald recognizes that he never specifically asked the VA or the EEOC for compensatory damages, he argues that Title VII claimants can obtain compensatory damages for emotional injuries only in actions brought in federal district court, not in administrative proceedings. He therefore maintains that he cannot be faulted for failing to ask the VA for compensatory damages because it is beyond the power of the VA to offer such. Cf. Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 710 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Fitzgex'ald also contends that it would be Holdings: 0: holding that an alien must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief from detention 1: holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court 2: holding that the prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as to each defendant later sued 3: holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim 4: holding that state prisoner seeking only monetary damages in  1983 suit need not exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to  1997e if such remedies do not provide for the award of monetary relief", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "those grants and found them inadequate to justify the restriction. It did not consider the stations\u2019 positions as holders of broadcast licenses. There is, perhaps, good reason for the Court to have hesitated to give great weight to the government\u2019s property interest in the spectrum. First, unallocated spectrum is government property only in the special sense that it simply has not been allocated to any real \u201cowner\u201d in any way. Thus it is more like unappropriated water in the western states, which belongs, effectively, to no one. Indeed, the common law courts had treated spectrum in this manner before the advent of full federal regulation. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station, 111. Circuit Ct., Cook County, Nov. 17, 1926, reprinted in 68 Cong. Rec. 215-19 (1926) (<HOLDING>); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, \u201cThe Rationality Holdings: 0: holding that it is well settled that while one tenant in common may acquire homestead rights in the common property the rights so acquired are not superior to the rights and remedies of the other joint owners he can acquire no such rights as will prejudice or in anywise interfere with the rights of the other tenants in common 1: holding that failure to use irrigation water rights on conveyed property for more than ten years did not sever water rights from said property absent compliance with statutory requirements 2: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 3: recognizing rights in spectrum acquired by reason of investment of time and money in application of the resource to productive use and drawing on analogy to western water rights law 4: recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in the Northern District of Georgia in 1990, nothing more. Since Orozco merely repeated the same information known to him when he talked with the government before his sentencing, he is not eligible for a Rule 35(b) motion under the exception for information that is not known by the convicted defendant until more than a one-year period after sentence imposition. Congress has enacted several revisions of Rule 35(b) and, thus, has shown attentiveness to changing the specific terms of this rule. We are not at liberty to add terms or posit an interpretation that differs from the explicit language of Rule 35(b), particularly when we can decide this ease within the plain terms of the rule. See Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 567, 572, 103 S.Ct. 1356, 1364, 75 L.Ed.2d 281 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Carey, 120 F.3d at 512 (\u201cWhether we agree Holdings: 0: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 1: recognizing that federal courts are not authorized to add specific language that congress did not include in a carefully considered statute 2: recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts 3: holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms 4: holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "generate sufficient revenues to settle the judgment against it. These measures may include but are not limited to a combination of those specified in Conclusion Of Law Numbers 3-9 [of the Order]. According to the Commission, Engelman retains discretion at this stage to choose the means by which it can raise revenue, whether it elects to sell some combination of the assets identified in the Order or to utilize other means not considered by the Commission or the ALJ, including entering into agreements with Shields Brothers to restructure the debt. There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (<HOLDING>); City of LaPorte v. Taylor, 836 S.W.2d 829, Holdings: 0: holding that a valid judgment hen is enforceable against the property of the estate recovered by the trustee 1: holding that a reasonable contractedfor limitations period that is not contrary to public policy is generally enforceable 2: holding that waivers of  2255 collateral attack rights must be expressly stated to be enforceable 3: holding that the legislatures rules of procedure are not reviewable except on constitutional grounds 4: holding that builders hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to establish a necessary element of the crime: the existence of a single scheme involving theft of $5,000 worth of property from the water department. The standard of review for a claim of insufficient evidence is \u201cwhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir.1989) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). There is ample support for allowing the government to aggregate several acts to establish the $5,000 threshold required for prosecution where the multiple conversions are part of a single scheme. See, e.g., Sanderson, 966 F.2d at 189 (<HOLDING>). The district court instructed the jury in Holdings: 0: holding that for the government to be sued on a contract pursuant to the tucker act there must be privity of contract between the plaintiff and the united states 1: holding that when one steals paint and supplies and then orders employees to use such materials in private contract work both actions will be considered components of the larger single fraudulent act of theft from the local government 2: holding in a breach of contract action that a state statute established that employees have a right to rely on the layoff and termination procedures advanced by their employers and that to the extent that the government employer considered factors in addition to seniority ability and merit the countys termination of the plaintiffs employment was in violation of the county personnel management act 3: holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work 4: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "but he was not charged under that statute. The third superseding indictment sought forfeiture based on other statutes, see 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 246, which authorize forfeiture of proceeds from \u201cspecified unlawful activity,\u201d including mail fraud, and contain no requirement about \u201caffecting a financial institution,\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2461; see also 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1956(c)(7) (defining \u201cspecified unlawful activity\u201d and incorporating the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961(1), which include mail fraud, into this definition). Because Foley does not argue that forfeiture was improper under section 981, the statute upon which the government sought forfeiture, Foley\u2019s argument is frivolous. Cf. United States v. Jennings, 487 F.3d 564, 584-85 (8th Cir.2007). (<HOLDING>); United States v. Edelkind, 467 F.3d 791, 799 Holdings: 0: holding that when a plea agreement or consent order does not explicitly prohibit seeking the forfeiture of substitute assets via civil forfeiture under  981 the statutory scheme controls and requires the forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to  2461c and 853p 1: holding that 28 usc  2461c authorizes criminal forfeiture of proceeds from general mail fraud via 18 usc  981a1c 2: holding that  2461 allows for criminal forfeiture of the proceeds of general mail fraud 3: holding that the defendant could be prosecuted for making false claims against the government under either the false claims statute 18 usc  287 or the mail and wire fraud statutes 18 usc  1341 1343 4: holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education.... \u201d 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401(17). In light of these definitions, defendants\u2019 attempt to characterize the program at Jewel Manor as \u201ctreatment,\u201d rather than \u201ceducation,\u201d must fail. The concept of education under the Act clearly embodies both academic instruction and a broad range of associated services traditionally grouped under the general rubric of \u201ctreatment.\u201d Any attempt to distinguish academics from treatment when defining \u201ceducational placement\u201d runs counter to the clear language of the Act. There can be no question that plaintiffs\u2019 assignment to Jewel Manor was an educational placement within the meaning of the Act. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3rd Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). See also, Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Holdings: 0: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance 1: holding that loss of earnings was sufficiently encompassed by general prayer for relief 2: holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement 3: holding that a residential placement is encompassed within the term special education 4: holding that subcontractor can recover in quasicontract from contractor for work not encompassed in the agreement between the two", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a union election, explaining that \u201c[t]he plaintiff voluntarily-thrust himself into the controversy- by campaigning for .reelection to the position of secretary-treasurer of Local-526\u201d and that \u201c[i]n the context of a union election campaign, the plaintiff, as an incumbent, should expect criticism of his record.\u201d Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328, 475 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1985) (collecting cases). New Jersey\u2019s intermediate appellate court held that a candidate in an election for a seat on the board of a condominium association was a public figure for the limited purpose of statements made in the context of his election because he chose to involve himself in a \u201chotly contested\u201d race. Gulrajaney v. Petricha, 381 N.J.Super. 241, 885 A.2d 496, 505 (App. Div. 2005); accord Verna, 852 A.2d at 214 (<HOLDING>). A California court has taken the further step Holdings: 0: holding that a candidate for a planned unit development associations board was a limited purpose public figure because as a candidate for election to the associations board of directors plaintiff thrust himself into a spotlight which justified viewing him as a public figure for the limited purpose of his candidacy 1: holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board 2: holding candidate for house of representatives had standing to challenge election regulation exempting opponents of selffinancing candidates from certain campaigncontribution limits where plaintiff candidate had declared his candidacy and was demonstrably a selffinancing candidate whose opponents would imminently receive expanded access to campaign funding 3: holding that candidate for state medical board voluntarily placed herself in position of public attention given strong public interest in board appointees qualifications 4: holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "debtor\u2019s employer prior to obtaining a final judgment against the debtor; (5) disclosing or threatening to disclose information concerning the existence of a debt known to be disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact; (6) communicating with the debtor or any member of the debtor\u2019s family or household in an abusive or harassing manner; (7) threatening any action which the principal creditor does not normally take in the usual course of business; (8) claiming a right, or attempting or threatening to enforce a right, if the right does not exist; (9) using a communication that falsely simulates legal or judicial process or otherwise gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or approved by the government or an attorney; and (10) fail .S.2d 207, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>). The mere fact that New York State has chosen Holdings: 0: holding that new york alcoholic beverage control law preempted local law 1: holding that new york law applies to this matter 2: holding guilderlands local law was preempted by new york state law which provided a comprehensive scheme for funding road construction 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 4: holding the state law claims were not preempted", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at 605. The district court found this and similar statements sufficient to support its conclusion that, \u201c[i]n essence, the Seipels wish merely to have a voice in controlling the timing and processing of this lawsuit (which is no concern of theirs) in the hope that, if they succeed in obtaining a judgment in the Territorial Court, they can satisfy it by recourse to the $250,000.\u201d Mountain Top, slip op. at 4. This argument- fails to recognize the scope of interests encompassed in Rule 24(a)(2). Proposed inter-venors need not have an interest.in every aspect of the litigation. They are entitled to intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in those issues is significantly pro-tectable. See, e.g., Harris 820 F.2d at 599; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1141, 1142 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error 1: holding that the defendant waived the right to challenge a suppression ruling on appeal 2: holding that nonminority employees had the right to intervene to challenge the promotional remedy but not to contest the existence of past discrimination 3: holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy 4: holding that in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment based on a plea of guilty or no contest a defendant must bring forward a full statement of facts including a transcription of the plea proceedings", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "factual findings are insufficient to qualify him as a \u201cleader, manager, or supervisor.\u201d According to Brown, \u201cit appears that Clark may have been using Brown\u201d for a place to stay, and for food, alcohol, and drugs. Thus, he contends \u201c[t]he fact that he and Brown went out together a few times to deliver Brown\u2019s crack cocaine, and Clark happened to be the driver, does not categorically place Clark in the position of being \u201ccontrolled\u201d by Brown.\u201d Brown may well be correct such evidence would not, as a matter of law, suffice to establish a defendant\u2019s role as a supervisor or manager. The problem, however, is his view of the evidence, as recited above, differs markedly from the district court\u2019s view. \u201cWhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the district court\u2019s 8th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, I concur in the majority\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live 1: holding that there was a sufficiently direct relationship between restricting the defendants selfemployment as a roofer and his bank fraud conviction when the defendant used his roofing business to facilitate the fraud and after his initial sentence he failed to provide information about his business activities to his probation officer 2: holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities 3: holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities 4: holding that a defendant may be seen as supervising the four drivers he used in his criminal activities", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "487 A.2d at 287 (quoting Stebbins-Anderson Co., 117 A.2d at 910) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A judgment creditor\u2019s lien cannot attach to a seller\u2019s - bare legal title in the property after the seller has conveyed equitable title, because the seller\u2019s legal title is a mere \u201ctechnicality.\u201d Wolf Org., 705 A.2d at 46. Nor can the judgment creditor\u2019s lien attach to the seller\u2019s equitable interest in the property, because that interest has already become \u201cvested in another.\u201d Id. Moreover, the Maryland doctrine of equitable conversion protects the security interest of a purchaser regardless of the purchaser\u2019s compliance with the recordation statutes. The recordation statutes protect only bona fide purchasers. See Lewis v. Rippons, 282 Md. 155, 383 A.2d 676, 680 (1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the question of whether a bankruptcy trustee or a putative lessor was entitled to the proceeds of an equipment sale depended on whether a true lease was involved when the lease is intended as a security interest article 9 applies however a bona fide lease is not affected by article 9 1: holding a tape of a telephone call was admissible because one party to the call consented to the recording 2: holding section 365d4 inapplicable to saleleaseback arrangement because not true and bona fide lease 3: holding that because a party was not a bona fide purchaser the recording statute availed him not 4: holding plan was not bona fide because the employees never earned more than the guaranteed hourly wage", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "agreement. Where, as here, the Offer Letter specifies benefits payable on discharge, the employee is entitled to those benefits if the termination amounts to a constructive discharge. See Robinson v. Kingston Hosp., 55 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 866 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) (observing that, despite plaintiff\u2019s being at-will employee, change in employment terms would entitle her to contractual severance benefits if it amounted to constructive discharge). In rejecting Scott\u2019s claim of constructive discharge and accepting Harris\u2019s claim of resignation, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that a salary in the reduced amount of $150,000 could not be deemed so abusive as to render continued employment untenable. See Pena v. Brat-tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); accord Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgmt. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff alleging constructive discharge must prove deliberateness of the employers action and intolerability of the working conditions 1: recognizing constructive discharge where employer rather than acting directly deliberately makes employees working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be forced into involuntary resignation 2: recognizing doctrine of constructive discharge under federal civil rights act and national labor relations act where employer knowingly permits working conditions to become so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign 3: holding employee resigned and was not constructively discharged because there was no evidence that employer deliberately created working conditions that led to her resignation 4: holding that defendant interfered with plaintiffs right when the employer forced her to choose between resignation and working without leave", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that costs were unreasonable. See, e.g., Kern County v. Ginn, 194 Cal. Rptr. 512, 516 (1983); Horner v. Marine Eng\u2019r\u2019s Ass\u2019n., 1 Cal-Rptr. 113, 117 (1959). TCW has failed to demonstrate that the deposition in question was not reasonably necessary at the time it was taken. The interpreter fees in the amount of $300.00 will accordingly be allowed by the Court as costs. E. Depositions 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1920 permits deposition expenses to be awarded as costs. Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990). TCW is correct in stating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld decisions of district courts that deny costs for depositions solely because they were not used at trial. Wash. State Dept. of Transp. v. Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The Ninth Circuit has never, however, stated Holdings: 0: holding that court reviews trial courts decision to release a defendant for abuse of discretion 1: holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion 2: holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous 3: holding that decision on waiver of affirmative defense normally is within district courts discretion 4: holding that denial of amendment is within discretion of trial court", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Throughout the trial, Frantz indicated that he thought the requested tape had particular significance to his defense. Despite the damaging statement on the tape that the robber was armed, Frantz believed that the tape could impeach the credibility of the government\u2019s most knowledgeable witness, Diana Villalobos. Villalobos, the cashier whom Frantz allegedly approached to rob, was the sole witness who described the entire sequence of the robbery. She was also the only witness to testify that she saw Frantz with a gun; the police officers who responded to the scene did not report seeing Frantz with a gun and never recovered one. Accordingly, during his two-day trial, Frantz three times tried to introduce the tape or its transcript, and Lamb told the judge during on ir.1992) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). (2) How the reply to the jury\u2019s request Holdings: 0: holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required 1: holding that a defendants faretta rights were violated by his exclusion from bench conferences covering important issues including the admission of evidence 2: holding that defendants right to be present does not extend to bench conferences on legal and scheduling issues in which defense counsel participated and to which defendant could not have made a meaningful contribution 3: holding unrecorded objection made at bench did not preserve error regarding admission of evidence 4: holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "WL 1468435, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (\"Upon default and the acceleration of the loan, the maturity date advances and any subsequent payment is no longer considered a voluntary prepayment. The lender forfeits the collection of a prepayment premium in such a scenario unless the parties' agreement contains a 'clear and unambiguous\u2019 clause requiring payment of the prepayment premium upon default and accel- ' eration. This general rule created the problem that a borrower might actually intentionally default to acquire the right to prepay without penalty, so lenders began including provisions in loan documents to ensure the prepayment penalty would be enforceable after default.\u201d) (citations omitted)). 26 . S. Side House, 451 B.R. at 269 (citations omitted). 27 . Id. at 270. 28 . Id. (<HOLDING>). 29 . United Merchants and Mfrs., Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a preexisting or antecedent debt may constitute sufficient consideration to support a mortgage 1: holding mortgage lenders claim for a postdefault postacceleration prepayment premium pursuant to escape clause in mortgage documents that prohibited debtor from evading prepayment fee by tendering full amount of debt postforeclosure had to be disallowed because the debtor in proposing to pay mortgage debt over time in plan of reorganization was not tendering full amount of debt and was not attempting to prepay this accelerated debt 2: holding that a mortgagee could enforce mortgage covenants requiring the mortgagors to keep the property free of encumbrances even after it foreclosed by advertisement and purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt because the mortgage covenants concerned title to the mortgaged property rather than repayment of the debt 3: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt 4: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "at a hearing, examining trial, or trial, the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter to interpret the proceedings in any language that the deaf person can understand, including but not limited to sign language. Tex.Code CRIm.Proc.Ann. art. 38.31(a). Article 38.31 implements the constitutional right of confrontation, which includes the right to have trial proceedings presented in a way that the accused can understand. Salazar v. State, 93 S.W.3d 339, 340 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. dism\u2019d untimely filed). Prior to September 1, 2003, Article 38.31 applied to a juvenile, but not to his parents or guardian unless the parents or guardian testified. See In the Matter of G.I., No. 05-95-01323-CV, 1997 WL 303754, * 3-4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.)(not designated for publication)(<HOLDING>). In 2003, the Legislature amended Section Holdings: 0: holding that a  15 lien did not apply because that section does not require reimbursement for an injury not compensable under c 152 1: holding that letter stating an annual salary did not embody the terms of any agreement between the parties as it did not specify a beginning date duration of time and did not require acceptance signatures 2: holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice 3: holding that article 3830 did not require appointment of interpreter for juveniles parents who did not speak english 4: holding that time was not compensable where the employer provided but did not require use of a shuttle", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "opening brief could have been more precise, we believe he did adequately raise the certified issues there. He identified each of the certified issues as section headings and explicitly referenced precedents regarding the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing, as well as the district court\u2019s ruling below noting that a denial of Faretta rights is subject to harmless error analysis. Appellant\u2019s Opening Brief at 37-38. Therefore, it is appropriate to reach the merits of the certified issues. HALL, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I believe that Ramirez waived the issues certified for appeal, and so I dissent. A habeas petitioner who fails to address the issues certified for appeal waives those issues. Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In Holdings: 0: holding that in general we will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in appellants opening brief 1: holding that issues which are not specifically and distinctly argued and raised a partys opening brief are waived 2: holding issues that are not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived 3: holding that issues not argued specifically and distinctly in a partys opening brief are waived internal quotation marks and citations omitted 4: holding that a court need not review arguments not specifically and distinctly raised in a partys opening brief", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed a complaint against Jeffrey G. Lerman and Jeffrey G. Lerman, P.C., (the \u201cDefendants\u201d or \u201cLerman\u201d), alleging that, while acting in the capacity of debt collector, the Defendants sent him a debt collection letter (the \u201cLetter\u201d) that violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (\u201cFDCPA\u201d), 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1962. Presently before the Court is a motion by the Defendants to dismiss the class action complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (\u201cFed. R. Civ.P.\u201d) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. I. BACKGROUND The following facts are derived from the complaint and the Letter which is attached to the complaint as exhibit A. See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). On or about August 19, 2005, the Defendants Holdings: 0: holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6 1: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint 2: holding that for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss the complaint includes any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference 3: holding that a written statement could not be regarded as an affidavit sufficient in law for any purpose because it was not sworn to by any one or before any officer 4: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "892 F.2d at 159. In the instant ease, however, there was not an abundance of evidence on Steward\u2019s intent to defraud the bank. Steward gave conflicting testimony on the issue, once admitting she pleaded guilty to having an intent to defraud, but twice informing the jury she did not intend to defraud the bank. Other than Steward\u2019s conflicting testimony, the government\u2019s limited harmlessness analysis does not reference any evidence of Steward\u2019s intent to defraud, the very element it had to prove to establish Nickl\u2019s guilt. The prosecution was not permitted to use Steward\u2019s guilty plea for the purpose of establishing she had the intent to defraud NBA, because Steward\u2019s intent to defraud was an element of Nickl\u2019s crime. See United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, when the presiding judge remarked that Holdings: 0: holding coconspirators guilty plea is admissible as an aid to the jurys assessment of witness credibility but not as substantive evidence of a defendants guilt 1: holding that testimony regarding witness credibility is prohibited unless it is admissible as character evidence 2: holding that entering a guilty plea is an admission of guilt and a waiver of the right to jury trial 3: holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators 4: holding that police officers testimony as to the victims prior inconsistent statements made to him on day of the alleged crime were not admissible as substantive evidence and could not be used to support a finding of guilt", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "present or, more plainly, \u2018from the moment of the wrong.\u2019 \u201d See Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 808 F.Supp. 1187, 1190 (D.N.J.1992) (quoting Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274, 300 A.2d 563 (1973)). If equity dictates, however, New Jersey will apply the \u201cdiscovery rule\u201d which will delay the accrual of a cause of action until the injured party discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, that the elements of a clai 5 (1953) (quoting Ash v. Cohn, 119 N.J.L. 54, 58, 194 A. 174 (E. & A. 1937)) (discussing the distinction between a malicious prosecution claim, which requires a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings, and abuse of process, which does not); Pisano v. City of Union City, 198 N.J.Super. 588, 593, 487 A.2d 1296 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, because Michaels did not file Holdings: 0: holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated 1: holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative 2: holding that a false arrest claim accrues at the latest when the criminal prosecution is dismissed 3: holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest 4: holding that claims for false arrest and imprisonment under  1983 accrue at the time of the arrest", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "concealment rule states that when facts essential to the cause of action are fraudulently concealed, the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff has discovered such facts or could have done so in the exercise of reasonable diligence.\u201d Bricker v. Putnam, 128 N.H. 162, 165 (1986). Here, the rule is inapplicable because, as the trial court found, the plaintiff knew, or \u201cin the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the causal r 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (NewYork courts \u201cdo not generally regard the accountant-client relationship as a fiduciary one\u201d (quotation omitted)), there is no support in our case law for the proposition that a limitations period is tolled in fiduciary cases until the fiduciary discloses his or her misconduct. See Furbush, 149 N.H. at 430-31 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, despite the defendants\u2019 failure to Holdings: 0: holding that although the defendantattorney did not disclose to the plaintiff his failure to file a claim in a timely manner the limitations period on the legal malpractice claim began to run when the plaintiff could reasonably discern that he suffered some harm caused by the defendants conduct 1: holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run 2: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage 3: holding that the statute of limitations for a miscalculation of benefits claim began to run at the time at which some event other than a denial of a claim should have alerted the claimant to his entitlement to the benefits he did not receive 4: holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that the post-petition earnings of Mr. Markosian are property of the chapter 7 estate by operation of \u00a7 541(a)(7), we reject that argument. Section 541(a)(7) makes property of the estate any interest in properly that the estate (not the debtor) acquires after the case. Here, the bankruptcy court found that the bonus constituted earnings from personal services of Mr. Markosian under \u00a7 1115(a)(2) and that ruling was not appealed. Thus, the earnings fall within the earnings exception stated in \u00a7 541(a)(6). We note however that there may be chapter 11 cases which are converted to chapter 7 where it is necessary to separate earnings from personal services by an individual from the earnings of a business. See FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1984) Holdings: 0: holding noncompete payments were not exempt from the debt ors bankruptcy estate as earnings from postpetition services under  541a6 because the noncompete agreement was inextricably intertwined with the debtors sale of stock that was an includable bankruptcy asset that predated debtors bankruptcy petition 1: holding that where the debtor is the owner of a policy insuring his own life and listing his wife as the beneficiary upon his death the proceeds of the policy including the cash value thereof are exempt from the claims of the insureds creditors 2: holding that proceeds of a personal injury settlement are not exempt under missouri law 3: holding that where subchapter s corporations revenue was generated from professional accounting services of its sole shareholder or from personal services performed under him funds generated by the business which shareholder withdrew to pay personal expenses although not denominated wages for purposes of bookkeeping could be considered wages for purposes of calculating preinjury wage 4: holding that only the debtors earnings from his own personal services were exempt under 541a6 as opposed to all profits generated by his law practice", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in a way regarded as offensive.\u201d Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled, in part, on other grounds, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); accord Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir.2006). Economic harm may constitute persecution; however, \u201can applicant for asylum must demonstrate a severe economic disadvantage.\u201d Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 173 (BIA 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, \u201c[t]he economic difficulties must be above and beyond those generally shared by others in the country of origin and involve noticeably more than mere loss of social advantages or physical comforts.\u201d Id.-, see also Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Yang\u2019s assertion, the BIA did not Holdings: 0: holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 1: holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims 2: holding that an asylum applicant must show at least a deliberate imposition of a substantial economic disadvantage in order for the harm to constitute economic persecution 3: holding that an asylum applicant must make a showing of a particularized threat of persecution 4: holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "There must be some \u201cclear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.\" Id. at 205. More specifically, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal when (1) a judgment expressly disposes of some, but not all defendants, (2) the only remaining defendants have not been served or answered, and (3) nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, such that the case \u201cstands as if there had been a discontinuance\u201d as to the unserved defendants. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181,187 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.1962)); see also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex.2004) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>)', In re Miranda, 142 S.W.3d 354, 357 Holdings: 0: recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision 1: holding that the decision in mcmillan survives apprendi 2: holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision 4: holding that decision in penn survives lehmann", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a reasonable accommodation for the employee\u2019s limitations is low: an employee need only \u201cinform the employer of a need for an adjustment due to a medical condition using plain English and need not mention the ADA or use the phrase reasonable accommodation.\u201d Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an employee is not required to use any particular language, the employer\u2019s duty is not triggered unless the employee or his or her representative \u201cprovides the employer with enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.\u201d Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir.1999); see also Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, 127 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The employee\u2019s request for an accommodation Holdings: 0: holding that temporary employee status for workers compensation purposes is determinable as a matter of law where the particular undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact 1: holding that no issue of material fact existed as to the reasonableness of an employers response where the offending employee was promptly suspended and fired 2: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 3: holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months 4: holding no triable issue of fact existed where employee had not asked for accommodation", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Morris intriguingly argues that he could not have been guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Mississippi does not permit an instruction defining the limits of reasonable doubt. Morris argues that by not requiring the court to define the limits of reasonable doubt, Mississippi is in effect trampling upon the requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi however has a longstanding policy of relying upon jurors to determine whether their doubt is reasonable, and prohibits any instruction that would presume to define the nature of reasonable doubt. Isaacks v. State, 337 So.2d 928, 930 (Miss.1976). \u00b6 9. We find no error in the refusal of the requested instruction. III. IS THE VERDICT CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVID 03, 806 (1957) (<HOLDING>). This Court cannot substitute its judgment Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony 1: holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony 2: holding that strength of testimony is not the result of a calculus of witnesses 3: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 4: holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Interest cannot be used to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement, see \u00a7 1332(a), so this claim comes in well under the jurisdictional limit. Mr. Amari argues that I have supplemental jurisdiction over the claim under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367, but because I decline to exercise my jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claim, I dismiss the pendent state claim as well. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(c)(3); Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee County Bd. of Supervisors, 273 F.3d 722, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (\u201c[A] district court\u2019s decision to \u2018relinquish pendent jurisdiction before the federal claims have been tried is ... the norm, not the exception.\u2019 \u201d). Mr. Amari may bring this claim as a counterclaim in the substantive action. See Channell v. Citicorp Nat\u2019l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Radio Spirits\u2019 motion to dismiss is Holdings: 0: holding that where counterclaim arises out of same transaction alleged in plaintiffs complaint is not barred by a running of the statute of limitations thereafter rather statute of limitations is suspended until counterclaim is filed 1: holding that the time limits in the equal access to justice act are jurisdictional 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a 3: holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations 4: holding that counterclaim is within jurisdictional limits of  1367a", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent remains \u2018convicted\u2019 for immigration purposes.\u201d 23 I. & N. Dec. at 624; see also Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 306 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201c[A] subsequent dismissal of charges, based solely on rehabilitative goals and not on the merits of the charge or on a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, does not vitiate that original admission [of guilt].\u201d). Nothing in Pickering precludes a stipulated vacatur from invalidating a conviction as a ground for removal or for other immigration purposes, provided that the vacatur is still based on a defect in the underlying conviction rather than rehabilitative or otherwise proscribed grounds. See Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d at 1131 Holdings: 0: holding that a prior conviction obtained in violation of a defendants constitutional rights cannot be used as the underlying conviction in a prosecution under colorados felon with a gun statute 1: holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him 2: holding that the petitioners vacatur obtained by settlement rather than adjudication meets the pickering standard because the petitioner claimed a defect in his underlying conviction 3: holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law 4: holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "624 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill.2009). 17 . Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 319 (D.C.1989). 18 . Sennett argues that there was no probable cause to believe that she was guilty of conspiracy or aiding and abetting because the record does not contain evidence satisfying all the elements of those offenses. This argument fails because \"evidence sufficient to find an individual guilty of an offense is not required to establish probable cause.\u201d Gantt v. Whitaker, 57 Fed.Appx. 141, 148 (4th Cir.2003); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir.1998) (\u201cProbable cause requires more than \u2018bare suspicion\u2019 but requires less than evidence necessary to convict.\u201d). And, based on the totality of the facts an 455 (9th Cir.1975)); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 Holdings: 0: holding police are not required to explore and eliminate every potentially plausible claim of innocence as part of their prearrest investigation 1: holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest 2: holding that police officer is not required to explore and eliminate all theoretically plausible claims of innocence 3: holding that petitioners challenge to jury instructions in light of some new cases did not demonstrate his actual innocence because petitioner only asserts legal innocence not actual innocence 4: holding that police officer was not required to eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before effectuating arrest for animal cruelty", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the Eighth Circuit held that the state law claims were indeed preempted by ERISA, reasoning that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims all relied on Mr. Kuhl\u2019s status as a beneficiary under the employer\u2019s health benefits plan and arose from the administration of benefits under the plan. Id. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that [ajrtful pleading by characterizing Lincoln National\u2019s actions in refusing to pay for the surgery as \u201ccancellation\u201d or by characterizing the same administrative decisions as \u201cmalpractice\u201d does not change the fact that plaintiffs\u2019 claims are based on the contention that Lincoln National improperly processed [Mr.] Kuhl\u2019s claim for medical benefits. Id. at 303; see also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F.Supp. 110, 114 (D.Md.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4. Plaintiffs\u2019 State Law Claims Initially, we Holdings: 0: recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 1: holding that employees claims for medical malpractice negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against an hmo arising out of refusal to pay for surgery were integrally and inextricably related to their employee benefit plan and therefore preempted 2: recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 3: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 4: holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that the prosecutor lied to the jury about Abdur\u2019Rahman\u2019s culpability by arguing that the defense\u2019s theory that the SEGM orchestrated the killing was \u201cbunk.\u201d The district court rejected the claim on the merits. Id. at *6-9. Seventh, Abdur\u2019Rah-man charged that the prosecutor showed the jury an indictment against Abdur\u2019Rah-man for robbery in violation of a trial court order. The district court also addressed the merits of this claim. Id. at *18. Martinez 'does not apply to claims that were fully adjudicated on the merits in state court because those claims are, by definition, not procedurally defaulted. Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2662, 189 L.Ed.2d 230 (2014); see also Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 840 (8th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 297, 193 Holdings: 0: holding that martinez did not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel subclaims that were not defaulted by postconviction counsel 1: holding that the defendants ineffective assistance of counsel claims which were raised in a motion for a new trial and challenged on direct appeal were not barred in postconviction by the doctrine of res judicata because the defendants conviction and sentence were affirmed without a written opinion expressly addressing the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that martinez did not apply to case where ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were reviewed on the merits in a  2254 proceeding 3: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 4: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "government agreed to ensure that Berkeley would not face charges in Maryland. Plea Agreement \u00b6 5. Berkeley \u201cdoes not affirmatively allege, much less establish to a reasonable probability, that he would have chosen to go to trial\u201d despite the risks, United States v. Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. 781, 782 (D.C.Cir.2003), if only he had known that the advice the court found Wood gave him \u2014 -that he \u201ccould be placed in a Bureau of Prison[s] drug treatment program which, if completed successfully, could allow him to be released from prison\u201d up to a year early\u2014 was incorrect. Berkeley, 515 F.Supp.2d at 165 (emphases added). Accordingly, Berkeley \u201ccannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.\u201d Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. at 782; see United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Curry, 494 F.3d at 1131; In re Holdings: 0: holding that a  mere allegation that the petitioner would have insisted on trial but for his counsels errors  is ultimately insufficient to justify relief 1: holding that where defendant seeks to withdraw his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel the prejudice prong of the strickland test is satisfied by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial alteration in original quoting hill v lockhart 474 us 52 58 106 sct 366 88 led2d 203 1985 2: holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial 3: holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial 4: holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Chasmer was very different from the current language. At the time, \u00a7 5G1.3 provided for consecutive sentences when defendant was serving an unexpired sentence \"unless one or more of the instant offense(s) arose out of the same transactions or occurrences as the unexpired sentences.\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5G1.3 (1988). The commentary stated that the presumption that sentences imposed at different times run consecutively \"does not apply when the new counts arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as a prior conviction.\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5G1.3, commentary (1988). The focus, thus, was on \"prior conviction,\u201d not on what offenses the imprisonment \"resulted\u201d from. However, as we note, we do not need to rule on this question here. 3 . Compare United States v. Goldman, 228 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1175, 121 S.Ct. 1149, Holdings: 0: holding that applica tion note 6s language is mandatory 1: holding that the statute is mandatory 2: holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language 3: holding that the language of the iad is mandatory and absolute 4: holding that application note 6 is not mandatory", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that indirectly delight and \"passive\" uses that do so directly. 156 The majority next opines that the Club's proposed aesthetic, recreational, and piscatorial uses cannot be \"beneficial\" because they have no \"objective limits, beyond which it becomes unreasonable, inappropriate, inefficient, or wasteful.\" Maj. op. 1122-23. Yet these types of uses can be- and are statutorily required to be-limited to amounts \"reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made.\" \u00a7 37-92-103(4). Water courts are well equipped to determine what amount of water is reasonable for recreational uses. See Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 602-08 (Colo.2005) (<HOLDING>). As with RICDs, expert testimony can establish Holdings: 0: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 1: holding that the recreational inchannel diversion ricd statute requires water courts to determine the amount of water necessary for a reasonable recreation experience 2: holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder 3: holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district 4: holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "& N. Dec. 912, 917-18 & n. 4 (BIA 2006); see also Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir.2008). Joseph claims that the BIA failed to consider unrebutted evidence of past torture and existing country conditions that are \u201crelevant to the possibility of future torture,\u201d under 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.16(c)(3). He notes, in particular, that there is no indication in the BIA\u2019s opinion that the Board considered Concannon\u2019s expert testimony, as well as evidence from various sources (including the State Department Country Report for Haiti, issued in March 2008) that chronicled human rights abuses in Haiti from 2004 through 2008, perpetrated in part by the Haitian National Police and armed anti-Lavalas groups. Joseph relies primarily on Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 477, 479 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). (Pet. Br. at 22 (Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 Holdings: 0: holding that the bia erred under 8 cfr  20816c3 when it provided only a minimal analysis of zubedas claim and cavalierly dismissed the substantial documentation of conditions in the drc democratic republic of congo 1: holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte 2: holding that the bia rule is reasonable 3: holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte 4: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider a claim not raised before the bia even when the bia sua sponte considers the claim", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Both of Appellant\u2019s arguments are without merit and we affirm. I. Appellant argues that attempted second-degree kidnapping as defined by Oregon law is not a crime of violence as that term is defined by U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.2(l)(ii). Section 4B1.2(1) defines the term \u201ccrime of violence\u201d \u2022 as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.2(1). Appellant was convicted under Oregon Revised Statute section 163.225(l)(a) which provides that: [a Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Application Note 2 to section 4B1.2 Holdings: 0: holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which necessarily involves the threatened use of physical force under 18 usc  924 1: holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which involves a serious potential risk of injury under 18 usc  924 2: holding that the potential for violence against the victim is an inherent aspect of the crime of kidnapping under 18 usc  924 3: holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence 4: holding that kidnapping is a violent crime which inherently involves the threat of violence under ussg  4b121ii", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Sec\u2019y of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384-85 (2d Cir.1977). In this case, however, the court does not find it necessary to review extraneous material because Krichbaum has not shown that any of his proposed additions to the record are necessary to the court\u2019s effective review of the agency\u2019s decision. None of Krichbaum\u2019s exhibits provide needed background information, raise questions that the agency failed to consider, or present evidence of bad faith. Instead, they merely criticize the Forest Service\u2019s methodology and decision to proceed with the sale. Supplementation of the administrative record \u201cto determine the correctness or wisdom of the agency\u2019s decision\u201d is specifically prohibit ed. Asarco, 616 F.2d at 1160; see also Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. at 2730 n. 21 (<HOLDING>). Because the materials submitted by Krichbaum Holdings: 0: holding that court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency 1: holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 2: holding that the court is not to undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence make credibility determinations or substitute its judgment for that of the agency 3: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 4: recognizing a subsequent agency action as a valid ratification and indicating that the court will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1981). The defendants also argue that the statement was inadmissible because Whitaker did not write it or review it, but \u201cwhen a statement is the party opponent\u2019s own statement, there is no requirement that the party opponent \u2018adopt\u2019 the statement.\u201d Bondie, 947 F.2d at 1534. The defense did not question the authenticity of Whitaker\u2019s statement. The transcript was admissible under the business records exception because a Cincinnati Insurance representative testified that the document was \u201cmade at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,\u201d the document was \u201ckept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,\u201d and \u201cit was the regular practice of that business activity to make\u201d the record. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) ; Bondie, 947 F.2d at 1534 (<HOLDING>). See also Essex Ins. Co. v. Fid. Guar. Ins. Holdings: 0: holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses 1: holding social workers report about plaintiffs statements was admissible through the combined effect of rules 801d2a and 8036 2: holding that a plenary hearing was necessary based upon mothers certification and school social workers report of childs behavioral problems 3: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible 4: holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "view that surprise in litigation is something to be avoided. Such a rule also gives an undeserved windfall to the complainant as a reward for not acknowledging that reversible error has been made. I believe that the majority has erred by affirming the relief granted by the court of appeals but refusing to address the merits of the State\u2019s claim. Today, we have either abdicated our responsibility to answer an important but unsettled question of state law or we have created a legal fiction by granting relief on the basis that Appellant preserved a claim that our case law tells us need not be preserved. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the Court\u2019s resolution of this case. 1 . See Lee, 115 S.W. at 322 (citing City of Dallas v. Peacock, 89 Tex. 58, 60-63, 33 S.W. 220, 220-22 (1895) (<HOLDING>)). 2 . My research has revealed no historical Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court may refuse to exercise continuing jurisdiction even though the parties have agreed to it parties cannot confer jurisdiction by stipulation or consent 1: holding that parties may consent to jurisdiction on noncore matters 2: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 3: holding that parties to a suit cannot waive a judges disqualification but not equating inability to consent to a loss of jurisdiction 4: holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the office during normal business hours. Rev. Breen Deck \u00b6\u00b6 22-24. This creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that employer\u2019s allowance of medical -leave to other employees created genuine issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999) (observing that an employer \u201c \u2018may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy ... selectively \u201d (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Carr v. Reno, cited by the defendant, is not Holdings: 0: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 1: holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved 2: holding that because the employee had engaged in similar religious conduct on prior occasions employer had notice of the conflict 3: holding that the employer must offer a medical leave of absence in order to satisfy the requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation 4: holding that plaintiff demonstrated factual dispute by providing evidence that employer had granted another employee the requested accommodation in a similar situation", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. DISCUSSION \u00b644 We must recognize what the statute at issue does. RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(iv) categorically prevents any person from possessing firearms while pending trial for a series of statutorily enumerated serious crimes. The judge must find only probable cause that the accused committed the crime\u2014 there is no opportunity for an individualized hearing of dangerousness (indeed, the facts of this case demonstrate that judicial discretion will be overruled by the statute). The accused is deprived of the fundamental right to possess firearms and faces additional criminal prosecution upon exercising that right. See State v. Sieyes, 168 Wn.2d 276, 287, 225 P.3d 995 (2010) (<HOLDING>). \u00b645 Though the right to bear arms is not Holdings: 0: recognizing that the right to bear arms is fundamental 1: holding right to be fundamental 2: holding that us supreme court cases do not define the fundamental right to bear arms to include activity barred by the auuw statute 3: holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Fed.Reg. 68,722 at 68,724-25 (\u201cAlthough water quality problems also can occur from agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture, this area of concern is statutorily exempted from regulation as a point source under the Clean Water Act.\u201d). Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the Clean Water Act\u2019s exemptions for irrigated agriculture are inapplicable to defendant\u2019s operations because defendant\u2019s possible over-application of fruit processing wastewater to its crops is more akin to industrial, non-agricultural activities. The only case to support this position was decided seven years before Congress added the exemption for agricultural runoff to the Clean Water Act. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 852, 854 (E.D.Pa.1980) (<HOLDING>); see Pub.L. 100-4, Title V, \u00a7\u00a7 502(a), 503 Holdings: 0: holding that a period of paid leave does not qualify as a suspension 1: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 2: holding that the spraying of an overabundance of wastewater onto irrigation fields may qualify as a point source 3: holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief 4: holding that the department of transportation may be enjoined from diverting water flow onto a landowners property", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Ann. \u00a7 99-39-3 et seq. (Supp.1992). Section 99-39-3 provides that a \u201c[djireet appeal shall be the principal means of reviewing all criminal convictions and sentences, and the purpose of this chapter is to provide prisoners with a procedure, limited in nature, to review those objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.\u201d If any effect is to be given to such legislative intent, the right of a prisoner to challenge his conviction based on subsequent changes in the law must be limited. However, our PCR Act has its own provisions regarding intervening decisions. See Miss.Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 99-39-5(2) and 99-39-27(9) (Supp.1993). Accordingl .Ct. 1712, 1722, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Nixon failed to object to the jury Holdings: 0: holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission 1: holding that a defendant may object to the exclusion of members of the defendants own race 2: recognizing that we are obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affects the substantial rights of the defendant 3: holding that exclusion of potentially qualified members below the grade of e7 was improper 4: holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by the provisions of a contract to which it was not a party. Nor do they cite a similar provision from the 2003 BAA, and it does not appear that any such provisions exist. This argument is of no moment. Plaintiffs also attempt to place the onus on BancorpSouth to object if the \u201ccourse of dealing\u201d was inconsistent with the BAA. See, e.g., id. at 4 (\u201cThe Bank never objected to either the Lender, whether Roy Al or Edwards, or CHFS as to the course of dealing for the blocked accounts.\u201d). But under the BAA, it was allegedly the lender\u2019s right to have Ban-corpSouth prohibit wrongful transfers. If the Edwards Entities wanted to continue enjoying that right, they were required, under Mississippi law, to insist on it in the face of a known breach. See Upchurch Plumbing, Inc., 964 So.2d at 1112 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs failed to do so here. So based on Holdings: 0: holding that the party seeking contractual attorneys fees is entitled to a decision on the merits 1: holding that the court should look to the actions of the relevant party and determine whether that party fails to insist on its contractual rights or acts inconsistently with such rights 2: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 3: holding that the substitution of a party acts as a modification discharging the replaced party and substituting the new party with the same rights and liabilities 4: holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "125 (2d Cir.2006), no reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to credit the explanation he offered, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). These inconsistencies went to the heart of Petitioner\u2019s claim as they related to the medical care he received for his alleged beatings. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.2008). Since the only evidence that Petitioner was likely to be persecuted or tortured depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184-85 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). We decline to consider Petitioner\u2019s challenge Holdings: 0: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility 1: holding that defeat of asylum claim on credibility grounds does not necessarily preclude relief on a cat claim 2: holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum 3: holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture 4: holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of \u201cdisposal\u201d is \u201cclear,\u201d 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F.2d at 1362, whether the definition includes passive soil migration is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts have taken a variety of approaches. Those opinions cannot be shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case. Compare United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that absent \u201cany evidence that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property,\u201d there is no \u201cdisposal\u201d), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that prior owners are not liable for the gradual spread of contamination underground 1: holding past owners liable for the disposal of hazardous wastes that leaked from an underground storage tank 2: holding that all property owners affected by a residential use permit are necessary parties 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding that subsequent property owners were bound by prior owners agreement to restrict building density and preserve certain portions of land as a condition of the original zoning approval", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is defined as \u201ca security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or .(2) of section 77r(b) of this title, at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation, omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred.... \u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 77p\u00a9(3). Section 77r(b)(2) provides that a \u201csecurity is a & Thompson, supra, at 35-36 (stating that the SEC regulates variable universal life insurance policies). Second, the plaintiff invested his premiums in a sub-account which is registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Araujo v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 01-6622, Notice of Removal \u00b6 4. As such, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a \u201ccovered security\u201d under SLUSA. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, courts have regularly concluded Holdings: 0: holding that variable annuities are covered securities under slusa because they are securities and the subaccounts are registered with the sec under the investment company act 1: holding that slusa precludes statelaw class action claims against these banks because the claims are predicated on the banks involvement with the fraudulent securities transactions of bernard l madoff investment securities madoff securities 2: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable 3: holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable 4: holding that variable insurance policies are covered securities under slusa", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the precluded evidence\u201d on Oatts\u2019s Sixth Amendment rights and the \u201cstate\u2019s interests in excluding the evidence at issue.\u201d Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137-1138. We first address the state\u2019s interest in excluding the evidence by noting the policy of Indiana\u2019s Rape Shield Rule. The Rule reflects a policy first embodied in Indiana\u2019s Rape Shield Act, Indiana Code \u00a7 35-37-4^1, that inquiry into a victim\u2019s prior sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become a focus of the defense. Rule 412 is intended to prevent the victim from being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and, importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes. Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. See also Baughman, 528 N.E.2d at 79 (<HOLDING>); Tagne, 3 F.3d at 1139 (recognizing the Holdings: 0: holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded 1: holding that evidence of prior molestation by a different person was the type which the legislature deemed should be excluded 2: holding that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in a statute 3: recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended 4: holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seek relief properly characterized as prospective.\u201d Id. Although this inquiry does not include an inquiry into the merits of the claim, it may include an inquiry as to whether the suit and the remedy it seeks implicate special sovereignty interests such as those found in Coeur d\u2019Alene. Union Electric Co. v. Missouri Dep\u2019t of Conservation, 366 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir.2004) (citing Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm\u2019n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 647, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) and Idaho v. Coeur d\u2019Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997)). The Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint unquestionably alleges an-ongoing violation of federal law and seeks prospective relief. Each of the five 0th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The Eighth Circuit has addressed the \u201cspecial Holdings: 0: holding the governors emergency powers to take private property for the public benefit was a special sovereignty interest but the relief requested was not so much of a divestiture of the states sovereignty to render the suit as one against the state itself 1: holding that a states interest in the integrity of its property tax system lies at the core of the states sovereignty it is impossible to imagine that a state government could continue to exist without the power to tax 2: holding that interest received by a foreign corporation on a tax refund from the united states was interest on an interestbearing obligation of a resident of the united states within income tax statute 3: holding that tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only the federal government not the states 4: holding states property interest in right to profits from a recreational land lease did not rise to the level of a special sovereignty interest", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "receiver, manager of property, or debtor in possession be appointed by a court of the United States. Based on review of virtually all, if not all, reported opinions of federal courts dealing with the 1887 and 1911 versions, this Court has located no opinion where a court utilized it as applicable to any receiver or property manager other than one appointed by a federal court. See, e.g., Investment Registry v. Chicago & M. Elec. Ry. Co., 204 F. 500, 507 (E.D.Wis.1913); In re Kalb & Berger Mfg. Co., 165 F. 895, 896 (2d Cir.1908). With only one exception, this remained true after the statute was revised in 1948. See, e.g., SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass\u2019n, 557 F.2d 1274, 1277 n. 1 (9th Cir.1977); Republic Bank of Chicago v. Lighthouse Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 829 F.Supp.2d 766, 772 (D.Minn.2010) (<HOLDING>). This requirement arises not only from the Holdings: 0: holding that section 959a applies to receivers appointed by federal courts not state courts 1: holding that a federal courts dismissal of state claims without prejudice is not res judicata as to adjudication in either state or federal courts 2: holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts 3: recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts 4: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "MOTION FOR REHEARING AND WRITTEN OPINION PER CURIAM. We deny Appellant\u2019s motion for rehearing, but withdraw our previous per curiam opinion dated June 14, 2011, and substitute the following opinion in its place. AFFIRMED. See Santiago v. State, 65 So.3d 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); see also Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144, 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); accord Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868 Holdings: 0: holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review 1: holding that batson v kentucky does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review 2: holding that courts must begin the process by following the commissions instructions in ussg  1b110  to determine the prisoners eligibility for a sentence modification quoting dillon v united states 560 us 817 827 130 sct 2683 177 led2d 271 2010 3: holding inter alia that the decision in padilla v kentucky  us  130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 should not be applied retroactively while certifying the question as one of great public importance 4: holding that the rule announced in padilla v kentucky 559 us 356 130 sct 1473 176 led2d 284 2010 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the terms \u201cdiscipline or discharge\u201d in the context of section 31-51q, the Connecticut Superior Court held that \u201cthe language of \u00a7 31-51q, which ... is restrictive even by Connecticut standards, simply cannot compare with the expansive texts of these asserted federal counterparts.\u201d Bombalicki v. Pastore, 2000 WL 726839, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 10, 2000). Rather, under section 31-51q, the term \u201cdiscipline\u201d contemplates \u201can affirmative act of deprivation that diminishes the status or happiness of the recipient rather than a failure to enhance that status or happiness.\u201d See Burdick v. Clouet, 2011 WL 2739557, at * 7 (Conn.Sup.Ct. June 14, 2011) (citing Bombalicki, 2000 WL 726839, at *3). Examples of discipline include a change in an employee\u2019s salary or fringe benefits. See id. (<HOLDING>). A transfer will generally not be considered Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony 1: holding that transfer was not discipline because transfer neither altered salary nor fringe benefits 2: holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court 3: holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock 4: holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of commercial sports facilities the same as we treat other commercial property owners. Therefore, I would apply the business invitee rule, under which the stadium owner and operator would owe a duty \u201cto conduct a reasonable inspection to discover latent dangerous conditions,\u201d and the stadium owner and operator would have a duty to \u201cguard against any dangerous conditions ... that the owner either knows about or should have discovered.\u201d Parks v. Rogers, 176 N.J. 491, 497-98 n. 3, 825 A.2d 1128 (2003)(quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 434, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993)). Moreover, under certain conditions the landowner has a duty to protect business visitors from foreseeable criminal acts. Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 516-17, 694 A.2d 1017 (1997) (<HOLDING>). There is nothing about the game of Holdings: 0: holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons 1: holding that a residential landlord has no duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 2: holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties 3: holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 4: holding a business owner must protect invitees against injury caused by third persons", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "uncovered authority that expressly undermines this Court\u2019s decision to employ a presumption of prejudice where an extensive preindictment delay is involved. See Hey, 269 S.E.2d at 394, syl. pt. 2. Our holding in Hey is called into question by the Fourth Circuit\u2019s recognition that \u201c[t]he Due Process Clause has never been interpreted so as to impose a presumption of prejudice in the event of a lengthy preindictment delay----\u201d Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 906 (4th Cir.1996); accord U.S. v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir.1995) (rejecting contention that delay was presumptively prejudicial, holding that \u201ca defendant must show actual prejudice to establish a claim of preindictment delay under the due process clause\u201d); State v. Collins, 118 Ohio App.3d 73, 691 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Firmly rejecting an argument to extend the Holdings: 0: holding that unquestionable lack of actual prejudice weighs against a finding of a speedy trial violation 1: holding the military judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing charges with prejudice for violation of speedy trial courtmartial rule and recognizing that the military judge assessed the prejudice that would result from remedies short of dismissal 2: holding that the government may appeal trial courts dismissal of count in indictment because of prejudice caused by preindictment delay without violating double jeopardy principles 3: recognizing speedy trial analysis is genesis of presumptive prejudice rulings and holding that notion of presumptive prejudice  has no application to preindictment delays 4: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to this action. The original complaint against Yashinsky by Consolidated Rail brought professional malpractice, negligence, and breach of contract claims, all state law claims. It stated that \u201cjurisdiction is vested in this Court by 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1331 [federal question] and 1332 [diversity] pursuant to diversity of citizenship between the parties.\u201d Whether the complaint was based on diversity or federal question jurisdiction, Michigan\u2019s statute of limitations would apply to this action. If the case is a diversity jurisdiction case, Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945), requires the federal court to apply the Michigan statute of limitations under the Erie doctrine. See also Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762, 764 (6th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>). In any event, if the complaint housed some Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases 1: holding that a federal court with diversity jurisdiction must apply the choiceoflaw rules of the state in which the federal court sits 2: holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law 3: holding that in diversity eases the law of the state in which a federal court sits must be followed with respect to the statute of limitations citing guaranty trust 4: holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and whether PGM was a party to a fraudulent transfer. \u00b6 15 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 1 . PGM also argues that Westchester failed to show that the alter ego and fraudulent transfer issues were fully and fairly litigated because Westchester did not supply the trial court with the full record from the Paria litigation. Cf. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996). However, this court has held that, when the moving party produces documents that make a facial showing that a particular issue was litigated, the burden falls to the nonmoving party to show that the record before the court did not establish that the issue was in fact litigated. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case 1: holding that burden was on nonmoving party to show issue was not litigated where moving party presented arbitrators order showing issue had been litigated 2: holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response 3: holding that all matters litigated or which could have been litigated in al foreclosure action are forever at rest  4: holding that trial by consent requires that the parties actually recognize the issue to have been litigated", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "log indicated the notice of appeal was accepted by the mail room on Monday, November 3, 2003, Singletary deposited the mail in the legal mail box no earlier than Friday, October 31, 2003, two days after the excusable neglect period expired. Thus, the magistrate judge apparently concluded that the appeal period could not be extended. See Hensley v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 651 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir.1981) (finding that expiration of time limits in Rule 4 deprives court of jurisdiction over case). The record was then returned to us for further review. It appears from our review of the record that the magistrate judge\u2019s order may be a dispositive ruling as it potentially ends Singletary\u2019s ability to pursue his appeal. See Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co., 984 F.2d 168, 169-70 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the magistrate judge only is authorized Holdings: 0: holding that it is unconstitutional for a us magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  636c over a  2255 motion 1: holding that a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal is dispositive 2: holding that under 28 usc  1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case 3: holding that a magistrate judge acting pursuant to   636b1  has no authority to issue a dispositive ruling on a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal under 28 usc  1292b  2000  4: holding the failure to file objections to a magistrates report issued pursuant to 28 usc  636b1 waives the right to appeal all issues both factual and legal", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "class actions because of the concept\u2019s novelty. Aseertainability, as defined by defendant, is particularly misguided when applied to a case where any difficulties encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defendant\u2019s own acts or omissions. Had defendant obtained the identities of consumers when giving out $25 gift cards, the problems it now offers as grounds for upending certification would not exist. Allowing a defendant to escape responsibility for its alleged wrongdoing by dint of its particular recordkeeping policies \u2014 an outcome admittedly un-troubling to some federal courts \u2014 is not in harmony with the principles governing class actions. See Byrd, supra, 784 F.3d at 176, 2015 WL 1727613, at *14, 2015 U.S.App. LEXIS 6190, at *50 (Rendell, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). In the final analysis, \u201caseertainability\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that advertising and selling expenses incurred by a manufacturer clearly fall within the class of charges which congress intended to be included in the tax base as they enter into the composition of the wholesale selling price 1: recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice 2: recognizing that wjithout the class action mechanism corporations selling smallvalue items for which it is unlikely that consumers would keep receipts are free to engage in false advertising overcharging and a variety of other wrongs without consequence 3: holding that facilitating small claims is the policy at the very core of the class action mechanism 4: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "pr e-Miranda silence, we cannot say that LaCourse is controlling. \u00b6 13. Nor is there controlling federal precedent. The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 n.2, 238 (1980) (concluding that the prosecution may use a defendant\u2019s pre-arrest, pr e-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes but explicitly withholding judgment on the issue of whether such silence may be used in the prosecution\u2019s case in chief where the App. 2008) (\u201c[W]e hold that a proper invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination is protected [by the Fifth Amendment] from prosecutorial comment or substantive use, no matter whether such invocation occurs before or after a defendant\u2019s arrest.\u201d); State v. Leach, 2004-Ohio-2147, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 9, 807 N.E.2d 335 (<HOLDING>); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 349-50 (Utah Holdings: 0: holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments 1: holding that substantive use of prearrest silence is contrary to fifth amendment 2: holding that federal constitution does not permit state to use prearrest silence to imply guilt and characterizing the states argument to the contrary as nothing short of incredible 3: holding that state constitution prohibits substantive use of prearrest silence 4: holding that the government can use prearrest silence for impeachment purposes against a defendant because no government action induced the silence", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "noneconomic damage awards. A defendant is liable to a claimant only for the percentage of the damages found by the trier of fact equal to that defendant\u2019s percentage of responsibility unless the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant is greater than 50% or the defendant engaged in particular conduct listed in the penal code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 33.013(a), (b) (West 2008). Here, the jury found LMS 30% responsible and found Hospital 60% responsible. Based on our above holding that legally insufficient evidence exists to support the jury\u2019s joint enterprise finding and the fact that the jury assessed only 30% responsibility against LMS, LMS cannot be jointly and severally liable with Hospital for the entire judgment. See id.; Able, 35 S.W.3d at 616 (<HOLDING>); Shoemaker, 513 S.W.2d at 14 (same). Holdings: 0: recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention 1: recognizing that each party in a joint enterprise is responsible for the negligent act of the other 2: holding that the jones act did not operate to make negligent crew members liable to their employers for damages paid to other seamen under the jones act because crew members cannot sue each other for negligence 3: holding that a clause providing that the insurer has a right to recover damages from a responsible third party referred to a tortfeasor because the use of damages in bodily injury cases means pecuniary compensation resulting from an unlawful or negligent act by a wrongdoer 4: holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of a new or different offense to a petition if the motion to amend is made before the adjudicatory hearing begins.\u201d Rule 10-103 committee commentary (emphasis added). Thus, the rule contains no authority to amend the charging document in a delinquency case after commencement of the adjudicatory hearing. {8} The State, however, attempts to rely on the provision in Rule 10-103(F) that permits amendments in order to correct mistakes in the pleadings. This ment. Roman, 1998-NMCA-132, \u00b6 12, 125 N.M. 688, 964 P.2d 852. Only amendments that are made to conform to the evidence in support of the charge on which defendant was tried are permissible. Marquez, 1998-NMCA-010, \u00b6\u00b6 20-21, 124 N.M. 409, 951 P.2d 1070; but see State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, \u00b6\u00b6 23-25, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (<HOLDING>). {10} Any addition of new criminal charges not Holdings: 0: holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury 1: holding that whether amendment to capital felonymurder information to add the charge of premeditated and deliberate murder was improper turned on whether there was prejudice or surprise 2: holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder 3: holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder 4: holding that states pretrial amendment of the original indictment charging defendant with willful and deliberate first degree murder to add an alternative murder theory of depraved mind murder did not add a different offense and therefore did not prejudice the defendant", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of cool reflection.\u201d Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 19.02(a)(1); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211. Sudden passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from former provocation. Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 213. Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone raises an issue on sudden passion arising from adequate cause. See id. at 213-14; see also Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd) (stating defendant\u2019s testimony of being upset and angry over culmination of events did not rise to level of adequate cause). Similarly, a defendant may not rely on a cause of his own making to support an argument for sudden passion. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211 (<HOLDING>); Trevino v. State, 157 S.W.3d 818, 822 n. 4 Holdings: 0: holding evidence legally sufficient under sections d and e 1: holding evidence legally insufficient 2: holding evidence legally sufficient 3: holding that ordinary anger or causes of defendants own making are not legally adequate causes 4: holding district court may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally related", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Procedure \u00a7 26.3c, at 1219-25 (4th ed. 1998). 12 . In Dale, we added that \"[cjircuit precedent suggests that habeas prejudice may require a greater showing, namely, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the errors in question.\u2019\u201d 140 F.3d at 1056 n. 3 (quoting United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287 (D.C.Cir.1994)) (emphasis in Dale); cf. Frady, 456 U.S. at 174, 102 S.Ct. 1584 (rejecting as insufficient to support a colla (stating that the omission of an element from a jury instruction would not be deemed harmless on direct review if \"the defendant contested the omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding\u201d); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-39, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt 1: holding that nonconstitutional error is harmless if it did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict 2: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 4: holding on habeas review that a constitutional trial error did not substantially  influence the jurys verdict and hence was harmless where the states evidence of guilt was if not overwhelming certainly weighty", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "if needed. on v. Varney, 586 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), \u201c[t]he payment of wages is the least important factor\u201d in determining an employment relationship. Id. at 464. Because neither the law nor the record on appeal supports the trial court\u2019s ruling, the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment based on lack of an employment re B-2-00-3 (2001) (concluding that an employee injured while crossing a street to eat lunch at a restaurant also located on campus sustained a compensable injury, because \u201cas a matter of law, the grounds of an entire college campus constitute its \u2018premises,\u2019 rather than simply the building or buildings in which an employee happens to regularly work\u201d). See generally In the Matter of Anneliese Ross and Dep\u2019t of the Army, 42 E.C.A.B. 371 (1991) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of Gordon R. Woodruff and Dep\u2019t Holdings: 0: holding that civilian distributing leaflets on military base could not constitutionally be convicted of unlawfully entering the base where the military had abandoned any right to exclude civilian vehicular and pedestrian traffic from the avenue greer 424 us at 835 96 sct at 1216 1: holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus 2: holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act 3: holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment 4: holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that Fleming\u2019s denial of any further medical services or supplies in July 1993 justified his non-compliance with the applicable fee schedule. \u00b6 31. We cannot say that Fleming\u2019s denial of further medical services and treatment in July 1993 justified Henderson\u2019s disdain for the Commission\u2019s procedures as set forth in the fee schedule. Henderson has cited several cases in his brief to this Court where the Mississippi Supreme Court has upheld a claimant\u2019s right to secure medical services on his own elsewhere after the employer/earrier refused to provide medical services and supplies to the injured employee and that the employer/earrier should be held liable for the medical services selected by the injured employee. Thornbrough Well Servicing Co. v. Brown, 223 Miss. 322, 78 So.2d 159 (1955) (<HOLDING>); Central Elec. & Machinery Co. v. Shelton, 220 Holdings: 0: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 1: holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness 2: holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga  349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action 3: holding that employee was consumer of medical insurance purchased by employer for employees benefit 4: holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "decision that one party\u2019s version of the events is more credible than the other party\u2019s is, without more, insufficient to justify an award of attorneys\u2019 fees_\u201d Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1986) (discussing fee awards under the Copyright Act); see also Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (noting that \u201cnot every instance in which a district court credits one side\u2019s witnesses over another\u2019s is an occasion for sanctions\u201d). Here, the district court merely stated that the Sprafkins\u2019 testimony, \u201c[i]n light of all the evidence in this case, ... simply was not credible.\u201d It set forth no explanation for this conclusion. We think that a district court cannot predicate the use of its inherent powers on a mere conelusory statement that the witnesses were not credible. Cf. Blue, 914 F.2d at 544 (<HOLDING>). Because the district court neither explained Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts specific meticulously detailed finding of bad faith was supportable on appeal 1: holding proper basis for award of fees 2: holding a district court may in its discretion award attorneys fees upon a finding that plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith 3: holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees 4: holding that although the fee award was assessed against plaintiffs in a complex civil rights suit it was proper because the district courts order imposing fees meticulously describes each instance of perjury and bad faith", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "prejudice by his counsel\u2019s failure to submit jury instructions as he did not demonstrate that there was an instructional error or that there was a reasonable probability of a different result had his counsel submitted jury instructions. Moreover, in light of the aggravating circumstances in this ease - the emotional harm to the victim, that the molestation occurred over a long period of time, the exploitation of children other than the victim, Liska\u2019s pri- or felony convictions for child molestation and motorcycle theft, and Liska\u2019s long history of taking pornographic pictures of nude boys - it is unlikely that Liska\u2019s attorney\u2019s failure to present additional mitigating evidence, if indeed there was any, was prejudicial. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 836 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Pizzuto, 280 F.3d at 968-69 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply to state capital sentencing schemes where judges are required to find certain aggravating circumstances before imposing a death sentence 1: holding that the cause and prejudice standard applied to defendants failure to object to his career offender classification at sentencing 2: holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that where the aggravating circumstances are overwhelming it is particularly difficult to show prejudice at sentencing due to the alleged failure to present mitigation evidence 4: recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "College, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253, 255 (1903): The acceptance of the bid and the making of a memorandum thereof by the trustee being a complete contract of sale, binding the purchaser to accept the bid and pay the purchase money, must he, in seeking the enforcement of that contract, show that the trustee has proceeded regularly in making the sale? The contract does not confer title upon him. He obtains that by the deed. It confers only the right to call for the legal title, to enforce a specific performance of the contract of sale. Accordingly, legal title to real property does not pass until a conveyance is made by deed; equitable title to the real property, however, passes to the purchaser at the time of sale. See, e.g., Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343, 351 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of a true trustee-beneficiary Holdings: 0: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property 1: holding that a constructive trust is imposed in order to prevent injustice and that such a trust may be imposed when the circumstances show that it would be inequitable for the holder of legal title to retain the property 2: holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence 3: holding that the legal title holders to real property held it in constructive trust for the equitable title holder who was entitled to the real property based on an earlier contract 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Report Ex. 15. Despite Strougo\u2019s contentions and as demonstrated by the SLC\u2019s Final Report, the SLC pursued its investigation in a thorough and diligent manner. From June through December 1998, the SLC interviewed 11 witnesses and conducted a comprehensive review of approximately 36,000 pages of documents. The SLC requested documents from Defendants throughout the course of its investigation and prepared memoranda of its interviews and meetings. The SLC\u2019s Report and the five volumes of exhibits thereto outline the SLC\u2019s reconstruction of the history of the events surrounding Strougo\u2019s allegations, and the SLC\u2019s findings and conclusions based on its efforts. This is a reasonable investigation and thus, the SLC has demonstrated its good faith. See Rosengarten, 613 F.Supp. at 1501 (<HOLDING>); Grossman, 89 F.R.D. at 664 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that benefiting fiduciary must show he acted in good faith and that transactions were fair and equitable 1: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 2: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 3: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims 4: holding that special litigation committee acted in good faith based upon a 33page report several exhibits interview summaries meeting minutes and a chart of the movement and volume of the corporations stock during the relevant time period", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Francisco public housing, such as the \u201cright\u201d to an entry door fitted with a solid door, would not necessarily exist for residents of Marin County public housing, just across the Golden Gate bridge. While federal courts often apply different state laws to federal claims, for example, the statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim differs depending on the state in which the claim arose, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Court is un intiff stated a section 1983 claim against a supervisor at a state facility who placed plaintiff in danger by assigning her to work with an inmate sex offender who had a history of violent as saults against women; he subsequently-raped and kidnapped her); Wood v. Os-trander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs do not allege any affirmative Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 1: holding that workers compensation statute barred suit of medical technologist who was allegedly raped and robbed in dormitory room which she rented from the hospital at which she was employed 2: holding that plaintiff stated a section 1983 claim against police officers who after examining plaintiff and finding him in medical need canceled a 911 call to the paramedics dragged plaintiff from his porch where he was in public view into an empty house then locked the door and left him there alone 3: holding that plaintiff stated a section 1983 claim against a state police officer who caused a woman to be stranded in a highcrime area at night where she was subsequently raped 4: holding woman who alleged she was terminated for having an abortion stated a prima facie case for discrimination", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "composition of Innovative AFC\u2019s board of directors. Although Rene Harris\u2019s affidavit was not greatly detailed, it did constitute admissible evidence that David Edwards, George Williamson, Brenda Lester, Priscilla Murrell, Hazel Bartlett, Michelle Johnson, and Julian Watkins had been elected as directors of the corporation sometime in 1999. Specifically, Rene Harris averred that the four original incorporators had met sometime in 1999 and had \u201cunanimously agreed\u201d to elect the individuals listed on Exhibit A to the board of directors of Innovative AFC. Contrary to the ruling of the circuit court, this affidavit did contain sufficient detail to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Bennett v Detroit Police Chief, 274 Mich App 307, 318-319; 732 NW2d 164 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the affidavit that our Supreme Court Holdings: 0: holding that the original pto declarations create a genuine issue of material fact 1: holding that subsequent affidavit contradicting prior sworn testimony does not create genuine issue of fact 2: holding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine 3: holding that a speculative affidavit which contained mere conjecture was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial 4: holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "712 F.2d at 135. Thus, the criminal defendants\u2019 Fifth Amendment rights weigh heavily in favor of a stay to avoid prejudice to the other civil parties, especially The Hartford. See Holden Roofing, Inc., 2007 WL 1173634, at *1 (finding that if depositions were permitted in a civil case related to a pending criminal ease, a significant portion of questions posed to the defendants would likely result in the defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, which weighed heavily in favor of a stay). The civil action should also be stayed because Hoeffner, a criminal defendant, seeks discovery as a civil plaintiff. As a matter of equity and public policy, a criminal defendant may not institute a civil action to obtain discovery relating to the criminal case. See Campbell, 307 F.2d at 487 (<HOLDING>); see also Agran v. City of New York, 95 Civ. Holdings: 0: holding that liberal civil discovery procedures are not a back door to information otherwise beyond reach under the criminal discovery rules 1: recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery 2: holding discovery rules apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted 4: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "damages and increased it by $10,000. He also maintains that those \u201cadjustments\u201d produced an aggregate award of $15,000 less than the total quotient in jury note 1. Given such large deviations, the trial court reasonably could have decided that the verdict materially varied from the quotient. Although Alabama cases recognize that a quotient verdict may still be presumed despite a minor deviation between the quotient and the verdict, see Harris, 288 Ala. at 378, 261 So.2d at 46, no Alabama case has ever considered discrepancies as large as $10,000 and $25,000 to indicate mere mathematical adjustments, or \u201crounding off,\u201d to an agreed-upon quotient, even in relation to a $200,000 verdict. Compare Burgreen Contracting Co. v. Goodman, 55 Ala.App. 209, 222, 314 So.2d 284, 295 (Civ.App.1975) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[A] material variance between the quotient Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 1: holding that the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict 2: holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial 3: holding that notwithstanding defendants consent the verdict was a nullity where the trial court proceeded to verdict with a jury of eleven 4: holding that discrepancy of only 225 between a quotient of 3275 and a verdict of 3500 was so great as to completely negate the conclusion that the quotient process had been followed in arriving at the verdict", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000). In many ways, plaintiffs seek to base jurisdiction for their claims against these defendants on the in-forum contacts of plaintiffs own subsidiary, C & F. By this logic, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which plaintiff had a subsidiary. Imposing jurisdiction on such \u201crandom\u201d and \u201cfortuitous\u201d grounds would undermine the due process considerations on which the minimum contacts analysis is based. See Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 121, 649 A.2d 379; see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1698, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 142 (1978). Indeed, such an exercise of personal jurisdiction is precluded by well-established due process principles. Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 15, 134 S.Ct. at 1122, 188 L.Ed.2d at 21 (<HOLDING>). 4. Summary There being no grounds for the Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights 1: holding that defendant has initial burden to establish link between fourth amendment violation and challenged evidence 2: holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action 3: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 4: holding that plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, that \u201cthe question of the sufficiency of the evidence needed to go to the jury in a diversity case is a matter of federal law\u201d); Bank of Cali, N.A. v. Opie, 663 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir.1981) (\u201c[Fjederal law alone governs whether evidence is sufficient to raise a question for the trier-of-fact.\u201d). Applying that standard to the case before it, this court in Foster held that, at summary judgment, the plaintiff \u201cmust set forth evidence of a clear and convincing nature that, if believed by the ultimate factfinder, would establish that plaintiff was more likely than not the victim of illegal retaliation by her employer.\u201d Foster, 293 F.3d at 1195. See also Conrad v. Bd. of Johnson County Comm\u2019rs, 237 F.Supp.2d 1204, 1266-67 (D.Kan.2002) (<HOLDING>). Thus, although the state law dictated that a Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law 1: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case 2: holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied 3: holding that a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to follow the law of the forum state 4: holding that for state law retaliatory discharge claims the clear and convincing standard is applied at the summary judgment stage  at least when the claim is brought in a federal court sitting in diversity", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "U.S.C. \u00a7 1252. We review the BIA\u2019s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005), and we grant the petition for review. The BIA denied Hanna\u2019s motion to reopen on the ground that Hanna did not demonstrate he will likely be singled out for persecution and did not address Hanna\u2019s claim that the documentary evidence establishes a pattern or practice of persecution of Coptic Christians in Egypt. See 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A) (proof of particularized persecution to establish a well-founded fear not required where the applicant proves a pattern or practice of persecution of a protected group to which the applicant belongs); see also Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We grant the petition for review and remand Holdings: 0: holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals 1: holding bia erred in requiring petitioners who were hungarian gypies to prove they were singled out for persecution where there was evidence other gypsies were being persecuted 2: holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate 3: holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract 4: holding that district court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show that they were better qualified than employees who were promoted in order to make a prima facie case", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "M.R. Evid. 403, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, \u00b69 n. 3, 892 A.2d 456, 458-59 (admission of a photograph over a Rule 403 objection); or (3) denying Keene\u2019s oral motion for a change of venue, see State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, \u00b6 14, 776 A.2d 621, 626 (denial of a motion for a change of venue). Furthermore, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Keene\u2019s convictions. See State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, \u00b6 7, 895 A.2d 319, 321 (review for sufficiency of the evidence). Finally, although Keene argues that the court was barred under 17-A M.R.S.A. \u00a7 1256(3)(B) from imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a single criminal episode, section 1256(3)(B) did not apply because manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. See State v. Horr, 2003 ME 110, \u00b6 11, 831 A.2d 407, 411 (<HOLDING>). 3 .Keene\u2019s account of the events in the alley Holdings: 0: holding that unintentional crimes which lack criminal purpose and a specific intent element are excluded from the limitation set out in section 12563b 1: holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes 2: holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes 3: holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law 4: holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "must show that the class of plaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members would be \u201cimpracticable.\u201d In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in a national scheme to illegally fix the wholesale price of Potash. The class Plaintiffs seek to represent contains thousands of farm co-ops, agricultural distributors and farmers who purchased potash between April 1987 and July 8, 1994. (Pis.\u2019 Mem. in Supp. of Class Cert, at 5.) Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs\u2019 showing of the numerosity requirement, and based upon the geographical dispersion and number of putative class members, the Court finds that such a challenge would be unavailing. Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that joinder of all putative membe (D.Minn.1990) (<HOLDING>); see generally 4 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Holdings: 0: holding that alleged pricefixing conspiracy involved common questions relating to the existence and proof of illegal agreement 1: recognizing that the government carved out a portion of a larger conspiracy and alleged it as a separate conspiracy 2: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 3: recognizing that ajntitrust pricefixing conspiracy cases by their nature deal with common legal and factual questions about the existence scope and effect of the alleged conspiracy 4: holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "11, the Eleventh Circuit held in Massengale v. Ray that attorney\u2019s fees cannot be awarded to a pro se attorney litigant. 267 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (11th Cir.2001). \u201cBecause a party proceeding pro se cannot have incurred attorney\u2019s fees as an expense, a district court cannot order a violating party to pay a pro se litigant a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee as part of a sanction.\u201d The court relied, in part, on the fact that \u201cthe word \u2018attorney\u2019 generally assumes some kind of agency (that is, attorney/client) relationship\u201d and that when a lawyer proceeds pro se, \u201clegal fees are not truly a \u2018cost\u2019 of litigation \u2014 no independent lawyer has been hired (or must be paid) to pursue the ... complaint.\u201d Id. at 1301 (quoting Ray v. United States Dep\u2019t of Justice, 87 F.3d 1250, 1251 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>)). Other courts have reached the same Holdings: 0: holding that new jersey rule patterned on fed r civ p 11 precludes a pro se attorney litigant from receiving attorneys fees because such fees are not actually incurred 1: holding a pro per litigant to the same standard as an attorney 2: holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 3: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 4: holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "encompasses not just consistency but also plausibility and sufficient detail. See, e.g., In re M-D-, 1998 WL 127881, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1182 (BIA 1998). The B We decide instead to join the Second and Third Circuits in expressly approving the BIA\u2019s corroboration rule. See Guam, Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep\u2019t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Diallo, 232 F.3d at 285); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554); see also Capric, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the rule and the Ninth Circuit\u2019s disapproval of it but neither accepting nor rejecting it). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Micakovic v. Ashcroft, 85 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that the BIA Holdings: 0: holding that due process required a hearing so the putative father would have an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably have complied with utahs statutory requirements or deadlines because he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in utah 1: recognizing refund claim could be barred if there was any valid local limitations law in force when the claim was filed 2: holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force 3: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave 4: holding that even if he was credible the applicant could be reasonably expected to corroborate his claim that government officials in kosovo attempted to force him into military service", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the jury to find that the negative employment action was based on a mix of lawful and unlawful reasons, but which also would have provided Xerox a defense to the effect that it would have taken the same action against Hylind even if the discriminatory factors had not been present). In Gross, the Supreme Court determined that a mixed-motive instruction is not appropriate in an Age Discrimi nation in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d) case. Id. at 2350. But, since this is a Title VII case, not an ADEA case, the Court finds that Gross in no way affects the Court\u2019s decision to give a pretext instruction in this case. In Title VII cases, a plaintiff may proceed under either a pretext theory or a mixed-motive theory. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 317-18 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Watson v. Se. Penn. Trans. Auth., 207 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination 1: holding that the contention that all employment discrimination cases should be analyzed as mixedmotive cases is meritless 2: holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination 3: holding  95114c generally applicable to employment discrimination cases 4: holding that the mixedmotive framework does not apply to retaliation cases under title vii", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "prong of the Collins [v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)] test, the panel opinion did not apply the first prong \u2014 establishing an underlying constitutional violation.\u201d). Indeed, some courts have actively cabined Fagan to its facts and held that, generally, plaintiffs may not pursue a municipal .liability claim without any concomitant individual liability. See, e.g., DeNinno v. Municipality of Penn Hills, 269 Fed.Appx. 153, 158 (3d Cir.2008) (\u201cEven more fundamentally, there can be no municipal liability here because we have determined that none of the individual defendants violated the Constitution.\u201d) (citing Grazier, 328 F.3d at 124 n. 5); Cole ex rel. Cole v. Big Beaver Falls Area Sch. Dist, 2009 WL 3807185, at *8 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 12, 2009) (<HOLDING>) (citing Grazier, 328 F.3d at 124 n. 5); Leddy Holdings: 0: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 1: holding that if the actions of the officer did not reach the level of a constitutional tort the township through its police department cannot be liable because of an inadequate policy or ineffective training program and noting marks criticism of fagan 2: holding that plaintiffs reliance on fagan is misplaced because fagan merely carved out an exception to the general rule of law that a municipality cannot be held accountable pursuant to  1983 when no individual officer violated the constitution  subsequent to fagan the united states court of appeals for the third circuit has clearly stated that it carefully confined fagan to its facts a substantive due process claim resulting from a police pursuit  3: holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights 4: holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "re Roso), 76 F.3d 179, 181 (8th Cir.1996). We review de novo the district court\u2019s conclusions of law, which include the application of collateral estoppel. See Tudor Oaks Ltd. Partnership v. Cochrane (In re Cochrane), 124 F.3d 978, 982 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 118 S.Ct. 1044, 140 L.Ed.2d 109 (1998). Section 523(a)(6) provides that certain debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, namely those that are \u201cfor willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity.\u201d Willful and malicious are two distinct requirements that Fischer, as the party seeking to avoid the discharge of the debt, must prove by the preponderance of the evidence before the \u00a7 523(a)(6) exception to discharge applies. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 926 F.2d 741, Holdings: 0: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied to all of the  523 dischargeability exceptions including the fraud discharge exception 2: holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to  523 claims 3: holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The evidence, all facts, and any reasonable inferences from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. On appeal, WCI challenges the district court\u2019s determination that the assumption and indemnification clauses in the Purchase Agreement place the liability for the cleanup of the Edison Facility on WCI. WCI does not contest the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment on its claims under CERCLA, the Spill Act, or negligence, and thus has waived its right to appellate review of these claims. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Hence, the primary legal question confronting Holdings: 0: holding that generally arguments not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned or waived 1: holding that arguments not briefed are abandoned 2: holding that arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived 3: holding arguments not raised on appeal waived 4: recognizing that arguments not briefed on appeal are waived", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The right at issue in habeas cases, in other words, is not the same right as that at issue in \u00a7 1983 cases. In \u00a7 1983 cases, it is the constitutional right itself that forms the basis of the claim. In habeas cases, in contrast, it is the right not to be held in custody in violation of the Constitution that lies at the core of the suit. This is no mere difference in semantics. Where a petitioner asserts the violation of a constitutional right \u2014 indeed, even one so fundamental as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures \u2014 but the violation did not contribute to the custody of the petitioner, the Court has held that such a claim is not cognizable on habeas. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (<HOLDING>). When the custody itself is unlawful, however, Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 1: recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule 2: holding that fourth amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas review because the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not relate to the accuracy of the factfinding process 3: holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate payment and therefore such claims are not within the jurisdiction of the court 4: holding that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rules are not implicated by a private search", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "I succeeded in their defenses that the guarantee had expired or that the guarantee was fraudulently induced. We again agree with Tucker. The concept of privity requires an alignment of interests and not an exact identity of parties. In Nash County Board of Education v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 494 (4th Cir.1981), this Court applied the definition of privity employed by Judge Goodrich in his concurrence in Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.1950): \u201cPrivity states no reason for including or excluding one from the estoppel of a judgment. It is merely a word used to say that the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to include that ot Cont\u2019l Sav. Ass\u2019n v. Collins, 814 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1991) (<HOLDING>). We do not hold, however, that privity exists Holdings: 0: holding that under florida law for the purposes of collateral estoppel an attorney is in privity with his or her client in a previous suit when the opposing party in that action brings a subsequent suit against the attorney based in the same facts 1: holding that under texas law the mere representation of a party in a lawsuit does not establish privity between an attorney and his or her client 2: holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability 3: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 4: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "define the terms of an otherwise unambiguous contractual term. Sydlik\u2019s interpretation is unimportant when we may construe the contract without that interpretation. Certainly, had she stated she did not believe she had released anyone from liability, appellees would not put such stock in her view. Holding to our traditional rules of interpretation for pre-injury releases, we turn now to determine what claims and parties were released within the four corners of the contract. b. Claims Released As we have explained already, to satisfy the express negligence prong, the release must mention all claims it purports to release. Sydlik relies on certain cases to argue that the language in the release is not specific enough. See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>); Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 811 S.W.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that subcontractor was not obligated to indemnify general contractor for general contractors own negligence where indemnification clause did not expressly state that subcontractor would indemnify general contractor for such negligence 1: holding that if the party seeking indemnity is held liable in part because of its own negligence common law indemnification is unavailable and the only remedy is contribution 2: holding that illinois construction contract indemnification for negligence act invalidates indemnity provision in contract between general contractor and postal service 3: holding that indemnification provision did not expressly state the party was seeking indemnity for its own negligence so as to satisfy express negligence test 4: holding that indemnification  without regard to  the negligence of any party clearly and unequivocally provided bay drilling with indemnification for its own negligence", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Abraham-son insists they are distinct companies observing all corporate formalities. (6/29/10 Abrahamson Dec. \u00b6 4, 6.) 3 .As discussed below, the Court concludes that transfer of this action is appropriate. Accordingly, the standards for evaluating the other portions of Defendants' Motion \u2014 concerning personal jurisdiction and improper venue \u2014 will not be recited herein. Notably, the Court may transfer this action regardless of whether venue is proper in this district or whether it enjoys personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1406(a) (even if action is filed in improper venue, district court may transfer it to \"any district or division in which it might have been brought\u201d); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (<HOLDING>); Eggleton v. Plasser & Theurer Export Von Holdings: 0: holding district lacking personal jurisdiction over defendant not one in which suit might have been brought under section 1404a 1: holding that personal jurisdiction was lacking when the only contact by defendant with forum state was initiated by plaintiffs counsels paralegal for the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction 2: holding that transfer most appropriate under 28 usc  1406a 3: holding that section 1406a grants district courts power to transfer cases even where personal jurisdiction is lacking 4: recognizing conflicting case law regarding whether waiver  under rule 12b3 extends to a request for a transfer under  1406a given that such a transfer is premised on venue being improper in this district", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 411. But the court squarely held that legislative enactments will not be permitted to \"fetter the efficient operation of the courts or impair their ability to uphold their dignity and authority.\" Ibid. The issue in Continental Insurance was whether the maximum penalty specified in the contempt statute was binding on the courts if that maximum penalty was clearly inadequate to preserve the court's authority and efficacy. But courts in other states have held that this same principle-the principle that the contempt power is inherent in the judicial branch of government-forbids the legislature from restricting the judiciary's use of the contempt power, or limiting the instances in which this power may be employed. j See Walker v. Bentley, 660 So.2d 313, 317-321 (Fla.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); La-Grange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutional a statute which prohibited courts from using criminal contempt proceedings to enforce domestic violence restraining orders and which required that all such prosecutorial decisions be made by the executive branch 1: holding that a motion to enforce bankruptcy sale order is a core proceeding and citing 11 usc  105a as the section which gives the bankruptcy court the power and the jurisdiction to enforce its valid orders  2: recognizing that a court granted jurisdiction by statute to review the legality of administrative orders is also empowered to examine the constitutionality of the statute by virtue of which such orders were entered 3: holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions 4: holding that when the executive branch defaults a district court has the authority to appoint a prosecutor for contempt proceedings in order to preserve respect for the judicial system itself", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "demonstrate that \"the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.\" Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). It is not enough that an official \"fail[s] to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not.\" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The proposition that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs can amount to a constitutional violation has been well-settled since Estelle in 1976. Moreover, numerous decisions have involved the withholding or delayed administration of medication. See, e.g., Canady v. Wilkinson, 90 Fed.Appx. 863 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Dozier v. Pauley, 24 Fed.Appx. 398 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that the preindictment delay was a due process violation because actual prejudice was shown and the state had shown absolutely no need for any investigative delay 1: holding that delay in prescription was not eighth amendment violation because delay was inadvertent and quickly rectified 2: holding that a twoday delay was insufficient to establish deliberate indifference and citing cases where no deliberate indifference was found after a sixteenday delay a sixday delay and a threemonth delay 3: holding that prescription delay was not violation because plaintiff could not establish detrimental effect of delay in treatment 4: holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on Texas contract law, but whether its claim is allowable in bankruptcy \u201cis a matter of federal law and the bankruptcy court\u2019s exercise of equitable powers.\u201d See First City Beaumont v. Durkay (In re Ford), 967 F.2d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir.1992). Section 502(b) provides nine grounds for disallowing a claim that has been objected to. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(b). One of these grounds is that the claim \u201cis unenforceable against the debtor under ... applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured.\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 502(b)(1). Courts have uniformly interpreted this to mean that a claim may be disallowed if it is unenforceable under applicable state law. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 127 S.Ct. 1199, 167 L.Ed.2d 178 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Under Texas law, a credit card issuer must Holdings: 0: holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code 1: recognizing rule that state law governs the substance of claims in bankruptcy proceedings 2: recognizing that there are no formal procedures for determining the validity of rs 2477 claims 3: recognizing validity of state antidiscrimination provisions 4: recognizing that  502b1 requires bankruptcy courts to consult state law in determining the validity of most claims", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Iowa inmate Beau T. Berge appeals from the final judgment ent 991) (\u00a7 1983 suit; holding officer who was aware affidavit was untruthful \u201cshould have known [it] would violate the accused\u2019s constitutional rights\u201d). As to Shatto, Milburn, and Lamack, however, Berge failed to specify in his complaint how any of them violated a protected right. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 1: holding that a plaintiff in a bivens action must allege that the individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation 2: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action 3: holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 4: holding that to state  1983 claim against defendant plaintiff must allege that defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the warrant. Rather, according to the trial court, the express terms of the warrant \"through inadvertence\u201d did not permit as extensive a search as was actually conducted. Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial court's ruling was that the search exceeded the scope of a valid warrant. 3 . We do not here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the lower court\u2019s judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court. We do note, however, that our previous opinions on that question have been somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower court\u2019s decision); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (<HOLDING>); L & M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448, 449-50 Holdings: 0: holding that   1252d1 bars the consideration of bases for relief that were not raised below and of general issues that were not raised below but not of specific subsidiary legal arguments or arguments by extension that were not made below 1: holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal 2: holding that petitioners had abandoned arguments not raised below 3: holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below 4: holding that an issue not properly preserved below in the district court is generally waived", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201cMere \u2018knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement\u2019 is not sufficient.\u201d Id. at 1368 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In establishing the predicated direct infringement, a patentee need not present direct evidence of infringement, because a finding that the accused device contains all the limitations of the asserted claims may be done with direct or circumstantial evidence. 02 Micro Int\u2019l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 449 Fed.Appx. 923, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int\u2019l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). For example, \u201cuse of instruction manuals [may Holdings: 0: holding that direct evidence of defendants dna found at the scene was direct evidence merely of a circumstance that suggested his participation in the burglary and theft but was not direct evidence of his participation in the burglary 1: holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct evidence in criminal prosecution 2: holding that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be given the same weight when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 3: holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that a method step was carried out by the direct infringer even in the absence of direct evidence for direct infringer 4: recognizing the difficulty of determining a nonspeculative hypotheticallicense damages amount when the infringer is a direct competitor", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P\u2019ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393-4, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). The \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement has been applied considerably more flexibly\u2014 when it has been applied at all \u2014 in institutional reform cases. See, e.g., Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164. There is good reason for this. Private parties can be expected to move in a timely fashion to modify or vacate orders whenever a change in circumstance arises. Municipal entities, such as the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, however, do not have perfect institutional memory, and where a consent decree has gone unenforced for many years, the individuals who administer those entities may not have any knowledge of its existence. See Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925, 933-34 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, consent decrees, unlike other Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court should overturn a district courts denial of a motion to amend a complaint only if the district court has abused its discretion 1: holding that the district court had abused its discretion in failing to consider the public nature of the litigation in finding that the citys motion to amend did not meet rule 60bs timing requirement 2: holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months 3: holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend 4: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the claimed design by stating, \u201cthe broken lines showing the door pull are for illustrative purposes only and form no part of the claimed design.\u201d Similarly, the patentee could have shown the rear features in broken lines to comply with \u00a7 1.152 while excluding those features from the claimed design. Rather than doing so, the paten-tee included the rear features in the claimed design. In addition, the rear features are not generally concealed. After the door has been installed, the rear features may be temporarily hidden from view when the door is closed. The rear features are visible, however, before the door is installed and when the door is open during use. Accordingly, the rear features are not \u201chidden\u201d and their appearance is a \u201cmatter of concern.\u201d See KeyStone, 997 F.2d at 1451 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the rear features are not Holdings: 0: recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate 1: holding that if there is only one construction that will permit all parts of the deed to be given effect it should be followed 2: holding that actual posses sion requires some visible means which gives notice of exclusion from the property to the true owner or to the public and of the adverse claimants dominion over it 3: holding that there is no hidden portion of a patented block even though it ceases to be visible as a block when incorporated in a wall because as a block all parts of it are visible 4: holding that the use of visible shackles is prohibited unless that use is justified by an essential state interest  such as the interest in courtroom security  specific to the defendant on trial", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "filed and it does not matter that all parties were not served within thirty days. AWSD bases its argument on a novel reading of our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788 (1990). In Maples, the Supreme Court held that on procedural matters such as time limitations for appeals, rules adopted by the Supreme Court governing limitations period for appeal to the judiciary from workers\u2019 compensation deci sions prevail over an inconsistent statute. Id. at 36, 791 P.2d at 790. AWSD argues that Section 72-7-1 is such an inconsistent statute and that AWSD was therefore required to comply only with the requirements set out in Rule 1-074 to perfect its appeal to the district court. But cf. In re Application of Metro. Invs., Inc., 110 N.M. at 440, 796 P.2d at 1136 (<HOLDING>). {7} AWSD admits that it did not make this Holdings: 0: holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional 1: holding that successive new trial or jnov motions do not toll the time for serving the notice of appeal 2: holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue 3: holding that the time limits in the equal access to justice act are jurisdictional 4: holding that section 7271 statutory provisions specifically dealing with the time limits for serving notice of appeal from decisions of the state engineer were jurisdictional", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cbased on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Zhang has not established any error in the BIA\u2019s conclusion that there was no material change in country conditions here. First, Zhang\u2019s apparent assistance to the United States government is a change in personal circumstances that does not excuse the time and number limitations. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006); see also Ali v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Young Dong Kim v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1181 (7th Holdings: 0: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 1: holding that the faas action in this case was  analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion  and noting that when prosecutorial discretion is at issue the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law 2: holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record 3: holding that exercise of prosecutorial discretion was not subject to judicial review absent a constitutional claim or question of law 4: recognizing that the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of that State.\u201d Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396, 68 S.Ct. 1156. The Supreme Court has long held that \u201cthe pursuit of a common calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause.\u201d United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 79 L.Ed.2d 249 (1984). The practice of law has long been held to be a fundamental right within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the profession has both a commercial and noncommercial role in the United States. See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 553, 109 S.Ct. 1294, 103 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989); Piper, 470 U.S. at 281, 105 S.Ct. 1272; cf. Parnell v. Supreme Court of Appeals of W.Va., 110 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). B. Discrimination on the Basis of Residency Holdings: 0: holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice 1: holding right to be fundamental 2: holding that sponsoring applicants for pro hac vice admission to practice law is not a core component of the fundamental right to practice law 3: holding that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes violation of code 4: holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not end our inquiry. Our legislature established restitution as part of a defendant\u2019s sentence. \u201cA victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge ... against the offender if. the offender is' convicted.\u201d Minn.Stat, \u00a7 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). And Minn. Stat. \u00a7 609.10, subd. 1(a)(5) (2012), provides that court-ordered restitution is a sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of a felony. Minnesota courts have consistently interpreted these statutes to mean that restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn.2016); see also State v, Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn.2011). Because the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence, and the rules of evidence do not Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Robers v. Holdings: 0: holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings 1: recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings 2: holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution 3: holding that because restitution hearings are a part of sentencing and have nothing to do with a defendants guilt or innocence the rules of evidence do not apply 4: holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Act, standing alone, is not protected conduct under the SOX.... Id. Further, Plaintiffs deposition testimony makes clear that the bulk of her complaints related to purported ethical lapses of Stifel employees, which Plaintiff deemed contrary to Stifel\u2019s internal ethical policies \u2014 i.e., engaging in office romances, using office equipment for personal reasons, asking an assistant to fix personal computers of the supervisor\u2019s family and friends, spending too much time on out-of-office travel, showing lack of enthusiasm in being a branch manager, meeting \u201cundesirables\u201d in the parking lot, and the like. But complaints about alleged violations of internal company policies are not protected activities under SOX. Wiest v. Lynch, No. 10-3288, 2011 WL 2923860, at *9 (E.D.Pa. July 21, 2011) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Marshall v. Northrup Gruman Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity 1: holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity 2: recognizing that complaint to supervisor could constitute protected activity where employer was made aware of such complaint 3: holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor 4: holding that raising a complaint about a violation of an internal policy is not considered protected activity", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the litigation.\u201d MBI Grp., Inc. v. Credit Fonder Du Cameroun, 616 F.3d 568, 571 (D.C.Cir.2010) (emphases added). \u201cA court first determines whether there is an adequate alternative forum and, if so, then proceeds to balance both private interest factors and public interest factors in favor of the respective forums.\u201d Jackson v. Am. Univ. in Cairo, 52 Fed.Appx. 518, 518 (D.C.Cir.2002). The Supreme Court has explained that, ordinarily, the requirement of an adequate alternative forum \u201cwill be satisfied when the defendant is \u2018amenable to process\u2019 in the other jurisdiction.\u201d Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981). However, \u201cwhere the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory,\u201d for example \u201cwhere the alternative foru D.N.Y.1996)(<HOLDING>); Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that extreme delay in the alternative forum can render that forum inadequate 1: holding an alternative remedy to be inadequate where it would have caused great delay in the vindication of the petitioners rights 2: holding that ghana was an inadequate alternative forum for a former ghanian trade counselor suing a ghanian security official for alleged torture because plaintiff would be put in grave danger if forced to litigate there 3: holding inadequate alternative forum because the court believed that plaintiffs would not obtain justice at the hands of the courts administered by iranian mullahs and would probably be shot if they returned to iran 4: holding that paraguay was an inadequate alternative forum because the paraguayan government was implicated in the alleged wrongdoing and individuals investigating the case had been murdered", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "as follows: When a company sells or transfers its assets to another company, the successor company does not acquire the liabilities of the transferor\u2019s assets, unless (1) The sale transaction is, in effect, a consolidation or merger. (2) The successor corporation is merely a continuation of the transferor corporation. (3) The transaction is fraudulently entered into in order to escape liability. Dawejko v. Jorgensen, 290 Pa.Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106, 107-108 (1981) \u00b6 11 The agent\u2019s statements to Mr. Scanlon that Vista was told to \u201cchange its name\u201d to DCL because Vista was being \u201ctaken over\u201d by DCL, considered with other evidence adduced at trial, provides the evidentiary foundation for the charges of these three exceptions. Lockhart v. List, 542 Pa. 141, 148, 665 A.2d 1176, 1179 (1995) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 12 For all of the foregoing reasons, I Holdings: 0: holding that unless an erroneous instruction was unlikely to have changed the result of the trial a reviewing court cannot say that giving the instruction was harmless error 1: holding that in reviewing a jury instruction this court must review the entire instruction and look at all the evidence on the record to determine whether there was error and whether that error prejudiced the complaining party 2: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 3: holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present 4: holding that a court reviewing an informal adjudication must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "985 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, it is evident that Prive\u2019s injury occurred in the context of Dr. Fabian\u2019s business activities. Clearly if Prive had tripped while in Dr. Fabian\u2019s office, see also Harad, supra at 985, had been exposed to disease because Dr. Fabian had improperly labeled laboratory samples, see Doe v. Doctors Bryan, Hatcher, Vick and Gastings, 623 So.2d 722 (Ct.App.La. 1993), or had injured herself moving a patient, see Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (Ca. 1952), a medical malpractice action would not be warranted. As these cases recognize, the proper recourse for a physician\u2019s negligence toward nonpatients is a common law claim for negligence rather than a claim for medical malpractice. See Doe, supra at 723; see also Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 49-50 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the exclusion clause in the Holdings: 0: holding that a patients settlement of a prior action brought against him by doctors for payment of a bill did not bar medical malpractice action against doctors 1: holding that doctors conduct toward patient that does not come within penumbra of doctorpatient relationship cannot form basis for malpractice action 2: holding that doctors may limit the extent of their responsibility to patients by narrowing the scope of the doctorpatient relationship 3: holding that provision would not be enforced due to that fact that the doctorpatient relationship is special and entitled to unique protection 4: holding that an obligation imposed by statute cannot form the basis for a statutory employer relationship", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "de novo a district court\u2019s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. Guzman v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Homeland Sec., 679 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir.2012). Sefa\u2019s claims against the Cabinet are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment \u201cbars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments.\u201d Thiokol Corp. v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir.1993). Because Kentucky has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity under sections 1981 and 1983 or any other federal statute cited by Sefa, his claims against the Cabinet cannot proceed. See Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193-94 Holdings: 0: holding california school district a state agency for purposes of the eleventh amendment 1: holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation 2: holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981 3: holding that the eleventh amendment bars blyshrl and nychrl claims against a state agency in federal court 4: recognizing that section 1981 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "AND ORDER DISPOSING OF ALL PENDING MOTIONS McMAHON, District Judge. The various pending motions are disposed of as follows: 1. TM\u2019s motion for Leave to Rely on the Statement of Ethan Miller is granted, and IBM\u2019s cross-motion to strike the statement is denied. 2. IBM\u2019s motion for summary judgment relating to the \u2019342 patent is denied, on the ground that there are myriad disputed issues of material fact, almost all of them concerning the question of substantial equivalence under the Doctrine 985). See also, e.g., C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F.Supp. 213 (E.D.N.Y.1966) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 397 F.2d 952 (2nd Cir.1968); Servaas & Holdings: 0: holding that motions for summary judgment in patent cases must be considered with unusual caution 1: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment 2: holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care 3: holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto 4: recognizing that summary judgment must be approached with special caution in discrimination cases", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "regarding the remedial investigation that occurred from March 1996 through February 1997. Second, it contends that the public was not given a \u201cmeaningful\u201d opportunity to comment on Aviall\u2019s remedy selection because the public meeting held at the end of 2002 was merely a \u201csham.\u201d Concerning the first argument (regarding the remedial investigation), the parties are again silent on the question whether all foreseeably affected parties were given a meaningful opportunity to comment. The court will therefore afford the p blic meetings did not allow meaningful opportunity for comment on remedy selection, where first did not even discuss issue, and second was held after plaintiff had already begun an \u201cearly and essential step\u201d in remediation process); Pierson Sand, 1996 WL 338624, at *3-*4 (<HOLDING>). Thus the court declines to hold, as a matter Holdings: 0: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient 1: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful 2: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 3: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy 4: holding that public meetings were not adequate where first was held without sufficient notice and second was held after remedy was already selected by means of consent judgment", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to make a factual determination as to whether Richardson\u2019s failure to appear at his sentencing was willful. At this hearing, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Richardson willfully failed to appear. See Peacock v. State, 77 So.3d 1285, 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing Ingmire, 9 So.3d at 1281). If the State fails to establish willfulness, then Richardson should be sentenced in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement previously accepted by the trial court. See Lowery v. State, 22 So.3d 745, 749 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). REVERSED and REMANDED. TORPY, PALMER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur. 1 . Richardson\u2019s plea agreement is known as a \"Quarterman\u201d agreement. See Quarterman v. State, 527 So.2d 1380 (Fla.1988) Holdings: 0: holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that as a matter of common sense a defendant is already under a legal duty not to go out and commit more crimes in the future regardless of whether the penalty is ordinary or enhanced neither the court nor counsel is required to advise a defendant what penalty he can expect to receive for crimes not yet committed the defendant can avoid further sentencing consequences enhanced or otherwise by refraining from committing new crimes future sentence enhancement for a later crime is not a direct consequence of a plea at all but is instead contingent first on the defendants voluntary decision to commit another crime second on whether the new crime is one capable of having enhanced sentencing and third on the prosecutors discretionary decision whether to seek enhancement future sentence enhancement is plainly a collateral consequence not a direct consequence of the defendants plea in the earlier case 2: holding specific performance of plea agreement proper remedy where defendant testified against all of his coconspirators and where court later unilaterally breached original plea agreement by imposing a ninety day term of incarceration in addition to sentence of probation that had been earlier agreed to without first providing1 defendant with opportunity to withdraw plea on the record 3: holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing 4: holding that where a furlough and an enhanced sentence for failure to appear in court at a later time are part of the plea agreement a court is justified in imposing the enhanced sentence after the defendant fails to appear in court without giving him an opportunity to withdrawhis plea", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with Samek in Samek\u2019s individual capacity, and not with Samek\u2019s group practice. The court awarded Gerson $400,-000.00 in damages for breach of contract plus $371,835.62 in prejudgment interest, which had been pled in the complaint. The record reflects that there was competent and substantial evidence presented at trial that fully supports the jury verdict. \u201cCredibility of the witnesses was a jury question. There was sufficient testimony upon which the jury could fix and determine the amount of damages. The testimony as to damages was not so uncertain, speculative, remote, contingent and inconclusive that it could not support or justify the verdict rendered.\u201d McCall v. Sherbill, 68 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla.1953). See also Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 349 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla.1977)(<HOLDING>); Espino v. Anez, 665 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 3d Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 1: holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party 2: holding that a verdict must be sustained against a sufficiency of the evidence challenge if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence 4: holding that a district court must compare and weigh the opposing evidence and it must set aside the verdict if it determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "available only if the violation of state law \u201craises federal constitutional problems.\u201d Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, whether or not the state court erred under Alabama law in its rulings at Davis\u2019 trial is \u201clargely beside the point\u201d in the court\u2019s analysis. Jammed v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.1991). IV. DISCUSSION Davis seeks habeas corpus relief as to his sentence of death based upon the Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in Roper, supra, and the court addresses this claim first. Davis also has raised and briefed six constitutional guilt-phase claims attacking the validity of his judgment of conviction which the court will address in the order in which the claims are asserted by Davis. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). A. Davis\u2019Sentence of Death This case no Holdings: 0: holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied 1: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 2: holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 3: holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law 4: holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "6 (1998). According to Kansas case law the generally accepted meaning of an accident is \u201can undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.\u201d Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 553, 867 P.2d 325 (1994). According to USF & G, the allegations of negligent misrepresentations and negligence in inspecting the minivan and reporting the history of the minivan do not fit the generally accepted meaning of an \u201caccident.\u201d The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether negligent misrepresentation or negligence in discovering and reporting safety defects constitutes an \u201caccident.\u201d This court believes that, if faced with the issue, the . of New York, 32 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1258 (D.Kan. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Mike Miller Holdings: 0: holding that negligently allowing a statute of limitations to run does not constitute an ethical violation 1: holding that negligent construction is not sudden unexpected or unanticipated and does not constitute an accident 2: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 3: holding that the insurer did not have a duty to defend because the pleadings alleged that the defendants had acted intentionally rather than negligently 4: holding that the claim that the defendants negligently provided investment advice did not constitute an accident", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "When Asbill initially entered the hotel\u2019s office, Cruel was the only employee present, which represented to third parties that she was in charge. Asbill testified that Patidar told him that he could leave the papers with Cruel or that he could come back. Patidar similarly testified that he told Asbill it was up to him whether to leave the papers. Under these facts, we find that Patidar knowingly permitted Cruel to exercise authority to accept service of process and further find that his manifestations to Asbill indicated that Cruel had such authority. For these reasons, we hold that evidence in the record supports the trial court\u2019s finding that Cruel was authorized to accept service. Brown v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.A., 348 S.C. 569, 583, 560 S.E.2d 624, 631 (Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). II. Rule 55(c) Appellants argue that the Holdings: 0: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 1: holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required 2: holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error 3: holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support the finding 4: recognizing that the findings of the circuit court on factual issues arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction are binding on the appellate court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 493-94. This principle of representative claim preclusion indisputably applies to actions brought by a government agency or officer on behalf of non-party individuals. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 494. \u201cWell established precedent ... holds that the judgment in an action in which a government agency or officer represents private individuals is binding on those individuals.\u201d Id. (citing Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46, 32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820 (1912) (recognizing \u201cif the United States ... is entitled to bring a suit ... [to set aside illegal land conveyances], it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the litigation\u201d)); see also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass\u2019n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1125 Holdings: 0: holding that consent decree in action by united states and state of alaska against exxon which resolved governments claims for damage to use and enjoyment of environment had res judicata effect and precluded nonparty sport fisherman from pursuing same type of claim in separate action against exxon 1: holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity 2: holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action 3: holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary 4: holding that the united states and the state of alaska as public trustees under the cwa and cercla could recover all lost use damages caused by the spill and that private claims for lost recreational use were barred under res judicata", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "credence to Ms. Thompson-Wright\u2019s tip. The justification for detaining appellant was markedly enhanced when Officer Chih learned (before taking him to the show-up) that appellant had recently arrived at the apartment (making it more likely that he was out in the neighborhood at the time of the robbery). Assessing the totality of these circumstances, the trial court properly avoided the \u201csort of divide-and-conquer analysis\u201d in which appellant engages. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744. It did not err in concluding that the police acted reasonably in commanding appellant not to make any sudden moves, in patting him down to check for weapons, and in detaining him until the show-up procedure was complete. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603, 608 Holdings: 0: holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous 1: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger 2: holding that an officer making a reasonable investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from attack by a hostile suspect  and he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to this protective purpose 3: holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot 4: holding that long authorizes protective search of vehicle for weapons during terry stop even when suspect is outside vehicle and effectively under police control", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "between investigative detentions and custody are legion. Thus, to discuss the issue here, it is necessary to use that investigative detention/custody framework. Nevertheless, the use of the term investigative detention when discussing the Fifth Amendment should be interpreted as a non-custodial encounter under Miranda rather than a Fourth Amendment stop under Terry. 27 . See United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 296 (6th Cir.1988) (Jones, J., concurring) (concluding \"since a valid Terry seizure is, by definition, not a \u2018full seizure\u2019 \u2014 a term synonymous with \u2018arrest\u2019 \u2014 a person properly seized on reasonable and articulable suspicion for a brief investigatory detention could never be considered \u2018in custody\u2019 so long as the scope and duration of the Terry stop do not exceed h Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 29 . If custody and investigative detention Holdings: 0: holding defendant was in custody under miranda while being detained under terry 1: holding police officer knew that miranda rights are required to be given only to individuals who are in custody and although giving miranda warnings to a detainee may not automatically convert a terry stop into an arrest it is evidence that the nature of the detention has grown more serious 2: holding a defendant was not in custody for purposes of miranda after he consented to go to police headquarters 3: holding miranda inapplicable because defendant not in custody 4: holding that defendant was not in miranda custody during knock and talk interview at his residence", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "$5 and costs, conviction reversed); Jones v. Opelika (1942) 316 U.S. 584 [86 L.Ed. 1691, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 141 A.L.R. 514] (selling books without license, reversed) (fine of unstated amount, see Cole v. City of Fort Smith (1941) 202 Ark. 614 [151 S.W.2d 1000]); Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U.S. 147 [84 L.Ed. 155, 60 S.Ct. 146] (violation on ban on public distribution of leaflets, convictions reversed) (fines of $5, see Commonwealth v. Nichols (1938) 301 Mass. 584 [18 N.E.2d 166], and $25, see People v. Young (1938) 33 Cal.App.2d Supp. 747 [85 P.2d 231]); Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444 [82 L.Ed. 949, 58 S.Ct. 666] (distribution of literature without permission of city manager, $50 fine, conviction reversed); Davis v. Massachusetts (1897) 167 U.S. 43 [42 L.Ed. 71, 17 S.Ct. .731] (<HOLDING>). 3 Since Congressman Tunney\u2019s appearance at Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine 1: holding meeting without a permit fine of unstated amount conviction affirmed 2: holding meeting without permit fine of 25 plus costs conviction reversed 3: holding religious meeting in public park without license 20 fine conviction affirmed 4: holding meeting without permit 10 fine conviction reversed", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for dependency did not reference abandonment. The father\u2019s position is unfounded because the petition for dependency alleged generally that the parents had abused and neglected the child, and the trial court stated on the record that the child was found dependent based upon the father\u2019s neglect. The father also argues that this court erred when it dismissed his first appeal based upon a determination that the trial court\u2019s order finding his daughter dependent but withholding an adjudication of dependency. was not a final, appealable order. Although both parties recognize that this issue is now moot, both request appellate review because of an apparent inconsistency in the manner in which our court has addressed this issue. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So.2d 964 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). We agree that appellate review is warranted Holdings: 0: recognizing the general principle that a party who fails to address an issue has conceded the issue 1: holding that an appellate court cannot address on appeal an issue never ruled upon by the trial court 2: holding that the court can properly address an issue which although moot is likely to recur 3: holding that the court properly refused to instruct on an issue for which no evidence was offered 4: holding that although an address in which the zip code is incorrect may be properly addressed an address in which both the zip code and the street address is incorrect is not properly addressed", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 702. The civil forfeiture in Plaintiffs\u2019 case was achieved by a consent judgment in judicial proceedings; the civil forfeiture did not involve agency action. By its own terms, \u00a7 702 only applies where the party seeks judicial review of agency action. Because the instant forfeiture took place in the context of a civil judicial proceeding, there is no agency action for the district court or this Court to review. See Comm, of Blind Vendors of D.C. v. District of Columbia, 28 F.3d 130, 134 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The APA therefore cannot be the basis for a Holdings: 0: holding that under the apa exhaustion is a prerequisite to judicial review when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review so long as the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review 1: holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record 2: holding apa 5 usc  702 inapplicable because no agency proceeding took place for the court to review 3: holding that the apa does not afford an implied grant of subjectmatter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action 4: holding a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. Alternatively, Markwell claims that his alleged action is immunized based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Def. Mot. to Dismiss (d/e 14) at 15. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides that \u201cparties may petition the government for official action favorable to their interests without fear of suit, even if the results of the petition, if granted, might harm the interests of others.\u201d See Tarpley v. Keistler, 188 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir.1999). The doctrine protects \u201clitigation, lobbying, and speech... as an application of the First Amendment\u2019s speech and petitioning clauses.\u201d New West, LP v. Joliet, 491 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir.2007). The Seventh Circuit has extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to government officials as well. See id. at 721-22 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In doing so, the court recognized that public Holdings: 0: recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment 1: holding that ijnjuries caused by the condition of a public entitys property  clearly refers to ownership of a property interest which allows a public entity to control the property 2: holding that joliet public officials actions of filing litigation sending letters and making public statements regarding a property in an effort to persuade the department of housing and urban development to cut funding to the property were protected by the first amendment 3: holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern 4: holding that a public entitys property refers to the public entity that owns the property where a dangerous condition exists", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144 (1986); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977)). The State contends that Smith is distinguishable from the present case, stating that, unlike in Smith, where the trial judge ruled that proof of a required element of the charged offense was lacking, here, the State was required to prove an additional element that the statute does not require. In short, the State argues that Carter was never \u201cacquitted\u201d for double-jeopardy purposes. We cannot agree. To begin with, the Supreme Court\u2019s definition of \u201cacquittal\u201d in Smith, only requires a \u201cresolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.\u201d Smith, 125 S.Ct at 1134 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the State has failed to cite a Holdings: 0: recognizing ruling on motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo on appeal 1: holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added 2: holding that competency is appropriately defined as the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed upon the convict emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added 4: holding that an acquittal may be based on a ruling by the court however mistaken that the evidence is insufficient to convict emphasis added", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "bright line rule designed to exclude the use of state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See, e.g., Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 401, n. 15, 90 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 15; Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 866-867; Matter of S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 752 (5 Cir.1976). However, \u201cit appears that [that] choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of [the now pending] summary judgment motion ... [because plaintiffs\u2019 state claims] are not permitted [in any event] where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law\u201d. Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F.Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn.1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Complaint of DFDS Seaways (Bahamas) Ltd., 684 Holdings: 0: holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law 1: holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law 2: holding that reverseerie doctrine requires that substantive remedies afforded by state law conform to federal maritime standards 3: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 4: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or the nature of the position for which the defendant was employed. Obviously, a janitor employed by the government that defies department rules and/or his supervisor\u2019s orders could not be reasonably deemed to be entitled to official immunity when he decides not to post a \u201cwet floor\u201d sign after mopping. The janitor\u2019s duty to post such a sign could not be deemed to require \u201cthe exercise of reason in the adaptation of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or course pursued\u201d regardless of whether such action is required by statute or state regulation. Indeed, Missouri cases have routinely denied official immunity in instances where no statute or state regulation was violated. See Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Mo.App. W.D.2010) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Brandt, 325 S.W.3d 481, 483 Holdings: 0: holding that mayor is a high public official 1: holding that it was a jury question whether a general warning to avoid excessive pressure was adequate to reveal the danger of an exploding safety ring at a high pressure setting 2: holding dismissal of petition was erroneous and that the defendant failed to demonstrate entitlement to official immunity where the plaintiff averred that the defendant a public employee negligently injured him while operating a high pressure hose 3: holding that stateagent immunity was not available to a county employee who sued the plaintiff and had him arrested for operating without a business license because the evidence showed that in so doing the defendant acted with malice willfullness or  so beyond his authority that sovereign immunity would not apply footnote omitted 4: holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "While not specifically enumerated in the terms of Article II, section 3 of Montana\u2019s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right to pursue life\u2019s basic necessities.\u201d Wadsworth v. Montana, 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1996). In Wadsworth, the Montana Supreme Court held \u201cthat the opportunity to pursue employment, while not specifically enumerated as a fundamental constitutional right under Article II, section 3 of Montana\u2019s constitution is, notwithstanding, necessarily encompassed within it and is itself a fundamental right because it is a right \u2018without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1986) (<HOLDING>)). Plaintiffs want to equate the opportunity to Holdings: 0: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution 1: holding that montanas constitution does not create a right to welfare 2: holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm 3: holding that the employer intended to create a new employee welfare benefit plan 4: holding that the constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "itself,\u201d Lim, 224 F.3d at 936, here Salguero-Castro testified to threats \u201cwith more\u201d\u2014the threats were menacing and were combined with an (albeit unsuccessful) attempt by the military to shoot and kill Salguero-Castro. As the majority notes, in Gui v. INS, we found past persecution when an applicant was first threatened and then survived a staged car crash. 280 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir.2002). The reasoning in Gui supports a finding of past persecution here: \u201cThe fact that [Salguero-Castro] did not in fact die or suffer serious injury in [the shooting incident] should not mitigate the severity of the acts. Had he been maimed in the [shooting incident], persecution would be established easily.\u201d Gui, 280 F.3d at 1229. See also Del Carmen Molina v. INS, 170 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.1999)(<HOLDING>); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity 1: holding that substantial evidence did not support agencys finding fear speculative when petitioner had offered evidence that she had already had two children that she planned to have more that she had gone to great lengths to avoid being sterilized in china and that she had removed her iud after escaping to the united states 2: holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer and officer testified that request was unambiguous 3: holding that alien who had received numerous death threats and whose colleagues were murdered by the military had not proven past persecution 4: holding that where petitioner testified that some of her cousins had been killed because they served in the military and that she had received two threatening notes she had demonstrated past persecution", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "also moved to strike Asphalt as class representative arguing that Asphalt lacked the requisite typicality and commonality because Nextel had unique defenses applicable only to Asphalt. At the hearing, affidavits and depositions were introduced. Thereafter, the trial court granted the motion to strike Asphalt as class representative, but denied the motion for summary judgment. The parties filed motions for rehearing and/or reconsideration. Following a hearing, the trial court also granted final summary judgment against Asphalt. This appeal follows. First, contrary to H & J and Asphalt\u2019s assertion, we find that the trial court acted within its discretion by striking them as class representatives. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a); Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); Weinstein v. American Biomaterials Corp., 123 Holdings: 0: holding that a class action may continue even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot 1: holding that trial court may not consider whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail 2: holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist  between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot 3: holding that trial court may consider honesty and trustworthiness of the named plaintiff to judge the adequacy of representation 4: recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and, given the absence of contrary law in the First Circuit, this Court concludes that the award of $8,000 of Wife\u2019s pension to Husband did not create a dischargeable debt. It is both equitable and in conformance with the clear majority rule, that this Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court that Husband has a vested property interest in an amount of $8,000 in Wife\u2019s pension fund and that such interest was not a prepetition debt of the Bankruptcy estate. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . A vast majority of courts have followed the line of cases holding that an interest in a spouse\u2019s pension awarded prepetition is not a dischargeable debt. Chandler v. Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), Hall v. Hall, 51 B.R. 1002 (S.D.Ga.1985) Holdings: 0: holding former wifes cause of action accrued at the time of former husbands failure to pay her the portion of his retirement benefits to which she was entitled which was no earlier than the date of his actual retirement 1: holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce 2: holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce 3: recognizing that a divorce decree which obligated the divorcing husband to name the children of his first marriage as the irrevocable beneficiaries of an insurance policy precluded him from naming his new wife as a beneficiary entitled to a portion of the insurance benefits 4: holding debtor could not discharge that portion of his monthly army retirement benefits awarded to his wife pursuant to a divorce decree", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "have moved for summary judgment does not permit the entry of a summary judgment if disputes remain as to material facts. However, cross motions for summary judgments do authorize the court to assume that there is no evidence which needs to be considered other than that which has been filed by the parties. Harrison W. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). See Sec. & Exch. Comm\u2019n v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir.1976)(\u201c[F]iling of cross-motions under Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. raises the inference that there is no evidence other than the pleadings and supporting instruments to be considered, and so the trial court need only examine those materials in ascertaining whether an issue of material fact exists.\u201d (8th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>). \u201cThe district court has discretion to go Holdings: 0: holding that the district court has no affirmative obligation to plumb the record to procure material facts 1: holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  2: holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense 3: holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority 4: holding that the court had no obligation to search large record extract", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "execute their duties as police officers. Thus, this type of communication falls squarely within the scope of speech as a public employee under Garcetti. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff also copied the Memorandum to next level of supervision (i.e., the Village Board) does not alter the analysis in this case. The fact that plaintiff not only expressed the grievance to his immediate supervisor, but also to the entity ultimately responsible for the proper functioning of the police department is simply further evidence that this speech was not citizen speech; rather, the Memorandum \u2014 whether required or not\u2014 was clearly pursuant to his duties as a police officer. See, e.g., White v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., No. 8:06-CV-1626-T27MAP, 2008 WL 227990, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 25, 2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Knight v. Drye, 375 Fed.Appx. 280, Holdings: 0: holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself 1: holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties 2: holding that letter that was copied to the schools board of directors was written pursuant to her duties and was not protected speech 3: holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law 4: holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the county claims statute could limit. Pross, 303 S.E.2d at 890. The United States Supreme Court has also employed a similar rule of statutory construction when interpreting whether the United States is included as a \u201cperson\u201d within federal legislation: Since, in common usage, the term \u201cperson\u201d does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 743-44, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Employing the above standards, we are Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff may state a claim under the sherman act for a defendants enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the pto where the plaintiff alleges deliberate fraud and the other elements of a monopolization claim under section 2 of the sherman act 1: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred 2: holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act 3: holding that the use of the words any person was insufficient under the ordinary dignities of speech to authorize an action by the federal government for treble damages under the sherman act 4: holding treble damages under the civil theft statute are punitive", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of his excessive force grieva rrectional officer shut off water for five days because the prisoner used the prison grievance system was sufficient to state a retaliation claim); Burgess, 39 F.3d at 218 (threat made in retaliation for a prisoner\u2019s use of the prison grievance system is sufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim). A reasonable jury could conclude that Blair\u2019s placement of Santiago in a cell without his personal property, proper facilities, bedding, or clothing and Blair\u2019s threat that things would get worse, issued after hearing Santiago complain that he was being retaliated against, are adverse actions sufficient to chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 398 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Santiago has also satisfied the causal Holdings: 0: holding that the prison physician lacked standing to raise the prisoners rights of access to the courts 1: holding that harassment physical threats and transfer to the area of the prison used to house mentally disturbed inmates especially combined with the conditions allegedly present there would likely deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from exercising a right to access the courts 2: holding that the record contained insufficient evidence that increasing the prisoners work load would chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from using the prison grievance process 3: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution 4: holding that threats to an inmates safety after his use of the prison grievance system supported a retaliation claim", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "existing driveways and curb cuts in light of the statutory change that has affected the plaintiff\u2019s ability to use his deeded easement. This conduct is the functional equivalent of the obstruction or impairment contemplated in Sakansky and Bean. The trial court also found that the deviation proposed by the plaintiff would not unduly burden the defendant. We uphold such findings if they are supported by the evidence and are not erroneous as a matter of law. See Batakis v. Town of Belmont, 135 N.H. 595, 597, 607 A.2d 956, 957 (1992). The record supports the trial court\u2019s findings. Under these circumstances, the owner of the dominant estate may deviate from the deeded easement to the extent reasonably necessary to secure an egress to the highway. Cf. Haley v. Colcord, 59 N.H. 7, 9 (1879) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we uphold the trial court\u2019s ruling Holdings: 0: holding that an easement is not a separate estate when dominant and servient tracts are under the same ownership 1: holding that the owner of the dominant tenement may extinguish an easement appurtenant by specifically excluding it from a conveyance of the dominant estate 2: holding that the burden on the servient estate cannot be increased without the consent of the owners of the servient estate and that the owner of the dominant estate to which the appurtenant easement is attached has no power to convey or expand use of that easement in connection with a tract of land owned by another 3: recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement 4: holding that dominant tenant may deviate from path of prescriptive easement to extent reasonably necessary to pass around obstruction created by servient tenant", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in employment discrimination cases,\u201d citing Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.1990); Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364). Summary judgment is appropriate in employment discrimination cases only in \u201cthose rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion.\u201d Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244; see also Webb v. St. Louis Posh-Dispatch, 51 F.3d 147, 148 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244); Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244). To put it another way, \u201c[b]e-cause discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant.\u201d Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (<HOLDING>); accord Snow, 128 F.3d at 1205 (\u201cBecause Holdings: 0: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 1: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 2: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 3: holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment 4: holding that an eeoc reasonable cause determination letter did not constitute evidence precluding summary judgment when the other evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "held that \u201c[e]ach patent asserted raises an independent and distinct cause of action.\u201d Id. at 1555-56. Plaintiffs argument appears to be a red herring. While the Court understands that, for purposes of res judi-cata, each patent is distinct, there is undoubtedly no question here as to whether the '505 and '418 patents are independent of the four patents involved in the 2006 Maryland action. Thus, the issue here is not one of res judicata; rather, it is whether StemCells subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this Court when it filed a prior suit against Neuralstem with respect to related patents, involving the same parties, and arising out of the same transaction or same nucleus of operative facts. See Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940.F.2d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The Court is satisfied that there exists Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction 1: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 2: holding that a defendant who elected to avail itself of the benefit of a state courts jurisdiction by filing a prior suit against the same party waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim and arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts for which it originally invoked the courts jurisdiction 3: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction 4: holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "In Comdisco, the taxpayer submitted information to a taxing authority listing the value of its taxable property at \u201c$13,000,000\u201d instead of \u201c$1,300,000.\u201d 927 S.W.2d at 326. The court of appeals held that, under the provisions of section 25.25(c) of the Tax Code, the taxpayer\u2019s alleged mistake was the result of a clerical error, and the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment that had been granted in favor of the taxing authority and remanded the case for a determination of the actual value of the property. Id. at 327-28. We note that, in Comdisco, the taxpayer\u2019s alleged error resulted from the addition of an extra decimal place. Id. at 326; see also Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 985 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Here, Marubeni alleges that the errors in its Holdings: 0: holding that it was a clerical error readily correctable under frcrim p 36 where the judgment of conviction named a different subsection than that for which the defendant was charged and tried but where the penalties under those subsections were the same 1: holding sufficient evidence existed that the victim was not released in a safe place where the victim was left tied to a tree in a damp wooded area fortyfive feet off a dirt road and ninetythree feet down a path 2: holding that there was sufficient evidence of wanton endangerment where a bullet came within fifteen feet of a bystander 3: holding that the court made a clerical error or was just guilty of creating ambiguous verbiage where it sentenced the defendant to parole under counts four and five instead of one and three and concluding that the answer is for the order to be corrected not vacated 4: holding that taxing authoritys incorrect listing of warehouse as having 20125 square feet instead of 201250 square feet was correctable clerical error under section 2525c of the tax code", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "credits. Stated another way, the ALC may not summarily decline to hear an inmate appeal solely on the ground that it involves the loss of the opportunity to earn-sentence related credits. Turning to the facts of the instant case, the ALC should not have summarily dismissed Appellant\u2019s appeal as it involved more than a review of the loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credits and a reduction in earned-work credits. Appellant also challenged the SCDC\u2019s enforcement of the policy forbidding one inmate from providing legal assistance to another inmate. Because Appellant\u2019s claim constitutes an as-applied constitutional challenge to the policy, the ALC could have ruled on this claim. See Travelscape, LLC v. S.C. Dep\u2019t of Rev., 391 S.C. 89, 108-09, 705 S.E.2d 28, 38-39 (2011) (<HOLDING>). However, for reasons that will be discussed, Holdings: 0: holding that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs asapplied challenge to the constitutionality of the tennessee collateral review statutes under rookerfeldman 1: holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that the alc may not rule upon a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation or statute but may rule upon an asapplied challenge 3: holding that a facial challenge to regulation accrues when the agency publishes its rule in the federal register 4: recognizing that categorical constitutional challenge was fundamentally similar to asapplied constitutional challenge initially raised on appeal", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the date of the court\u2019s October 1995 judgment) from the es-crowed sales proceeds. Sandra filed a motion to amend the judgment, arguing that the court should reverse its award of interest on the $6,693 it awarded to the IRS. Sandra also moved the court to award her interest, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2411, on the funds that the IRS would have to return to her. The court granted Sandra\u2019s motion in part, deleting the interest awarded to the IRS, but denied her request for interest. The government filed a timely notice of appeal and Sandra filed a timely notice of cross-appeal in June 1999. In October 1999, the government petitioned this court for en banc review of the Craft I decision. The government argued that the Craft I decision \u2014 as well Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>), a prior decision upon which the Craft I court Holdings: 0: holding that when the united states held a senior tax lien it was an indispensable party under the controlling federal tax law 1: holding that the right to disclaim property under state law does not defeat a federal tax lien because the taxpayer exercised control over the disposition of the property 2: holding that under michigan law tenants in the entirety possess sufficient property interests for federal tax liens to attach 3: holding that no tax liens may attach to property after the fdic acquired title 4: holding that federal government may not under michigan law attach lien to entireties property to satisfy individual tax liability of one spouse", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "public interest.\u201d Administrative agencies are far better suited than \u00e1re courts to make determinations based on the broad policy question of what is in the \u201cpublic interest.\u201d Third, \u00a7 925(c) contains a restriction on the consideration of new evidence by the district courts, stating; \u201cThe court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.\u201d This constraint on the admission of evidence suggests that the initial adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of the Treasury. We therefore conclude that Congress in tended for district court review to be contingent on an initial consideration of an application by the Secretary. See Saccacio v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 211 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Owen v. Magaw, 122 F.3d 1350, 1354 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925c 1: holding that congress clearly intended to suspend  925c relief by denial of funding for investigating and processing applications under the statute and denying writ of mandamus 2: holding that section 925c authorizes judicial review of only the denial of an application for relief 3: holding that the only role for the judiciary is judicial review of a denial of relief under  925c 4: holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "injury and intrude into a state-administered and judicially-ordered execution in the manner proposed by Arthur. X. TURNER FACTORS Lewis further explained that Bounds \u201cmust be read in pari materia\u201d with Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), which held \u201cthat a prison regulation impinging on inmates\u2019 constitutional rights \u2018is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.\u2019 \u201d Lewis, 518 U.S. at 361, 116 S.Ct. at 2185 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 88, 107 S.Ct. at 2262). The courts thus must \u201caccord adequate deference to the judgment of the prison\u2019 authorities,\u201d especially with inmates in lockdown or other inmates \u201cpresenting special disciplinary and security concerns.\u201d Id.; see also Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has laid out four factors Holdings: 0: holding that turner did not cast doubt on the courts previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons 1: holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for racial classifications even in the prison context 2: holding that strict scrutiny applies 3: recognizing in a  1983 case brought by a deathrow prisoner that the deferential turner standard differs from the strict standards of scrutiny applicable to the con stitutional rights of persons in free society 4: holding that judicial scrutiny of attorney performance must be highly deferential", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In all \u201cspecial needs\u201d cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical. For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Court noted that requiring a warrant before a search of a probationer\u2019s home would \u201cinterfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system,\u201d and would \u201creduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create.\u201d Similarly, the Burger Court noted that \u201csurprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function at all.\u201d 482 U.S. at 710, 107 S.Ct. 2636; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (<HOLDING>). If a special need renders the warrant Holdings: 0: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 1: holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant requirement 2: holding that imposing the traditional warrant and probablecause requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration of the illinois probation system because the process of obtaining a warrant would delay the officers ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the probationer and would facilitate the probationers evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct 3: recognizing the searchincidenttoarrest exception to the warrant requirement 4: recognizing that the special need articulated must make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable before waiving those requirements", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "motive for the Challenged Laws. Before reaching that question, however, the Court notes that Defendants contend once again, in the context of Plaintiffs\u2019 free exercise claim, that housing is not eligible for free exercise protection because it is not a religious use. (See, e.g., Defs.\u2019 Mem. 2.) However, at least in the context of RLUIPA, the Court has already found that \u201cthe building of rabbinical college,\u201d of which student housing would be a part, \u201cfalls squarely within [the] definition of \u2018religious exercise,\u2019 \u201d and that \u201cthe multi-family dormitories that [Plaintiffs] seek to build are intended to facilitate religious exercise.\u201d Tartikov, 915 F.Supp.2d at 629. The same analysis is applicable here. Because the definition of religious exercise is quite broad, see WDS I, 386 F.3d at 186 (<HOLDING>), accessory housing, and particularly accessory Holdings: 0: holding exempt under ors 307130 which relates to other charitable institutions a building that was used as an office for a religious official and religious court and a printing press for a religious publication 1: holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise 2: holding rluipa claim requires prisoner to show he wishes to engage in 1 a religious exercise 2 motivated by a sincerely held belief which exercise 3 is subject to a substantial burden imposed by the government 3: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 4: recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and are not likely to be working as blackjack dealers, bingo callers, or other employees of Indian casinos.\u201d Def.\u2019s Reply In Supp. of Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. at 8. This logic cannot be refuted. NIGC\u2019s decision not to search these records was reasonable. See Weisberg v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485-89 (D.C.Cir.1984). Even if the Enforcement Division\u2019s individual investigatory files contained responsive records, NIGC asserts that those files are law enforcement documents which, in the absence of a waiver, are exempt under FOIA Exemption 7(C) because their disclosure \u201ccould reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.\u201d 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(b)(7)(C); see Melius v. Nat\u2019l Indian Gaming Comm\u2019n, 96-CV-2210 (TFH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17537, at *14-15 (<HOLDING>). The Court agrees that NIGC\u2019s investigations Holdings: 0: holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports  have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed 1: holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c  are exempt from disclosure 2: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure 3: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure   4: holding that names of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are categorically exempt from disclosure unless disclosing such information is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that refusal may be admissible in a subsequent prosecution; (2) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, the person\u2019s license to operate a motor vehicle will be automatically suspended, whether or not the person is subsequently prosecuted as a result of the arrest, for not less than 180 days;.... The statute was later amended to also require a warning that \"if the person refuses to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer may apply for a warrant authorizing a specimen to be taken from the person.\u201d Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S. ch. 674 \u00a7 2011 Tex. Sess. Law serv. 1627 (West). 3 . The fact that Barker\u2019s comments were in response to Appellant\u2019s questions does not by itself render the trooper\u2019s statements non-coercive. See, e.g., Hall, 649 S.W.2d 627 (<HOLDING>). It is, however, a factor to consider. Holdings: 0: holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on appeal if not raised before the board 1: holding that because of the factbound nature of the inquiry determination of voluntariness of consent to search is reviewed for clear error 2: recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law 3: holding that the evidence raised the issue of voluntariness of consent even though the officers comments were in response to an inquiry by the suspect 4: recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Opal Coleman appeals from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of the Arkansas Department of Correction, Varner Unit (ADC), in her Title VII action alleging discrimination and constructive discharge on the basis of her race (African-American). For reversal, Coleman argues that (1) the district court erroneously construed her complaint as simply raising claims of a hostile work environment and constructive discharge, rather than discrimination; (2) she produced sufficient evidence of d 6 (8th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Holdings: 0: holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment 1: holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment 2: holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible 3: holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment 4: holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "mentioning Turner\u2019s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace. 5. The ALJ also did not err in accepting the vocational expert\u2019s testimony that Turner could perform jobs with Level 2 reasoning. The RFC determination limiting Turner to \u201csimple, repetitive tasks,\u201d which adequately encompasses Turner\u2019s moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, is compatible with jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. C, \u00a7 III (4th ed. 1991) (defining jobs with Level 2 reasoning as requiring the employee to \u201ccarry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions\u201d and \u201c[d]eal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations\u201d); compare Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). 6. The ALJ erred by failing to set forth Holdings: 0: recognizing conflict 1: holding that there was a conflict between an rfc of simple routine or repetitive work and level 3 reasoning 2: recognizing conflict between circuits 3: recognizing the conflict 4: recognizing possible conflict between the cases", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "simply did not bar the use of the residual exception. We note that Judge Wiss dissented from the Court\u2019s decision on this issue and complained \u201cthat the majority has erred by shuffling past one of the three absolute prerequisites for admission of hearsay under\u201d the residual exception by passing over the fact that the child/vietim in Morgan was available and did testify, albeit in a somewhat limited manner. 40 M.J. at 413 (Wiss, J., dissenting). (2). As to the second part of the appellant\u2019s argument, that AK\u2019s testimony should not have been admitted because better evidence (i.e., Mr. Mills\u2019 tes ority for his contention except to quote our opinion in Martindale out of context. Martindale did not involve the exclusion or possible exclusion of other evidence because, as we pointed out 88) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that this aspect of Mil.R.Evid. Holdings: 0: holding also that only a childs first statement made is admissible under the exception 1: holding childvictims statement to babysitter admissible un der residual exception in addition to statement to physician under medical treatment exception 2: holding multiple statements by childvictim and childs mother admissible under residual exception 3: holding statement by childvictim to teachers aide admissible under residual exception in addition to statements to school nurse and pediatrician under medical treatment exception 4: holding ehildvictims testimony at pretrial investigation admissible under residual exception in addition to doctors testimony under medical treatment exception", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Proposal 2 interfered with the Air Force\u2019s right to hire employees, the Authority found the Proposal negotiable under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 7106(b)(3) because it concerned \u201cappropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected\u201d by the Air Force\u2019s exercise of its hiring authority. Id. at 914. II In its petition, the Air Force contends, for the first time, that it had no duty to negotiate over Proposals 1 and 2 because they conflicted with federal statutes and regulations governing VRAs. It also argues the Authority erred when it determined that Proposals 1 and 2 did not improperly infringe on management authority. We find the first claim waived and the second insufficient to overcome our deferential standard of review. See Nat\u2019l Fed\u2019n of Fed. Emps. v. FLRA, 745 F.2d 705, 707-08 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). A The Air Force identifies two alleged Holdings: 0: holding that cis rejection of visa renewal application was not arbitrary capricious an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law 1: recognizing that a court may reverse the pelrbs actions where those actions are arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion    not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole or otherwise not in accordance with law 2: holding that court may set aside lsc decisions that are arbitrary and capricious or are not based on substantial evidence 3: recognizing a nonstatutory basis for setting aside an arbitration award if it is arbitrary and capricious 4: holding an authority ruling may only be set aside if arbitrary capricious an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Fact No. 1-5 made in the Referee\u2019s first decision. Claimant argues that there is no substantial evidence that the \u201cletters\u201d and \u201ccalls\u201d to Claimant made by Employer took place after July 11, 2011. Claimant is correct. The contacts took place in January of 2011, at a time when Claimant did not believe she could do any job. In sum, we agree with Claimant that Employer did not present any evidence that it ever offered her a job after July 11, 2011. The Board sidesteps the question of when Employer contacted Claimant about available jobs. It contends that when Claimant \u201creleased\u201d herself to work at some kind of job, her absence from work immediately became unexcused. In support, the Board relies upon Oliver v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa.Cmwlth. 98, 450 A.2d 287 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no relevant work rule or Holdings: 0: holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim 1: holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy 2: holding that the claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy 3: holding that employers policy which required employee to work without pay in violation of federal law was unreasonable and employees refusal to comply was not misconduct 4: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Jenney\u2019s claim does not necessarily require proof through his conversations with his attorney, the sword and shield doctrine does not apply to waive his attorney-client privilege. Cf. Long v. Murphy, 663 So.2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (rejecting application of the sword and shield doctrine to waive attorney-client privilege because the plaintiff could rely on his own testimony and cross-examination of the defendants to prove his case and thus had no need to use privileged communications with his attorneys to establish his claims). Moreover, attorney-client privilege is not waived simply because the credibility of Jenney\u2019s statements concerning his intent could possibly be impeached by his communications with his former attorney. See Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>). Were this court to hold otherwise, it would Holdings: 0: holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts 1: holding that former wifes interest in her homestead was held in cotenancy with a mortgagee who succeeded to her former husbands 2617 fee simple interest 2: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 3: holding that the former husbands property from a noninterspousal gift may not be distributed under section 610751 although use of the former husbands separate property may be awarded to the former wife to satisfy the former husbands child support obligation 4: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for an exclusionary rule analysis, we will remand. A government search of a private home presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances or a valid warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). To be valid, the relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant \u201cparticularly describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphases added). The particularity requirement \u2014 \u201cthe touchstone of [the] warrant,\u201d Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.2004) \u2014 is satisfied by expressly listing items to be seized or expressly incorporating by reference an affidavit that lists such items. See Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428-429 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The requirement that the warrant particularly Holdings: 0: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable 1: holding that plan documents could be incorporated without converting the motion to one for summary judgment even though the complaint referred only to the plan and not the accompanying documents 2: holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6 3: holding that if a warrants particularity depends upon incorporated documents those documents must physically accompany the warrant 4: holding that where original documents were illegally seized those documents as well as all copies had to be returned", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly serves the purposes of pleading negligent misrepresentation as well as would rule 9(b). Indeed, the Twombly rule is better, because there is nothing served by creating a new exception to Twombly\u2019s general rule for a negligence tort unless there is some compelling reason to do so. Not finding that compelling reason, the Court will decline to apply rule 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation claims, particularly those like New Mexico\u2019s and Colorado\u2019s, which are truly based on negligent conduct. LAW REGARDING GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY A foreign jurisdiction is not compelled to follow the governmental immunity laws that protect a state-governmental entity in its own state. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 123 S.Ct. 1683, 155 L.Ed.2d 702 (2003)(<HOLDING>); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424, 99 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that a forum is not required to extend sovereign immunity to other states sued in its courts but should extend immunity under the principle of comity unless doing so would violate the forums public policies 1: holding that rfras waiver of sovereign immunity did not extend to monetary damages the acts reference to appropriate relief was susceptible to more than one interpretation and thus was not an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity 2: holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a forum to apply the sovereign immunity doctrine of another state if such an application would violate the forums legitimate public policies 3: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine 4: holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "references to a group such as \u201cthe Kingston Polygamist Family\u201d might reasonably be understood to refer to an individual surnamed Kingston. See Fenstermaker, 43 P. at 114 (allowing head of a family to maintain an action for defamation where defamatory statements were made about \u201ca family named Fenstermaker\u201d). But see Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 564A cmt. a, illus. 1 (1977) (giving hypothetical example where defamatory statements about a large family would not be actionable by individual family members). In fact, if the Pratts were widely known as members of \u201cthe Kingston Polygamist Family,\u201d the Pratts might very well be able to maintain an action on such statements, even without referring to the Kingston Complaint. See Fawcett Publ\u2019ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 51-52 (Okla.1962) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 513, 84 S.Ct. 964, 11 Holdings: 0: holding that a single member of a large university football team could maintain a lawsuit for libel for general statements about the team since he was well known and identified in connection with the group and because he had sufficiently established his identity as one of those libeled by the publication 1: holding that the court could reasonably assume that no rational class member would have purchased the product had he known of the alleged misrepresentation 2: holding as a matter of law that the plaintiff could not recover for libel to his person  for the reason that the articles referred to no person who could possibly be identified as him 3: holding that a plaintiff would have to show that he was not promoted because of his race not that he was a member of a protected group and was not promoted 4: holding that the insured could not maintain a lawsuit for additional federal benefits because he had not submitted a sworn proof of loss", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "The school\u2019s pedagogical considerations are present, and are perhaps heightened, when a parent is the speaker because parents, much like teachers, are typically held in high regard and viewed as authoritative by young children. By inviting participation in curricular activities, educators do not cede control over the message and content of the subject matter presented in the classroom. Were teachers or school administrators required to do so, individual students or parents could use the classroom to promote any message in the guise of a pedagogically approved curricular activity. Educators should be free to seek appropriate ways to involve parents in the education of their children. See Brief of Nat\u2019l Sch. Bds. Ass\u2019n and Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass\u2019n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 4 (<HOLDING>). Yet the value and frequency of these efforts Holdings: 0: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 1: recognizing that without claim preclusion plaintiffs in small claims cases will not feel obligated to present all of their claims or all of their evidence  and they can simply file again  if need be 2: holding that evidence of the fathers conduct in stabbing the childrens mother alleged to endanger the childrens physical and emotional wellbeing is pertinent to and entwined in the issue of the childrens best interest 3: recognizing that to shift the patenteligibility inquiry entirely to  102 103 and 112 risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped to do 4: recognizing the need to avoid creating legal disincentives for schools to do all they can to engage parents in their childrens educations", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "warnings. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The court reasoned that the competency of an expert witness has never been limited to only those facts he or she has learned from personal demonstration. Instead, the court explained, \"where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, observation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify.\" Id. Exide cites several cases as support for the proposition that \"mere practical knowledge and frequent use of a product does not qualify the user as an expert on ... warnings.\" However, none of these cases support this proposition. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656 (2nd Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Silva v. American Airlines, Inc., 960 F. Holdings: 0: holding that warnings given to a witness by the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the possibility that testifying could place the witness in jeopardy of revocation of his plea agreement and charges of perjury or false statement did not violate the defendants due process rights because the warnings merely corroborated in a straightforward and nonthreatening manner the information given by the witness attorney 1: holding witness was not qualified to opine on the adequacy of the warnings of a specialized glue because he lacked expertise in either the product  was not a chemical engineer toxicologist or an environmental engineer  or the design of warning labels 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of mechanical engineer in products liability case involving automobile because expert did not have specific experience regarding subject matter of lawsuit 3: holding that the shape of a product was not an advertising idea because there was no allegation in the complaint that the design itself was a trademark or was intended to distinguish the product from others that might enter the market citation omitted 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for district court to allow a mechanical engineer to give expert testimony about a machine with which the engineer had no design experience", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and sentence. I. DISCUSSION A Unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C, \u00a7 922(g) Seneeharles first contends that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g) is unconstitutional, both facially and as-applied to him, because his possession of the firearm did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Because Seneeharles did not object to the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute in the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1018-19 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating we review constitutional objections \u201cnot raised before the district court only for plain error\u201d). Senecharles\u2019s facial challenge is directly foreclosed by our precedent upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g). See United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Further, because the parties stipulated the Holdings: 0: holding that double jeopardy precludes dual convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of separate ammunition because section 790231 florida statutes prohibits possession of  any firearm ammunition or electric weapon or device emphasis in original 1: holding the jurisdictional element of the statute ie the requirement that the felon possess in or affecting commerce any firearm or ammunition immunizes  922g1 from a facial constitutional attack 2: holding that conviction for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 usc  922g is valid under the commerce clause as long as the ammunition had previously moved in interstate commerce even though the possession did not have a substantial affect on same 3: holding that a prior conviction ie one for which the civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored is an element of a 922g1 violation 4: holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "this court to read \u00a7 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii) as requiring \u201cpermanent and enforceable reductions in emissions from sources in the nonattainrrient area.\u201d Under this interpretation, EPA would need to determine that the Cincinnati area has achieved attainment status solely because sources within the confines of the nonattainment area have sufficiently reduced their emissions; improvements in Cincinnati air quality due to emissions reductions from anywhere else would be ignored. EPA and the Intervenors respond that the statutory text is silent on the location of the reductions and that k regional foc Cir.2008) (rejecting a \u201cregionwide approach to CAIR\u201d where \u00a7 7410(a)(2)(D)\u00a9 required a focus on sources \u201cwithin the State\u201d); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575, 585-87 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). But, unlike the .statutory sections in those Holdings: 0: holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated 1: holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate the payment of money by the united states 2: holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation 3: holding that party who sought stay after mandate had issued first had to show that mandate ought to be recalled and then had to show that recalled mandate should be stayed 4: holding that epa violated the mandate of  7511ablb which requires calculation of baseline emissions  from all anthropogenic sources in the area", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "whatever means necessary \u2014 including violence \u2014 to avoid being apprehended; and (2) individuals involved in narcotics trafficking \u2014 which is, by its very nature dangerous\u2014could be present in the warehouse for the purpose of purchasing drug paraphernalia. When these two potential risks are coupled with the fact that the agents believed a fugitive was present in the warehouse, it is clear that the agents possessed the reasonable articulable suspicion required under Buie to conduct a protective security sweep. Further, the layout of the warehouse made a protective sweep particularly appropriate. Scartozzi saw immediately upon entering the warehouse, a building he had never entered before, that inside were long, high rows of stacks of boxes. Cf. Buie, 494 U.S. at 333, 110 S.C .Ed.2d 112 (<HOLDING>). The plain view exception only applies, Holdings: 0: holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment 1: holding that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent where the police officers had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of a crime 2: holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant 3: holding that the fourth amendment permits seizure of property in plain view where 1 the officer has a lawful right to access the object itself and 2 the propertys incriminating character is immediately apparent 4: holding that a seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine where there was probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "way to the objective of the statute. Few statutes have been found so wanting in \u201crationality\u201d as to fail to satisfy the \u201cessentially arbitrary\u201d test. Stated positively, the test is that courts must uphold a statutory classification where it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. The rational basis test reflects the judiciary\u2019s awareness that it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide the wisdom and utility of legislation, [Wysocki, 248 Mich App at 354 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] With regard to SORA in general, this C 16 (2007) (upholding the trial court\u2019s determination that the requirement of sex offender registration for \u201ccertain nonsexual abduction-related crimes\u201d was constitutional); People v Johnson, 225 Ill 2d 573, 591-592; 870 NE2d 415 (2007) (<HOLDING>); State v Sakobie, 165 NC App 447, 453; 598 Holdings: 0: holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement 1: holding that sex offender registration and notification do not constitute punishment 2: holding that the inclusion of aggravated kidnapping of a minor by a nonparent in the illinois sex offender registration act was not violative of due process regardless of whether the offenders conduct was sexually motivated 3: holding that classifying the defendant as a sexually oriented offender after he was convicted of kidnapping minors without a sexual purpose violated the defendants right to substantive due process where the statutory definition of sexual offender included one who had committed certain criminal offenses against a minor regardless of sexual intent 4: holding that the requirement of sex offender registration for the defendants conviction of false imprisonment of a minor was not cruel and unusual punishment and did not violate substantive or procedural due process", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and stating that the six tests in Baker v. Carr were \u201cprobably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty\u201d). 171 . TEX. CONST. art. VII, \u00a7 1. 172 . 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691 (\"The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.\u201d). 173 . West Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 563. 174 . Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). 175 . Nix 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (concluding that a challenge to Congress\u2019 power to pass a statute with a one-House veto did not present a political question); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (concluding that a political patronage case involving dismissal of employee by 71, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1976, writ ref. n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). 182 . Ex parte James, 836 So.2d 813 Holdings: 0: holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution 1: holding that whether a hospital district included areas not benefitted by any services solely for purpose of raising revenue does not present a justiciable matter under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cregardless of whether the respondent has been tried, acquitted, or convicted in a court for the alleged criminal offense.\u201d This language makes it clear that a disciplinary violation premised on a violation of law is separate from the initiation or outcome of criminal proceedings based on the same conduct. Behm\u2019s argument that he cannot be found to have violated the rules at issue without an express finding of intent is also without merit. While this Court has held that \u201cin order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), the Bar must prove intent,\u201d this Court has also stated that the intent ele ment can be satisfied \u201cmerely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.\u201d Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So.2d 76, 81 (Fla.2005); see also Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla.2006) (<HOLDING>); Fla. Bar v. Barley, 881 So.2d 163, 169 Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys engaging in conduct involving dishonesty amounts to conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law 1: holding intent as an element for disciplining an attorney for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation is proven by establishing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing 2: holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty 3: holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana 4: holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rather, it shows that accidents were infrequent, with only a few other large objects falling from mezzanines over the previous decade and smaller objects falling more frequently, and that tens of thousands of bags had been moved up and down without incident. Although the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate suggest an injury may have been likely to occur, the required showing is not made \u201cby demonstrating an employer\u2019s awareness that a dangerous condition exist[ed], or that an employer knew an accident was likely.\u201d Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co., 288 Mich.App. 688, 795 N.W.2d 161, 168 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 285 F.3d 448, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). In addition, \u201c[t]o be \u2018known\u2019 and \u2018certain,\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding that there was not complete preemption because the applicable federal statute did not provide a private right of action to redress the same kind of injury alleged in the plaintiffs statelaw claims 1: holding wdcas intentionaltort exception did not apply where plaintiffs suffered injury after being instructed to remove carpet under which there was asbestos because the plaintiffs had shown only that the defendants knew of the general dangers of as bestos and did not provide proper training or safety equipment 2: holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody 3: recognizing that georgia did not adopt  115 but even if it did finding that plaintiff did not consider removal of asbestos to be immediately necessary where there was an undisputed delay between plaintiffs discovery of the hazard and beginning of removal 4: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "safety information they would choose to disclose in their initial, allegedly fraudulent, reports, would be the most severe adverse events. b. Motive For Fraud Plaintiff contends that its allegations regarding motive bolster its scienter pleadings. In support of this argument Plaintiff argues that it alleged a motive to commit fraud when it alleged that, at the time the allegedly fraudulent statements were made, Defendants were seeking a partner and were planning to raise capital in a stock offering. In addition, Plaintiff points to its allegations that individual defendants knew that they would receive higher salaries, bonuses, and stock options and that the value of their stock options would increase substantially if Rigel reported positive results from the clinical trial. Howev 001) (<HOLDING>). In fact, it supports the opposite inference. Holdings: 0: holding that where knowledgeable insiders did not sell stock at a time that would have taken advantage of allegedly fraudulent statements there was not a strong inference of scienter 1: holding that where a defendant sold no stock at all this suggested that there was no insider information from which to benefit and there was not a strong inference of scienter 2: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter 3: holding that recounting of analysts opinions did not prove underlying factual support necessary to create a strong inference of scienter 4: holding that there was no inference of scienter based on defendants knowledge of facts or failure to monitor information because plaintiffs did not specifically identified any reports or statements that existed or would have come to light in a reasonable investigation that would have demonstrated the falsity of the allegedly misleading statements", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "filed this action in federal district court. Allen named as defendants the Casino, the Tribe, Mattie Mayhew, and John Does 1 thru 300, against whom he asserted various employment, civil rights, and conspiracy claims. The magistrate judge recommended that the claims against the Tribe be dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity. The magistrate judge assumed without analysis that the Tribe\u2019s immunity extended to the Casino. The magistrate judge found that the only remaining claim was for false accusations against Mayhew. He recommended dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this was a non-federal claim. The district court adopted these recommendations and dismissed all claims. On appeal, Allen, who is now represented by counse 4th 632, 642, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 (1999) (<HOLDING>). The question is not whether the activity may Holdings: 0: recognizing sovereign immunity of forprofit corporation formed by a tribe to operate the tribes casino 1: holding that a casino that functioned as an arm of the tribe enjoyed tribal immunity 2: holding that offreservation casino owned and operated by tribe was arm of the tribe and therefore was entitled to sovereign immunity 3: holding that by engaging in gaming tribe waives sovereign immunity for narrow purpose of determining tribes compliance with the igra 4: recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of justice extends to sentencing under section 3C1.1. U.S.S.G. \u00a7 3C1.1 (\u201cthe defendant willfully obstructed ... or attempted to obstruct ... the administration of justice with respect to ... sentencing\u201d). As the district court pointed out, Lewis was a crucial witness regarding drug quantity (which is the primary consideration in de ment is inapplicable because he did not send the threat directly to Lewis, but rather included it in a letter to Holmes \u2014 suffers the same fate. Cogswell cites United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir.1992), in which the Fourth Circuit required the threat to be made directly to the intended target or under circumstances in which there is some likelihood that the intended target will learn of the threat. Following this l (6th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Searcy, 316 F.3d at 553 (\u201cThe Fourth Holdings: 0: holding that statements even when made to a third party which are appropriately determined to be threatening can constitute obstruction of justice 1: holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys 2: holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party 3: holding that plaintiffaffiant did not have personal knowledge of statements made to him by a third party 4: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of service contracts, which' are specifically excluded from Article 2 coverage. Id. at 138. Oklahoma courts have not addressed the issue of whether a software license would constitute a sale of goods; however, Massachusetts has considered the issue, at least indirectly. In VMark Software v. EMC Corp., 37 Mass. App.Ct. 610, 642 N.E.2d 587, 590, n. 1 (1994), the Massachusetts Court of Appeals assumed that Article 2 of the UCC applied to a software licensing agreement and held that the licensee met its burden of proof regarding allegations of misrepresentation by the licensor of a software program. This application is consistent with the holding in the majority of cases addressing the issue. See e.g., Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F.Supp. 235 (D.N.H.1993) (<HOLDING>); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article Holdings: 0: holding that a contract for the installation and implementation of a complex computer system did not constitute a consumer purchase covered by the njcfa and noting that the contract did not provide for simply the installation of a standardized computer software program but rather the design of a custommade program to satisfy the plaintiffs unique needs and the defendants active participation in implementation of this program 1: holding that the ucc applies to a computer software license with an additional obligation to provide incidental services where the predominant thrust of the contract was the sale and support of the software 2: holding that the statute of frauds of chapter 8 of kansass ucc applies to the sale of 50 of banks stock 3: holding the predominant purpose of a contract containing both sale and nonsale aspects was the sale of goods in part because the portion of the cost attributable to nonsale elements was less than onehalf of the total contract price 4: holding that a contract for the design construction and installation of a water tank was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods under the ucc", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Union made an unconditional agreement or an offer, as the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that an insurer is not estopped to dispute its defense obligations by reason of having sent letters to the insured in which the insurer initially agreed to defend the underlying suit. Ga. Farm, Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanhuss, 243 Ga.App. 26, 26, 532 S.E.2d 135, 136 (2000). In Vanhuss, the court held that where the insured did not claim that he relied to his detriment on the insurer\u2019s initial decision to defend the suits and no such reliance appears, the insured is not estopped from later denying coverage. Id.; see also Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-174, 2011 WL 1321578, at * 4 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing Danforth v. Gov\u2019t Emps. Ins. Co., 282 Ga.App. 421, 638 S.E.2d 852 (2007) (<HOLDING>)). Here, as in the Vanhuss case, there is Holdings: 0: holding that injured employee has right to settle with thirdparty tortfeasor claims not covered by minnesota workers compensation act 1: holding that insurers assurances that it would pay for repairs including its attempt to settle with a thirdparty did not waive right to deny coverage 2: holding that an insurer has no obligation to pay diminished value in addition to repairs 3: recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control 4: holding insured relinquished right to sue general liability insurer for breach of contract relative to insurers allegedly improper handling and payment of thirdparty claim by purchasing policy which gave insurer right to settle", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1054 (Ind.App.1990) (addressing the claims of a decedent who began smoking in 1940, and finding \u201c[t]he state of knowledge attributable to the community of individuals consuming cigarettes has changed over time and will continue to do so.\u201d). Accordingly, we must reverse the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment on Mrs. Tompkin\u2019s design defect and failure to warn claims. B. Mrs. Tompkin additionally contends that the district court erred in concluding that OPLA preempted her negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct claims. This court has applied OPLA to product Lability negligence claims and has therefore implicitly concluded that common law negligence claims have been preempted by OPLA. See Amendola, 1999 WL 1111515, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the Faugh court, using the Holdings: 0: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 1: holding that the plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are governed by opla 2: holding that a party claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot recover for emotional disturbance alone 3: holding that plaintiffs negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not independent of the breach of contract claim and summary judgment is warranted on these claims 4: holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "interested adult. See Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 19-2-511; Ind.Code.Ann. \u00a7 31-32-5-1; Iowa Code Ann. \u00a7 232.11; Miss.Code Ann. \u00a7 43-21-311; Mont. Code Ann. \u00a7 41-5-331; N.H. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 169-B:12; N.D. Cent. Code \u00a7 27-20-26; Okla. Stab. Ann. tit. 10 \u00a7 7003-3.7; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. \u00a7 51.09; W. Va.Code \u00a7 49-5-8(d). Those jurisdictions consistently have held that any statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible where a juvenile\u2019s parents are absent. People v. J.D., 989 P.2d 762 (Colo.1999) (observing that statute requires notification of parents when juvenile is taken into custody and requires suppression of statements or admissions made by juvenile during custodial interrogation where interested adult is not present); In re L.B., 33 Colo.App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069, 1070 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 Holdings: 0: holding inadmissible statements of juvenile made where parent who was incarcerated for drunkenness was brought to juveniles interrogation although interested adult must be present mere physical presence of parent is insufficient 1: recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian 2: holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles 3: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 4: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States.\u201d 28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1441(a). Section 1441 makes clear that removal of any civil action over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction is allowed unless (1) expressly provided otherwise by (2) an act of Congress. Neither condition is met by the FLSA, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals so held in Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 786 F.2d 445, 451 (1st Cir.1986). The ambiguity of Congress\u2019s use of \u201cmaintain\u201d is self-evident. That \u201cmaintain\u201d can be interpreted to suggest congressional intent to bar removal falls short of the standard set in \u00a7 1441 that a bar on removal must be \u201cexpressly provided.\u201d See, e.g., Cosme Nieves, 786 F.2d at 451 (<HOLDING>). There is also no \u201cAct of Congress\u201d which bars Holdings: 0: holding that congress would have used express terms not ambiguous ones like maintain if its intent were to prevent removal of cases under the fsla 1: holding contract with ambiguous terms should not be dismissed on pleadings 2: holding exclusion was not ambiguous 3: holding that parol evidence can be presented when the terms of the agreement are ambiguous 4: recognizing ambiguous terms of plea agreement are construed against government", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided in relevant part: \"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations....\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 35(a)(2) (re pealed 1978). The commentary in Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that the addition of \"actual fraud\u201d simply clarifies the limited scope of the fraud exception: The addition of the words \u201cor actual fraud\u201d probably makes no change in the law as it existed prior to enactment of the [Bankruptcy Act of 1978] because false pretenses and representations were construed to mean acts involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.... In any event, section 523(a)(2)(A) was intend (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 260, Holdings: 0: holding that jurys determination is not binding on courts ch 93a decision 1: holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief 2: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief 3: holding jurys finding of liability on partys claim does not bestow prevailing party status when party received no relief on that claim 4: holding that jurys finding was binding on court considering claim for equitable relief", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "survey line by means of adverse possession and the doctrine of acquiescence. 6 . During the pendency of this appeal, defendants removed the boulders from plaintiff's property. Accordingly, the building is the only alleged encroachment onto plaintiff\u2019s land that remains for this appeal. This Court granted defendants a stay of the injunction to remove the building from plaintiff's land while this appeal was pending, on the condition that defendants post a $50,000 bond. 7 . This Court notes that the row of trees was not specifically planted by either party in order to serve as a boundary marker nor is there any allegation that they consist of either arborvitae or a hedgerow that may be commonly understood to denote a boundary. Cf. Acampora v. Pearson, 899 A.2d 459, 461, 463 (R.I.2006) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The trial justice, after viewing the Holdings: 0: holding that determination of the oklahoma and texas common boundary in a prior suit was conclusive in future litigation 1: holding that the doctrine of acquiescence had established a boundary line between two adjoining lots where the plaintiff had planted a row of thirteen or fourteen arborvitae shrubs along the line which she claimed as the boundary 2: holding that members of congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the line item veto act 3: holding that substantial evidence did not support agencys finding fear speculative when petitioner had offered evidence that she had already had two children that she planned to have more that she had gone to great lengths to avoid being sterilized in china and that she had removed her iud after escaping to the united states 4: holding that where petitioner testified that some of her cousins had been killed because they served in the military and that she had received two threatening notes she had demonstrated past persecution", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and Ek sold the vessel with the anchor, rope, and chain still on it. Even if Ek did misappropriate these items, Peterson does not have standing to assert the claim of a third party. Standing in this court is a rule of judicial self-restraint that asks whether the person raising a particular claim is a \" 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue.' \u201d Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 n. 25 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). We cannot consider the purported transfer of the materials lien from Dockery to Peterson because it was not in the record before the superior court and was improperly included in Peterson's excerpt of record. Alaska R.App. P. 210. See also B.B. v. D.D., 18 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Alaska 2001) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, any payment that Peterson did Holdings: 0: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal 1: holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court 2: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 3: holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial 4: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "presented for payment was money mandating. We held that the regulation, at best, only conferred rights on presenting banks (a category that did not include the plaintiff, the bank that received the deposit). We concluded that \"the regulations could [not] be construed as being money-mandating as to [the plaintiff bank], even if they were money-mandating as to [the presenting bank] ... since there is support its argument involve delay of the class certification until after a trial on the merits or the question of whether a court can consider the merits when ruling on class certification. The one case cited by Greenlee County that is on point is against the weight of authority, and we decline to follow it. See Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int'l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1216 (11th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 1: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding that court should have ruled on certification even after granting summary judgment for the defendant 4: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to issue conservation orders \"to conserve the property [of a non-domiciliary insurer] found in this state or any other state.\u201d Tenn. Senate Bill 1080 \u00a7 4. The Chancery Court, however, rendered the Liquidation Order pursuant to Section 402, which governs liquidations and which was not amended in this manner. See Tenn.Code. Ann. \u00a7 56-9-402 (1999). Moreover, although the amendment purports to have retroactive effect, the retroactivity provision states that the amendment applies only \"for the purpose of conducting the proceeding henceforth.\u201d Tenn. Senate Bill 1080 \u00a7 5. Because our review takes place after the completion of the Tennessee proceedings, we conclude that the amendment does not have retroactive effect in this case. 5 . Accord Bryant v. United Shortline, 984 S.W.2d at 297-98 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court exceeded its authorized scope of review by invoking equitable jurisdiction 1: holding that a court may consider materials outside the pleadings to determine its jurisdiction 2: holding that tennessee court exceeded its statutory jurisdiction when it ordered liquidation of assets outside tennessee 3: holding that a challenge to liquidation instructions falls under  1581i jurisdiction 4: recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "be instructed that \u201csurreptitious\u201d interception meant \u201cunauthorized, in other words unlawful\u201d interception. Under this theory, lawful intercepts by law enforcement would not qualify as surreptitious. Kachi-kian\u2019s defense was that if he manufactured the wiretapping devices believing that they would be used primarily for law enforcement-authorized purposes, he would not be breaking the law because he could not have \u201c[had] reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for ... surreptitious interception\u201d of wire communications. Id. The term \u201csurreptitious\u201d as used in the statute was aimed at the secret nature of the interception, not the illegality of it. That is the common understanding of the word. See United States v. Lande, 968 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bast, 495 F.2d 138, 143 Holdings: 0: holding that the cost of capital equipment is not recoverable under the terms of the miller act 1: holding that experienced contractor familiar with business practices is merchant with respect to buying certain equipment despite lack of special knowledge of that equipment 2: holding description all personal property sufficient to cover equipment 3: holding that equipment manufactured to intercept and descramble satellite television programming met the surreptitious element because the producers of satellite programming were unable to detect the interception equipment 4: holding that a general contractors right to forbid the work from being performed in a dangerous manner and the fact that he would have stopped the work and required protective equipment had he seen the employee of the independent contractor not using such equipment merely showed the possibility of control not actual control", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a non-attorney representative of a Social Security claimant whose fee agreements had been repeatedly denied. 256 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir.2001). In that case, we found the petitioner had failed to prove that he had exhausted all other avenues of relief because he had not filed a fee petition pursuant to 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 404.1725. Id. Although the district court below did not address whether the reasons for the ALJ\u2019s disapproval of the fee agreement were entitled to deference, this does not change Cordoba\u2019s requirement that a representative seeking approval of a fee agreement must exhaust all available administrative remedies \u2014 including a fee petition \u2014 before the writ of mandamus may be granted. See also Power, 292 F.3d at 786 (<HOLDING>). In addition, Baker has not shown that the fee Holdings: 0: recognizing conflict between filing motion to dismiss and fee application and noting postponement of fee application resulted in no prejudice to any party 1: holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied 2: holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  3: holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition 4: holding that the petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claim involving a procedural error correctable by the bia", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "forming his opinion as to the risk of infection, he assumed that Mr. Jones and Ms. Zhong had sex two to three times per week, contrary to Ms. Zhong\u2019s record testimony that she and Mr. Jones had sex about once a week. Furthermore, the government presented its own expert witness, Harold Margolis, M.D., of the Centers for Disease Control, who disagreed with Dr. Gubbins\u2019s assessment of the risk of infection. Dr. Margolis testified that Mr. Jones had only about a ten per cent, chance of infection over the course of a year. While the fact that the government would have presented an opposing expert is not by itself a' sufficient reason to exclude Dr. Gubbins\u2019s testimony, it was a factor that the District Court properly considered in its assessment. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (<HOLDING>). The District Court\u2019s analysis and findings as Holdings: 0: holding that jury must be instructed that value of identification testimony may depend upon the witnesss capacity and opportunity to observe the offender 1: recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony 2: holding that a federal courts inquiry into the reliability of expert testimony is flexible and may depend upon a variety of considerations 3: holding that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in accepting  expert testimony  on the issue of reliability and rank order scoring that happened to include a component reliability estimate 4: holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "have shown that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; therefore, it would have rebutted the librarian\u2019s statement that Mitchell was at the canteen instead of checking in at his assigned housing unit. Due process requires a DHO to produce and review evidence alleged by a prisoner to be supportive of his defense unless do ing so would be \u201cunduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.\u201d Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813-14 (10th Cir.2007). But assuming, without deciding, that the DHO in this case committed error by refusing to consider the work-crew log, the error was harmless to Mitchell and therefore cannot form the basis of a due process claim. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814-15 & n. 5 (<HOLDING>); of. Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 801, 805 Holdings: 0: holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record 1: recognizing that a dhos unjustified refusal to review a videotape alleged to be exculpatory might constitute harmless error and remanding to the district court to make a determination of harmlessness on a fuller factual record 2: holding that the district courts review of a partial and truncated record was error and remanding the case for review on the entire administrative record 3: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 4: holding that chapman harmless error review will be conducted when error is tested for harmlessness for the first time on habeas", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "intended for the Workers' Compensation Act to \"be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation ....\" \u00a7 8-40-102, C.R.S. (2007). Thus, a primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate injured workers \"regardless of fault.\" Colo. Springs Disposal v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 58 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Colo.App.2002). In a previous case, we noted that the Workers' Compensation Act \"is intended to be remedial and beneficial in purpose, and should be liberally construed in order to accomplish these goals.\" Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted). The temporary total disability benefits 29-30 (Colo.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). The penalties and enforcement provision Holdings: 0: holding a claimant who refuses to provide financial information necessary to ascertain whether a claimant is working may have his indemnity benefits suspended until such information is provided 1: holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434048 when the claimant refused to cooperate with a vocational rehabilitation plan 2: holding that a claimant establishes a prima facie case for compensable medical treatment where a qualified physician indicates treatment was necessary for a workrelated condition 3: holding that a claimants benefits were rightly suspended under what is now section 8434043 when the claimant did not return to the authorized physician for treatment 4: holding the procedural right to request a onetime change of physician during the course of treatment does not attach until claimant actually begins treatment with the initially authorized physician", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "law, for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. They concede that in this case, the only public policy at issue is the First Amendment, so we affirm the summary judgment on the state tort claim on the same basis as on the section 1983 claim as no violation of Hobler\u2019s or Southwell\u2019s First Amendment rights occurred. Conclusion Because plaintiffs were \u201cconfidential employees\u201d in the Bmnti sense, the First Amendment did not protect them from dismissal because of their political loyalty to the defendant\u2019s political adversary, so the summary judgment for defendant is AFFIRMED. 1 . 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). 2 . 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. 3 . 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). 4 . Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673. 5 134, 1139 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp. High Holdings: 0: holding that defendants status as police officer did not obviate the requirement of miranda 1: holding that an employees status as a policymaker under the branti exception does not obviate the pickering analysis 2: holding that access to confidential information didnt transform janitorial staff into confidential employees under branti 3: recognizing exception 4: holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "it appears Union County has not asserted a standing argument at all, but rather has attempted to invoke parens patriae authority, which in Latin means \u201cparent of his or her country,\u201d and refers to \u201cthe state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.\u201d Parens patriae, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1287 (10th ed. 2014), But it has long been settled that \u201ca state may act as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens. However, a county has no sovereign powers and cannot act as parens patriae, asserting the claims of its residents.\u201d Bd. of Comm\u2019rs of Howard Cty. v. Kokomo City Plan Comm\u2019n, 263 Ind. 282, 295, 330 N.E.2d 92, 101 (1975) (internal citations omitted)- (emphasis added); see also Shoemaker v. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs of Grant Cty., 36 Ind. 175, 183-84 (1871) (<HOLDING>). Union County is thus disqualified from Holdings: 0: holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity 1: holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county 2: holding that the county had no standing to sue the state to recover taxes illegally obtained from citizens unless the money belongs to the county 3: holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county 4: holding before the apa definition of person was amended to include county that the board of county commission ers of dolores county could not sue the state agency that had ordered reappraisals of real property in dolores county in connection with valuation for ad valorem taxation because the board of county commissioners was not a person under the apa and did not otherwise have authority to sue under statute or constitution", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7\u00a7 300aa-l-300aa-34. 2 . The non-resident defendants were Abbott Laboratories Inc.; American Home Products Corp., doing business as Wyeth, Wyeth Laboratories, Wyeth-Ayerst, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Wyeth Lederle, Wyeth Lederle Vaccines, and Lederle Laboratories; Aventis Pasteur, Inc., individually and as successor in interest to Connaught Laboratories, Inc.; Baxter International, Inc.; Eli Lilly and Company; GDL International, Inc; GlaxoSmithKline, individually and as successor in interest to SmithKline Beecham Corp; King Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Merck & Company, Inc.; Sigma-Aldrich, Inc.; Spectrum Chemical Manufacturing Corp.; and Medeva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 3 . See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1332, 1441(b), 1446. 4 . 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 300aa-l-300aa-34. 5 . 385 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 992, 125 S.Ct. 1825, Holdings: 0: holding that there is no improper joinder when the allegation of improper joinder rests only on a showing that there is no reasonable basis for predicting that state law would allow recovery against the instate defendant and that showing is equally dispositive of all defendants 1: holding there was no claim and no basis for a claim of surprise concerning allegation of a former conviction 2: holding that a sentence is not excessive if it is within statutory limitations and there are no facts supporting an allegation of prejudice against the defendant 3: holding that no heightened showing is required 4: holding that there is no right of recovery against individual defendants under the ada", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "preclude the formation of an installment contract because \u00a7 2-612\u2019s definition of \u201ccontract\u201d is quite expansive. It is defined to mean \u201cthe total legal obligation which results from the parties\u2019 agreement as affected by this title and any other applicable rules of law.\u201d \u00a7 1-201(11). The parties\u2019 \u201cagreement\u201d is in turn defined to mean \u201cthe bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.\u201d \u00a7 1-201(3). Nowhere in these definitions is there a requirement of a single document or negotiation. And other courts agree that \u00a7 2-612 does not impose such a severe restriction. See, e.g., Cassidy Podell Lynch, Inc. v. Snydergeneral Corp., 944 F.2d 1131, 1146-47 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In addition, even limiting our focus to Holdings: 0: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods 1: holding that black box labeled purchase orders was insufficient structure to perform the generate purchase orders function 2: holding that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude suit for a later installment 3: holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract 4: holding that twentythree purchase orders made up a single installment contract", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and ministerial acts in its application of the qualified public official immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 284, 653 A.2d 436, 442 (1995) (noting that \u201cthe Court has distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which ... applies [to judges] regardless of the nature of the tort\u201d (emphasis added)); Mandel, 320 Md. at 110, 576 A.2d at 769 (recognizing that \u201c \u2018the Maryland cases seem to indicate that discretionary action [of officials] will be protected only in the absence of malice\u2019 \u201d (emphasis added) (quoting Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356, 196 A.2d 887, 890 (1964))); Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm\u2019rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In the context of public official immunity, Holdings: 0: holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added 1: holding that individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level are entitled to absolute immunity 2: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 3: holding that  in maryland governmental immunity is extended to all nonmalicious acts of public officials  when acting in a discretionary  capacity  emphasis added quoting duncan 260 md at 104 271 a2d at 550 4: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is common in adversary proceedings for expert witnesses to be present during the presentation of factual testimony so that they have a foundation on which to base their opinions. See, e.g., Federal Rule of Evidence 615. Although that Rule authorizes a district court to sequester witnesses to prevent them from hearing the testimony of other witnesses, it also provides several exceptions, including an exception for \u201ca person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party\u2019s cause.\u201d Fed.R.Evid. 615(3). The Advisory Committee notes specify that this exception contemplates \u201can expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation.\u201d Fed.R.Evid. 615(3) Advisory Committee notes. See United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1404-05 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 Holdings: 0: holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue 1: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify 3: holding that the presence in the courtroom of an expert witness who does not testify to the facts of the case but rather gives his opinion based upon the testimony of others hardly seems suspect and will in most cases be beneficial for he will be more likely to base his expert opinion on a more accurate understanding of the testimony as it evolves before the jury 4: holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "when he had been sentenced two years prior to Portillo. Thus, the court omitted that portion of the judgment requiring payment \u201cjointly and severally with Isidro Silva Rubio (Case No. 2:96-cr-33).\u201d Second, the court discovered that it had erred by ordering restitution to be paid to the GBI rather than to the six illegal aliens listed in Rubio\u2019s PSI. Thus, the court corrected the order to substitute the six aliens for the GBI as payees. Because we find that the errors corrected by the court in Portillo\u2019s judgment and commitment order were merely clerical, we affirm. I. DISCUSSION We review the district court\u2019s application of Fed.R.Crim.P. 36 to correct its judgment at sentencing as a matter of law de novo. See United States v. Pease, 331 F.3d 809, 812, 149, 151 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious 1: holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing 2: holding that rule 36 may not be used by the district court to fundamentally alter the defendants sentence from three to five years imprisonment in an attempt to conform the sentence to the intention of the parties as reflected in the plea agreement which provided that the prisoner would serve exactly five years 3: holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony 4: holding that rule 36 was inapplicable when a court order fundamentally changed the sentence appellant had earlier received", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and claims do not resolve the reasonable debate as to the proper way to correct the obvious error in claim 8. Finally, while it is not entirely clear if it intends this argument to apply in the correction context, we note that Fargo argues that the prosecution history supports only one reasonable construction of claim 8. IRIS maintains, however, that under Novo Industries our inquiry is com p\u00edete if the proper way to correct the error is not apparent from the face of the patent, even if the proper correction is clear from the prosecution history. Fargo is correct in so far as it argues that the prosecution history is to be consulted to determine whether the error is subject to only one reasonable construction. See Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The error must be evident on the face of the Holdings: 0: holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record 1: holding that when two patents issued from continuationinpart appliea tions derived from one original application the prosecution history of a claim limitation in the first patent to issue was properly applied to the same claim limitation in the second patent to issue 2: holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning 3: holding that a court can correct a patent claim for a grammatical error where the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims 4: holding that claim 22 which depends from nonexistent claim 38 could be corrected because the error in the dependency was evident based on the face of the patent and that the correct antecedent claim was apparent from the prosecution history", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "membership dues were actually waived by the Local and that membership status was conferred without any payments. Furthermore, it is clear that the IBT and the Local did not consider or treat the nurses as members since they paid the striking nurses \u201cOut-of-W0rk\u201d benefits at the \u201cnon-member\u201d rate. Plaintiffs argue that the president of Local 803 had at least apparent authority, if not actual authority as a union agent, to waive dues and confer membership status upon the plaintiffs, and that Local 803 and the IBT ratified his actions. Thus, they contend, the Local and the IBT should be estopped from disclaiming plaintiffs\u2019 membership status now. Agency theory may well apply to some acts of union officials. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). See also Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Holdings: 0: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 1: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that ratification by a union of disciplinary acts of the local leadership against members would occur if the union affirmed the discipline with full knowledge that it was part of an overall scheme to suppress dissent in violation of the lmrda 4: holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "credibility in that the complaints presumably accuse the officers of lying about the legality of their conduct. See Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) (allowing, in the discretion of the court, inquiry on cross-examination into specific instances of conduct probative of truthfulness). The excluded testimony is thus relevant and admissible. The district court could have properly excluded it under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, however, concluding that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice due to the inherently unreliable nature of unsustained complaints and the danger of confusing the issues and wasting time with mini-trials regarding the events underlying different complaints. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In order to show a Confrontation Clause Holdings: 0: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime 1: recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing 2: recognizing rule 3: recognizing that under the proper application of rule 608b extrinsic evidence of specific instances of bad conduct is made inadmissible when offered to prove a witnesss character for untruthfulness 4: holding prior bad acts evidence is admissible where there is an articulation or identification of the consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other acts is directed", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 460, 461 (6th Cir.1980). However, because of this statutory provision, creditors may continue to pursue their remedies against a dissolved corporation despite its formal nonexistence if the action is commenced within two years from the date of dissolution. Lottman v. Piper Indus., Inc., 726 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (applying Tennessee law, dismissing claim pursuant to T.C.A. \u00a7 48-1-1013 which was filed more than two years after dissolution). Statutes similar to T.C.A. \u00a7 48-1-1013 have been described as survival statutes rather than statutes of limitation. 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations \u00a7 2897 (1986) (discussing the provision found in the Model Business Corporations Act). The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained ., 448 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff'd 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Several courts have nonetheless held that a Holdings: 0: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 1: holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment 2: holding allegation of fraudulent concealment did not affect the running of the survival statute 3: holding that engle established the conduct elements of a fraudulent concealment cause of action 4: holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1,000 clients over the course of his practice.\u201d Coppola\u2019s experience in the practice of law, especially in the area which is the subject matter of this case, is definitely an aggravator. See Attorney Grievance v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 263, 950 A.2d 798, 812 (2008) (\u201cRespondent also had substantial experience in the practice of law having been admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on December 1, 1973, the Bar of the District of Columbia in 1991, and the Bar of the State of New York in 1997.\u201d); Attorney Grievance v. Mininsohn, 380 Md. 536, 576, 846 A.2d 353, 376 (2004) (\u201cWith almost twenty-five years experience at the bar, Mininsohn also has \u2018substantial experience in the practice of law.\u2019 \u201d); Attorney Grievance v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 106, 797 A.2d 757, 769 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, Holdings: 0: holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age 1: holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice 2: recognizing attorneys substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor 3: holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing 4: holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "credit against his federal sentence because he would likely have served only half of his 15-month term if it were not for the extradition detainer. We agree with the district court that there was no meaningful evidence to support that argument. For the reasons stated above, the district court\u2019s Order denying Efrosman\u2019s habeas petition is hereby AFFIRMED. 1 . Efrosman\u2019s petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255, challenged the propriety of the BOP\u2019s execution of his sentence, not the legality of the district court\u2019s imposition of his sentence. Placing substance over form, see Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 277-78 (2d Cir.2003), the petition is properly construed as brought under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241, see Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474-75 (2d Cir.1997) Holdings: 0: recognizing our ability to construe a pretrial habeas petition filed under  2254 as being brought under  2241 1: holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation 2: holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction 3: holding that petition relating to calculation of credit for time served during federal detention was properly brought under  2241 4: holding that credit cannot be awarded for time served on community control", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "testimony concerning his qualifications and his resume chronicling his extensive experience as a salvor, we alternatively hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Startz\u2019s knowledge, skill, experience, and training concerning the documentation, evaluation, and liquidation of a variety of types of damaged goods qualified Startz to give an opinion that would be helpful to the finder of fact on that subject \u2014 his documentation, replacement valuation, and attempt to liquidate AHC\u2019s inventory of smoke-damaged hats. We overrule the portion of Wise Electric\u2019s second issue to the extent that it may be construed as complaining of Startz\u2019s qualifications to offer replacement-value testimony. See, e.g., Helena Chem, Co. v. Wilkins, 47, S.W.3d 486, 500 (Tex.2001) (<HOLDING>). 29 . Wise -Electric states that \u201cStartz\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sequestering a criminal defendants fingerprint expert 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "touch a minor constituted a violent act, the State could not demonstrate a prima facie case that defendant violated an \u201cexpress\u201d probation condition, and the VOP conviction cannot stand. See State v. Austin, 165 Vt. at 398, 685 A.2d at 1082. \u00b6 17. Our probation condition precedent provides no direct analogy to the case at hand. In prior cases where this Court contemplated violations of the probation condition prohibiting \u201cviolent\u201d and \u201cthreatening\u201d behavior (here Condition N), we addressed the terms separately, as distinct types of action. The application and interpretation of this condition has generally been challenged in cases where the State alleges that the probationer engaged in threatening behavior that was primarily or exclusively speech. See, e.g., Johnstone, 2013 VT 57, \u00b6 17 (<HOLDING>); Sanville, 2011 VT 34, \u00b6 12 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had not violated probation condition prohibiting violent or threatening behavior when he was simply mouthing off to his girlfriend and did not intend to put his probation officer in fear of harm 1: holding that probation is not a sentence 2: holding that it is sufficient grounds to revoke a probation if only one condition of the probation is broken 3: holding that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing when he admitted to violating the terms of his probation and refused the district courts offer to appoint counsel 4: holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Hospital, 911 F.Supp. 1213, 1221 (W.D.Mo.1995), aff\u2019d, 69 F.3d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.1995)(\u201c[o]nee a relevant market has been established, the Court must next determine whether the proposed consolidation will have anti-competitive effects\u201d). Plaintiffs have not shown any anticompetitive effects whatsoever that will result from the merger. Plaintiffs have simply made eonclu-sory allegations that the merged entity will have significant market power and that the merger will significantly limit competition without any evidence of the same. Also, there seem to be significant efficiencies realized from this merger that plaintiffs have failed to address. F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corporation, 946 F.Supp. 1285, 1300-02 (W.D.Mich.1996), aff'd., 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 420543 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Department of Justice and Federal Trade Holdings: 0: holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction 1: recognizing exceptions to the continuous ownership requirement in certain merger cases 2: holding that the trial court did not err in its refusal to consider the borrowers defense of merger on appeal since the defense was outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court 3: recognizing the efficiencies defense in merger cases 4: recognizing defense in securities case", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "copies to the United States Sentencing Commission and the United States Bureau of Prisons. 1 . The Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed the question of what constitutes \"a single act of aberrant behavior.\u201d In United States v. Pe\u00f1a, 930 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir.1991), the court upheld the district court\u2019s decision to depart downward on the basis of \"a single act of aberrant behavior.\u201d The Tenth Circuit found that implicit in the district court\u2019s findings was the conclusion that defendant's behavior was an aberration from her usual conduct, as reflected by her long-term employment, economic support for her family, and lack of either abuse or prior involvement in the distribution of controlled substances. Pe\u00f1a, 930 F.2d at 1495. Cf. United States v. Bauer, 995 F.2d 182 (10th Cir.1993) Holdings: 0: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart 1: holding there was no jurisdiction to review district courts discretionary refusal to depart downward on the grounds that defendants conduct constituted a single act of aberrant behavior 2: holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart 3: recognizing that aberrant criminal behavior may justify downward variance 4: holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Police Board held a hearing on the Internal Affairs complaint and sustained the complaint by a vote of 4-1. Although the results were forwarded to the then acting police chief, Barile has received no communication regarding his complaint. On July 17, 2004, Barile read a newspaper article indicating that the Honorable Ellen Bree Burns, U.S.D.J., had ruled on a consent decree that would result in the review and, hopefully, resolution of the backlog of complaints against the Hartford Police Department. Barile commenced this action by complaint dated July 20, 2004. III. Discussion Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is time-barred. The limitations period for filing a section 1983 action is three years. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Barile alleges that defendant Rodrigues used Holdings: 0: holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations set forth in connecticut general statutes  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that civil rights claims at least those arising under 42 usc  1983 were subject to the applicable states personal injury statute of limitations 2: holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions 3: holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 4: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "entire arbitration provision because the PAGA waiver expressly forbids severance. 2013 Agreement \u00a7 14.3(v)(c). In any event, even if Uber\u2019s structural argument offered a plausible construction of the Agreement (and the Court has considerable doubts on that point) it must ultimately be rejected. At best, Uber\u2019s argument suggests there is some ambiguity in the otherwise crystal clear language of the contract that provides that the PAGA waiver is not severable. Because the 2013 Agreement is a standardized contract written by Uber, however, to the extent the language is ambiguous any ambiguity, must be \u201cresolved against the drafter.\u201d Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal.App. 4th 779, 798, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 273 (1998); see also Slottow v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 10 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court would Holdings: 0: recognizing that california has a valid interest in protecting a california company from copyright infringement 1: recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired 2: recognizing rule 3: recognizing california law rule that ambiguities in a written instrument are resolved against the drafter 4: holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "applied in federal court appeals\u201d) (footnote omitted); In re St. Mary Hospital, 120 B.R. 25, 28 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (\u201cThe district court may affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court on any basis that finds support in the record.\u201d), aff'd, 931 F.2d 51 (3d Cir.1991) (unpublished disposition). Finally, Beal argues that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the principles of waiver and estoppel precluded Beal from applying the default interest rate to the matured loans. Because, like the district court, we conclude that the plain language of the contract precluded the default interest rate from applying to the matured loans, we need not reach the issues of waiver and estoppel. AFFIRMED. 1 . See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 2 . See NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1089 Holdings: 0: holding state law governs property interests in bankruptcy proceedings unless some federal interest requires a different result   1: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 2: holding that in a bankruptcy proceeding state law governs the rights of the parties with regard to interests in property 3: holding that federal law governs the definition of property which embraces both fee and lien interests 4: recognizing rule that state law governs the substance of claims in bankruptcy proceedings", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a natural condition. \u00b6 18 Thus, even assuming that the negligent actions of government employees or the defective condition of the reservoir or floating dock proximately caused Glaittli's injuries, his injuries arose out of, were in connection with, or resulted from a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled land. See id. \u00a7 68G-7-301(5)(k). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the natural condition exception to the waiver of immunity is applicable and bars Caittli's suit. CONCLUSION \u00b6 19 Based on Glaittli's pleaded facts, the wind-caused waves on the Jordanelle Reservoir that caused his injuries were a natural condition. @Glaittlif's injuries arose out of, were suffered in connection with, or resulted from that natural condition. Thus, the 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Were we to overlook the effect of the Holdings: 0: holding on rehearing that exclusion for disabilities caused by a preexisting medical condition would not support denial of benefits caused by staph infection resulting from surgery for a preexisting condition 1: holding that a shorebreaking wave was a natural condition even if caused by manmade improvements to the beach 2: holding as a matter of law that natural condition present was open and obvious to all who would encounter it 3: holding that employer was entitled to discharge employee after he threatened life of his supervisor even if such misconduct was caused by employees disability 4: holding that the plaintiff had no riparian rights in a natural lake when the plaintiffs access to the lake was provided by a manmade channel and that the defendant was entitled to exclude the plaintiff from the lake by installing a fence", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the remedies previously available to insureds in certain scenarios involving bad-faith conduct by their insurers, inter alia, by authorizing punitive-damages awards. See generally Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos. Inc., 567 Pa. 386, 402, 787 A.2d 376, 386 (2001). Allstate removed the litigation to a federal district court. During pretrial proceedings, Wolfe filed an amended complaint and Allstate pursued summary relief, asserting that, as a third party to the Allstate/Zierle insurance policy, Wolfe lacked standing to pursue damages under Section 8371. This position was grounded on two main premises. First, Allstate explained, under Ash v. Continental Insurance Co., 593 Pa. 523, 932 A.2d 877 (2007), Section 8371 created a form of an unliquidated tort claim. See id. at 536, 932 A.2d at 885 (<HOLDING>). Second, per longstanding Pennsylvania law, Holdings: 0: holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations 1: holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions 2: holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983 3: holding in determining the appropriate limitations period that an action under  8371 is a statutorilycreated tort action 4: holding that an employees action against her employer for negligent supervision lies not in tort but with an action for breach of contract", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by Plain Dealer. Moreover, subsection (c)(7) of those regulations permits, on its face, unbridled discretion and therefore an inherent threat of arbitrary decision making. Since Gannett did not involve a facial challenge to adopted licensing requirements, it is inapplicable to this instant case. B. Provision Granting the Architectural Board of Review With Standardless Discretion Is Unconstitutional The provision requiring the Board to approve the design of newsracks is unconstitutional under a time, place and manner analysis because the provision is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L s Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937) (<HOLDING>) as authority for the above proposition. Holdings: 0: holding that the national labor relations act does not unconstitutionally abridge the freedom of the press in that it does not interfere with the right to discharge any employee for any proper cause 1: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act 2: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 3: holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government 4: holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "J. This appeal raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in ordering judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $1.00 for nominal damages. We find there was no error. This complaint arises from an arson fire of a studio and its contents destroyed by the fire of property owned by the plaintiff, Dona M. Kerins. The fire was set by three juveniles, Christopher M. Rule, James Hannan, and Kevin Dmytryck. The defendants, Linda McConnell and Joseph Hannan, are the parents of the juvenile, James Hannan. The cases against the foster parents of Christopher M. Rule and the parent of Kevin Dmytryck have previously been resolved. See Kerins v. Lima, 425 Mass. 108, 680 N.E. 2d 32 (1997) (<HOLDING>); and Writ of Execution on Money Judgment as to Holdings: 0: recognizing that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a continued relationship with their foster child 1: holding that natural parents could not lose parental rights to foster parents where the foster agreement contemplates a surrender of custody for only a temporary period of time 2: holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child 3: holding the foster parent did not possess a liberty interest in her relationship with the foster child 4: recognizing emotional bond between foster parents and child although ultimately determining foster parents did not have rights of parents in dependency action under chapter 2644 rcw", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Affirmed. See Adams v. State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); accord Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722 (Fla. 3d Holdings: 0: holding that section 89313 as amended by section 893101 florida statutes 2002 is constitutional 1: holding that the legislature amended section 8120142d florida statutes now renumbered as section 8120143c in 1992 to omit habitual offender penalties for the crime of felony petit theft 2: recognizing that the 1992 amendment to section 8930216 florida statutes changed the law 3: holding florida sexual predators act section 77521 florida statutes 2000 to be unconstitutional as violating procedural due process 4: holding that arbitration is not a civil action as that term is used in section 76873 florida statutes 1991", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the inference that there was a fraudulent intent,\u201d and that this inference cannot be rebutted by \u201cthe mere assertion by a party that it did not intend to deceive.\u201d Id. at 1352 (emphasis added). Contrary to Pequignot\u2019s position, the Federal Circuit did not hold that this inference is irrebuttable. Indeed, Pequignot\u2019s interpretation would eliminate any distinction between intent to deceive, which \u00a7 292 requires, and knowledge of falsity, a different state of mind. Moreover, to hold, as Pequignot suggests, that a party that knowingly made false patent markings is precluded from even offering evidence that it did not in tend to deceive would be inconsistent with the high bar that is set for proving deceptive intent. See Brose v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 455 F.2d 763, 768 (5th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Central Admixture Pharmacy Servs. v. Advanced Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review 1: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive 2: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 3: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury 4: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "who commits any felony has the requisite mens rea to commit first-degree murder is a legal fiction we no longer can support. In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree. This presumption is inappropriate today for lesser-degree felonies where moral, social, and penal considerations dictate that criminal liability should be imposed according to moral culpability. Thu 494 (1958) (stating that the mere violation of a traffic safety statute is an insufficient predicate for felonious slaying, that it requires \u201crecklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision\u201d); State v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ohio 1993) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop 1: holding that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop did not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved as long as the officer articulated a lawful reason for the stop 2: holding that the forceable stop at issue was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest 3: holding that the misdemeanormanslaughter rule requires a showing of intent or the commission of an act in such a maimer as to make the killing of deceased a natural or probable result of such conduct 4: holding that a minormisdemeanor such as the failure to stop at a stop sign could not be a predicate offence for misdemeanormanslaughter because it did not show the necessary intent or recklessness", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "lawful police power because City\u2019s billboard ordinance is unconstitutionally unreasonable because it does not further public welfare, health, or safety. Lamar\u2019s pleadings (including its summary judgment pleadings) did not challenge the constitutionality of City\u2019s billboard ordinance on this or any other basis. Lamar\u2019s further contention that City never formally declared the Agreement to be adverse to its interests and never officially repudiated the Agreement preserves nothing for our review. Lamar does not explain the legal relevance of this fact, and provides no authority explaining why the fact prevented the trial court from determining that the Agreement was void ab initio pursuant to section 432.070 because it exceeded the scope of City\u2019s powers. Ad Trend, 272 S.W.3d at 206-07 (<HOLDING>). Lamar\u2019s fourth point on appeal next argues Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court is not required to review an appellants point relied on which appears without citation of applicable or relevant authority 1: holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority 2: holding that issues raised but not supported by argument are deemed abandoned 3: holding an issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority 4: holding that pejorative allegations about questioned actions where the legal significance is not explained nor supported by relevant authority or by an explanation for the lack of relevant authority are deemed abandoned and unpreserved for appellate review", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "further supported the government\u2019s position. After reviewing the evidence in the record-especially the Franks hearing testimony regarding the states of mind of the government agents-and applying the correct understanding of reckless disregard, we conclude that the record does not support the finding that the omission of the SEC investigation in the Title III wiretap application was made with \u201creckless disregard for the truth.\u201d In any event, even if we were to assume, arguendo, the opposite conclusion-that government officials omitted information about the SEC investigation with \u201creckless disregard for the truth\u201dwe are persuaded that this omission was not material, substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court\u2019s analysis on that issue. Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at *21-24 (<HOLDING>). C. \u201cProbable Cause\u201d: Did the District Court Holdings: 0: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract 1: holding that the evidence presented at a factfinding hearing was sufficient to support the chins finding 2: holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned 3: holding that the wiretap application as corrected was sufficient to support a finding of necessity 4: holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "cannot order that requested relief. Numerous Maryland decisions illustrate the rule. They include Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 561, 510 A.2d 562, 564-65 (1986) (dismissing appeal as moot because patient no longer required medical treatment that included a blood transfusion, to which she refused to consent; the Court concluded \u201c[njothing that we say will bind the parties to any future course of action or will affect or remedy what has already taken place\u201d); National Collegiate Athletic Ass\u2019n v. Tucker, 300 Md. 156, 158-59, 476 A.2d 1160, 1161 (1984) (after lacrosse season, dismissing, as moot, appeal from injunction allowing allegedly ineligible lacrosse players to participate in intercollegiate games); Hagerstown Reprod. Health Servs. v. Fritz, 295 Md. 268, 454 A.2d 846 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208, 103 S.Ct. 3538, Holdings: 0: holding that filing of appeal to federal circuit divests this court of jurisdiction to consider motion to stay court order pending appeal 1: holding that the fact that injunction at issue did not restrict the expression of those demonstrating in favor of abortion rights was justly attributable to the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor of abortion rights and noting that the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the courts original order 2: holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case 3: holding appeal moot on this basis 4: holding as moot appeal from circuit court injunction prohibiting abortion where abortion performed during appellate stay", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or special situation theories or that Sonitrol was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A. Standard of Review 1. Motion to Dismiss A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove facts in support of a claim that would entitle it to relief. Coors Brewing Co. v. Floyd, 978 P.2d 668, 665 (Colo.1999). But see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, -- U.S. --, --, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 1968-69, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating this standard for motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and holding that to survive such a motion the complaint must set forth factual allegations sufficient to \"raise a right to relief above the speculative level\"); Alvarado v. KOB-TV, LLC., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 n. 2 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 1: recognizing that district courts should resolve issues related to jurisdiction or venue prior to ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 2: holding that the bell afl corp standard applies to all motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief 3: holding that motions to dismiss should have been converted into motions for summary judgment where the district court relied upon contract documents submitted by the defendant 4: holding that the criminal jurisdiction bar applies to the denials of motions to reopen", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Const. art.I, art. II. Extraterritorial tax enforcement directly implicates relations between the United States and other sovereign nations. See Attorney General of Canada, 268 F.3d at 114. As the Second Circuit stated: When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to \u2014 and better handled by\u2014 the political branches of government. Id.; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (stating that courts are not responsible for political functions affecting foreign relations); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 740 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Holdings: 0: recognizing rule 1: recognizing continued validity of the modified prospectivity rule of kitto 2: recognizing that udja waives sovereign immunity in suit challenging validity of statute 3: recognizing validity of rule stated in marhal 4: recognizing continued validity of rule barring adjudication of a foreign tax suit", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201d Id. at 1079 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549). Therefore, a state law is preempted if it adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. Id. (citing Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379, 122 S.Ct. 2151). The Kentucky Act essentially creates a statutory bad faith claim. Cummings v. Thomas Industries, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 99, 101 (W.D.Ky.1993) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky.1988)). A plaintiff may recover \u201csuch damages as he sustained by reason of the violation\u201d of the Act. Ky.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 446.070. The plain language of this statute permits, at a bare minimum, compensatory damages. In addition, a plaintiff can recover damages for anxiety and mental anguish. FB Ins. Co. v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Ky.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). By comparison, ERISA limits plaintiffs Holdings: 0: holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse 1: holding the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that the plaintiff could be awarded damages for anxiety mental anguish and loss of consortium for a violation of the kentucky act 2: recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium 3: holding that trial court did not err 4: recognizing loss of consortium claims", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "two months, CU withdrew from the Plough action. It subsequently disclaimed coverage. On November 26,1980, a year and a half after it withdrew its defense, CU brought this declaratory judgment suit seeking a determination that it was not liable to defend or indemnify IFF in the Plough action. Since the Plough action had been pending for almost two years and IFF was in the midst of defending itself in that litigation, IFF moved to stay the declaratory judgment suit as untimely. On March 25, 1981, after extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court stayed the suit 46 A.D.2d 97, 361 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (3d Dept.1974); Padavan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dept.1973) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 123 Misc.2d 932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221-22 (1984) (<HOLDING>). By bringing this declaratory judgment action Holdings: 0: holding that indemnitee may recover attorneys fees incurred in defending indemnity agreement 1: holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers 2: holding that insured could recover the costs of defending a declaratory judgment action brought by the injured party to compel the insurer to defend but could not recover the costs associated with prosecuting crossclaims against the insurer 3: holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured 4: holding that insured who brought third party action against insurer could recover costs incurred in defending insurers counterclaim for declaratory relief since the insureds posture in the counterclaim was that of a defendant", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "passage of interstate commerce of either people of goods.\u201d United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288-89 (3d Cir.1996) (Alito, J., dissenting). The Lessor Defendants argue that Congress appropriately invoked this authority because strict vicarious liability lawsuits against lessors of motor vehicles typically arise following an automobile accident that occurs on roads, streets, intrastate or interstate highways, all of which are channels of commerce. See, e.g. Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003) (upholding legislation aimed at improving safety in the \u201cchannel of commerce,\u201d including streets, roads and federal highways); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, Holdings: 0: holding that state ownership of submerged lands remains subject to congress paramount power over navigable waters under the commerce clause 1: holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce 2: holding action equivalent to quiet title over navigable waters regulated and controlled by state is form of prohibited relief 3: recognizing that navigable waters railroads and highways are channels of commerce which can be regulated under congress commerce powers 4: holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "F.Supp.2d 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y.2007); Kreinik v. Showbran Photo, Inc., No. 02CV1172, 2003 WL 22339268, **8-9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18276, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2003) (\u201cTo state a claim under Section 215, [employee] must adequately plead that [employer\u2019s] counterclaims constituted an adverse employment action taken because of [employee\u2019s] complaints under the Labor Law.\u201d). In addition, New York\u2019s anti-retaliation provision requires a nexus between the employee\u2019s complaint and the employer\u2019s retaliatory action. Kreinik, 2003 WL 22339268, **8-9, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18276, at *29 (finding that employee\u2019s allegations sufficiently plead that his labor law complaints were a motivating factor for employer\u2019s adverse action); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 162 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The defendant contends that the plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that the close connection in time between the complaint and termination indicated that complaints could have been a motivating factor for employees termination 1: holding that plaintiff must come forth with sufficient facts to permit a determination that his statements were a substantial motivating factor in his employment termination 2: holding that a 17 month time period between the employees protected speech and his termination could not support an inference of causation 3: holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim 4: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with property \u2018is satisfied only if a court issues a provisional remedy such as attachment, an order of arrest or an injunction.\u2019 \u201d Equity Assocs., Inc. v. Village of Northbrook, 171 Ill.App.3d 115, 121 Ill.Dec. 71, 76, 524 N.E.2d 1119, 1124 (1988) (quoting Tedeschi v. Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 548 F.Supp. 1172, 1174 (S.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850, 106 S.Ct. 147, 88 L.Ed.2d 122 (1985)). In Illinois, the court\u2019s focus rests upon the peculiar effect of the suit upon plaintiffs right to use the property; special injury in civil cases will not be found unless the injuries emanate directly from the impact of the issues allegedly wrongfully litigated. Compare Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 78 Ill.2d 235, 35 Ill.Dec. 758, 399 N.E .2d 1286 (1980) (<HOLDING>) and Norin v. Scheldt Mfg. Co., 297 Ill. 521, Holdings: 0: holding that injunction restraining distribution of life insurance proceeds for more than nine years to widowed beneficiary sufficient interference with property to satisfy special injury requirement 1: holding that husbands obligation to pay premiums on a life insurance policy for five years with wife as the beneficiary was periodic alimony 2: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate 3: holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms 4: holding that insureds widow as beneficiary of life insurance policy had standing as an injured person under the insurance code", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "offense of attempt\u00e9d second-degree murder based on knowing merely that one\u2019s conduct will cause serious physical injury, the giving of the instruction was reversible error. Ontiveros\u2019s conviction must therefore be reversed. CONCLUSION \u00b6 20 We reverse Ontiveros\u2019s conviction and remand for a new trial. Because of this disposition, we do not reach the sentencing issue raised by Ontiveros. CONCURRING: G. MURRAY SNOW, Presiding Judge and DONN KESSLER, Judge. 1 . The offense of attempted second-degree murder under \u00a7\u00a7 13-1001(A)(2) and -1104(A)(2) does not, contrary to Ontiveros\u2019s argument, require an intent to cause death. The culpable mental state of knowingly causing the death of another is sufficient under \u00a7 13-1104(A)(2). Cf. State v. Nunez, 159 Ariz. 594, 769 P.2d 1040 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>). The requirement of acting knowingly, however, Holdings: 0: holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder 1: holding that fetus was not a human being for purposes of attempted firstdegree intentional homicide and firstdegree reckless injury statutes 2: holding that a jury could not be instructed that attempted murder can be committed knowingly 3: holding that attempted firstdegree murder may be committed knowingly or intentionally 4: holding that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue based on the first districts decision in montgomery that the standard attempted manslaughterbyact instruction was fundamentally erroneous where betts was charged with attempted firstdegree premeditated murder and convicted of the necessary lesserincluded offense of attempted seconddegree murder", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.\u2019 \u201d Cruz v State Farm, Mut Auto Ins Co, 241 Mich App 159, 164; 614 NW2d 689 (2000), aff'd 466 Mich 588 (2002), quoting MCL 500.3105(1). 5 MCL 500.3104(17) provides: Not more than 60 days after the initial organizational meeting of the board [of directors of the MCCA], the board shall submit to the commissioner for approval a proposed plan of operation consistent with the objectives and provisions of this section, which shall provide for the economical, fair, and nondiscriminatory administration of the association and for the prompt and efficient provision of indemnity. 6 This Court has previously implicitly found that an insurer constitutes a \u201cthird party\u201d under \u00a7 10.06. See Farmers Ins Exch, 251 Mich App at 458-459 (<HOLDING>). 7 We believe that our holding is not only Holdings: 0: holding that  1006 applies to an insurers recoupment of money from another insurer 1: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent 2: holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss 3: holding that admonishment for breach of insurers obligation to insured is not applicable to equitable share dispute between insurers 4: holding that the language of  9133 applies only to insurers and not to the insurers employees", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "by private litigants, who lack the institutional constraints of prosecutors and grand juries. These distinctions in the two neighboring state\u2019s laws created differing expectations about what conduct each would allow or prohibit. This case is, thus, distinguishable from those in which courts declined to dismiss claims recognized under New Jersey local law, even though out-of-state plaintiffs might have been unable to pursue such causes of action under their own state\u2019s local law. In those matters, the plaintiffs were allowed to pursue their claims on the ground that their home states had no reason to deny them the fortuity of a remedy for what both states recognized as \u201cthe same evil,\u201d even if they did not recognize it to the same degree. See Boyes, supra, 27 F.Supp.2d at 547-48 (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Alza Corp., 400 N.J.Super. 529, Holdings: 0: recognizing new jerseys interest in deterrence of tortious misconduct as a relevant factor in choice of law decisions applicable where two of defendants were new jersey residents from whom damages were sought for their negligent acts in new jersey 1: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey 2: holding that a writ of execution under new jersey law is not an action against the consumer 3: recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller 4: recognizing that alabama had no interest in denying its residents the procedural and substantive advantages afforded under new jerseys product liability and consumer fraud statutes but not alabamas for claims against a new jersey manufacturer", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "be believed.\u201d Id. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859. \u201cCredibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor\u2019s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.\u201d Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. at 1040, 154 L.Ed.2d 931. Although we afford great deference to the trial court\u2019s observations of the prosecutor\u2019s demeanor and intent, \u201c[deference does not by definition preclude relief.\u201d Id. at 1041; see also Lewis, 321 F.3d 824 (\u201cThe proffer of various faulty reasons and only one or two otherwise adequate reasons, may undermine the prosecutor\u2019s credibility to such an extent that a court should sustain a Batson challenge.\u201d); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim 1: holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination 2: holding that although reasons given by a prosecutor would normally be adequately neutral explanations taken at face value the fact that two of the four proffered reasons do not hold up under judicial scrutiny militates against their sufficiency 3: holding outofcourt statements relating to reasons for investigation are not admissible where the reasons for the investigation are not at issue 4: recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Plaintiffs have satisfied this requirement of Rule 23, notwithstanding Defendants\u2019 arguments to the contrary. In particular, I find that BPI Global has constitutional and statutory standing and would be an adequate class representative in this case. a. Article III Standing (\u201cInjury-in-Fact\u201d) Defendants\u2019 argument that BPI Global does not have constitutional standing ignores the fact that BPI Global is a direct investor in several of the funds for which it served as investment advisor. Defendants argue that because BPI Global was a mere advisor (through BPI Capital) to the mutual funds for which it purchased Sonus stock, it never suffered any injury itself. They rely upon a recent ease denying standing to an investment advisor. See In re Tyco Int\u2019l, Ltd., 236 F.R.D. 62, 73 (D.N.H.2006) (<HOLDING>). However, Tyco is inapplicable in this case Holdings: 0: holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention 1: recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements 2: holding that bjecause plaintiff does not allege that it was directly injured by the defendants alleged misconduct it lacks article iii standing to sue on its clients behalf 3: holding that the tcpa does not limit its protection to instances in which the plaintiff is charged within the context of article iii standing 4: holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "after Wisconsin adopted \u00a7 904.085 in 1993, for example, contains an express exception allowing a party to admit evidence of mediation communications for the purpose of \u201cprov[ing] a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.\u201d See Uniform Mediation Act, The National Conference of Commis sioners on Uniform State Laws, \u00a7 6(b)(2), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ Act.aspx?title=Mediation Act (last visited Oct. 30, 2014)'. Although one might contend it is unjust that a person like Doe cannot recover if he was in fact fraudulently induced into signing a settlement agreement, our task is to apply the Wisconsin statute as it is written. Cf. Rojas v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 407, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 643, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Princeton Ins. Co. v. Vergano, 883 A.2d 44, Holdings: 0: recognizing the validity of a rule 26c confidentiality order entered on good cause 1: recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege 2: recognizing a federal mediation privilege 3: holding california mediation privilege was not subject to good cause exception because only exceptions to mediation confidentiality were those expressly provided in statute 4: recognizing an exception to a california announcement and entry statute", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir.1988) (necessity is a factual question). To hold otherwise would result in a disincentive for cleanup. Indeed, the cleanup may be motivated by many factors, such as fear of a government enforcement action, landowner liability, and even self-serving economic reasons. Nor must a plaintiff show agency action as a prerequisite to cost recovery. Agency inaction is not dispositive of the question whether contamination presents an environmental risk worthy of response. See id. (\u201c[T]he district court erred in ruling that some governmental entity must authorize and initiate a response action for that action to be necessary and consistent with the national contingency plan.\u201d); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Whether the Water Quality Board would have Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 1: holding that declaratory relief only appropriate once some expenditure has been made toward necessary response costs 2: holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla 3: holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken 4: holding that the proper remedy for future response costs is not a present lumpsum payment of anticipated expenses but instead a declaratory judgment award dividing future response costs among prps", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(same). Hames may nevertheless be liable for the damage caused by the search if, as Sosa asserts, Hames made material misstatements and omissions in the Affidavit supporting the Warrant. \u201cA search warrant may be voided if the affidavit supporting the warrant contains deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth ... and this rule includes material omissions.\u201d Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). \u201cNonetheless, the warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.\u201d Id. (allegedly misstated or omitted facts did not alter determination that considering the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d there was a sufficient basis 11, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (<HOLDING>). The Affidavit does not state that Sosa Holdings: 0: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 1: holding that eyewitness accounts and an officers observations established probable cause 2: holding affiant entitled to rely upon observations of investigators as basis for probable cause for search warrant 3: holding that observations made a during prior illegal search should not have been included in the affidavit for the search warrant 4: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4 . In the argument section of his brief pertaining to the issue of the violation of the Act, Baltrip states the following: The Board met in private with the attorney who was prosecuting the evidence on which she sought dismissal before the Board of Education. No one,could seriously argue that a District Attorney General, prosecuting a criminal in a court of Tennessee, could meet with a jury to discuss the sentencing options prior to the jury rendering a verdict. Baltrip does not raise this matter as an issue in the issues section of his brief; nor does he cite any authority suggesting that the dual role of the Board\u2019s attorney amounts to reversible error. In fact, there is authority suggesting to the contrary. See, e.g ., Cochran v. Board of Educ., 815 S.W.2d 55, 60 (Mo.Ct.App.1991)(<HOLDING>). In any event, since this matter has not been Holdings: 0: holding that the state courts factfinding procedure was adequate even though it did not hold an evidentiary hearing because  hearing as used in  2254d does not require a trialtype hearing at which live testimony is presented and the accused has the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses 1: holding that appearance at the scheduled hearing demonstrates actual notice of the hearing 2: holding mere fact that school boards attorney actively participated in dismissal hearing did not render hearing unfair 3: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing 4: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the other person in fear.\u201d People v. Davenport, 230 Mich.App. 577, 583 N.W.2d 919, 921 (1998). At the time Davis entered the stolen vehicle the elements of the crime had been satisfied. Second, although flight in this instance may provide an inference of knowledge of the crime, it does not similarly provide an inference that Davis took a conscious action to aid the commission of the crime. Finally, the fact that Davis was found stripping the car several hours after the crime provides no indication or inference that Davis encouraged Washington in the commission of the crime in any way. This fact may provide evidence that Davis was an accessory after the fact; however, assisting after the fact is not sufficient to find Davis guilty of aiding and abetting. See Hopson, 1987 WL 37432, at *2 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, taking the facts together does Holdings: 0: holding that postcrime conduct does not support finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant aided crime 1: holding factual finding authorizing death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 3: holding that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": ".... warrants [the equipment], for a period of six months, from the date of delivery .... \u201d See Carruthers Out-of-Pocket Expense Aff., Ex. D (\u201cElectric Mobility Limited Warranty\u201d)(emphasis added). The plain language of the Limited Warranty thus implies that the date of the delivery of each Electric Mobility scooter and wheelchair, and not the date of the potentiometer installation, triggers the beginning of the warranty period. Quite plainly, the Defendants\u2019 moving papers themselves demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The interpretation of the Limited Warranty is a material fact since it is relevant as one factor in determining which damages were reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants. See e.g., Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 444, 453 A.2d 160 (1982)(<HOLDING>). The Defendants\u2019 analysis conflicts with the Holdings: 0: holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where plaintiffs claim arose solely as a result of the existence of a contract between the parties 1: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 2: holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract 3: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 4: holding that a defendant is not chargeable for loss that he did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "owed to a governmental unit. 341 B.R. at 50. However, that bare restatement of the rule in \u00a7 1322(a)(4) does not help determine the meaning of \u201cowed directly to or recoverable by a governmental unit.\u201d In fact that was not even the question presented in Sanders. Rather the question in that case was whether \u00a7 1322(a)(2) required priority claims to be paid in the order specified in \u00a7 507, so that a domestic support obligation under \u00a7 507(a)(1) would be paid in full before administrative expenses under \u00a7 507(a)(2). Id. at 49-50. The bankruptcy court held that it did not. Id. at 50 aff'd, Alabama Dep\u2019t of Human Res. v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 347 B.R. 776 (N.D.Ala.2006). See also In re Lanigan, 101 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (citing In re Parker, 21 B.R. 692, 694 (E.D.Tenn.1982)) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Sanders does not illuminate the Holdings: 0: holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13 1: holding that a plan under chapter 13 although confirmed was invalid because it failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of 11 usc  1322a2 requiring full payment of all claims entitled to priority 2: holding that priority claims can be paid concurrently with other creditors over the life of a chapter 13 plan 3: holding that child support arrearages may not be included in a chapter 13 plan 4: holding that a creditors failure to vote or to object to a chapter 11 plan constitutes acceptance of the plan", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Court is persuaded that the Sixth Circuit would follow this line of thinking when dealing with broad fraud allegations against contracts that contain jury trial waivers. First, the court has held unequivocally that a contract action asserting fraud in the inducement is not sufficient to implicate an arbitration clause where there is no claim of fraud specifically relating to that clause. Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 575-76 (6th Cir.2003). Second, in the case of parties with equal bargaining power, the court has not hesitated to find that an agreement to waive a jury trial can satisfy the requirement that constitutional rights can be waived if the waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 756 (<HOLDING>). Third, the court has relied on the rationale Holdings: 0: holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary 1: holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing 2: holding that the magistrate was correct in applying the knowing and voluntary standard in this instance 3: holding that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary and must be a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available to a defendant 4: holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Based upon the scant record before us, which does not include a transcript of the proceeding below or an appropriate substitute, we cannot conclude that the lower court abused its discretion when it entered a final judgment of dismissal. For this same reason, we also cannot find that the order denying appellant\u2019s motion to set aside final judgment, due to the appellant\u2019s failure to appear for the duly scheduled trial of this cause and/or failure to contact the court or opposing counsel requesting a continuance was an abuse of discretion. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (<HOLDING>); Prymus v. Prymus, 753 So.2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA Holdings: 0: holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings 1: holding that in appellate proceedings the decision of the trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error 2: holding that it is the duty of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial courts judgment by demonstrating some reversible error 3: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error 4: holding that although the presumption of correctness applies to the ultimate classification decision  the presumption carries no force as to questions of law", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the judicial branch of government. The Legislature has established the Court of Claims by law and delegated to it the Legislature\u2019s power to investigate certain claims against the State that may not be prosecuted in the courts because of the State\u2019s sovereign immunity. See W.Va.Code \u00a7 14-2-1 (1967) (Repl.Vol.2000). The Court of Claims is also charged by law with the duty of recommending payment of such of those claims as it finds worthy, in specified amounts, to be paid by specific appropriations designated by the Legislature for payment of claims against the State, which it recognizes as a moral obligation of the State notwithstanding the immunity of the State from suit in its various courts. See Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. C & D Equip. Co. v. Gainer, 154 W.Va. 83, 174 S.E.2d 729 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Because the Court of Claims is a public body Holdings: 0: recognizing that the state enjoys sovereign immunity in regard to tort actions unless the legislature waived immunity pursuant to a specific statute 1: holding that only the legislature can authorize such payments when sovereign immunity exits if and when they are found and declared by it to be moral obligations of the state and specific appropriations made for payment thereof 2: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 3: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 4: holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "his testimony to what she had told him about her condition and what she had told him about how she was feeling. He did not offer a medical opinion on what Guarilia's hostility, if true, could have done lo a person with diabetes and hypertension. He also offered no link between her depression and Guarilia\u2019s treatment. For all those reasons I do not believe Dr. Portnow's testimony carries any great weight. Michaud herself testified as to her condition, that is, that both her blood pressure and blood sugar level increased and that Guarilia\u2019s treatment depressed her. Because the evidence is in the record through Michaud, there is no need for me to rely on Dr. Portnow's report of the same information. 11 . See Priest v. Interco, Inc. (In re Interco), 135 B.R. 359, 361-62 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1991) (<HOLDING>); accord Perino v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 107 Holdings: 0: holding that to apply the personal injury endorsement montana law requires the complaint to allege facts establishing the elements of one of the enumerated torts listed under the insurance policys definition of personal injury 1: holding that personal injury exception should be construed narrowly so as not to include torts without physical injury 2: holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort 3: holding that age discrimination is not a personal injury tort 4: holding that the definition of customer under sipa should be construed narrowly", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rather to officials of institutions, we conclude that the motion justice erred in holding that the defendant was required by \u00a7 11 \u2014 37\u201416(b) to register. Conclusion For the reasons stated, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the Superior Court. We remand the record to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . General Laws 1956 \u00a7 11-37-16, although nominally repealed, is still effective with respect to a limited class of individuals. That is because G.L.1956 \u00a7 11-37.1-18 of the subsequently enacted registration statute contains a savings clause stating that \"[njothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate any duty to register which exists or existed under the provisions of former \u00a7 11-37-16.\" See also State v. Flores, 714 A.2d 581, 583 (R.I.1998) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The facts, pertaining to the underlying Holdings: 0: holding that an individual who is required to register as a sex offender is not in custody 1: holding that the defendant could not be sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute if his offense occurred before the statute became effective 2: holding that although the defendant in that case was convicted after the effective date of the new statute  1137118 he nevertheless was required to register as a sex offender because  113716 was in effect at the time he was charged 3: holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law 4: holding that the imposition of a life sentence for failure to register as a sex offender constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence was so harsh in comparison to the crime", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "no confidential/fiduciary relationship existed because the parties were adversaries, each represented by their own attorney. On appeal, Virginia contends the law permits the inference of a confidential relationship to the extent Edwin holds property in excess of $690,000 that rightfully belongs to her. We disagree with Virginia\u2019s argument. Texas law recognizes that a relationship on which a constructive trust can be based may be an informal fiduciary relationship that arises from a moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence. Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962). However, any such fiduciary relationship between Edwin and Virginia terminated when they divorced. See Solares v. Solares, 232 S.W.3d 873, 881 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Notash, 118 S.W.3d 868, 872 Holdings: 0: holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel 1: holding in a contested divorce where each spouse is independently represented by counsel the fiduciary relationship terminates 2: holding that the automatic stay terminates completely as to a serially filing spouse but remains in force as to a newly filing spouse 3: recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice 4: recognizing that the rights accorded by the homestead laws vest independently in each spouse regardless of whether one spouse or both actually owns the fee interest in the homestead", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "arbitrary and capricious manner. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The state \u201chas a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty,\u201d which includes a responsibility to \u201cdefine the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates \u2018standard-less [sentencing] discretion.\u2019 \u201d Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196 n. 47, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (alteration in original)). The \u201ccapital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a \u2018meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which 1759 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Supreme Court has \u201cinsisted that Holdings: 0: holding that georgias reckless driving statute now ga code ann  406390 which is similar in substance to the virginia statute is not unconstitutionally vague 1: holding that georgias outrageously or wantonly vile horrible or inhuman circumstance was also invalid 2: holding that failure to consider potential mail delay was not a nonnegligent circumstance 3: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added 4: holding that appellants seven day hospitalization was a nonnegligent circumstance", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "made for the benefit prior to the execution of the settlement agreement. Hence, Comiskey\u2019s waiver of future medical and rehabilitation workmen\u2019s compensation benefits precludes his recovery of the claim he asserts here.\u201d Id. In this case, Plaintiff twice requested approval for alternative physician care from Drs. Fulk-erson and Swan and was twice denied, all prior to entering into a settlement agreement. Unlike the home spa in Comiskey, therefore, Plaintiffs evidence \u2014 viewed in the light most favorable to her as the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor \u2014 shows the alternative care requested was not \u201cpermissible under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\u201d See Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Centura Health-St. Anthony Cent. Hosp., 46 P.3d 490, 493 (Colo.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, summary judgment on Plaintiffs Holdings: 0: holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier 1: recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer 2: holding that carrier was entitled to intervene as of right where the states workers compensation law permitted subrogation of a compensation carrier 3: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 4: holding if a workers compensation carrier denies liability for medical expenses of its insured the nofault carrier is bound promptly to pay benefits concerning such expenses under its policy", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "requirement under the applicable rules of civil procedure. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7004(b)(4) provides, in relevant part, that proper service on the United States is accomplished by \u201cmailing a copy of the summons and complaint addressed to the civil process clerk at the office of the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought and by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia[.]\u201d As with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(1), when proper service of process has not been made upon the United States under Rule 7004(b)(4), the United States has not been made a party to an action and a court is without jurisdiction to enter judgment against the United States. See Bland v. Britt, 271 F.2d 193, 194 (4th Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>); In re Morrell, 69 B.R. 147, 149-50 Holdings: 0: holding that notice requirements of 4206a are jurisdictional 1: holding that notice requirements under rule 252b3 are jurisdictional 2: holding that notice requirements under former rule 40b1 are jurisdictional 3: holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature 4: holding service requirements under fedrcivp 4 to be jurisdictional", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Summary Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Mr. Aubin is entitled to summary judgment on his state law false arrest claim. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike (Doc. 81) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 119) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs\u2019 state law failure to train claim is DISMISSED. 1 . Plaintiffs state law failure to train claim is dismissed because it is expressly barred by La. R.S. \u00a7 9:2798. 1(B), which provides public officials with immunity for discretionary functions like training. See Smith v. Lafayette Parish Sheriffs Dpt., 874 So.2d 863, 867 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Hoffpauir v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-403, 2013 WL 5934699, at *12 (M. D. La. Nov. 5, 2013) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Sheriff Ard does not dispute that he is a Holdings: 0: holding that public officials are immune from suit for discretionary functions like training under louisiana law 1: holding that quasijudicial immunity extends only to officials who perform discretionary functions 2: holding state immune from suit brought in state court 3: holding that qualified immunity extends to government officials performing discretionary functions 4: holding state immune from suit involving a federal question", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "185, 196 (1st Cir.1999) (requiring plaintiff in suit under PSLRA to plead facts which give rise to a \u201cstrong inference\u201d of scien-ter). Lehman\u2019s argument is well taken. The outcome of the SEC action, in combination with the Greebel decision, makes the plaintiffs\u2019 prospects for success rather bleak. See also In re Centennial Technologies Litig., No. 97-10304-REK (D.Mass. Oct.23, 1999) Practice and Procedure Order No. 8 at 2-3 (allowing Lehman\u2019s motion to dismiss in a related class action because plaintiffs failed to meet pleading requirements on scienter required by the PSLRA). Indeed, the court in Jones Motor discouraged courts from allowing \u201ca party sensing an adverse court decision a second chance in another forum.\u201d Jones Motor, 671 F.2d at 43; see also Morales Rivera, 418 F.2d at 726 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, \u201c[ajrbitration clauses were not Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs suddenly discovered affection for arbitration came too late when the claim was made after the action was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute 1: holding that when an action is dismissed without prejudice because of a failure to prosecute the interruption in the running of the statute is considered as never having occurred 2: holding that a defendant homeowners association was the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees when a plaintiff homeowners action was dismissed for failure to prosecute 3: holding defendant still considered successful party under ars  1234101a where there was no adjudication on the merits as action was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute 4: holding that the defendant became the prevailing party and thus properly claimed attorneys fees when the plaintiffs claim was involuntarily dismissed for failure to prosecute", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Merkwan v. Leckey, 376 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1985); Burke v. Foss, 334 N.W.2d 861, 864 (S.D.1983); Chipperfield v. Woessner, 84 S.D. 13, 14, 166 N.W.2d 727, 728 (1969)). The statute of limitations in workers compensation cases is jurisdictional in nature, as making a timely claim is an essential element of the right to compensation. Klein v. Menke, 83 S.D. 511, 517, 162 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1968) (citation omitted). [\u00b6 42.] It is a \u201cwell established principle that statutes of limitation applicable to suits [or claims] against the government are conditions attached to the sovereign\u2019s consent to be sued and must be strictly construed.\u201d Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 320 (3rd Cir.1976) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306, 311 (1957)) (<HOLDING>). The United States Supreme Court has stated Holdings: 0: holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely letter with the irs that requested a refund and subsequently filed a formal refund claim 1: holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed 2: recognizing that  2244dlds statute of limitations can be tolled 3: holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run 4: holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the \u201ceconomic relationship and community of interest\u201d between contractor and architect on a construction project \u2014 that moved the court to find an independent duty of care. Forte Bros., 525 A.2d at 1303. In the present case, for example, Fleet relied on Federal to administer its claims and determine the scope of coverage. Federal\u2019s negligent administration could result (or, as Plaintiffs allege, did result) in the denial of an estimable claim, thereby depriving Fleet of coverage otherwise owed under the Policy. This would seem to offer some support for the conclusion that Federal should handle Plaintiffs\u2019 claims with reasonable care. But Rhode Island courts have been reluctant to extend Forte Bros, beyond the ehainlink fences of a construction site. See, e.g., Kennett, 798 A.2d at 419 (<HOLDING>); Boston Inv. Prop. No. 1 State v. E.W. Burman, Holdings: 0: holding that real estate agents owe their  clients a duty of loyalty 1: holding that a real estate agent does not owe a buyer a duty independent of the agency relationship with the seller 2: holding that officers owe a duty to the public to detect and investigate crime but owe no duty to individuals for negligent investigation 3: holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision 4: holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to Class Cert, at 12 & 12 n. 6.) 10 . Specifically, Defendants claim that these large-volume purchasers are able to use their superior bargaining positions to obtain volume discounts, off-season price discounts, and special inventory fill promotional discounts; they are able to obtain more favorable pricing through long-term contracts and/or special bid quotes; and are able to utilize warehousing arrangements and other storage, distribution, inventory, transportation or handling arrangements to further reduce price. (Defs.\u2019 Mot. in Opp. to Class Cert, at 13.) 11 . There is a wealth of authority supporting this position. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 997, 1994 WL 663590 (N.D.Ill.1994); In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F.Supp. 1019 (N.D.Miss.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., Holdings: 0: holding typicality requirement satisfied because named plaintiffs claims stemmed from same legal theory as class claims notwithstanding fact that class purchased tickets at different prices according to different terms 1: holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory 2: recognizing that in determining numerosity courts must consider the geographical dispersion of the class the ease with which class members may be identified the nature of the action and the size of each plaintiffs claim 3: holding that class of catfish purchasers satisfied typicality requirement despite purchasers varying sizes geographical locations and buying methods because the substance of antitrust pricefixing claim was the same for all class members 4: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the Court should summarily dismiss the Applications. ' In its Amended Application WTC states that, because it was not a retained professional in the bankruptcy case, its \u201cclaim [based on the Indenture] would not normally involve the specificity required of fee applications under 11 U.S.C. section 330.\u201d WTC acknowledges, though, that it must provide \u201cmeticulous contemporaneous time records ... [which] should reveal sufficient data to enable the Court to make an informed judgment about the specific tasks and hours allotted.\u201d In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 582 (Bankr. D.Utah 1985). Accordingly, WTC and its attorneys reviewed the time records submitted with the original Application and, in its Amended Application, categorized the time bas 1409, 1416 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 1. Section 503(b)(1) The bulk of WTC\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and persuasion as to the existence of standing 1: recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant 2: holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the movant 4: holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1866. 18 . See, e.g., id., 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. at 1869 (\"In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel\u2019s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor\u2019s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge\u2019s province.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 . Washington, 34 S.W.3d at 380 (\"A trial court\u2019s ruling on a Batson challenge will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.\u201d). 20 . See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 347 F.3d 598, 605-06 (6th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 1: holding that defendant bears burden to rebut prosecutions stated reasons for exercising peremptory challenges and that if a defendant fails to rebut the facially raceneutral reasons offered by the prosecution an appellate court may re view the trial courts decision to deny the batson objection only for plain error 2: holding that the trial court is required to provide reasons for its decision prior to appeal 3: holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more 4: recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not only because of the form, but also, because it is an appearance by a corporation, and not the work of an attorney. This court has held that because Rule 7, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, applies only to individuals, a corporate entity may only appear in court though an attorney. Dell Development Corp. v. Best Industrial Uniform Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied). As we stated in Dell, \u201cwhere a corporation chooses to represent itself through a non-attorney officer, it does so at its own risk; to do so may be viewed as negligence.\u201d Id. However, the failure of appellant to file an answer through an attorney does not prevent the response from precluding a default judgment. See also R.T.A International, 915 S.W.2d at 151 (<HOLDING>). Appellant\u2019s first point of error is Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense 1: holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction 2: holding that where answer omits certain formalities required by the rules of procedure it does not render the answer ineffective so as to entitle the plaintiff to a default judgment 3: holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions 4: holding that the defense of insufficient process was waived because it was not raised by the defendant in its answer but later in its response to the plaintiffs request for default judgment", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Blankenship admits that these prior convictions fall within the class of felonies to which the statute refers, but he contends that they were too remote in time to serve as a proper predicate for enhancement of the sentence. If a statute that imposes a criminal penalty is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the defendant. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980). However, in this case, section 924(e)(1) is not ambiguous. There is no indication, either in the statute or in the legislative history, that Congress intended to include a temporal restriction in that statute. See United States v. Green, 904 F.2d 654, 655-56 (11th Cir.1990); see also Young v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 690 F.Supp. 990, 995 (S.D.Ala.1988) (<HOLDING>). We refuse to construct such a restriction out Holdings: 0: holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 usc  922g1 did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted 1: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 2: holding that because a jury need only agree that a defendant possessed a firearm in order to find a defendant guilty of violating  922g1 a unanimity instruction was not required where defendant was charged with one count of violating  922g1 and multiple firearms were listed in that count 3: holding that period of proscription for firearm ownership under section 922g1 was indefinite 4: holding that a prior conviction ie one for which the civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored is an element of a 922g1 violation", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.\u201d); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (1974) (\u201c[Plea negotiations] are essential to relieve court calendar congestion and they relieve the prosecution and defense from the risks and uncertainties of trial.\u201d) 4. Modern Acceptance (1970s-Today) Today, approximately ninety-four percent of all state convictions and ninety-seven percent of all federal convictions are resolved by plea bargaining. See Missouri v. Frye, \u2014 U.S, -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Plea bargaining has become a reflexive Holdings: 0: holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding that defense counsel had duty to communicate formal offer from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused 2: holding that defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution 3: holding that to demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsels deficient performance that caused a defendant to forgo a favorable plea offer a defendant must show that he would have accepted the offer to plead and that there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented 4: holding that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "copy of Morris D. Murphy's driving record as maintained by the Secretary of State, as of this date. Although the last paragraph in the certificate referred to an attached copy of Murphy\u2019s driving record, no other document was attached to the certificate. However, a third exhibit, a copy of the letter entitled \u201cNotice of Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing\u201d was also admitted in evidence over Murphy\u2019s objection. 3 . The notice of suspension in the certification stated: \"[N]otice of suspension was sent by regular mail to Richard E. Tayman, Jr. ... by the Violations Bureau of the District Court, pursuant to 29-A MRSA Section 2608.\u201d State v. Tayman, 2008 ME 177, \u00b6 3, 960 A.2d 1151, 1153 (quotation marks omitted). 4 . See also State v. Knight, 2009 ME 32, \u00b6\u00b6 4, 10, 967 A.2d 723, 724, 725 (<HOLDING>). 5 .Cf. State v. Francis, 610 A.2d 743, 745 Holdings: 0: holding that admission of evidence in violation of confrontation clause was harmless because it did not relate to the contested issue before jury 1: holding that admission of business records does not violate the confrontation clause under roberts 2: holding that hearsay argument for admission of evidence did not preserve confrontation clause challenge on appeal argument could have referred either to rules of evidence or confrontation clause but failed to identify confrontation clause as basis and thus did not put trial court on notice of issue 3: holding that the admission of prior testimony that had been subjected to crossexamination violated the confrontation clause because the state did not prove that the witness was unavailable 4: holding that the admission in evidence of a certifying document from the secretary of state that its history records indicated that notice of suspension was sent by regular mail to the defendant did not violate the confrontation clause", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which is to be determined from the totality of all of the circumstances. Id. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The voluntariness of a consent to search should be evaluated in much the same fashion as the voluntariness of a confession. Washington, 653 So.2d at 364 (\u201cAlthough a warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the search will be considered lawful if conducted pursuant to consent which was given voluntarily and freely.\u201d (citing Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643 (Fla.1980))); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223-24, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (turning to the bod urt has held that consent will be considered involuntary if given in response to a police assertion of an intent to search the premises. See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, consent has been deemed to be Holdings: 0: holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises 1: holding that consent was coerced when officers told defendants wife they came to search the premises and she allowed them to enter 2: holding that a landlord cannot validly consent to a search of a tenants apartment despite ownership and legal authority to enter the premises 3: holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search 4: holding that a defendants consent to accompany dea agents from the detroit airport to the dea office was voluntary when she was asked to accompany the officers there were no threats or show of force and the officers told her twice that she could decline to consent", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as \"a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable [investor].\u201d TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976); see Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir.1980). The alleged concealment of both the conflict of interest, Press, 218 F.3d at 130, and the excessive commissions, Ettinger, 835 F.2d at 1033, satisfy the materiality requirement. 55 . While the QPA-2 and the fixed portions of the other annuities were not \"securities\u201d under federal securities laws, because they were part of the putative pay-to-play scheme, they cannot be used to support a civil RICO claim. See Bald Eagle, 189 F.3d at 329-30 (<HOLDING>). As such, the Court rejects Plaintiff's Holdings: 0: holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities 1: holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 2: holding that evidence was sufficient to support convictions for willfully engaging in fraudulent conduct in connection with sale of securities because kjnowledge that the act violates the securities laws  is not relevant 3: holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument 4: holding that 1 even if some conduct is not actionable as securities fraud that conduct cannot support a civil rico claim if it was also undertaken in connection with the purchase of a security and 2 conduct in maintaining ponzi scheme was conduct undertaken in connection with the purchase or sale of securities", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the issuer ....\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 7244(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). By contrast, section 304 does not mention the availability of any action to enforce its mandates, nor does it explicitly describe a forum in which suit may be brought or a plaintiff for whom such a forum is available. Accordingly, any private right of action within section 304 must be implied from the statute\u2019s language, structure, context and legislative history. Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass\u2019n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir.2004). B We next turn to whether section 304 creates an implied private right of action. So far as we can determine, no circuit has yet answered this question, except in dicta. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 792-93 (D.C.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). However, a number of district courts have Holdings: 0: holding that a private right of action exists 1: holding itca does not create new causes of action but creates acceptance of liability under circumstances that would bring private liability into existence 2: holding that section 4625bc does not create a private right of action for money damages 3: holding that defendants directors decision not to bring suit under section 304 for disgorgement by ceo and cfo was within the business judgment rule since  304 does not create a private right of action 4: recognizing private right of action", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "undisputed facts to a statutory standard. See Kelly v. Nicholson, 463 F.3d 1349, 1352-53 (Fed.Cir.2006) (\u201c \u201cWe have recognized, however, that where adoption of a particular legal standard dictates the outcome of a case based on undisputed facts, we may address that issue as a question of law.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Halpern v. Principi, 384 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed.Cir.2004))). Moreover, all three issues of law are \u201ccontrolling,\u201d because, if the court\u2019s rulings on any of the grounds relied upon were to be reversed on appeal, a trial on the merits would be obviated, as the FPAA would have been untimely. Second, a \u201csubstantial ground for difference of opinion\u201d must be established regarding the controlling questions of law. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 129 o. 8:06-CV-1340-T-24MAP, 2007 WL 2209129 (M.D.Fla. July 30, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a substantial ground for Holdings: 0: holding sixyear extended limitations period of irc  6501e1a applicable to partnerships overstatement of basis in son of boss transaction 1: holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy 2: holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional 3: holding that sixyear statute of limitations in  65314 is applicable to violations of  7202 4: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Supreme Court broadly held that in admiralty cases, the general rule is that \u201ca tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong.\u201d Id. at 309, 48 S.Ct. 134. Robins Dry Dock has generally been interpreted as establishing a bright line rule barring recovery for economic losses caused by an unintentional maritime tort absent physical damage to property in which the victim has a proprietary interest. See, e.g., Amoco Transport Co. v. S/S MASON LYKES, 768 F.2d 659, 666 (5th Cir.1985). Robins Dry Dock has been applied in the Second Circuit. See Fed. Commerce & Navigation Co., Ltd. v. The M/V MARATHONIAN, 528 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.1975) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Adders Int\u2019l (Ships) Ltd. v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that robins dry dock barred a time charterers claim for loss of use that resulted from the chartered ship being laid up after a collision with the defendants vessel 1: holding that a claim that unlawful termination resulted in loss of benefits is not preempted by erisa 2: holding that the rule of robins dry dock barred recovery of a cruise ship concessionaires lost profits that resulted from the cancellation of cruises during repairs after an accidental grounding 3: holding that the claim of not being able to interview jurors was procedurally barred because the claim should and could have been raised on direct appeal 4: holding disability discrimination claim barred", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "simply because a state judge believes a \u201cbetter\u201d decision could be made.\u2019 \u201d \u2014 So.2d at-(quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 2054). We affirm that conclusion today and extend it to the statute before us. If the grandparents in this case had been required to show that the child would be harmed by being deprived of unsupervised or overnight visitation with the grandparents, we might have a different case. The state has a compelling interest in preventing harm to children. See In re Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 13-21, 969 P.2d at 27-31 (reviewing various Supreme Court decisions upholding state initiatives designed to prevent harm to children in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment strict-scrutiny analytical framework); Williams v. Williams, 256 Va. 19, 22, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1998) (<HOLDING>). See also R.J.D. v. Vaughan Clinic, P.C., 572 Holdings: 0: holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation  award 1: holding that for a compelling state interest to exist justifying an order of visitation over the objection of a childs parents a court must find an actual harm to the childs health or welfare without such visitation construing virginias statute as requiring such a finding 2: holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest 3: holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decisionmaking forcing parents to prove visitation not in childs best interest 4: holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(5th Cir.1968)). With that said, however, revisions in the law of the case occur \u201cvery infrequently\u201d when one court is asked to review the decision of a coordinate court. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed.Cir.1984). Although the case at hand is not a \u201ctransfer\u201d case in the typical sense of the term, it is nonetheless a case which was decided by a previous coordinate court on a rule of law \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 which the Ohio District Court should have respected and used as a basis to dismiss the case. In other words, the district court should have dismissed Plaintiffs case under the law of the case doctrine based upon the rulings from the Kansas District Court. See Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 166\u201469 (3d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Holloway v. State of Ohio, No. Holdings: 0: holding that under the law of the case doctrine an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal 1: holding that law of the case prevented the new jersey district court from redetermining jurisdictional issue previously decided by the district of columbia district court and noting that the principles of comity among courts of the same level of the federal system provide further reason why  an issue already decided by a court of equal authority should not be reexamined 2: holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue 3: holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court 4: holding that law of the case acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "416.1467. The Commissioner\u2019s decision does not become \u201cfinal\u201d until \u201cafter the Appeals Council has denied review or decided the case after review.\u201d Mathews v. Chater, 891 F.Supp. 186, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d 681 (2d Cir.1996) (table); see 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 404.981, \u00a7 416.1481. When Iwachiw filed his complaint on October 24, 2001, the Commissioner had made no final decision in his case. Indeed, the previous month, by order dated September 18, 2001, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ\u2019s decision denying Iwachiw\u2019s benefits claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. See generally Weeks v. Social Sec. Admin. Com\u2019r, 230 F.3d 6, 7 (1st Cir.2000) (noting that Appeals Council\u2019s order vacating ALJ\u2019s decision and remanding for further proceedings is not an appea -35 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Doughty v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 644, 647 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits 1: holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over claim for interim social security benefits during pendency of administrative proceedings 2: holding that eaja applies to court proceedings for review of social security cases 3: holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation 4: holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Disciplinary Enforcement Rules for its contrary decision because, in its view, enforcement of the Disciplinary Enforcement Rules falls within the exclusive authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board. Id. at 321, citing Pa.R.D,E. 201(a) (exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Disciplinary Board under these rules extends to attorney admitted to practice law in Commonwealth and formerly admitted attorney). The court acknowledged this Court previously held a suspended attorney in contempt for violation of Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 217(j) for representing claimants in unemployment proceedings. Powell, 128 A.3d at 321, citing In the Matter of David Louis Bargeron, No. 1073 DD3, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 1695, at *1 (Pa. July 27, 2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The Commonwealth Court nevertheless concluded Holdings: 0: holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney 1: holding suspended attorney in contempt of rule 217j and ordering attorney to immediately cease and desist from all activities in connection with representation of claimants and employers in unemployment compensation proceedings and comply with all provisions of rule 217 2: holding that a suspended attorney should not be permitted to have contact with clients 3: holding that in a case where a suspended attorney commingled funds between his attorney trust account and attorney business account and the funds could not be traced claimants state of new jersey and clients security fund reached an amicable agreement to divide the funds equally 4: holding that the trial judge must comply with rule 3172c8 and advise all defendants in all cases that the plea may subject him or her to deportation ", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "motion for summary judgment and or dered that Landowners were due compensation of $826,215. Landowners appealed, challenging the exclusion of Hiles\u2019s affidavit. On appeal, the County raised two new complaints about defects in the affidavit, including that the affidavit lacked a jurat and was neither sworn to nor given under oath. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s ruling based on the County\u2019s newly-raised-jurat argument, holding that the lack of a jurat was a defect of substance, not of form, and therefore could be raised for the first time on appeal. 365 S.W.3d at 358. Landowners petitioned this Court for review. The Government Code defines \u201caffidavit\u201d as \u201ca statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by the party making it, sworn to before an .W. 29, 30 (1900) (<HOLDING>). A jurat is a certification by an authorized Holdings: 0: holding that an unsigned statement lacked an essential part of the mandatory affidavit requirements 1: holding an affidavit statement referring to the notice required for a binding contract was inadmissible as a legal conclusion 2: holding that a trial court had implicitly found that an affiant lacked credibility even where the affidavit testimony was uncontroverted 3: holding that the eaja application satisfied the eaja content requirements because it contained among other things an itemized statement of the fees sought  supported by an affidavit from the appellants counsel 4: holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir.2009) (citation and internal quotation omitted). The sale of the drugs on credit distinguishes this case from United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814 (9th Cir.1994) as the arrangement provides evidence of an agreement and intent to redistribute the drugs beyond the actual sale. See Mincoff, 574 F.3d at 1193 (noting that \u201cevidence of fronting may support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance\u201d). There was also testimony that Smith gave oxycodone pills to the government\u2019s confidential source in exchange for bringing Smith customers. Evidence of this \u201cdrug commission\u201d was also sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy to distribute oxycodone. See United States v. Webster, 623 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). We hold that there was sufficient evidence Holdings: 0: holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction 1: holding that the evidence did not plausibly support a buyerseller instruction because overwhelming evidence showed that defendants agreed to import drugs with the intent to distribute them and engaged in repeated transactions of large quantities of narcotic drugs for resale 2: holding in part that awareness of resale activities together with evidence of kickback relationship is sufficient to support conviction for conspiracy to distribute 3: holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine 4: holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "either that there was an attorney-client relationship between Coffey and TADA members or that the communications sent to TADA members were kept confidential. To invoke the attorney-client privilege, Defendants must show that the asserted holders of the privilege, here the members of the TADA, were or sought to become clients at the time the allegedly privileged communication was made. See Mobil, 149 F.R.D. at 536. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether a trade association\u2019s members are necessarily clients of the association\u2019s lawyer and, thus, are permitted to invoke the protections of the attorney-client privilege for communications with the association\u2019s lawyer. Defendants cite cases from other circuits that support such a rule. See Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 294 F.Supp. at 1150 (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. American Radiator & Holdings: 0: holding thatcities are not persons within the meaning of  3a9 of pre1975 version of securities exchange act of 1934 which defined person to mean an individual corporation a partnership an association a jointstock company a business trust or an unincorporated organization 1: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 2: holding that undisclosed representation of an association that the arbitrator disclosed he was a member of and the association will be affected by the outcome of the case is evident partiality 3: holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person 4: holding that each individual member of an unincorporated association is a client of the associations lawyer", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at the time of death of [a] loved one.\u201d In the case of Mrs. Gendek, the condition has caused the onset of major depression \u201cwith characteristics of recurrent crying spells, feelings of self-reproach, [and] impairment of concentration.\u201d As for Mr. Gendek, Dr. Rubin was of the opinion that Mr. Gendek has repressed his emotions, resulting in a \u201cblunting of affect and response to his own inner life.\u201d The Gendeks brought an action for compensatory damages against several defendants, including the doctors, nurses, and hospital, allegedly responsible for causing their child\u2019s death. After defendants had answered plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, defendants Mercer Medical Center moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim for negligent infliction of e N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Our cases also recognize indirect claims for Holdings: 0: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 1: holding that the law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress every time an employer negligently fails to comply with performance evaluation procedures resulting in an employees termination and emotional distress 2: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute 3: recognizing claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress when hospital negligently failed to release to parents their sons braindead corpse 4: recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "42 of the United States Code is a federal statute which \u201cprovides a civil remedy against any \u2018person\u2019 who, under color of state law, subjects a \u2018citizen of the United States\u2019 to the \u2018deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities\u2019 secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws.\u201d Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991) (quoting 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983). \u201cBy the plain terms of \u00a7 1983, two \u2014 and only two \u2014 allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute.\u201d Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). A \u00a7 1983 claim need only allege that \u201csome person has deprived [the claimant] of a federal right\u201d and that person \u201cacted under color of state or territorial-law.\u201d Id. See In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 62 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Among other things, Thornton\u2019s complaint Holdings: 0: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 1: holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 2: holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability 3: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action 4: recognizing that to sufficiently plead a  1983 claim a plaintiff need allege only that some person acting under color of state law has deprived the claimant of a federal right citing green v maraio 722 f2d 1013 1016 2d cir1983", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "respect to this group of documents. Gov\u2019t Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. It is true that Stein did not specifically contest this point in his appeal letter. He disputed the SEC\u2019s withholding decision under Exemption 7(A) \u2014 which, according to the SEC, was also the exemption under which the SEC was withholding some documents related to the second document category. See Compl., Ex. D at 1 n.l. But his appeal letter also specifically demanded \u2014 twice\u2014\u201call of the requested documents,\u201d not just documents related to the. first category. See Compl., Ex. E at 1-2. The government is obligated to construe FOIA requests \u2014 and appeals \u2014 liberally, where a request is \u201creasonably susceptible to the broader reading.\u201d See LaCedra v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 317 F.3d 345, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). While Stein\u2019s appeal letter could have been Holdings: 0: holding that a foia request should be read to seek all documents covered by a catchall 1: holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents 2: holding that a contract should be read to give reasonable meaning to all provisions of that contract 3: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 4: holding that related provisions should be read together", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent. Id. \u00a7 75-1-605(8). 136 This section of the UUTC directly conflicts with the holding of Banks. Under Banks, the settlor's intent at the time of creation of the trust was paramount because the settlor has created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust property and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument.\" Banks, 2002 UT 65, \u00b6 9, 52 P.3d 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in Banks we noted that \"a settlor has the power to modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the trust.\" Id. Under this framework, a settlor may revoke or amend the trust only by strictly complying with its terms. See id. 112 (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the UUTC does not require strict Holdings: 0: holding that beneficiaries could not sue attorneys of the trust for legal malpractice because beneficiaries are not direct recipients of the attorneys services 1: holding that nonsignatory settlor and trust beneficiaries could be compelled to arbitrate under account agreement between trustee and merrill lynch which contained an arbitration clause because agreement was the underlying basis for all the claims of the beneficiaries and there would have been no claims without the agreement 2: holding that the settlor could divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests only by completely revoking the trust because she had limited her ability to eliminate the beneficiaries interests by including language in the trust stating that the interests of the beneficiaries  shall continue until this trust is revoked or terminated internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that a union health trust had standing to sue tobacco companies to recover medical expenses paid by the trust and allegedly caused by beneficiaries smoking 4: holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "are unenforceable, they are also severable from the agreement. Given that these provisions were not enforced in Morrison's arbitration, the arbitration proceeded as though the provisions were in fact unenforceable and severed. For this reason, we affirm the district court\u2019s order on these grounds. 3 . This opinion uses the term \"cost-splitting,\" rather than \"cost-sharing\u201d or \"fee-splitting,\u201d to describe the arrangement by which the parties to an arbitration bear the costs of an arbitration equally. Some arbitration agreements also provide for \"cost-shifting,\u201d an ar rangement by which the arbitrator may determine that one of the parties should bear all or most of the costs of the arbitration. 4 .See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Col., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Shankle could also be interpreted as Holdings: 0: holding that arbitration agreement requiring litigant to pay onehalf of arbitration costs failed to provide an accessible forum in which litigant could resolve his statutory rights 1: holding that plaintiff cannot be forced to submit to an arbitration process that imposes costs that render the arbitral forum less accessible than a judicial forum that the arbitrator is obligated to allocate costs and fees in accordance with the law and that therefore plaintiff bears no risk by proceeding to arbitration 2: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs 3: holding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof because he offered absolutely no evidence to support his claim that the costs of arbitration will deny him an effective forum to vindicate his statutory rights 4: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "we find that a more intensive analysis is necessary when searches of this nature are conducted, especially when done in the field. That is not to say, however, that these searches are per se prohibited \u2014 no court in this Commonwealth has ever made such a declaration, and we decline to do so today. But we do note that officers should be cautious when performing these types of searches, outside of a sanitary and secure police station. And while this case provides facts sufficient to support the reasonableness of the search conducted, that will not always be the case. Indeed, the police risk the loss of evidence when they subject arrestees to strip searches outside of the police station, and even sometimes when the search is conducted in the station house. See Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57 (<HOLDING>). Here, as stated above, the officers faced a Holdings: 0: holding strip searches conducted in the station house without reasonable suspicion that minor offenders had possession of contraband are unreasonable and violate the fourth amendment 1: holding that policy requiring strip searches of prisoners prior to transfer did not violate fourth amendment 2: holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable 3: holding that inmates fourth amendment protection from unreasonable strip searches survives hudson 4: holding that it was clearly established that a strip search policy applied to minor offense detainees without particularized reasonable suspicion was unlawful", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "10 . The Disciplinary Commission reviews questions of law de novo and defers to the hearing officer\u2019s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 58(b). 11 . Former Standard 9.32(j). 12 . Peasley received the FBI reports from the State Bar four months after he deposed Judge Nichols. But Peasley contends that he did not \"revisit\u201d those reports until after the hearing officer issued his decision. 13 . No explanation is given why Judge Nichols did not disclose this contact either before the hearing on the motion to dismiss or during his deposition in this proceeding. 14 . A judge\u2019s findings in the underlying criminal case do not necessarily determine whether or not an ethical violation occurred. Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we also note that \u201d[o]nly in the Holdings: 0: holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim 1: recognizing claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel usually must be raised in collateral proceeding 2: holding that a trial courts finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in a rule 32 proceeding does not necessarily equate to a finding of a violation of our ethical rules 3: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the holding over and the continuing payment and acceptance of the agreed-upon rent creates a presumption that the lessee has effectively exercised an option to extend a lease that does not require the lessee to give notice of its decision to extend the lease \u2014 was then and continues to be the prevailing view. Carder, Inc. v. Cash, 97 P.3d 174, 181 (Colo.Ct.App.2003); Corthouts v. Conn. Fire Safety Servs. Corp., 2 Conn.Cir.Ct. 34, 193 A.2d 909, 912 (1963); Head v. Scanlin, 258 Ga. 212, 367 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1988); Sanders v. Middleton, 112 Me. 433, 92 A. 488, 489 (1914); Straus v. Shaheen, Inc., 310 Mass. 646, 39 N.E.2d 573, 574 (1942); Enter. Co. v. Americom Corp., 1 Neb.App. 1125, 510 N.W.2d 537, 540-41 (1993); Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100-01 (1966) (<HOLDING>); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that where the rent payments during the original and extended terms were the same the lessees payment of rent and continued occupation of the leased premises standing along was insufficient  to establish that they had exercised their option to renew the lease for an additional term 1: holding that increase in rent combined with friction between tenant and landlord does not establish claim under fair housing act 2: holding that a landlord has a duty of reasonable care over common areas or other areas over which the landlord has retained control 3: recognizing that the burden is on the landlord in a lease dispute to establish that the lease contract had been breached and that such breach entitled the landlord to the possession of the property in question 4: holding over and paying the increased rent showed an intent to exercise the option and acceptance by landlord waived notice", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "determining whether a private right of action for damages can be imphed under the Texas Constitution. We hold there is no impUed private right of action for damages arising under the free speech and free assembly sections of the Texas Constitution. InitiaUy, the officers argue that other jurisdictions have recognized state causes of action based on Bivens. Several states faced with the issue before us have found an im-pUed cause of action while others have rejected such an action. There is Uttle uniformity in how other ent Servs., Inc., 408 So.2d 711 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982), approved, 432 So.2d 567 (Fla.1983) (because the Florida Constitution is self-executing, remedy can be afforded absent statutory authorization); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 390 Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: holding that the act provides the exclusive procedures and remedies for common law causes of action based on allegations of deception fraud and misrepresentation 2: recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary 3: holding that because common law provides remedies an impued cause of action is not necessary 4: recognizing the cause of action", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the committee voted seventeen to three to recommend that the court reporter be required to make a record only \u201cupon request.\u201d Id. at 5422. But when the amended rules issued, the court exercised its prerogative to stay its course: \u201cThe official court reporter or court recorder must ... unless excused by agreement of the parties, attend court sessions and make a full record of the proceedings.\u201d Tex.R.App. P. 13.1(a). In short, the Supreme Court of Texas has repeatedly rejected the concept of the court reporter being required to make a record only \u201cupon request\u201d and has instead opted for a mandatory duty \u201cunless excused by agreement of the parties.\u201d This well-considered judgment should be respected by this Court. 1 . See Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 508-09 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (<HOLDING>); Meredith v. Ellis, No. 11-04-00300-CV, 2005 Holdings: 0: holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal 1: holding timely and sufficiently specific objection is required to preserve error 2: holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of hearing by failing to object 3: holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object 4: holding that an objection is required to preserve error in court reporters failure to record bench conference and disapproving of holding in tanguma v state 47 sw3d 663 texappcorpus christi 2001 pet refd that rule dispenses with the requirement of an objection to preserve error", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Rule 29(c)). 9 . 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g) states, in relevant part; It shall be unlawful for any person \u2014 (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 10 .It is not clear whether the government attempted to demonstrate that the pistol and rifle were acquired separately and at different times or places. If they did not make such a showing, the indictment under which Alanis was charged would be duplicitous under our recent holding in United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The defense did not challenge the indictment Holdings: 0: holding that without such a showing the government may only charge the defendant with one violation of  922g1  regardless of the actual quantity of firearms involved 1: holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense 2: holding that a prior conviction ie one for which the civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored is an element of a 922g1 violation 3: holding that the quantity of drugs involved in an offense does not support a downward departure because the legislature intended the quantity of drugs to be a determining factor in varying penalties 4: holding that because a jury need only agree that a defendant possessed a firearm in order to find a defendant guilty of violating  922g1 a unanimity instruction was not required where defendant was charged with one count of violating  922g1 and multiple firearms were listed in that count", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "been severed, he has failed to show prejudice. Finally, Cornelio-Legarda correctly asserts the refusal to sever Count 10 resulted in the jury being told he had previously been convicted of a felony. The prior felony was stipulated to by Cornelio-Legarda and the stipulation was read into the record at the close of the Government\u2019s case. The details of the prior conviction were not provided to the jury. The conviction was mentioned only briefly by the Government during its closing argument on the felon-in-possession charge when the prosecutor simply stated: \u201cMr. Cornelio has stipulated that he is a convicted felon.\u201d On these facts, we cannot conclude Corne-lio-Legarda has met his heavy burden of showing actual prejudice. See United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 290 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Cornelio-Legarda also argues the evidence was Holdings: 0: holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof 1: holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury 2: holding the refusal to sever firearm charges was not an abuse of discretion because the defendants prior conviction was mentioned only briefly during closing argument and limited to establishing the fact of the conviction as an element of the weapons offenses 3: holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime 4: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, and, consequently, the Fourth Circuit held, it was premature to resolve the issue of unconscionability without allowing the parties to \u201cpresent evidence of the circumstances surrounding the original consummation of their contractual relationship,\u201d including the existence of meaningful alternatives. See Carlson, 883 F.2d at 292-93 (observing, \u201cunconscionability generally ... include[s] an absence of meaningful choice\u201d) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). As discussed, plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to support a finding that Smith lack a reasonable alternative, or any other evidence to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. See Aron, 143 Cal. App.4th at 808, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, Smith\u2019s reliance on Maniscalco v. Holdings: 0: holding that courts should address a procedural unconscionability defense to the enforcement of an arbitration provision 1: holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim 2: holding in the context of a forumselection provision that the balancing of procedural and substantive unconscionability requires courts to consider each questionable forumselection clause on a casebycase basis and precludes the development of a brightline rule 3: holding that procedural unconscionability is properly evaluated at the time a contract is negotiated 4: holding claim of unconscionability requires showing of both procedural and substantive elements", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is whether substantial evidence supports the jury\u2019s finding. The jury found that \u201cLabCorp breached the license agreement by terminating it\u201d for the Abbott test. LabCorp contends that it did not formally terminate the contract, because the contract requires that the licensee provide written notice. The record contains no evidence of a written termination. The record does show, however, that LabCorp stopped paying royalties on the total homocysteine tests. Refusal to pay royalties is a material breach of the license. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2000). A material breach, in turn, constitutes termination even where the license agreement termination clause does not expressly so provide. See Apex Pool Equip. Corp. v. Lee, 419 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>); see also Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract 1: holding that repudiation alone gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach 2: holding that licensees use of photograph after license expired infringed licensors copyright 3: holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff 4: holding that a licensees material breach implicitly gives rise to a licensors right to terminate", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "case of In re White, No. 02-10378 (Bankr.N.D.W.Va. May 2, 2002), the court determined that a foreclosure sale was not complete so long as the debtor retained a legal interest in that property. White, however, never cited \u00a7 541(d) and assumed that the foreclosure sale could be avoided even though no party had brought an avoidance action to set aside the sale. 2 . In this regard, the Debtor has attempted to conjure an unsecured claim in his case by requesting that he be permitted to file a single unsecured claim \u2014 after expiration of the claims bar date \u2014 on behalf a creditor. See infra, Part 11(D). 3 . The reasonable value of property sold at foreclosure is deemed to be the amount realized at the sale. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994) Holdings: 0: holding that consideration received from a noncollusive real estate mortgage foreclosure sale conducted in conformance with applicable state law is an exchange for reasonably equivalent value 1: holding the real estate sale proceeds 2: holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage 3: holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale 4: holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to do so, one being the plaintiffs failure to respond to several of the defendant\u2019s grounds for dismissal. No. Civ.A. 05-321, 2006 WL 508343, at *3 (D.D.C. March 1, 2006). This court determined that \u201c[b]ecause the plaintiff only addressed some of the defendant\u2019s challenges in her response, the Court will consider those challenges not addressed by the plaintiff in her response as conceded.\u201d Id.; see also Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C.Cir.997) (\u201cWhere the district court relies on the absence of a response as a basis for treating the motion as conceded, we honor its enforcement of the rule.\u201d). Sim ill employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all[,]\u201d Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., Inc., 597 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1991); see also id. at 33 (<HOLDING>). Both the ADA and the DCHRA provide \u201ca Holdings: 0: holding that absent a law or collective bargaining agreement a municipal employee is an employee atwill 1: recognizing exception to atwill employment doctrine where employee is terminated by employer for refusing to violate municipal regulation 2: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 3: holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine 4: recognizing narrow whistleblower exception to the atwill doctrine", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "County had a duty to warn the Osborns under the rescue doctrine because Dracobly assured Wiseman he would post flyers, failed to post flyers, and discouraged Wiseman from posting flyers. Id. In other words, it held Mason County had a duty to warn the Osborns because Wiseman relied on its assurances. But that cannot support a duty under the rescue doctrine unless the Osborns reasonably relied on Wiseman. And the Osborns fail to show such reliance. Because Mason County had no duty to warn the Osborns \u2014 under the rescue doctrine or any other theory of liability \u2014 it is entitled to summary judgment. A. Mason County Had No Statutory Duty To Warn the Osborns \u00b68 The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the superior court\u2019s conclusion th 925, 937, 968 P.2d 522, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d Holdings: 0: holding that the government may be an identifiable victim 1: holding public entities have no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate with a violent history unless the inmate makes a specific threat against a specific identifiable victim or group of victims 2: holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person 3: holding that specific incidents of a victims conduct are not admissible to show that the victim was the first aggxessor 4: holding that common law duty to warn arises when a person being released from custody has made a specific threat of harm directed at a specific individual", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "this argument is without merit. We have recognized that an IJ need not first identify the particular pieces of missing, relevant evidence, and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant before relying on a lack of corroboration to support an adverse credibility finding. See Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 633-34 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that an IJ must follow these steps in denying a claim based solely on insufficient corroboration, as opposed to adverse credibility). In light of the agency\u2019s reasonable adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Herath Mudiyan-selage\u2019s applications for relief. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 426 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a withholding of removal claim necessarily fails if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same 1: recognizing that withholding of removal claims must fail if petitioner is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the claims are based on the same factual predicate 2: holding that although the ij did not explicitly analyze the cat claim the denial of the claim was linguistically separate from the denials of asylum and withholding under the ina 3: holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each 4: holding that the agency need not analyze separately a withholding of removal claim based on the same facts as an applicants asylum claim", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "exercise of discretion which is protected by FTCA \u00a7 2680(a).\u201d). Further, \u201c[u]nder a plain reading of this provision, practicability limits both the extent to which the USFS is required to eliminate safety hazards and the immediacy with which the USFS must correct high-priority hazards.\u201d Tam v. United States, 905 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (W.D.Wash.2012). Specifically, Section 2332.1 \u201crequires the USFS to determine, within the confines of its many other responsibilities, how quickly to address high-priority hazards,\u201d and to use \u201cits discretion and policy judgment to choose which items to treat as \u2018high-priority\u2019 from among the nearly limitless category of potential hazards\u201d present in a National Forest area. Id. at 1231; see also Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Notably, the discretion vested in the Forest Holdings: 0: holding that police officers charge to protect the public differentiated them from the public 1: holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy 2: holding that a national park service policy manuals broad mandate to warn the public of and protect it from special hazards involves the exercise of discretion in identifying such hazards 3: holding that for public policy reasons the mere filing of a bar complaint by a defendant against his attorney does not mandate removal of the attorney 4: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Our decision in Pangle v. Bend-LaPine School District, 169 Or App 376, 10 P3d 275 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 558 (2001), is instructive. In Pangle, the plaintiffs, who sought to challenge a school district\u2019s disciplinary decision, brought two actions, one seeking a writ of review, and the other seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment and related injunctive relief under ORS chapter 28, alleging that the school\u2019s disciplinary decision violated various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 379. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 petition for writ of review as untimely, and we affirmed that dismissal. Id. at 383. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief o 435, 963 P2d 149, rev den 328 Or 40 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs seek substantially the same Holdings: 0: holding that second sentence of  506a precludes deduction of hypothetical costs of sale in valuing chapter 13 debt ors real property to be retained by debtor 1: recognizing that a debt ors sequential filing of a chapter 7 petition and then a chapter 13 petition is the socalled chapter 20  2: holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration 3: holding that a corporate chapter 7 debt ors malpractice claim against its bankruptcy attorney was related to its bankruptcy case 4: holding that regarding claims for employment discrimination under ors chapter 659 the exclusivity provision of ors 341022 was inapplicable", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with S.182, \u00a7 1, 2005-2006 Gen. Assem., Bien. Sess. (Vt. 2006) (bill as introduced) (\u201c[T]he court shall personally address the defendant in open court, advising him or her of and determining that he or she understands the following: \u2018If you are not a citizen of the United Sta ould have informed him that he is subject to automatic denial of citizenship, which he describes as a \u201cdirect consequence\u201d of his plea. The Rule 11 colloquy requires that the defendant know and understand the \u201cdirect consequences\u201d of his plea in order to ensure that his waiver of constitutional rights is voluntary. See In re Parks, 2008 VT 65, \u00b6 14, 184 Vt. 110, 956 A.2d 545 (\u201cA trial court\u2019s failure to satisfy any of the core objectives of Rule 11 \u2014 ensuring that the guilty plea is free of coercion, 708 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Rule 11(c)(7) mandates that the court put a Holdings: 0: holding that rule 11 does not require court to ensure that defendant understands consequences of nolo contendere plea on parole eligibility in sexual assault case 1: holding that conviction based on plea of nolo contendere bars subsequent  1983 claim because even though such a plea does not involve admission of guilt it does communicate acceptance of conviction and sentence 2: holding that the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea 3: holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense 4: holding consistent with hill and with every other circuit that has addressed the question that fedrcrimp 11c does not require trial courts to inform a defendant of parole eligibility consequences of a guilty plea", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "when infringements occur during the limitations period recovery may be had for past infringements. Recovery is allowed only for those acts occurring within three years of suit and is disallowed for earlier infringing acts.\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted); see also Repp v. Webber, 914 F.Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (addressing motion contending that counterclaims filed in 1991 only reached acts of infringement occurring after 1988). In the instant case, after all, a finding that Armstrong\u2019s claims against the defendants accrued in 1991 would mean that Armstrong could only recover damages for those infringing acts occurring less than three years prior to his initiation of the instant action. See Johnson v. Radio City Prods., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4099(JSR), 1998 WL 171463, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1998) (<HOLDING>). However, if it is assumed for the sake of Holdings: 0: holding that acts occurring thirteen years before the acts in the instant case were not too remote given the similarity of the offenses 1: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility 2: holding federal copyright laws threeyear statute of limitations not to bar acts of infringement occurring within three years of action despite fact that related earlier acts of infringement were barred 3: holding that acts of infringement occurring earlier than three years prior to suit are barred by section 507b but that triable issue of fact exists as to whether acts of copying and distribution occurred thereafter 4: holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3583(d). 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3583(g) requires the court to revoke supervised release and to require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3583(e)(3). 4. The court must revoke supervised release in this ease under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3583(g)(1), as the defendant tested positive on three occasions for cocaine use and admitted to such use. 5. Chapter Seven of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines also applies to supervised release in this case. The Sentencing Guidelines\u2019 treatment of revocation of supervised release is advisory rather than mandatory. These policy statements are only one factor the court shall consider in addressing modification of supervised release. See United States v. Schwegel, 126 F.3d 551 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 6. The Probation Office\u2019s petition and Holdings: 0: holding that a sentencing court is required by 18 usc  3583g to revoke the defendants term of supervised release  unless defendant could come under the exception in 18 usc  3583d 1: holding that supervised release provisions remained advisory after amendments to 18 usc  3583 2: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release 3: holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc  3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction 4: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "frequently made, to accommodate conditions such as plaintiffs insomnia, Kleiner\u2019s opinion is not framed in those terms. Rather, because Kleiner\u2019s opinion does not proffer any specialized knowledge, and invokes legal standards (\u25a0ie., that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff), his opinion would \u201cnot aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute [his] judgment for the jury\u2019s.\u201d See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (\u201cWhen this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.\u201d); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Kleiner\u2019s second opinion \u2014 that defendants Holdings: 0: holding that fire expert should not have been sequestered where opposing expert testified to facts and theories not revealed prior to trial 1: holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded 2: holding that the district court should have excluded expert testimony in an excessive force case where the expert testified that defendants conduct was not justified or warranted under the circumstances and totally improper noting that the experts opinions merely told the jury what result to reach 3: holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge 4: holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or a balance of the conveniences is on the party seeking to proceed with the second action. See First City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1989). One such special circumstance warranting an exception to the first filed rule occurs when a party files a declaratory judgment action after receiving notice of a planned lawsuit by its adversary. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908; 99 S.Ct. 1215, 59 L.Ed.2d 455 (1979) (\u201cWhen the declaratory judgment action has been triggered by a notice letter, this equitable consideration may be a factor in the decision to allow the later filed action to proceed to judgment in the plaintiffs\u2019 chosen forum.\u201d); Federal Insurance Co., 808 F.Supp. at 349-50 (<HOLDING>); Sharimalia Food Corp. v. Monarch Wine Co., Holdings: 0: holding first lawsuit and allegations in second lawsuit part of same transaction for res judicata purposes even though different theory of recovery and harm alleged in second lawsuit 1: holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit 2: holding that a party may pursue what would be a compulsory counterclaim in a separate lawsuit but that party runs the risk of losing in the initial lawsuit and being bound by that result 3: recognizing that where first suit is filed in response to notice of a planned lawsuit by the plaintiffs adversary that lawsuit may be dismissed 4: holding that an injured former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata where he never authorized the union to represent his interest in a previous lawsuit over the same benefits", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to include the University of Notre Dame. Criminal statutes are strictly construed; \u201cthey may not be enlarged beyond the fair meaning of the language used.\u201d Pridgeon v. State, 569 N.E.2d 722, 723 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). The fair meaning of the word \u201cschool\u201d does not encompass a college or university. See Lawrence v. Cain, 144 Ind. App. 210, 216, 245 N.E.2d 663, 666 (1969) (stating that \u201cthe word \u2018school\u2019 by common usage, is considered local school corporations and does not generally include higher seats of learning which are usually referred to as colleges or universities.\u201d); see also Pridgeon, 569 N.E.2d at 723 (noting that \u201c[although the word \u2018school\u2019 has numerous meanings, this court excluded colleges and universities from the \u2018common usage\u2019 of this term in Lawrence ....\u201d); cf. id. at 724 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, within the meaning of our Holdings: 0: recognizing that property interest based on contractual relationship may arise  when a student enrolls in a college or university pays his or her tuition and fees and attends such school  1: holding that the words school property do not include a college or university 2: holding state university is not a person under  1983 3: holding that the university of maryland law school was a state agency 4: holding college school district immune from suit in federal court under eleventh amendment", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "As an initial matter, the Court has serious doubts about whether Article V(l)(c) of the New York Convention authorizes this Court to deny confirmation of the Award on the ground that the arbitral panel ex ceeded its powers. Unlike Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which states that an award may be vacated \u201cwhere the arbitrators exceeded their powers,\u201d Article V(l)(c) is not so broad; rather, Article V(l)(c) authorizes the Court to deny confirmation of an award if \u201c[t]he award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.\u201d See also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L\u2019Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Mgmt. & Technical Consultants S.A. v. Holdings: 0: recognizing commonwealth court authority supporting proposition that arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction when they considered issues which were not properly presented in the demand for arbitration 1: holding that a court reviewing an arbitrators award in an act 111 grievance arbitration involves questions regarding 1 the jurisdiction of the arbitrator 2 the regularity of the proceedings 3 an excess of the arbitrators powers and 4 deprivation of constitutional rights 2: holding that an arbitrators award should have been vacated 3: recognizing that article vlc tracks in more detailed form section 10d of the federal arbitration act  which authorizes vacating an award where the arbitrators exceeded their powers  emphasis added 4: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a mental process) may not be subject to the same requirements. 13 . See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (\"Industrial processes ... are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.\u201d (emphasis added)); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1880) (\u2018\u2018A manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.\u201d (emphasis added)); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876) (\"A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.\u201d). 14 . See AT & T, 172 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (<HOLDING>); State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (\"[W]e Holdings: 0: holding that the trier of fact must consider the length of time and manner of use of trade dress the nature and extent of its use and efforts made in order to promote a conscious connection in the publics mind between the mark and the particular source of origin 1: holding the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the automobile prior to the upset and its value when prepared and presented to the plaintiff for acceptance 2: holding the aggregate value of the land and its improvements is the controlling value 3: holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate  an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings 4: holding patentable a process that uses the boolean principle in order to determine the value of the pic indicator and that required the use of switches and computers", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that Title VII hostile work environment plaintiffs need not prove a pattern, \u201csteady barrage,\u201d or other minimum quantum of discriminatory conduct in order to establish actionable harassment. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir.1997) (\u201cOf course, even a single episode of harassment, if severe enough, can establish a hostile work environment.\u201d); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir.1988) (\u201c[P]laintiff need not prove that the instances of alleged harassment were related in either time or type. Rather all that the victim of racial harassment need show is that the alleged conduct constituted an unreasonably abusive or offensive work-related environment or adversely affected the reasonable employee\u2019s ability to do his or her job.\u201d); Rodgers v. W 170 (10th Cir.)(<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 983, 117 S.Ct. 437, Holdings: 0: holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment 1: holding that a claim of constructive discharge requires a showing of harassment that is more severe and pervasive than that required to show a hostile work environment 2: holding that harassing conduct not sufficiently severe and pervasive where conduct would not have affected the work environment of a reasonable person 3: holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination 4: holding in a 42 usc  1981 and 1983 context that although a single incident ordinarily will not give rise to a cognizable claim for hostile work environment  where the plaintiff was subjected to a physical assault in which he was punched in the ribs and  temporarily blinded by having mace sprayed in his eyes we cannot say that as a matter of law such an incident is not sufficiently severe in all the circumstances to create a hostile work environment", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "In his pleadings, Ordonez alleged that Johnson had been negligent per se based on his failure to maintain an assured clear distance between the two vehicles as required by statute. At the close of Ordo-nez\u2019s case, McCurdy moved for a directed verdict on that claim, alleging that Ordonez failed to present any evidence supporting a finding of negligence per se. The trial court entered a directed verdict on Ordonez\u2019s negligence per se claims. At the charge conference, Ordonez requested an instruction on the negligence per se issue, which the trial court refused. To survive a directed verdict, it is axiomatic that a party must state a theory of recovery recognized at law. See Group Hosp. Servs. Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.\u2014 Dallas 1986, no writ) (<HOLDING>). The trial court must submit jury instructions Holdings: 0: holding that trial court properly granted directed verdict when plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to state cause of action under the dtp a 1: holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim 2: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 3: holding insufficient the plaintiffs generic allegations 4: recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the person. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 269-70 (10th Cir.1989), in which the court recognized the distinction to be drawn between \u201cstanding to challenge a stop and standing to challenge a search.\u201d The court pointed out, citing, inter alia, Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484, 83 S.Ct. at 415, 9 L.Ed.2d at 453, that \u201c[e]ven if defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the car, if the initial stop was illegal, the seized contraband is subject to exclusion under the 'fruit of the poison tree\u2019 doctrine.\u201d 875 F.2d at 269 n. 2. In United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664, 666 (10th Cir.1988) the court excluded evidence seized incident to an illegal arrest. Other cases and treatise writers have gone even further. E.g. United States v. Durant, 730 F.2d 1180, 1182 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 Holdings: 0: holding that the government must proffer clear evidence of an independent untainted investigation that inevitably would have uncovered the same evidence as that discovered through the illegal search 1: holding that a passenger has standing to challenge a stops constitutionality because the passenger is seized from the moment a car is stopped 2: holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress 3: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 4: recognizing that a passenger in an automobile that is stopped may on the basis that it was illegal move to suppress evidence uncovered as a direct result of the stop", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "citations imposed upon Releo. The operative word in the statute is \u201cfor,\u201d as it signals when a licensed electrician is needed. As it is written, a licensed electrician is required to install any conduit when the purpose of such conduit is \u201cfor carrying * * * electricity[.]\u201d Section 5-6-2 (emphasis added). Clearly, the PVC conduit in this case was not to be used for the passage of air or water, but specifically for the carrying of electrical conductors and electricity. Further, we agree with the hearing justice that the petitioners\u2019 argument\u2014that the PVC conduit in question did not fall under \u00a7 5-6-2 because no wires or conductors were present within the PVC conduit itself\u2014would reduce the term conduit in the statute to \u201cmere surplusage.\u201d In re Harrison, 992 A.2d 990, 994 (R.I.2010) (<HOLDING>). The substantial record developed below Holdings: 0: holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained 1: holding phrase based upon or attributable to is not ambiguous and rejecting secondary suit construction 2: holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions 3: holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that no construction of a statute should be adopted that would demote any significant phrase or clause to mere surplusage quoting state v clark 974 a2d 558 572 ri 2009", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 1252(a)(1). Although the jurisdictional statute strips us of jurisdiction over \"any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b,\" 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have interpreted that provision to apply only to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of removal. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir.2003). Satisfaction of the continuous residency requirement is not such a discretionary decision and is thus subject to our review. See Mendez-Reyes v. Att\u2019y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir.2005); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 588 n. 4 (3d Cir.2005). 4 . Shah did raise the continuous physical presence issue in his reply brief, but that was insufficient to preserve the issue. See In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Shah could raise his Holdings: 0: holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief 1: holding that the petitioners failure to address an issue in the argument portion of his opening brief waived the issue 2: holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 3: holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue 4: holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 33 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). Given that Section 501.008 of the Government Code precludes an inmate from filing suit until he has exhausted his remedies through the grievance system, an inmate\u2019s failure to provide the required information subjects his suit to dismissal. See Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 341. The second purpose served by Section 14.005(a)\u2019s requirements is that the information provided by the inmate will enable the trial court to determine whether the inmate has filed his claim within the time period specified by subsection (b). See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied); but see Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 803-04 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)(<HOLDING>). If the inmate does not file his suit within Holdings: 0: holding that even in absence of copy of written decision inmates affidavit and notations on grievance form provided trial court with information necessary to determine whether inmates suit was filed within statutory time period 1: recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance 2: holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure 3: holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause 4: holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Ark. 142, 60 S.W.3d 464 (2001); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037 (Del. 2001); State v. Paul, 62 P.3d 389 (Okla.Crim. App.2003). Many of these states simply cited a case from the federal circuit that covers the state to support their approach to this issue. {33} We disagree with the reasoning of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits and the state courts that follow them because it ignores the scope requirement of the second-prong of the Terry test, which our case law has consistently recognized as appropriate to analyze traffic stops. As we said in Werner, an officer\u2019s actions during the \u201cinvestigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop.\u201d 117 N.M. at 317, 871 P.2d at 973; see, e.g., Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, \u00b6 20, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (<HOLDING>). We feel the cases relied upon by the Seventh Holdings: 0: holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation 1: holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle 2: holding that defendant was unreasonably seized under fourth amendment when officer detained him to ask questions unrelated in scope to the reasons that justified the initial traffic stop 3: holding that for purposes of determining whether the roadblock worked a fourth amendment seizure the controlling considerations are whether 1 the motorist was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock and 2 the motorist was so stopped 4: holding that any questions an officer asks of a stopped motorist must be reasonably related to the circumstances which justified his initial stop", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "overreaching, or compromised independence). We do not presume to draft precise disclaimers for each of appellants\u2019 four claims; we leave that task to the agency in the first instance. Nor do we rule out the possibility that where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright. For example, if the weight of the evidence were against the hypothetical claim that \u201cConsumption of Vitamin E reduces the risk of Alzheimer\u2019s disease,\u201d the agency might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer such as \u201cThe FDA has determined that no evidence supports this claim\u201d would not suffice to mitigate the claim\u2019s misleadingness. Cf. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Finally, while we are skeptical that the Holdings: 0: holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act 1: holding in a false advertising case under the lanham act that a proposed disclaimer would not suffice to cure the misleadingness of an advertising claim 2: holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury 3: holding that both lanham act false advertising claim and a false advertising claim made under section 349 or section 350 require a showing that the advertisement was false or misleading 4: holding that while under a false association claim parties need not be direct competitors under a false advertising claim they do", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir.2001) (rejecting claim that deposition testimony became a \u201cjudicial document\u201d \u201cbecause the Court reviewed it in order to decide whether or not to enter [a] protective order\u201d); United States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1995) (\u201cWe are not aware ... of any common-law principle that documents submitted to a court in camera for the sole purpose of confirming that the refusal to disclose them to another party was proper, are to be deemed judicial records open to the public.\u201d); accord United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir.2007) (noting that \u201cdocuments filed with the court are generally subject to the common law right of access, unless attached to a discovery motion\u201d); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). See generally Newsday, 730 F.3d at 167 n. 15 Holdings: 0: holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions 1: holding that there is a presumptive common law right to public access to all material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions  but no such right as to discovery motions and their supporting documents 2: holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions 3: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 4: holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the ADA provide a definition for physical \u2022 impairment which includes \u201cany physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: musculoskeletal ...\u201d 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1630.2(h)(1). The term impairment \u201ccannot be divorced from its dictionary and common sense connotation of a diminution in quality, value, excellence or strength.\u201d de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir.1986). Szalay\u2019s physician testified that Szalay\u2019s knee injury has a permanent, negative effect on his bending and climbing capabilities. Because Szalay\u2019s condition so diminishes his abilities, it is a physical impairment as defined by the EEOC regulations. See Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 659 F.Supp. 1328 (S.D.Tex.1987) (<HOLDING>). Once the Court determines that an individual Holdings: 0: holding that for a plaintiff to prove that he has a record of impairment under 42 usc  121022b there must be a record of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities 1: holding that workers compensating for pain in his right knee by dependence upon his left knee was insufficient to remove the rightknee injury from the schedule overruling masterbrand cabinets inc v ruggs 891 so2d 869 alacivapp2004 which had held that when the effect of a lefthand injury extended to the right hand because of the workers overuse of the right hand the lefthand injury should be treated as nonscheduled 2: holding that plaintiffs knee injury was considered an impairment because it prevented poleclimbing 3: holding that a plaintiffs bare allegation of a walking impairment was not sufficient to avoid summary judgment because the plaintiffs deposition testimony provides little support for the claim that his impairment rises to the level of a disability 4: holding that an allegation of impairment to freedom of expression demonstrated an irreparable injury", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "stated: It is virtually impossible to resolve this dilemma on purely linguistic grounds. The ambiguity makes either the reading urged by the Plaintiff or by the Defendant possible. However, to accept Ethicon\u2019s interpretation we must believe that the PTO, in reissuing the Fox Patent, intended to significantly expand the scope of that patent. Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical, 855 F.Supp. at 1514-15. At our recent hearing we were able to take a much closer look at the file history and from this we were convinced that the PTO did not intend to grant sweeping new scope in reissuing the Fox Patent. Initially, we must recognize that new Claim 24 must be understood in light of the other claims and the entire file history of the Fox invention. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d at 1056 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the terms used in Claim 24 must be Holdings: 0: holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history 1: holding that in order to understand patent claims a court can take instruction from the other claims the specification and the prosecution history 2: holding that limitations from the specification should not be read into the claims 3: holding that a court can correct a patent claim for a grammatical error where the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims 4: holding that summary judgment was improperly granted in view of the need for careful interpretation of the original and reissue claims in light of the specification the prosecution history and the alleged industry practice", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a defense to the claims asserted. It is a \"constitutional principle\u201d that \"limit[s] the federal courts\u2019 jurisdiction under Article III,\u201d Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 64, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), therefore the Court considers Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as attacking subject matter jurisdiction. 9 . FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-54, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (explaining that \"the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity .... the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.\u201d); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (<HOLDING>). 10 . This suit primarily seeks declaratory Holdings: 0: holding that sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit against a state brought by one of its own citizens even though the text of the eleventh amendment only addresses suits brought by citizens of another state 1: holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts 2: holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens 3: holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens 4: holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "courts had held that \u201cabsolute immunity was conferred upon judges acting within their lawful powers, even where the actions allegedly involved serious misconduct,\u201d and that this principle \u201cwas directly imported into the law of the United States as the common-law basis for judicial immunity.\u201d This common law principle is most often used to immunize a judge from liability in civil litigation, but it has also been used to support the proposition that a judge cannot be compelled to testify about his or her thought process in making a decision in a case. See State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1994) (stating that a judge may not be examined as to his or her thought process in making a decision); Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Marks, 898 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). We can draw the same analogy to the Holdings: 0: holding order of contempt sentence without statutory opportunity for appeal was in error but nevertheless involved a judicial act subject to judicial immunity 1: recognizing that absolute judicial immunity is not grounded in any special esteem for those who perform judicial functions and certainly not from a desire to shield abuses of office but because any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself 2: holding that individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level are entitled to absolute immunity 3: holding that a hearing officer acting in a judicial capacity was entitled to claim judicial immunity and could not be compelled to give testimony about his mental process in deciding a case 4: recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (requiring that a person be presently- \u2014 -not potentially or hypothetically- \u2014 substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability). \u201cMere 249 F.3d 557, 562 (6th Cir.2001) (\u201cA person is \u2018disabled\u2019 under the Act if his or her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more life activities, including breathing and self-care.\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1203, 152 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 495-96 (10th Cir.2000) (\u201cMajor life activities include such functions as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working.\u201d); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the critical question before the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs evidence showing that defendant refused to allow her to work as flight attendant because of her weight failed to demonstrate that defendant perceived her as substantially limited in any major life activity 1: holding that plaintiffs severe allergic reactions to peanutladen foods did not substantially limit major life activity of breathing because her ability to breath was otherwise generally unrestricted 2: holding that plaintiffs claim that she was disabled because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ada 3: holding that plaintiffs hernia condition was not sufficient to render her disabled under the ada 4: holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Landlord delivered no later than January 15, 2006.\u201d Starr Pis.' Compl. Exs. P & Q, at \u00b6 24.24. 11 .On July 23, 2008, APA and the remaining Defendants named in the Writ of Summons before the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, filed a Notice of Removal, seeking to remove the action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1446. On July 31, 2008, Starr Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, arguing that Defendants' removal to federal court was premature as a matter of law because Starr Plaintiffs had yet to file a complaint in the state court. Following a hearing on these motions, the Court granted Starr Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to remand, relying upon the Third Circuit's decision in Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the case returned to Holdings: 0: holding that the one year limit applies only to removals based on something other than the initial pleading  that is only to removals pursuant to the second paragraph of 28 usc  1446b 1: holding that a writ of summons alone can no longer be the initial pleading that triggers the 30day period for removal under the first paragraph of 28 usc  1446b 2: holding other paper must be unequivocally clear and certain to start the time limit running for a notice of removal under the second paragraph of section 1446b 3: holding that removal under the second paragraph of  1446b did not apply and defendants therefore had removed outside of the thirty day time period triggered at the time of service of the complaint 4: holding that an initial pleading triggered the thirtyday time limit for removal under  1446b because it sets forth on its face express allegations as to the monetary amount of damages", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Those requirements include: (1) written notice to the parolee of the alleged parole violations, (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him, (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (4) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (5) neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the requirements of due process include informing a defendant of the range of penalties involved in the crime with which he is being charged. Commonwealth v. Zanine, 444 Pa. 361, 282 A.2d 367 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>); see also Lanzetta v. Board of Probation and Holdings: 0: holding that waiver of counsel during pcr review requires a judicial inquiry into whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel 1: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel 2: holding that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel only after his sic is aware of the nature of the charges against him the possible penalties and the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation 3: holding that written waivers referring only in general terms to potential advantages of representation by counsel and potential disadvantages of selfrepresentation did not sufficiently demonstrate awareness of the dangers of selfrepresentation 4: holding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel even though the exchange between the magistrate and the defendant was inadequate standing alone to inform the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "sentence ran concurrently to the federal sentence, and not vice versa. This analysis fails to take into account the effect of the Brazos County sentence, which the TDCJ re-commenced on November 28, 1998, before Mr. Thomas was sentenced in the federal case. After his federal sentence was imposed, he was returned to state custody, still serving a state sentence from Brazos County. Any time he served before being transferred to Burleson County custody was thus state time, not federal time. Also, although the federal sentence was imposed prior to his Burleson County sentence, under the applicable law his federal time did not actually begin to run until he was taken into federal custody, which only occurred on April 5, 2006. See Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3585(a). Finally, we Holdings: 0: holding that merely alluding to federal law does not raise a federal question 1: holding that a federal sentence does not commence until a prisoner is actually received into federal custody for that purpose 2: holding that a determination of whether the defendants actions constituted a taking under the louisiana constitution does not implicate any issues of federal law and thus does not provides a basis for a federal district court to exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds 4: holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "checkpoints are inherently unconstitutional, the checkpoints the Court sanctions today are designed in such a way as to engender fright and concern in law-abiding motorists. Also, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial courts\u2019 rulings, demonstrate neither empirical evidence of checkpoint effectiveness, nor that explicit, neutral guidelines for police conduct were issued and followed. The trial courts had sufficient evidence to hold that the checkpoints were conducted in an unreasonable fashion, and therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 . State v. Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. banc 1994). 2 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 . See State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). 4 . See, e.g. Op. at 573-574 (<HOLDING>); Op. at 575 (holding that there is \"no Holdings: 0: holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county 1: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  2: holding that evidence demonstrates that the checkpoints were modeled after the successful program in phelps county that evidence shows that the particular checkpoints at issue here were planned in such a way as to increase the likelihood of actually capturing drug traffickers that evidence also demonstrated that phelps county law enforcement officials who helped texas county officials operate the checkpoint had been told by drug couriers that they had been warned to avoid 144 a quick glance at a missouri road map reveals that us 60 is the other major westtoeast roadway across southern missouri 3: holding that defendants successful completion of pretrial intervention program in one county and the entry of a nolle prosequi as to the relevant charges in that county barred subsequent prosecution in a separate county for charges arising out of the same conduct 4: holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "damages which the plaintiff may seek in this case, including a description of the extent of Davis\u2019 injuries and all medical expenses that he has incurred as a result of the May 30, 2003 motor vehicle accident; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the defendant has seven (7) days from the service of the plaintiffs response to show cause to this Court why it has subject matter jurisdiction and that this case should not be remanded to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi. 1 . Ford is both incorporated and has its principal place of business in a state other than Mississippi. See Notice of Removal, \u00b6 3. The plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Jefferson County, Mississippi. Id. 2 . See St. Paul Mercury Indent. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) (<HOLDING>). 3 .The complaint requests ''[a]ctual and Holdings: 0: holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint 1: holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith 2: holding that where the complaint requests a specific sum of damages that amount controls if made in good faith 3: holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law 4: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "will not state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.\u201d Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 502-03. The Complaint here fails to state a cause of action. Although attorney honesty and fidelity are vital to the legal system and a matter in the public interest, we do not believe that a former law firm employee can be immune from the general rule of at-will employment merely by complaining to the Firm and its attorneys prior to being fired about deceitful but seemingly legal billing practices he no longer wishes to participate in. While we do not condone the Firm\u2019s alleged misconduct here, we are not persuaded that plaintiffs allegation of \u201chonesty and fidelity\u201d in the legal system satisfies the supreme court\u2019s \u201cnarrow definition of public policy\u201d in retaliatory discharge cases. Id. at 507-08 (<HOLDING>). We affirm the dismissal of the Complaint. Holdings: 0: holding that based on the narrow scope of a retaliatory discharge action the general concept of patient safety by itself is simply inadequate to justify finding an exception to the general rule of atwill employment 1: holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law 2: recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge 3: recognizing general rule 4: recognizing narrow whistleblower exception to the atwill doctrine", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "reasonably trustworthy information would lead a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime.\u201d Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (quoting Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim.App.1972)). In Parker v. State, the Texas- Court of Criminal Appeals held that \u201cif [an] [ojfficer ... makes a traffic stop and, when the driver rolls down his window, the redolent odor of burnt marihuana wafts out, he may well have probable cause to believe that the person (or persons) inside that small, enclosed area has been or is committing the offense of possession of marihuana.\u201d Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (citing Moulden, 576 S.W.2d at 818 (<HOLDING>)). Moreover, in Jordan v. State, the Court of Holdings: 0: holding the odor of burnt marihuana standing alone provided  peace offieers with the requisite probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the defendants vehicle 1: holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs 2: holding the odor of an etherlike substance in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle 3: holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place 4: holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or motive.\u2019 \u201d Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. 363, 366 (677 SE2d 92) (2009) (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 158 (115 SCt 696, 130 LE2d 574) (1995)). \u201c \u2018If the statement was made later, proof of the statement does not assist the jury to evaluate the witness\u2019s testimony because the reliability of the statement is subj ect to the same doubt as the trial testimony.\u2019\u201d Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 119 (674 SE2d 280) (2009) (citation omitted). Applying this principle, this Court has held that a co-defendant\u2019s prior statement made with the alleged motive of currying favor with the State to obtain a plea agreement is not admissible as a prior consistent statement when the co-defendant testifies for the State at trial. See Mister v. State, 286 Ga. 303, 307 (687 SE2d 471) (2009) (<HOLDING>). See also Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 511-512 Holdings: 0: holding that no constitutional violation occurred where state prosecutor did not allow defendant to withdraw guilty plea and reinstated additional charges after defendant violated plea agreement by failing to testify truthfully at codefendants trial 1: holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant 2: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 3: holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari 4: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an advance of $1,000 in defense of a claim of back rent. He then entered an appearance in the case and filed an answer, but did nothing else while a judgment was entered against his client in the amount of $22,000. In a third client\u2019s matter, McCartney required an advance payment of $23,500 to handle a real estate matter, but then took no action. While these clients attempted to contact McCartney, he closed his law office, absconded, did nothing to salvage his client\u2019s interests, and subsequently failed to respond to his bar complaints. Moss\u2019s behavior does not rise to the level in McCartney. However, Moss does have a past disciplinary record. We hold that the negotiated sanction is appropriate and in accord with case law. See Thompson v. Kentucky Bar Ass\u2019n, 360 S.W.3d 238 (Ky.2012) (<HOLDING>). B.Dismissing Count Y: SCR 3.130(8.1)(b). The Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys failure to timely file application for suspension of deportation despite contrary representations to client constituted ineffective assistance 1: holding that plaintiffs failure to respond to argument warranted dismissal with prejudice 2: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 3: holding that suspension for fortyfive days with requirement of paying restitution of 47950 to client plus costs was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorneys conduct relating to representation of client in divorce action in failing to act with diligence failing to keep client informed failing to adequately explain matters to client and failing to return unearned advancefee upon termination of representation and for attorneys conduct in failing to respond to two letters from office of bar counsel seeking explanation of inconsistencies in attorneys response to bar complaint 4: holding thompsons earlier private admonition coupled with his new violations warranted a sixtyone day suspension to be partially probated with conditions thompson admitted the following violations a lack of diligence a failure to safekeep client property a failure to timely terminate representation upon disability a failure to communicate with clients and failure to return client files and unearned fees", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "atffl 16-22. 40 . Doc. No. 41 at \u00b6 35. 41 . In re Seaway Intern. Transport, Inc., 341 B.R. 333, 334 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006). 42 . In re McCarn\u2019s Allstate Fin., Inc., 326 B.R. 843, 852 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2005) (\"Once a court determines that transfers are avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 548 or under Florida Statutes section 726.105, (available to the Trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544(b)), the Court must then look to Bankruptcy Code section 550 to determine the liability of the transferee of the avoided transfer.\u201d); see also In re Int\u2019l Admin. Servs., Inc., 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir.2005) (discussing re-coverability issues under \u00a7 550 for transfers avoided under \u00a7 544 and FUFTA). But see In re Jackson, 318 B.R. 5, 26 (Bankr.D.N.H.2004) subsequently aff'd, 459 F.3d 117 (1st Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 43 . In re Kingsley, 518 F.3d 874, 877 (11 th Holdings: 0: holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate 1: holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law 2: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law 3: holding clear and convincing standard to prove fraud or fraudulent intent and preponderance of the evidence to prove other elements under  727 4: holding that because the plaintiff could not prove avoidance of the transfers under  548 and only proved elements of the state law fraudulent transfer causes of action through  544 the plaintiff was limited to the state law recovery scheme and not  550", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the district court\u2019s legal conclusions is de novo and thus less deferential. See id at 1216. But we give \u201cdue deference\u201d to the district court\u2019s application of the Guidelines to the facts of each case. Id. at 1216-17. In addition, we review all sentences \u2014 whether inside or outside the suggested Guidelines range \u2014 for \u201creasonableness\u201d under a \u201cdeferential abuse-of-discretion standard.\u201d United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir.2008). A. To justify an offense level enhancement under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(6), the district court had to find that Defendant possessed a firearm \u201cin connection with another felony offense.\u201d The additional felony offense identified by the district court, in this case, was kidnapping. See Cummings v. State, 968 P.2d 821, 832 (Okla.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Morris, 562 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding the felony conviction requirement of section 1202a1 was not satisfied because oklahoma courts did not view the deferred judgment as a conviction 1: recognizing that kidnapping under oklahoma law is a felony 2: holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony 3: holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law 4: holding that a defendant is guilty of the class a felony of kidnapping only if the jury finds that the evidence establishes both the class b felony of kidnapping as defined in rsa 63311 and the elements of a class a felony set forth in rsa 6331 ii", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of interference, in the context of an easement acquired by condemnation. In Blair v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 187 Wis. 552, 556-57, 203 N.W. 912 (1925), the court held that when an electric company has a right-of-way, it has the right to make a reasonable clearance for its wires by cutting down and trimming trees. \"To hold otherwise,\" the court noted, \"would be to jeopardize the efficient operation of the line and perhaps to subject to greater peril the public or those who may have occasion to be on or near the wires, for it is a well known fact that, especially in wet weather, trees touching high-voltage electric wires transmit the current to the ground, where it may do damage to persons or property.\" Id.; see also Klump v. Cybulski, 274 Wis. 604, 613-14, 81 N.W.2d 42 (1957) (<HOLDING>). The reasoning of these cases leads us to Holdings: 0: holding that the court must determine rights in condemnation ujnless  there is found in the deed of the plaintiffs granting the easement to the railroad company language indicating a purpose or operating to pass a larger or more extended right or easement than that which would have been acquired by judgment in condemnation proceedings   1: holding the easement a power company acquires by condemnation may include the right to cut down trees to provide sufficient clearance for its wires 2: holding that permanent easement arising from condemnation of pipeline easement reduced property value by 20 3: recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance 4: holding that when federal government acquires property through condemnation it must account for state and local property taxes interest and penalties", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Supreme Court limited in Finley. In Finley, the plaintiff was attempting to bring non-federal defendants into a federal action based on a statute which is explicitly written to allow jurisdiction over only federal defendants. In the case at bar, a defendant is attempting to join a third- party defendant under the impleader rule which explicitly allows such an inclusion. The justice of the impleader rule is that it allows a defendant, who is itself in federal court against its will, to bring in parties who in fact may be more responsible to the plaintiff. Id. at 204-205. Further, the Sixth Circuit has recently applied the Finley rule to a situation with a \u201cposture\u201d or \u201ccontext\u201d analogous to the present case. See Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830, 836-839 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); See also Hall American Center Associates v. Holdings: 0: recognizing loss of consortium claims 1: holding that the district court should not have exercised pendent party jurisdiction over the husbands loss of consortium claim and therefore the jurys verdict in his favor had to be reversed 2: recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium 3: holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse 4: holding that district court appropriately retained pendent jurisdiction over state claims where it had invested time and resources in the case", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Judge. Freddick Woodson appeals the revocation of his probation for committing a new offense. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison. We affirm. In doing so, we reject without discussion Mr. Wood-son\u2019s suggestion that he was not properly advised of his probationary terms. See State v. Green, 667 So.2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). We write briefly to explain that Mr. Woodson Holdings: 0: holding that due process does not require notice or hearing before writ of garnishment issues 1: holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice 2: holding that due process does not require defendant to receive verbal notice of standard probation conditions because all persons have constructive notice of states criminal statutes 3: holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied 4: holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "ured professor at the same time. (7/1/14 Liu Tr. at 74:18-75:2). The employment agreement required Dr. Liu to agree to the University\u2019s Patent, Invention, and Copyright Statement. (Employment Agreement at 49) (7/1/14 Liu Tr. at 94:24-95:9.) In pertinent part, this statement provides that the University \u201chas a valid interest\u201d in Dr. Liu\u2019s discovery or invention of patentable items. (Employment Agreement at 49). Further, Dr. Liu\u2019s employment agreement explicitly required him to disclose all discoveries and inventions to the University and assign all inventions to the University. (Id. at 48-49) (\u201cI hereby [agree to disclose my inventions], and assign to the University all discoveries and inventions.... \u201d)). Dr. Liu testified that he believed !he di , 601 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). ' Adaptix asserts Dr. . Liu was on a partial Holdings: 0: holding that due to the csra a federal employee has no independent right of action for damages against a supervisor who improperly disciplined the employee for exercising his first amendment rights 1: holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech 2: holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made 3: holding that a sexual assault on a female employee was of a personal nature and not directed against the employee as part of the employment relationship 4: holding that the contractual language employee assigns his inventions has the effect of expressly granting rights with no further action needed on the part of the employee ", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "false. Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106). \u201c[M]ere conclusory allegations of fraud are insufficient.\u201d Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds as stated in Flood v. Miller, 35 Fed.Appx. 701, 703 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002). Broad allegations that include \u201cno particularized supporting detail\u201d do not suffice, Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001), but \u201cstatements of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are sufficient,\u201d Wool, 818 F.2d at 1439. Allegations of fraud based on information and belief may suffice as to matters peculiarly within the opposing party\u2019s knowledge, so long , Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). We recognize other portions of the complaint Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs speculations did not satisfy rule 9b requirements 1: holding a complaint failed to satisfy rule 9b where the allegations were lacking in detail 2: holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b 3: holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b 4: holding allegations that fraudulent statements were made during fourmonth period insufficient to satisfy rule 9b", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "On the contrary, each of the co-conspirators testified under oath that his or her interview summary was true and correct. See e.g., PL\u2019s Ex. 210 at 8-9 (Tr. Gnau G.J. testimony); PL\u2019s Ex. 211 at 9 (Tr. Marcus G.J. testimony); PL\u2019s Ex. 214 at 9 (Voss Grand Jury testimony); PL\u2019s Ex. 269 at 10 (Tr. Spartin G.J. testimony); PL\u2019s Ex. 204 at 10 (Peterson Grand Jury testimony). Had any of the co-conspirators testified falsely that he or she had told the plaintiff about the- illegal payoff scheme, the plaintiff would be rightly outraged, but that is not what occurred before the grand jury. Second, no legal requirement obliges prosecutors to include exculpatory information in presentations to the grand jury. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54-55, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Borda, 905 F.Supp.2d 201, Holdings: 0: holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant 1: holding that the government is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury 2: holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury 3: holding that courts have no authority to require the government to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury because it would alter the grandjurys historical role 4: holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "may have led to discovery of admissible evidence, they present no intelligible explanation of how that is so, nor can we detect any; the requests have every indicia of the quintessential fishing expedition.\u201d). Therefore, as Defendant\u2019s subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because \u201ccompli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case\u201d); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); Barrington, 2007 WL Holdings: 0: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 1: recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents 2: holding that subpoenas seeking any and all documents files and records reflecting or relating to the employment of each plaintiff were overly broad on their face 3: holding that subpoenas seeking the complete employment file of plaintiff including employment application payroll records medical records evaluations correspondence and all other records omitting nothing  were overbroad and could be quashed on that basis alone 4: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or death shall be applica ble for the full period during which compensation is payable.\u201d In this case, the trial court awarded the employee TTD benefits of $771 per week from December 21, 2012, to July 1, 2013, which was the average weekly wage in effect at the time of the employee\u2019s accident, but $788 per week from July 1, 2013 .to January 28, 2014, .based upon the director\u2019s determination of the average weekly wage of the state as of July 1, 2013. The employer contends, and the employee concedes, that the increase in. the TTD benefits from July 1, 2013, mandated by the trial court was contrary to \u00a7 25-5- d for review was final and ordered that the petition would instead be treated as an appeal. See generally Ex parte Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, 209 So.3d 496, 502 (Ala.Civ.App.2016) (<HOLDING>). Because the trial court\u2019s ruling was a final Holdings: 0: holding that if a trial court enters a judgment finding that an injury is compensable ordering payment for medical treatment and awarding temporarytotaldisability benefits regardless of whether the amount of those benefits is specified in the judgment this court will treat such a judgment as final for purposes of appeal 1: holding that order finding that injury arose out of and in the course of the employment and awarding medical benefits was interlocutory order that would not support appeal 2: holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal 3: holding that even an order that establishes entitlement to a judgment is not final unless it  actually enters or renders a judgment  or includes specific language of finality necessary for a judgment  to be considered final for purposes of an appeal 4: holding trial court may make a judgment final for purposes of appeal by severing the causes and parties disposed of by the judgment into a different cause", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "-activity to which the petition to seal pertains. Once the applicant receives the certificate of eligibility, he or she then petitions the court to seal the record. \u00a7 943.059, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, criminal records that \u201crelate to\u201d certain enumerated offenses, such as violations listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, which includes an act of domestic violence, cannot be sealed by the court. Id Here, the FDLE should have issued the certificate because Lazard satisfied the conditions of section 943.059(2). Then, upon a petition to seal, it would be for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lazard\u2019s offense \u201crelated, to\u201d an act of domestic violence precluding his record from being sealed. See J.A.H. v. State, 198 So.3d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (<HOLDING>), At this hearing, the court must consider all Holdings: 0: holding that before denying petition trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and state specific reasons for denying the petition 1: holding that an appeal denying a petition for what was essentially a petition for a new trial to reopen the criminal process was not separately appealable 2: holding that the trial court must consider these factors in denying appellants petition to transfer prior to trial 3: holding that untimely petition for postconviction petition divests trial court of jurisdiction 4: holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "representative of ISA in the Shields settlement; and (2) the FDIC\u2019s mismanagement claims are different from the claims advanced by the shareholder plaintiffs in Shields. We are not persuaded. 1 The FDIC argues that \u201c[t]he fact that one entity is a wholly owned subsidiary of another entity is insufficient to establish privity between the two entities for purposes of the defense of claim preclusion.\u201d The FDIC raises four major contentions in support of this argument. First, the FDIC\u2019s contention that \u201c[t]he parent/subsidiary relationship of ICA and ISA, though potentially relevant, is not dis-positive\u201d is unpersuasive in light of this court\u2019s clear holdings to the contrary. See, e.g., Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 920, 112 S.Ct. 1295, Holdings: 0: holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control 1: holding that parent corporation could not be held liable for any acts of whollyowned subsidiary although boards of directors of the two corporations overlapped in all other respects corporation had not disregarded subsidiarys corporate separateness had not involved itself directly in management of subsidiary and had not otherwise dominated or controlled subsidiary 2: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations 3: holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary 4: holding that whollyowned subsidiary and partnership in which that subsidiary is the general partner may invoke the two dismissals of the subsidiarys parent and claim rule 41a1 res judicata", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "above, we view the facts, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Henry, 652 F.3d at 527. Thus, on appeal from an award of qualified immunity, we generally \u201cadopt[ ] ... the plaintiffs version of the facts.\u201d Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir.2011) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)). In conducting this review, \u201c[i]t is not our job to weigh the evidence.\u201d Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir.1991). Accordingly, disputed questions of fact must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party at the summary judgment stage. See Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 Holdings: 0: holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues 1: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if the resolution of material issues depends upon credibility determinations 2: holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage 3: holding that in determining the propriety of summary judgment credibility determinations may not be made  4: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a result of discriminatory and retaliatory animus. The District Court granted summary judgment to NASA, in part because the white co-worker Nurriddin offered as an alleged comparator was not sufficiently similarly situated. Nurriddin IV, 40 F.Supp.3d at 121. Nurriddin claims this was in error, and also spills much ink criticizing the District Court\u2019s alleged reliance on whether he made out a prima facie case. We note that it is unclear whether the District Court believed that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a \u201csimilarly situated\u201d employee outside of her protected class received a promotion as part of her prima facie case. See id. at 120 (citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2003)). Such a showing is not required. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 n. 2 (\u201c[T]o Holdings: 0: recognizing that prior decisions created confusion on this point 1: holding that cue review applies only to prior final decisions of agencies of original jurisdiction ros and not to prior decisions of the board 2: holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions 3: recognizing that this created a cooperative scheme 4: recognizing this rule", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "declined to provide a breath sample. At some point during or after the booking process, appellant complained of chest and wrist pain, so the police called for an ambulance. The trial court found appellant guilty of DWI, and this appeal followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his DWI conviction. A. Standard of Review When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (<HOLDING>). Our review of \u201call of the evidence\u201d includes Holdings: 0: holding that jackson standard is only standard to use when determining sufficiency of evidence 1: holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence  based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard 2: holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict 3: holding the applicable standard of review in addressing the sufficiency of the evidence is manifest error 4: holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or identified in the same manner as a specific chattel.\u201d See, e.g., 9310 Third Ave. Assocs, Inc. v. Schaffer oney alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Holdings: 0: holding that contents of joint bank accounts which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant were sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion 1: holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim 2: holding that contract debt  was not subject to an act in tort for conversion 3: holding in a class action derivative suit that the joint defense privilege cannot be waived without the consent of all the parties to the defense except in the situation where one of the joint defendants becomes an adverse party in a litigation 4: holding that bank accounts in husbands and wifes joint names were property in a tenancy by the entirety", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "privacy in one\u2019s bodily integrity. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861. This lesser degree of privacy would result from the needs of prison officials to check intimate areas of a prisoner\u2019s body for weapons or drugs. See id. The theory underlying this principle is that once a person has been subject to such searches, one does not expect to retain such privacy. This logic breaks down when applied and extended to probationers who have not served time in this environment and have not experienced this repeated searching. See id. In addition, the logic is not applicable to a person released and no longer subject to such searches. The intrusion past one\u2019s bodily surface implicates the most grave privacy rights. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826; Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 658 (<HOLDING>). In the context of a warrantless and Holdings: 0: holding that presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard are constitutionally required in criminal cases 1: recognizing the difference between the physical intrusion required to take a fingerprint and the intrusion required to draw a blood sample is  constitutionally significant 2: holding that resentencing is required 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "principles of res judicata; however, the court cannot agree with Mclnnis that the \u00a7 522 Avoidance was conditioned upon the Debtors completing a Chapter 13 plan and receiving a discharge. As more fully explained infra, the Avoidance Order clearly establishes that these conditions only applied to the \u00a7 506 Avoidance; therefore, the Avoidance Order, as amended by this Order, remains effective and enforceable as to the \u00a7 522 Avoidance. DISCUSSION Amendment of Avoidance Order 15. Before addressing the issues presented in the Second Avoidance Motion and the Second Objection, the court will thoroughly analyze the Avoidance Order, because the implications of the Avoidance Order directly affect the res judicata defense presented by Mclnnis. At the 2016 H 326, at *3 (Bankr.D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Using its equitable powers authorized by 11 Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy courts have inherent power and authority under 11 usc  105a to sua sponte reconsider modify or vacate orders previously entered 1: holding a bankruptcy court is empowered to reopen a bankruptcy case on its own motion under 11 usc  105a 2: recognizing that bankruptcy rule 9024 provides authority for the court to revoke a discharge 3: holding that bankruptcy courts have independent authority pursuant to 11 usc  105 and rule 9024 of the federal rules of bankruptcy procedure to reconsider sua sponte their own orders at any time 4: holding that  105 allows sua sponte transfer under rule 1014a2", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "long been recognized \u201cto possess independent vitality, separate and apart from the guarantees provided by the United States Constitution.\u201d City of Sherman, 928 S.W.2d at 473; In the Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 197 (Tex.1994); LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339. Thus, it is no surprise that the Texas Supreme Court concluded long ago that article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution gives additional protection against retroactive lawmaking \u2014 in the form of an express bar on the passage of any \u201cretroactive law\u201d \u2014 not found in the U.S. Constitution. See Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 252. In the face of this express constitutional prohibition, little if any presumption of constitutionality remains. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938) (<HOLDING>). In shielding individual rights from the Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption 1: holding that state appropriation to ports authority violated constitutional prohibition against state debt and other constitutional provisions 2: recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed 3: recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation 4: recognizing that scope of constitutional presumption is much narrower when legislation appears on its face to fall within express constitutional prohibition", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "States criminal justice system. See Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. Frye & Lafler v. Cooper, 46 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 457, 468 (2013); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum. L.Rev. 1, 1 (1979). These concessions may relate to the sentence imposed by the court or recommended by the\u2019 prosecutor, the offense charged, or a variety of other circumstances; they may be explicit or implicit; and they may proceed from any of a number of officials. The benefit offered by the defendant, however, is always the same: entry of a plea of guilty. Alschuler, supra at 3-4. A. History 1, Inflpence of English Practices The practice dates to medieval times. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 n. 8, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (<HOLDING>). In Alford, the Supreme Court explained: The Holdings: 0: holding criminal defendant does not have constitutional right to have guilty plea accepted by court 1: holding jeopardy attaches when the guilty plea is accepted 2: holding that the defendant was entitled to have his plea accepted absent a sound reason for rejecting the plea 3: holding that a criminal defendant must provide a fair and just reason to support withdrawal of his guilty plea even when that plea has not yet been accepted by the district court 4: holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right before it is accepted by the court based on ndr crim p 32d3 which states that a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court  alteration in original", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "failure to respond to the court\u2019s inquiry is not the only instance of abandonment. His counsel filed documents with the court just two days after Smart filed his request. This included an \u201cExhibit List\u201d and \u201cDefendant\u2019s Witness List.\u201d Additionally, Islas represented to the court that he was acting as Smart\u2019s attorney. Cf. Brown, 665 F.2d at 612 (\u201cThe general rule is that a court may accept counsel\u2019s representations and the defendant is bound thereby, except upon a showing of counsel\u2019s bad faith or gross negligence.\u201d). Though silence alone does not constitute waiver, silence in the face of contradictory intent to be represented by counsel generally indicates abandonment of the request to proceed pro se. See id. at 611-12; see also United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 728 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404, Holdings: 0: holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself 1: holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded 2: holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so 3: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 4: holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the contract, and (3) damages. See AIB Mortgage Co. v. Sweeney, 687 So.2d 68, 69 (Fla. 3rd Dist.Ct.App.1997). Moreover, Florida law provides that \u201c[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.\u201d Fla. Stat. \u00a7 672.204(1) (adopting U.C.C. 2-204). This statute includes \u201cshrinkwrap contracts\u201d like the one at issue, where an agreement becomes effective as soon as a customer opens the product. Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Access Telecom, Inc., 642 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1364 (S.D.Fla.2009). In \u201cFlorida and the federal circuits, shrinkwrap agreements are valid and enforceable contracts.\u201d Salco Distribs., LLC v. iCode, Inc., 2006 WL 449156 at *2 n. 5 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 22, 2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that performance may be valid acceptance 1: holding that a valid contract requires acceptance of an offer 2: holding purchaser of software product was bound by terms of shrinkwrap agreement upon opening the packaging of the product reasoning that a vendor as master of the offer may invite acceptance by conduct and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance a buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance 3: holding that complete performance of contract constituted acceptance 4: holding that absence of judicial opinions demonstrating acceptance by other courts of particular type of scientific technique should not by itself foreclose finding of general scientific acceptance and reliability", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "disabled to the extent he would not be able to function in prison or in the population upon release without control of his delusional disorder.\u201d Citing United States v. McAllister, 969 F.Supp. 1200, 1207-08 (D.Minn.1997), Green argues that \u201c[i]f the \u2018gravely disabled\u2019 language in the [Policy] were not read to require a showing of dangerousness within the institution, the [Policy] would be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.\u201d True, Harper's specific holding is that Due Process allows an inmate to be treated \u201cif [he] is dangerous to himself or others\u201d and (2) when \u201cthe treatment is in the inmate\u2019s medical interest.\u201d Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. 1028. The Harper opinion does not make these criteria the only basis for involuntary medication. See id. at 227, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has explained that an Holdings: 0: holding that the due process clause permits the state to involuntarily treat a prison inmate who is seriously mentally ill if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest 1: holding that inmate has a liberty interest under the due process clause to refuse the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs 2: holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate  with antipsychotic drugs against his will under certain circumstances while not limiting treatment to those circumstances 3: holding that prisoners possess a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and identifying procedures which comported with due process 4: holding that the due process clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmates medical interest", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "potential impact upon interstate commerce,\u201d was sufficient. Finally, Malkus contends that Instructions 49 and 50 are contradictory in that one allowed the jury to consider \u201csworn testimony, exhibits and stipulated facts,\u201d whereas the other told the jury it could consider \u201conly the testimony and exhibits received into evidence.\u201d As stipulated facts are in fact received into evidence, I cannot see how the jury could have been confused. In any event, the court also described matters that \u201care not evidence\u201d and that \u201cmay not be considered in deciding what the facts are.\u201d Stipulated facts were not among them. For these reasons, I would affirm across the board. 1 . We review the question whether there was a material variance or constructive amendment de novo. See United State (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). 4 .As the Second Circuit has explained, So Holdings: 0: holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy 1: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 2: holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators 3: holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman 4: holding that a master conspiracy with subschemes to sell speed was a single conspiracy", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of status because he \u201clacked both an approved visa petition and an approved labor certification.\u201d (Oct. 8, 2004 BIA Op. at 1.) The BIA found that the IJ did not err in denying the continuance request, and that in light of his failure to establish eligibility for adjustment of status, Faustino did not demonstrate any prejudice that would constitute a due process violation. The instant petition followed. II. Standard of Review We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(2). Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir.2003). We review the BIA\u2019s affirmance of the IJ\u2019s denial of a continuance request for abuse of discretion. Id. at 377. Under an abuse of discretion standard, the BIA\u2019s decision should only be reversed if it is arbitrary, .1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its Holdings: 0: holding no abuse of discretion where ij denied aliens request for continuance because alien had no immigrant visa available and it was unlikely attorney general would exercise discretion to permit excludable alien to stay 1: holding that the ij did not abuse his discretion in denying request for further continuance where the ij granted previous request 2: holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion 3: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 4: holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "were short, making minimization difficult. Finally, as the district court noted, Judge Parker received reports on the investigation every ten days, in which he was informed that the government was intercepting communications involving Brown, Sanders, and Weems, among others. In fact, the very first of these reports listed Brown and Judge Sanders as people whose calls the government had intercepted. In light of these factors, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the government\u2019s interception of the Cascade-related calls was objectively reasonable. Therefore, we affirm the district court\u2019s denial of Brown\u2019s motion to suppress the fruits of the wiretap. VIII. For the reasons stated above, Brown\u2019s convictions on all counts are hereby A 1, 1015 (5th Cir.1990). 22 . See id. (<HOLDING>). 23 . See Kimbrough, 69F.3dat731. 24 . 18 Holdings: 0: holding that because the defendants offer of proof failed to show that the affiant was untruthful the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order disclosure of the informant 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order production of government files under rule 16a1c 2: holding that district court did not abuse discretion in not binding government to casual statements made by its attorney 3: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case 4: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify class action when claims were so individualized that certification was improper", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "notice has been provided to the interested parties. Tex.R.Civ.P. 316; see Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). Rule 329b(h) provides that \u201c[i]f a judgment is modified, corrected or reformed in any respect \u201d the appellate timetable runs from the date of the new judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(h)(emphasis added); Lane Bank Equipment Co., 10 S.W.3d at 313. Any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable under Rule 329b(h). Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313. Since Appellants timely filed a motion for new trial seeking a substantive change in the judgment, the court signed the judgment nunc pro tunc during the court\u2019s plenary power. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e); Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313 (<HOLDING>). The correction of the clerical error during Holdings: 0: holding that a timely filed motion for sanctions which specifically requested modification of judgment extended trial courts plenary power 1: holding that any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable but only a motion seeking a substantive change will extend the appellate deadlines and the trial courts plenary power 2: recognizing plenary power of district court to alter interlocutory orders 3: holding that appellate timetable is extended by filing postjudgment motion or other instrument that is 1 timely filed and 2 assails the trial courts judgment 4: holding that a nonpartys motion for new trial and petition for intervention filed after the trial court signed a final judgment did not extend the courts plenary jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was that he was homeless. See ORS 151.505(3) (\u201cThe court may not require a person to pay costs under this section unless the person is or may be able to pay the costs.\u201d); ORS 161.665(4) (\u201cThe court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs under this section unless the defendant is or may be able to pay them.\u201d). Defendant urges us to review and correct the error as \u201can error of law apparent on the record.\u201d ORAP 5.45(1); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991). The state concedes that the trial court committed plain error when it imposed court-appointed attorney fees. We accept the state\u2019s concession that the trial court plainly erred in imposing attorney fees of $416 on this record. See State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App 714, 716, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Further, we conclude that, for reasons Holdings: 0: holding that it is plain error for a trial court to require a defendant to pay courtappointed attorney fees in the absence of legally sufficient evidence that defendant has the ability to pay the amount imposed 1: holding that a trial court commits plain error by imposing courtappointed attorney fees where the record is silent as to the defendants ability to pay the fees ordered 2: holding that a trial court cannot decide the issue of attorneys fees without findings as to one spouses ability to pay and the others need 3: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 4: holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The majority concluded that the agency had conducted a search, and because the intrusion occurred in the absence of a valid warrant, it was a violation of Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. In his concurrence, Justice Alito proposed that, as opposed to short-term monitoring, long-term GPS monitoring and cataloguing of a vehicle\u2019s every movement impinged upon society\u2019s expectation of privacy. Id. at _, 181 L. Ed. 2d at 934 (Alito, J., concurrence). We note that as to the application of the Fourth Amendment in the context of SBM, our Court has declared United States v. Jones to be inapposite. See State v. Jones, _ N.C. App. _, _, 750 S.E.2d 883, 886 (2013) (citing State v. Martin, _ N.C. App. _, 735 S.E.2d 238 (2012) (<HOLDING>)). We also note that in United States v. Jones, Holdings: 0: holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts 1: holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person 2: holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 3: holding parolees right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was unaffected by his signing of the consent to search provision 4: holding that forfeiture statute is subject to the fourth amendments prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the holding in Waugh); Lichter v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Lichter), 1999 Bankr.Lexis 1904, *12 (Bankr.D.Md. 1999) (\u201cThis court agrees with the majority conclusion as expressed in Waugh.\u201d). See, e.g., In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 705 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2006)(\u201cThis [c]ourt agrees with [In re] Rowe[, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D.Kan.2006)] that the phrase \u2018allowed claim\u2019 in \u00a7 521(a)(6) is one of those \u2018rare cases.\u2019 There is no logical reason why Congress would differentiate between creditors in asset cases and those in no asset cases, allowing the former but not the latter relief if debtor use a \u2018ride through.\u2019 And the Court is unaware of Congress ever articulating any such distinction.\u201d) (internal citation omitted); In re Fibrex, Inc., 270 B.R. 714, 717-18 (Bankr. S.D.Ind.2001) (<HOLDING>); Woloshin, Tenenbaum and Natalie, P.A. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the court had no authority to order the payment of interim compensation to professionals without the chapter 9 debtors consent because  331 which governs interim payments to professionals is not incorporated into chapter 9 1: holding that licensor was entitled to administrative expense priority claim where debtor remained in possession postpetition of real property under a license agreement 2: holding that the estimation provision in 11 usc  502 which governs prepetition claims does not apply to 11 usc  503 which governs administrative claims 3: holding that interest on postpetition taxes incurred by the debtor during chapter 11 reorganization is an administrative expense 4: holding that the legislative intent of 11 usc  503b3f does not permit the court to grant administrative expense priority for compensation paid to professionals hired by the committee without the courts approval", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "state habeas court\u2019s findings of fact were objectively unreasonable. We assume arguendo, that the district court concluded, for the six reasons it gave, that they were not objectively reasonable. 6 . See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (reasoning that trial court determinations of credibility and demeanor, which are entitled to \"special deference\u201d on direct review, deserve \"no less\u201d respect in habeas proceedings). 7 .. The state contends that Broolcs \"was unlawful insofar as it departed from [Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 620 (5th Cir.1994)], which held that '[t]he Supreme C nd therefore nonprecedential, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5, their reasoning is persuasive. 9 . See Rivas v. Thaler, 432 Fed.Appx. 395, 404 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Again, Rivas is not precedential but is Holdings: 0: holding that district courts decision that trial counsels failure to object to crawford material was based on a reasonable trial strategy and did not constitute deficient performance under washingtons  first prong was not debatable 1: holding that counsel could have reasonably determined that the trial court would not sustain a rule 403 objection therefore counsels failure to object to this evidence was not deficient performance 2: holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy 3: holding that counsels failure to object or request a limiting instruction for evidence of defendants incarceration was sound trial strategy 4: holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "identification of Elliott as the perpetrator by having her concede that she told police that she could not give a positive identification of Elliott for various reasons including that she was unsure, had a bad memory, and did not look at Elliott\u2019s face. N.T., Oct. 26, 1994, at 90-99. Thus, Elliott brings to light no evidence that trial counsel would have been able to offer had he further investigated the prior bad acts relating to Ber-son, Gogos, or Cardinal, which would have altered the outcome of his trial. Finding no prejudice arising from trial counsel\u2019s alleged failure to investigate the prior bad act witnesses, we conclude that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue such issue. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Elliott was properly denied Holdings: 0: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 1: holding that an attorney is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection 2: holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue 3: holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim 4: holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failure to present cumulative evidence", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a certain period of time. Id. at 532. Our Supreme Court held \u201cthat when changing a group policy insuring contributing employees and obtaining the applications of those employees, the employer acts as an agent of the employees [cits.], and as such is under a duty to notify the employees of differences between the old and new policies and of any rights the employees may have to continue the old insurance on an individual basis. We hold further that where this duty is breached, an employee can recover such damages as result from the difference in coverage.\u201d Id. at 535-536. Although this case is somewhat factually different from Dawes Mining, the same analysis of duty and breach are applicable in this case. When an employee makes application for group health insurance coverage and ) (1981) (<HOLDING>). In reaching our decision we are mindful that Holdings: 0: holding the employer breached the duty owed to its employee by erroneously advising the employee he would continue to have coverage for 30 days following his termination of employment under the employers group policy 1: holding that employer breached fiduciary duty to disclose that it was considering allowing employees to participate in benefit plan 2: holding that the employer created an erisa plan when it 1 paid for the employees insurance 2 contracted with the insurance company for coverage and eligibility requirements and 3 collected and remitted the employees dependents premiums 3: holding that the employer breached a duty to its employees by allowing their insurance coverage to lapse without giving them reasonable notification of the lapse 4: holding the plain terms of the mortgage did not demonstrate any contractual duty on the mortgagee to procure coverage on plaintiffs property or to notify plaintiff of lapse in coverage", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "be set aside only when liability is truly joint \u2014 that is, when the theory of recovery requires that all defendants be found liable if any one of them is liable \u2014 and when the relief sought can only be effective if judgment is granted against all.\u201d). Cole v. Erwin, _ N.C. App. _, 729 S.E.2d 128, 2012 WL 2895265, *6 (2012) (unpublished opinion). The United States Bankruptcy Court from the Middle District of North Carolina has embraced applying the Frow principle when allowing default judgment against one defendant would be logically inconsistent with the outcome for similarly sit uated non-defaulting defendants. In re Moss, 03-12672C-7G, 04-2004, 2005 WL 1288134 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 16, 2005) (\u2018\u2018Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Imps., Inc., 740 F.2d 1499, 1512 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Holdings: 0: holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact 1: holding that the notice of appeal filed after the district court entered judgment as to one defendant but before the court dismissed the claims against the other defendants would have become effective when those defendants were later dismissed 2: holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits 3: holding that the principle that when defendants are similarly situated but not jointly liable judgment should not be entered against a defaulting defendant if the other defendant prevails on the merits is sound policy 4: holding that summary judgment should not be granted when depositions are pending unless protective order is sought or entered", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a record cannot qualify as a business record if it was prepared for purposes of litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir.2006). But where a document is created primarily for the government to use it as a substitute for live testimony in a criminal prosecution, the fact that the document might happen to fall within the jurisdiction\u2019s business records exception to the hearsay rule does not render the document non-testimonial. Accordingly, because DEA chemist\u2019s reports are created expressly for use in criminal prosecutions as a substitute for live testimony against the accused, such reports are testimonial, whether or not they happen to meet this jurisdiction\u2019s definition of a business record. See State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309-10 (Minn.2006) (<HOLDING>). ' Citing Howard, 473 A.2d at 839, the Holdings: 0: holding that bureau of criminal apprehension bca laboratory report identifying a substance as cocaine was testimonial and implicated defendants right to confrontation 1: holding that state bureau of criminal apprehension laboratory report offered at trial to prove that substance seized from defendant was cocaine was clearly prepared for litigation and was testimonial 2: holding forensic laboratory experts statement that substance was cocaine is testimonial for sixth amendment confrontation clause purposes 3: holding that fdle lab report reflecting that substances possessed by defendant were marijuana and cocaine was testimonial as such document was accusatory was prepared by law enforcement pursuant to a police investigation and was admitted to establish an element of the crime 4: recognizing that evidence regarding the high price the defendant had paid for the substance in question was relevant to show the substance was cocaine", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "original intended purpose requirement. Indeed, two of the words, \u201crepair\u201d and \u201crefurbish,\u201d lend themselves most naturally to an interpretation that an item will retain its originally intended purpose. See, e.g., Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1923 (2002) (defining \u201crepair\u201d as \u201cto restore by replacing a part or putting together what is torn or broken\u201d (emphasis added)); id. at 1910 (defining \u201crefurbish\u201d as \u201cto make as if new\u201d); see also In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir.2014) (recognizing that we interpret words using their ordinary and common meanings). And there is nothing about any of the other three words, \u201cresold,\u201d \u201cdonated,\u201d and \u201creused,\u201d that excludes an original intended purpose requirement. See, e.g., Webster\u2019s at 672 (defining \u201cdonate\u201d as \u201cto make 05) (<HOLDING>). But see Tebbetts v. Whitson, 956 P.2d 639, Holdings: 0: holding that a superior court can adjudicate a child as a child in need of aid based on the acts of just one parent 1: holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute 2: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 3: holding that statute defining prostitution of a child as inducing a child to perform sex acts through the use of coercion threat or intimidation or in exchange for money can reasonably be construed in two different ways one which does not require a commercial transaction and one that does and turning to the legislative history for guidance 4: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "sufficient to render it liable to suit. Id. at 1385. We rejected this argument, instead defining maintain as \"keeping a constructed edifice, structure, or improvement in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed.\" Id. at 1886. A failure to maintain a roadway therefore, \"is not a failure to keep a roadway in existence, but a failure to. restore a roadway to the state in which it was originally constructed.\" Id. In explaining our construction of the statute, we recognized that in 1992, to clarify the meaning of maintenance, the General Assembly added the following language to the definition of \"dangerous condition\": \"Maintenan\u00e9e does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.\" Id. at 1885 (<HOLDING>) (quoting ch. 172, see. 1, \u00a7 24-10-1038, 1992 Holdings: 0: holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons 1: holding that the word interest is to be understood in its ordinary senseto hold that congress intended to use the word in the sense of a penalty is contrary to all rules of interpretation and invokes a special definition of the word interest that is unwarranted citations omitted 2: holding that the most common definition of a word does not preclude other accepted alternatives 3: holding that purpose of the amendment was to clarify the definition of the word maintain 4: holding that the word void is not sufficient", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "at *5 (Tex.App.-El Paso Dec.21, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (concluding based on Jenkins that \"possession\u201d refers only to statements in the prosecutor\u2019s possession). 9 . Brooks v. State, 901 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref\u2019d & pet. dism\u2019d). 10 . Williams v. State, 940 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref\u2019d); Jordan v. State, 897 S.W.2d 909, 918 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). 11 . Additionally, the trial court found that the recorded statements were made contemporaneously with the written statements and speculated that they were probably more detailed than the written statements. No one disputed the trial court\u2019s recitation of the facts. 12 . See Amunson v. State, 928 S.W.2d 601, 608 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); see also Olivas, 2000 WL 1867971, at *5 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report 1: holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel 2: holding that it was a deprivation of due process to find that a probationer had violated probation by failing to immediately report that he had received a traffic citation where such reporting was not required as a term of the probation 3: holding that it was error for the trial court to refuse to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a new affidavit and report complying with section 2622 where there was no indication that the plaintiffs failure to file the report earlier in the litigation was in bad faith 4: holding no jurisdiction where appellant argued report was no report because it failed to mention appellant in any substantive way but trial court found report was merely deficient on element of causation as to appellant and granted extension", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that the summonses were issued as part of a criminal investigation against plaintiff, and Manzur\u2019s declaration confirms this. See Compl. \u00b6 4; Manzur Decl. \u00b6\u00b6 3-5. Therefore, defendants were not required to provide advance notice of the summonses to plaintiff under \u00a7 7602(c). In short, assuming arguendo that the Court could consider the merits of Counts One, Two, and Three, defendants would be entitled to summary judgment on those claims. III. Right to Financial Privacy Act Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs separate claim under the Right to Financial Privacy Act (Count Four) on the ground that IRS summonses are exempted from its provisions. Defs.\u2019 Mem. at 3. Defendants rely on 12 U.S.C. \u00a7 3413(c), which provides that \u201c[n]othing in this chapter prohibits the 1 (D.Md.2007) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 275 Fed.Appx. 221 (4th Cir.2008) (per Holdings: 0: holding this with respect to the defenses in 29 usc  623f 1: recognizing the importance of a determination on the merits with respect to the issuance of a permanent injunction 2: holding that the irs was not required to provide a certificate of compliance with the rfpa under 12 usc  3403b with respect to issuance of summonses based on the exclusion set forth at 12 usc  3413c 3: holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled 4: holding that strict compliance with the 30180day time limit set forth in krs 4392651 is required", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the palm trees were at, and the water was dirty\u201d; and picking up a water bottle as he was walking with Agent Hunter. Despite Alcantara\u2019s detailed recollection of the former events, Alcantara did not remember traveling through a rugged and mountainous area into the United States, any statement to Agent Hunter about his entry into the United States, or even Agent Hunter\u2019s trial testimony from the day before until finally answering the district court in denying Alcantara\u2019s request for a curative instruction, as the district court properly held that the jury had been fully instructed concerning the credibility of government witnesses, and its prompt instruction to disregard the isolated comment sufficiently remedied any error. See United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 955 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Holdings: 0: holding that a district court can cure the effect of an improper prosecutorial comment with a jury instruction 1: holding that instruction to disregard cured error from prosecutors improper comment during voir dire 2: holding that defendant suffered no prejudice from allegedly improper comment on defendants refusal to testify 3: holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness 4: holding that the district courts swift response instructing the jury to disregard the improper comment prevented  the improper comment from materially affecting the verdict", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "student\u2019s education, \u201cincluding] the conduct and development of evaluations, eligibility determinations, IEPs, and educational placement.\u201d Michael C. ex rel Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 654 (3d Cir.2000). No such proceeding concerning E.M.\u2019s education has been initiated. Although the Majority devotes pages to discussing whether this case is a \u201cproceeding\u201d under \u00a7 1415, the proper inquiry is whether there exists a separate pending \u00a7 1415 proceeding, such as a due process complaint or an appeal of a ruling on such a complaint. Because \u201cstay put\u201d operates only \u201cMuring the pendency\u201d of such a proceeding, and no such proceeding has been initiated, \u00a7 1415\u2019s \u201cstay put\u201d provision simply does not apply. See Moss by Mutakabbir v. Smith, 794 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C.1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as the Majority acknowledges, there Holdings: 0: holding that the stay put provision establishes a strong preference but not a statutory duty for maintenance of the status quo 1: holding that a federal action to enforce the stay put provision is not itself a pending proceeding under  1415 that triggers stay put 2: holding that insurance guarantee association stay statute did not suspend limitation period because action was not pending when stay was entered 3: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay 4: holding that use of the preliminary injunction equitable factors would dilute the statutory framework under the stay put provision", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "227, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y.2001). However, the prospective class members were not denied benefits; they received benefits that they later discovered were miscalculated with resulting underpayment. The relevant date for fixing the accrual of such a claim is when a plaintiff was put on notice that the defendants believed the method used to calculate his disability pension was correct. Thus, the claim does not begin to run until a prospective class member inquires about the calculation of his benefits and the Plan rejects his claim that the benefits were miscalculated. See e.g., Davis v. NMU Pension & Welfare Plan, 810 F.Supp. 532, 536 (S.D.N.Y.1992); Kiefer v. Ceridian Corp., 976 F.Supp. 829, 842-43 (D.Minn. 1997); Cotter v. E. Conf. of Teamsters Ret. Plan, 898 F.2d 424, 429 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to plaintiffs argument, it is Holdings: 0: holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made 1: holding that the statute of limitations for a miscalculation of benefits claim began to run at the time at which some event other than a denial of a claim should have alerted the claimant to his entitlement to the benefits he did not receive 2: holding that a plaintiff in an erisa denial of benefits case bears the burden of proving her entitlement to contractual benefits 3: holding that although the defendantattorney did not disclose to the plaintiff his failure to file a claim in a timely manner the limitations period on the legal malpractice claim began to run when the plaintiff could reasonably discern that he suffered some harm caused by the defendants conduct 4: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "289, 292 (D.D.C.2000); Arakelian v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 126 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1989). Such a finding is proper when \u201c \u2018on the entire evidence\u2019 the court \u2018is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u2019\u201d Neuder, 194 F.R.D. at 292 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); see also Arakeli-an, 126 F.R.D. at 2. I. Protective Order Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to \u201cserve upon any other party a written request for the admission ... of any m have treated requests for admissions as being subject to discovery cutoff dates. See Coram Health Care Corp. of Ill. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., No. 01 C 1096, 2001 WL 1467681, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 15, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Revlon Consumer Prods. Corp., 2001 WL 521832, Holdings: 0: holding that the states rule dates the beginning of the discovery period only from the filing of the answer 1: holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates 2: holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates 3: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 4: holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a basis for calculating lost profits, reversal is not required where the trial court properly charged the jury that lost earnings were recoverable \u2018where the evidence shows with reasonable certainty the amount of the loss\u2019 \u201d (citation omitted)); Pouts, 222 Ga. App. at 577 (4) (noting the distinction between lost profits and lost earnings, and holding that the evidence presented at trial supported a claim for lost earnings); Quiktrip Corp. v. Childs, 220 Ga. App. 463, 467 (5) (469 SE2d 763) (1996) (\u201cLost wages and earnings are recoverable where the evidence shows the amount of the loss with reasonable certainty and the evidence permits the jury to determine the amount of the loss without speculation or guesswork.\u201d); Beal v. Braunecher, 185 Ga. App. 429, 433-34 (5) (364 SE2d 308) (1987) (<HOLDING>); id. at 435 (noting the \u201csubstantial Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not commit reversible error when it submitted admissibility of evidence question to jury because the trial court had independently decided the question 1: holding that trial court did not commit reversible error in charging jury that reasonable certainty was the proper standard for establishing the value of plaintiffs lost earnings and that some evidence was all that was required in this matter 2: holding that it was reversible error for district court to charge jury that plaintiffs were required in reduction of force case to show that they were clearly better qualified than the employees retained 3: holding that a district court did not commit reversible error because it attached great weight to one factor 4: holding that reversible error was committed when the court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is therefore available in more than just the two circumstances described in Irwin and Bailey. See Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 5 n. 7 (1st Cir.1993) (\u201cA fair reading of Irwin, however, shows that the Court did not undertake an exhaustive list of factors that may be considered in the equitable weighing process.\u201d). In addition to the guidance provided by the Supreme Court, several circuits have allowed equitable tolling based on mental illness. The First Circuit has established that mental incapacity is a suitable basis upon which to equitably toll a statute of limitations. See Mel\u00e9ndez-Arroyo v. Cutler-Hammer de P.R., Co., 273 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir.2001) (remanding for factual inquiry into whether plaintiffs mental state warranted equitable tolling); Nunnally, 996 F.2d at 5 (<HOLDING>); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 28 n. Holdings: 0: holding that mental incapacity is an extraordinary circumstance that may warrant equitable tolling 1: recognizing that  2244dlds statute of limitations can be tolled 2: holding that 26 usc  6511 may not be equitably tolled but that mental incapacity is a grounds for tolling when available 3: holding that 42 usc  405g may be equitably tolled based on a plaintiffs mental impairment 4: holding that 5 usc  7703b2 can be tolled due to mental incapacity", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "certain third class cities, a person appointed to be the chief of police must have been a member of the police, department. The Union concedes that the City of Terre Haute is a second class city, not a third class city. The fact that Ind.Code \u00a7 19 \u2014 1\u2014 29.5-1.5 was enacted after Ind.Code \u00a7 19-1-29.5-13 is instructive. \u201cOne inference that may be drawn from an amendment adding a provision to a statute is that, in the view of the legislature, the statute as originally drafted did not contain the provision.\u201d Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.1987)., The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that, when a statute is ambiguous, we may look to subsequent amendments for evidence of the legislature\u2019s initial intent. See Seymour Nat\u2019l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind.1981) (<HOLDING>), modified on reh\u2019g on other grounds by 428 Holdings: 0: holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent 1: holding that in cases of ambiguity we may resort to subsequent amendments in order to glean the legislatures intent 2: holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent 3: holding that 1991 amendments to other aspects of  3910114lai clarified intent of 1988 amendments to statute 4: holding legislatures intent is determined from plain and common meaning of words used", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 223-24 (4th Cir.1999) (\u201c[Sjervice of process is not legally defective simply because the complaint misnames the defendant in some insignificant way.\u201d). Technical defects in the form of the summons and the complaint do not invalidate an otherwise proper and successful delivery of process under Fed. R.Civ.P. 4. Mid-Continent Wood Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir.1991) (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.1984)). In other contexts, federal courts have determined that a technical defect in the service of process does not invalidate the service where the plaintiff has substantially complied with the appropriate state-law rule. Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 829-30 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Freeman v. Freeman, 2002 WL 539061, at *1 n. Holdings: 0: holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country 1: holding that service to defendants business address resulted in total failure to serve process rather than mere technical defect and thus could not be cured by rule 415f 2: holding that there was no duty to answer a complaint after removal but pointing out that south dakota law will excuse a technical defect in the service of process where a plaintiff has otherwise substantially complied with the appropriate rule 3: holding that affidavit submitted to the court after the plaintiffs motion to remand was sufficient to cure the defect in the removal petition 4: holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "versa. Id. This court reviews a district court\u2019s determination of inequitable conduct under a two-tiered standard: we review the underlying factual determinations of materiality and intent for clear error, and we review the ultimate decision as to inequitable conduct for an abuse of discretion. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. If the district court\u2019s inequitable conduct determination rests on a clearly erroneous finding of materiality or intent, it constitutes an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. Id. We agree with Honda that the undisclosed 96RL information was material to the Three-Status patent because the jury found, and the court upheld, the asserted claims as anticipated by the 96RL system, and ACI has not appealed that decision to us. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291-92 (<HOLDING>). The materiality of the undisclosed Holdings: 0: holding that in reviewing a defendants motion for judgment of acquittal based on insanity which the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the court must determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find that the defendants criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence 1: holding that if a claim is properly invalidated in district court based on the deliberately withheld reference then that reference is necessarily material because a finding of invalidity in a district court requires clear and convincing evidence a higher evidentiary burden than that used in prosecution at the pto 2: holding that a finding of fraud may be reversed only for clear error but that the finding must be judged in view of the clear and convincing burden of proof 3: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence 4: holding that appellate court may infer that district court considered sentencing guidelines policy statements despite district courts failure to make explicit reference to them", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of attempting to set fire to or burn a building under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-67.1. The State was not required to prove a \u201cburning\u201d in order to prove an attempt to bum or set fire. Avery, 315 N.C. at 25, 337 S.E.2d at 799. We note that, unlike the facts of Avery, the juvenile in the present case did not set off a fire bomb, but rather set off fireworks. While this factual distinction may be significant under different facts, the facts here are that the juvenile set off fireworks \u201cnear the wall\u201d of the interview room. Given the proximity of the fireworks to the wall and the resulting flame and damage, we infer an intent to set fire with the fireworks. See State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 457, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendant acknowledged awareness of the consequences of his plea agreement counsels erroneous explanation of the consequences was not prejudicial 1: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 2: holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea 3: holding the federal government responsible for the immediately foreseeable consequences of its actions 4: holding that an individual is presumed to intend the natural consequences of the individuals actions", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the ultra vires exception to the Eleventh Amendment and, thus, Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 state law claims as to the individual basis, on this basis, is denied. D. Federal Claims Against Defendants Cuomo, Lippman, Prudenti, Hite, Ahl, Hanrahan, Megna, and DiNapoli in their Individual Capacities Plaintiffs assert \u00a7 1983 claims for monetary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment against Defendants Cuomo, Lippman, Prudenti, Hite, Ahl, Hanrahan, Megna, and DiNapoli, individually. Suits against state officials in their personal capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even for actions required by their official duties, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-28, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (<HOLDING>); however, such actions may be subject to Holdings: 0: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 1: holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity 2: holding state of north carolina and state official sued in their official capacity are immune from  1983 and  1985 actions in federal court 3: holding that eleventh amendment does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacity 4: holding that state officials may be personally liable for actions taken in their official capacity", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "produce a policy-mandated incident report, created issues of material fact that should have been presented to the jury. The doctrine of spoliation provides that \u201cthe deliberate or negligent destruction of relevant evidence by a party to litigation may give rise to an inference that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to that party.\u201d Tancrelle, 756 A.2d at 748. The defendants argue that their failure to produce an incident report did not rise to the level of spoliation since there was no evidence that the report ever was prepared or destroyed, notwithstanding the policy requirement to do so. However, we \u201cdecline to allow defendants] to benefit from [their] own unexplained failure to preserve and produce responsive and relevant information during discovery.\u201d Kurc-zy, 820 A.2d at 947 (<HOLDING>). In light of testimony that defendants Holdings: 0: holding spoliation instructions appropriate in light of the defendants failure to produce boardmeeting minutes for meeting where accident may have been discussed 1: holding that defense counsel may call attention to the states failure to produce evidence 2: recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence 3: holding that counsel may not be deemed ineffective under strickland for failing to object to jury instructions where this court previously upheld validity of those instructions 4: holding that in light of the defendants failure to engage in the interactive process liability would be appropriate if  reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act [29 U.S.C. \u00a7 301 et seq.], or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this sub- chapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.... 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1140 (emphasis added). Thus, this section forbids, and gives rise to wrongful discharge claims for, both \u201cretaliation\u201d for exercise of ERISA plan rights, and, as is alleged in this case, \u201cinterference\u201d with future ERISA plan benefits. Kinkead v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 49 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Morrison v. FirsTier Bank, 26 F.3d 65, 67 Holdings: 0: holding that where both defamation and tortious interference claims are pled and are based on same facts minnesota law requires the application of the actual malice standard to tortious interference claims 1: holding that interference and retaliation are two separate theories that can be advanced under the fmla and that termination is evidence of retaliation 2: recognizing similar analysis applies to discrimination and retaliation claims 3: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 4: recognizing both retaliation and interference claims under  1140", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Motion that Figure 7 of the FAC contains an accurate version of the endorsement email. See ECF No. 42. 5 . Plaintiffs selectively quote this blog post in the FAC, but the Court takes judicial notice of the entire document, which is available at http://blog.linkedin.com/2009/03/27/how-to-report-abusive-behavior-on-linkedin/, because the document has been incorporated by reference into the FAC. See infra Section II.C. 6 . In addition, Plaintiffs attach two judicial documents (an order and a complaint) to their Request for Judicial Notice, though they do not explicitly request judicial notice of these documents. See ECF No. 25-2, Exs. E-F. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n. 1 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Defendants, in a footnote, move to strike Holdings: 0: recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record 1: holding that undisputed matters of public record are proper subjects for judicial notice 2: holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice 3: holding that the existence of prior convictions are typically matters of public record of which the trial court can take judicial notice without violating the defendants right to due process 4: holding that courts may take judicial notice of sec filings that are matters of public record", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to independent-negligence claims by an employee against his employer\u2019s parent company, that is, Plaintiffs allegations in paragraph 9 tend to show that Novar and Indalex \u201cwork[ed] closely together,\u201d Hinkle, 24 F.Supp.2d at 821 n. 2, not that Novar \u201cha[d] undertaken the duty to prevent injuries to [Indalex\u2019s] employees.\u201d Id. at 821. Further, while Plaintiffs allegations might also tend to show that Novar was concerned about safety at Indalex or that it even promulgated safety procedures that Indalex was supposed to implement, such allegations are still insufficient as a matter of law to show that Novar entered upon an active course of conduct to ensure the safety of Indalex\u2019s employees so as to create an independent claim of negligence against Novar. See, e.g., Muniz, 737 F.2d at 148 (<HOLDING>). In summary, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to Holdings: 0: recognizing a state law tort claim for negligence arising under a duty to provide a safe work environment 1: holding that njeither mere concern with nor minimal contact about safety matters creates a duty to ensure a safe working environment for the employees of a subsidiary corporation 2: holding that control person liability adequately alleged because as the sole shareholder of the subsidiary the parent corporation had the potential power to influence and direct the activities of its subsidiary 3: holding that parent corporation could not be held liable for any acts of whollyowned subsidiary although boards of directors of the two corporations overlapped in all other respects corporation had not disregarded subsidiarys corporate separateness had not involved itself directly in management of subsidiary and had not otherwise dominated or controlled subsidiary 4: holding that there must be evidence that the parent corporation assumed a duty to ensure safety", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "instance to the trial court and, therefore, is not preserved for appellate review. In any case, because we have vacated the award of punitive damages, the issue is now moot. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. HEARN, C.J., and CONNOR, J, concur. 1 . S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 36-2-714 (1976). 2 . S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 36-2-715 (1976). 3 . Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm'n, 332 S.C. 54, 504 S.E.2d 117 (1998). 4 . South Carolina Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 136, 538 S.E.2d 285, 288-89 (Ct.App.2000). 5 . S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 36-1-106 (1976). 6 . S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 36-1-106 cmt. 1 (1976); see also Novosel v. Northway Motor Car Corp., 460 F.Supp. 541 (N.D.N.Y.1978) (noting that punitive damages are not recoverable); Sims v. Ryland Group, Inc., 37 Md.App. 470, 378 A.2d 1 (Md.1977) (<HOLDING>); cf. 11 S.C. Juris. Damages \u00a7\u00a7 47, 70 (1992) Holdings: 0: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988 1: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under subsection 216b 2: holding punitive damages not recoverable under 2715 3: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable under viwda 4: holding that punitive damages are recoverable in a claim for retaliation under the flsa", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "third parties. In the course of codifying execution remedies for judgment creditors, Rhode Island enacted a statutory provision codifying and arguably expanding the old creditor\u2019s bill devised by the equity courts. R.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7 9-28-1. This provision permits an unsatisfied judgment creditor to reach \u201cany equitable estate, any equitable assets, or any choses in action of the judgment debtor, except such as shall be exempt from attachment by virtue of statutory provision.\u201d On its face, this language refutes any claim that Rhode Island is hostile to creditors taking over debtors\u2019 legal claims against third parties. Howe responds by pointing to the just quoted qualification (\u201cexcept such ... \u201d), arguing that this incorporates section 9-26-4(10)\u2019s reference to \u201cpolicy\u201d exemp 987) (<HOLDING>). In the end almost everything turns on how an Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 1: holding property exempt where inter alia claim not subject to garnishment affd 855 f2d 859 8th cir1988 2: holding that property not subject to sequestration is not therefore exempt 3: holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim 4: holding that because nondischargeable debt based on fraud was not one of the four enumerated exceptions to exempt property the exempt property was not liable for the creditors surviving claim", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "promptly. See Def.\u2019s Mem. Ex. H (Memorandum of Counseling, Sept. 7, 2007) at 2. It closed by warning that \u201c[t]his time ... is just a counseling but if this happen[s] again, we will take the appropriate action.\u201d Given that the memorandum itself made clear that disciplinary action was not forthcoming as a result of its issuance \u2014 and that \u201cmere speculation that a letter of reprimand may lead to future punishment is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action,\u201d Coleman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2434926, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2006) \u2014 the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable employee would have been deterred from pursuing a claim of discrimination by the prospect of receiving a memorandum like this one. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; Herbert, 766 F.Supp.2d at 75 (<HOLDING>). ii. The September 13, 2007 Meeting with Holdings: 0: holding that counseling sessions and written criticisms of employees work performance did not fall within the types of materially adverse employment actions 1: holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same  rate of pay and benefits and her duties were not materially modified 2: holding that allegations that employee was yelled at for complaining about his discriminatory treatment and criticized  were not materially adverse actions 3: holding that a similar written reprimand provided to an architect of the capitol employee was not materially adverse because it merely criticized his job performance 4: holding that the decision to reprimand or transfer an employee if rescinded before the employee suffers a tangible harm is not an adverse employment action", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is not precluded if the other factors are sufficiently compelling. 8 . The girls and defendant primarily differed on whether defendant was clothed and what he was doing with his hands. See also note 13. 9 . Cf. United States v. Hall, 724 F.2d 1055, 1059 (2nd Cir.1983) (noting that \"there is force in the [trial] judge\u2019s observation that Hall knew his rights all along since he was not 'a newcomer to the law,\u2019 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); and, more important, no newcomer to the jurisprudence of Miranda \"). However, in Hall the defendant, a repeat offender, was at least read his rights and the only question was whether he understood them. See also Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 579 F.Supp 36, 42 (C.D.CaI.1984) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The State makes two additional arguments Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that although miranda warnings were not given to defendant police officers they had no cause of action under 42 usc  1983 because they were never prosecuted 2: holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible 3: holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search 4: holding that defendants prosecuted under section 922g8 may only attack the validity of the underlying protective order on the grounds that they were not provided a hearing of which they were given actual notice and an opportunity to participate", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the claim.\u201d Here the court has tacked on fees for litigating the issue of presuit noncompliance, as well as for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. Under the plain text of the statute, however, the liability is only for the narrow purpose specified and therefore the amount awarded should have been limited to those incurred \u201cduring the investigation and evaluation.\u201d See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1996) (\u201cThese provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during \u2018the investigation and evaluation of the claim\u2019 and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.\u201d); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993) (<HOLDING>). We therefore reverse the award and remand for Holdings: 0: holding that higher rate would not be awarded for supplemental fees because there was no showing that any special factor justifies an increased rate for litigating the attorney fees motion 1: holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law 2: holding that fees may be awarded for litigating amount of fees only where language of statute supports such conclusion 3: holding that such fees are discretionary but routinely awarded 4: holding that where a state statute provides for the award of attorneys fees those fees can be considered as part of the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining federal diversity jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "liable when sexual harassment discrimination occurs in the workplace, the employer knows or should know of the harassment, and the employer fails to take \u201ctimely and appropriate action.\u201d See Minn.Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 363.01, subd. 41(3) (sexual harassment occurs when the employer knows or should know of the existence of the harassment and fails to take timely and appropriate action); 363.03, subd. l(2)(c) (1996) (employer engages in unfair employment practice when it discriminates, because of sex, against person with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment). Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on a liberal, remedial interpretation of the MHRA when it first recognized other types of sexual harassment under the Act in the past. See Continental Can, 297 N.W.2d at 248-49 (<HOLDING>); see also Cummings v. Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, Holdings: 0: holding that under edenfield the act should be liberally construed 1: holding that coas should be construed liberally 2: holding coemployee sexual harassment actionable mhra should be liberally construed 3: holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed 4: holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(Ala.1991). We may not reverse the judgment, based on a jury verdict, on the ground that the evidence was insufficient unless that evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to Mokrzycki, indicates that the verdict was \u201cplainly and palpably wrong and unjust.\u201d Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350, 1354 (Ala.1992). \u201cA jury\u2019s award of punitive damages will be considered excessive, as a matter of law, only if: 1) the jury\u2019s decision-making process was tainted by bias, passion, prejudice, or other improper motive; or 2) the verdict goes beyond that necessary to accomplish society\u2019s goals of punishment and deterrence.\u201d Killough v. Jahandarfard, 578 So.2d 1041, 1046 (Ala.1991) (citation omitted). After conducting a hearing under Hammond v. City of Gadsde 436 So.2d 827, 830-31 (Ala.1983) (<HOLDING>); Hutchins v. Shepard, 370 So.2d 275, 276-77 Holdings: 0: holding that this court will not consider a theory or issue that was not pleaded or raised in the trial court 1: holding that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this court 2: holding that as a general rule this court will not consider an issue that was not raised below 3: holding that our court will not consider an issue of whether a defendant has standing to seek suppression of evidence if the issue was not raised in the lower court 4: holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Ninth Circuit held that HCFA\u2019s letter authorizes the continued application of the Boren Amendment standards, see 188 F.3d at 1095, and implicitly concluded that private parties may enforce the HCFA letter in a \u00a7 1983 action. We respectfully disagree with the latter conclusion. We have held that a formal regulation cannot by itself give rise to a federal right enforceable under \u00a7 1983. See Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.1987); see also King v. Town of Hempstead, 161 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (noting that the circuits are divided on the question of whether a regulation alone can create a federal right). A policy letter has even less legal stature than a regulation. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662-63, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, HCMF\u2019s claim is not cognizable Holdings: 0: holding regulations entitled to chevron deference 1: holding that deference  is warranted only when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority and discussing united states v mead corp 533 us 218 22627 121 sct 2164 150 led2d 292 2001 and chevron usa inc v natural res def council inc 467 us 837 84245 104 sct 2778 81 led2d 694 1984 2: holding that the slidingscale standard for granting preliminary injunctions survives winter v natural resources defense council inc 555 us 7 129 sct 365 172 led2d 249 2008 3: holding that agency opinion letters and policy statements unlike regulations are not entitled to deference under chevron usa inc v natural res def council inc 467 us 837 104 sct 2778 81 led2d 694 1984 4: holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was no longer entitled to chevron deference given that the agency had changed its position on the issue", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "dard or limitation that Esso is allegedly violating under CWA. The CWA provides that a civil action may be brought against anyone \u201calleged to be in violation of [\u00b6]... ] an effluent standard or limitation of this chapter.\u201d See 33 USC 1365(a)(1). Effluent standard or limitation is d ed in the interior of the island constitutes water in the territorial seas. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1941) (a body of water is \u201ca navigable water of the United States\u201d if (1) it presently, or (2) has been or was in the past, or (3) could be made in the future by reasonable improvements, susceptible for use in interstate or foreign commerce.), but see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.1975) (<HOLDING>); Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d at 154-55 (citing Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 1: holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters 2: holding that as used in the cwa the term waters of the united states is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability 3: holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states 4: holding that the term includes in the cwa allows for additional unstated meanings", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "fraud claim on its findings that Chandler\u2019s claim for money from the gas and oil severance tax and from the \u201cburned out school\u201d money was based on a void contract. In its order, the trial court found \u201cthat plaintiff [Chandler] would not be able to assert fraud based upon a fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract to pay a portion of revenue monies since the former has been determined to be a void contract as against public policy.\u201d In light of our holdings in parts I, II, and III, we conclude that the reasoning given by the trial court in support of the summary judgment on the fraud claim was incorrect. The question then becomes whether the summary judgment can be sustained on any other grounds. See Lowe v. East End Memorial Hosp. & Health Centers, 477 So.2d 339 (Ala.1985) (<HOLDING>). After reviewing the record and the Holdings: 0: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion 1: holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment 2: holding summary judgment must be upheld if it is proper on any grounds 3: holding that on appeal a summary judgment ruling will be upheld if it can be sustained on any grounds even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its ruling 4: holding that a trial courts ruling on a motion for new trial will be upheld if it is correct on any applicable legal theory even if the court articulated an invalid basis", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). A federal habeas court must grant relief if it is in \u201cgrave doubt\u201d as to the harmlessness of the error. O\u2019Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir.2002). \u201c \u2018[G]rave doubt\u2019 exists when, in the relevant circumstances, the question is so evenly balanced that the reviewing court finds itself in \u2018virtual equip\u00f3se\u2019 [sic] on the harmlessness issue.\u201d Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 461 (4th Cir.2008); Fullwood, 290 F.3d at 679; accord O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992. The test is whether it can be said with fair assurance that not a single juror\u2019s decision was swayed by resort to the extrinsic influence of the dictionary. See Parker, 385 U.S. at 366, 87 S.Ct. 468 (<HOLDING>); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat 1: holding right of accused to trial by impartial jury justified postverdict protection of jurors from harassment and did not violate first amendment 2: holding that defendant has constitutional right to be tried by impartial jury unprejudiced by extraneous influence 3: holding that a defendant is entitled to be tried by 12 not 9 or even 10 impartial and unprejudiced jurors 4: holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "restrictions in part of a tract of land which he is selling does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he intended thereby to have the restrictions apply to his remaining land.\u201d); cf. Varney v. Fletcher, 106 N.H. 464, 466-67 (1965) (implying an equitable servitude where 100 lots were laid out on a series of recorded plans and all but the fifteen or eighteen lots still owned by the real estate developer were conveyed with the same restrictions). Although the Pierros argue that the deeds from Frank Lord demonstrate his intent to expand his father\u2019s scheme for the benefit of the back lots, the deeds themselves contain no such language. Nor do the deeds from Frank Lord incorporate by reference his father\u2019s common scheme of development. See Regan v. Hovanian, 115 N.H. 40, 42-43 (1975) (<HOLDING>); McCleary v. Lourie, 80 N.H. 389, 392 (1922) Holdings: 0: holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement 1: holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title 2: holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone 3: holding that implied easement arose because each deed in chain of title referenced community plan 4: holding foreclosure of prior deed of trust extinguished subsequent easement", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "easily originated from a large number of sources, including the carpet, comforter, victim\u2019s nightshirt, or any of the items thought to have been emptied from her purse which were discovered under the comforter upon which her body was found. See id. Likewise, the hair could have attached on contact with the belt or clothesline rope that were also used to bind Susan. See id. Thus, the conclusory assertion that if the hair does not belong to Overton or the victims, it must belong to a person who committed or participated in the crime, is far too tenuous because there is no way to determine when, why, where, or how the hairs attached to the tape. This assertion is the type of speculation that this Court has found to be a basis for denying a rule 3.853 motion. See Lott, 931 So.2d at 821 (<HOLDING>); Hitchcock v. State, 866 So.2d 23, 26 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant whose new trial motion is based on the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel may bypass rule 33s sevenday time limit only if his claim that his counsel  was ineffective was based on information unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial 1: holding a written order is required for an appeal from a convicting courts ruling on a postconviction motion for dna testing 2: recognizing that an order for dna testing could cause irreparable harm because the test is intrusive and any error in improperly ordering genetic testing cannot be remedied on appeal after the testing is done and the results are released 3: holding that the defendant embarked on a fishing expedition for genetic material whose  potential relevance is pure conjecture and that the defendant could not obtain dna testing based on the speculative allegations in his motion 4: holding that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence the defendant must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the defendant", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "fiat.\u201d Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1078 (D.C.1984). Appellants buttress their argument for extending Williams by citing cases in several states which would allow recovery on a claim such as theirs. There are, however, a number of cases in other states in which such recovery would be denied. We are not bound, of course, by any of these decisions. None sways us from our belief in the correctness of our holding in Williams and of the cautious approach that led to that holding. Ill Alternatively, appellants argue that, even if Williams does not provide a basis for their claim, the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for the denial of their right to make a medical decision based on informed consent. See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-562 (D.C.1982) (<HOLDING>). This argument is without merit. What the law Holdings: 0: holding that a physician has a duty to make disclosure that is reasonable under the circumstances so that the patient may make an intelligent and informed choice to undergo or reject a proposed treatment 1: holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied 2: holding that the alj must make findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in order to reject the contradicted opinion of a treating physician 3: recognizing that a conflict with treatment history is a germane reason to reject a physician assistants opinion 4: holding that the alj is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Moreover, she did not have to reach the question whether the media defendants\u2019 actions were protected by a common law privilege for reporting official actions in the District. See Phillips, 424 A.2d at 88. 17 . The balance of the instruction explains what is meant by \u201cpublication of a statement\" and by a \"defamatory statement.\u201d 18 . It is important to emphasize that we are taking no position on the question whether, in this context, expert testimony would be required if a party raised the point. We note, however, that there is nothing to prevent a person who acted in or observed the transactions or occurrences at issue from testifying as an expert on the applicable standard of care. See Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 656-57 (D.C.1985) (<HOLDING>). 19 . Muse averred that it was \"customary for Holdings: 0: holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of mechanical engineer in products liability case involving automobile because expert did not have specific experience regarding subject matter of lawsuit 2: holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard 3: holding that an expert may base his or her opinions and inferences on facts andor data perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that professional whose opinions about lawsuit are acquired as an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit may provide expert testimony without certification as expert under superctcivr 26b4", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "time of the divorce had accrued while the parties were married. Further, Ginger accepted as correct Randall\u2019s valuation of the plans. Thus, we need not recalculate the value of the community extent in the plans as of the date of divorce. Further, Randall\u2019s complaint is not about the 50-50 division of the plan values through the date of divorce, but about the trial court\u2019s award of 50% of any future increases in value to Ginger. Post-divorce increases in the value of an individual\u2019s defined-benefit retirement plans that are attributable to the person\u2019s continued employment, such as raises, promotions, services rendered, and post-divorce contributions, are the individual\u2019s separate property and are not subject to division. See Grher v. Grier, 731 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex.1987) (op. on reh\u2019g) (<HOLDING>); Burchfield, 968 S.W.2d at 424 (listing types Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was wrongfully denied a promotion prior to his retirement accrued on the date that he was finally denied that promotion  the date of his retirement at the lower rank 1: holding that postdivorce increases in an individuals retirement benefits are subject to community property division if they are not attributable to postdivorce employment or contributions 2: holding that costofliving increases are not the result of any postdivorce labor but rather are a means of offsetting the otherwise declining value of retirement benefits after they become fixed 3: holding that berry prohibits nonemployee spouse from sharing in any postdivorce increases in value of employees retirement benefits 4: holding that retirement benefit increases due to postdivorce promotion were separate property", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "liable for this deprivation of Gross\u2019 constitutional rights. \u201cLiability may be imposed under \u00a7 1983 upon one who has a duty to act to prevent a deprivation of another\u2019s constitutional rights, and who fails to do so in reckless disregard of the other\u2019s constitutional rights.\u201d Hathaway v. Stone, 687 F.Supp. 708, 712 (D.Mass.1988) (citing Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1983). \u201cThus courts have held that a police officer who fails to prevent the use in his presence of excessive force by another may be held liable under \u00a7 1983.\u201d Id. at 712 (citing Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.1972); see Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422, 426 (6th Cir.1982); Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F.Supp. 1018, 1025 (D.Mass. 1985)); see also, Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 560 (1st Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs allege that the defendant Holdings: 0: recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer 1: holding that an alcoholic beverage control officer was a public officer within the meaning of the statute 2: holding officer liable for deprivation of constitutional rights despite argument that officer although present was not in control of the situation 3: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself 4: holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the application of engineering and traffic studies to the installation of traffic control devices: a) New restrictions. The establishment or revision of a traffic restriction covered in this chapter may be warranted if: (1) One or more -of the engineering and traffic study elements justifies the traffic restriction. (2) Sound engineering judgment based upon a combination of all data sources substantiates the need for the restriction. 11 . Pa. R.E. 407 provides as follows: When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove that the party who took the mea per.2000), appeal denied, 566 Pa. 666, 782 A.2d 548 (2001) (<HOLDING>). 13 .When an expert testifies about underlying Holdings: 0: holding parol evidence is admissible to show mistake 1: holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim 2: holding that evidence of subsequent measures was admissible to show the feasibility of a design change 3: holding that remedial measures evidence was not admissible to impeach testimony that at the time of the event the measure was not believed to be as practical as the one employed 4: holding that postevent disciplinary measures are not admissible to show negligence or culpability", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at 16-17.) He said that common practice in the school district would be to make a referral to MCDJFS after a child had missed a certain number of school days. Mr. Schumacher testified that he could not recall talking to MCDJFS about Timothy at all, but if he did, it would have been about attendance. {Id. at 18-20.) 25 . Mr. Koslik testified at his deposition that, in January 2008, his brother-in-law, the former Director of MCDJFS, revealed the identity of the individual who made the complaint, and it was not someone employed by, related to or involved with the School District. The Court views this information as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 56, and declines to rely on it in rendering its decision here. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Ohio Rev.Code \u00a7 5153.17. 26 . Plaintiffs also Holdings: 0: holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 1: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 2: recognizing records material to selfdefense claim outweigh victims interest in confidentiality 3: recognizing the public interest exception 4: recognizing strong public interest in maintaining confidentiality of official records concerning child abuse", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "are under the control of the parties, the Court finds neither forum to be clearly more convenient. 2. Non-Party Witnesses The Defendants note several non-party witnesses, identified from exhibits attached to CAI\u2019s amended complaint, and assert that their existence requires transfer to the Western District of Washington. When weighing the relative convenience of witnesses, courts assign greater weight to the location of non-party witnesses because securing their testimony may require use of compulsory processes and because they are more likely to be inconvenienced by having to travel. Dee Eng\u2019g, Inc., 2003 WL 1089515, at *4 (\u201clive testimony is favored over deposition testimony at trial\u201d); Kendall U.S.A., Inc. v. Cent. Printing Co., et al., 666 F.Supp. 1264, 1268 (N.D.Ind.1987) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, whenever possible, courts are Holdings: 0: holding that transfer was appropriate because the transferee district could exercise compulsory process over nonparty witnesses 1: holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court 2: holding that a state defendant has a sixth amendment right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendments due process clause to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor 3: holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration 4: holding that title vii claim was subject to compulsory arbitration", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as to whether this error resulted in egregious harm under Almanza. See Trejo, 280 S.W.Bd at 261. The author of the concurring opinion in Teal expressly distinguished the situation in the case at hand from the situation in Teal. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 183-84. Therefore, the concurring opinion in Teal does not support the State\u2019s argument that the charge error in this case did not result in egregious harm. We do not find any other information revealed by the record relevant to the egregious-harm analysis. Conclusion Having considered the factors set forth in Almanza, we hold appellant was egregiously harmed by the trial court\u2019s submission of a charge authorizing the jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense. See Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); Woodard, 300 S.W.3d at 410-12 (same as Holdings: 0: holding that error in omitting requisite mental state from application paragraph of charge did not result in egregious harm 1: holding that charge error that allowed jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense caused egregious harm 2: holding jury charge error consisting of disjunctive submission of three separate sexual assault offenses without unanimity instruction caused egregious harm to defendant 3: holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony 4: holding charge error which authorized jury to convict without finding every requisite element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt was egregious based on the entirety of the charge the contested evidence and the arguments of counsel", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one. Although a State\u2019s general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment .... In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to federal-court jurisdiction, we decline to find that [a state] has waived its constitutional immunity.\u201d); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halder-man, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (Powell, J.) (\u201c[A] State\u2019s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.\u201d) (emphasis in original); Serrano v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, 12-CV-1592 (MAD) (CFH), 2013 WL 6816787 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State Univ. of New York, No. Holdings: 0: holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts 1: holding that new mexico did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by engaging in activities and entering contracts subject to federal regulation 2: holding that the nyshrl does not waive the new yorks eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court 3: holding that state did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by removing case to federal court 4: holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "ERISA plan. Id. at 1292-93. As the Fifth Circuit later explained, Cefalu \u201crejected the contention that preemption was avoided because the former employee was not seeking recovery from the plan itself or its assets, but only from his former employer.\u201d Lee v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 894 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir.1990); see also Memorial Hosp. System v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cWe have [ ] held in this circuit that ERISA preempts state law claims, based on breach of contract, fraud, or negligent misrepresentation, that have the effect of orally modifying the express terms of an ERISA plan and increasing plan benefits for participants or beneficiaries who claim to have been misled.\u201d); Olson v. Gen. Dynamics Carp., 960 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., Holdings: 0: holding that fraudulent oral misrepresentation of the level of benefits does not provide the basis for a nonpreempted claim even though erisa may also provide no remedy 1: holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates 2: holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations 3: holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause 4: holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "cannot serve as an excuse for a violation of Fed. R. Civ. 45(b)(1). For these reasons, we find that the district court had a reasonable basis to conclude that Butler violated MRPC 8.4(g). C Allegation of Bias Butler also argues that the \u201ccourt was not even handed\u201d with him by \u201cignoring the conduct of Kansas counsel\u201d in finding him in violation of Canon 9 and MRPC 8.4(g). For the reasons detailed above, we find that there is a reasonable basis to support the district court\u2019s finding that Butler committed ethical violations. As such, we find no indication of bias by the judge in the record. IV Conclusion We find no basis for Butler\u2019s argument that the district court clearly erred in assessing the evidence, or otherwise abused its discretion. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (<HOLDING>). On the contrary, our review discloses a Holdings: 0: holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits 2: holding that a court would abuse its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence 3: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence 4: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "refusal was not triggered.\u201d Id. at 408. The same is true of the transfer of the Share from the Partnership to the LLC. There was no meaningful change in control of the property. There was no desire to sell, no bona fide offer or purchase, nor were there any terms of sale of any kind. Simply put, the transfer did not invoke the right of first refusal provision. This conclusion is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir.2005) (\u201cA right of first refusal to purchase real property is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property. Only when the conveyance is marked by arms\u2019 length dealing and a change in control of the property may that right be exercised.\u201d); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo.2000) (<HOLDING>); Wallasey Tenants Ass\u2019n v. Varner, 892 A.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing enforceability of right of first refusal when burdened property is part of integrated transaction with sale of unburdened property 1: recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step 2: holding that when determining the proper amount for a burdened property that was purchased in a package only two methods suggest themselves as arguably appropriate 1 a determination of the fair market value of the  property burdened by the right of first refusal or 2 a determination of the portion of the  purchase price which based on the percentage of the fair market value of the entire package represented by the  property burdened by the right of first refusal should be allocated to the  property burdened by the right of first refusal 3: holding that transfer of property from an individual to a corporation wholly owned by the same individual was not a sale triggering a right of first refusal 4: holding that for a transaction to constitute a sale and trigger a first right of refusal it must involve an armslength transaction resulting in an actual change in control of the burdened property rather than simply moving it from the individual owners to an entity controlled by them", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "point. Neither Dickinson nor Cooper established that a claimant may recover damages for a taking of property that occurred prior to his ownership. In fact, in Dickinson, the Supreme Court observed that if the taking began long before purchase, plaintiffs \u201cclaim would be barred because he acquired the land after that date.\u201d Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 747, 67 S.Ct. at 1384. Ownership of a property interest is an essential element in a takings claim. A property interest is grounded in a legally enforceable right, not an expectancy. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 n. 9, 66 S.Ct. 596, 600 n. 9, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (finding no property right in expectation that lease would be renewed); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 491, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1712, Holdings: 0: holding that mere speculation is insufficient to support a jury verdict 1: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault 2: holding that mere expectancy is not property 3: holding that mere ownership of property in north carolina is not sufficient to establish the necessary minimum contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "over other attorneys, settled tort cases only pursuant to directives he received from an internal management committee, and never participated in any forum wherein departmental policy was discussed and/or established. The defendants\u2019 reliance on a string of cases holding that municipal attorneys in positions similar to Selkirk\u2019s were not protected by Elrod and Branti, is irrelevant and misplaced. The very essence of the following cases required an examination of the duties of each plaintiff to ascertain whether his position entailed \u201cpolicymak-ing\u201d responsibility or required political fealty to effectively perform. The Court need not undertake such an analysis here because the Defendants have already done so and concluded to the contrary. See Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Mummau v. Ranck, 687 F.2d 9 (3rd Cir. 1982) Holdings: 0: holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under  1988 in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the states case including deciding which evidence to present 1: holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony 2: holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury 3: holding that nasd disciplinary officers are entitled to absolute immunity from further prosecution for civil liability for them actions taken within the outer scope of them official duties 4: holding in dicta that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute loyalty from his assistants and could terminate them for political reasons", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that are objectively justifiable, moreover, regardless of an officer\u2019s subjective intent. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The impoundment/inventory decision in the case at bar was objectively justifiable, and the trial court\u2019s application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was entirely proper. B. Exclusion of Expert Testimony\u2014 General vs. Specific Intent. The district court\u2019s decision not to receive the testimony of medical experts who would have suggested that the defendant lacked control over his actions stemmed in part from the court\u2019s view that the crime defined in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(a)(1) is a general intent crime as to which diminished capacity is not a defense. See United States v. Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649, 651 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Kimes contends that evidence of his Holdings: 0: holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes 1: holding that the prosecutor does not have general discovery rights because michigan law requires a defendant to disclose only a defense of insanity or diminished capacity citing mcl  76820a 2: holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes 3: holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity 4: holding that the government may not be permitted to introduce other crimes evidence in its case in chief to prove intent unless the defense disputes intent during opening statements", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on a public exchange\u201d). But not every communication from'management to corporate shareholders amounts to solicitation under \u00a7 14(a). Sargent v. Genesco, 492 F.2d 750, 767 (5th Cir.1974); see also Brown v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 328 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir.1964); see generally 4 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 1952 (3d ed. 1990) (listing examples of communications not covered by \u00a7 14(a) rules). Rather, it is only when management seeks consent or authorization for actions \u201crequiring such approval\u201d that \u00a7 14(a) steps in to ensure that approval is given with full knowledge. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 775 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145, 102 S.Ct. 1006, 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982); see also Ash v. GAF Corp., 723 F.2d 1090, 1094 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 Holdings: 0: holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights 1: holding that an infringement on the right to vote necessarily causes irreparable harm 2: holding that complainant must show that he suffered harm from the infringement of his corporate suffrage rights to state a claim under  14a 3: holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm 4: holding that for any utpcpl claim plaintiff must show that he 1 justifiably relied on a defendants wrongful conduct or representation and 2 suffered harm as a result of that reliance", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has exhibited dangerous behavior towards females, and the underlying murder involved stab wounds to the victim\u2019s nipples and right labia. See McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir.1993). 13 . Johnson applied 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255, which imposes a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their federal sentences. Like section 2244, section 2255 states that the one-year period runs from the latest of four alternative dates, the last of which is \u201cthe date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255. We see no reason to distinguish between \u201cfacts supporting the claim\u201d in section 2255 and \"factual predicate\u201d in section 2244. See Burns, 134 F.3d at 111-12 (<HOLDING>). 14 . We are surprised and disappointed that Holdings: 0: holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar 1: holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions 2: holding that limitations periods are tolled regardless of why the district court denied certification 3: holding that oneyear limitations periods under sections 2244 and 2255 are virtually identical 4: holding that oneyear limitations period set forth in  2255 is not a jurisdictional bar and is thus subject to equitable tolling", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Bonner\u2019s entry of a not guilty plea and his attack on MeDay\u2019s credibility also enhances the probity of the prior offense evidence by placing his intent and state of mind at issue. See Henthorn, 815 F.2d at 308 (finding probative value of extrinsic offense evidence outweighed possible prejudice where defendant pleaded not guilty and attacked the credibility of witnesses). Although the danger of prejudice associated with prior conviction evidence is often great, the district court in this case substantially reduced the possibility of prejudice to Bonner by carefully instructing the jury on how they could consider the evidence. See id. at 304 (finding that careful jury instructions minimized possibility of prejudice); see also United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1174 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Based upon the foregoing considerations, we Holdings: 0: holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection 1: holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard 2: recognizing that a limiting instruction has the potential to cure any prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence 3: holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction 4: holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in an increase in the sentencing range from 15-21 months to 27-33 months, did not present an \u201cexceptional circumstance[ ]\u201d as contemplated by McMillan. Watts, 519 U.S. at 156-57, 117 S.Ct. 633. Nor does the case before us today. See e.g., United States v. Fenner, 147 F.3d 360, 366 (4th Cir.1998) (rejecting argument that increases from 42 years imprisonment to 55 years imprisonment for one defendant and from 115 months imprisonment to 210 months imprisonment were \u201cso profound that it is sufficient to implicate due process concerns or to give the impression of having been tailored to permit the application of [a] cross-reference to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 425-26 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); cf. United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, Holdings: 0: holding that detention of approximately eight months violated due process 1: holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure 2: holding that a potential increase in a guideline range from 2127 months to 6378 months did not raise due process concerns 3: holding one and onehalf months establishes causation while three months is too long and does not 4: holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of violence to the person (great weight), see \u00a7 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003); (2) Reynolds committed the murder while engaged in or an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit any burglary (great weight), see \u00a7 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003); (3) Reynolds committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest (great weight), see \u00a7 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003); and (4) Reynolds committed the murder in this case in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel fashion (great weight), see \u00a7 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2003). With respect to Christina Razor\u2019s murder, the trial court also considered the additional aggravating circumstance that the victim was a person less than twelve years of age (great weight), see 921.141(5)(Z), Fla. Stat. 1) (<HOLDING>); Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 647 Holdings: 0: holding death sentence proportional in a case where the aggravators were murder committed during the course of enumerated felony prior violent felony and hac and the following nonstatutory mitigating factors were found remorse unstable childhood positive personality traits and acceptable conduct at trial 1: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense 2: holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and hac 3: holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill 4: holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where only the hac aggravator was found", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "But under either plain or clear error review, Phillips's arguments fail. 3 . Probable cause existed even without mention of computer paper because Williams and Smith observed child pornography images in the residence. Phillips argues that the statement about the images being on standard computer paper impermissibly expanded the warrant to include computer equipment. But the warrant would have included computer-related equipment for seizure because pornographic images typically are received via computers connected to the internet. See United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir.2006), reversed and remanded on other grounds by United States v. Williams, \u2014 U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008), superseded by United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir.2008) Holdings: 0: recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography 1: holding that trading of child pornography is distribution for purposes of  2g22b2 2: holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment 3: holding admission of videos containing child pornography was probative of intent to sexually assault a child 4: recognizing common use of computers and internet in child pornography offenses", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997e(a) (emphasis added). As used in the PLRA, the modifier \u201cavailable\u201d requires \u201cthe possibility of some re lief for the action complained of\u2019. Booth, 532 s grievance process, a prisoner must pursue a grievance through both steps for it to be exhausted. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 515 (citing Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir.2001)). This court has also provided that \u201c[njothing in the [PLRA] ... prescribes appropriate grievance procedures or enables judges, by creative interpretation of the exhaustion doctrine, to prescribe or oversee prison grievance systems\u201d. Wright, 260 F.3d at 358 (<HOLDING>). With these principles in mind, we turn to Holdings: 0: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 1: holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice 2: holding that the plra mandates that prisoners exhaust internal prison grievance procedures before filing suit emphasis added 3: holding that although the only remedy sought was money damages substantial compliance by filing a stepone grievance constituted failure to exhaust 4: holding that plaintiffs failure to exhaust available grievance procedures does not bar her title vii claims", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. See Fed. R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Here, the prosecutor used Lester Jones\u2019s prior conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for impeachment. Lester Jones\u2019s narcotic offense does not fall under Rule 609(a)(2)\u2019s ambit because it did not involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (\u201cA person\u2019s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....\u201d); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the prosecutor\u2019s questioning of Holdings: 0: holding prior use of one type of drug is not relevant to establish use of another type of drug on a different occasion 1: holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged  to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident 2: holding the use of a drug that carries a higher sentence rather than another drug does not amount to sentencing factor manipulation 3: holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness 4: holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "detected. We thus hold that the probation officer\u2019s decision to order Duff to undergo drug screening was not inconsistent with the trial court\u2019s failure to require such testing. We now consider Duff\u2019s claim that the drug testing was unreasonable and thus violated his fourth amendment rights. We assume but do not decide that the taking and testing of a urine sample constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182, 1185 n. 5 (7th Cir.1986); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F.Supp. 1089, 1098 (D.N.J.1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 577, 93 L.Ed.2d 580 (1986); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (<HOLDING>). Although the fourth amendment\u2019s requirement Holdings: 0: holding that blood alcohol content almost 30 over the limit together with testimony of intoxication at the time of driving was sufficient to convict contrasting a case in which the blood alcohol content was just barely over the limit which was insufficient to convict 1: holding a warrantless blood test reasonable due to bloods rapid loss of its alcohol content 2: holding that the fourth amendment is implicated by the withdrawal of blood to test its alcohol content 3: holding blood testing for alcohol content a search 4: holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Tree. 10 . Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include \u201cjob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12111(9)(B). 11 . While there appears to be some issue as to whether Susie's frequent absences prevent her from meeting the statutory requirement that she is a \"qualified individual with a disability,\" 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12111(8), the parties have failed to adequately develop this issue in the summary judgment record before the court. The court does note, however, that federal courts have frequently held that \"[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a qualified individual protected by the ADEA.\u201d Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d at 213. See also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Law v. United States Postal Serv., 852 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim 1: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact 2: holding that coming to work regularly is an essential function 3: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function 4: holding it is not reasonable to require an employer to hire a helper to do overhead work for a miner who cannot perform this essential job function alone", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to join in litigation against the shopping mall and their secret financing and control of that litigation were not \u201cmodes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . .,\u201d Button, supra, 371 U.S. at 428-29, 83 S.Ct. at 335, for two reasons. First, Primus and Button are concerned only with the solicitation and financing of good faith claims. Here, the Plaza defendants are alleged to have solicited numerous baseless suits by the landowners. Second, the First Amendment does not shield such improper practices in the solicitation and representation of clients as occurred here. See Primus, supra, 436 U.S. at 426 and 439, 98 S.Ct. at 1901 and 1908; cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 449, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1915, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978) (<HOLDING>). In this regard, we note that it is relevant Holdings: 0: holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor 1: holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property 2: holding a state constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person    under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the state has a right to prevent 3: holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment 4: holding that the state police is a state agency", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "granted. See RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384-385, 650 A.2d 153, 155 (1994) (\u201cIf a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant.\u201d). B. Count Thirteen: Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) Clear Channel and Koplik move for summary judgment on the plaintiffs CUTPA claim on the ground that Goldsich does not fall within the class of persons that CUTPA is intended to protect. In order to prevail on a CUTPA claim, the plaintiff must establish that the conduct of the defendants resulted in a substantial injury to consumers, competitors, or other business persons. See Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 496, 656 A.2d 100 7, at *5 (D.Conn.1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the motion for summary judgment on the Holdings: 0: holding a limitation on damages arising out of bodily injury to one person involved in an accident applies to all claims arising from the death of that person 1: holding that a person involved in a motor vehicle accident with a customer of enterprise was not a consumer or competitor of enterprise or other business person affected by enterprises conduct 2: holding that the person charged with violating  1962c must be distinct from the rico enterprise 3: holding that predicate acts need not be in furtherance of the enterprise 4: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle ", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "be an incorrect or negligent medical judgment, but that alone does not give rise to deliberate indifference. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-09 (\u201cMere medical malpractice cannot give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.\u201d); Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (\u201cIt is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference.\u201d). Nurse DeLorenzo did not refuse to provide required medical treatment without reason or prevent Mr. Thomas from receiving recommended medical treatment; instead she concluded \u2014 consistent with Prison medical policy \u2014 that no medical treatment was necessary or even available. This is not deliberate indifference. See Goodrich v. Clinton Cty. Prison, 214 Fed.Appx. 105, 112 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Chimenti v. Kimber, 133 Fed.Appx. 833, 836 Holdings: 0: holding that a difference of medical opinion was insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference 1: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment 2: holding that a medical professional clearly indicated an exercise of medical judgment rather than deliberate indifference where the medical professional engaged in a goodfaith clinical assessment of plaintiffs symptoms concluding on several visits that his condition did not warrant medication 3: holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs 4: holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is that any person \u2014 may it be a parent, school system employee, or concerned citizen while on school premises or a school bus \u2014 who dares to speak critically to school officials at any time in the presence of minors must leave the premises when so ordered by a school official or face arrest and prosecution for a misdemeanor. Though the statute ostensibly only criminalizes the speech after the speaker refuses to leave school premises, the result is the same: the speaker is silenced, either through his or her absence on the school premises or school bus or through subsequent prosecution, based on the content of his or her speech, be it at a high school football game or a parent-teacher conference. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (109 SCt 2746, 105 LE2d 661) (1989) (<HOLDING>). Decided October 31, 2016. Jason R. Clark; Holdings: 0: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information 1: recognizing that time place and manner restrictions must be content neutral 2: holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition 3: holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication 4: recognizing prudential concerns underlying antitrust standing restrictions", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "right to private communication, i. e., communication free from telephone taps or interceptions. But the subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841-842 (CD Cal. 1998) (broadcast of videotape recording of sexual relations between famous actress and rock star not a matter of legitimate public concern); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts \u00a7117, p. 857 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that there is little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person\u2019s life, but that \u2018\u2018portrayal of... intimate private characteristics or conduct\u201d is \"quite a different matter\u201d); Warren & Brand\u00e9is 214 (<HOLDING>). Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 448, Holdings: 0: recognizing that in certain matters the community has no legitimate concern 1: recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions 2: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern 3: holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern 4: holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that would arise if we were to affirm a removal order on a ground introduced only on appeal and not raised or litigated below, see Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir.2003), the government\u2019s argument fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our review. Whatever the grounds on which Al Mutarreb might have been found removable, only one was charged. We have no power to affirm the BIA on a ground never charged by the Service or found by the IJ. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (noting that a \u201ccourt is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate and proper basis\u201d not relied on by the agency); see also Cardoso-Tlaseca v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Nor do we accept the government\u2019s contention Holdings: 0: holding that when an ij issues a decision granting an aliens application for withholding of removal without a grant of asylum the decision must include an explicit order of removal designating a country of removal 1: holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft 2: holding that term order of removal does not include aliens ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning attorneys actions taken after order of removal becomes final 3: holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of  4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute 4: holding that an aliens prior possession conviction cannot sustain the removal order because it was not alleged in the nta", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the \u201cuse\u201d of any trademark belonging to plaintiffs, as that term is used in the Lanham Act, because WhenU does not use any of the plaintiffs\u2019 trademarks to indicate anything about the source of the products and services it advertises. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877-78 (6th Cir.2002) (when a domain name is used to indicate an address on the Internet, and not to identify the source of goods and services, it is not functioning as a trademark); U-Haul, 279 F.Supp.2d at 727-28. The cases cited by plaintiffs (Plaintiffs\u2019 Reply Mem. pp. 1-2) do not support their argument that the inclusion of URLs in the WhenU directory constitutes the use of a trademark under the Lanham Act. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir.200 2 F.Supp.2d 1029 (N.D.Ill.2001)(<HOLDING>); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F.Supp.2d 309, 322-23 Holdings: 0: holding that use of plaintiffs trade name as metatag in defendants website was a permissible fair use as metatag simply described defendants and the content of their website 1: holding that there is nothing improper about the use of a trademark to communicate that goods bearing that mark were actually sold on defendants website 2: holding that use of metatags constitutes use in commerce but finding no trademark violation because defendants only used mark in metatag to fairly identify the content of his websites and did so in good faith that is without the intention of capitalizing on the plaintiffs reputation and goodwill 3: holding that an unspecified number of complaints posted on the defendants website was insufficient to show that the defendant had knowledge of an alleged defect 4: holding that there is nothing improper with defendants purchase of sponsored links when defendants actually sell plaintiffs products  on their website", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "privilege must be applied cautiously because it could become the exception that swallows up the rule favoring governmental openness and accountability. If governmental employees at any level could claim the privilege, Tennessee\u2019s public records statutes and open meetings law would become little more than empty shells. Whether the \u201cdeliberative process privilege\u201d may be invoked depends on the governmental official or officials involved. We have no doubt, for example, that the Governor may properly invoke this privilege, should he or she care to, in meetings with staff or cabinet members. We have also held that the Constitution of Tennessee embodies a version of the privilege for the General Assembly when it decides to invoke it. Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 772 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). However, we decline to hold that the Holdings: 0: recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings 1: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy 2: holding that the public does not have a right of access to all legislative meetings because of tenn const art ii  21 and 22 3: holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts 4: recognizing that intent of public records act is to provide all citizens with access to the records of all public governmental bodies", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the California judgment was void because its court had no jurisdiction and that the Superior Court of New Jersey \u201chas sole jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by modification\u201d of the previous decree. The New Jersey court, after hearing argument on the return day, entered a final judgment for the plaintiff. It found the Superior Court of California had properly assumed jurisdiction to make a child custody determination and that the Superior Court of New Jersey did not have jurisdiction. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division. Finding that the California court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Division reversed. 187 N.J.Super. 133 (1982). We granted plaintiff\u2019s petition for certification. 93 N.J. 15 (1982). The L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (<HOLDING>); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, Holdings: 0: holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree 1: holding that plaintiffs who had been served and received responses to interrogatories on personal jurisdiction had had such a fair opportunity 2: recognizing that the ohio longarm statute does not extend to the limits of due process and focusing the inquiry on whether defendant established sufficient business contacts with ohio 3: holding that a maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over an ohio lawyer when a maryland client initiated five of seven contacts with the lawyer the parties created the attorneyclient relationship in ohio and the attorneyclient relationship involved only events in and the law of ohio 4: holding ohio need not give full faith and credit to wisconsin custody judgment because wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in ohio with children at time process was served wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 44-45; see also Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d at 856. We recognize that, when appropriate, litigation costs must be apportioned between business and personal claims, and that business litigation costs are nondeductible to the extent that they constitute capital expenditures. See, e.g., Kurkjian v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 862 (1976) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney\u2019s fees attributable to personal matters); Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 646-647 (1975) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney\u2019s fees attributable to acquisition of intangible assets); Merians v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 187 (1973) (deduction disallowed for portion of attorney\u2019s fees attributable to personal matters); see also Boagni v. Commissioner, supra (<HOLDING>). This principle of allocation is inapposite to Holdings: 0: recognizing the not insignificant costs involved in both establishing and operating as an llc 1: holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees 2: holding defense applicable to both types of claims 3: holding that an ex post facto claim can only be successful if the law can be characterized as punishment in the constitutional sense 4: recognizing that litigation costs can be characterized as both deductible and nondeductible when the litigation is rooted in situations giving rise to both types of expenditures", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "suffered from past persecution nor had a well-founded fear of future persecution because of his Indian ethnicity. Substantial evidence supports the Board\u2019s and Immigration Judge\u2019s findings of fact that Petitioner was not credible and that he failed to show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and uphold the Board\u2019s decision. A. Adverse Credibility Determination The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner refugee status primarily because she found that he was not credible. After reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial evidence supports this adverse credibility determination. An adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of an applicant\u2019s claim. Yu, 364 F.3d at 703 (<HOLDING>). Such a finding \u201ccannot be based on an Holdings: 0: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility 1: holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum 2: holding that where asylum officer testifies regarding accuracy of interviewing procedures inconsistencies between petitioners asylum interview testimony and merits hearing testimony form sufficient basis to uphold adverse credibility determination 3: holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination 4: holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "California state prisoner Thomas Hen-nagan, Jr. appeals pro se the magistrate judge\u2019s order denying his motion for appointment of counsel in his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the challenged order is not immediately appealable. See Serine v. Peterson, 989 F.2d 371, 372-73 (9th Cir.1993) (order) (concluding magistrate judge\u2019s order was not appealable because the order could not form the basis of a final judgment without subsequent intervention by the district court); Kuster v. Block, 773 F.2d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). All pending motions are denied as moot. Holdings: 0: holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order 1: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 2: holding that denial of counsel in section 1983 action is not immediately appealable 3: holding that the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case is not appealable 4: holding if immunity is raised as a basis in the motion for summary adjudication a substantial right is affected and the denial is immediately appealable", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is successive. First, in ise F88-39846B, Petitioner filed several otions trying to vacate his plea based on Peart argument. See Peart v. State, 756 }.2d 42 (Fla.2000). His motions were mied and Petitioner filed a Writ of Habe- > Corpus on June 27, 2002. In this Writ, etitioner made some of the same argu-ents he is now bringing under this cur-snt Petition, inter alia, that he was denied fective assistance of counsel in the man-ir in which his plea was conveyed. The ourt denied Petitioner\u2019s Habeas on July ., 2002. Therefore, Petitioner\u2019s claim of effective assistance of counsel in the anner in which the plea was conveyed ould be successive. Second, in case F91-.41, Petitioner appealed the denial of his 850 motion to the Third District Court of ppeal on So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). But see Dickey v. State, Holdings: 0: holding that expressions of belief or opinion regarding the future of plaintiffs and defendants respective businesses and promissory statements of future intent do not violate the udtpa 1: holding that the alleged inconsistency between the awarding of future medical expenses and the failure to award damages for future pain and suffering could be readily resolved and did not require a new trial 2: holding that failure to predict future law or to anticipate arguments that blossomed after trial is not a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 3: holding that defendants failure to anticipate future events did not constitute securities fraud 4: holding that even assuming that the defendants attorney had misadviced the client that his previous convictions could not be used to enhance future sentences njeither the court nor counsel is required to anticipate a defendants future recidivism ", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "process to convict a defendant when he is legally incompetent. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir.1995). \u201cCongress has safeguarded this [due process] right by providing that trial courts conduct competency hearings\u201d under specified circumstances. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a)). Of relevance here, when neither party to a criminal trial moves for a competency hearing, the district court shall order such a hearing on its own motion[ ] if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. \u00a7 4241(a); see also Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289 (<HOLDING>). Whether such reasonable cause exists, Holdings: 0: holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question 1: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: recognizing that the existence of reasonable cause requires the sua sponte ordering of a competency hearing 4: recognizing cause of action", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "would \u201ccompl[y] with all required regulations and standards;\u201d (3) that the development, unless deemed a public necessity, would \u201cmaintain or enhance the value of contiguous property;\u201d and (4) that the development \u201cconform[ed] with the general plans\u201d for Town development. Piney Mountain, 63 N.C. App. at 248, 304 S.E.2d at 254. Likewise, ordinances at issue in Rauseo v. New Hanover County, 118 N.C. App. 286, 290, 454 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1995), Vulcan Materials Co. v. Guilford County Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 115 N.C. App. 319, 323, 444 S.E.2d 639, 642, disc. review denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 758 (1994), and Petersilie v. Town of Boone Bd. of Adjustment, 94 N requirements under Asheville\u2019s City Code. Cf. Three Guys Real Estate v. Harnett County, 345 N.C. 468, 473, 480 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The City \u201cmay not create new requirements not Holdings: 0: holding plain language compelled that reading 1: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning 2: holding that the plain language of the regulations requires a claimant to have an intent to file a claim for va benefits 3: holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute 4: holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that Gorman was not a credible witness or that the Commission erred by considering Gorman\u2019s testimony, that argument fails because this court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Darkenwald v. Emp\u2019t Sec. Dep\u2019t, 182 Wn. App. 157, 172, 328 P.3d 977 (2014), aff\u2019d, 183 Wn.2d 237, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). 32 It is reasonable that, because the various parties disagreed about the best approach, the parties would submit competing evidence and proposals. And because competing evidence was presented, the Commission would have used its discretion to make complex factual determinations and select a proposal. It is precisely in this sort of circumstance that we defer to the Commission\u2019s discretion and authority. See US W. Commc\u2019ns I, 134 Wn.2d at 56 (quoting Cole, 79 Wn.2d at 309 (<HOLDING>)); see also RCW 80.04.430 (providing the Holdings: 0: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 1: holding that the commission exercises substantial discretion in selecting the appropriate ratemaking methodology and this is especially true where as here the issues involve complex factual determinations peculiarly within the expertise of the commission 2: holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission 3: holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity 4: holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may assess the tax only on assets that a donee actually receives through the bequest. The Constitution provides that \u201c[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.\u201d U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 9. This provision bars Congress from imposing a \u201cdirect\u201d tax without apportioning it to the population. Congress need not, however, apportion \u201can excise upon ... the shifting from one to another of any power or privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of property.\u201d Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352, 66 S.Ct. 178, 90 L.Ed. 116 (1945) The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attempts to portray the estate tax as an unconstitutional direct tax. Fernandez, 326 U.S. at 352-58, 66 S.Ct. 178 (<HOLDING>); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502-04, Holdings: 0: holding that the tax was not direct even though the government imposed it on the estate rather than the recipient 1: holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property 2: holding that the tax was not direct even though it encompassed a spouses joint interest in the decedents property 3: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate 4: holding that the irs may reach half of a nonliable spouses sole management community property to satisfy a liable spouses tax debt", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1999) (quoting Chitwood, 443 S.W.2d at 830-31) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court entered separate orders of dismissal for the chancery court and circuit court cases. Only one order was appealed. Because consolidated lawsuits remain separate actions, \u201cit logically fol lows that consolidation cannot cure defects in either lawsuit.\u201d Givens v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2011-00186-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 5145741, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Oct. 28, 2011) (citing McMillin, 2009 WL 749214, at *3). The developers\u2019 appeal of the order of dismissal in the circuit court case does not constitute an appeal of the chancery court case. Without an appeal, the chancery court order became a final judgment thirty days after it was entered. Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377 (Tenn. 2009) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThe thirty-day time limit for filing a Holdings: 0: holding attorney may not wait more than thirty days from the entry of final judgment give notice of nonrepresentation and then seek to enforce a hen not noticed before the entry of the final judgment 1: holding that the requirement to serve a motion for attorney fees or costs within thirty days after filing of judgment applies even where the final judgment reserves jurisdiction to award same 2: holding that california supreme courts denial of habeas petition becomes final thirty days after filing 3: holding in part as a general rule a trial courts judgment becomes final thirty days after its entry unless a party files a timely notice of appeal or specified posttrial motion 4: holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "2002) (\"Because it is summary in nature, a Section 225 proceeding is limited to those issues that must necessarily be considered in order to resolve a disputed corporate election process.\u201d); Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 1997 WL 589030, at *3 (Del.Ch. Sept. 17, 1997) (explaining that a Section 225 proceeding has the limited scope of determining \"the validity of a corporate election or to determine the right of a person to hold a corporate office in the event that such office is claimed by more than one person.\u201d (citation omitted)). 82 . Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *17 (Del.Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (internal citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 737 A.2d 530 (Table), 1999 WL 636634 (Del.1999). 83 . Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Box, 697 A.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>). 84 . Arbitrium, 1997 WL 589030, at *4. 85 . Holdings: 0: holding that section 105 does not afford a private cause of action for  506bbased issues 1: holding that in a subsequent criminal action for driving under the influence collateral estoppel did not apply to issues decided at a prior administrative hearing held pursuant to implied consent statute 2: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings not on direct appeal 3: holding that declaratory judgments should not be used as a restraint against criminal action 4: holding that a section 225 action should not be used for trying purely collateral issues", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Ability to Perform, Job With or Without Accommodation Gil claims that in spite of his impaired vision, \u201che was at all times during his employment with Vortex, able to perform the essential functions of his job.\u201d Compl. \u00b6 46. Vortex does not dispute this assertion, but argues that Gil\u2019s discrimination claims must fail because he never requested an accommodation for his impairment. See Culhane v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 69 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 2007 WL 1630093, at *7 (Mass.App.Ct. June 6, 2007) (affirming dismissal of a claim at the summary judgment stage where \u201c[t]he accommodations the plaintiff asserts should have been provided were ... never requested or even suggested by the plaintiff\u2019). See also Otolo v. Middlesex Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 4248122, at *4 (Mass.Super. Nov. 14, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Gil responds \u201cthat there is no need for [him] Holdings: 0: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 1: holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation 2: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation 3: holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months 4: holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "instead, the dispute is whether the consent was voluntary. ANALYSIS The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that it is \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in then-persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment shall not be admissible at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (\u201c[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... \u201d); Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla.1962) (\u201cThis lid and involuntary where the police falsely assert that they have a valid search warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-50, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (<HOLDING>). In Royer, a case originating in Florida, the Holdings: 0: holding that consent was coerced when officers told defendants wife they came to search the premises and she allowed them to enter 1: holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant 2: holding consent invalid when given under coercive circumstances in which police misrepresented that they had a warrant to search the home 3: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 4: holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "did not challenge the adequacy of [the] defendants' search for records in response to his FOIA requests in Counts II and III\u201d). 6 . The plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to provide to him his 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice. However, the plaintiff only requested the 2014 Within Grade Increase Notice in his FOIA request. See Def.\u2019s Mot., Def.\u2019s Facts 1. Furthermore, the Court is baffled by the plaintiff\u2019s assertion, given that he provided the Court with the requested 2013 Fiscal Year Acceptable Level of Competence Form, See Pl.\u2019s Compel Mot, I at 23. Accordingly, because the production of any 2013 Within Grade Increase Notice falls outside of the scope of the defendant\u2019s obligations under the FOIA, see Larson v. Dep\u2019t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Truitt v. Dep\u2019t of State, 897 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable 1: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint 2: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 3: holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist 4: holding that a foia request should be read to seek all documents covered by a catchall", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u2018imprisonment,\u2019 and a community confinement facility is a \u2018penal or correction facility.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 1025. In fact, it is \u00a7 3621(a) that arguably provides the closest thing to a definition of \u201cimprisonment\u201d as one can find in the United States Code: A person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment ... shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of the term imposed, or until earlier released for satisfactory behavior pursuant to the provisions of section 3624. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3621(a) (emphasis added). The statute makes clear that it is not place, but custody, that defines imprisonment \u2014 a conceptual distinction that is consistent with long-accepted views on this subject. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 63-65, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). The district court in Holdings: 0: recognizing that time spent in community confinement subject to bop custody entitles a prisoner to sentencing credit while community confinement on pretrial release does not because ujnlike defendants released on bail defendants who are detained or sentenced always remain subject to the control of the bureau  1: holding that due process clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked 2: holding that credit cannot be awarded for time served on community control 3: holding that the purpose of the credit statute is to provide credit for confinement    where 1 bail has been set for the defendant and 2 the defendant was financially unable to post the bail 4: holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "reasons, the Court has held that presumptively involuntary statements taken in violation of Miranda may be used by the prosecution for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). These holdings do not extend to cases of actually coerced confessions. Before Fulminante, the distinction between actually and presumptively coerced confessions was relevant with regard to harmless error as well. In deciding, as the Su preme Court did in Fulminante, that the improper introduction at trial of an actually coerced confession is subject to harmless error analysis, the Court overturned a well established line of precedent which held to the contrary. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding introduction of actually coerced confession constitutes reversible error even where confession was cumulative in nature 1: holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that states procedure providing for jury evaluation of voluntariness of a defendants confession violates fourteenth amendment due process 3: holding that introduction of an actually coerced confession deprives the defendant of his fourteenth amendment rights to due process even if ample evidence existed to otherwise support the conviction 4: holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "any manner or that Banco Popular bears any responsibility for the lengthy delay. Indeed, the \u201cexplanatory statement\u201d prefacing the new Property Registry Facilitation Act indicates that registrar delay has been widespread in Puerto Rico for quite some time without the fault of applicants. See 2010 P.R. Laws No. 216. Moreover, the local statutes give no indication that mere passage of time caused by registrar delay somehow nullifies or expires the filing entry or its priority rank. Cf. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 30, \u00a7 2255 (entry of presentation expires where notified defect is not seasonably corrected). Like the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as the creditor in 229 Main Street, Banco Popular obtained a concrete, pre-petition debt owed to it by the property owner. See 229 Main St., 262 F.3d at 7 (<HOLDING>). Even more than Massachusetts, though, Banco Holdings: 0: holding that no distinction exists between investigatory costs and onsite cleanup costs for purposes of recovery 1: holding that the state was not liable as an operator for responding to a site to conduct cleanup activities 2: holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution 3: holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs 4: holding that the department of transportation was liable under the mtca but that it was not responsible for any of the cleanup costs", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(7)(f) or other discovery under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16, but the defendant is not under obligation to do so. The statute places the affirmative burden on the State to allege the prior offense upon which it relies for the imposition of the mandatory sentence. The State does not meet that burden by the penalty format it uses here. [\u00b6 13] In State v. Gielen, 54 N.D. 768, 210 N.W. 971, 975 (1926), the Court stated: It may be said that while the information in this case, under the circumstances presented by the ons which have reached what appears to be the opposite conclusion. But, we have not adopted a strict compliance standard. Rather, we have interpreted the statute as a notice requirement to which the harmless error analysis applies. Cf. State v. Anderson, 303 N.W.2d 98 (N.D.1981) (<HOLDING>). The analysis in the Federal decisions appears Holdings: 0: holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice 1: holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law 2: holding that due process does not require defendant to receive verbal notice of standard probation conditions because all persons have constructive notice of states criminal statutes 3: holding probationer who did not receive notice of specific offenses she was believed to have committed but had notice of probation terms states attorney believed were violated and of the facts constituting violation was not harmed 4: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "subject to the exclusions in the policy\u201d). Accordingly, an additional insured not only reaps the benefits of the insured\u2019s policy, but it also bears the burden of the exclusions. It is further our view that, if the insurer intended to exclude indemnification agreements within insured contracts from the substantial restriction on coverage that the On-Premises Endorsement constitutes, the policy would have expressly so stated. See Maroney v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 5 N.Y.3d 467, 805 N.Y.S.2d 533, 839 N.E.2d 886, 889 (2005) (stating that \u201c[i]f the insurer intended to limit [an] exclusion * * * it could have done so explicitly, as it does in the very same policy\u2019s * * * provisions\u201d); see also Chimbay v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., 742 F.Supp.2d 265, 283 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>). The policy at issue in the instant case does Holdings: 0: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 1: holding that if an insurer intended to exclude insured contracts from the provision denying coverage for injuries to employees it could have expressly stated as such 2: holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage 3: holding that insured cannot demand reimbursement for defense insurer had no opportunity to control if insured does not promptly notify insurer of facts triggering coverage 4: recognizing that a conflict of interest may provide the source of prejudice upon which an insured may rely to estop an insurer from denying coverage", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "clear error in this factual finding. The district court accordingly determined that Agent Woodruffs additional questioning of Chacon and Carrillo was not objectively reasonable because it did not conform to the justifying purpose of the stop\u2014determining the citizenship status of persons traveling through the Sierra Blanca checkpoint. Id. at *5-*7. The district court applied this court\u2019s decision in Portillo-Aguirre, a case involving the same checkpoint, the same Border Patrol agent and a similar factual scenario. In Portillo-Aguirre, this court held that where a border patrol agent has completed the immigration purpose of a stop, questioning that unduly prolongs the duration of the stop may be improper under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d at 657 (<HOLDING>). The district court\u2019s legal determination, Holdings: 0: holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law 1: recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 2: holding that if an agent does not develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before the justifying purpose of a checkpoint stop has been accomplished he may not prolong the stop 3: holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished 4: holding that an officer can stop an individual if the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underfoot", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "circumstances, the Court concludes that [defendant] was not \u201cin custody\u201d ... and that [the agents] were not required to Mirandize him. Id. at *27-28 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). One additional factor that arose in Kofsky was that during the search, the agents continued to question the defendant after he had asked to speak to counsel. Regarding this issue, Judge DuBois held that \u201c[u]nder the circumstances, the Court concludes that [the defendant] was not \u2018in custody\u2019 ... and that [the agents] were not required to Mirandize him. Accordingly, the Court also rejects defendant\u2019s argument that the agents [were required] to stop questioning him after he requested counsel. \u201d Id. at *28 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. McNaughton, 848 F.Supp. 1195, 1200 (E.D.Pa.1994) (<HOLDING>)). In the present case, as in Kofsky, the Court Holdings: 0: holding that where defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation agent did not violate the fifth amendment by contacting defendant for questioning after defendant refused to answer questions without a lawyer present 1: holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer 2: holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel 3: holding fifth amendment prohibits comment on accuseds silence during police custodial interrogation 4: holding that miranda does not apply to statements of the defendant which are voluntary and unsolicited and not the product of custodial interrogation", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Yeota Christie contends that she received demands for mortgage payments from several entities that did not have the authority to make such demands: The Bank of New York Mellon, N.A, as Trustee for the CWALT Pass-Through Certificates CWALT Series 2007-OA3 (the \u201cCWALT Trust\u201d); Bank of America, N.A.; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP; and Re-conTrust Company, N.A. (collectively, \u201cAp-pellees\u201d). Christie alleges that unauthorized and inauthentic assignments of her loan have rendered her Note (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Christie\u2019s reliance on the California Holdings: 0: holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts 1: holding federal courts are bound to follow intermediate state appellate court decisions unless there is persuasive evidence that the states highest court would rule otherwise 2: holding that federal courts must accept the decision of the states highest court even if it is an erroneous one 3: holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state 4: holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Life Partners Inc., 650 F.3d at 1029; Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). 5 . Id. (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). 6 . Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir.2006). 7 . New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Worker\u2019s Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir.2013) (en banc) (citing Lampton v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 223, 227 n. 14 (5th Cir. 2011)). 8 . Lampton, 639 F.3d at 227 n. 14 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 . 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794; see Dark v. Potter, 293 Fed.Appx. 254, 258 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (explaining that the Rehabilitation Act \u201cconstitutes the exclusive remedy for a federal employee alleging disability-based discrimination\u201d); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 1: recognizing that the rehabilitation act as amended in 1978 provides individuals a private cause of action to obtain relief for handicap discrimination on the part of the federal government and its agencies 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of transportation where the apa provides an adequate remedy 4: holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "request for an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys\u2019 fees. This case is hereby REMANDED to the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas. SO ORDERED. 1 . 12 U.S.C. \u00a7 1819 was amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (\"FIRREA\u201d), with the effective date of amendment August 9, 1989. FIRREA's removal provisions became effective as of that date. Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Svc. Corp., 884 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir.1989). 2 . The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it need not decide whether the FDIC must remove a case within thirty days of its appointment as receiver for a failed thrift where the thrift is already a party to litigation. See, e.g., FDIC v. Brooks, 652 F.Supp. 744, 745 (N.D.Tex.1985) (\"Brooks I\") (Woodward, J.) (<HOLDING>); compare Sunbelt Sav. Ass'n v. Browning, No. Holdings: 0: holding that the absence in the notice of removal of copies of the summonses served on the defendants uncorrected until after the thirty 30 day removal period had expired violates 28 usc  1446a and bars removal 1: holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer 2: holding that the thirty day removal period runs from the date of fdics plea in intervention and notice of substitution 3: recognizing that while defendants may freely amend their notice of removal within thirty days of service they may not add new grounds for removal after the thirty day period has expired 4: holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "stated in language from an earlier century. As we have stressed in its application, Article 4 is about access to the judicial branch to enforce the law. See Holton v. Dep\u2019t of Emp\u2019t & Training, 2005 VT 42, \u00b6 27, 178 Vt. 147, 878 A.2d 1051. We cannot believe that the drafters of Article 4 intended that judicial access be denied by legislative inaction in creating an enforcement mechanism. Indeed, denial of access to the courts is a violation of the substantive requirements of the Article. \u00b6 51. The principles of due process have been developed and applied in thousands of decis (stating that \u201cprohibitive clauses of the constitution such as the due process clause are self-executing and require no legislation for their enforcement\u201d); Dorwart v. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, \u00b620, 58 P.3d 128 (<HOLDING>). For example, in Spackman v. Board of Holdings: 0: holding that pretrial detainees can bring substantive due process claim 1: recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution 2: holding that a conflict of interest on the part of the prosecution violates the due process clause of the virginia constitution 3: recognizing exception under state constitution 4: recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in September 2009. 29 . The court measures this amount by considering the joint life expectancy of the child and the deceased parent. See BellSouth Tele., 863 So.2d at 292. 30 . While there is no disagreement between the parties on this point, the court notes that the proposition is well supported by case law. The Eleventh Circuit has plainly stated that the FTCA\u2019s express provision that the government is liable to the same extent as a private party \"applies to any limitation on damages.\u201d Scheib v. Fla. Sanitarium & Benev. Ass\u2019n, 759 F.2d 859, 864 (11th Cir.1985). See also Richards, 369 U.S. at 11-16, 82 S.Ct. 585 (in- cheating that the state\u2019s whole law applies, including its choice of law rules and statutory damages caps); Cibula v. United States, 551 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Carter v. United States, 333 F.3d 791, 794 Holdings: 0: holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor 1: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred 2: holding that a state statute that affects the governments ultimate liability is to be applied as substantive state law under the ftca 3: holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law 4: holding that the state police is a state agency", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "see EEOC v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 1994 WL 68420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1994) (EEOC conciliation efforts toll limitations period), Plaintiffs\u2019 one-year period within which to apply for leave to file late notice of claim under \u00a7 3813 has nevertheless expired. Discussion, supra, at 573-74. If the one-year statute of limitations was first tolled, as Plaintiffs contend, on June 21, 2004 the date which Plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC, through January 14, 2007, the date Plaintiffs are presumed to have received their Right to Sue Letters from the EEOC, Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201cA presumption exists that an EEOC notice is received three days after its mailing.\u201d); Allen v. Darbey, 2006 WL 2504446, at * 5 (W-D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Slootskin v. John Brown Eng\u2019g and Constr. Holdings: 0: recognizing added presumption 1: recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation 2: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 3: recognizing presumption 4: recognizing a presumption of reasonableness", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the trial court is properly presented to this Court. Because we find the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction with respect to the permanent injunction and the order was interlocutory with respect to the preliminary injunction, we vacate in part and remand in part for further proceedings. I. Permanent Injunction \u201cA permanent injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy and may only properly issue after a full consideration of the merits of a case.\u201d Shishko v. Whitley, 64 N.C. App. 668, 671, 308 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1983). \u201cA judge conducting a hearing to determine whether a temporary restraining order should be continued as a preliminary injunction . . . has no jurisdiction to determine a controversy on its merits.\u201d Everette v. Taylor, 77 N.C. App. 442, 444, 335 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1985) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[Where] the judgment entered [is] beyond the Holdings: 0: holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction 1: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction 2: holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success 3: holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction 4: holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "records were lost or destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, supra at 131 (internal citations omitted). \u201cIn the absence of prejudice to the one asserting laches, the doctrine will not be applied.\u201d Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 394, 172 A.2d 152, 154 (1961). In other words, \u201cprejudice to the defendant must be shown as a prerequisite to the application of laches.\u201d Miller v. Hawkins, 416 Pa. 180, 190, 205 A.2d 429, 434 (1964) (citing id.). Importantly, a single co-executor or co-administrator generally has authority to act unilaterally on behalf of an estate only if the act falls within the ordinary course of administering the estate. See Fesmyer v. Shannon, 143 Pa. 201, 208, 22 A. 898, 899 (1891) (<HOLDING>); Holmes v. Lankenau Hosp., 426 Pa.Super. 452, Holdings: 0: holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan 1: holding single coexecutors release of mortgage debt paid to estate was valid and binding on estate because acts of any coexecutor in respect to the administration of the effects of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all as where one releases a debt or settles an account of a person with the deceased or surrenders a term or sells the goods and chattels of the estate his act binds the others characterizing conversion of decedents personal property into cash as act in due course of administration of estate 2: holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate 3: holding that for estate tax purposes property is to be valued as it exists in the hands of the estate 4: holding estate was not bound by single coexecutors confession of judgment for claims regarding decedent debts even though acts done by one coexecutor which relate to the testators goods such as sale delivery possession  are considered as equivalent to the acts of all as they possess a joint authority", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The downzoning was the subject of the other case consolidated on appeal. The Court of Appeals initially opined: We think it plain ... that the WSSC was subject to valid criticism ... from the Council and the Planning Commission, each of whom had legitimate reason to be concerned .... That they voiced their concern ... and urged the WSSC to deny the permit ... is not the equivalent of wrongful governmental pressure brought to bear upon a sister agency. ... Nor does the mere fact that the future commercial development ... was under study ... justify an inf , 428, 571 A.2d 1270 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 323 Md. 504, 594 A.2d 95 (1991) (stating that application for permit does not create vested right); Miller v. Forty West Builders, Inc., 62 Md.App. 320, 330, 489 A.2d 76 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Prince George\u2019s County v. Equitable Trust Holdings: 0: holding that vested rights were not acquired by obtaining approval of the subdivision plan 1: holding that a plan sponsor was an erisa fiduciary to the extent that it was vested with and exercised discretionary control 2: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 3: holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary 4: holding that the right of approval is subject to standards of reasonableness implied by law", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.2006), to challenge the BIA\u2019s consideration of the underlying adverse credibility determination is misplaced. In Paul, we held that the BIA abused its discretion by denying a motion to reopen based on changed country circumstances, where, despite an adverse credibility finding, the IJ had explicitly credited the movant\u2019s assertion regarding his religious affiliation that would likely result in persecution. Id. at 152-55. Here, unlike in Paul, the IJ did not find any aspect of petitioner\u2019s testimony credible, and the BIA reasonably relied on this general adverse credibility finding (along with other evidence) to find that petitioner did not adequately establish her religious affiliation. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-49 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Because petitioner\u2019s assertion of ineffective Holdings: 0: holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding 1: holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding 2: recognizing that omissions of details may be an insufficient basis for upholding an adverse credibility finding 3: holding a general adverse credibility finding may justify a decision to reject other claims 4: holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or, although they could be discovered upon investigation, do not in due course of business come to [the] knowledge [of the debtor]\u201d); Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 490, 108 S.Ct. 1340 (stating that \"[n]or is everyone who may conceivably have a claim properly considered a creditor entitled to actual notice ... [as][i]t is reasonable to dispense with actual notice to those with mere 'conjectural' claims\u201d). 8 .While the bankruptcy court's known creditor analysis is reviewed de novo, it is nonetheless appropriate to give substantial consideration to the bankruptcy court's conclusions in this regard given that court's significant experience and expertise in these matters, which routinely arise in the administration of bankruptcy estates. 9 . See In re Crystal Oil Co., 158 F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Under Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs 1: holding that the debtor in possession was liable for civil contempt when he disobeyed the courts order to turn over the cash collateral and violated 11 usc  363 2: holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor 3: holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors 4: holding that in order for a claim to be reasonably ascertainable the debtor must have in his possession at the very least some specific information that reasonably suggests both the claim for which the debtor may be liable and the entity to whom he would be liable", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "among the items mentioned, we conclude that the legislature intended trust assets to be included among the available resources of potential recipients. Id. at 45, 176 N.W.2d at 892. Although McNiff did not involve a minor settlement fund, its reasoning and holding nonetheless apply here. Minor settlements, like private trusts, are not among the enumerated assets that are not to be considered available resources. Minn.Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 256B.06, subd. l(13)(a); 256B.07. Under Minn.Stat. \u00a7 645.19 (1986), \u201c[exceptions expressed in a law shall be construed to exclude all others.\u201d In the absence of any compelling authority to the contrary, the fact that minor settlement funds are not specifically excepted from consideration as available resources is dispositive. See also Brooks, 405 N.W.2d at 433-34 (<HOLDING>). II Hennepin County\u2019s claim for reimbursement Holdings: 0: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits 1: holding that a gift of 5000 was an available resource for the purpose of determining eligibility for afdc benefits 2: holding that a legal determination regarding an aliens eligibility for adjustment of status was not barred by the statute 3: holding that state agencys voluntary reinstatement of benefits after agency had previously announced that recipients no longer met the eligibility requirements for those benefits did not moot suit challenging the termination of the benefits when agency remained free to reassess the recipients needs and cancel their benefits at any time 4: holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "clauses discussing venue in terms' of \u2019a state are commonly interpreted as creating either a'geographic or sovereignty limitation on venue. [Fjorum selection clauses that use the term \u2018in [a state]\u2019 express the parties\u2019 intent as a.matter of geography, permitting jurisdiction in both, the state-and federal courts, of the named state, whereas forum selection clauses that use the term \u2018of [a state]\u2019 connote sovereignty, limiting jurisdiction over the parties\u2019 dispute to the state courts of the named state.. FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys.. Env\u2019t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755 (4th Cir. 2010) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Dixon v. TSE Int'l Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Several of. our sister circuits have applied Holdings: 0: recognizing the same rule in texas courts 1: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 2: holding that a texas court had personal jurisdiction over a kansas resident who after objecting to the texas courts jurisdiction filed a motion for attorneys fees 3: holding that the contract language the courts of texas usa shall have jurisdiction precluded federal jurisdiction by explaining that flederal district courts may be in texas but they are not of texas emphasis in original 4: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "recusal. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir.2000) (\u201cWe have repeatedly stated that a party\u2019s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.\u201d). Hartman also complains about Judge Diamond\u2019s \u201cattitude,\u201d asserts that he exhibits a \u201cpersonal interest in the case,\u201d and alleges that he has been \u201cunduly distrustful and suspicious of Plaintiff.\u201d These bare allegations are not sufficient to mandate recusal. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (\u201cNot establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, image and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women ... sometimes display.\u201d); see also In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we will deny the mandamus Holdings: 0: recognizing that tenuous assertions strung together by strands of speculation and surmise cannot defeat summary judgment 1: holding that recusal is not required on the basis of unsupported irrational or highly tenuous speculation 2: holding that under section 455 a judge should not recuse himself based upon conclusory unsupported or tenuous allegations 3: holding that recusal was required based on newspaper report of interview with trial judge 4: holding recusal not required", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Because Hobson failed to object to the question on redirect, he has waived any potential error on appeal. Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 853 (Miss.1995). \u00b6 15. It is true that a party cannot open the door to admission of hearsay evidence. Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1293-94 (Miss.1984). However, in this case, the defendant elicited the hearsay himself. \u201cIt is axiomatic that a defendant cannot complain on appeal concerning evidence that he himself brought out at trial.... As the Court stated pithily in Reddix v. State, 381 So.2d 999, 1009 (Miss.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986, 101 S.Ct. 408, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980): \u2018If the defendant goes fishing in the state\u2019s waters, he must take such fish as he catches.\u2019 \u201d Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 289 (Miss. 1992) (internal citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). We find no error resulting from the admission Holdings: 0: holding that defendant waived error of admission of hearsay testimony when he elicited it himself 1: holding that we would not review a claim of error regarding the admission of evidence when the defendant stipulated to its admission at trial 2: holding improper admission of hearsay evidence is reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice 3: holding that defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection to admission of another part of same statement 4: holding that admission of hearsay constituted harmless error when there was more than sufficient other evidence in the record to support the verdict", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cundesirables\u201d in the office, office romances, the personal use of office equipment, too much time spent on out-of-office travel, and the like. The majority of Plaintiffs complaints are simply reports of personal or managerial shortcomings of her colleagues and supervisors \u2014 spending too much time on-out-of-office travel, using an office copy machine for personal needs, asking the office assistant to fix a home computer, not properly securing office files, a , 504 (Minn.1991) (concluding that a report about behavior that \u201cseems distasteful and ... ill-advised, but that is not ... illegal\u201d is not protected under the MWA). Ultimately, even if the Court assumes that all the facts occurred as Plaintiff reported them, none constitutes a violation of the law. Kratzer, 771 N.W.2d at 22-23 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). For Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff is obliged to present facts that if true would constitute violation of clearly established law 1: holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case 2: holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law 3: holding that the proper standard to apply  is to assume that the facts have occurred as reported and then determine  whether those facts constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law 4: recognizing that when the facts alleged in the administrative complaint are not disputed this leaves only conclusions of law to be drawn as to whether the admitted facts constitute a violation of the statutes as charged and penalties to be imposed", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizurcs are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.\u201d Id. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248. The Court cautioned that \"detention for custodial interrogation\u2014regardless of its label\u2014intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.\u201d Id. at 219, 99 S.Ct. 2248. To the extent that the record in this case supports an inference that Acosta was brought to the customs detention area and placed in an interrogation room in order to effect a transfer of \"custody\" to and permit questioning by the DEA, the rule of Dunaway arguably comes into play. Cf. United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 10 . As to whether the officers could Holdings: 0: holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid 1: holding that two and onehalf hour detention at airport police office was analogous to the de facto arrest in dunaway 2: recognizing a nonresident who receives the most votes for elected office does not hold the office but not discussing the de facto officer doctrine 3: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave 4: holding that a de facto arrest had occurred where petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found  but rather was taken  to a police car transported to a police station and placed in an interrogation room", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Courts in rendering opinions\u201d on certain matters). This court concludes that, under Hawaii law, if an underlying action is dismissed against a nonconsenting defendant because it was a necessary condition of settlement with the other defendants in the underlying litigation, the dismissal with prejudice is not a dismissal on the substantive merits of the case and is therefore not a termination in favor of the nonconsenting defendant for malicious prosecution purposes. See Villa, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d at 649 (finding that \u201ceven where a defendant does not agree to a settlement made on his behalf, his or her dismissal from the lawsuit pur suant to that settlement will not be viewed as a favorable termination as long as it was a necessary condition to settlement\u201d); Haight, 244 Cal.Rptr. at 490 (<HOLDING>). This rule comports with Hawaii\u2019s public Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 1: holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice can be a favorable termination under certain circumstances 2: holding that a dismissal of a defendant who did not agree to settlement is not a favorable termination if dismissal of that defendant was a condition of settlement 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "it may \u2018skew[] the fairness of the entire system.\u2019 \u201d Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In this case, the delay did not cause Ashburn any pretrial incarceration because Ashburn was already in prison for another offense. Thus, while Ashburn argues on appeal that \u201c[w]here a defendant is incarcerated during delay, like Mr. Ash-burn, \u2018he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,\u2019 \u201d it was not the delay which caused this prejudice. Ash-burn also does not claim any actual prejudice to his defense. In fact, the government claims that the delay, if anything, harmed its case because one of the witnesses (an individual who had found the body), died prior to trial. Ashburn, though, h Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Because Ashburn was not denied his Sixth Holdings: 0: holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial 1: holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial includes the right to a reasonably prompt sentencing 2: holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds 3: holding that delay resulting from prior incompetence to stand trial does not violate speedy trial guarantee 4: holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "bankruptcy petition no such judgments had been entered against either Montana or the Crown. Their \u201crequests\u201d are also not \u201cdemands,\u201d they explain, because those requests are not personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage claims, and thus they did not \u201caris[e] out of the same or similar conduct\u201d as the claims subject to the injunction. See id. \u00a7 524(g)(5)(B). While those arguments reflect some creativity, they are ultimately unpersuasive. Montana\u2019s and the Crown\u2019s assertion that a \u201cclaim\u201d arises when it fully accrues is based on the now-rejected reasoning of Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re Frenville), 744 F.2d 332, 335-36 (3d Cir.1984), which we explicitly overruled in In re Grossman\u2019s, Inc., 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir.2010) (en banc). See Grossman\u2019s, 607 F.3d at 121 (<HOLDING>). The law in this Circuit now is that \u201ca claim Holdings: 0: holding that discovery accrual rule applies to causes of action under michigan law for fraud 1: recognizing obligation to read the language of the statute in light of previously established common law 2: holding that the ordinary observer test should be the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed 3: holding that the accrual test previously established in frenville should be and now is over ruled 4: holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "rule applies. The limited duty rule is an exception to general negligence principles, and more particularly, to the application of the business invitee standard of care in the commercial context. The dissent apparently prefers not to consider public policy and fairness concepts if the result is to hold the owner of the commercial enterprise responsible for its negligence when it does not adequately protect its business invitees, at least outside of the spectator seating areas. But, the Court is required by its common law precedents to examine the owner\u2019s duty in those circumstances, and to consider which of the parties is best able to bear the burden of foreseeable harm within the stadium. See Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 135 N.J. 182, 194, 638 A.2d 1288 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of City of Clifton v. Holdings: 0: holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client 1: holding that the unique nature of psychotherapistpatient relationship gives rise to a duty of care to the patient 2: holding that relationship between plaintiff and tortfeasor nature of risk and ability and opportunity to exercise care are relevant concerns to imposition of duty 3: holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise 4: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the required analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply. On appeal, although our review of the available facts might lead us to reach the same ultimate decision to suppress the evidence, we are not in a position to reach out and undertake an analysis that is better left to the District Court in the first instance. See United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (\u201cWhile it appears at first blush that suppression might be inappropriate in this case, we will remand to the district court for the purpose of re-examining the facts and balancing the interests as required by Herring.\u201d); United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 67, 68 (2d Cir.2010) (\u201c[0]n remand, the district court may consider whether the circumstances of this search, considered i 0th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 846 Holdings: 0: holding that the government cannot rely upon affidavits not attached to the warrant itself to satisfy the particularity requirement 1: holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement 2: holding that a roving wiretap surveillance warrant meets the fourth amendments particularity requirement 3: holding that an incorporated affidavit did not provide particularity because the government offered no evidence that the affidavit or any copies were ever attached to the warrant or were present at the time of the search 4: holding that plaintiffs did not satisfy particularity requirement where plaintiffs assertions were based in part on the statements of unnamed former employees", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.\" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The narrowest ground for the court's disposition in Williams is that of the lead opinion and Justice Thomas: the subject report was not testimonial. But, as the Arizona Supreme Court recently explained, the plurality's 'primary purpose' test nor Justice Thomas's solemnity standard can be deemed a subset of the other; therefore, there is no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial.\" State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (2013) (citing United States v. Alcon Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). We agree, and apply Williams accordingly. [\u00b6 Holdings: 0: holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal 1: holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land 2: holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision 3: holding that when no single standard  legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue there is then no law of the land 4: holding that the deed and not the historical description of the land determines what land constitutes the forfeitable property", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "waivers, deletions, changes or amendments shall be effective during the life of this Agreement, unless evidenced in writing, dated and signed by the parties hereto.\u201d Agreement \u00a7 16.1. Defendants argue that the term \u201cparties\u201d encompasses individual employees as well as the collective bargaining unit, while Plaintiffs dispute that interpretation. Plaintiffs\u2019 own discussion of the application of the integration clause nevertheless calls on the court to interpret the CBA. For this reason, I am satisfied \u00a7 301 preempts the breach of contract claims because \u201cat the very least,\u201d this court \u201cwould be required to interpret the CBA to determine whether it was intended to be the sole agreement between the parties.\u201d DiGiantommaso v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 85, 89 (D.Mass.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Cavallaro A, 678 F.3d at 5-7 (1st Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties 2: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 3: holding that a cause of action for breach of a purported implied contract would require interpretation of a cba and the totality of the parties contractual relationship 4: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of die United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 2 . Inferior officers may be appointed by the President alone, the heads of departments, or the judiciary, as Congress may determine, but it is undisputed that no inferior officer was involved in the civil enforcement action here. 3 . Nor can Congress confer the Executive's unique Article III standing to private individuals. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (<HOLDING>); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex Holdings: 0: holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent 1: holding that congress cannot confer the executives standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through citizensuit provisions 2: holding that congress cannot consistent with the constitutional principles of the separation of powers confer standing on a qui tam plaintiff who has suffered no cognizable injury to allow that plaintiff to prosecute an fca action on the governments behalf 3: holding that congress did not intend to give individuals a right to enforce  specific provisions of  nclb 4: holding congress must unambiguously confer federal rights on the plaintiff", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "close a loophole that had allowed preferences in the form of set offs.\u201d In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 486 (7th Cir.1988). Section 553(a)(3) modified a Bankruptcy Act provision that prohibited setting off debt intentionally incurred for such a purpose by effectively limiting the determinative inquiry to whether the creditor intended to offset the recently acquired debt. In re Butcher, 79 B.R. 741, 746 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1987) (quoting DuVoisin v. Foster (In re S. Indus. Banking Corp.), 48 B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1985)). The Section 553(a)(3) exception to setoff \u201cprevents the courts from rewarding creditors who persuade a debtor to engage in conduct which has the effect of impermissi-bly improving the creditor\u2019s position among the other creditors.\u201d Woo , 568 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Factors that courts consider when evaluating Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors deposit of funds was not in the ordinary course of business and was for the purpose of creating a setoff right for the bank 1: holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale 2: holding that for setoff purposes    a debt is due when the bank has the power to deem the debt due not when the bank actually exercises that power 3: holding that boat repair was done in the ordinary course of business of river transportation company 4: holding that the payment of a settlement from estate funds is not within the ordinary course under  363b", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "odor, found twenty-four days after the year 1995 had concluded, tended to show that the conspiracy to obtain and deliver cocaine had taken place during 1995. Moreover, because of the narcotics odor on the bills, the evidence had the requisite probative value for admission into evidence without the danger of \"unfair prejudice.\" See Evid. R. 408 (emphasis supplied). Because the State successfully proved the relevancy, probative value, and lack of unfair prejudice of the $5000-showing that the $5000 was evidence of charged conduct in 1994-95-there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence. However, to preclude argument on the matter, the better course would have been to amend the dates on the charging information. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 728 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ind.2000) (<HOLDING>). Howard attempts to analogize his case to Holdings: 0: holding that information was not fatally defective because while defendants name did not appear in the charging part of the information it did clearly appear in the caption and in the verification of the charge by the district attorney 1: holding that rules of criminal procedure prohibited the state from amending the indictment at the close of the trial to include additional methods of csp because such amendment substantially prejudiced defendant 2: holding that states amendment of the charging information at the close of states case in chief was permissible because amending the date of the charged crimes did not affect browns defense 3: holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment 4: holding that an amendment to a felony information on the day of trial charging the defendant as a habitual criminal was not error", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of crack cocaine in the \u2018kangaroo pouch\u2019 of defendant\u2019s boxer briefs, or the \u2018fly area . . . where the two pieces of fabric overlap. Fowler,_N.C. App. at __, _S.E.2d at _. On appeal, this Court held that \u201cthe search[] of defendant\u2019s person constituted [a] strip search,\u201d noting that, \u201c[djuring [the] search]], defendant\u2019s private areas were observed by [the law enforcement officer].\u201d Fowler, _N.C. App. at _, _S.E.2d _. However, we also held that there was ample reason to believe that the defendant would be carrying drugs, that the second \u201cstrip search\u201d took place at a \u201cdiscreet\u201d location, and that exigent circumstances (consisting of the defendant\u2019s familiarity with processing procedures at the jail and his repeated requests not to be taken there) justified a strip .2d 30, 37 (1989) (<HOLDING>). A helpful manner in which to give content to Holdings: 0: holding that a panel of the court of appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question but in a different case unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court 1: holding stare decisis applies when one court of appeals panel is faced with previous decision of different panel 2: holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court 3: holding that where a panel of the court of appeals has decided the same issue albeit in a different case a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent unless it has been overturned by a higher court 4: holding that a panel of this court is bound by a holding of a prior panel but is not bound by a prior panels dicta", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as McGinley v. Houston, 282 F.Supp.2d 1304 (M.D.Ala.2003), aff'd, 361 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir.2004), points out, Establishment Clause jurisprudence would be unworkable if it were any other way: \"For this court ... to hold that the removal of ... objects to cure an Establishment Clause violation would itself violate the Establishment Clause would ... result in an inability to cure an Establishment Clause violation and thus totally eviscerate the [E]stablishment[C]lause.\u201d Id. at 1307 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 9 . Because Vasquez failed to state a claim under the Establishment Clause, we also deny his request for leave to amend his complaint to add a claim for nominal damages. See generally Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) Holdings: 0: recognizing that when actual damages cannot be proved with the required certainty nominal damages alone are recoverable 1: holding that under  1983 violations of constitutional rights are actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury 2: holding that nominal damages are appropriate for deprivations of constitutional rights that do not result in actual injury 3: holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict 4: holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201cvirtually every significant class action case would need to be litigated in California\u201d). However, it has a characteristic that all of these Costco management districts except the Southern District of California lack: it is the most appropriate forum for litigating the claims of at least one named plaintiff. Furthermore, it is a forum for which there has been no showing of inconvenience for Costco, due to defendant\u2019s strong contacts here and the agreement of the parties to travel to witnesses\u2019 own locales for purposes of discovery. The Northern District is the plaintiffs chosen forum, and as such it is entitled to some deference. In class actions, this deference is reduced where a plaintiff lacks contacts with the chosen district. See Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In judging the weight to be accorded to the Holdings: 0: holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent 1: holding individual defendants subject to suit 2: holding that when an individual brings a derivative suit or represents a class the named plaintiffs chosen forum is given less weight 3: holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment 4: holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist  between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to be paid and which are not, and when.\u201d Id. at 757. As stated in Anderson: A person need not be an officer, director, employee, or shareholder of a company to be held accountable as a responsible person. The test is whether the person had control of the disbursements of the taxpayer, that is, whether \u2018he had the final word as to what bills should or should not be paid, and when.\u2019 It is not necessary that such control be exercised exclusively by the person; it may be exercised jointly with others. Id., 561 F.2d at 165 (citations omitted; emphasis added). In the cases where third party lenders have been held hable under \u00a7 6672, the lender has exercised control over the disbursements of the taxpayer. See Commonwealth National Bank of Dallas v. United States, 665 F.2d 743 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Merchants National Bank of Mobile v. United Holdings: 0: holding successor national bank liable for punitive damages judgment against bank that merged into successor national bank 1: holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank 2: holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation 3: holding a bank liable where a bank officer held checks that were intended to pay the irs for withheld taxes 4: holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for the \u201cprevailing competitive price\u201d for glass repair based upon \u201cprices charged by a substantial number of repair facilities in the area * \u215c * as determined by a survey.\u201d Because Glass Service\u2019s prices typically exceed what State Farm has determined by a survey to be the prevailing competitive price, State Farm is not obligated under the policy to pay the excess. State Farm was justified in informing insureds of this policy limitation and in suggesting alternative vendors whose charge would be fully covered under the policy. See Minn.Stat. \u00a7 72A.201, subd. 4(5) (making it an unfair claims practice to fail to notify an insured of all available benefits which the insured may be eligible to receive); see also DeBonaventura v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 419 A.2d 942, 951 (Del.Ch.1980) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, State Farm\u2019s representations to its Holdings: 0: holding that the first element in a prima facie case of tortious interference with prospective business advantage is the existence of business expectancy 1: holding no improper interference with prospective business opportunity of repair shops by directing insureds to preferred shops or informing them they would otherwise have to pay difference 2: recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage 3: holding that the difference between interference with contract and prospective relations is that second tort requires showing of malice 4: holding that under colorado law tjortious interference with a prospective business relation requires a showing of intentional and improper interference preventing formation of a contract", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and convincing evidence of abuse inflicted by Smith. I believe this was error. An allegation.of an accident does not equate to the admission of an intentional act of child abuse for purposes of demonstrating evidence of a prior bad act. See State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 218-19, 641 S.E.2d 873, 879 (2007) (reversing a death penalty conviction when the trial court admitted evidence of the victim\u2019s spiral leg fracture at age ten-weeks despite the fact that the prior injury was, by all accounts, accidental and therefore not relevant to show the nature of defendant\u2019s relationship with the victim). This is particularly true where, as is the case here, Smith did not have exclusive custody and control over the victim. See State v. Cutro, 332 S.C. 100, 105-06, 504 S.E.2d 324, 326-27 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, DSS was unable to determine who Holdings: 0: holding admission of prior bad acts of child abuse was reversible error when the defendant did not have exclusive control over the children during the period when the prior bad acts occurred 1: holding that the more similar the prior bad act is to the charged crime the more relevant the prior bad act becomes toward proving intent 2: holding that it is error for a trial court to admit evidence of prior bad acts without properly conditioning the jurys use of that evidence 3: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime 4: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "served as its Chief Executive Officer, and sat on its Board of Directors. According to the Fund, Mr. Reynolds actively participated in the day-to-day management of Greystone and made \u201cdecisions related to its operations and eventual closure in 2011.\u201d Even accepting the Fund\u2019s assertion that Mr. Reynolds actively managed Grey-stone, an assertion he denies, the Fund cannot show the necessary minimum contacts. The Fund argues that any actions Mr. Reynolds took in his official capacity as an owner and operator of Coleridge and Jelniki are attributable to Coleridge and Jelniki. The record, however, contains no credible allegations Mr. Reynplds routinely acted on behalf of Coleridge and Jelniki when he discharged any of his duties as an officer and director of Greystone. See id. at 943 (<HOLDING>). For example, the Fund asserts in its Holdings: 0: holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities 1: holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham 2: holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another 3: holding constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an usually high degree of control over the subsidiary 4: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "316 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cSeverino admitted \u2014 more than once \u2014 that he had no way to challenge the validity of the prior conviction.... The error was harmless.\u201d); United States v. Williams, 298 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.2002) (where both government\u2019s information and PSI disclosed convictions used for enhancement and defendant did not challenge through \u00a7 851(c) or at sentencing, \u201cany error resulting from the district court\u2019s failure to comply with the procedures of \u00a7 851(b) was harmless error\u201d); United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1525 (D.C.Cir.1997) (per curiam) (\u201cAlthough failure to comply strictly with the statute\u2019s requirements is error, here the error was harmless.\u201d) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 71 F.3d 1537, 1541 & n. 4 (10th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by United States Holdings: 0: holding that failure to comply with  851b was harmless in part because defendant did not object to prior convictions listed in presentence report 1: holding that a sentencing court may warn a defendant of the possibility of a sentence enhancement 2: holding failure to comply with  851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with  851c procedures for challenging prior convictions 3: holding that the district court lacked authority to revisit the application of the career offender enhancement in a  3582 motion because that enhancement was not affected by a retroactive amendment 4: holding that failure to comply with  851b was harmless because defendant was properly put on notice that the government was seeking an enhancement and defendant concluded that no valid grounds existed for challenging the convictions or enhancement after research", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as the starting date for calculating Gasser\u2019s delay in filing suit. Thus, although the court credited Gasser\u2019s testimony at least to the extent that this meeting took place, it failed to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Gasser about what took place during this encounter. Given Gasser\u2019s testimony that at the conclusion of the meeting he felt that Infanti would comply with the agreement, and that he saw no evidence that Infanti was not complying with the agreement until 1986, a reasonable inference would be that Gasser had no reason to sue until at least 1986, a difference in the delay period that might well have made a difference in the final outcome. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia s.p.a., 944 F.2d 870, 878-79, 20 USPQ2d 1045, 1052 (Fed.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Alternatively, based on Gasser\u2019s testimony Holdings: 0: holding based on similar facts and a delay of three and onehalf years that it would have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to have held that these circumstances resulted in laches 1: holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law 2: holding that delay for three and onehalf years was unreasonable under rule 60b6 3: holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable 4: holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add count when no prejudice resulted from two and onehalf year delay and facts underlying new and old counts were similar", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Iowa. Nor can we say that Aidco\u2019s actions were targeted to have an effect in Iowa. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1487. When a business seeks to promote its products and solicit the customers of its competitors, it necessarily wishes to have customers believe that its products are superior and to place its competitor\u2019s products in a less favorable light. Although this promotion and solicitation may have an effect on a competitor, absent additional contacts, this effect alone will not be sufficient to bestow personal jurisdiction. We do not mean to imply that we approve or disapprove of Aidco\u2019s actions, only to point out that the holding of Calder cannot be read as broadly as Hicklin wishes. See also Keystone Publishers Serv., Inc. v. Ross, 747 F.2d 1233, 1234 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated above we affirm the Holdings: 0: recognizing the tort of interference with prospective contractual relations as a subspecies of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage 1: holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction 2: recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with anothers business relations 3: holding that interference with contractual relations occurring outside of iowa and causing injury in iowa is not sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction in iowa 4: holding that the statute of limitations for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations begins to run when the contract in question has been breached", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of reasonableness, and such amounts ordinarily cannot be recovered without evidence showing the charges were reasonable. Fort Worth Hotel Ltd. P\u2019ship, 977 S.W.2d at 762-63; see Murnan, 916 S.W.2d at 589; GATX Tank Erection Corp., 693 S.W.2d at 620; Bradley v. Castro, 591 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Fort Worth 1979, no writ); Frost Nat\u2019l Bank of San Antonio v. Kayton, 526 S.W.2d 654, 666-67 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Allright, Inc. v. Lowe, 500 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ). These cases hold that a plaintiff cannot recover damages just by proving how much it spent. It must also provide evidence that the amount spent was reasonable and necessary. But see Liptak v. Pensabene, 736 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tex.App.\u2014Tyler 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>) (citing English v. Fischer, 649 S.W.2d 83, Holdings: 0: holding that the testimonies of three qualified expert witnesses about the damages done to a house by termites and their opinions as to what the repairs would cost was some evidence that the cost of repairs was reasonable and necessary although those words were not used in their testimonies 1: holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible 2: holding that if despite repairs there remains a loss in actual market value estimated as of the collision date such deficiency is to be added to the cost of repairs 3: holding that the total cost of repairs could be found to be a fair measure of the plaintiffs total damage 4: holding where a house sold by defendant was found to fall short of the sellers promises and where it could not be repaired to the promised condition defendants liability could not be limited to the cost of repairs however if the repairs had been adequate to restore the house to its promised condition and if plaintiff had claimed additional consequential damages for example water damage to a rug from the leaky roof the limitationofremedies clause would have been effective", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "recovery of those litigation expenses. We disagree. \u201cMandamus is an extraordinary remedy. One petitioning for the writ of mandamus must show \u2018(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.\u2019 \u201d Ex parte City of Irondale, 686 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.1996) (quoting Ex parte Johnson, 638 So.2d 772, 773 (Ala.1994)). See also Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991); and Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989). As discussed above, LaConsay and Wet-zel did attempt to appeal from the probate court\u2019s October 17, 2006, order, but the circuit court dismissed those appeals because the proba pp. 2003) (<HOLDING>). In the second appeals, the circuit court Holdings: 0: recognizing a defendants right to appeal when a court fails to award litigation expenses in a condemnation action 1: recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation 2: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 3: holding that defendant forfeits right to have issue considered on appeal when he fails to object to misconduct at trial 4: holding that there is no right to monetary compensation for a regulatory taking in an inverse condemnation action", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "but seeks a review and reversal of the bankruptcy court\u2019s summary judgment. But see In re Rodriquez, 258 F.3d at 759 (finding the appeal moot because the appellant was challenging the sale of property from the bankruptcy estate where there was no stay pending appeal); Wintz, 219 F.3d at 812 (finding the appeal moot because the appellants failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and thus were barred from attempting to overturn the sale of the property from the bankruptcy estate). In the final analysis, though, this panel cannot provide relief. If we were to rule in favor of Appellant on the summary judgment issue, Appellant could perhaps seek money damages from the proceeds of the sale received by the bankruptcy estate. See In re Popkin & Stem, 223 F.3d 764, 766 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, obtaining money damages equal to the Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief 1: holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages 2: holding that even if the sale cannot be undone nor property specifically awarded parties may still receive money damages for their loss 3: holding that attorneys fees may be awarded against a public official even when the official is immune from money damages 4: holding that the loss of money from a bank account does not constitute irreparable harm because that loss can be compensat ed by money damages", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "caused by the intoxication of the dram shop patron. The last sentence of the portion of section 123.92 quoted above provides that the dram shop may assert an affirmative defense that the intoxication was not a proximate cause of the patron\u2019s injurious action. See Gremmel v. Junnie\u2019s Lounge, Ltd., 397 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1986) (defense that intoxication was not a proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries was available upon showing that animosity between combatants and not intoxication precipitated assault). The rise of the claim created by section 123.92 extending liability to liquor purveyors is mirrored by the recent genesis of separate common law actions against those who sell or provide liquor in violation of criminal statutes. See Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977) (<HOLDING>); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Iowa Holdings: 0: holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury 1: holding iowa code section 63113 which is now section 6317 contains no provision for posttrial motions on appeal from a small claims court judgment 2: holding a common law cause of action exists against a nonlicensee who furnishes alcohol to a minor in violation of iowa code section 12347 where the minor subsequently causes the plaintiffs injuries 3: holding in a case in which negligence was based on the illegal sale of alcohol to a minor in violation of iowa code section 12343 now section 12347 that proximate cause was an issue to be resolved by the finder of fact 4: holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Protective Proceedings, and Durable Power of Attorney Act of 1986) which provides a system of limited and general guard-ianships for incapacitated individuals and protective proceedings concerned with management of their estates. See also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 301-334 (governing intervention proceedings). 2 . D.C.Code \u00a7 46-404 provides that proceedings to annul a marriage on behalf of a lunatic and certain others may be instituted by a next friend. 3 .Appellant sought to amend his complaint to preclude appellee from making a claim against the decedent's estate because of the terms of a prenuptial agreement. However, the court held that leave of court was not required to amend the complaint because no responsive pleading had been filed. See Wilson v. Wilson, 785 A.2d 647, 649 (D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>). No issue concerning any subsequently filed Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant waived its impropervenue defense where its responsive pleading which asserted the defenses of failure to state facts to state a claim and failure to join a necessary party  did not assert the defense of improper venue 1: holding that a motion to dismiss was not a responsive pleading under rule 15 2: holding that for purposes of super ct civ r 41b demand is not jurisdictional but an element of the shareholders claim 3: holding that courts look to substance of plea for relief to determine nature of pleading not merely title of pleading 4: holding that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of super ct civ r 15a which permits a party to amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Ho because he does not have constitutionally sufficient \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with Washington. Id. at 801. In particular, Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing that Ho \u201cexpressly aimed\u201d his conduct at Washington. Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir.2012) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)). Although Ho may have received reports about the activities of Dressel Investment Ltd. and he may have participated in some decision-making, his participation did not rise to the level of the \u201cguiding spirit\u201d or \u201calter ego\u201d of Dres-sel. See, e.g., RSL-3B-IL, Ltd. v. Symetra Life Ins. Co. (In re Rapid Settlements, Ltd.), 166 Wash.App. 683, 271 P.3d 925, 931 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Nor do Plaintiffs allegations of fraud Holdings: 0: holding that one company was the alter ego of another where among other things the ownership of both entities has been held out to third parties as identical with an identical place of business 1: holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements 2: holding individual defendant liable where he among other things made inquiries into the business obligations under the flsa 3: holding that a subsidiary is not an alter ego of its parent even when the corporations are closely tied through stock ownership shared officers financing arrangements and the like 4: holding evidence of virtually identical offense was relevant to show intent among other things in trial of charged offense", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "In Griggs v. Barnes, 262 Ala. 357, 78 So.2d 910 (1955), our Supreme Court recognized that \u201c[t]he essence of custody is the companionship of the child and the right to make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and religion.\u201d 262 Ala. at 363, 78 So.2d at 916. Moreover, in J.S., this court observed: \u201cThe common law recognized a right of parents to determine with whom their child would associate. In contrast to parents, grandparents generally had no common-law right to visitation if the parents objected. Ex parte Bronstein, 434 So.2d 780 [ (Ala.1983) ]; Ronald W. Nelson, \u201cTroxel v. Granville: The Supreme Court Wades Into the Quagmire of Third-Party Visitation,\u201d 12 No. 6 Divorce Litig. 101 (June 2000).\u201d \u2014 So.2d at-. See Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399, Holdings: 0: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children 1: holding north dakotas grandparentvisitation statute unconstitutional on the basis that it burdened the parents fundamental right to control their childrens associations 2: holding right to be fundamental 3: recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents 4: recognizing that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care custody and control of their children", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201c[had] nothing to do with denat-uralization.\u201d Id. at 38 n. 5. I agree with the First Circuit\u2019s sound reasoning. For the foregoing reasons, I cannot accept the majority\u2019s conclusion that Pullman-Standard and Anderson overruled\u2014 by implication \u2014 Baumgartner and its progeny. It follows that our precedent, Lim v. Mitchell, which relies on Baum-gartner's progeny, controls the appellate standard of review in this case. Thus, we are required to conduct an independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether that evidence is sufficient to satisfy the government\u2019s heavy burden to show by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a Mexican citizen, not a United States citizen. See supra Part III.A; United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). IV. THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE Holdings: 0: holding that a three judge panel is free to reexamine the holding of a prior panel when the supreme court has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable 1: holding a three judge panel  cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel unless an intervening supreme court decision undermines an existing precedent of the ninth circuit and both cases are closely on point internal quotations and citation omitted 2: holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel 3: holding that a three judge panel is not bound by prior circuit precedent if an intervening decision of a higher authority undercuts the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable 4: holding that threejudge panel cannot disregard or overrule circuit precedent", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "facial neutrality.\u201d Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. We must look beyond the text of the ordinance and examine whether the Borough enforces it on a religion-neutral basis, as \u201cthe effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.\u201d Id. at 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because Ordinance 691 is neutral and generally applicable on its face, if the Borough had enforced it uniformly, Smith would control and the plaintiffs\u2019 claim would accordingly fail. The Borough insists it has done so, but the record shows otherwise. Indeed, the Borough has tacitly or expressly granted exemptions from the ordinance's unyielding language for various secular and religious-though never Orthodox Jewish-purposes. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953) (<HOLDING>). From the drab house numbers and lost animal Holdings: 0: recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion 1: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 2: holding that limitations placed upon the religious activities of two prison groups found to be religious organizations were reasonable under the circumstances 3: holding that exclusion of religious groups from universitys open forum policy violated the first amendment 4: holding that city violated free exercise clause by enforcing ordinance banning meetings in park against jehovahs witnesses but exempting other religious groups", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "condition during Gretillat\u2019s employment. Gretillat does not respond to Care Initiatives\u2019s arguments in her Resistance. \u201cWhen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported ... [and] the adverse party does not ... respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The court finds summary judgment is appropriate as to Gretillat\u2019s alleged inabilities to squat, crawl, crouch and kneel. Summary judgment as to Gretillat\u2019s alleged inabilities to squat, crawl, crouch and kneel is appropriate because an employer is not required to make an accommodation for the physical limitation of an employee unless the employer has knowledge that such a limitation exists. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat\u2019l Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629-30 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Care Initiatives could not have discriminated Holdings: 0: holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made 1: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 2: holding that although of course an employee is not required to modify his religious beliefs a reasonable accommodation need not be on the employees terms only 3: holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant 4: holding defendant was not required to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee because the employee did not apprise defendant that she suffered from a mental impairment", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to the FDIC\u2019s assignee, a bridge bank), cert. denied sub nom. Rogers v. FDIC, 498 U.S. 1083, 111 S.Ct. 954, 112 L.Ed.2d 1042 (1991); Porras v. Petroplex Sav. Ass\u2019n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir.1990) (extending the D\u2019Oench doctrine\u2019s protection to transferees of assets from the FSLIC in purchase and assumption transactions); FDIC v. First Nat'l Fin. Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.1978) (rejecting the argument that the D\u2019Oench doctrine does not apply to the FDIC as receiver). Courts also applied the D\u2019Oench bar to secret agree ments between borrowers and a subsidiary of the failed financial institution under the regulatory agency\u2019s control. See Victor Hotel Corp. v. FCA Mortg. Corp., 928 F.2d 1077, 1083 (11th Cir.1991); Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Sav., 23 F.3d 951, 956 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 725, 130 Holdings: 0: holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists 1: holding that the doench doctrine extends broadly to cover any secret agreement adversely affecting the value of a financial interest that has come within the rtcs control as receiver of a failed financial institution including the financial interest of a whollyowned subsidiary 2: holding that the doench doctrine extends to claims involving a wholly owned subsidiary of the failed financial institution in receivership 3: holding that doench applies to secret side agreements made by subsidiaries and subsubsidiaries of the failed institution in receivership 4: holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to the Commissioner under the statutory and constitutional mandates that already apply to him rather than to give him detailed and rigid directives through rules. See Diaz v. State of Florida, 945 S2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (\u201cIn light of the exigencies inherent in the execution process, judicial review and oversight of the Department of Corrections\u2019] procedures is preferable to [APA] administrative proceedings.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Darling v. State, 45 S3d 444, 453 (Fla. 2010). See also Brown v. Vail, 237 P3d 263, 270 (Wash. 2010) (\u201cThe [execution] protocol itself is not an order or directive subjecting a person to a penalty or sanction, but rather a procedure for carrying out an already imposed penalty.\u201d); Abu-Ali Abdur\u2019Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 SW3d 292, 312 (Tenn. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Rather than adopting a detailed rule Holdings: 0: holding that the management of executions is ill suited to apa rulemaking 1: holding that claimant is entitled to ongoing medical treatment if such is geared toward management of the claimants injury 2: holding cafeteria management fee is not taxable even if it is bundled with the sales price of food 3: holding that a seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure even if he falls ill or is injured while ashore as long as he is subject to the call of duty 4: holding the lower court properly opened the confessed judgment but erred in setting aside the executions and the attachments stated plaintiff is fairly entitled to this security pending the proceedings upon the opened judgment unless security equivalent to it and approved by the court is substituted for it", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "it was seeking an administrative claim for only the post-petition portion of the first quarter of 1995, which is from March 3, 1995 through March 31, 1995. The Debtors conceded that the administrative claim was proper to the extent that it covered only the post-petition portion of the first quarter of 1995. The claim of the IRS for administrative expenses for the post-petition portion of the first quarter of 1995 is allowable to the extent that it seeks taxes, fines and penalties. See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 503(b)(l)(B)(C). The Court will determine whether post-petition interest is an administrative expense. 4 . Prior to the Court's decision, one circuit court had addressed the issue. See United States v. Friendship College, Inc. (In re Friendship College, Inc.), 737 F.2d 430, 433 (4th Cir.1984) Holdings: 0: holding that interest on postpetition taxes incurred by the debtor during chapter 11 reorganization is an administrative expense 1: holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor 2: holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business is eligible for chapter 11 3: holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions 4: holding that licensor was entitled to administrative expense priority claim where debtor remained in possession postpetition of real property under a license agreement", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the existence of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must be assumed.\u201d). The judicial deference which must be given to the legislature under \u201crational basis\u201d review is illustrated by case law. For instance, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), the Court upheld an ordinance on Equal Protection grounds which banned advertising on trucks, but exempted those trucks advertising their own products. The Court stated that the law was designed to promote public safety and that the city \u201cmay well have concluded\u201d that those advertising their own products would not present the same traffic problem. Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (<HOLDING>); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 1: holding that a state ban on nonreturnable milk containers while permitting the use of other nonreturnable containers did not offend the equal protection clause since the legislature might have determined that even a limited ban would promote greater use of environmentally desirable alternative containers 2: holding that the states reapportionment plan might violate the equal protection clause 3: holding that a state weapons ban did not violate equal protection principles because the plaintiffs challenge related to classifications among weapons not persons 4: holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "clearly intended that the defendant\u2019s right to appeal an issue would be preserved. See United States v. Elizalde-Adame, 262 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir.2001); Markling, 7 F.3d at 1313. The cases examining the intent to preserve the right to appeal typically lack a written plea agreement, however, which is a significant difference from the case now before us. Written plea agreements are contracts, and we interpret them according to general principles of contract law. United States v. Hernandez, 544 F.3d 743, 750 (7th Cir.2008). Thus, unlike those cases involving verbal agreements, we look to extrinsic evidence of the parties\u2019 intentions \u2014 possibly found, for example, in a plea colloquy \u2014 only when the written contract is ambiguous. Cf United States v. Given, 164 F.3d 389, 396 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). In this context, we have the power to review Holdings: 0: holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight 1: holding that the district court properly declined to consider extrinsic evidence where the plea agreement was unambiguous 2: holding extrinsic evidence contradicting language in will inadmissible when will is unambiguous 3: holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous 4: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 94-95. 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 95. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. 16 . AS 18.70.080(a)(2). 17 . AS 08.40.240. 18 . O\u2019Callaghan, 996 P.2d at 94. 19 . AS 18.70.080. 20 . AS 08.40.240-250. 21 . See AS 08.40.210; Ch. 132, \u00a7 9, SLA 1988. 22 . See H. Fin. Comm. Minutes (March 22, 1988) (comments of Eugene R. Rutland, Executive Director, Mechanical Contractors of Fairbanks). 23 .Id. 24 . See 13 AAC 50.020(12)(b) (1988) (adopting Uniform Mechanical Code by reference to Uniform Building Code). 25 . 858 P.2d 621, 624 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). 26 . Stepovak\u2014Shumagin Set Net Ass\u2019n v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 886 P.2d 632, 637 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990)). 27 . O'Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). See also Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 397 (<HOLDING>). 28 . Mechanical Contractors also claims that Holdings: 0: holding that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates constitutional rights the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 1: holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation 2: holding that perfection not required for regulation to be reasonable courts task is simply to determine whether regulation is reasonably related to agencys statutory mandate 3: holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended 4: holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "did not have a reasonable belief that he was opposing an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII when he filed his complaint regarding Defendant Fetter\u2019s alleged harassment and ridicule. See McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir.2001) (citation omitted). As will be discussed below, at best, Plaintiff is merely attempting to allege that he was retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment. Even though Plaintiff may believe that Defendants\u2019 actions were wrongful or even spiteful, the courts have repeatedly emphasized that \u201cTitle VII is not a general \u2018bad acts\u2019 statute.\u201d Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 176 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir.1999) (quotation and other citation omitted); see also Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Montanile v. National Broadcast Co., Holdings: 0: holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor 1: holding that the term protected activity refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination quotation and other citation omitted 2: holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity 3: holding that qualified immunity turns upon the objective legal reasonableness of the officers action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding the term earnings for purposes of  541a6 is not limited to wages and salary but refers to all income generated by an individual citation omitted", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by the record. See United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 77 (3d Cir.1996). The Government\u2019s central argument is that Lowe did not submit to the initial show of authority because he failed to show his hands in response to the officers\u2019 commands. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has explained that \u201c[an individual] sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.\u201d Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400. The Government\u2019s argument invites us to add \u201cunless the police have instructed him to stand up\u201d to the analysis. Neither Supreme Court precedent nor the law of our Circuit supports such a qualification. See id. (explaining that responding to a show of authority by staying put is a means of passively submitting to that authority); Campbell, 332 F.3d at 206 (<HOLDING>). Instead, failure to submit has been found Holdings: 0: holding that no valid arrest had taken place before the search of the defendants person was conducted even though prior to that point a police officer had approached the defendant displayed his badge informed the defendant of his suspicions that the defendants luggage contained drug contraband informed the defendant of his constitutional rights and detained the defendant for twenty minutes after he had accompanied the officers to a police office located in the airport 1: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights 2: holding that the defendant submitted to a show of authority by remaining in place even though he declined the police officers initial request to roll down his window and refused to provide the officer with his identification 3: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live 4: holding that police may approach citizen and ask that he roll down the window as long as the officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the citizen may not leave", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "diversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident.\" 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1441(e)(1)(A) permits removal of a civil action to a federal district court if \"the action could have been brought in a United States district court under 1369 of this title ....\" 7 . Nor do we, as we affirm the district court's jurisdiction under CAFA. 8 . 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1332(d)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1453(a) (\u201cDefinitions. \u2014 In this section, the terms 'class\u2019, \u2018class action\u2019, 'class certification order\u2019, and \u2018class member\u2019 shall have the meanings given such terms under section 1332(d)(1).\u201d). 9 . See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658, 666-67, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979) (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941)) (<HOLDING>); see also Will v. Mich. Dep\u2019t of State Police, Holdings: 0: holding that under 28 usc  194 applying to land disputes between a tribe and a white person a state was not a person but observing that there is nevertheless no hard and fast rule of exclusion  and much depends on the context the subject matter the legislative history and executive interpretation 1: holding that a state agency is not a person subject to suit under federal false claims act 2: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 4: holding that a person who cut and removed timber pursuant to the direction of the person in possession of the property but without the written consent of the company holding legal title to the land could be held liable under the gtccs", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "direction and discretion of the child's parents.\"); of CCRS, 892 P.2d at 258 (comparing cases from other jurisdictions, in which babysitters or temporary caregivers were determined not to have \"physical custody\" of a child, with case of the prospective adoptive parents at issue, who had total care of the child with the intention that they would ultimately adopt the child). 110 Accordingly, when determining whether a nonparent, who shares physical care of a child with a parent, has standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), a court considers the nature, frequency, and duration of the contacts between the child and nonparent and between the child and parent. See .S., 264 P.3d at 625; LF., 121 P.3d at 270; In re V.R.P.F., 989 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo.App.1997); see also E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 554 (<HOLDING>). { 11 For example, in EZ.L.M.C., the partner Holdings: 0: holding that the requisites for in loco parentis status are the actual care and custody of a child by a nonparent who assumes parental duties because the parent  generally due to his or her absence  is unable or unwilling to care for the child 1: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 2: holding that the modification order itself must be signed before the child turns eighteen 3: holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school 4: recognizing that nonparent standing turns on the quality of the relationship between the nonparent and the child", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "by her pro bono counsel. 7 . Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AEDPA\u201d) (effective April 24, 1996). 8 . Section 5103 states: \u00a7 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters (a) General rule. \u2014 If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court ... of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the ... matter, the court ... shall not quash ... or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the ... matter shall be treated as if originally filed in a court ... of this Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court ... of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court ... where it shall be treated as if orig .2000) (<HOLDING>). 11 . We invite our Supreme Court to look at Holdings: 0: recognizing that the supreme court maintained the trial courts fact finding authority without setting a new standard in booker 1: holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts 2: holding a per curiam affirmance from a florida district court of appeal is not renewable by the florida supreme court 3: holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction 4: holding florida constitution grants supreme court exclusive authority to set deadlines for postconviction motions therefore legislation setting time limits is unconstitutional", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.3d at 909 (noting that a \u201cfull evidentiary record\u201d had already been developed); Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d at 1045 (noting that district court\u2019s factual findings on the relevant issue were \u201cunequivocal\u201d); McElyea, 158 F.3d at 1021 (finding that, after a full inquiry into the relevant issue, \u201c[t]he record ... does not contain any information\u201d that would suggest an alternative factual finding), or where there was a failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue, see Reyes-Oseguera, 106 F.3d at 1484 (stating that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless endangerment); Ponce, 51 F.3d at 829 (finding that the government had offered no evidence to support sentencing at criminal history category III); Becerra, 992 F.2d at 967 (<HOLDING>). Here, in contrast, there was no offer of Holdings: 0: holding that the government had offered insufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant jose becerra knew about or could have anticipated that the drug transaction in question could have involved 25 kilograms of cocaine 1: holding evidence of prior drug sales admissible under 404b to show knowledge and intent where defendant claimed he did not know that the gym bag he took possession of contained two kilograms of cocaine 2: holding that government did not suppress evidence when defendant knew about the existence of the evidence and could obtain it through the exercise of reasonable diligence 3: holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine 4: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "exist, the defendant must establish the following: \u201c(1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced.\u201d Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255, 1259 (Fla.2003). Prejudice exists if the suppressed evidence was material. See id. at 1260. Finally, evidence is material if a reasonable probability exists that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have led to a different result at the proceeding. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The claim based on notes from police brainstorming sessions is clearly without merit. Overton was provided the Rou (<HOLDING>). During the evidentiary hearing, it was Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant insufficiently pled the brady claim because he failed to assert how the evidence was material or how he was prejudiced by the states nondisclo sure 1: holding that the information contained in the police files with regard to other possible suspects was not brady material 2: holding that the brady claim was insufficiently pled in the rule 3851 motion because the defendant presented no factual basis that the disputed item ever existed or contained exculpatory information 3: holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation 4: holding that there was no brady violation because the exculpatory effect of the disputed documents was merely speculative", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "statement is relevant to understanding the purpose of the relocation provision with respect to the broader interests of Section 17.52.515, the Court denies this objection. \u25a0 \u25a0 29 . Plaintiffs also cite a single case from the Oregon Supreme Court to argue that the on-site/offsite distinction in Section 17.52.515 runs afoul of the liberty of speech clause. Opp'n at 24 (citing Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 340 Or. 275, 132 P.3d 5, 18 (2006)). The Court does not consider this case persuasive. The Ninth Circuit has rejected the approach suggested by Outdoor Media Dimensions, explicitly recognizing that the onsite/offsite distinction is not content-based under the California Constitution. See Vanguard Outdoor, LLC v. City of L.A., 648 F.3d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In the absence of any authority to the Holdings: 0: holding that restriction of medicaid funding to those abortions that are necessary to save the life of the mother violates equal protection guarantee of new jersey constitution although same restriction does not violate united states constitution 1: holding that an arbitration agreement that was invalid due to unconscionability was not enforceable 2: holding that definition of seizure under state constitution differs from that under us constitution 3: recognizing exception under state constitution 4: holding that offsite sign ban was a contentneutral restriction that was not facially invalid under california constitution", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to Aquino\u2019s lawsuit, had no obvious motive to misrepresent the coverage limit. Moreover, as noted, the company\u2019s representation of liability limits (as \u201c100,000 CSL\u201d) coincided with language used in the declaration page (\u201c$100,000 Combined Single Limit\u201d) to describe coverage limits for property damage and bodily injury. Thus, because Pearson\u2019s statements resulted from a reasonable, albeit mistaken, interpretation of the insurance policy, they are not actionable under Chapter 93A. See Guity, 36 Mass.App.Ct. at 343, 631 N.E.2d 75 (\u201cA plausible, reasoned legal position that may ultimately turn out to be mistaken ... is outside the scope of the punitive aspects of the combined application of Chapter 93A and Chapter 176D\u201d); United States ex. rel. Metric Electric, 301 F.Supp.2d at 70 (<HOLDING>). Even assuming arguendo that Pearson\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment on chapter 93a claim is appropriate when summary judgment is granted on fraud claim and chapter 93a claim is solely based on the underlying claim for common law fraud 1: holding that where there was no evidence of the claimed underlying violation and where there were no unique arguments related to the chapter 93a claim defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs chapter 93a claim 2: holding that a closing protection letter offering to indemnify a mortgage company was not an insurance contract where although issued by an insurance company there was no distribution of the risk 3: holding that inaccuracies did not give rise to a violation of chapter 93a where there was no deliberate misrepresentation of underlying facts and no indication that the insurance company did not believe its conclusions to be true at the time 4: holding that a city may not be held liable under  1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "requires courts to analyze whether convenient and suitable access exists between the public roadway and the private parcel, or between some commercially useful location within the property and the point on the perimeter connecting the property to the public roadway. Whether there is reasonably convenient and suitable access to a parcel does not depend on whether the landowner prefers a different point of access. Grossman, 571 N.W.2d at 51. It is generally true that we consider the commercial use the complaining property owner wishes to make of the parcel when evaluating whether reasonably convenient and suitable access exists. See, e.g., Johnson, 263 N.W.2d at 607. (considering the commercial use of a bus company); County of Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Minn.App.1993) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. May 28, 1993). But these Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination 1: holding the district court erred when it did not consider the disruption of business caused by a roadway modification that may have interfered with large vehicles accessing the property 2: holding that the district court erred when it relied on the governments representation that the property sought by the defendant had been destroyed because the government did not submit any evidence of the propertys destruction 3: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm 4: holding circuit courts injunction interfered with the general operations of the agency", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "demonstrate that Qwest was entitled to forbearance in the Phoenix MSA.\u201d). However, the Commission moved the goalpost. It criticized Qwest\u2019s evidentiary showing again, this time because Qwest failed to present evidence that consumers consider wireline voice services and wireless voice services to be substitutes, such that the latter materially constrains the price of the former. Specifically, the Commission observed, \u201cKnowing the percentage of households that rely exclusively upon mobile wireless is insufficient to determine whether mobile wireless services have a price-constraining effect on wireline access services.\u201d Id. at 8654, \u00b6 59. This kind of goalpost-moving does not reflect an optimal mode of administrative decisionmaking. ulatory Comm\u2019n, 584 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (D.C.Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Verizon Tel., 570 F.3d at 304 (\u201c[I]t is Holdings: 0: holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious 1: holding that an agencys sudden shift in the nature of proof required of the regulated party was not sufficiently explained and necessitated remand 2: holding that an agencys sudden unexplained shift in the kind of data that a regulated party was required to submit was arbitrary 3: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 4: holding that it was not arbitrary and capricious for an agency to change course when one of its basic assumptions in earlier rulemaking was contradicted by new data", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "sentences for multiple offenses ran concurrently. United States v. Martin, 526 F.3d 926, 940 (6th Cir.2008). Alexis\u2019s three drug offenses meet the first and second Hill tests. Fifteen days separated the first and second offenses, and ten days separated the second and third offenses. \u201cBecause each offense occurred on a separate day, there is a distinct separation between the beginning and ending of all three offenses.\u201d Banner, 518 Fed.Appx. at 406. Additionally, during the time separating Alexis\u2019s offenses, he had the ability to cease his criminal conduct and withdraw without committing a subsequent offense. We have held that periods of time far shorter than ten days between offenses qualify as separate episodes. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 381 Fed.Appx. 495, 506 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Because Alexis was convicted of illegally Holdings: 0: holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank 1: holding that evidence the victim tried to keep defendant from fleeing the scene of a crime and defendant killed victim in order to escape supported the finding that murder was committed to avoid arrest 2: holding that a robbery defendant was not entitled to a compulsion instruction in the absence of a claim that he or the victim was the target of a specific threat forcing the defendant to participate in the robbery 3: holding that two robberies committed within hours of each other were not part of a common scheme or plan when the defendant did not originally plan to rob his second victim 4: holding that a defendant committed separate offenses when he robbed multiple individuals within minutes at the same location because he retreated on foot to the corner of the block or to hide behind cars between every robbery each time making a conscious decision to return to the scene to rob another victim", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. State, 696 So.2d 901, 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Keller v. State, 586 So.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Perez v. State, 566 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). However, in Chaeld v. State, 599 So.2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the court held that a jury instruction based on Faison was not applicable when a charge alleges false imprisonment. The Chaeld court held: This so-call Faison instruction must be given upon the defendant\u2019s request whenever the state charges kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony under \u00a7 787.01(l)(a)2. It has no application when the charge alleges that the defendant kidnapped the victim with any of the other specific intentions identified in \u00a7 787(l)(a)l, 3 or 4. See Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 251 (Fla.1991) (<HOLDING>). Because the Faison instruction is implicated Holdings: 0: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 1: holding that defendant charged with conspiracy to manufacture marijuana and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute was not entitled to specific buyerseller instruction even though support for such instruction existed because court gave a complete instruction reciting all the elements of conspiracy 2: holding that a defendant charged with kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim is not entitled to a faison instruction 3: holding that the first amendment prohibits criminal sanctions for true statements made with an intent to inflict harm 4: holding that life sentence imposed for kidnapping with bodily injury of 14yearold victim was not cruel and unusual punishment even though bodily injury was slight given circumstances attendant upon offense", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "overturned unless no reasonable juror could have found that the govern ment disproved either element of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir.1992). In this case, the Government produced evidence that undercut at least the element of predisposition. Whether to believe this evidence or accept Mannar\u2019s conflicting evidence was a question for the jury. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.1994). The fact that the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count does not amount to a finding of entrapment; even if it did, it would not preclude a rejection of that defense for the second count. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Mannar also asserts that the district court Holdings: 0: holding that jury finding of entrapment in may and june offenses did not extend to august offense 1: holding that erroneous exclusion of evidence regarding defendants lack of criminal record was not harmless in prosecution for drug offenses in which defendant asserted entrapment 2: holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense 3: holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical 4: holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of evidentiary privilege of the FRE applies to all stages of proceedings before bankruptcy- judges. Under the FRE, \u201cevidentiary privileges in federal question cases are governed by federal common law\u201d. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 2625, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989). Courts have uniformly held that the \u201cbanker-depositor privilege was not recognized at common law\u201d and \u201cdoes not exist in the Federal Courts\u201d. United States v. Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400, 402 (5th Cir.1976); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir.1969); Reiserer v. United States, 479 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir.2007) (under Federal common Law, \u201c[i]t is well settled that there is no privilege between a bank and its depositor\u201d). See also, Sneirson v. Chemical Bank, 108 F.R.D. 159, 162 (D.Del.1985) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even assuming state law creates \u201ca Holdings: 0: holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank 1: holding that statute making child welfare agency records confidential but disclosable pursuant to a court order did not create an absolute privilege for such records 2: holding that a claim of privilege to bank records pursuant to federal public policy was without merit 3: holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege 4: recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the party with whom the plaintiff expects to do business.\u201d Schuler v. Abbott Laboratories, 265 Ill.App.3d 991, 203 Ill.De\\c. 105, 639 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1993). Because Cook did not name any particular third party with whom he had a reasonable expectation of a business relationship, or toward whom Winfrey directed her interfering actions, the court concluded that the complaint was inadequate. Cook responds to this dismissal by identifying Illinois cases holding that the plaintiff may point to an identifiable \u201cclass\u201d of third parties with whom he had a business expectancy (and toward whom the defendant directed her interfering actions), rather than a single third party. See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154, 217 Ill.Dec. 410, 667 N.E.2d 499, 507 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Darien, Holdings: 0: holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party 1: holding in addition to the requirements in 23a and 23b the plaintiff must also show  that the class is indeed identifiable as a class 2: recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined 3: holding that a plaintiff must allege either an interference with specific third parties or an identifiable class of third persons 4: holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir.2006), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2914, 168 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007). We note, however, that because the EEOC in Holow-ecki did not issue a right-to-sue letter or otherwise treat the questionnaire as a charge, id. at 563, Holowecki is notably different from the case before us. In addition, as explained above, Mr. Jones reasonably believed that the questionnaire constituted a charge. 5 . Because Mr. Jones does not assert a pattern-or-practice claim, we do not decide whether the pattern-or-practice method of proof is available to individual plaintiffs. We note, however, that other circuits have held that this method of proof is not available in a private, non-class suit. See Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding because the plaintiffs erisa claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence  the eighth circuit analyzed the claim under the mcdonnell douglas framework 1: holding that without a link to the challenged decision stray remarks did not constitute indirect evidence of discrimination sufficient to satisfy the final prong of the mcdonnell douglas framework 2: holding because libels erisa claim is based on alleged circumstantial evidence  we analyze it under the mcdonnell douglas framework 3: holding that general employment practices are relevant to eeoc investigation of individual disparate treatment claim 4: holding that a patternorpractice claim is not available to individual plaintiffs although patternorpractice evidence may be relevant to proving an otherwiseviable individual claim for disparate treatment under the mcdonnell douglas framework", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "an intention to call a telephone number or party not listed by him on the required MITS \u201cNumber Request Form,\u201d see supra p. 281, even assuming he were to elect to utilize the MITS. Instead, since there can be no secre tive acquisition of information already provided to the DOC, see supra pp. 288-89 (noting that \u201csecretive\u201d interceptions presume lack of knowledge), Gilday simply assumes, sub silentio, that any putative number(s) and person(s) he might call would not already have been known to the DOC before the call was placed. Absent evidence on this critical point, however, there can have been no pri-ma facie showing that any surreptitious or secretive \u201cinterception\u201d would occur, let alone did occur, within the meaning of the Massachusetts Wiretap Act. See Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 340 (<HOLDING>). In all events, as noted above, see supra p. Holdings: 0: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law 1: holding that a secretive interception has occurred unless both parties to the call had actual knowledge of the intrusion 2: holding that it seems clear that when the contents of a  communication are captured or redirected in any way an interception occurs at that time but also since the definition of interception includes the aural acquisition of the contents of the communication the interception must also be considered to occur where the redirected contents are first heard 3: recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge 4: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to its property interest in federal Medicaid and Medicare funds and injury to its liberty interest in its reputation. Id. at 1139, 1142. The court found that an informal administrative hearing held prior to the reimbursement ban satisfied due process and that a full evidentiary hearing was not required. Id. at 1145; see also Vencor Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.1999) (although nursing facility had a constitutionally-protected interest in not being terminated from the Medicare/Medicaid program, the court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not show likelihood of success on the claim that HHS termination procedures violated due process); Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F.Supp. 929, 940 (S.D.W.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 134 F.3d 1218 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that a statutory entitlement to payment for reasonable and necessary medical treatment cannot give rise to a property interest until the payments in question have been proven to be reasonable and necessary 1: holding the medicaid act permits enforcement under  1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures 2: holding that a plaintiff in an erisa denial of benefits case bears the burden of proving her entitlement to contractual benefits 3: recognizing entitlement to government benefits and finding that state medicaid agency violated  45523 which only permits temporary withholding of payment when it suspended payments indefinitely 4: holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Although public policy arguments are not resolved by juries, they require that the court understand what happened to a plaintiff, a question only answered after a. judge has heard evidence detailing the circumstances that resulted in an injury. See Lodge, 246 Conn. at 578, 717 A.2d 215 (resolving public policy question after trial); Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 408, 696 A.2d 332 (same). To address public policy for the first time at this stage in the litigation deprives the Munns of the opportunity to rebut Hotch-kiss\u2019s version of events. How, for example, could the Munns have known that they needed to offer evidence of \u201cthe normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review\u201d? Even if Hotchkiss had adequately preserved its argument, however, it should not be excused from (<HOLDING>). There is no public policy exemption Holdings: 0: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate 1: holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination 2: holding first that tortfeasor could have foreseen that victims employers insurance premiums might increase and then deciding that public policy precluded liability for those increases 3: holding first that injuries sustained during contact sports were foreseeable then deciding that public policy insulated the defendant from liability for those injuries 4: holding that a standard employers liability policy is not an ocean marine policy", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "salutary protection of the people against their own representatives which such legislation is designed to secure. Luzerne Township v. Fayette County, 330 Pa. 247, 252, 199 A. 327, 330 (1938). Because there was no meeting of the minds, no compliance with the statutory provisions necessary to properly execute a binding agreement on County\u2019s behalf and no material fact at issue, the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment must be affirmed. ORDER AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 1997, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED. PELLEGRINI, J., concurs in the result only. 1 . Act of July 3, 1986, P.L. 388, as amended, 65 P.S. \u00a7\u00a7 271-286. 2 . See Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 134 Pa.Cmwlth. 494, 579 A.2d 1358 Holdings: 0: holding that section 13 of the sunshine act 65 ps  283 grants the court discretion to invalidate any or all official actions taken at illegally closed meetings 1: holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances 2: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties 3: holding texas open meeting act prohibiting governmental body from conducting closed meetings during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control is discussed to be contentneutral because closed meetings 1 prevent transparency 2 encourage fraud and corruption and 3 foster mistrust in government 4: holding that state officials may be personally liable for actions taken in their official capacity", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "EMTALA \u2014 they knew the essential facts and had both the basic legal and medical knowledge to do so. At this late hour, they shall not be heard to the contrary; specially given the fact that Plaintiffs were twice allowed to amend the complaint after Defendants moved to dismiss but failed to address most of the factual issues discussed here. See Ibarzabal v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 333 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissal affirmed where plaintiff received notice of affirmative defense but failed to address it in an amended complaint). Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs\u2019 claims under EMTALA are DISMISSED with prejudice. Having so decided, Plaintiffs\u2019 supplemental state-law claims must also be \u00cdHSMISSED. See Newman v. Bwrgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs may pursue those claims in state Holdings: 0: holding if the legislature had the power to confer upon the county commissioners jurisdiction to hear and determine the question as to whether or not a town was of undue extent and to deprive it of a part of its territory then the proceeding being statutory before a body of limited powers the record must show affirmatively that such a case was brought before them as they were authorized to hear and determine and that all the jurisdictional facts were found to exist where the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine depends upon the existence of a fact that fact must appear or the proceedings are coram non judice and void 1: holding that no substantial question of federal law was required to be answered to determine the plaintiffs statelaw legal malpractice negligence and breach of contract claims 2: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power 3: holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit  and the district court has considerable authority whether or not to exercise this power in light of such considerations as judicial economy convenience fairness to litigants and eomity  4: holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.2d at 206-07. Reasonableness, as shown by the movant, is essentially judged by looking to \u201cthe delay ... from the time the party is deemed to have notice of the grounds for its Rule 60(b) motion.\u201d Jones v. City of Richmond, 106 F.R.D. 485, 489 (E.D.Va.1985). In measuring this delay, however, there is no set time period distinguishing timely from untimely motions outside of the absolute, one-year time frame for Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) motions. What constitutes a reasonable time will generally depend on the facts of each case. See United States v. Wyle (In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.), 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989). A major consideration may well be whether the nonmovant was prejudiced by the delay and whether the movant had a good reason for failing to take action sooner. Compare id. (<HOLDING>), with McLawhorn v. John W. Daniel & Co., 924 Holdings: 0: holding an internal error that caused the movant to receive the trustees notice of motion twentysix days after the court heard the trustees motion  may have constituted excusable neglect had the movant made a prompt motion for reconsideration and pointing out it is the movants actions after he became aware of the existence of the trustees motion  that reaches the level of willfulness 1: holding that the csu board of trustees and individual trustees sued in their official capacity are a political arm of the state and as such are immune from suit 2: holding that a debtor could not relitigate the claim that the trustee breached his fiduciary duty because the bankruptcy court had already held that the trustees actions were not improper 3: holding a bankruptcy trustees rule 60b6 motion timely despite a delay of eighteen months from the date of the court order and fifteen months from the denial of the trustees written request for a refund government found to have been put on notice of intention to reopen settlement by earlier actions of trustee 4: holding that the trustees preference actions against each of the defendants was precluded as a matter of law by the debtors earlier assumption of its agreements with them ", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "pursue dual-purpose storage[,]\u201d SMUD IV, 293 Fed.Appx. at 772, the court has determined that even in light of the January 1, 2000 acceptance date, DOE\u2019s January 31, 1998 partial breach of the Ju court prospectively apply the $4,196,260 savings SMUD realized in 2003 for each of the years 2004-2008. No evidence, however, has been proffered of the exact SNF pool savings, if any, that SMUD realized in 2004-2008 (Rem. TR at 10, 69, 140-51). SMUD has requested an unspecified amount of damages \u201cfrom January 1, 2004 forward\u201d in a separate proceeding, Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States, Case No. 09-587C (Dec. 4, 2009) at \u00b623. Accordingly, the court has decided it is proper to account for any 2004-2008 SNF wet pool savings offset in that proceeding. Indiana Michigan, 422 F.3d at 1377 (<HOLDING>)- The Government, however, legitimately is Holdings: 0: holding that in a partial breach case the plaintiff cannot recover prospective damages for anticipated future nonperformance 1: holding that plaintiff could recover only damages sustained as a result of the sale of the accused product by defendant prior to the issuance date 2: holding that a contract must entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the governments breach of that contract 3: holding that absent an independent tort a plaintiff alleging a breach of contract may only seek to recover the damages flowing from the breach 4: holding that if the breach of an entire contract is only partial the plaintiff can recover only such damages as he or she has sustained leaving prospective damages to a later suit in the event of further breaches", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "satisfy the \u201cextra-element\u201d test and so is equivalent to CoStar\u2019s claim under the Copyright Act. Accordingly, it is preempted. The determination of whether CoStar\u2019s remaining state claims are preempted similarly turns on whether they arise solely from copying or whether they require additional elements. CoStar characterizes its unjust enrichment claim as based not on the copyright infringement, but rather upon misattribution of source arising from its Lanham Act claims. Paper no. 94, at 36. In Wharton, however, the court held that the plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment was preempted by the Copyright Act because it \u201cconcerns the central allegation that Defendants plagiarized his copyrighted screenplay.\u201d Wharton, 907 F.Supp. at 146; see also American Movie Classics, 922 F.Supp. at 934 (<HOLDING>). CoStar seeks to distinguish the present case Holdings: 0: holding that declaratory judgment and unjust enrichment claims were preempted notwithstanding that plaintiff did not assert a copyright claim 1: holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim 2: holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement 3: holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment 4: holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "3 . The Cities appear to have done just that, appealing the NPDES permits to the Environmental Appeals Board and challenging the use of the 2009 Document in that appeal. See, e.g., Pet'n for Review at 46, In re Town of Newmarket, No. NPDES 12-05 (Dec. 14, 2012) (arguing that \u201cEPA is illegally applying an unadopted, numeric criteri[on] violating applicable Federal law, in deciding that a 0.3mg/L TN criteria must be met throughout the Great Bay Estuary to protect eelgrass\u201d), available at http://go.usa.gov/4yYR. 4 . Indeed, the havoc would likely be incompatible with a ''clear-cut\u201d nondiscretionary duty to review that is' actionable under section 1365(a)(2), the citizen suit provision that forms the basis of plaintiffs\u2019 suit. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on the Eight Circuit Holdings: 0: holding under a nearly identical provision of the clean air act that a nondiscretionaiy duty supporting a citizen suit must be nondiscretionary ie clearcut 1: holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the citizen suit provision of the caa 2: holding the epa could regulate air pollutants under the clean air act solely on the basis of the pollutants risk to human health 3: holding for a citizen suit brought under a substantially identical provision of the clean air act that whether plaintiffs have established a nondiscretionary duty to act by the epa is a merits question under rule 12b6 rather than a subjectmatter jurisdiction question under rule 12b1 4: holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "over. The parties have agreed that any remainder will go, after distribution of treble damages to class members, to cancer or patient-related charities. Although unusually timed, the cy pres fund in this case, contrary to Howe\u2019s argument, is not taking damages away from the class members. The settlement per mits all plaintiffs to claim and be paid their damages \u2014 indeed treble their damages\u2014 before any money is paid to charity through cy pres. This process is like other, routinely approved cy pres distributions. See, e.g., Powell, 119 F.3d at 705-06 (refusing, after money in a settlement fund remained, to distribute the rest to class members because \u201cneither party ha[d] a legal right\u201d to the unclaimed funds); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). It would elevate form over substance to Holdings: 0: holding that when counsel denied the petitioner the right to appeal neither the strickland prejudice prong nor the harmlesserror test is appropriate 1: holding that the defendants contention was waived because it was supported neither by cogent argument nor citation to authority 2: holding that when plaintiff sought arbitration and neither the award nor the arbitration agreement mentioned interest the plaintiff was not entitled to preaward interest 3: holding a cy pres distribution was appropriate when 6 million remained in a fund created to pay costs and extra claims in a settlement because neither the plaintiff class nor the settling defendants had any right to the money 4: holding that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on a defendants jurydemand where the defendant had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to make such a demand", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (quoting Amaker v. Coombe, 2002 WL 523388, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.29, 2002)). Plaintiff has made no attempt to establish that this seven-day delay somehow caused his condition to deteriorate, or that he suffered extreme pain. In fact, plaintiff admits that he suffered \u201cno pain as a result of his rectal condition.\u201d Plaintiffs Rule 56(e) Statement, \u00b6 3. The crux of plaintiffs complaint centers around the delay in treatment between his first complaints in March of 1998, while he was incarcerated at Auburn, and his eventual diagnosis in November 1998, while housed at Collins. Most of the delay in plaintiffs treatment can be attributed to plaintiffs transfer from Auburn to Southport and eventually to Collins. See Ross v. Kelly, 784 F.Supp. 35, 47-49 (W.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>). Athough the lag in treatment is unfortunate, Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendants claim did not amount to a complete denial of counsel it could not form the basis of a collateral attack 1: holding that charging fees for medical services did not violate the eighth amendment where prisoner did not allege denial of medical care 2: holding frequent transfers did not amount to denial of medical care 3: holding that a state is required to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals 4: holding the delays of more than six years did not amount to the denial of access to the courts", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 uent to the events alleged here. Further, in deciding Croft, the Third Circuit appears to break new ground rather than rely on firmly established constitutional principles; the Croft court cites to no cases decided prior to 1996 that announced the same specific standard. Consequently, the Croft decision is not determinative of whether Scheer knowingly violated clearly defined existing law in depriving Miller of the custody of her children without, allegedly, an objectively reasonable basis for suspecting abuse. Rather, the court must look to case law as it existed in September 1995 in deciding whether Scheer\u2019s alleged conduct violated clearly established rights. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816-17, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Prior to Croft, there were no clearly Holdings: 0: holding that a disability must be evaluated at the time of the challenged employment action 1: holding that clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court under aedpa is the law at the time of the statecourt adjudication on the merits not at the time the conviction becomes final 2: holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action 3: holding that the court of appeals in applying state law on appeal of a diversity action must apply law of the state as it existed at the time of its decision rather than as it stood at the time the case was decided in district court 4: holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "be actually living with defendant, and not just be visitor). Service of process is intended to give notice to a defendant and, thus, service of process must be reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (stating \u201cdue process [requires] * * * notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pre 0th Cir.1935) (requiring permanancy of residence); Burtchaell v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 738, 738-39 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (concluding girlfriend from another state occasionally visiting for few days to week not residing therein); Gamboa v. Jones, 455 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). DECISION Peterson\u2019s 14-year-old stepson, who Holdings: 0: holding housekeeper did not reside therein 1: holding the tenday requirement was ministerial and the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay 2: holding tenday visitor not residing therein 3: holding babysitter was not residing therein 4: holding fourmonth visitor was residing therein", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Personal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa.Super.Ct.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 . Id. at 1149 (citations omitted). 8 . Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . See Rhodes v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 21 A.3d 1253, 1263 (Pa.Super.Ct.2011). 10 . Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 523 (3d Cir.2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 . Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1145 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006). 12 . To the extent the Miezejewskis argue the claim representative was not permitted to make an initial offer pending further discovery on the basis of the information already submitted to the insurer, they misconstrue Pennsylvania law. See id. at 1151 (<HOLDING>). 13 .There is simply no evidence that the Holdings: 0: holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule 1: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 2: holding that insurer did not engage in bad faith by relying on the equivocal contents of a police report in taking an initial position pending further investigation and evaluation that claimant was not entitled to uim benefits 3: holding insurer was not acting in bad faith in denying underinsured motorist benefits where denial was based on an issue of law unsettled in iowa and on which other jurisdictions disagreed 4: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "evidence, Jacob moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that no evidence had been presented which would support a finding that his injuries were caused by anything other than Amtrak\u2019s negligence. The District Court reserved decision. Because Jacob failed to renew his motion within ten days of the entry of final judgment, as is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, he waived his claim for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b); Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46, 50 n. 6 (3d Cir.1989). In his reply brief, Jacob argues that even if he waived his claim for judgment as a matter of law, we should nonetheless review his sufficiency of the evidence argument and, if we find that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict, grant a new trial. Id. (<HOLDING>). But cf. Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence 1: holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial 2: holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified 3: holding that the defendants insufficientevidence claim was barred by his failure to renew his rule 29 motion at the close of all the evidence because there was no manifest miscarriage of justice 4: holding that an appellate court should not undertake to review whether a plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the only motion filed and the only motion on appeal was the trial courts grant of summary judgment", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "others] under the age of 30 ... who came to the United States under the age of sixteen\u201d without authorization and meet certain other criteria. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secy of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm\u2019r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Imm. & Customs Enforcement, at I (June 15, 2012), and citing Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at Al). 4 . Courts considering similar enactments prior to Arizona likewise held them unconstitutional. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 221 (3d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), vacated on other grounds, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that municipal ordinance was preempted by frsa and void under supremacy clause 1: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law 2: holding preempted municipal housing ordinance that would effectively remove persons from the city based on a snapshot of their current immigration status rather than based on a federal order of removal 3: recognizing that old chief was based entirely on the federal rules of evidence rather than the constitution 4: holding that a local ordinance prohibiting rental housing for illegal aliens was not field preempted and did not conflict with the federal removal process and where the ordinance specified it did not prohibit conduct expressly permitted by federal law did not conflict with federal antiharboring law", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "See Mem. in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 7 n. 4 (ECF 2-4). Accordingly, I will consider the parties\u2019 claims in the context of well-established First Amendment case law. 15 . In a previous, unreported decision in this district considering a First Amendment challenge to earlier Ocean City ordinances restricting activity on the boardwalk, Judge Marvin J. Garbis rejected Ocean City's argument that the boardwalk is not a public street for First Amendment purposes. See One World One Family Now, Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean City, Civ. No. MJG-95-1401, op. at 9-11 (D. Md. June 22, 1995). 16 . Some decisions have held that certain publicly-owned tourist areas are not traditional public fora. See, e.g., New England Regional Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 22-23 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier & Holdings: 0: holding that chicagos navy pier is not a traditional public forum 1: holding that bostons fish pier is not a traditional public forum 2: holding that san franciscos fishermans wharf is a traditional public forum 3: holding that the venice beach boardwalk is a traditional public forum 4: holding that the state could not require yakama indians to purchase licenses for using traditional nets to catch fish", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that actual service on the defendants at the end of July of 2005 constituted a step in the prosecution interrupting prescription. We must disagree. We find that the signing of the case management order by the trial judge in another division did not interrupt the running of the time period for abandonment as to the instant lawsuit. Moreover, none of the exceptions that would defeat abandonment for matters not appearing of record are applicable in this case. Lastly, and most importantly, plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the relied-upon action was taken by a party to the instant lawsuit. Therefore, it cannot serve to interrupt the running of the applicable period. See La.Code Civ. P. art. 561; see also Furr v. Pearce & LeBkmc, Inc., 2006-564 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/27/06), 948 So.2d 279 (<HOLDING>). We further find that the motion to dismiss Holdings: 0: holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk 1: holding that the clerk who refused to accept filing of complaint at the direction of the judge was entitled to quasijudicial immunity 2: holding that although the filing of suit and service of citation interrupt the running of the statute its dismissal for want of prosecution will have the same effect as if the suit had never been filed 3: holding that the filing of a motion to dismiss the case by the clerk of court did not interrupt the running of the threeyear prescriptive period for abandonment because the action was taken by the clerk of court a nonparty 4: holding analogous federal rule did not authorize the filing of a motion to join by a nonparty to the lawsuit", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of public concern is Gardetto\u2019s public support of the three non-incumbent candidates for positions on EWC\u2019s board of trustees. One of the primary functions of a L.Ed.2d 201 (1992). Thus, we hold that Gardetto\u2019s endorsement of the three insurgent candidates for the college\u2019s board positions involves speech on a matter of public concern. Similarly, we hold that Gardetto\u2019s statements criticizing Mason for holding himself out as a \u201cdoctor\u201d when he did not have a Ph.D. or other doctoral degree involves speech on a matter of public concern. The integrity, qualifications, and misrepresentations of a highly visible public official, such as the president of a college, obviously impact the social and political life of a commu nity. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Conaway, 853 F.2d at 796-97 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that a city finance directors allegations of discriminatory employment practices in support of black females and perceived illegal budgeting activities were matters of public concern 1: holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern 2: holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern 3: holding allegations of wrongdoing by public officials are on the highest order of first amendment concern 4: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "When a complaint seeking review of governmental action is combined with one or more counts alleging causes of action that are independent of the court\u2019s review of the governmental action, the court will be called upon to act in two distinct capacities \u2014 as an appellate court and as a trial court. Because of the distinction in the nature of the claims, the procedure for resolution of the claims will differ as well. Thus, the rules require that the party filing a combined complaint must immediately seek an order from the court specifying the future course of the proceedings in order, to avoid confusion in the processing of the complaint. See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(i). The motion must be filed within ten days after the filing of the complaint. See id. [\u00b6 15] 98 ME 71, \u00b6 9, 708 A.2d 1027, 1030 (<HOLDING>); Saucier, 1998 ME 61, \u00b6 6, 708 A.2d at 283 Holdings: 0: holding that delay is waived when the defendant makes dilatory pleadings and motions 1: holding sanctions were appropriate due to prejudice imposed on other party from failure to disclose subject matter of expert testimony 2: holding sanctions were appropriate when the party had no reasonable justification for his repeated failures to designate an expert 3: holding sanctions were appropriate when excessive responsive pleadings were filed for purposes of delay 4: holding sanctions were appropriate where party filed motions merely for purposes of delay", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "degree upon the particular facts presented by each individual case. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948. Applying this test to Ulrich, the court concluded that Ulrich\u2019s injuries did not occur as a natural consequence of the use of the motorist\u2019s truck, but rather occurred as a natural consequence of the motorist\u2019s use of a gun. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. The court further commented that the motorist\u2019s intentional act of shooting was an independent, intervening cause of Ulrich\u2019s injuries, rendering the motorist\u2019s use of his truck legally insignificant. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. \u00b652 State Farm cites several cases from courts in other jurisdictions also applying a restrictive interpretation to \u201carising out of the use.\u201d See e.g., Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (Mich. App. Ct. 1975), 235 N.W.2d 42, 50 (<HOLDING>); Lemmons v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Holdings: 0: holding that where occupants left uninsured vehicle assaulted a pedestrian pedestrian ran into highway and was struck by a truck no causal connection existed between pedestrians injuries and use of the uninsured vehicle because assaults and fisticuffs are not normal foreseeable occurrences in the use of a vehicle 1: holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes 2: holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle 3: holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key 4: holding that under the plain and obvious meaning of the uim statute a prerequisite to the term underinsured motor vehicle is the existence of  bodily injury liability insurance coverage which is less than the liability for damages imposed by law  and where no such coverage existed tortfeasor was not underinsured under the statute but rather uninsured concluding that terms underinsured and uninsured are mutually exclusive as applied to the same motor vehicle and the combination of these two coverages by the insured was contrary to legislative intent", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "clear that the standard of consumer mark recognition required for a trademark-dilution claim is much more stringent \u2014 meaning truly na tional, widespread recognition \u2014 than that required for a likelihood-of-confusion analysis in a trademark-infringement claim. 12 Eva\u2019s Bridal, 639 F3d at 789 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). 13 See, for example, Detroit Creamery Co v Velvet Brand Ice Cream Co, 187 Mich 312, 316; 153 NW 664 (1915) (\u201cIt has been universally held that a trade-mark, as such cannot be assigned separately and distinct from the property to which it has been attached, and likewise the rule has been laid down that a naked license to use a trade-mark is of no more validity than an assignment thereof.\u201d); Broeg v Duchaine, 319 Mass 711, 713; 67 NE2d 466 (1946) (<HOLDING>); 3 McCarthy, Trademarks & Unfair Competition Holdings: 0: holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong 1: holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark 2: holding under common law of trademark that one who has developed a trade mark as a guaranty of the quality of his merchandise should not he permitted to license its use apart from his business to those who may sell an inferior product 3: holding that the lack of a confidentiality agreement does not necessarily defeat an argument that information is a trade secret because where an employee acquires during the course of his employment a special technique or process developed by his employer he is under a duty not to use it to the detriment of his employer 4: holding that the essential wrong of trademark infringement the appropriation of the good will of anothers established mark may be effectively accomplished by advertising matter associating that others distinguishing mark with the product of defendant", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to demonstrate genuine issues exist for trial. Griffin, 74 F.3d at 827. 1. Direct Discrimination As she did in the district court, Markel contends that several statements attributed to Offerman and LaForge are evidence of direct discrimination. Offer-man, LaForge, and the University deny that the statements were ever made. At oral argument the University contended that these statements are more appropriately considered performance related, and even if they are believed, show an aversion toward age not gender. Either way, the statements are not worth repeating because they fail to show direct discrimination. In order to arrive at the conclusion Markel would have us reach, we would need to infer discriminatory animus into the statements, which we cannot do. See Randle, 876 F.2d at 569-70 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Moreover, the statements Holdings: 0: holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact 1: holding that estoppel was a question of fact 2: holding that direct evidence if believed by the trier of fact will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption 3: holding that a statutory presumption is a rule of law requiring a trier of fact to reach a particular conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary 4: holding it is a question of fact", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in this subsection, the term \u2018any person\u2019 includes any State____\u201d Id. \u00a7 3(a) & (c). Instances in which Congress has explicitly included states but not the federal government is conclusive evidence of congressional intent to exclude the federal government. See Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 617-18, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1634, 118 L.Ed.2d 255 (1992) (\u201cIts omission has to be seen as a pointed one when so many other governmental entities are specified\u201d). This legislative intent is even more obvious when one considers the historical context: the amendment was enacted without any mention of the federal government against a legal backdrop of cases holding that the Lanham Act did not apply to state or federal governments. See Woelffer v. Happy States, 626 F.Supp. 499, 504 (N.D.Ill.1985) (<HOLDING>); Serra v. General Servs. Admin., 667 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that the ats does not waive the united states sovereign immunity 1: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 2: holding that the lanham act did not waive states sovereign immunity 3: holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity 4: holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "relief independently of Tan in addition to being included as a derivative party on her asylum claim. See AR at 395-401. The Immigration Judge (\"U\u201d) and BIA ultimately denied his application for cancellation of removal. See id. at 391, 379. 3 . An applicant for withholding of removal need not show that she would be singled out for persecution if she can demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution of persons similarly situated to her on account of, inter alia, race or religion. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 208.13(b)(2)(iii). In the instant case, Tan did not raise the pattern or practice argument before the BIA, and therefore we are without jurisdiction to review such an argument, even though the BIA sua sponte addressed it. See Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, she does not raise the argument Holdings: 0: holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte 1: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the bia refusing to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte 2: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims not raised below by the alien even when the bia reviews the claim sua sponte 3: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been raised before the bia 4: holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "failed to show that other alleged false statements were actually false. As to the allegations that the \u201ccompare to\u201d language impliedly communicated that the products had been tested against each other, PBM\u2019s marketing director testified that the products have, in fact, been tested against each other. Id. at *5. In addition, Mead Johnson alleged that PBM\u2019s label stated its gentle formula contains \u201cpartially broken down whey protein\u201d but presented no evidence to suggest otherwise. As a result, the alleged implied message could not be proven false. In any event, even if PBM\u2019s \u201ccompare to\u201d messages were false, the district court correctly concluded that Mead Johnson cannot prove that the \u201ccompare to\u201d language caused any damages. See Xoom v. Imageline, 323 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The fatal flaw in Mead Johnson\u2019s economic Holdings: 0: holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages 1: holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation 2: holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers 3: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 4: holding that in order to recover damages under the lanham act plaintiff must prove that there was a violation that plaintiff has been damaged and that there is a causal connection between the violation and those damages", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "provision that expressly permits PMI to terminate employees covered under the CBA. That provision requires PMI to give employees \u201cthree (3) working days notice before layoff if circumstances reasonably allow.\u201d In addition, the CBA contains a provision stating that \u201c[t]he management and direction of the Plant and working forces is vested in the Company, except insofar as is expressly abridged by specific provisions of this Contract.\u201d This court has held that \u201c[i]t is clear ... that neither federal labor law nor ordinary collective bargaining agreements compel an employer to maintain in operation all or any part of its business.\u201d Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115, 1122 (6th Cir.1981); see also Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 228 (6th Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). Here, the CBA allows PMI to terminate union Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under  301 of the lmra because absent an express contractual provision there is no prohibition against an employer moving its operations to another state 1: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 2: holding plaintiffs state law claims of inter alia tortious interference with contract are preempted by section 301 of lmra 3: holding employees negligence claim against his employer was preempted by the lmra 4: holding that an administrative agency or a state courts finding that an employer had just cause to terminate a plaintiff is not preclusive with regard to the plaintiffs discrimination claim against the employer", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "748 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex.App.\u2014 Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). The question presented is whether Mrs. Domel\u2019s affidavit raises an issue of material fact as to whether the tributary is a watercourse. We believe it does not. Mrs. Domel admits that the tributary can fairly be classified as an intermittent stream with perennial pools. She also states that prior to 1998, there was a flow of water after significant rains, and that the tributary was dry from late spring until early fall. Hoefs instructs that a current of water \u201cneed not be continuous and the stream may be dry for long periods of time,\u201d and a stream may be \u201cintermittent as to flow \u2019 and remain a watercourse. Hoefs, 273 S.W. at 786-87; see also Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Arseneaux, 116 Tex. 608, 297 S.W. 225, 227-28 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. Holdings: 0: holding that debt orhusband could exempt his interest in home even though he lived elsewhere and even though the home was a residence only for his children and codebtor wife from whom he was separated 1: holding that the plaintiff adequately alleged an injury in fact where it alleged that it would receive less irrigation water from a bureau as a result of restrictions imposed on the bureau from the challenged agency opinion 2: holding that the farreaching benefits from a flood control program outweighed the possibility of future floods 3: holding navasota river a watercourse even though plaintiff alleged it flowed only during rainy seasons from storm and flood waters 4: holding that even though  24 only refers to actions in state court it applies to state claims brought in federal court", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "[them] from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction regardless of the facts,\u201d Utah R.Crim.P. 18(e)(10), and (2) those jurors \u201cwho would always vote to impose the death penalty upon a finding of first degree murder.\u201d State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 342 (Utah 1993) (plurality opinion) (citing State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1225-26 (Utah 1986)). Defendant argues that this practice \u201ccreates a conviction-prone jury that is underrepresentative of the community\u201d and therefore violates his state constitutional rights to an impartial jury and to due process. Utah Const, art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 7, 12. Defendant concedes that the United States Supreme Court has rejected this argument under the United States Constitution. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986) (<HOLDING>). However, he contends that a \u201cstate Holdings: 0: holding death qualification of jury prior to guilt phase of bifurcated capital trial did not violate defendants sixth amendment right to impartial jury representative of fair crosssection of the community 1: holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment 2: holding that the defendants sixth amendment right to a jury did not include having a jury decide whether or not he should receive a capital sentence 3: holding right of accused to trial by impartial jury justified postverdict protection of jurors from harassment and did not violate first amendment 4: holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Jackson. Schreiber argues that Daily\u2019s alleged conflict of interest caused Daily\u2019s (and presumably Neary\u2019s) failure to pursue Jackson\u2019s assertion that she was intimidated. Schreiber also alleges eight other grounds that allegedly show Daily was ineffective. Schreiber did present these other grounds to the court of appeals in a pro se brief, but he was represented by counsel, and the court apparently chose to evaluate only counsel\u2019s arguments. Because Schreiber\u2019s appellate attorney presented only the juror intimidation issue to the court of appeals, and because the court of appeals only addressed that argument in respect to its decision on prejudice, that is the only ground of its decision this Court may review pursuant to \u00a7 2254. See Myartt v. Frank, 395 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Schreiber does not establish an adverse Holdings: 0: recognizing that  2254d by its own terms applies only to claims previously adjudicated on the merits in statecourt proceedings 1: holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court 2: holding that a claim brought in a pro se brief that the state court did not address was not adjudicated on the merits as required by  2254d 3: holding that aedpa only applies where the state court adjudicated the constitutional issue on the merits 4: holding that this court will not address the merits of an issue presented for the first time in a reply brief", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Distribution Agreement effectively destroyed Innomed\u2019s ability to assign its rights to AHP. Because the January 26 agreement was never memorialized in writing, Innomed must point to evidence in the record as to, inter alia, the terms of the oral contract and the terms that ALZA allegedly breached. See Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pacific Bus. Credit, Inc., 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 272 Cal.Rptr. 387, 395 (1990); see also Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Med. Group, 84 Cal.App.4th 32, 100 Cal. Rptr.2d 627, 646-47 (2000). Innomed has failed to proffer any evidence as to the terms of the January 26 agreement, so it is impossible to determine whether ALZA breached any of the terms of the agreement when it terminated the Distribution Agreement on March 26. See Khajavi, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d at 646-48 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, no reasonable juror could conclude Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on an oral representation that the atwill provision of his employment contract did not apply to him when he entered into the contract that expressly contradicted the oral representations 1: holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds 2: holding that express oral agreement with government agent was not binding because among other factors applicable regulations required contract to be in writing 3: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 4: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "credibility for different reasons. The withheld evidence went to Storch\u2019s sophistication and motivation in his capacity as a prosecution informant and not, like the other evidence produced at trial, to his general propensity for dishonesty. Even if the lies did not provide a novel angle of attack on Storch\u2019s credibility, which we believe they do, as we explained in Killian, \u201cthe finders of fact were deprived of the fundamental inference that if [the government informant] lied about X, Y, and Z, it is quite likely that he lied about Q, R, and S.\u201d 282 F.3d at 1209. The evidence withheld revealed that Storch, like the witness in Bern, was \u201ccompletely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system.\u201d 283 F.3d at 1059 (<HOLDING>). Because Storch\u2019s testimony implicating Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation 1: holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial 2: holding impeachment evidence falls within the brady rule 3: holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation 4: holding that the prosecutions failure to disclose multiple pieces of critical impeachment evidence that could have been used to undermine credibility of the jailhouse informant who testified that defendant admitted committing the murders was sufficient to violate brady", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "916 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1983); In re Wood, 23 B.R. 552 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982). See Barr v. Hinshaw (In re Hinshaw), 23 B.R. 233 (Bankr.D.Kan.1982) (ERISA benefits held to be an exemption under \u00a7 522(d)(10)(E)). See also Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.1983) (ERISA qualified \u201cKeogh plan\u201d held to be property of the estate notwithstanding a prohibition against alienation). Cf., United States v. Devall, 704 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.1983); Toson v. United States, 18 B.R. 371 (N.D.Ga.1982); In re Greene, 27 B.R. 462 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1983) (all holding that social security benefits are property of the estate despite a statutory prohibition against alienation). But see Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewit), 24 B.R. 927 (D.Kan.1982); In re Rogers, 24 B.R. 181 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1982) (<HOLDING>); Hildebrand v. Social Security Administration Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate 1: holding that social security benefits are excluded from property of the estate because of the statutory antialienation provision 2: holding that a plaintiff in an erisa denial of benefits case bears the burden of proving her entitlement to contractual benefits 3: holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate 4: holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of glasses. Pursell, on the other hand, claimed that he went to Dr. Perry\u2019s on July 23, 1981, the afternoon before Christopher Brine was killed. A number of witnesses took the stand and identified Pursell as the man that they saw in Dr. Perry\u2019s office on July 24,1981. (Tr. 1/20/82, at 245-47, 253). These witnesses explained that Pursell looked different on July 24, 1981 than he did at the time of trial. See, e.g., id. at 253. And this testimony helped the jury determine the credibility of the witnesses identifying Pursell and the accuracy of their identification. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly held, the admission of this evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. Accordingly, it cannot amount to a violation of due process, Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 228-29, 62 S.Ct. 280 (<HOLDING>), and defense counsel\u2019s failure to object to Holdings: 0: holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation 1: holding that admission of relevant evidence generally not due process violation warranting habeas relief 2: holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process 3: holding that the mere fact that relevant evidence is shocking to the sensibilities does not make the admission of that evidence a violation of due process 4: holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "however, is inapposite to the present case. In contrast to this ease, in Short the Claims Court found jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491, not the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1505. See Short, 12 Cl.Ct. at 40 (\u201c[Plaintiffs are suing as individuals under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491 (1982).\u201d). Later, \u201c[i]n 1989, the Claims Court denied the plaintiffs\u2019 claim for group damages under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1505.\u201d Short v. United States, 50 F.3d 994, 997 (Fed.Cir.1995) (emphasis added) (citing Order at 3-10, S es, 169 Ct.Cl. 1009, 1012-13 (1965) (finding that identification of two scattered families descended from an Indian nation was sufficient to support Claims Commission\u2019s determination that plaintiffs constituted an identifiable group); Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348, 360 (1952) (<HOLDING>). What is more, plaintiffs assert a collective Holdings: 0: holding that tribal courts have jurisdiction to divide trust property in a divorce action when both parties are indians 1: holding that indians of california could bring suit as identifiable group despite lack of formal tribal organization 2: holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation 3: holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity 4: holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "violated the Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct and is against public policy. Finally, Appellants argue that, even if only the March 2002 event is covered by the Engagemen f the Farm Account in 1997 and the distribution to Beverly and termination of the Irrevocable Trust in February 1998 are related in any way to the sale of property held by Vernon\u2019s Trust on March 14, 2002. From the amended complaint and the parties\u2019 descriptions of the events, the three events appear to be completely separate allegations of malpractice. Consequently, the alleged arbitrable issue is separable from the nonarbitrable issues, and both arbitration and the litigation can proceed at the same time. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1241, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part Holdings: 0: holding that the federal arbitration act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums 1: holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived 2: holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act 3: holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation 4: holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct\u201d); see also Jacob v. ES-O-EN Corp., No. 2:06-CV-740 TC, 2008 WL 474120, at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12742, at *8 (D.Utah Feb. 19, 2008) (\u201c[Plaintiffs] allegations of rape and assault by [an employee] amount to [a] hostile work environment, because these actions could be severe enough to alter [her] conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.\u201d); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 953, 970 (D.Minn.1998) (\u201cA single sexual assault has a far greater potential to adversely alter the work environment, and with greater permanence, than would an offensive verbal remark, or a series of such remarks.\u201d); cf. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 230 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The facts presented in this case do not rise Holdings: 0: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 1: recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context 2: holding that plaintiffs allegation of one incident where supervisor wrapped his arms around her and made sexually explicit statements was not sufficient to establish a claim of a hostile working environment absent the most stringent circumstances courts have refused to hold that one incident in itself was so severe as to create a hostile work environment 3: holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment 4: holding in a 42 usc  1981 and 1983 context that although a single incident ordinarily will not give rise to a cognizable claim for hostile work environment  where the plaintiff was subjected to a physical assault in which he was punched in the ribs and  temporarily blinded by having mace sprayed in his eyes we cannot say that as a matter of law such an incident is not sufficiently severe in all the circumstances to create a hostile work environment", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "intend to establish the SPCA as a state agency. 6 . While the SPCA argues it is entitled to immunity because of the law enforcement function it performs, whether an entity is engaged in a governmental function is not controlling. See Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Company, 531 Pa. 500, 614 A.2d 218, 220 n. 4 (1992) (governmental immunity not dependent on whether agency performs governmental function). 1 . For example, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission has the statutory authority to sue and be sued, see 36 P.S. \u00a7 652d; nevertheless, it has maintained that it is entitled to immunity. See, e.g., Farabaugh v. Pa. Tpk. Comm\u2019n, 590 Pa. 46, 55-56, 911 A.2d 1264, 1269-70 (2006) (discussing the Commission\u2019s position); accord Bradley v. Pa. Tpk. Comm\u2019n, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 51, 55, 550 A.2d 261, 263 (1988) Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the commonwealth resulted from a mistaken view of the law by earlier courts 1: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 2: holding that ujnlike for local agency employees willful misconduct does not vitiate a commonwealth employees immunity because sovereign immunity protects a commonwealth employee acting within the scope of his or her employment from liability even for intentional torts 3: holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth 4: holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "NCAA discriminated against him based on his disability. 3. Defendant\u2019s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct. Rec. 53, is GRANTED IN PART on the issues of whether Plaintiffs ADA claim has become moot and whether the NCAA cannot be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. 4. Because the Court lacks the authority to grant Plaintiff any relief for his claimed injury under the ADA, Plaintiffs ADA claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 5. Because Plaintiffs due process allegations fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claim, Plaintiffs claim under the WLAD is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Th ge, 959 F.Supp. 496, 498-99 (N.D.Ill.1997) (<HOLDING>); Stoutenborough v. Nat\u2019l Football League, 59 Holdings: 0: holding ada claim was discharged 1: holding that group organizing bike race was not subject to ada 2: holding that national football league was not a place and therefore not subject to ada 3: holding that a plaintiff would have to show that he was not promoted because of his race not that he was a member of a protected group and was not promoted 4: recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "this matter and identify the burden of proof for each cause of action. The Court will then discuss each cause of action in turn. A.Jurisdiction The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1331 and 1338, as well as 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1121(a). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(a). Venue in the Southern District is proper under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1391. B.Burden of Proof The party making the allegations of infringement \u2014 here, Tiffany \u2014 -has the burden of proof to present evidence in support of the allegations set forth in its complaint and to prove those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See Merit Diamond Corp. v. Suberi Bros., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 4572(SHS), 1996 WL 11192, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.11, 1996) (<HOLDING>); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Comstock Partners, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence entitlement to an administrative claim 1: holding that the shareholder has shown a credible basis by a preponderance of the evidence for his allegations of selfdealing with respect to a number of corporate transactions 2: holding that trademark infringement must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the credible evidence 3: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or proper. The NJCFA provides, as pertinent, that The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise ... or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has been damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. As Defendants point out, the private remedy provisions of both statutes require a plaintiff to have suffered an ascertainable loss. See Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc., 565 Pa. 612, 618, Holdings: 0: holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion 1: holding that in order to have standing under the act a private party must plead a claim of ascertainable loss that is capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment 2: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion 3: holding a ruling on a motion for summary judgment adjudicating the rights of a party is a final judgment subject to appeal 4: holding that a deposition is the time for the plaintiff to make a record capable of surviving summary judgment  not a later filed affidavit", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in violation of Fourth Amendment). We have not adopted the \u201cgood faith\u201d exception for purposes of art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights or statutory violations, focusing instead on whether the violations are substantial and prejudicial. See Commonwealth v. Beldotti, 409 Mass. 553, 559 (1991) (denying exclusion of evidence because intrusion was minimal, but noting \u201cwe do not rely on any theory the police were proceeding in good faith reliance [on] a defective search warrant\u201d); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 405 Mass. 86, 91 n.6 (1989) (reiterating that Massachusetts law has not adopted good faith exception of United States v. Leon, supra, to exclusionary rule); Commonwealth v. Treadwell, 402 Mass. 355, 356 n.3 (1988) (same); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 394 Mass. 381, 391 (1985) (<HOLDING>). See also J.A. Grasso & C.M. McEvoy, Holdings: 0: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 1: holding that deficiency as to particularity in warrant not prejudicial under art 14 where search was conducted as if warrant were in compliance and thus was not unreasonable 2: holding it was reasonably practicable to obtain warrant to search defendants vehicle where courts were open on day of warrantless search and judges were available to sign warrant 3: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 4: holding that strip search incident to arrest was not per se unreasonable but holding that search was performed in an unreasonable manner when conducted in view of the public", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "524, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (concluding that summary judgment is proper where ADA plaintiff fails to show that he is \"regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs\u201d)). 13 . See also Olivieri v. Abbot Laboratories, Civil No. 05-1244(ADC), 2008 WL 747082 (D.P.R. March 19, 2008) (evidence that employer was aware of plaintiffs condition, viewed her as unable to meet certain essential requirements of her job and even offered accommodations is insufficient to establish claim that defendant regarded plaintiff as disabled under ADA, inasmuch as the record is void of any evidence that defendant viewed plaintiff as unfit to perform a broad range of jobs). 14 . The EEOC guidelines have defined the term \u201cqualified individual with a disability\u201d as \u201can indiv 8, 1279-80 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys\u2019 Home, 831 Holdings: 0: holding that attendance is a minimum function of any job 1: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function 2: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact 3: holding that inability to maintain regular and reliable level of attendance defeated plaintiffs qualification for the job 4: holding that attendance can be an essential function of a position and that excessive absenteeism rendered an employee unqualified for such a position", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "2000, pet. ref'd). 68 . We also observe that if a defendant is permitted to represent himself but the appropriate admonishments as to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation are not given until after jury selection, they are too late and the error is not subject to a harmless error analysis. Manley, 23 S.W.3d at 175. 69 . See Bartlett, 44 F.3d at 100-02; Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 642; Anderson v. State, No. 14-06-00348-CR, 2007 WL 1470275, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2007, pet. ref\u2019d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating mere acquiescence to a trial court\u2019s unmistakable denial of his request to represent himself is not a waiver of a defendant's right to self-repr L.Ed.2d 155 (2000); Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 809 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966, 105 S.Ct. 366, 83 Holdings: 0: holding defendant waived selfrepresentation right by proceeding with assigned counsel and walking out of faretta hearing 1: holding that right of selfrepresentation did not attach because defendant had made no indication of his desire to proceed without counsel 2: holding that written waivers referring only in general terms to potential advantages of representation by counsel and potential disadvantages of selfrepresentation did not sufficiently demonstrate awareness of the dangers of selfrepresentation 3: holding that a newly assigned counsel may be entitled to a continuance based on the criminal defendants sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 4: holding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel even though the exchange between the magistrate and the defendant was inadequate standing alone to inform the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the EPA itself takes the position that an RCRA citizen suit may be brought after a state has received authorization to operate its program in lieu of the federal program: \u201c[ujnder RCRA, Section 7002, any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any government instrumentality or any person who is alleged to be in violation of permits, regulations, conditions, etc. [\u00b6]... ] As a result, any person, whether in an authorized or unauthorized State, may sue to enforce compliance with statutory and regulatory standards.\u201d Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 258, 261 (M.D.Pa.1989) (quoting 45 Fed.Reg. 85016 (Dec. 24, 1980) (emphasis added); citing also 49 Fed.Reg. 48300 (Dec. 12, 1984)); see also Sierra Club v. Chemical Handling Corp., 824 F.Supp. 195, 197 (D.Colo.1993) (<HOLDING>); Murray v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that because colorados hazardous waste program was authorized by rcra it became effective pursuant to rcra and the citizen suit provision of section 6972a1a applies 1: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate waste management of north americas claim that the el toro marine corps air base was required to award waste management of north america with a waste collection award since it was the only permittee in orange county because the case was not properly initiated as a citizen suit under rcra in addition the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit held that waste management of north america did not have standing under 31 usc  35512 since it did not file a proper bid protest nor submit a bid 2: holding that compliance with analogous notice provision of the resource conservation and recovery act rcra was a mandatory condition precedent to suit 3: holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the citizen suit provision of the caa 4: holding as a matter of course that georgias epaapproved ust program is enforceable by a rcra citizen suit", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "after the agency\u2019s final order of deportation and it was his second motion to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i), there is no time or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is \u201cbased on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.\u201d 8 U rate an objectively reasonable fear of persecution, as he did not present any evidence that Chinese officials were aware or would become aware of his \u201cFalun Gong identity,\u201d or that the Chinese government targets similarly-situated individuals upon their return to China. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce 1: holding that a defendant may be seen as supervising the four drivers he used in his criminal activities 2: holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities 3: holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities 4: holding that plaintiff had stated a claim for violation of his first amendment right to intimate association where he alleged that his employer harassed him in retaliation for his fathers political activities", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of lien interests is \u201cfirst in time is first in right\u201d). Second, even if the trial court had the authority to declare the Association\u2019s lien superior to the mortgage lien as a sanction, the fact remains that the issue of lien priority was never actually litigated. See Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., Inc., 804 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (providing that for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue \u201cmust have been actually litigated\u201d). Nor would it change the fact that PNC Bank, as the holder of the mortgage who obtained title to the subject property via foreclosure sale, qualified as a first mortgagee regardless of the fact that the Association\u2019s assessment lien survived the foreclosure action. See Beltway Capital, LLC v. Greens GOA Inc., 153 So.3d 330, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>). Third, and aside from the fact that no Holdings: 0: holding that because the bank held the mortgage when it acquired title by foreclosure it was entitled to safe harbor as a first mortgagee without further regard to whether it was also an assignee 1: holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage 2: holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage 3: holding that the mortgagee named in the mortgage at the time of the mortgages execution acquired the legal title to the property 4: holding that rookerfeldman barred a debtors action to rescind a mortgage because it was inextricably intertwined with a state courts foreclosure judgment which was premised on the existence of a valid mortgage", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "October 1, 1998 and October 1, 2000. Under certain circumstances, failure to appeal an added assessment, in itself, may support a conclusion that the municipality is entitled to a hearing-on the issue of change in value under the Freeze Act. Here, however, defendant has provided no explanation of the added assessment, and the Steinhart Certification makes no reference to the added assessment as evidencing that a change in value occurred as of October 1, 2000. Plaintiffs failure to appeal does not compensate for defendant\u2019s failure to present any proofs that the \u201calterations\u201d which were the basis for the added assessment resulted in a substantial and meaningful change in the value of the subject property. Cf. United States Postal Serv. v. Town of Kearny, 19 N.J.Tax 282 (Tax 2001) (<HOLDING>). Defendant has not provided the court with any Holdings: 0: holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added 1: holding defendants failure to object to the drug quantity assessment in the presentence report at sentencing was a waiver of the issue on appeal 2: holding that the only question on a rule 35a motion is whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face  emphasis added 3: holding that failure to appeal an added assessment did not preclude application of the freeze act where the added assessment was improperly imposed 4: holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(\"The court or jury trying the case involving a violation of clause (ii), (iii) or (iv) of \u00a7 18.2-266 or \u00a7 18.2-266.1, or 18.2-272 shall determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant from all the evidence concerning his condition at the time of the alleged offense.\u201d); Code \u00a7 18.2-268.10(A) (providing that the \"court shall, regardless of the result of any blood or breath tests, consider other relevant admissible evidence of the condition of the accused\u201d). 6 . See also Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 376, 379, 437 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1993) (reversing trial court's admission of certificate because appellant was not given a chance to elect between blood and breath test as required under predecessor statute); Snead v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 372, 374, 437 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Wendel v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 958, 964, Holdings: 0: holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant 1: holding defendant was improperly denied potentially exculpatory evidence 2: holding that once probable cause is developed officers have no constitutional obligation to conduct further investigation in the hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence 3: holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation 4: holding that the state has no affirmative duty to seek out and gain possession of potentially exculpatory evidence", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "negotiations in good faith, sending them to binding arbitration instead. In addition, the arbitration provision is intended to apply even if, as here, one of the parties continues to be represented by the same counsel who represented that party in the settlement negotiations, contravening the letter and intent of the public policy of Texas as stated in sections 1.101 and 6.603 of the Family Code. Thus, even if I had not concluded that the entire Agreement was void, I would hold that the inclusion of an arbitration provision in the parties cooperative law agreement violates the letter and the spirit of sections 1.101 and 6.603 of the Family Code and that the provision is void an unenforceable as against the public policy of the State of Texas. See In re Poly-America, 262 S.W.3d at 348 (<HOLDING>). Conclusion For all the foregoing reasons, I Holdings: 0: holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process 1: holding  he who seeks equity must do equity  2: holding invalid on preemption grounds state statute making agreements to arbitrate franchise claims unenforceable 3: holding similar agreement void on public policy grounds 4: holding that agreements to arbitrate are valid unless grounds exist at law or in equity for revocation including voidness under public policy", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "testimony as a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A). 2. 911 Call and Recorded Body-Microphone Statements The district court initially ruled that the 911 call was admissible as a present sense impression and excited utterance but that the recorded body-microphone statements could be used only for impeachment purposes; however, the court ultimately ruled that both categories of evidence could be admitted as substantive evidence under the present-sense-impression and excited-utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides that \u201c[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it\u201d is \u201cnot excluded by the rule against hearsay.\u201d \u201cThe underlying rationale of the 995) (<HOLDING>)). Additionally, we determined that the Holdings: 0: holding statement made twentythree minutes after event admissible as a present sense impression 1: holding that under certain circumstances statements on a 911 tape may be admissible as a present sense impression 2: holding trial courts allowance of testimony under the present sense impression exception if error was harmless because statement was admissible under excited utterance exception 3: holding statements on 911 tape admissible as present sense impression where call was made almost immediately after the defendant left the store after a shooting incident 4: holding railroad workers statement to police made after he had walked approximately 100 feet admissible as a present sense impression", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from admitting a criminal defendant\u2019s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.1989); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283-84 (6th Cir.2000); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (\"[W]e are not confident that Jenkins permits even evidence that a suspect remained silent before he was arrested or taken into custody to be used in the Government's case in chief.\u201d). The D.C. Circuit has stated that \u201ccustody\u201d \u201cis the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda.\u201d United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits Holdings: 0: holding that the government may comment on a defendants prearrest premiranda silence as well as his postarrest pr emiranda silence 1: holding that the defendants postarrest pr emiranda silence was admissible in the governments caseinchief because there was no official compulsion the court qualified its holding stating we do not decide today whether compulsion may exist under any other postarrest pr emiranda circumstances 2: holding that if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendants exercise of his or her right to remain silent it violates the defendants state constitutional right to silence whether comment was introduced in states caseinchief or for impeachment purposes holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his postarrest or postmiranda silence 3: holding that the admission of a defendants postarrest premiranda silence in the prosecutions caseinchief violates the fifth amendment because the defendant was in custody 4: holding that introduction of defendants premiranda custodial silence is violation of fifth amendment", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "help establish the existence of an unconstitutional practice or custom \u2014 cannot be readily deduced from simply reading the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4. See Model Instruction 9.4 (\u201c \u2018Practice or custom\u2019 means any permanent, widespread, well-settled practice or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure of the defendant.\u201d); see also Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1067 (observing that \u201cjuries are not clairvoyant\u201d and will not know to follow a particular legal principle \u201cunless they are told to do so\u201d). Accordingly, in the context of this case the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4 was \u201can incomplete, and therefore incorrect, statement of the law.\u201d Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1066; see also Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Further, by stating that a practice or custom Holdings: 0: holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error 1: holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions 2: holding that the ninth circuit erred because the state appellate courts conclusion that one incorrect statement in jury instructions did not render the instructions likely to mislead the jury was not unreasonable 3: holding that jury instructions must allow the jury to determine the issues presented intelligently 4: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in giving jury instructions that taken together fairly and adequately conveyed the issues to the jury", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "trigger CERCLA liability, nor does actual disposal of hazardous substances. A release must occur or be threatened before CERCLA is triggered. A party that \u201carranged for disposal\u201d of a hazardous substance under \u00a7 9607(a)(3) does not become hable un der CERCLA until there is an actual or threatened release of that substance into the environment. Arranging for disposal of hazardous substances, in itself, is neither regulated under nor prohibited by CERCLA. Further, disposal activities that were legal when conducted can nevertheless give rise to liability under \u00a7 9607(a)(3) if there is an actual or threatened release of such hazardous substances into the environment. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States (Cadillac Fairview/California I), 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Holdings: 0: holding that a party that sold a product to another party arranged for disposal of a hazardous substance 1: holding past owners liable for the disposal of hazardous wastes that leaked from an underground storage tank 2: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 3: holding that arranger liability claim requires proof that defendant arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances owned or possessed by defendant 4: holding that in a situation where the police have probable cause to arrest one party and reasonably mistake a second party for that first party the arrest of the second party is still a valid arrest", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "have merit. Carnahan\u2019s statement to Det. Tecklen-burg was an out-of-court statement \u201coffered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,\u201d i.e. that David was involved in the conspiracy and served in the role of money collector or \u201cmuscle\u201d for Martin. Fed. R Evid. 801(c). David made a timely objection to the admission of this aspect of Det. Tecklenburg\u2019s testimony, and we find no applicable exclusion to the hearsay definition nor exception to the general rule of inadmissibility that would permit Det. Tecklenburg\u2019s testimony. Carnahan was a cooperating informant and his statement to Det. Tecklenburg was made in that capacity, not in the capacity of co-conspirator and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Also, it is not clear that Pieters\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that statements by a cooperating coconspirator to known authorities made after the commencement of cooperation are not admissible under rule 801d2e because such statements are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy 1: holding that statements made to keep a coconspirator informed as to the groups drug supply were made in furtherance of the conspiracy 2: holding that post arrest statements made by coconspirator to law enforcement officer were not admissible under rule 801d2e but admission of testimony was harmless because officers testimony was cumulative 3: holding a trial court should not allow a jury to hear outofcourt coconspirator declarations before holding a hearing outside the jurys presence to determine whether such statements are admissible under federal rule of evidence 801d2e 4: holding that statements aimed at preventing detection and punishment were not admissible under the coconspirator exception because admission of such statements would expand exception to hearsay rule to include declarations made not in furtherance of conspiracy charged but made in furtherance of an alleged implied but uncharged conspiracy aimed at preventing detection and punishment", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "We agree with the reasoning of the Navarro court. Evidence that appellant drew a handgun, a deadly weapon per se, from his pocket in response to a threat by Scur-lock does not alone raise an inference that appellant was unaware of the risk posed by that conduct. To the contrary, drawing a deadly weapon in response to a physical threat indicates that the actor is not only aware of the risk posed by the weapon, but is choosing to exploit that risk. We are cognizant that\" appellant\u2019s version of the facts characterizes the shooting as an \u201caccident\u201d; however, a showing of accidental discharge does not necessarily raise the issue of criminally negligent homicide. See Thomas v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); see also Simpkins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). That is, a showing that the defendant did not Holdings: 0: holding defense crossexamination did not raise issue of intent or identity 1: holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue 2: holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal 3: holding party may raise jurisdictional issue at any stage of proceedings 4: holding that evidence of accidental discharge does not nec essarily raise issue of criminally negligent homicide but may raise defense of accident", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "with the EEOC within 180 days of the occurrence of an allegedly unlawful employment practice. Burgh v. Borough Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 2001). Within ten days, the EEOC must serve notice of the charge on the plaintiff\u2019s employer. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(e)(l). Where, as here, the plaintiff also files a complaint with a parallel state agency, \u201cthe period for filing the charge with the EEOC is extended to 300 days from the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice.\u201d Burgh, 251 F.3d at 470 (citing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(e)(l)). The plaintiff must allow the EEOC at least 180 days to investigate the charge before filing suit. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(f)(l); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S. Ct. 2447, 53 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1977) (<HOLDING>)). The plaintiff is entitled to sue at the Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: holding that a private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed 2: holding that a private right of action exists 3: holding  1330a motion untimely when filed over 180 days from confirmation 4: holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "damages were not warranted against Dr. Gordon. After the jury verdict, Ms. Liles settled with Dr. Gordon and Ridge Pathology and voluntarily dismissed her claims against Dr. Gordon and Ridge Pathology with prejudice. The trial court entered a final judgment against the Hospital and in favor of Ms. Liles for $500,000 in compensatory damages and for $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The Hospital now appeals. II. Analysis A. Medical malpractice The Hospital first argues that the trial court erred in failing to treat this case as a medical malpractice case subject to the provisions of chapter 766. We disagree. Section 766.106(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), defines a \u201c[cjlaim for medical negligence\u201d or \u201cclaim for medical malpractice\u201d as \u201ca claim, arising out of 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Ms. Liles, who was not a Holdings: 0: holding at least under the facts of the case that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action did not begin to run until the plaintiff secured a specific medical diagnosis 1: holding that parents claims of outrage and negligent handling of a body were not subject to the medical malpractice statutes because hospital personnel did not engage in any medical skill or judgment in the disposition of the childs remains 2: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment 3: holding that there was insufficient evidence that alleged victim made statements to forensic nurseexaminer for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in part because there was no evidence regarding alleged victims past experience with medical facilities or medical providers 4: recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A (1962). 29 . Id. at 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218. See also n. 23 supra. 30 . 370 U.S. 139, 143-44, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962). See also People v. Von Villas, Cal.App.2d Dist., 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 133 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 838, 114 S.Ct. 118, 126 L.Ed.2d 83 (1993) (recognizing that Lanza\u2019s holding that confidential relationships would \"continue to receive unceasing protection despite the jailhouse setting\u201d); In re Joseph A., supra at n. 22. Cf., e.g., U.S. v. Geller, supra n. 27 (intercepted wire communications between spouses suppressed since such communications were made in confidence and were privileged). 31 . D.R.E. 504. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. 507 (<HOLDING>). 32 . People v. Elwood, Cal.App. 2nd Dist., Holdings: 0: holding that on march 13 2004 it was clearly established that the fourth amendment protects people from medical procedures induced by lawenforcement officers 1: holding that to decide whether or not a given area viewed in the abstract is constitutionally protected deflects attention from the problem presented because the fourth amendment protects people not places 2: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 3: holding that the fourth amendment protects people not places 4: holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers.\u201d). Thus, the district court\u2019s order did not trigger the truncated process of reciprocal discipline under the Rules of Professional Conduct and this Court is without authority to impose reciprocal discipline in this proceeding. Although this Court on two previous occasions has considered the imposition of reciprocal discipline arising out of discipline imposed by a federal trial court, in neither case did we address the issue of whether a federal district court constituted \u201canother jurisdiction\u201d within the meaning of Rule 9.4. See In the Matter of Joyce Marie Griggs, 277 Ga. 663 (593 SE2d 328) (2004) (imposing reciprocal discipline); In Re Levi Breedlove, Case No. S07Y0270, State Disciplinary Board Docket No. 4935 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Having now considered the meaning of the term Holdings: 0: holding that misrepresentations in documents filed in state court in no way constituted a basis for imposing federal rule 11 sanctions 1: holding that an attorneys typewritten name on a pleading is not a signature for purposes of rule 11 and therefore does not subject him to sanctions 2: holding federal rule 11 contempt sanctions do not fall within ambit of state disciplinary rules and are not subject to reciprocal discipline 3: holding that rule 11 sanctions are dispositive and thus subject to de novo review 4: holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is not the type of oppositional activity covered by Title VII because Bevels was not engaged in an unlawful employment practice. As explained earlier, her alleged inquiry was neither a sexual demand nor sexual harassment. To come within the opposition clause of Section 2000e-3(a), one must demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that the practice \u201copposed\u201d actually violated Title VII; otherwise, the activity (here, simply a negative response to an inquiry) was not statutorily protected activity. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (since no reasonable person could have believed that a single incident implicated Title VII\u2019s sex discrimination coverage, retaliation claim was properly dismissed); Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019-20 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass\u2019n Inc., 41 F.3d Holdings: 0: recognizing that title vii protects individuals from retaliation regardless of the merit of their complaints so long as they can show a good faith reasonable belief that the challenged practices violate title vii 1: holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii 2: holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief 3: holding that the only qualification  placed upon an employees invocation of protection from retaliation under title viis opposition clause is that the manner of his opposition must be reasonable and noting that there is no qualification on who the individual doing the complaining may be 4: holding that an employee seeking the protection of the opposition clause must demonstrate a good faith reasonable belief that the challenged practice violates title vii", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. Johnson, 425 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D.1988) (indicating \u201c[i]n a criminal trial to the court without a jury, our standard of review is the same as if the case had been tried to a jury\u201d). [\u00b6 6] In a DUS case, the proseeution must prove the driver had notice his license was suspended. State v. Egan, 1999 ND 59, \u00b6 8, 591 N.W.2d 150; State v. Tininenko, 371 N.W.2d 762, 764 (N.D.1985). Here, the trial court did not expressly indicate it found Neumiller received notice of the suspension. However, by acknowledging the issue was whether Neumiller received notice and finding Neu-miller guilty of DUS, the trial court validly found Neumiller received notice. See State v. Smokey\u2019s Steakhouse, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 361, 362 (N.D.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Fargo v. Brennan, 543 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing the trial court in reaching its general verdict necessarily resolved disputes of fact against the defendant 1: recognizing this court will uphold a general verdict if evidence on any one count issue or theory sustains the verdict citations omitted 2: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 3: recognizing that a trial court can set aside verdict 4: recognizing general rule", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the estoppel depends on \u201cthe inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment.\u201d Id. at 1840, 62 USPQ2d at 1712. A patentee is not barred from asserting \u201cequivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of wh .3d 1570, 1583, 34 USPQ2d 1673, 1683 (Fed.Cir.1995). It is apparent from the record that numerous amendments of the claim limitations were made during prosecution of the \u2019220 patent. Also, in its October 3, 1991 response, Allen made numerous arguments respecting the patentability of the claims as amended. On remand, the district court must consider whether any of these amendments and arguments gives rise to prosecution history estoppel limiting resort to the doctrine of equivalents. Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1839, 62 USPQ2d at 1711-12 (<HOLDING>); Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1583, 34 USPQ2d at 1682 Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that a voluntary amendment may give rise to prosecution history estoppel 1: holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims 2: holding that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the patent act may give rise to an estoppel 3: holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action 4: holding that the first amendment does not by itself give rise to a cause of action for damages", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of $150,000 under the Services Contract, regardless of Allard\u2019s representation; there is no evidence that Schwan\u2019s was aware of Allard\u2019s representation; and Good Stuff could not have relied upon Allard\u2019s June 6 representation when it sought the final Schwan\u2019s prepayment. As to the latter point, Schwan\u2019s final prepayment to Good Stuff\u2014 which Schwan\u2019s was required by the Services Contract to pay \u2014 was made by a check dated June 4, 2002, before Allard\u2019s email containing the alleged misrepresentation. In short, all of the bank\u2019s actions represented \u201cthe legitimate advancement of its own economic interest ... which, is not \u2018improper\u2019 for purposes of a tortious interference claim.\u201d Pembroke Country Club, Inc. v. Regency Sav. Bank, F.S.B., 62 Mass.App.Ct. 34, 39, 815 N.E.2.d 241 (2004) (<HOLDING>); accord In re General Plastics, 158 B.R. at Holdings: 0: holding that a lender violated the tila by splitting the charges surrounding one loan into two loans executed on the same day where the consumer only sought one loan 1: holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan 2: holding that it was not improper for a lender to halt the proposed settlement and discounted payment of plaintiffs loan when the lender believed the loan would otherwise be paid in full 3: holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan 4: holding that the lender was subject to the dtpa because the borrowers purpose in obtaining the loan was the purchase of a house", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "writ denied). However, \u201c[t]he phrase \u2018Approved as to Form and Substance\u2019, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a consent judgment.\u201d Id.; Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.\u2014 Dallas 1997, no pet.). In the absence of some indication in the record the case was settled or something in the body of the judgment indicating it was rendered by consent, that phrase above a signature on the form of judgment \u201cis too indefinite to justify declaring as a matter of law that the judgment was a consent judgment\u201d and that the right of appeal has been voluntarily relinquished. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.\u2014Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); see Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 647-48 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Here, the trial court\u2019s order was signed Holdings: 0: holding that partys consent to the trial courts entry of judgment waives any error except for jurisdiction error contained in the judgment   1: holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion 2: holding where record plainly indicated party disagreed with verdict and record contained no evidence of actual agreement between parties partys submission of proposed judgment conforming to trial courts intended judgment and containing notation that party approved it as to both form and substance did not create consent judgment 3: holding the intent of parties can be inferred from sufficient details contained within the consent judgment indicating the parties understood the consent judgment operated as a final adjudication of the factual issues 4: holding that failure to move for judgment after verdict entitled party only to a new trial not a judgment in its favor", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was intended to prevent creditors from obtaining the Business interest. Thus, the fourth element is met in this case. Finally, the Court readily finds that the omission was material in this case. \u201cThe subject matter of a false oath is \u2018material,\u2019 and thus sufficient to bar discharge, if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt\u2019s business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.\u201d Chalik, 748 F.2d at 617, citing In re Steiker, 380 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir.1967). Even the omission of assets of little value can be material. See, e.g., Olson, 916 F.2d at 484 (concluding that omission of dinner theater which had \u201cquestionable value\u201d was material for purposes of section 727(a)(4)(A)); Chalik, 748 F.2d at 619 (<HOLDING>). In this case there is substantial evidence Holdings: 0: holding that failure by corporation president to list asset on corporations bankruptcy petition was omission of material information supporting a  152 conviction 1: holding that such information is not material under securities law 2: holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time 3: holding inadmissible expert testimony that included statements that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under utah law that the material actually provided to investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the act and that the agreements at issue were securities under utah law 4: holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "course of the hearings, Has-kell asserted that the document entitled \u201cStatement of Resident Rights\u201d was meant to establish the applicable standard of care for his expert report. He further asserted that the documents established how being dismissed affected his health and that he was a resident at the Center. It is undisputed by the parties that nothing in the report addresses any breach by either defendant as to any standard of care. Defendants in this matter urge us to determine that the report served by Has-kell was so deficient as to not constitute a report. If we hold that Haskel report must be sufficient as to each defendant individually. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 74.351(a); see also Rivenes v. Holden, 257 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we will review the sufficiency Holdings: 0: recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff 1: holding that the trial court should have granted a motion for relief from judgment when it was the trial courts failure to serve the defendant with notice of the final judgment as required by rule 1080h1 that prevented the defendant from timely appealing 2: holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case 3: holding that the defendants failure to timely serve a notice of appeal and docketing statement did not prejudice the plaintiff and therefore would not serve as a basis to dismiss the appeal 4: holding if plaintiff does not serve report as to particular defendant trial court must dismiss that defendant from suit", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Letter are final orders relating to \u201caviation duties and powers,\u201d \u00a7 46110 preempts the district court from considering these claims. But if they are not final, then the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d) bars the district court from hearing the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 704. The finality requirement comes from two sections in the APA. An \u201corder\u201d is defined as \u201c \u2018the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making.\u2019 \u201d Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir.1981) (citing 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 551(6)). The APA only allows judicial review of \u201cfinal agency actions.\u201d 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 704. Thus, if an FAA order is not final, neither we nor the district court have jurisdiction over the case. See Air Cal, 654 F.2d at 622 (<HOLDING>). As a result of the finality conundrum, the Holdings: 0: holding district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the document before the district court in this instance is not a vehicle for any recognized legal remedy under the rules 1: holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court 2: holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney 3: holding that this court lacked jurisdiction under  46110 for lack of finality and that the district court also lacked jurisdiction because the orders were not final and thus not ripe for review 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because the case was not ripe for adjudication", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "address was defendant\u2019s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father\u2019s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant\u2019s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant\u2019s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996). 5 . Although we do not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee\u2019s behalf, we note that Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides, \"No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him.\u201d \"In evaluating pp.2000) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. If service of process is not Holdings: 0: holding that the court cannot conclude that failure of service resulted from defendants rejection of delivery where letters sent to defendant were returned stating unclaimed and not at this address 1: holding that rule 415f worked to cure deficiencies in service of process in action to enforce a judgment lien on real estate where service was provided at debtors last residential address known to lienholder because address was used during underlying lawsuit lienholders attorney checked county record to verify address information debtor did receive summons and residential address was on the former situs of debtors business 2: holding that trial rule 415f will not cure defective service of process where no person authorized by the rules was actually served 3: holding that service to defendants business address resulted in total failure to serve process rather than mere technical defect and thus could not be cured by rule 415f 4: holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or issues remanded.\u201d United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 597-98 (6th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted). \u201c[A]bsent explicit limitations in the appellate court\u2019s mandate, an order vacating a sentence and remanding the case for re-sentencing directs the sentencing court to begin anew, so that fully de novo resentencing is entirely appropriate^]\u201d United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1422 (6th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Accordingly, when no express lim t court violated \u00a7 3553(c) when it failed to explain the reasons underlying his sentence \u201cin open court.\u201d Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that upon resentencing, the reasons supporting the sentence must be pronounced by the district court from the bench. See DeMott, 513 F.3d at 58 (<HOLDING>). We agree and hold that upon general remand, Holdings: 0: holding that states procedure providing for jury evaluation of voluntariness of a defendants confession violates fourteenth amendment due process 1: recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language 2: holding that upon resentencing providing only a written opinion violates the open court requirement of  3553c 3: holding that school policy prohibiting written material of a religious nature violates the fust amendment 4: holding that  172545hs written notice requirement is mandatory", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "this Circuit routinely reject Exemption 4 arguments that are grounded in generalizations. See Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep\u2019t of Energy, 191 F.Supp.2d 187, 194-95 (D.D.C.2002) (\u201cThe Courts of this Circuit have viewed [Exemption 4] arguments with skepticism, generally requiring agencies to disclose information under Exemption 4\u2019s competitive harm prong unless they are able to demonstrate that release of the information would be of substantial assistance to competitors in estimating and undercutting a bidder\u2019s future bids.\u201d); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep\u2019t of Air Force, 781 F.Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C.1991) (rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was \u201cspeculative\u201d). Cf. Gilda Indus., 457 F.Supp.2d at 11 (<HOLDING>). Because the D.C. Circuit has cautioned that Holdings: 0: holding that competitive harm would result where the agency identified 212 competitors and explained how the requested information could be used in combination with publicly available information to disrupt supply product lines supply chains and customers 1: recognizing that there is an important privacy interest in corporate financial documents the court agrees that the information can be protected therefore the court  required that the information be disclosed pursuant to a confidentiality order only to be used in connection with this litigation 2: holding contact information of potential computer network services clients was not a trade secret because all businesses are now potential customers of computer network services and their contact information is publicly available 3: holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish unconscionability based upon the alleged excessive cost of arbitration because they failed to supply information as to the actual costs that might be incurred 4: holding that contact list based on inter alia information that was publicly available did not qualify as trade secret", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1157. And standing must remain \u201cextant at all stages.of review.\u201d Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975)). \u201cStanding cannot be \u2018inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings,\u2019 \u201d FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (quoting Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 284, 3 S.Ct. 207, 27 L.Ed. 932 (1883)), or even from the government\u2019s concession of standing, \u201cbut rather \u2018must affirmatively appear in the record.\u2019 \u201d FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 231-36, 110 S.Ct. 596 (quoting Mansfield C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 392, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884)) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has \u201calways insisted on Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance 1: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law 2: holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff 3: holding that a courts order invalidating part of a city billboard ordinance did not moot a claim for damages arising from that invalidated portion of the ordinance 4: holding certain plaintiffs did not have standing to attack ordinance governing sexually oriented businesses where the record did not reveal that any one of these plaintiffs was subject to the ordinance even though the city attorney conceded at oral argument before the supreme court that one or two of them had had their licenses denied under the ordinance", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and in Gregory requires a comparable holding in this case. Mr. Cervine misreads our decision in Gregory. For purposes of establishing reasonable suspicion, we only consider vehicle and weather conditions when the underlying state statute so directs. We considered these conditions in Gregory because the underlying Utah statute contained an-as-nearly-as-practical requirement. The relevant statute in Gregory, Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 41-6-61(1), requires that \u201c[a] vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane.... \u201d Id. (emphasis added). Given the difficult weather, vehicle, and road conditions, it was not \u201cpractical\u201d for the driver in Gregory to avoid the emergency lane at all times. See Gregory, 79 F.3d at 978; State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in Gregory, we recognized nothing more Holdings: 0: holding that one isolated incident of partially weaving into emergency lane does not constitute a traffic violation in tennessee 1: holding that one in stance of weaving does not constitute a violation of utah code ann  416611 2: holding in part that the utah state probation agreement does not create such an option 3: holding that the unauthorized practice of law constitutes violation of code 4: holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of fact in a Terry stop). Where, as here, police officers themselves are responsible for the mistake (as opposed to police functionaries), the application of the rule is more efficacious still. But ignoring these deficiencies, and assuming without finding that Swierk and Mitchell simply misheard Antone say \u201ccome on\u201d (when he really said \u201chold on\u201d), the Court finds that an objectively reasonable police officer would not have believed that Antone consented to the entry of his home. As previously discussed, Det. Swierk asked Antone whether he would come to the police station, and Antone said that he would. To a reasonable person, Antone\u2019s unsolicited statement, \u201ccome on,\u201d would have been a puzzling follow up to Det. Swierk\u2019s introduction and question. Cf. Marshall, 348 F.3d at 286-88 (<HOLDING>). The statement that the detectives thought Holdings: 0: holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search 1: holding that when reasonable suspicion exists a school search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search 2: holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act 3: holding that the challenged item was within the scope of the search because it reasonably fell within the expressed object of the search even though it turned out to be the defendants personal property 4: holding that where defendant consented to search of his car and stood by as agent conducted a thorough and systematic search which included removal of vehicles back seat and raising of cars rear quarter panel defendants failure to object to search indicated search was within scope of consent", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "litigation. See Allen, 94 F.3d at 928 (\u201cThose contractual provisions ... specify that \u2018any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to\u2019 [an entity\u2019s] participation in Lloyd\u2019s be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the British courts .... \u201d (quoting underlying -contract)); Rice, 240 F.Supp.2d at 528 (\u201cThe form contract used ... contained a choice of forum clause, stating that \u2018any litigation arising hereunder shall be filed only in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia or the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and you hereby consent to the jurisdiction of such courts.\u2019 \u201d (quoting underlying contract)); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-89, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that a forum selection clause encompassing any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this agreement included all causes of action arising directly or indirectly from the business relationship evidenced by the contract 1: holding that forum selection clause providing that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the borough of manhattan new york city new york shall have exclusive jurisdiction was not dispositive but merely one factor to consider in transfer analysis quoting underlying contract 2: holding that plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim was subject to mandatory forum selection clause requiring litigation in florida of any claims or disputes arising from employment agreement 3: holding that contract promise to litigate any dispute arising from the contract in the english courts was prima facie valid quoting underlying contract 4: holding valid forum selection clause providing that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under in connection with or incident to this contract shall be litigated if at all in and before a court located in the state of florida quoting underlying contract", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "] [of] the defense attorney\u201d and continuing by emphasizing that there was no evidence presented to support such a claim, the prosecutor was properly answering an argument of opposing counsel. See Felder, 848 S.W.2d at 94-95. Case law supports this conclusion. For example, in Coble the prosecutor argued that the defense attorney\u2019s lawyer was arguing \u201csomething ridiculous.\u201d 871 S.W.2d at 205. The court of criminal appeals noted that such a statement was not directed at defense counsel, but at defense counsel\u2019s argument. Id. This stands in stark contrast to the cases cited by Davis and other cases in which the appellate court has determined that a prosecutor\u2019s comment did strike at the defendant over defense counsel\u2019s shoulders. See Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Lopez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 844, 846 Holdings: 0: holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper 1: holding prosecutors argument that defense counsel was manufacturing evidence and thus suborning perjury was improper 2: holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument 3: holding prosecutors statement that defendant and defense counsel were lying when they pleaded not guilty was improper 4: holding prosecutors isolated argument referencing punishment was not improper because it was responsive to evidence in the record and was not intended to inflame the jury", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "139 L.Ed.2d 300 (1997).\u2019 \u201cSamra v. State, 771 So.2d 1108, 1112 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). \u201cNo doubt that with additional time and money Brunson and McKinnon could have done soniething more or different. The same could be said after any trial where a capital defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death, but \u2018perfection is not the standard of effective assistance.\u2019 Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir.1995). Mr. Brunson and Mr. McKinnon faced a daunting task defending Dunaway and both testified they spent far more hours preparing for Dunaway\u2019s case than they were given compensation. The cap on personal compensation did not lessen Brunson\u2019s and McKinnon\u2019s vigor or zeal in their preparation arid presentation at Dunaway\u2019s trial. See Bui v. State, 717 So.2d 6, 15 (Ala.Crim,App.1997) (<HOLDING>). \u201cBased on this Court\u2019s review of the record Holdings: 0: holding we reject the notion that alabamas statutory scheme for compensating attorneys in capital cases in and of itself denies a defendant effective representation 1: holding that alabamas capital sentencing scheme which utilizes a factfinding jury remains constitutional under hurst 2: holding that under section 27702 each defendant under sentence of death is entitled as a statutory right to effective legal representation by the capital collateral representative in all collateral relief proceedings 3: holding teague applies to capital cases 4: holding that even capital prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas cases", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as an \u201cagent\u201d of WMATA, is an \u201cemployer\u201d hable under section 2000e-2(a)(l) for discriminating against her on the basis of her sex. While a construction of the statute to impose individual liability on an agent is facially plausible, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that \u201c[t]he obvious purpose of this agent provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute.\u201d Miller v. Maxwell\u2019s Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.1993) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while a supervisory employee may be joined as a party defendant in a Title VII action, that employee must be viewed as being sued in his capacity as the agent of the employer, who is alone hable for a violation of Title VII. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Considering the evidence in the hght most Holdings: 0: holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii 1: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 2: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding individual employees may be liable under title vii", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The appeals system had been set up specifically to deal with a dispute over an individual\u2019s entitlement to disability benefits. See id. at 424-26. Not all of Appellant\u2019s allegations serving as a basis for his Bivens claim involve individual action leading to final agency decisions reviewable pursuant to the APA. For example, Appellant\u2019s allegations that some Defendants denied him certain rights pursuant to his management plan is properly challenged in an administrative proceeding. Therefore, a Bivens claim for that particular allegation is precluded. However, several of Appellant\u2019s allegations of Defendants\u2019 intentional misconduct are unrelated to any final agency action and are therefore properly within the scope of a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, 247 F.3d at 572-573 (<HOLDING>); Western Center for Journalism, v. Cederquist, Holdings: 0: holding that a bivens cause of action cannot be maintained against a federal agency 1: holding that social security regulations and procedures precluded a bivens action 2: holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility 3: recognizing potential of bivens action for extraprocedural and unconstitutional actions by faa inspectors while acknowledging that a bivens action would be unavailable to challenge the faas attachment of condition notice to companys airplane 4: holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Finally, the relief the Laws seek is beyond just preserving the status quo pending a trial on the merits. The status quo to be preserved is \u201cthe last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status that preceded the pending controversy.\u201d Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d at 528. The Laws contend the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status was Dr. Bass\u2019s decision to overturn the two semester suspension. We disagree. The Laws appealed that decision to Dr. Gillis. Instead, the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status is Dr. Gillis\u2019 decision to uphold Dr. Bass\u2019s decision after the second disciplinary hearing, i.e., the failing grade in organic chemistry and the two semester suspension. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Paiz, 856 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, in vacating the temporary Holdings: 0: holding status quo was school districts decision to prohibit student who had not passed taas test from participating in graduation ceremonies 1: recognizing districts obligation to maintain special needs student at specific private school where hearing officer had directed district to place and fund student pending development of iep 2: recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts 3: holding that a school had no duty to protect pedestrian from student 4: holding school districts had standing to bring claims against the state asserting that school financing system had become unconstitutional", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "under the anti-stacking statute. The majority does not analyze the statute and resolve this critical issue, although it admits that Andrea, as the \u201cinjured insured,\u201d would have been limited to only one UM policy had she lived. The very reason she would be limited is because she, not her parents, is the \u201cinsured\u201d under the anti-stacking statute. The observation that a wrongful death action is a \u201cseparate and independent\u201d cause of action from Andrea\u2019s personal injury action, although true, is immaterial. Op. p. 744. The Boullts are not attempting to \u201cstack\u201d their policies covering Andrea\u2019s wrongful death on top of policies covering Andrea for personal injury damages. They are attempting to \u201cstack\u201d two UM policies providing evelopment, 94-0735 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 1242 (<HOLDING>). 2 . The \"insured\u201d for purposes of uninsured Holdings: 0: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended 1: holding that the married parents of their deceased son could not stack two separate um policies under which they and their son were each insureds because the antistacking statute reference to the insured contemplates the person who suffers the bodily injury or bodily injury resulting in death 2: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 3: holding that a divorced parent of a deceased child may chose to recover wrongful death damages under either her um policy or her exhusbands um policy which ever is more favorable but is prohibited by the antistacking statute from recovering under both policies 4: holding that divorced parent could not stack their separate um policies for the wrongful death of their son because the insured referred to in the antistacking statute is the person who suffers bodily injury or bodily injury which results in death", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "companies appellees allege, he owns. Therefore, the analysis is whether the $20,000 in contributions the campaign retained in 2014 creates an appearance of impropriety for a case that will be before the court in 2017. Few cases in Arkansas address whether campaign-related matters require recusal by a judge. See Massongill v. Scott, 337 Ark. 281, 991 S.W.2d 105 (1999) (denying a challenge that the judge should have re-cused when one attorney was former campaign treasurer); Eason v. Erwin, 300 Ark. 384, 781 S.W.2d 1 (1989) (stating a judge did not necessarily hav\u00e9 to recuse off case of prominent local lawyer, campaign contributor, and alleged close friend | \u00bfbut that the judge should rule objectively); Committee for Utility Trimming, Inc. v. Hamilton, 290 Ark. 283, 718 S.W.2d 933 (1986) (<HOLDING>). So the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Holdings: 0: holding that recusal is not required on the basis of unsupported irrational or highly tenuous speculation 1: holding that recusal was required based on evidence of judges statements of bias against a particular ethnic group 2: holding recusal not required 3: holding that recusal was required based on newspaper report of interview with trial judge 4: holding that recusal is not required when judge has minimal alumni contacts with a defendant university", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "957 F.2d at 621. Allison argues that Wellmark\u2019s interpretation of the Plan\u2019s subrogation provision conflicts with Congress\u2019s declaration of policy concerning employee benefit plans and directs the court\u2019s attention to Section 2 of ERISA: \u00a7 1001. Congressional findings and declaration of policy (a) The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national public interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the stability 299 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The court finds that Wellmark\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself 1: holding that erisa preempts state law claims of fraud and misrepresentation that are based upon the failure of a covered plan to pay benefits 2: holding that erisa employee benefits plan was subrogated to all claims by covered individual against third party for all payments made by the plan 3: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 4: holding that summary plan description and not individual notification is all that erisa requires of plans insurer", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was sufficiently included in the requested property division, Kelly does not contend that a request for property division is sufficient to provide notice that she sought payment of spousal maintenance following the property division. Outside the default-judgment context, some courts have held that absent special exceptions, a prayer for general relief will support an award of any relief raised by the evidence. See, e.g., Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The relief must also be consistent with the allegations in the petition, however. Id.; Hardin v. Hardin, 161 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Bufkin v. Bufkin, 259 S.W.3d 343, 358 Holdings: 0: holding prayer for general relief does not support award of attorneys fees 1: holding that a preliminary injunction reversed on appeal does not support an award of attorneys fees 2: holding prayer for general relief does not support award of commonlaw prejudgment interest as element of damages 3: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees 4: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to move for the exclusion of time, it argues that this failure did not contribute to the delay. Instead, the government contends that Koerber caused the delay in January 2011 by requesting (and receiving) an indefinite pretrial-motion-cutoff date. In evaluating the government\u2019s position, we note that we later address how Koerber\u2019s role in the trial delays might affect the STA analysis. But first we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering this 42-day period as part of the government\u2019s \u201cpattern of neglect\u201d leading to the STA violation. The January 27, 2011 continuance for pretrial motions did not trigger an excludable delay in the STA clock. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3161(h)(1); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 204, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) (<HOLDING>). In addition, \u201cdefense responsibility for Holdings: 0: holding an excludable period under  2912074a commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendants pretrial motion 1: holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act 2: holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under  3161h7a 3: holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under  3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under  3161h7 4: holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but may be excluded only when a court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under  3161h7", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of such an evaluation. Conn. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 17a-582(e). The court then considers both reports as well as any other evidence, including witness testimony, provided by the parties. Section 17a-582 further provides that a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect may contest a court\u2019s order regarding confinement or conditional release. Conn. Gen.Stat. \u00a7 17a-582(g) (\u201cAn order of the court pursuant to subsection (e) of this section may be appealed by the acquittee or the state\u2019s attorney to the Appellate Court. The court shall so notify the acquittee.\u201d) Kalman has appealed his confinement. Furthermore, following entry of the court order committing him to the PSRB\u2019s custody, the PSRB, pursuant to section .Ed.2d 67 (1987); Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516, 631 P.2d 173 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the defendants are entitled to Holdings: 0: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 1: holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts 2: holding that regardless of whether the deferred adjudication was part of a plea bargain recommended by the prosecution imposed by the trial court without objection by the appellant or granted under other circumstances once the trial court proceeds to adjudication it is restricted in the sentence it imposes only by the relevant statutory limits 3: holding that psychiatrists who upon appointment by a court recommended the release of a man acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect enjoyed judicial immunity from suit for damages by relatives of a woman later killed by the man released 4: holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "which he likens to the more familiar terms \u201cfor just cause\u201d or \u201cfor cause,\u201d which remove employment from the at-will category. The School District does not dispute that \u00a7 20.7(3) is applicable to Lockhart, but does contend that Lockhart is nonetheless an at-will employee. Quite surprisingly, no reported Iowa decision has directly addressed the issue of whether \u00a7 20.7(3) negates the presumption of at-will employment for the public employees and employers covered under this provision of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. The few cases that have specifically addressed \u00a7 20.7(3) deal with its interaction with other statutory provisions involving discharge of public teachers. See, e.g., Northeast Community Educ. Ass\u2019n v. Northeast Community Sch. Dist., 402 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1987) (<HOLDING>); McFarland v. Board of Educ., 277 N.W.2d 901, Holdings: 0: holding that a collective bargaining agreement between school board and teachers union established a teachers legitimate claim of entitlement to their positions at elementary school 1: holding that  2073 was not inconsistent with the provision regarding the discharge of a teacher employed by public schools iowa code  27927 2: recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts 3: holding that  2073 expressly grants school districts the power to suspend teachers for proper cause for disciplinary reasons provided an iowa code  27927 discharge proceeding has been initiated 4: holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a decision of this Court holding that the repeal had eliminated the right to jury in chancery court, the Legislature re-enacted verbatim the text of the repealed stat ute, and that legislation is now codified as section 21-1-103. Id. Just two years after restoring the statutory right to a trial by jury in chancery court, the Legislature enacted the THRA, and at that time, vested exclusive jurisdiction of THRA claims in chancery court. Not only is the Legislature presumed to have been aware of the statutory right to trial by jury in chancery court, given its very recent focus on that precise issue, the Legislature that enacted the THRA was almost certainly actually aware that the civil action in chancery it was authorizing included the right to trial by jury. Cf Doyle, 49 S.W.3d at 858 (<HOLDING>). Eighteen years after its enactment, the THRA Holdings: 0: holding that where state rules of civil procedure apply to courts of the state they do not apply to adjudicatory proceedings before state agencies 1: holding that tennessee rule of civil procedure 24 is not applicable to proceedings in juvenile court 2: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure 3: recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure 4: holding that by vesting jurisdiction of gtla actions in circuit court where the tennessee rules of civil procedure applied the legislature intended to allow the tennessee rules of civil procedure to apply to gtla actions", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of leniency in exchange for testimony is a recognized and established activity of federal prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of criminal activity. \u201cNo practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence.\u201d United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762 (1988). This traditional prosecutorial granting of leniency has, throughout history, been sanctioned by the courts as well. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 604, 25 L.Ed. 399 (1878) (The Whiskey cases) (<HOLDING>). The case law is replete with instances of Holdings: 0: holding that a public prosecutor is permitted to induce a witness to fully and fairly testify to the guilt of his associates in exchange for the prosecutors recommendation for executive clemency 1: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 2: holding that the witness had accepted immunity in exchange for no prosecution 3: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 4: holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and deprived each of unbiased, independent assessments of the available and outstanding claims.\u201d Again, we agree. See In re Prince, 40 F.3d at 361 (finding a conflict of interest where counsel \u201cwas in the unfortunate position of having to serve too many masters\u201d); id. at 360 n. 1 (\u201c[I]nability to independently evaluate claims for its client ... is the actual prejudice to the Debt- or ....\u201d). Having made these determinations, the bankruptcy court was well within its discretion to (1) conclude that \u201c[Q&B]\u2019s initial and continuing violation of the disclosure rules coupled with its non-disinterestedness warrants its disqualification in all of these related cases,\u201d (2) deny Q&B all compensation, and (3) order the firm to disgorge any pre-petition retainer. See In re Prince, 40 F.3d at 361 (<HOLDING>). In short, we affirm based on the bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that where a conflict of interests exists counsel should be denied compensation it is no answer to say that fraud or unfairness were sic not shown to have resulted alteration in original quoting woods v city natl bank  tr co 312 us 262 268 61 sct 493 85 led 820 1941 1: holding that no ada violation was shown because the disabled were not denied benefits that were otherwise available 2: holding that the question of whether it might have been error for the court to have denied leave to amend is not before us because plaintiffs never requested it 3: recognizing the conflict 4: recognizing conflict", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 237 (1988) (applying both Illinois and Indiana law). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, however, disagree. Both courts denied the corporation in bankruptcy the right to bring alter ego claims on behalf of its creditors. See Spartan Tube and Steel, Inc. v. Himmelspach (In re RCS Engineered Prods. Co.), 102 F.3d 223 (6th Cir.1996) (applying Michigan law); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.) (applying Arkansas law), cert. denied sub. nom., Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). 18 . To ascertain the property ownership of a foreign bankruptcy estate, the law of the jurisdiction where the section 304 proceeding is p (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1028, 116 S.Ct. 673, Holdings: 0: holding appellate courts cannot reverse judgment  on grounds not raised on appeal 1: holding that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice 2: recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law 3: recognizing reverse piercing ordinarily in oneman corporations 4: recognizing appellate court may not reverse a summary judgment on a basis not raised by the appellant on appeal", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as well as his motion to stay the proceedings prior to denying his claims on remand. It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct.App.1985). In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant\u2019s claims, we will not presume error. State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct.App.1991). Here, while Hyde attached to his brief copies of both motions and the Department\u2019s objection to his motion to disqualify, these documents were not made part of the clerk\u2019s record on appeal. Simply attaching documents to one\u2019s brief does not include them in the record. See Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991) (<HOLDING>). We will not presume error where we have no Holdings: 0: holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error 1: holding appeal of termination is limited to information that is part of the record 2: holding that evidence not submitted to the district court cannot be part of the record on appeal 3: holding that jury instructions attached to an appeal brief were not part of the record 4: holding an appellate brief may serve as a notice of appeal", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "period normally was limited to the current fiscal year or legislative session, rarely reaching back more than a year. Though the time period of retroactivity is particularly long here, such a concern is in part offset by the failure of the Plaintiffs to articulate a vested right with which the New Law interferes, as well as by the specific context of trade duties. In examining the nature and circumstances of the New Law, the court notes that customs duties are to an extent unique from other government assessments in that there is no right to import, and where unfair trade remedies apply, those with goods that may be imported rarely can predict with accuracy what the duty will be. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933) (<HOLDING>). For example, when goods become the subject of Holdings: 0: holding that the petitioner can claim no rate as a legal right  other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the agency commission 1: recognizing that as with tax rates no one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty 2: holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate 3: holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate 4: holding that a utility can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the commission", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455, 458-59 (3d Cir. 1981) (clear \u00e1nd unmistakable waiver of right to strike over administration of pension fund held unnecessary where general contract term extended scope of no-strike clause beyond scope of arbitration clause). We believe it consistent with the Act that the arbitrator\u2019s decision in the present case clearly and unmistakably recognized the existence of the special duties of union officials. To go further and require that the Board rather than the arbitrator must be the one to declare the meaning of the parties\u2019 agreement would be to give to the Board a power that Congress has denied it. See discussion of NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., infra. 22 . The court cited New Orleans Steamship Ass\u2019n v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455, 468 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>), cert, granted sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Holdings: 0: holding that the court may issue an injunction prohibiting a defendant from repeating statements determined at trial to be defamatory 1: holding that district court erred in ruling that a particular item of evidence must be admitted in the arbitral proceeding 2: holding that district court erred in issuing injunction against future work stoppages based on arbitral award prohibiting one such stoppage 3: holding that trial court erred by entering an injunction sua sponte as an injunction cannot be entered unless a pleading requests one 4: holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Carlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990) (\u201c[License fees which discriminate against nonresidents sere-prima facie a violation of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].\u201d). Further, an unbroken line of authority characterizes commercial fishing as a \u201ccommon calling\u201d that is protected by.the Privileges and Immunities. Clause. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-19, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952) (striking down Alaska\u2019s differentials for commercial fishing licenses as violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403, 68 S.Ct. 1156 (\u201c[Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.\u201d); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Tangier Sound Waterman\u2019s Ass\u2019n v. Pruitt, 4 Holdings: 0: holding an arbitration tribunal fell within the purview of section 1782 1: holding that commercial lobstering falls within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause 2: holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview 4: holding that licensing fee for nonresident commercial fishermen constituted discriminatory tax in violation of privileges and immunities clause", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "but even if he is correct, AT & T would still be able to terminate his employment based on a mistaken application of the internal policy, if AT & T is correct that his employment was unconditionally at-will. See Smith v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 265, 269-70 (D.C.1993) (affirming summary judgment to defendant employer where the plaintiff claims that she was terminated for violating a policy she in fact followed because the discharge violated no employment contract and was not contrary to public policy); Alibalogun v. First Coast Sec. Sols., Inc., 67 F.Supp.3d 211, 218 (D.D.C.2014) (complaint \"merely\u201d alleging termination due to \"a false reason,\u201d without more, is inadequate to support a claim of wrongful termination); cf. Pope v. Romac Intern., 829 A.2d 945, 947 (D.C.2003) (<HOLDING>). 3 . AT & T has also moved for sanctions, Holdings: 0: holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age  and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge 1: holding that where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employees assertion of statutory rights the discharge is discriminatory under section 215a3 whether or not grounds for other discharge exist 2: holding the pro se plaintiff has no breach of contract or wrongful discharge claim against defendant employer where the employer wrongfully characterized her discharge as for cause but remanding to trial court to consider whether the pro se plaintiff suffered some other compensable injury if the employer as alleged intentionally mischaracterized the plaintiffs discharge in order to reduce its unemployment contributions 3: holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby 4: recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and \u201cdemeaning\u201d and testified that, in response to her supervisor\u2019s remarks and conduct, she felt \u201cintimidated,\u201d \u201cembarrassed,\u201d and \u201cstressed.\u201d Fuchs also presented evidence that coworkers enlisted to assist Fuchs given her disability felt intimidated and threatened by the Employer\u2019s comments. Plainly, Fuchs has alleged conduct by the Employer that subjectively caused her \u201cintimidation, ridicule, and insult.\u201d Palesch, 233 F.3d at 566. As it was bound to do in ruling the Employer\u2019s summary judgment motion, the trial court treated Fuchs\u2019s factual assertions about the Employer\u2019s conduct and her subjective reaction to same as true. However, harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive both as viewed subjectively by the plaintiff and as vie 88, 503 (Mo.App.E.D.1990) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Geiger, 212 S.W. 384, 388 Holdings: 0: holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was normally a question of law that the district court was still entitled to deference because its determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility of the witnesses 1: holding it is a question of fact 2: holding that whether or not claimant would have returned to work at all was a question of fact 3: holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question 4: holding that whether appearing in a television report about in vitro fertilization would bring shame or humiliation to a reasonable person was a question of fact for the jury", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "8.) 4 . Defendants filed a Suggestion of Mootness [Doc. # 77] on June 6, 2000. Attached is the Affidavit of David C. Lanier. Mr. Lanier is the registrar at UNC, and he testifies that Ms. Jennings has graduated from UNC. (Lanier Aff. \u00b6 3.) Plaintiffs have not responded. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), courts can look beyond the pleadings to determine a matter on standing. Smith v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir.2002). Only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) converts to a summary judgment when additional evidence is examined. Id. 5 . If preemption is found, Plaintiffs will be precluded from suing officials in their individual capacities under Title IX. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Supreme Court recognizes that Federal Holdings: 0: holding title ix does not support an action against official in an individual capacity 1: holding that in a bivens action service upon employee in his official capacity does not amount to service in his individual capacity 2: holding that a claim for damages exists in an action to enforce title ix 3: holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix 4: holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and allocation that Beverly contends are material. Beverly argues that the handwritten agreement was not intended to be final because it lacked the waiver-and-release language that the typewritten proposal describes as \u201can essential and material term of this Agreement and that, without this provision, no agreement would have been reached by the' parties.\u201d But the handwritten agreement states' that Beverly demanded $210,000 and mediation costs \u201cto resolve this matter.\u201d Though' perhaps inartful, this phrase adequately conveys Beverly\u2019s offer to abandon her claims against Abbott; the use of formal terms such as \u201cwaiver,\u201d \u201crelease,\u201d and \u201ccovenant not to sue\u201d was unnecessary\u2014at least regarding the claims Beverly alleged in her complaint. See Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The other purportedly material term that Holdings: 0: holding that voting agreement that did not comply with certain notice requirements of the act was enforceable because all of the shareholders knew of the agreement and participated in the transaction in question 1: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 2: holding that agreement as to form and content did not constitute agreed judgment 3: holding that a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff agreed to drop all claims against the defendants in exchange for a specific sum of money was enforceable despite the fact that the agreement did not specify whether the plaintiffs promise would take the legal form of a release or a covenant not to sue 4: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (noting the presumption that \u201cidentical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning\u201d). We have not previously decided whether, under this prior version of section 1332(c), a corporation incorporated in the United States also takes the citizenship of its foreign principal place of business. But three out of four of our sister Circuits and two district courts in this Circuit that have confronted this issue have concluded that a domestic corporation with a principal place of business abroad should be treated, for diversity purposes, as a citizen of only the State in which it is incorporated. See MAS Capital, Inc. v. Biodelivery Sciences Int\u2019l, Inc., 524 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, Holdings: 0: holding that the location of a corporations principal place of business for diversity purposes is the state where the corporation has its headquarters or nerve center 1: holding  1332c does not apply to a domestically incorporated corporation with its principal place of business abroad 2: holding that if a domestic corporations principal place of business is abroad the foreign principal place of business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes 3: holding that a corporation is fairly regarded at home and so amenable to personal jurisdiction for suits relating to all of its activities including those outside the forum in its principal place of business and place of incorporation 4: holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "defendants also say that the prosecution presented false evidence to the grand jury in order to secure an indictment. We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that the government\u2019s testimony and evidence before the grand jury was false. The majority of the arguments presented by the defendants go to the weight and interpretations of the evidence, instead of demonstrating actual false statements made by the government. In addition, many of the arguably false statements appear to be about information that is not material to the case. The Ninth Circuit appears to focus on the materiality of statements when analyzing whether there has been government misconduct that warrants sanctions. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>) Post-Indictment The second argument focus on Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose 1: holding that tribal courts are not subject to the fifth amendments requirement of indictment by grand jury 2: holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury 3: recognizing that a constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when either the government the court or both broadens the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury 4: holding that in the situation of a possible dismissal of an indictment because of possible grand jury tampering  only where knowing perjury relating to a material matter has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "containers], which could be utilized in the event that both generators should fail for some reason.\u201d 11 . TransAtlantic\u2019s vice president filed a declaration stating that costs of supplying the clip-on generators required by the solicitation and the fuel to power them is approximately $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year for each container. We have no other evidence on this issue. Defendant responded only that this estimate \"could be wrong.\u201d The vice president also asserted that owning the barge and operating it with the company's own employees cost more than $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year. 12 . At least one court has ruled that a finding of likely success on the merits creates a presumption of irreparable harm. See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 559, 577 (2004) (<HOLDING>)(quoting Reebok Int\u2019l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding candidates for judicial office were entitled to preliminary injunction of expenditure limit given likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm and lack of public interest in enforcing a law that curtailed political speech 1: holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest 2: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm 3: holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm 4: holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "argued that \u201cgiven the criteria for major reports at the CCUSO unit,\u201d section 229A.8A(2)(e) constituted \u201can unconstitutional imposition of a limitation on a less restrictive placement.\u201d While we generally oppose the \u201celevat[ion of] form over substance\u201d in conducting error preservation analysis, we note Taft did not cite a specific constitutional principle or provision in support of his challenge to section 229A.8A(2)(e). Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm\u2019n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1991) (noting that error was preserved on a due process argument where the party cited the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Due Process Clause in support of its constitutional challenge); see also City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P\u2019ship Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n. 2 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). A party cannot preserve error for appeal by Holdings: 0: holding that patients constitutional due process rights were violated when his trial counsel was not allowed to present a closing argument prior to involuntary commitment 1: holding that when neither the petitioners state court briefs nor the state courts decision made any reference to any federal constitutional claim or cited any federal constitutional cases the lack of fundamental error found by the state court was a lack of fundamental error under arizonas state constitution 2: holding a party failed to preserve error on its constitutional due process argument concerning notice when they did not cite any state or federal constitutional provision to the trial court or otherwise explain how lack of notice violated their constitutional rights 3: holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice 4: recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "specified different criminal penalties for violations of the Trafficking Act, which include restitution for a defendant\u2019s ill-gotten gains. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1593(b)(3). If the government wanted to seek penalties under the Trafficking Act, it was required to prosecute Defendants under the Trafficking Act. Having chosen to prosecute Defendants under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 241, it may seek only the penalties authorized by law for violations of that crime. The government has cited no authority \u2014 and we know of none \u2014 for the proposition that the district court may exceed its statutory authority simply because of the government\u2019s assertion that \u201cdefendants engaged in the same sort of behavior\u201d as a crime of which Defendants were not convicted. Because the district court rejected the correct r.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1057 Holdings: 0: holding district courts adoption of the presentence report constitutes sufficient findings 1: holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error 2: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 3: holding that a district courts failure to make the necessary findings related to a restitution order constitutes plain error 4: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "requirements of the Uniformity Clause and the federal Equal Protection Clause. Appellants forcefully argue that, in a series of decisions, the intermediate court has misconstrued our analysis and holding in Downingtown. Thus, it is helpful to first review the relevant facets of that opinion and clarify their significance. The Downingtown Court recited the foundational and longstanding principle that \u201ca taxpayer is entitled to relief under the Uniformity Clause where his property is assessed at a higher percentage of'fair market value than other properties throughout the taxing district.\u201d Downingtown, 590 Pa. at 466, 913 A.2d at 199 (citing In re Harleigh Realty Co., 299 Pa. 385, 388, 149 A. 653, 654 (1930)); see Appeal of F.W. Woolworth Co., 426 Pa. 583, 587, 235 A.2d 793, 795 (1967) (<HOLDING>), quoted in Downingtown, 590 Pa. at 468, 913 Holdings: 0: recognizing that uniformity has at its heart the equalization of the ratio among all properties in the district 1: recognizing that using false documents that go to the heart of an asylum claim can indicate lack of credibility 2: holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding 3: recognizing implicit waiver of the attorney client privilege where the plaintiff has placed in issue a communication which goes to the heart of the claim in controversy 4: holding that omissions in petitioners asylum application which go to the heart of the claim support adverse credibility finding", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "she had just \u201cglanced at it\u201d but that no one had prevented her from reading it. Moreover, she testified, she was represented by counsel when she signed that document. \"See Burroughs v. Jackson Nat\u2019l Life Ins. Co., 618 So.2d 1329, 1332 (Ala.1993) (\u201cWhen the plaintiff ... [consults an expert in a field] ... [t]he knowledge and understanding of [that] expert are attributed to the plaintiff.\u201d). She also testified that she had no personal knowledge whatever of any wrongdoing by Merrill Lynch. Furthermore, Ms. Kirton and Merrill Lynch made no exceptions to their agreement that would have specifically excluded certain types of claims from arbitration. See Ex parte Dyess, 709 So.2d 447 (Ala.1997); Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 604 So.2d 332 (Ala.1991); H.L. Fulle 995) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Dickinson, 711 So.2d 984 (Ala.1998) Holdings: 0: holding that claims of breach of fiduciary duty negligence and fraud were subject to arbitration in light of broad arbitration clause which called for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of or relating to this agreement breach thereof or any aecounts   1: holding that under federal law the party seeking to obviate the forum selection clause must prove that the inclusion of the clause was the result of fraud or coercion  fraud in the inducement as to the entire contract is not enough 2: holding that a clause requiring arbitration of any controversy or claim that shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof was sufficiently broad to cover a 1934 securities act claim involving fraudulent misrepresentation 3: holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract 4: holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim  related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "arise: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. See LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 (1997). As plaintiffs do not allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship or that Ford made any representations about its ignition locks, only the second and third of the above-referenced circumstances are implicated here, and, as set forth above, both require a finding of \u201cmateriality.\u201d See, e.g., Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 964, 970-71 (N.D.Cal.2008), (<HOLDING>), aff'd Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 322 Holdings: 0: holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding that section 636b1c does not require any review at all by the district court of an issue that is not objected to 2: recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected 3: holding that section 636b1c  does not require any review at all  of any issue that is not the subject of an objection 4: holding the first condition is not at issue here  all of the other situations require materiality", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "authority to determine whether we 'have jurisdiction over deportation orders\u2018concerning alleged aggravated felons as described in Tapia Garcia, supra, \u201cthe plain language of \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(C) fairly explicitly strips the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear their claims on petitions for direct review.\u201d Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 351, 121 S.Ct. 2268, 150 L.Ed.2d 392 (2001). Because Mr. Latu does not contest his status as an aggravated felon subject to removal, thereby admitting the jurisdip-tional fact that strips the court of jurisdiction to review his final order-of removal, he has not. failed to seek an available judicial remedy, and he is not procedurally barred from habeas review in the district court. See Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Ramtulla v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 202, 203 & n. Holdings: 0: recognizing appellate court jurisdiction over questions of law when objections were not presented below 1: recognizing that failure by state to provide the required certification deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over appeal 2: holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction 3: holding that review of questions not raised to the bia is barred 4: holding that  1252a2c deprives court of appeals of jurisdiction over constitutional questions as well as other questions presented in petition for review by removable alien who has committed qualifying aggravated felony", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that FHLMC is a United States agency fo onsequential] damages are in the nature of expectancy damages: they place [plaintiff] in the position it claims it would have been had the promises been kept. Such damages are not recoverable through promissory estop-pel.\u201d). 18 . Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 251 n. 9 (5th Cir.1984). 19 . Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 421 n. 9 (5th Cir.2000). 20 . Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 927 (5th Cir.2006). 21 . Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1986). 22 . Washington v. Dep't of Transp., 8 F.3d 296, 299 (5th Cir.1993). 23 . See Young v. Repine (In re Repine), 536 F.3d 512, 518 n. 5 (5th Cir.2008). 24 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(2). 25 . See Coco v. United States, 569 F.2d 367, 372 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). 26 . See Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3) (\"A matter is Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a rule 56f motion for a continuance where the movant had ample time in which to pursue the discovery that it now claims is essential 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "class certification elements. C. The Prudential Life Insurance Sales Practices Class Action Satisfies Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) 1. The Estimated Eight Million Policyholders Satisfy the Numerosity Requirement 40. The proposed j class must be comprised of members that are so numerous that \u201cjoinder of all members is impracticable.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1); see In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F.Supp. 1449, 1464 (D.N.J.1987). To meet the numerosity requirement, class representatives must demonstrate only that \u201ccommon sense\u201d suggests that it would be difficult or inconvenient to join all class members. Lerch v. Citizens First Bancorp, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 247, 250 (D.N.J.1992). The Court may consider the geographical dispersion of class members. Eisenberg, 766 F.2d at 785-86 (<HOLDING>). \u201cTo be sure, when the class is very large \u2014 Holdings: 0: holding that a potential class of 256 members did not satisfy numerosity 1: holding joinder not practicable where 100 to 150 class members were geographically dispersed 2: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 3: holding numerosity requirement to be satisfied where putative securities fraud class consisted of more than 90 geographically dispersed plaintiffs 4: holding that securities fraud plaintiffs do not have to prove loss causation to obtain class certification", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys on the counts premised on the alleged breach of the Disciplinary Rules. In affirming the summary judgment, this Court stated: \u201cThe Alabama courts, state and federal, have never addressed the issue of whether a breach of a Disciplinary Rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the basis for a private cause of action. However, courts in other jurisdictions which have confronted this issue have expressly held that a violation of a Disciplinary Rule does not create a private cause of action. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A., 655 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1987); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376 (N.D.Iowa 1978), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th So.2d 363, 367 (Ala.1996) (<HOLDING>); Baker v. Baker, 862 So.2d 659, 663 Holdings: 0: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 1: holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law 2: holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 3: holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence 4: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not of limitation) rev\u2019d on different grounds 474 U.S. 9, 106 S.Ct. 289, 88 L.Ed.2d 9 (1985). Accordingly, this court concludes that the plain meaning of \u201cdischarge\u201d does not restrict the definition to point sources or non-point sources with conveyances. Defendants next argue that their interpretation of \u00a7 401(a) should receive deference from this court. Defendants assert that the court should defer to the Forest Service\u2019s long-standing practice of not requiring state certification for cattle grazing. The Supreme Court addressed the standards for determining the amount of deferenc the one it is entrusted to administer is entitled to no deference. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 29 Fed.Cl. 197, 223 (1993); Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, a post hoc rationalization by Holdings: 0: holding deference to agency methodology appropriate unless agency failed to address an essential factor 1: holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 2: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 3: holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency 4: holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "plate. 308 Or at 93. But, when the officer approached the defendant\u2019s car, he saw a temporary registration sticker in the window. At that point, the officer\u2019s reason for the stop evaporated. Id. Nevertheless, the officer proceeded to ask the defendant for his driver\u2019s license and proof of registration. The defendant\u2019s responses to those requests led to the discovery of evidence that the defendant\u2019s license was suspended and he was driving uninsured. The Supreme Court held that, once the reason for the stop evaporated, the officer did not have authority to ask the defendant for his license and registration, and the court affirmed the trial court\u2019s order suppressing the evidence resulting from those requests. Id. at 94; see also State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129, 134, 158 P3d 1081 (2007) (<HOLDING>). As Starr and Farley show, an illegal stop Holdings: 0: holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his car dissipated taint of officers illegal entry 1: holding that officers request for defendants name during an illegal entry constituted exploitation of the illegal entry under hall 2: recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry 3: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry 4: holding that a confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest is not admissible", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "get Morganti paid for unilateral modifications prior to the execution of bilateral modifications with respect to CPC 53 and CPC 58. Ms. Moore testified that she believed Mor-ganti was entitled to some money for these CPC\u2019s, even though she disagreed with the total amount Morganti was requesting in each of the CPC\u2019s. Thus, Ms. Moore released $2 million that was being retained for lack of progress until she and Morganti could defini-tize bilateral modifications based on CPC 53 and CPC 58. In sum, the court finds that neither Ms. McBride nor Ms. Moore did anything to intentionally undermine Morganti\u2019s performance. Importantly, Morganti presented no evidence that the FBOP\u2019s conduct interfered with its ability to perform. D.W. Sandau Dredging, 96-1 BCA \u00b6 28,064, at 140,160, 1995 WL 739023 (<HOLDING>) (citing Northern Helex, 197 Ct.Cl. at 124-25, Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff not required to perform its residual contract obligations after defendants material breach 1: holding only a material breach discharges contractors duty to perform 2: holding that whether failure to make progress or other payments is material depends upon the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the contractors ability to perform 3: holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors 4: holding that the right of action accrued upon failure to perform contract", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "agreement\u201d that \u201cachieved [plaintiffs] objective of obtaining injunctive relief to make [defendant\u2019s hotel] accessible\u201d). This is because a \u201cprevailing plaintiff ... should ordinarily recover an attorney\u2019s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.\u201d Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134 (9th Cir.2002). The Ninth Circuit has held that an ADA plaintiff is a prevailing party if she: (1) \u201cachieve[s] a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties\u201d; and (2) that alteration is \u201cjudicially sanctioned.\u201d Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2008). The second requirement can be met in many ways, including when a party enters into a legally enforceable agreement with the defendant. Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed\u2019n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys fees even where the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement because there was insufficient judicial sanctioning of the alteration of the parties legal relationship 1: holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 2: holding that plaintiff was prevailing party under 42 usc  12205 because he could enforce a settlement against the defendant 3: holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action 4: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not present during the above-referenced proceedings. The speakers are identified based upon representations made by others.\u201d But regardless of the authenticity of this transcript, the Estate submits it for the first time on appeal, and we will not consider evidence that was not presented to the trial court. See Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 712 (1) (493 SE2d 148) (1997) (\u201c[A]ppellate courts will review only evidence presented to the trial court before its ruling on the motion. Additional evidence will not be admitted on appeal.\u201d (punctuation omitted)); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 180 (236 SE2d 357) (1977) (same); RC Cola Bottling Co. v. Vann, 220 Ga. App. 479, 480(1) (469 SE2d 523) (1996) (same); see also Jones v. O\u2019Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 162-63 n.4 (692 SE2d 774) (2010) (<HOLDING>); Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shook, 215 Holdings: 0: holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal 1: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 2: holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court 3: holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court 4: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "did have a prepetition legal interest in that case. At the time of bankruptcy, \u00a7 172 of the Internal Revenue Code gave the debtor a claim for a tax refund if certain conditions were met. It was the combination of the law and the conditions made legally relevant by the law that conferred on the debtor a prepetition legal interest: the claim for a refund. In that way, the Segal debtors\u2019 claim for a refund is similar to the prepetition accrual of a cause of action that results in a post-petition judgment in the debtor\u2019s favor. In such eases, the debtor\u2019s cause of action is a prepetition legal interest \u2014 \u25a0\u00a7 541(a)(1) property- \u2014 -that brings the postpetition judgment into the estate as proceeds under \u00a7 541(a)(6). See, e.g., Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, by contrast, Burgess suffered the crop Holdings: 0: holding that claims harming the debtor corporation that arose from prepetition conduct become property of the estate under 11 usc  541a1 1: holding that causes of action for age and sex discrimination that arose prepetition were property of the bankruptcy estate 2: holding that to make out the fourth element of a prima facie case of sex discrimination plaintiff must prove that males remained in similar positions and similarly for age discrimination that she was otherwise discharged because of her age 3: holding lost future wages recovered pursuant to a prepetition cause of action are property of the estate 4: holding age discrimination claim barred", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not necessary. And in its \u201cTechnical Support Document,\u201d the EPA explained why it believed the revised MVEB was adequate for conformity purposes. Although the explanations may not have been as detailed as the Petitioner would have liked, we nonetheless conclude that through these documents the EPA adequately addressed the somewhat general comments of the Petitioner and sufficiently explained the basis and purpose of its actions. See Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm\u2019n, 105 F.3d 715, 722-23 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (\u201cAlthough the NRC did not directly respond to Dr. Reytblatt\u2019s suggested alternatives ..., its explanation was adequate in light of the general nature of Dr. Reyt-blatt\u2019s comments.... \u201d); National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1252 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). VI. To summarize, we conclude that nothing in Holdings: 0: holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 1: holding the rule of lenity inapplicable where the defendants interpretation failed to give meaning to each statutory provision 2: holding epas interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision unreasonable where it was inconsistent with the clean air acts purpose 3: holding that the epas explanation in five different documents of its interpretation of a specific statutory provision satisfied the apas basisandpurpose requirement 4: holding that to the extent the petition challenges the application of epas regulatory interpretation to petitioners plants the challenge is unripe", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "WL 625006, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 1997); Rodriguez v. Margotta, 71 F.Supp.2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (McMahon, J.); Schultz v. Inc. Vill. of Bellport, No. 08CV0930, 2010 WL 3924751, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (Bianco, J.)). Here, the Individual Defendants did not deny Plaintiff all opportunities to practice in her chosen profession. It is undeniable that Defendants\u2019 actions made it more difficult for Plaintiff to attain her goal as she now has a failing grade on her resume, lost her scholarship, and was only offered to repeat a course for which she allegedly should have been awarded credit. However, the ultimate resolution of Plaintiffs grade appeal was an opportunity to retake the student teaching seminar. See Sacco v. Pataki, 114 F.Supp.2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (Cedarbaum, J.) (<HOLDING>); Empire Transit Mix, Inc. v. Giuliani, 37 Holdings: 0: holding convicted sex offender had not been deprived of liberty interest for purposes of procedural due process challenge to sorp 1: holding plaintiffs are not deprived of a liberty interest because they cannot have the best job in their field 2: holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest 3: holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 4: holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "2. Local Law Claims Lastly, Defendants request that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims if the federal law claims are dismissed. Plaintiff asserts several causes of action under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Specifically, she alleges claims under Puerto Rico Laws 17, 69,100 and 80. With the dismissal of federal claims against Defendant, there are no pending claims giving rise to federal jurisdiction. 12 U.S.C. \u00a7 1819(b)(2)(A). As such, dismissal of pending state law claims is proper because an independent jurisdictional basis is lacking. Exercising jurisdiction over pendent state law claims once the federal law claims are no longer present in the lawsuit is discretionary. See Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the court chooses not to Holdings: 0: holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit 1: holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit  and the district court has considerable authority whether or not to exercise this power in light of such considerations as judicial economy convenience fairness to litigants and eomity  2: holding if the legislature had the power to confer upon the county commissioners jurisdiction to hear and determine the question as to whether or not a town was of undue extent and to deprive it of a part of its territory then the proceeding being statutory before a body of limited powers the record must show affirmatively that such a case was brought before them as they were authorized to hear and determine and that all the jurisdictional facts were found to exist where the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine depends upon the existence of a fact that fact must appear or the proceedings are coram non judice and void 3: holding that in the interest of judicial economy we exercise our discretionary power to suspend the rules pertaining to interlocutory appeals and address the remainder of the defendants appeal 4: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "with Turnage that the postconviction court\u2019s formulation of the second Larrison prong was erroneous insofar as it seemed to focus its inquiry on whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Turnage even without Quantez\u2019s testimony. Under the second Larrison prong, the court is to ask whether the petitioner has demonstrated \u201cthat without the [recanting witness\u2019s] testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion.\u201d Williams, 692 N.W.2d at 896; see also Hooper, 680 N.W.2d at 96 (affirming the postconviction court\u2019s holding that second prong not met because \u201ceven without [the recanting witness\u2019s] testimony, the strength of the other evidence presented at trial was such that the jury would not likely have reached a different conclusion\u201d); cf. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424 (<HOLDING>). As these cases make clear, the second Holdings: 0: holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses 1: holding that second prong was met because of the seven witnesses who testified for the state in a largely circumstantial case the testimony of five of them was either formally recanted or otherwise called into doubt in postconviction proceedings 2: holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial 3: holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as an abuse of the writ was properly filed 4: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "sentencing range. Because the district court abused its discretion when it imposed this substantively unreasonable sentence, I respectfully dissent. 1 . On a prior appeal of Edwards\u2019s sentence to this Court, Judge Kleinfeld dissented from the majority's decision to remand Edwards\u2019s sentence to the district court for possible resen-tencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Edwards, 158 Fed.Appx. at 932 (Kle-infeld, J., dissenting). Judge Kleinfeld would have vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable and remanded for resentencing. Id. 2 . Section 3553(a)(2) lists factors a district court must consider when it decides whether to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range. Section 3553(a)(2) require 7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Even outside the context of white collar Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence of twelve months imprisonment was unreasonably lenient where the defendant engaged in wire fraud and caused 90000 in losses and the guidelines range was sixtythree to seventyeight months imprisonment 1: holding that the district courts imposition of a 15month sentence when the guidelines range was 37 to 46 months imprisonment a 60 downward variance was unreasonable 2: holding that a sentence of seven days imprisonment was substantively unreasonable where the defendant participated in a securities fraud conspiracy that caused more than 1 billion in losses 3: holding a sentence is not based on the guidelines unless the plea agreement itself expressly uses a guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment 4: holding that a sentence of five years probation was unreasonably lenient where the defendant played a key role in an accounting fraud scheme that caused over 1 billion in losses to a companys shareholders and the guidelines range was seventyeight to ninetyseven months imprisonment", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "could not state that proposition. Alabama law is not permitted by the FAA to treat arbitratio his case. That fact is uncontested. In addition, it is uncontested that the contract to which Stiles assented may be changed by AGFC. A contract incorporating such a clause is valid under the laws of both Utah and Alabama. See discussion below. Stiles has, therefore, assented to an arbitration clause, even absent his signature. Cf. Clayton v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 981 F.Supp. 1447 (M.D.Ala.1997) (compelling arbitration where arbitration clause was included in constitution of fraternal benefit society, which was incorporated by reference into insurance contract); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. den., \u2014 U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 47, 139 L.Ed.2d 13 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The provision is not invalid because not Holdings: 0: holding corporation vicariously liable for assault on customer by assistant manager as customer was engaged in trying to settle a controversy concerning a portion of defendants business 1: holding former employee could properly use recollection of customer information where he did not otherwise misappropriate an actual customer list 2: holding that arbitration clause which was included with product mailed to customer and with proviso that customer could return product within 30 days was binding on customer who did not return computer 3: holding that a bank customer was not bound to arbitrate where the signature card that was signed referenced a collateral document which contained an arbitration clause but the bank never sent the customer a copy of the collateral document 4: holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in federal court, \u201c[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.\u201d United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Congress codified this holding in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(a), which provides that when district courts have original jurisdiction, \u201cthe district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same ease or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.\u201d Once a district court decides the state claims derive from the same operative facts, it possesses discretion to determine whether to deny exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (<HOLDING>); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding a district courts application of supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion not of plaintiffs right 1: holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court 2: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law 3: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 4: holding law of case doctrine is procedural and does not go to jurisdiction of court", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "108. 61 . We believe the instant case is one of these cases. 62 . See Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108. 63 . See McIntire, 698 S.W.2d at 658. 64 . Bahm, 219 S.W.3d at 396 (\"While the court of appeals used the words 'reasonable grounds,\u2019 its emphasis on proof in its analysis appears to conflict with its earlier statement that an appellant does not need to establish a prima facie case to obtain a hearing on his motion for new trail.\u201d). 65 . If an appellate court made such a determination in favor of an appellant and thus remanded the case to the trial court, what determinations would remain for the trial court to make at the hearing? 66 . Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108 (emphasis added). 67 . McIntire, 698 S.W.2d at 660; see McMillan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, pet. ref\u2019d) (<HOLDING>). 68 . See id. 69 . The instant case was Holdings: 0: holding that if the defendant fails to file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea he cannot attack it for the first time on appeal 1: holding that trial court did not err in ruling on appellees motion for summary judgment before appellees complied with appellants discovery request when the record reflected that appellant filed a motion to compel three days before the hearing and the record did not reveal any effort on the part of appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court on its motion to compel or object at the trial court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to ruling on the motion to compel 2: recognizing that the defendant whose trial counsel represented him on motion for new trial had no opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to appeal and remanding the case for a hearing solely on this issue 3: holding that the trial court should have granted a motion for relief from judgment when it was the trial courts failure to serve the defendant with notice of the final judgment as required by rule 1080h1 that prevented the defendant from timely appealing 4: holding that by denying the defendant a hearing on his motion for new trial the trial court abdicated its fact finding function and effectively prevented the defendant from making a record sufficient to challenge on appeal the policy about which he complains", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "where a negotiated compact is in effect between the state and the tribe. 25 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 2710(d)(1)(C). To this end, the language of the IGRA provides that \u201cAny State ... may enter into a Tribal-State compact governing gaming activities on the Indian lands of the Indian Tribe.\u201d Id. \u00a7 2710(d)(3)(B). The only reasonable interpretation of this language is that it authorizes state officials, acting pursuant to their authority held under state law, to enter into gaming compacts on behalf of the state. It follows that because the Governor lacked authority under New Mexico law to enter into the compact with Pojoaque Pueblo, the State of New Mexico has not yet entered into any gaming compact that the Governor may implement. Cf. Marburg v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-79, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Under federal law as expressed in Holdings: 0: holding that a void decree has no legal effect 1: holding to the same effect 2: holding that an evicted plaintiff has no legal interest in property and therefore has no standing to bring a cercla claim 3: holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal 4: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to the Petitioning Creditor. Despite this acknowledgement, this Court finds the Instant Memo to be insufficient to prove the existence of an enforceable contract because it makes no reference to the essential terms of whatever loan agreement that may exist between the parties. Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2009) (recognizing that when a party seeks to enforce an oral agreement, the party must establish the essential terms and conditions of the alleged agreement); CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.1999) (stating that a party must establish the essential terms of a contract in order to state a claim for breach of contract); Estate of Rodgers v. Morris Chapel Missionary Baptist Church, No. 04-1577, 2005 WL 3602536 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. Dec. 14, 2005) (<HOLDING>). For example, the Instant Memo makes no Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 2: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract 3: holding summary dismissal of breach of implied employment contract claim inappropriate where factual issue over existence of oral policy 4: holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "validly claim anxiety and concern over the pending charges. But that is not enough to find a constitutional speedy trial violation. Rather, if there is no actual prejudice, the presumed prejudice flowing from a long delay is \u201cinsufficient to carry a speedy trial claim absent a strong showing on the other Barker factors.\u201d Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600. This case does not present even a weak showing on the other Barker factors: Ashburn was as much, if not more, responsible for the pretrial delay; while Ashburn asserted his speedy trial rights, he also continued to request continuances; and the delay did not cause any pretrial incarceration and did not impair his defense. Under these circumstances, Ashburn was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 601 (<HOLDING>); Loera v. United States, 714 F.3d 1025, 1032 Holdings: 0: holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial 1: holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial 2: holding that aggressiveness with which defendant asserted his speedy trial right was lacking because he merely filed one demand for speedy trial and opposed his original counsels withdrawal 3: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant 4: holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "judgment on a take-nothing jury verdict against plaintiffs. Appellant challenges three of the district court\u2019s evidentiary rulings, which excluded evidence relating to crashworthiness and unreasonable dangerousness. We affirm. I. We review the district court\u2019s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1993). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, we may not set aside a verdict based on an error in the exclusion of evidence, \u201cunless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. To vacate a judgment based on such an error, we \u201cmust find that the substantial rights of the parties were affected.\u201d Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. (2d Cir.1981)(<HOLDING>); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Holdings: 0: holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute 1: holding that when congress has implicitly delegated legislative authority to an agency a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 2: holding that although the court has the authority to review facts not before the plan administrator the court should use that authority sparingly 3: holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of rule 8038c 4: recognizing a trial courts common law authority to enter an interim rather than permanent parenting plan at the time of entry of a dissolution decree even in the absence of express statutory authority", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "2d, Business Relationships \u00a7 1401, at 352; see Partnership Law \u00a7 10 [1].) Finally, that the complainant\u2019s attorney referred to the 1987 agreement as a partnership in 1992, five years after the 1987 agreement was drafted, does not prove, in and of itself, that the defendants and complainants were partners. (Brodsky v Stadlen, 138 AD2d 662, 663 [2d Dept 1988].) For similar reasons, the defendants\u2019 argument that the 1987 agreement created a joint venture, the establishment of which is based on the same rules in which the existence of a partnership is determined (see Scholastic, Inc. v Harris, 259 F3d 73, 84 [2d Cir 2001]), is also without merit. 17 . See 3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a7 19.4 (c) n 42 (2d ed). 18 . See State v Durant, 122 Or App 380, 383-384, 857 P2d 891, 893 (1993) Holdings: 0: holding under oregons larceny statute which is based on new yorks larceny statute that a partner cannot be charged with the theft of partnership property because oregon adheres to the commonlaw rule that partners cannot steal partnership property 1: holding that a transaction did not satisfy the requirements of  1031a when a partnership sold property and individual partners acquired the exchange property 2: holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny 3: holding larceny conviction was a violation of bar against double jeopardy where defendant was acquitted of larceny at first trial but at retrial was convicted of larceny and burglary 4: recognizing that partnership property is a type of ownership", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(\u201cOmegle Policy\u201d), Ex. E to Opp. Mem. at 1. 22 . Id. In fact, users\u2019 IP addresses are recorded with the explicit \u201cinten[tion] [of] be[ing] used for the purpose of law enforcement.\u201d Id. 23 . Id. 24 . Id. 36 . United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 665 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). 37 . 534 U.S. 112, 120, 122 S.Ct 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). 38 . Id. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587. 39 . Id. 40 . Newton, 369 F.3d at 665 (citing United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2d Cir.2002)). 41 . United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 182 (2d Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). 42 . Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). 43 . Rakas v. Illinois, t. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (<HOLDING>). 48 . Garcia, 56 F.3d at 422. 49 . Florida v. Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search 1: holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable 2: holding that a detained defendants consent to search his car was voluntary even though the police did not tell him he was free to leave 3: holding that a search can be consented to even if a defendant does not subjectively feel free to leave 4: holding inter alia that a search can be consented to even if a defendant to be advised that he is free to go", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "application [ ] when in fact th[e] Attorney General has given the required preliminary approval to submit the application ... does not warrant the suppression of evidence gathered pursuant to a court order resting upon the application.\u201d 416 U.S. at 571, 94 S.Ct. 1849. In other words, when the executive official who actually authorized a wiretap application had the power to do so, a law enforcement officer\u2019s failure to correctly identify the official in the wiretap application does not require suppression. These are the circumstances of this case. Indeed, the officers\u2019 reference to an outdated AG Order was merely a technical defect which did not subvert the primary purposes of the wiretap statute\u2019s authorization requirement. See United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court correctly Holdings: 0: holding that amended order which made more than clerical corrections was a nullity when it was entered after notice of appeal 1: holding statute which required consideration rather than a finding of amenability was constitutional 2: holding that deas reference to ag order 27582005 rather than 28872007 was a clerical error which did not subvert the reviewing functions required by congress 3: holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress 4: holding that appellate courts analyze plain error by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided rather than the extant law at the time of the disputed trial court ruling", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in the equipment; (4) Segundo did not assist Monson in retrieving the equipment from law enforcement; and (5) Segundo did not adequately protect its collateral. But these excuses do not make Monson\u2019s own conduct any less willful or malicious. The collapse of the business did not relieve Monson of the contractual obligations which he entered into or give him carte blanche to make off with equipment he bought with someone else\u2019s money. Demonstrably, Monson knew his actions were wrongful and without just cause. Further, Monson\u2019s behavior falls outside of the sort of reckless or unfortunate but non-malicious acts that this Court have previously held do not rise to the standard of a willful and malicious injury under \u00a7 523(a)(6). See In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163-65 (11th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Ikner, 883 F.2d at 987-91 (affirming the Holdings: 0: holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6 1: holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury 2: holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence 3: holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy 4: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(emphases added). Thus, contrary to Vester\u2019s contention on appeal, the United States Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between \u201cuncounseled\u201d convictions, and those that were secured with \u201cineffective\u201d counsel. Accordingly, Yester\u2019s claim that his \u201cineffective counsel\u201d amounted to \u201cno counsel,\u201d for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and collateral attack on his prior convictions, must fail. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held in Custis that the right to collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for enhancement purposes is limited to the actual denial of counsel. Id.; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 378, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 1581, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Although the Custis decision concerned the Holdings: 0: recognizing collateral attack on void order 1: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 2: holding that where a defendants claim did not amount to a complete denial of counsel it could not form the basis of a collateral attack 3: holding that when the law of the circuit was so firmly against him petitioner did not have to raise an issue to preserve it as a basis for collateral attack later on 4: holding that the complete denial of counsel on direct appeal requires a finding of prejudice", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "burden to establish prejudice \u201cdespite the fact that a delay occurred.\u201d Id. at 188. We concluded employer\u2019s delay of nearly seven months in moving to dismiss after employee\u2019s suit did not prejudice employee. Id. Our holding in Mueller is consistent with prior authority finding delay in seeking to compel arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice. See generally Freeman, 924 F.2d at 158-59 (moving party\u2019s use of judicial process and discovery before demanding arbitration not prejudicial to opponent as no issues litigated and limited discovery unusable in arbitration); Nettleton v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 904 S.W.2d 409, 410-12 (Mo.App.1995) (limited discovery and legal expenses incurred by party opposing arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice); Berhorst, 764 S.W.2d at 662-64 (<HOLDING>). Prejudice, however, may result from delay and Holdings: 0: holding party did not waive right to arbitrate despite moving to dismiss and moving for summary judgment on opponents claim 1: holding that the moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial 2: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case 3: holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court 4: holding that summary judgment should be denied where the moving party does not show that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact with respect to each essential element of the claim", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "but data-gathering that preceded it. See Seamon, supra, at 735-36 (quoting Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286). In the latter case, a court need not second-guess the decision's wisdom; it need only examine the decisionmaking process to determine whether the negligently produced data affected it. See id. 16 . The Court here used the term in its common-law sense, which distinguishes \"discretionary\u201d from \"ministerial\u201d acts, and not in its distinct but related FTCA sense. 17 . The Court has limited Mitchell, allowing immediate appeal only of denials of immunity turning on questions of law, not sufficiency of evidence. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), lim\u2019d in turn by Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 18 . As illustrated by the opinion Holdings: 0: recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling 1: holding that genuine factual dispute does not preclude appeal of discrete ruling on pure legal issue 2: recognizing that order denying confirmation of a plan does not resolve a discrete issue 3: holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact 4: holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "regarding the exclusivity provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, \u00a7 24 are determined by the judge, justiciable by motion. Anzalone v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 403 Mass. 119, 125, 526 N.E.2d 246, 249 (1988); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 548, 413 N.E.2d 711, 713 (1980); Catalano v. First Essex Sav. Bank, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 377, 381, 639 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (1994). It is reasonable to infer that the Verdict and Judgment followed the State Court judge\u2019s consideration and denial of motions to invoke the exclusivity clause under the Act, M.G.L. c. 152, \u00a7 24. In Massachusetts, that level of adjudication is sufficient to provide preclu-sive effect for the issue underlying the motion in a subsequent forum. Jarosz v. Palmer, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 834, 836, 733 N.E.2d 164, 167 (2000) (<HOLDING>) aff'd 436 Mass. 526, 531, 766 N.E.2d 482, 488 Holdings: 0: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   1: holding that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a significant disputed factual issue 2: holding that an evidentiary hearing or jury trial is not necessary for an issue to have preclusive effect if it was properly raised in the prior proceeding was submitted for determination and was actually determined citing restatement second of judgments  27 cmt d 3: holding that the disputed issue with respect to the state law bar was properly submitted to the jury 4: holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars readjudication of issues when 1 the prior suit resulted in judgment on the merits 2 identical issues are involved 3 the issue was actually litigated 4 the issue was actually determined and 5 the determination was necessary to the resulting judgment", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201cByLine\u201d products, are-invalid and, therefore, in advertising these products as being available \u201cexclusively\u201d at its retail stores, the Plaintiff has merely exercised its right to market the exclusive availability of these specific products, for which it holds the legal entitlement to sell as so trademarked. As a result, the attestations, which are contained in the Condon Affidavit, merely evince a consumer\u2019s reaction to a lawful marketing practice, and not some reaction to illegal and misleading advertising. Moreover, we agree with the Plaintiff that its representations concerning the \u201cexclusive\u201d availability of these products are, at their worst, exaggerated and overgeneralized puffery. See, e.g., Gordon & Breach Science Publishers S.A. v. American Institute of Physics, supra at 182 (<HOLDING>); Data Cash Systems Inc. v. Js & a Group, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that statements proclaiming the most costeffective prices and subscription prices as low as possible were puffery 1: holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement 2: holding statements of product superiority and that product was industry approved were puffery 3: holding statement that product was americas favorite pasta was puffery 4: holding that statements that 1992 will produce excellent results for adage and adage is on target toward achieving the most profitable year in its history were predictions as to future events not statements as to present facts let alone guarantees and were therefore immaterial as a matter of law", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(1) Employment in the institution. (2) Iowa state industries. (3) An employment program established by the director. (4) A treatment program established by the director. (5) An inmate educational program approved by the director. Iowa Code \u00a7 903A.2 (Supp.1997) (emphasis added). Propp had a category \u201cA\u201d sentence. 3 .The practice of the DOC is to allow an inmate required to participate in a sex offender treatment program to earn credits while awaiting placement in the program rather than being deemed ineligible until completion of the program. This interpretation of the statute is not challenged in this case. 4 . Propp does not claim that requiring him to participate in the SOTP is itself a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Cf. Schreiber v. State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Iowa 2003) (<HOLDING>). Nor does he claim he could not be disciplined Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them 1: holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause 2: holding that work release and security classification regulations were not ex post facto laws 3: holding imposition of discipline for refusal to supply blood specimen did not violate ex post facto clause 4: holding statute requiring inmates to submit blood specimens for dna profiling did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "trial court to have granted a 30-day grace period, in light of the fact that Schorp\u2019s attorney failed to file an expert report in compliance with the statute\u2019s requirements, would have undermined the statute\u2019s intent. For that reason, appellant\u2019s fourth issue cannot be sustained. Therefore, we overrule appellant's fourth issue. 4 . Bell and Baptist assert relevant questions which a jury would have to consider and would necessitate an expert's opinion: for example, (1) whether the decision to use an arterial line was within the appropriate standard of care; (2)what are the appropriate procedures for an arterial line insertion; (3) what other possible medical causes could exist; (4) what should have been the appropriate medical treatment or intervention? See Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 953 (<HOLDING>); Odak, 934 S.W.2d at 873 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that affidavit of merit is not required in common knowledge cases 1: recognizing common knowledge exception 2: recognizing a common knowledge exception 3: holding that administering of a hypodermic needle for the purpose of anesthesia was not within laymans common knowledge 4: holding that a reason to combine may come from the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art the nature of the problem to be solved or common knowledge and common sense", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "competent, ... a person rendering necessaries or professional services is entitled to recover from such person under the conditions stated in this Section, although the person expresses an unwillingness to accept the things or services. (Emphasis added.) In addition to the principles set forth in the Restatement of Restitution discussed above, cases from other jurisdictions have concluded that a patient is liable for the reasonable value of medical services rendered by a hospital based on an implied in law contract theory. See Nursing Care Servs., 380 So.2d at 518 (concluding that provider of nursing care services was entitled to value of services provided to patient based on emergency aid quasi-contract theory); Galloway v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 658 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Heartland Health Sys. v. Chamberlin, 871 Holdings: 0: recognizing that at least for certain purposes a hospital room is fully under the control of the medical staff yet for other purposes it is the patients room  because patient understands that nurses doctors food handlers and others enter and exit hospital room in accordance with medical need and hospital routine 1: holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients 2: holding that wife made an unambiguous unqualified promise to pay for the hospital services rendered to her husband when she signed a document that was separate from the patients registration form which she did not sign and which listed her husband as the person responsible for this account and when the separate document was entitled guarantee of account and provided i will pay any unpaid balance on dismissal and i agree to be responsible for hospital services rendered to this patient 3: holding that equity demanded that patients pay for medical services rendered by hospital in birth of child to prevent unjust enrichment 4: holding that claim against hospital regarding patients fall caused by defective footboard on hospital bed constituted health care liability claim", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the items\u201d does not permit the conclusion that the court gave little or no consideration to the erroneously admitted evidence of the perjury conviction in determining what weight to give the testimony of LeBray. The court could have attributed greater credibility to LeBray\u2019s testimony and drawn more extensive inferences from it precisely because it rejected Pierce\u2019s denial of possession to police based on the court\u2019s admission of evidence of Pierce\u2019s prior perjury conviction. Applying harmless error terminology, neither the \u201ccumulative\u201d evidence nor the \u201coverwhelming\u201d evidence formulation of harmless error analysis supports the conclusion that the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless. See, e.g., Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639, 113 S.Ct. at 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d at 373-74 (<HOLDING>); Lane, 474 U.S. at 450, 106 S.Ct. at 732, 88 Holdings: 0: holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if cumulative 1: holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless 2: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if other evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error is insignificant by comparison 4: holding that when evidence was erroneously admitted such error was harmless when the evidence was insignificant and cumulative", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that I can let you continue on with this case, so I\u2019m going to dismiss you from the case with my thanks for your service up to this point. And I\u2019m going to release you at this time. Defendant then filed a motion for mistrial pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1061 on the basis that the jury had heard extraneous informa tion in violation of defendant\u2019s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. After the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial, it inquired of the prosecutors and defense counsel as to their wishes regarding the jury in the capital sentencing proceeding. The prosecutor expressed a willingness to replace juror eleven with an alternate juror for the capital sentencing proceeding. However, defense counsel argued that the trial court had err 9, 192 (1971) (<HOLDING>). In State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 256, 485 Holdings: 0: holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 1: holding that notwithstanding defendants consent the verdict was a nullity where the trial court proceeded to verdict with a jury of eleven 2: holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision 3: holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury 4: holding that after court dismissed case at plaintiffs request notwithstanding the fact that jury had deliberated upon the case and indicated that it had reached a verdict there was no case pending in court on which a verdict could be predicated and the information which the judge got from an inspection of the petition handed to him by the foreman of the jury was information which he received as an individual and not as a judge of the court and further holding that despite violation of defendants right to receive the verdict that was purportedly reached the writing incorporated in the bill of exceptions as a verdict of the jury was in law no verdict because it was not received in court and published as required by law and was instead entirely extraneous and extrajudicial", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. As in Po-ohina, the District Court\u2019s sua sponte dismissal of the charges was not based on a decision on the merits of the case or a decision as to the guilt of Clemente. Instead, the District Court dismissed the charges as a sanction against the State because the District Court mistakenly believed that the State\u2019s witness, Officer Tallion, would not be appearing as ordered. Because the District Court\u2019s dismissal of the charges did not constitute an acquittal, the District Court had the authority to reconsider and overturn its dismissal ruling without violating the protection against double jeopardy. See Poohina, 97 Hawai'i at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12; Commonwealth v. Adams, 349 Pa.Super. 200, 502 A.2d 1345, 1347-52 (1986) (<HOLDING>); State v. Calhoun, 18 Ohio St.3d 373, 481 Holdings: 0: recognizing the specific need for an appropriate double jeopardy review when an appeal is taken by the state from a lower courts dismissal of the criminal charges 1: holding that defendant waived double jeopardy claim by obtaining severance of charges at first trial 2: holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy 3: holding that the trial courts dismissal of the charges after jeopardy had attached based on the prosecution witnesses failure to appear was not an acquittal and therefore double jeopardy did not prevent the court from reconsidering its decision and reinstating the charges 4: holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "only improves on the questions of fact. \u00b617 The employer also argues that neither Mayor Johnson nor the article revealed that Mr. White had epilepsy; only that he had seizures for which he had regularly been taking medicine to control. This could be a distinction without a difference, or at least it presents a genuine issue of material fact. In other words, a jury could find that the mayor\u2019s statement and the article that reported it undoubtedly referred to epilepsy. \u00b618 The employer argues that the information disclosed was not highly offensive. Cases from other jurisdictions involving publication of the intimate details of an employee\u2019s medical health have met the \u201chighly offensive\u201d requirement. See Blackwell v. Harris Chem. N. Am., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310 (D. Kan. 1998) (<HOLDING>); Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 241 F. Supp. 2d Holdings: 0: recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca 1: holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy 2: holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts 3: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 4: holding alleged disclosure of personal medical information to other employees sufficiently met elements of private facts tort", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (emphasizing the inherent power of federal courts to \u201cmanage their own affairs\u201d and stating that \u201cCourts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence.\u201d). Furthermore, the mandates of Rule 11 are not absolute. and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits. Rather, it requires determining a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process and, if so, the appropriate sanction. Lefley v. United States, No. 259-89, 1997 WL 718468, at *11-12, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 309, at *34-35 (Ct.Cl. July 31, 1997); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131,137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076,117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In Cooter & Gell, the Supreme Court set forth Holdings: 0: holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction 1: holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 2: holding that a district court could constitutionally impose rule 11 sanctions in a case in which was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case 4: holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "asylum application, but we find it doubtful that the DHS would deny asylum to the victim of a politically motivated, two-week detention filled with deliberate, vicious beatings but grant it to a similar applicant with additional nonlethal electrical shocks; pain is pain, whether inflicted with or without technological sophistication. Giday, 434 F.3d at 552. The discrepancies regarding Captain Azote\u2019s assassination, with the exception of those dealing with the motivation for the killing, are similarly unimportant. If Azote was killed for his association with Adekpe, it suggests that the government would likely kill Adekpe too, if given the chance, regardless of whether Azote was killed on a Monday or Saturday, walking or jogging. Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 336, 341-42 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the IJ found it unreasonable that Holdings: 0: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act 1: holding that minor discrepancies that do not involve the heart of the asylum claim are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding 2: holding that minor discrepancies in the date of an aliens graduation from high school as compared to the date of a beating did not justify an adverse credibility finding 3: holding adverse credibility finding was supported based on discrepancies between aliens testimony and statements regarding a police detention 4: holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "only the quantity of prior convictions, but also the qualitative relationship between the prior convictions and the present homicide conviction. 498 A.2d at 852. Justice Hutchinson suggests that prior felony convictions must be factually similar to the conviction at issue in order to support the aggravating circumstance. Id. This interpretation of the aggravating circumstance by Justice Hutchinson, accepted by only one other Justice, is not binding precedent upon this court. See CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service, Inc., 536 Pa. 462, 640 A.2d 372, 376 n. 3 (1994). Additionally, we specifically rejected reliance upon Holcomb for the argument raised by Appellant in Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 637 A.2d 1313, 1320-1321 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 1389, 128 L.Ed.2d 63 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The evidence of Appellant\u2019s two prior Holdings: 0: holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction 1: holding that section 9711d9 does not require that prior felony convictions be factually similar to the crime at issue 2: holding our habitual offender act does not limit enhancement to prior felony convictions within a certain time 3: holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded 4: holding that section 636b1c does not require any review at all by the district court of an issue that is not objected to", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "While McIntyre appears to have applied strict scrutiny, this Court does not find that the result differs under the exacting scrutiny standard. Simply stated, the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity to inform the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, at least in the context of referenda. The Defendants argue that the McIntyre holding is a very \u201cfact-specific\u201d and should yield to the more recent and relevant stream of Supreme Court cases. (Defs.\u2019 Br. Opp. Pl.\u2019s Mot. Summ. J. 4-5.) However, the Defendants do not fully develop this argument, and this Court has no obligation to formulate arguments for a party. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int\u2019l\u2014 Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2000); See also, United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). As highlighted in Swaffer, the only notable Holdings: 0: holding that the seventh circuit has made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority are waived even where those arguments raise constitutional issues 1: holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived 2: holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence 3: holding that claims must put parties on sufficient notice of underlying arguments or arguments are deemed waived 4: holding that appellate courts will not review undeveloped and unsupported arguments", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "only if \u201cthe guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines. ...\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 1B1.10(a)(1) (emphasis added). The central dispute in this appeal is the meaning of \u201capplicable to\u201d and \u201capplicable guidelines.\u201d The government contends that, in this case, the applicable guidelines are the Career Offender guidelines because Pleasant qualified as a Career Offender, even though he was not sentenced under those guidelines. Pleasant argues that, under Freeman, the applicable guideline is \u00a7 2D1.1 because the plea agreement called for sentencing to be imposed under that provision. The commentary to \u00a7 1B1.10 addresses this very question. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, Application Note 1(A) clarifies Holdings: 0: holding that commentary is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline it interprets or explains 1: holding that commentary to the guidelines is treated as an agencys interpretation of its own legislative rule 2: holding that guidelines and commentary have force of law that may not be disregarded by sentencing judge 3: holding that commentary accompanying guidelines is binding 4: holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "would have a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, albeit by a small margin. Furthermore, it is appropriate for a district court to consider the substantial increase in turnout of black voters that usually follows the creation of an opportunity district in its effectiveness analysis. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.Supp.2d 740, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (\"[I]t is unreasonable to assume that minority turnout will not increase under a system in which that turnout is made meaningful, relative to a system in which that turnout was entirely ineffective.\u201d) With the boost in turnout of black voters the district becomes substantially more effective. 188 . Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). 189 . Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07 (<HOLDING>): Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1425 (11th Holdings: 0: holding that miller and its progeny did not work a change in the first gingles inquiry and rejecting the argument that a proposed district that violates miller does not satisfy the first gingles factor per se 1: holding that the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendants argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it 2: holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor 3: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 4: holding that an argument not raised before the bankruptcy court will not be considered for the first time on appeal", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "adverse discrimination at all. The whole purpose of Title VII, as stated clearly by its text and controlling case law, is preventing harmful discrimination, not the lamentable-but-benign discrimination that the jury found Litton experienced. I respectfully dissent. 1 . See, e.g., Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir.2004); Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir.2000); Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir.2006). 2 . See, e.g., Fuhr, 364 F.3d at 757; Suggs v. ServiceMaster Educ. Food Mgmt., 72 F.3d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that the \"ultimate question\u201d is \"whether the plaintiff carried her burden of proof of discriminatory discharge.\" (emphasis added)); Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding the employees complaints must give adequate notice to the employer that the employee is complaining of conduct prohibited by title vii 1: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 2: holding that to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee the court examines if there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employers stated reason for the firing is pretext 3: holding that the one central question at a title vii trial is whether the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that  the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race color religion sex or national origin emphasis added 4: holding that whether an employee decides to assist the charging party or refuses to assist the  employer the employer may not retaliate against the employee because this decision of the employee constitutes participation in an investigation or proceeding under title vii", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "member, etc.), there was no evidence of the ultimately fatal situation that existed inside Ms. Patterson\u2019s home when Finley knocked on the door. Any conclusion that Ms. Patterson had, or did not have, a reasonably safe opportunity to warn Finley would be mere speculation. \u201cEvidence ... which affords nothing more than mere speculation, conjecture, or guess is insufficient to warrant the submission of a ease to the jury.\u201d Sprayberry v. First Nat\u2019l Bank, 465 So.2d 1111, 1114 (Ala.1984). Thus, the evidence did not indicate sufficient special circumstances to impose a duty on Ms. Patterson to warn Finley. The trial court properly directed a verdict mative-conduct theory because he does not allege that Ms. Patterson took any affirmative action. Cf. Orr v. Turney, 535 So.2d 150 (Ala. 1988) (<HOLDING>). 2 . We note that it would be peculiar to Holdings: 0: holding that a business owner has a duty to use reasonable care to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition for patrons 1: holding that premises owner owed higher duty of reasonable care to visitor instead of lower duty to licensee where owners affirmative conduct of running with a pan of hot grease created a risk to a visiting child 2: recognizing the general rule that a premises owner owes a licensee not only a duty to abstain from willfully or wantonly injuring the licensee but also a duty to avoid negligently injuring the licensee after the premises owner discovers that the licensee is in danger 3: holding that ship owners have a duty of exercising reasonable care to protect passengers regardless of status as invitee or licensee 4: holding that premises owner had duty to use degree of care in performing activities that owner of ordinary prudence would use under same or similar circumstances", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "written objection). Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). It is therefore within this Court\u2019s power and discretion to refuse to consider the materials submitted by LVNV on August 5, 2008, in support of claim 11, 12, 13, 14, and 18, which were filed without the Court\u2019s leave or the Debtors\u2019 consent after the Debtors lodged their claim objections. 2. The Court\u2019s Equitable Power to Allow or Disallow Amendments to Contested Proofs of Claim Filed Without Leave of Court Even if Bankruptcy Rule 7015 is reserved solely for adversarial proceedings, a number of courts have determined that proof of claim amendments are subject to the court\u2019s equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 105(a). See United States v. Johnston, 267 B.R. 717, 721 (N.D.Tex. 2001); see also In re Eden, 141 B.R. 121, 123-24 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit explained that Holdings: 0: recognizing that a bankruptcys equitable powers provided by  105 do not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law or constitute a roving commission to do equity 1: recognizing that many bankruptcy courts  for equitable reasons  do permit amendments to proofs of claim even past the bar date 2: recognizing heightened importance of bankruptcy forum after passage of bankruptcy amendments and federal judgeship act of 1984 3: holding that it was within the bankruptcy courts equitable powers to award damages in an action for fraud on the court 4: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "goes to the validity of the 292 month sentence, in that he argues that he should have been resentenced to time served, or for some period less than 292 months.\u201d Brown appealed. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. Our review is plenary over a district court\u2019s legal conclusions. See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir.2000). We may affirm the District Court on any basis supported by the record. See Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n. 15 (3d Cir.1985). Because Brown alleged that the BOP \u201chas failed to execute\u201d the Minnesota District Court\u2019s July 22, 2008, order, his challenge was properly brought under \u00a7 2241. See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142,146 (3d Cir.2009); see also United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Generally, federal prisoners must exhaust Holdings: 0: holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court 1: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law 2: holding that the authority to calculate a federal prisoners period of incarceration for the federal sentence imposed is delegated to the attorney general who acts through the bop 3: holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations 4: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "physical, mental, or emotional injury, \u00a7 39.01(30)(a), or uses inappropriate or excessively harsh disciplinary action that is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury, \u00a7 39.01(30)(a)(4). \u201cCorporal discipline may be considered excessive or abusive when it results in\u201d specified or similar injuries such as sprains, fractures, brain damage, asphyxiation, burns, cuts, disfigurement, or significant bruises or welts. Id. Here, the evidence showed merely that the mother threw an empty plastic jug at the oldest child on one occasion and physically disciplined her on another occasion. There was no suggestion that the child required medical attention or that her physical, mental, or emotional health was significantly impaired. See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>); see also J.C. v. Dep\u2019t of Children & Holdings: 0: holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses 1: holding that physical abuse to support dependency adjudication was not shown by evidence that mother pulled childs hair and father slapped childs face leaving a mark that did not require medical attention 2: holding that trial court improperly awarded custody of child to the childs stepmother and grandparents where no pleading in the case was directed at such relief and the childs mother had no notice that the issue would be considered 3: recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests 4: holding evidence legally and factually sufficient under sections d and e to terminate mothers parental rights based in part on evidence that mother endangered childs physical and emotional wellbeing by leaving child alone overnight with known cocaine abusers", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "possessing the authority to bind Defendant. State Sec. Ins., 145 Ill.2d at 431-32, 583 N.E.2d at 551, 164 Ill.Dec. at 635. During his deposition, Markwell acknowledged that he, through Kinsella, McNeeley, Ryan, and Markwell, Inc., represented approximately 20 insurance companies and that he was an independent contractor having limited authority to deal on behalf of a given insurance company. In addition, Markwell admitted that he did not have the authority to bind, nor did he have the authority to settle liability claims for Defendant. If Markwell was merely a broker rather an agent, Mark-well\u2019s knowledge of Plaintiffs occurrence may not be imputed to Defendant. Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bassett, 170 Ill.A Ill.App.3d 1040, 1043, 506 N.E.2d 627, 629, 106 Ill.Dec. 827, 829 (1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Equity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Patis, 119 Holdings: 0: holding that a five month delay was unreasonable 1: holding that a five month delay is unreasonable 2: holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable 3: holding that a six month delay was unreasonable 4: holding that a 14 month delay was unreasonable", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Bankruptcy Procedure 4004. Id. at 456-57, 124 S.Ct. 906. Rule 9006 allows extension of the Rule 4004 time limit only to the extent permitted by Rule 4004. When the creditor in Kontrick did raise an objection, the debtor responded by addressing the merits of the objection, and did not raise the timeliness issue until later. Id. at 449, 451, 124 S.Ct. 906. The Court held that the rule limiting the time for filing an objection was a claim-processing rule that did not implicate subject matter jurisdiction and that the debtor\u2019s failure to timely assert it resulted in a forfeiture under the rule. Id. at 456-59, 124 S.Ct. 906. Rule 59 is as much a claim-processing rule as the rule at issue in Kontrick. See also Eberhart v. United States, \u2014 U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 407,163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng\u2019g, Holdings: 0: holding that the time limit to move for a new trial under federal rule of criminal pro cedure 33b2 is claimprocessing rule forfeited by governments failure to timely raise it 1: holding that a defendant who fails to raise rule 11 error at trial has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule 2: recognizing rule 3: holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised 4: holding that kontrick and eberhart require the conclusion that rule 59e is a claimprocessing rule", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "contract, because the cause of action did not \u201carise under the agreement but [was] merely related to it.\u201d Id. 3 . Language in section 301(a) of the LMRA strongly suggests that its requirements are necessary to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts: The action \"may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.\" 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 185(a); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (reasoning that similar language in the Clean Water Act made the Act's requirements jurisdictional). This reading is consistent with our precedent. See Majestic Housing, 743 F.2d at 1345 (<HOLDING>). Thus, a failure to state a claim under Holdings: 0: holding dispute under collective bargaining agreement not arbitrable as delegation of nondelegable authority without reference to whether provision was consented to by parties 1: holding that a complaint for interference with a collective bargaining agreement against a nonparty to that agreement is not actionable under  301a of the lmra 2: holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement 3: holding that mere reference to a collective bargaining agreement does not confer federal question jurisdiction under section 301a 4: holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the employer need not persuade the court that the proffered reason was the actual reason for its decision.\u201d Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.2000). Finally, after the employer justifies its action, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer\u2019s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 469; see also Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38. Pretext can be shown by either presenting additional evidence showing that the employer\u2019s justification is \u201cunworthy of credence\u201d or relying solely on the \u201cevidence comprising the prima facie case.\u201d See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). There is no categorical rule that the plaintiff must offer, in addition to his prima fa 90 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because the PPR downgrade may lead to Holdings: 0: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 1: holding that downgrade of evaluation among other factors raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to adverse employment action 2: holding that an adverse party must state specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact for trial 3: holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issue of material fact on equitable estoppel claim 4: holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or indirectly\u201d language had been combined with a reasonable geographic and time-period restriction, the court would have nevertheless struck down the covenant. The Court finds more troubling Knob-loch and WES\u2019s central argument in this objection \u2014 the restriction on contacting customers. The covenant\u2019s restriction on solicitation of all customers and potential customers, which surely covers clients with whom Knobloch had no contact. Texas courts have struck down such covenants as unenforceable. TransPerfect Translations, Inc. v. Leslie, 594 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (S.D.Tex.2009) (\u201cTexas courts note that non-compete covenants that ... prevent contact with clients with whom the employee had no contact are unenforceable.\u201d); Peat Marwick Main v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 386-87 (Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, however, courts have also Holdings: 0: holding that the employer had a protectible interest in its good will where the employee had direct contact with its customers and much of the employers business was repeat business 1: holding that an accountant owed a duty of care not only to his own client but to a limited and foreseeable class of third parties for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows the information is intended 2: holding that an accounting firms protectable interest was its client base and that the nonsolicitation provision which inhibited departing partners from engaging accounting services for clients who were acquired after the employee left or with whom the accountant had no contact while at the firm was overbroad and unreasonable 3: holding that a firm could be disqualified from bringing an antitrust action against a former client for which the firm had worked on various corporate and tax matters during the relevant period in question 4: holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the rights of litigants.\u201d Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 297 (Tex.App.-Dal las 2009, no pet.). Interrogatories and requests for admission are not pleas, pleadings, or motions. See Exito, 142 5.W.3d at 305 n. 11 (noting that the \u201cpleadings\u201d in a suit are the petition and answer, and a \u201cmotion\u201d is an \u201c \u2018application requesting a court to make a specified rule or order\u2019 \u201d) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 45 and quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed.1999)). Further, Horowitz did not waive her special appearance by filing a motion to compel discovery. By its express terms, the motion was made subject to Horowitz\u2019s special appearance and her motion to dismiss for forum, non conveniens. See Puri v. Mansukhani, 973 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The motion to compel was not heard or decided Holdings: 0: holding that filing of rule 11 agreement and hearing of jurisdictionrelated discovery dispute did not waive special appearance 1: holding that defendant did not waive his special appearance by filing a motion for new trial subject to the special appearance 2: holding that party waived special appearance 3: holding that the defendant did not waive his special appearanee by filing a motion for sanctions that was made subject to and in the alternative to his special appearance and where the motion for sanctions was not heard or ruled upon 4: holding that defendant does not waive special appearance by engaging in discovery regarding merits of plaintiffs claims", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is sufficient\u201d (citation and punctuation omitted)). From her testimony, we know that Ms. Wright and Martin were on the floor in the den when they \u201cstarted to have sex.\u201d Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase, \u201cstarted to have sex,\u201d can imply foreplay in anticipation of penetration. However, under the extreme circumstances described by Ms. Wright, who wa pite the evidence of rape described above, the jury was unauthorized to find that a rape had occurred because Ms. Wright did not report the rape early in her interactions with investigators. We find this argument unpersuasive for four reasons. First, a rape conviction is not unauthorized under the law simply because the victim chooses not to report the rape immediately. See Watson v. State, 235 Ga. 461, 463 (2) (219 SE2d 763) (1975) (<HOLDING>). Second, the jury might well have considered Holdings: 0: holding that a letter written by a thirteenyearold victim two years after her alleged rape was admissible reasoning that the issue of the twoyear delay was one of credibility not admissibility 1: holding that a delay in reporting an alleged rape goes to the victims credibility which is solely a jury question 2: holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury 3: holding that the thirteenyearold victims twomonth delay in reporting her rape is explained by and completely consistent with the all too common circumstances surrounding sexual assault on minors  fear of disbelief by others and threat of further harm from the assailant 4: holding issues of fact in dispute are solely for the jury", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "go to the arbitrator\u201d); Overstreet v. Contigroup Cos., 462 F.3d 409, 411 n. 1 (5th Cir.2006) (declining to address whether a contract as a whole was unconscionable because \u201cfederal courts are limited to reviewing the arbitration clause itself\u2019). Thus, we will decide only whether the arbitration clauses are unconscionable. To determine what state\u2019s law applies to the question of unconscionability, we use Delaware law, pursuant to the choice of law provisions in the CMAs. See Overstreet, 462 F.3d at 411-12 (applying a choice of law provision to determine the law governing the unconscionability of an arbitration clause in a case where both the arbitration clause and the agreement as a whole were attacked as unconscionable); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). Under Delaware law, a contract is Holdings: 0: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect 1: holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld 2: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision 3: holding that party waived an objection to choice of law 4: holding that parties implicitly stipulated to choice of law", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "it does not necessarily follow that the threat-of-death enhancement would be grafted onto all crimes covered by \u00a7 2B3.1. Furthermore, a reading of the statute under which Jennings was indicted and convicted x-eveals that the threat-of-death enhancement would not be applied in \u201cevery conceivable circumstance\u201d under the statute. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2113(a) covers not only individuals who take property from a bank \u201cby force and violence, or by intimidation,\u201d as did Jennings, but also those who obtain property from a bank by extortion and those who enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony therein. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2113(a). Jennings\u2019s contention also does not recognize the fact that one can commit a robbery with force or intimidation without threatening Uves. See Jennette, 295 F.3d at 292 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bingham, 628 F.2d 548, 549 Holdings: 0: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction 1: holding that because it is not strictly necessary under the statute for a victim to fear death the guideline enhancement is not coterminous with the basic offense conduct 2: holding that application of  2a31 is appropriate even when the victim is fictional as an enhancement for a fictitious victim is consistent with the utilitarian purpose of the enhancement 3: holding that it is not 4: holding that the district court erred in imposing an enhancement under the  5k20 departure provision where an enhancement under the separate guidelines provision for restraining a victim during the course of an offense would have been appropriate", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "payment. Indeed, payments to the plaintiff do not \u201csuggest! ] ... affirmative misconduct,\u201d which is \u201ca prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the United States.\u201d Conax, 824 F.2d at 1131 (rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that the government was estopped from challenging a contract on which it had completed payment). Because payments alone are insufficient to establish affirmative misconduct, the defendant\u2019s partial payments of attorneys\u2019 fees, likewise, are insufficient. Furthermore, failing to raise arguments in an administrative due process hearing does not constitute affirmative misconduct absent a showing, by the plaintiff, that the omission was anything more than \u201cordinary negligence.\u201d See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (<HOLDING>); see also American Sav. v. Bell, 562 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 1: holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice 2: holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority 3: holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  4: recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "result from improper performance of the employee\u2019s duties.\u201d Martin, 381 F.3d at 583. Plaintiffs contend that underwriters do not exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance because the underwriters do not bear any responsibility for financial loss and do not determine the financial risk that Huntington will take for any given loan. However, while underwriters do not determine Huntington\u2019s overall risk guidelines, they still make decisions that signifi cantly impact the business and do determine the risk Huntington will accept for any particular loan. Underwriters can approve loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000. Their approval of a loan binds Huntington to that risk, and their denial of an application prevents a customer from acquiring credit. Cf (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Huntington\u2019s underwriters satisfy Holdings: 0: holding that the analogous predecessor regulation to 29 cfr  541202a did not encompass an employee who made no decisions that affect even the small segment of the companys operations in which his work is performed 1: holding that the fact that the insurance agents perform functions that are an essential part of the companys normal operations is a decisive factor 2: holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed 3: holding futa after which florida molded its unemployment law is phrased entirely in terms of the nature of the employer and not in terms of the work performed or the place at which the employee works 4: holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you  and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "but one, which showed that he was. And, importantly, although Jacob was only seen and taped on thirteen occasions, he was able to elicit testimony that Amtrak was billed $101,253.70 for 1,578 man hours of surveillance. Turning to the third criterion, granting Amtrak\u2019s request to play the tapes did extend the trial, but not for long. And, finally, the District Court found that defense counsel did not act in bad faith in failing to list the tapes or the investigators who made them in the final pretrial order. In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendment to the final pretrial order. The third issue raised by Jacob is whether the District Court erred in not granting his motion for judgment as a matter of law. At the close of all 2, 364 (3d Cir.1999)(<HOLDING>). Even assuming that Jacob has not waived his Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial 1: holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial 2: recognizing that to preserve a claim of insufficiency of the evidence a defendant must move for judgment of acquittal when the government rests or at the close of all the evidence 3: holding that a party who fails to comply with rule 50 by moving for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence wholly waives the right to mount any posttrial attack on the sufficiency of the evidence 4: holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "United States or of the state ... may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the district court in the county in which the conviction was had to vacate and set aside the judgment.... Minn.Stat. \u00a7 590.01, subd. 1 (2008). The term \u201ccrime\u201d was, and still is, defined as \u201cconduct which is prohibited by statute and for which the actor may be sentenced to imprisonment, with or without a fine.\u201d Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.02, subd. 1 (2008). A misdemeanor is \u201ca crime for which a sentence of not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both, may be imposed.\u201d Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.02, subd. 3. We have rejected indefensible divisions between felonies, gross misdemeanor, and misdemeanor cases in the past. See State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 396-97, 154 N.W.2d 888, 893 (1967) (<HOLDING>). Labeling the offense a felony or misdemeanor Holdings: 0: holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance 1: holding pursuant to courts inherent supervisory power over courts that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons 2: holding in situation of appointed counsel that if nonfrivolous issues may exist new counsel must be appointed 3: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 4: holding based on our supervisory power over the administration of justice that indigent defendants including those charged with misdemeanors were entitled to appointed counsel at trial if they faced incarceration for their crimes", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Toolasprashad\u2019s alleged deprivations also meet this standard. The Bureau offers several counter-arguments, none of which is convincing. For example, it notes that Toolasprashad\u2019s \u201cability to exercise his First Amendment rights has not been impaired by his transfer.\u201d Appellees\u2019 Br. at 24. This fact, though undisputed, is immaterial. The relevant question is not whether a transfer actually interferes with a particular prisoner\u2019s ability to exercise his rights but whether the threat of a transfer would, in the first instance, inhibit an ordinary person from speaking. See Crawford-El, 93 F.3d at 826. Equally irrelevant is the Bureau\u2019s long-recognized discretion to decide where to house prisoners. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1745, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[A]n ordinarily permissible\u201d exercise of Holdings: 0: holding inmates have no constitutional right to receive a particular or requested course of treatment and prison doctors remain free to exercise their independent medical judgment 1: holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison 2: holding that inmates have no constitutionally protected interest in the wages earned while in prison 3: holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells 4: holding that inmates have no justifiable expectation of being incarcerated in any particular prison", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the informant received cash awards and please state the total amounts received by the informant from you in relation to the events at issue in this Complaint!]\u201d may allow Plaintiff to piece together the person who made a purchase of heroin from him, which could put the informant\u2019s life and/or well-being in jeopardy. You cited to criminal defense cases as the basis for your argument that you are entitled to this information, however, this case does not' involve an \u201cindividual\u2019s right to prepare his defense.\u201d This case involves a civil complaint filed against Defendant Lopez, inter alia. You have not set forth a basis for the need to disclose the identity or even the identifying information of the informant. See McGee v. Hayes, 43 Fed.Appx. 214, 217 (10\u2019h [10th] Cir.2002) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>) Although you argue in your letter that Holdings: 0: holding that failure to develop a legal argument supporting a claim results in waiver of the claim 1: holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it 2: holding that the court is in no position to decide  whether there is a genuine dispute  because the district court did not permit  any discovery before issuing its ruling 3: holding that a district court is not required to permit plaintiff to engage in a fishing expedition in the hope of supporting his claim 4: holding that a plaintiff is required to identify specific acts of individual defendants  for his claim to survive", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "contrary to the public interest. A preliminary injunction in the instant case would not be contrary to the public interest because the courts should strive to enforce contractual agreements. To begin, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2336-37, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) noted that the Arbitration Act established a federal policy supporting arbitration which obligates the courts to enforce arbitration agreements rigorously. Recognizing this important policy, this Court stated in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (M.D.Fla.1991) that parties should not be allowed to circumvent the terms of arbitration agreements by utilizing the AMEX Window. See also Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, as stated before, customer Holdings: 0: holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision 1: holding that should is a preferential rather than mandatory word and that contract provision stating that parties should settle disputes in a particular forum was not a mandatory selection clause 2: holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement 3: holding that under ordinary contract principles the parties should be bound by an arbitration provision requiring that disputes be arbitrated only before particular fora 4: holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders of the Board. 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 921(c) (2006); see Eggers v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 11 F.3d 35, 38 (4th Cir.1993) (\u201cThe finality requirement contained in \u00a7 921 encompasses the same concepts as finality in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291 [(2006)].\u201d). Because the Board did not determine the amount of the attorney\u2019s fees and remanded the case for further proceedings, the Board\u2019s order is not a final order. See John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn award of attorneys\u2019 fees which does not fix the amount of the award or specify a formula allowing the amount to be computed is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291.\u201d); Dir., Office of Workers\u2019 Comp. Programs v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Dir., Office of Workers\u2019 Comp. Programs v. Holdings: 0: holding that denial of counsel in section 1983 action is not immediately appealable 1: holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order 2: holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 3: holding that order remanding  to an alj for further findings is not in general immediately appealable under 33 usc  921c 4: holding that the issue of whether the attorney general was entitled to qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "trial, facts may be proved by circumstantial evidence, \u201ceven if the jury might draw other reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence.\u201d United States v. Henry, 920 F.2d 875, 877 (11th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted). In this case, the government presented sufficient evidence to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cruz was the one who robbed the Bank of America. Cruz\u2019s co-worker, Diaz, identified Cruz as the robber on two surveillance photos taken inside the Bank of America. Although the photographs did not depict the robber\u2019s face with perfect clarity, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Diaz, who saw Cruz on a daily basis over several years, was capable of recognizing him from those pictures. Cf. United States v. Pierce, 136 F.3d 770, 773-75 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, there were at least two Holdings: 0: holding that lay opinion based on physical appearance is not enough to identify crackcocaine 1: holding that lay opinion testimony is not admissible when the jury can readily draw the necessary inferences and conclusions without the aid of the opinion 2: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 3: holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony 4: holding that lay opinion testimony of witnesses was helpful and admissible to identify the defendant as the bank robber depicted in a surveillance photo as the witnesses were more familiar with the defendants appearance than the jury", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "See, e.g., Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591, 603, 810 A.2d 947, 954 (2002) (\u201cThis Court has long recognized the parents\u2019 obligation to support their minor children. This obligation imposes a duty on the parent to provide support and confers a right on children to receive it.\u201d) (internal citations omitted). This duty is confirmed in the common law, see id., and in our statutes. See Md.Code Ann., Fam. Law (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol. & Supp.2009) \u00a7 5-203 (Parents are \u201cjointly and severally responsible for the child\u2019s support, care, nurture, welfare, and education.... \u201d). The duty is so important that a parent may not \u201cbargain away\u201d or waive his/her minor child\u2019s right to receive support. See Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 111-12, 591 A.2d 501, 503-504 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Citizens of Maryland and the Holdings: 0: holding that an agreement between a mother and father to waive payment of child support and arrearages in exchange for fathers consent to the adoption of the minor children by the mothers husband was invalid because it violated public policy 1: holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child 2: holding evidence insufficient to terminate mothers parental rights under section c because mother made arrangements for adequate support of children evidence showed mother left children with father who maintained steady employment and adequately supported children mother knew that father would provide adequate support and mother left children pursuant to agreed divorce decree 3: holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father 4: holding that the court erred in failing to credit fathers child support account for the entire amount that he paid for the mothers mortgage", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "presented for our consideration concern attorney\u2019s fees and costs and whether the trial court erred in failing to reserve jurisdiction over the charging lien filed by the Former Wife\u2019s counsel. We affirm the amended final judgment with the following exception. The Former Wife raises several arguments regarding the propriety of the trial court\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees and costs. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the award because, not only is the amended final judgment ambiguous regarding entitlement, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. Because the amount has not been determined, that portion of the amended final judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Zuberer v. Zuberer, 28 So.3d 993, Holdings: 0: holding dismissal without prejudice to refile a facially sufficient motion is a nonappealable nonfinal order 1: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order 2: holding that although the trial courts failure to determine amount of fees does not render underlying order nonfinal the fee award itself is not reviewable until the amount is determined 3: holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order 4: holding that the dismissal of a complaint ordinarily is a nonfinal nonappealable order since amendment generally is available while dismissal of the entire action ordinarily is final", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "an ordinary household item is not only present in virtually every American household\u2014it was also readily available within the Home Depot outlet where the device was installed. Indeed, Sheehan\u2019s own expert acknowledged that there was tape around the device that could have been used to attach one of the wires from the pipe to the .top of the battery. The language in Posnjak on which.Sheehan relies makes sense when read to require that a \u201ccombination of parts\u201d cannot be considered a destructive device based on the hypothetical possibility that the parts could be \u201creadily\u201d made into a bomb only if the defendant could obtain some crucial component that he did not possess and could not acquire without. a \u201cshopping trip.\u201d See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 546 F.2d 1182, 1184 (5th Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>). Posn-jak cannot sensibly be read to require Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could not be convicted for possessing a combination of parts that could be readily assembled into a bomb where the defendant did not possess any explosive material a key element required for the creation of a bomb 1: holding the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement where guns were found on the same premises from which the defendant trafficked drugs and were readily accessible to the defendant 2: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 3: holding that a reasonable jury could find the device to be readily convertible into an explosive bomb where wires could be quickly stripped and recrimped to a pager that was part of the detonating mechanism 4: holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "do so.\u201d). Further, it is well-settled that \u201c[a] party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract.\u201d Brooks v. Green, 993 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). This principle applies even where the terms of the contract are \u201charsh\u201d or \u201cout of the ordinary.\u201d Id. at 61. (citations omitted). In addition, to give proper meaning to a specific contract provision, a court must consider it in the context of the entire contract. Hand, 983 So.2d at 687. When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems. Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (<HOLDING>). Where the parties expressly provide that the Holdings: 0: holding a contract was divisible in its nature  if the intention is expressly stated in the contract 1: holding new york law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions but erisa statutes allow forfeiture of all deferred compensation benefits under noncompete forfeiture provisions in a top hat plan 2: holding that noncompete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where 1 the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working and 2 the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment 3: holding even though idaho law does not permit the enforcement of noncompete clauses in employment contracts erisa statutes allow forfeiture of pension benefits in excess of erisas minimum vesting requirements in noncompete clauses 4: holding that under arkansas law maximum duration of noncompete clause incident to employment agreement is three years", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Washington crimes. Weiand, at 31. If a comparable Washington \"offense definition\u201d exists, the court must next determine how that definition is classified under Washington law. Weiand, at 32. This inquiry'requires the court to determine whether the definition is classified as a felony, and if so, whether it is an A, B, or C felony. Weiand, at 32. Because the record is devoid of the underlying facts upon which Roche\u2019s California robbery conviction was based, it is impossible to determine how it would be classified in Washington. Therefore, the conviction must be removed from the calculation of Roche\u2019s criminal history unless, on remand, the State can establish that it would constitute a class A felony under Washington law. See State v. Cabrera, 73 Wn. App. 165, 169, 868 P.2d 179 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Herzog, 48 Wn. App. 831, Holdings: 0: holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the washington classification of an outofstate conviction the state must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendants criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 2: holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the information that she was possibly wanting to commit suicide;\u201d (7) both his partner, Officer Lilly, and Mother were on the scene; (8) he immediately opened the purse and looked in it for \u201c[a]ny type of weapon to harm herself or me;\u201d and (9) the incident took place in the early afternoon. \u00b6 11 There is no evidence in the record that the 9-1-1 call mentioned that Appellant had or was threatening anyone with a weapon. There was no sign of a weapon when the officers arrived on the scene, and upon their arrival, they saw no domestic violence or suicide attempt taking place. Officer Stewart testified, however, that the seizure of the purse was justified because when Mother called 9-1-1 she indicated Appellant was suicidal and vedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1 .1981) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 15 As Flippin explained, the relevant Holdings: 0: holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept 1: holding that a search was justified when the police responded to a complaint that a woman at a school bus stop might have a gun in her purse the womans responses to police inquiries were unhelpful and she resisted the purse being taken from her 2: holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone 3: holding that car passenger who left her purse in her boyfriends car had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse indeed a purse is a type of container in which a person possesses the highest expectations of privacy 4: holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is not sufficient to bar a retrial. Lewis has received one of the remedies that Brady envisions, a new trial. The prosecution\u2019s alleged Brady violations in this case simply do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause or otherwise bar his retrial. The district court thus did not err in rejecting Lewis\u2019s double jeopardy claim. CONCLUSION We DISMISS Lewis\u2019s fair warning claim for lack of jurisdiction. Although we have jurisdiction over his double jeopardy claim because it raises a colorable claim, the substance of that double jeopardy claim lacks merit. We therefore AFFIRM the district court\u2019s denial of Lewis\u2019s motion to dismiss with respect to the double jeopardy claim. DISMISSED, in part, and AFFIRMED, in part. 1 . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Lanier involved a defendant, state judge Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith 1: holding prosecutions suppression of favorable material evidence violates due process 2: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 3: holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 4: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "where the rights of employees may be vindicated to the fullest extent possible under our workers\u2019 compensation statutory scheme. For example, in Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, a player on the roster of the Washington NFL football team brought in Maryland a workers\u2019 compensation claim for game injuries sustained in various forums\u2014some in Maryland, and some out of state. 428 Md. 270, 275-76, 51 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012). McCants\u2019 employment contract contained a forum-selection clause choosing Virginia law, but we allowed McCants nonetheless to maintain a claim in Maryland for the injuries sustained here and out-of-state. McCants, 428 Md. at 288, 51 A.3d at 596-97; see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md.App. 463, 471, 474, 14 A.3d 678, 682, 684 (2011), aff'd, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012) (<HOLDING>). Although significant differences exist Holdings: 0: holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act 1: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act 2: holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim 3: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act 4: holding that a player on the roster of the washington nfl football team was a covered employee under  9203a of the workers compensation statute despite working intermittently in maryland playing games at fedex field and primarily in virginia practicing", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "statement as true at the time she gave it; that she was still consumed with the emotions of the event when talking with police; and that other evidence corroborated her statement, we find that there was sufficient evidence to lay a foundation for admission of the statement under section 90.803(5), even though the declarant herself never confirmed the accuracy of the statement at trial. Admission of Evidence Regarding Victim\u2019s Identification of Polite from a Photo Line-Up Polite next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Ms. Levine\u2019s out-of-court identification of him from a photo line-up on grounds that the State failed to inquire into this issue during its direct examination of Ms. Levine. E.g., Deans v. State, 988 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>); Neilson v. State, 713 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 2d DCA Holdings: 0: holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial 1: holding that appellant was not lawfully detained for investigation of public intoxication when he gave false identification therefore trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his false identification statements 2: holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial 3: holding that testimony regarding outofcourt identification was inadmissible where the state failed to ask the witnesses about the identification during its direct examination 4: holding that prior identification is not hearsay when the declarant is available at trial for crossexamination and that it makes no difference whether the witness admits or denies or fails to recall making the prior identification", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "agreed diming an interview that an \u201camendment regarding the level of copper\u201d would probably overcome the obviousness rejection. In the amendment that followed, the applicants stated that the phrase, copper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade, \u201cmakes explicit that which was implicit in the claim before, namely, that the composition of IgGl im-munoglobulin also contains copper ions.\u201d The applicants also stated that the claimed compositions comprise sufficient amounts of copper ion chelator to bind to the \u201ctrace amounts of copper\u201d and thus prevent degradation. After reviewing the specification and the prosecution history, the court finds that the phrase, \u201ccopper ions in an amount sufficient to degrade,\u201d should be construed according to its plain meaning. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (<HOLDING>). The inventors did not set forth an Holdings: 0: holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning 1: holding that to act as its own lexicographer a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning 2: holding that words in the claims are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning unless a patentee clearly sets forth a different definition in the specification or file history 3: recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning 4: holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Court for the Middle District of Florida to consider a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus raising a claim of intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia,\u201d as well as a stay of execution pending the outcome of the second or successive habe-as proceedings in the District Court. Three days after Mr. Henry filed his emergency application, our Court denied it \u201cfor two independent reasons: first, the rule enunciated in Hall v. Florida ha[d] not been made retroactive by the United States Supreme Court; moreover, even if it had been, [Mr. Henry] ha[d] not shown a reasonable likelihood that he would benefit from the rule in Hall.\u201d 757 F.3d at 1153. This Court also denied Mr. Henry a stay because he had not established any likelihood of success on t 0 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 Holdings: 0: holding that the rule announced in cage v louisiana 498 us 39 111 sct 328 112 led2d 339 1990 per curiam doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 1: holding that the rule announced in ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 2: holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 3: holding that the rule announced in espinosa v florida 505 us 1079 112 sct 2926 120 led2d 854 1992 per curiam doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 4: holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to ensure its enoxaparin is not adulterated. 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 351(b). This testing, which generates information for submission pursuant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, therefore falls squarely within the scope of the safe harbor. Finally, the dissent suggests that we must reject any disequilibrium between sections 201 and 202 of the Hatch-Wax-man Act, that is, the safe harbor should not be available unless a patent term extension is also available. Dissenting Op. at 1370-71. This is not correct. The Supreme Court in Eli Lilly noted that equilibrium was not always achieved. See Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 671-72, 110 S.Ct. 2683. We too have rejected this strict interpretation of the safe harbor, explaining that \u201cstatutory symmetry is preferable but not required.\u201d Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1029 (<HOLDING>). III. Under the correct interpretation of 35 Holdings: 0: holding that contracts are not binding before court approval because the debtorinpossession operates as a fiduciary any actions taken by the debtor are to be in the best interests of the creditor body as a whole for that reason  the debtors actions are subject to  review by the creditors of the estate and the bankruptcy court 1: holding that sellers of covered calls are not atypical class representatives 2: holding that uses which are not ultimately included in a submission to the fda are nonetheless exempted by the safe harbor 3: holding that sanctions under rule 11 are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is served on the opposing party for the full twentyone day safe harbor period before it is filed with or presented to the court 4: holding that class ii medical devices which are not subject to a rigorous premarket approval process and thus cannot receive patent term extensions are nonetheless covered by the safe harbor", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971) (\u201cWe do not mean to say or infer that parties may not make contracts ... providing for indemnification, but it must be done knowingly and willingly as in insurance contracts made for that very purpose.\u201d). To ensure that a party is not saddled with an unintended burden to insure or indemnify, such provisions are \u201cstrictly construed ... and will not be held to provide indemnity unless so expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.\u201d Moore Heating, 583 N.E.2d at 145 (\u201cCourts disfavor such indemnification clauses because to obligate one party to pay for the negligence of the other party is a harsh burden which a party would not lightly accept.\u201d); see also Exide Corp. v. Millwright Riggers, Inc., 727 N.E.2d 473, 480 (Ind.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); Ogilvie v. Steele by Steele, 452 N.E.2d 167, Holdings: 0: holding that an indemnification clause that covers all claims demands rights and causes of action of any kind whether arising from avants own acts or those of fitness pointe encompassed indemnification for negligent implementation of a fitness program 1: holding that because the indemnification clause contained no clear statement that would give the contractors notice of the harsh burden that complete indemnification imposes indemnification was inappropriate 2: holding that where the policy includes indemnification coverage to the corporation proceeds are not property of the estate where there is no proof of payments by corporation of payments 3: holding that although a letter agreementwas clear and unambiguous in requiring indemnification for undisclosed liabilities the relevant paragraph was uncertain and indefinite in that it did not specify what warranties representations and indemnification were appropriate  4: holding directors and officers liability policy was property of the estate because the estate was worth more with indemnification coverage than without the coverage", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "applies, with caution, a balancing test in which consideration is to be given in part to \u201cthe magnitude of the burden of guarding against [injury] and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {29} Further, under the circumstances in this case, we determine that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of termination by Haar of the physician-patient relationship. The once-existing special relationship and ability to control Haar\u2019s treatment disintegrated as a result of Haar\u2019s failure after March 8, 2000, to seek Defendant\u2019s assistance in any regard and Haar\u2019s having chosen other mental health providers to handle his treatment and medication. See Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1972) (<HOLDING>); cf. Paradies v. Benedictine Hosp., 77 A.D.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school 1: recognizing that a caregiver and patient relationship may be confidential 2: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave 3: holding that the physicianpatient relationship terminated when the patient missed a scheduled appointment and did not see the physician again and that the relationship did not continue despite the fact the patient later secured a refill of a prescription that was prescribed during the relationship 4: holding that no physicianpatient relationship between doctor who gave informal opinion over telephone at request of treating physician and minor patient whose case was discussed and thus doctor did not owe duty of care to patient", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the district court\u2019s determination that Boswell consented to the search. If Boswell had authority over the case, whether joint or sole, then he had authority to consent to its search. We conclude that, bas that authority to consent to a search of property does not necessarily translate into authority to search specific containers. See Welch, 4 F.3d at 764 (\u201cThe shared control of \u2018host\u2019 property does not serve to forfeit the expectation of privacy in containers within that property.\u201d). However, in the cases in which we have held that there was not actual or apparent authority for a third party to consent to a search we have found that there was some fact that made it unreasonable for the officer to believe that the third party had authority over the container. See, e.g., id. at 764-65 (<HOLDING>). Here, Boswell\u2019s statement that he did not Holdings: 0: holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept 1: holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car 2: holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person 3: holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent 4: holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "immediate appeals of interlocutory orders if a statute explicitly provides such jurisdiction. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex.2007). We strictly construe a statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal because it is an exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable. Id. at 841. To appeal pursuant to section 51.014(a)(5), the appellant must be \u201can individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state.\u201d See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 51.014(a)(5). Rogers does not argue that he is a state employee or that he otherwise contracted with a governmental entity to perform governmental duties. See id.; see also Knowles v. City of Granbury, 953 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). We therefore limit our inquiry to whether Holdings: 0: holding that private party can assert official immunity if it contracted with a public official to perform governmental duties 1: holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 2: holding that if official has violated clearly established law he is entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable official could have believed conduct was lawful 3: holding police officer is a public official 4: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 2464. Importantly, Miller applies only to juvenile defendants, who were not at issue in Harmelin. Id. at 2470 (\u201cHarmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders.\u201d). We therefore conclude that Miller did not alter Hcmne-lin as Lopez suggests; Lopez was not a juvenile at the time of the charged offense, so Harmelin \u2014 not Miller \u2014 is controlling. Accordingly we conclude that the Eighth Amendment is not violated by the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life, with the possibility of parole. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680. We overrule Lopez\u2019s third and fourth issues. C. Due process guarantees In his fifth'a Ct. 1586, 1591, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) (<HOLDING>), to argue that it is appropriate to deviate Holdings: 0: recognizing validity of retroactive license that memorialized grant of oral license 1: holding motorist entitled to hearing before taking his license under statute that required loss of license if uninsured driver involved in an accident 2: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 3: holding governments repudiation of license gave patentee right to terminate license 4: holding that a hit and run or unknown driver is deemed to be uninsured for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "DPUC\u2019s rules will deprive Berkshire of the claimed rights that it seeks to protect. While Berkshire remained an applicant, the DPUC\u2019s rules realistically threatened to harm Berkshire\u2019s rights or interests as an operator; now that Berkshire is no longer an applicant, such a threat no longer exists. Further, in spite of our specific inquiry, Berkshire has failed to show how its dissatisfaction with the requirements significantly affected its own application, or the outcome. Berkshire accepts this reasoning in respect to its \u201ctaking without compensation\u201d claim. But, it says that the \u201ccontroversy\u201d in respect to its First Amendment claims continues, and that the case is therefore\" not moot. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. First, Berkshire points out that Holdings: 0: holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided 1: holding that a trial court may deny a confirmation motion when satisfaction has rendered the controversy moot 2: holding a case becomes moot when a ruling will have no practical effect upon the existing controversy 3: holding appeal moot on this basis 4: holding continuing controversy not moot", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the \u2018purchase\u2019 method of accounting, under which the newly created thrift could designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of all acquired assets as an intangible asset called \u2018supervisory goodwill,\u2019 and claim it as an asset for purposes of computing regulatory capital.\u201d); Fifth Third Bank, 402 F.3d at 1224 (same). The panel majority\u2019s further holding that 12 CFR \u00a7 563.13, cited supra in Winstar, does not concern the purchase method of account 17 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2003) (\u201cThese arrangements concerning goodwill [including a Financing Agreement and a Bank Board Resolution] and the infusion of capital from various sources enabled Taiman in 1986 to meet the existing capital requirements.\u201d); California Fed. Bank v. United States, 245 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The panel majority\u2019s criticism that \u201cno Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement 1: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement 2: holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement 3: holding that objecting to guidelines calculations as specifically reserved in the plea agreement is not a breach of the plea agreement even if the objection is overruled and thus government is not released from obligation under the agreement to move for acceptance of responsibility 4: holding that even without an assistance agreement or a supervisory action agreement the factual records of the case including various correspondence memoranda and bank board resolutions show intent to contract with the government for specified treatment of goodwill", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "evidence of damages. Thus we remand the case to the trial court for additional testimony limited to the damages, if any, caused by the changes in the project as envisioned by the August 18 1993 plan and as referenced in the deed from Brenco to SCDOT, and the final project as built. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. BEATTY and SHORT, JJ., concur. 1 . Breneo contends the trial court erred in finding the parol evidence rule barred its representative\u2019s testimony regarding their belief sur rounding the access of the property to Highway 501. We agree, but even considering the testimony, we find Brenco failed to prove the deed should be rescinded due to unilateral or mutual mistake. See S. Realty & Constr. Co. v. Bryan, 290 S.C. 302, 309, 350 S.E.2d 194, 198 (Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). 2 . In addition to increasing the grade of Holdings: 0: holding that parol evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual term that is ambiguous 1: holding parol evidence is admissible to show mistake 2: holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract 3: holding that parol evidence is admissible to show that an individual who signed a contract but is not named in the body is a party to the contract 4: holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. at 1628, 100 L.Ed.2d at 36. In Sampson, the defendant challenged the search of trash that she had placed inside her yard, but also within reach from a municipal sidewalk. 362 Md. at 441, 765 A.2d at 630. We noted that the proper focus after Greenwood was whether the defendant\u2019s subjective expectation of privacy in her trash was objectively reasonable. Id. at 444-45, 765 A.2d at 632-33. This Court recently had the occasion to apply the objecti (6th Cir.2005) (finding that Hunyady had no standing to challenge search of home he illegally entered because his presence was \u201cwrongful.\u201d); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir.1998) (determining that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned home): United States v. Dodds, 946 F.2d 726, 728-729 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472 Holdings: 0: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment because hardly more than a fugitive presence would not be one that could be accepted by society 1: holding that squatter in home did not have standing to challenge search of house where he was staying 2: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied solely for the business of packing for distribution for narcotics 3: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying 4: holding that squatter had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no fourth amendment standing to challenge search of abandoned structure", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "The common-law duty to inspect, repair, and warn is not absolute. This court has adopted Restatement (See-ond) of Torts \u00a7 343A, subsection (1), which states: \u201cA possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 343A(1) (1965); Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Minn.1995) (citing Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 274 Minn. 495, 496-97, 144 N.W.2d 555, 557-58 (1966) (expressly approving Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 343A)). Generally, whether a condition presents a known or obvious danger is a question of fact. See, e.g., Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 321-22 (<HOLDING>). Whether the possessor could anticipate the Holdings: 0: holding that whether a plaintiffs reliance on defendants misrepresentations was justified is a question of fact precluding summary judgment 1: holding that summary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact pertaining to whether a motorists gratuitous signal to pass was negligent 2: holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because whether the danger posed by a swimming pool was known or obvious was a fact question 3: holding that the question of whether the defendants recording device was an intercepting device was a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 4: holding that summary judgment against plaintiff was premature because determination of whether plaintiff was a trespasser invitee or licensee was question of fact", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "rights as a tax hen. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3613(c); Hosking, 567 F.3d at 335. And whether or not Lestina is in a position to advocate for her husband (who did not try to appear in the district court as an interested party, see United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir.2007)), her argument that the restitution schedule is unfair to her husband rings hollow. Spouses have a general obligation to support each other, see 305 ILCS 5/10-2; Poindexter v. State ex rel. Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 229 Ill.2d 194, 321 Ill.Dec. 688, 890 N.E.2d 410, 415 (2008), but there is no requirement that each spouse contribute equally \u2014 or at all \u2014 to the support of the other so long as each is supported, see In re Estate of McGloon, 191 Ill.App.3d 968, 139 Ill.Dec. 53, 548 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1989) (<HOLDING>). As Lestina\u2019s own reporting reveals, this Holdings: 0: holding that a reservation clause gave a life estate to a spouse pursuant to a deed reserving use of the property to both husband and wife for life even though the husband had no interest in the property 1: holding that a husband cannot be required to pay a support award that exceeds his financial ability 2: holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted 3: holding that both husband and wife are obligated to support each other based on relative ability to pay 4: recognizing that husband and wife count as separate victims where each sustains part of the actual loss", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Ed., Charleston Reorganized School Dist. No. 1, 599 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Mo.App.1980). There is no requirement, however, that any board member actually sign the written decision. See Willis v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 189, 196 (Mo.App.1980) (applying this rule to the termination of a tenured teacher rendered pursuant to \u00a7\u00a7 168.118-.120); Brown v. Weir, 675 S.W.2d 135, 138-40 (Mo.App.1984) (applying the same rule to the termination of a teacher pursuant to \u00a7 168.221). The relevant question is simply whether the document containing the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision signed by Board President Riffle represents the written decision of the Board. See, e.g., Moesch v. Moniteau County R-1 School District Board of Education, 257 S.W.3d 661, 662-64 (Mo.App.2008) (<HOLDING>); Willis, 606 S.W.2d at 196 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal 1: holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings 2: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 3: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 4: holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the exercise of the Court\u2019s discretion. Indeed, with respect to discretionary issues, the only one that the Court finds it prudent to consider is whether the remaining heirs of von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, of whom there are apparently around forty, see transcript 3/5/08, should be joined to this lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Although neither party has moved for joinder, courts frequently do\u2014 and indeed should \u2014 consider the issue sua sponte because a primary purpose of Rule 19 is to protect the rights of an absentee party. See MasterCard Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Visa Int\u2019l Serv. Ass\u2019n, 471 F.3d 377, 382-383 (2d Cir.2006). As the Museums repeatedly have emphasized, however, they seek in this action declarations of their property rights in the paintings only v (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); cf. Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 732 Holdings: 0: holding a plaintiff failed to show an actual injury to challenge an epa rule when the plaintiff alleged he would not have purchased a piece of property or would have paid  less because the plaintiffs allegations showed only that the property was worth less to him not that the property was in fact worth less 1: holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation 2: holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time 3: holding that current titleholder would only have to be joined if the appropriate remedy for the plaintiff would be to reconvey his property 4: holding that in light of the defendants failure to engage in the interactive process liability would be appropriate if  reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(per curiam). With that in mind, we proceed to analyze Berry\u2019s submission. Berry must demonstrate that his attorneys charged a reasonable rate and that the time they expended on his representation was reasonable. See In re North (Gardner Fee Application), 30 F.3d 143, 146 (D.C.Cir.1994) (per curiam). Based on the affidavits and other exhibits submitted by Berry, we conclude that the hourly rates charged by his attorneys ($110 \u2014 $400) and their paralegals ($75-$100) comport with prevailing community standards and are within the realm of reasonableness. Id. We also conclude that he has, for the most part, provided adequate descriptions and documentation of the work performed. See National Ass\u2019n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). There are, however, various items that must Holdings: 0: holding that the officer played no role in the prosecution because the police report provided to the prosecutor did not contain false information 1: holding that a fee application must contain sufficiently detailed information about the hours logged and the work done 2: holding all contracts contain an implied term that the the person for whom the work is contracted to be done will not obstruct hinder or delay the contractor 3: holding that the unambiguous terms of the your work exclusion do not eliminate coverage for harm done to a subcontractors work 4: holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 203(s)(l)(A)(ii). Defendants have attached both an affidavit and the tax returns for the prior three years to their Motion to Dismiss, and these documents reflect that Pegaso\u2019s gross sale volume falls short of $500,000. In light of the evidence presented by Defendants, this Court finds Defendants have established that the restaurant does not meet the FLSA \u201centerprise\u201d standard. Plaintiff claims that it is premature for this Court to make a dispositive finding with respect to the gross volume of sales issue and asks that this Court provide her an opportunity to conduct further discovery. As discovery on this matter would not lead to any genuine issues of fact, this Court cannot accede to Plaintiffs request. Cf. Strag v. Board of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Even if an employer does not meet the Holdings: 0: holding that under rule 56f nonmoving party seeking additional discovery must demonstrate precisely how additional discovery will lead to a genuine issue of material fact 1: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 2: holding that a court may deny a rule 56f motion where the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment 3: holding that rule 56f may not defeat summary judgment where the result of a continuance to obtain further information would be wholly speculative 4: holding that the court was precluded from considering whether the district court had abused its discretion in ruling on defendants summary judgment motion before allowing plaintiff to conduct requested discovery where the plaintiff had not filed an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f and stating that  when a party does not avail himself of relief under rule 56f it is generally not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rule on the motion for summary judgment  citation omitted", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to the lawful arrest would have minimal deterrent effect on illegal police behavior. Conclusion In this case, where a stop was undertaken on less than reasonable suspicion, but with the purpose of executing a lawful outstanding arrest warrant, the trial court properly denied Quinn\u2019s motion to suppress because the intervening lawful arrest was sufficient to remove the taint of any police illegality. We affirm. Affirmed. SHARPNACK, J., concurs. RILEY, J., concurs in result with opinion. 1 . We note that neither case is binding on our decision today. See Palmer v. State, 744 N.E.2d 525, 530 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (declining to follow another panel of this court\u2019s decision in a factually similar case); rev'd on other grounds; McBride v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1135, 1137 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>). RILEY, Judge, concurs in result. I concur in Holdings: 0: recognizing federal authority on standing to be persuasive 1: recognizing that unpublished decisions issued after january 1 1996 are not controlling precedent but may be considered persuasive authority 2: holding the florida appellate courts are not bound by federal precedent which is persuasive not binding authority 3: holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation 4: recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of majority). While there may be an extreme case where the delay was so long and so prejudicial that it would violate due process to allow the case to proceed, this case is not close to that line. Delay also works to the disadvantage of a plaintiff, who bears the burden of proof, and loss or destruction of potential evidence, as the defendants allege occurred here, may be addressed through spoliation arguments or instructions where appropriate. See OCGA \u00a7 24-4-22; Cotton States Fertilizer Co. v. Childs, 179 Ga. 23, 30-31 (174 SE 708) (1934). Where the General Assembly wishes to put a firm deadline on filing lawsuits, it knows how to enact a statute of repose instead of a statute of limitation. See, e.g., OCGA \u00a7 9-3-71 (b), (c); Wright v. Robinson, 262 Ga. 844, 845 (426 SE2d 870) (1993) (<HOLDING>). 3. The trial court also found that Boyd was Holdings: 0: holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 1: holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes 2: holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed 3: holding that the legislature never intended for the dismissal and renewal statutes to overcome the statute of repose 4: holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in admitting that he was a \u201cresponsible person\u201d within the meaning of Section 6672 and that Debtor, after receiving the IRS\u2019s demand in May 1998 for full payment of the past due taxes, cooperated fully and openly with the IRS revenue officer, never attempting to \u201cpull the wool\u201d over Appellant\u2019s eyes. Appellant argues that Debtor\u2019s subsequent cooperation in assisting Appellant in collecting the past due taxes is irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. This Court agrees. Willfulness requires only the commission of a \u201cvoluntary, conscious, and intentional act.\u201d Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1154. A responsible person acts \u201cwillfully\u201d within the meaning of Section 6672 when he pays other creditors in preference to the IRS knqwing that withholding taxes are due. Id. See also Smith, 894 F.2d at 1554 (<HOLDING>); Hornsby, 588 F.2d at 953 (finding willfulness Holdings: 0: holding that in a proceeding to recover taxes from a nonbankrupt taxpayer the taxpayer has the burden of proving that his taxes complied with the internal revenue code 1: holding that even where taxpayer did not have the financial means to pay all of the taxes owed the taxpayer still willfully evaded tax obligation 2: holding that a plaintiff cannot assert a statutory claim for wages under the labor law if he has no enforceable contractual right to those wages 3: holding that taxpayer did not disprove willfulness where there was evidence he paid employees their net wages despite his knowledge that taxes were due 4: holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in light of the potential for recovery of attorney fees in the arbitration proceeding); Stenzel, 2005 ME 37, \u00b629, 870 A.2d 133 (rejecting the plaintiffs\u2019 argument that the costs of arbitrating individual claims precluded them from obtaining relief because, pursuant to federal and Texas law, the party challenging the arbitration clause must present a detailed showing of the arbitration costs and the plaintiffs had failed to do so). {49} The district court afforded the parties a second opportunity to explore whether the agreement should be set aside as unconscionable. It requested additional briefing on this issue, and then conducted a second hearing. However, Fiser introduced no evidence showing he could not fully pursue his claim in arbitration. See FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 757 (<HOLDING>). Fiser claims that the class action ban Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to carry his burden to show that arbitration was cost prohibitive because he has provided no evidence of the specific costs or arbitration fees or his financial inability to afford  them 1: holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish unconscionability based upon the alleged excessive cost of arbitration because they failed to supply information as to the actual costs that might be incurred 2: holding that where the defendants  107 claim was based on remediation costs they incurred and may incur in the future as the result of a lawsuit instituted under  107a they did not demonstrate that they incurred necessary costs of response within the meaning of  107a 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish procedural unconscionability since he had a reasonable opportunity to consider the agreement and the arbitration clause was clearly set forth in the contract 4: holding that because plaintiffs failed to prove that their incurred fuel characterization and loading costs would not have been incurred in the nonbreach world plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery for these costs", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "probable than those inferences in favor of the movant to create a factual dispute, so long as they reasonably may be drawn from the facts. When more than one inference can be reasonably drawn, it is for the trier of fact to determine the proper one. Id. Thus, if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant the summary judgment motion. See Augusta Iron & Steel Works, Inc., 835 F.2d at 856. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is well-established that the court may neither adjudge the credibility of the witnesses nor weigh the evidence. See Pita v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 666 So.2d 268, 268 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App. 1996) (<HOLDING>); Juno Indus., Inc. v. Heery Int\u2019l, 646 So.2d Holdings: 0: holding that it is trial courts function to evaluate witness credibility and weigh conflicting evidence 1: holding that it is function of trial court to judge witnesses credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence 2: holding that in resolving sufficiency of evidence appeals court does not weigh evidence or review credibility of witnesses 3: holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses but can resolve such issues  upon evidence which is not materially in conflict 4: holding that on a motion for summary judgment it is settled that a trial court is not permitted to weigh material conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is disabled, but rather whether the ALJ\u2019s findings were supported by substantial evidence. For the following reasons, we hold that the ALJ\u2019s findings were sufficiently supported to pass muster under our deferential standard of review. A. Extent of Disability Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ\u2019s findings were not supported by substantial evidence because he failed to consider the SPD\u2019s full effects in finding Plaintiff not disabled. In determining the extent of Plaintiffs disability, the Secretary must consider the physical abilities,. mental impairments and any other impairments. 20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 404.1545; 416.945. In making such assessments the Secretary is entitled-to rely on the conclusions of qualified expert medical professionals. Moothart v. Bowen, 934 F.2d 114, 116 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). At Plaintiffs hearing the ALJ received the Holdings: 0: holding that a courts role in reviewing an administrative agency decision is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agencys findings and conclusions and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law 1: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence 2: holding review of sufficiency of evidence of juvenile adjudication is same as reviewing substantial evidence to support a criminal conviction 3: holding that reviewing courts will review the engineers decision for substantial evidence 4: holding that the findings of reviewing physicians constituted substantial evidence in support of the secretarys decision to deny benefits", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the brief of a pro se appellant, Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993), and thus read Hulsey's brief to argue that Owens and Green are not immune from suit or liability for damages. 2 . Heck v. Humphrey prevents an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 when the complaint, directly or indirectly, challenges the legality of the complainant's conviction or imprisonment. Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. A \u00a7 1983 plaintiff must first prove that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated in a proper pro ceeding prior to bringing a \u00a7 1983 action. Id. If the sentence or conviction has not been invalidated there can be no action for damages under \u00a7 1983, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Id.; see also Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the statute of limitations on Holdings: 0: holding that that if the success of a  1983 damages claim brought by a prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been invalidated 1: recognizing that  1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated 2: holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled 3: holding that a claim for damages that would invalidate a conviction or sentence that has not already been invalidated or reversed on direct appeal by executive order by an authorized state tribunal or by a writ of habeas corpus is not cognizable under  1983 4: holding that a plaintiff requesting relief under  1983 had no cause of action unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed expunged invalidated or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the underlying crimes. But a court also cannot be expected to accept wholesale unsubstantiated accusations of egregious police misconduct. This conclusion is not based on an unreasonable understanding of Strickland or an unreasonable view of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d). Even if Bynum had testified, the only support for his claims of coercion would have been his own uncorroborated and self-serving testimony. He did not present any physical evidence of coercion or first-hand witness accounts of the interrogations. Without more support to Bynum\u2019s story, it was permissible for the state appellate court to conclude that there was not a reasonable probability that the trial court would have accepted By-num\u2019s version of events. See Mahaffey v. Page, 151 F.3d 671, 683-84 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Mahaffey v. Holdings: 0: holding that testimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be admitted as evidence of his guilt at trial 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that defendant had waived the opportunity for a suppression hearing on his confession by first moving to suppress the confession orally at the start of trial when no motion to suppress was filed no hearing requested and no objection to the admission of the statements was made 2: holding that when defendant failed to appear at scheduled suppression hearing the court could have decided the motion in defendants absence but it did not have the authority to refuse to consider it 3: holding that consistent testimony given by three officers made it unlikely that defendants motion to suppress his confession as coerced would have been granted even though two witnesses to the interrogation had not testified at suppression hearing 4: holding that petitioner was not prejudiced by counsels decision not to call sole witness to petitioners alleged beating at suppression hearing because testimony of arresting officers and assistant attorneys as well as absence of physical evidence of coercion made it unlikely that motion to suppress the confessions would have been granted", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that when he interviewed Lewis she never mentioned anyone besides Slovik throwing pool balls, but she did state that Featherstone pushed Slovik to the ground and then kicked him, and that Buckley-Stoffel and Featherstone did not plan to inform the police about either that or the parking lot fight. 4 . After briefing, oral argument, and publication of an opinion in this case, the State argued for the first time in a petition for rehearing that Slovik did not sufficiently raise a Confrontation Clause argument in state court proceedings. Moreover, Slovik apparently cannot return to state court to raise a Confrontation Clause claim because he failed to raise the argument in his original state habeas petition. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Slovik is no longer subject to Holdings: 0: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence   1: holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied 2: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 3: holding that absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single timely petition for writ of habeas corpus successive andor untimely petitions will be summarily denied 4: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence ", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "documents have not been disclosed to anyone outside of the EPA. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 48, 52. Defendant has further established that disclosure of the Redacted and Withheld Documents would reveal Defendant\u2019s enforcement practices and strategies, which could in turn allow Plaintiff other regulated entities to avoid detection and interfere with enforcement by providing Plaintiff with advance notice of Defendant\u2019s analytical approach and the weight to be accorded various factors. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 43, 44. Plaintiff asserts that the records at issue involve data and calculations or are spreadsheets (\u201cNumerical Information\u201d) used by Defendant in its civil and administrative actions under the CAA, and that the Numerical Information is \u201cpurely factual\u201d and may not therefore, be shielded from disclosure under the (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the record indicates that agency Holdings: 0: holding that a document does not become nondeliberative if facts are included in the deliberations 1: holding that if facts are in dispute jury is given authority to resolve them 2: holding that the district court may adopt facts contained in the psr without further inquiry if the facts have an adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence 3: holding that jurisdiction exists for determining if disputed facts are material 4: holding that a rule 3850 motion based upon new facts or a significant change in the law must be filed within two years of the time such facts become known or such change is announced", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "any proof that the LLNL BSL-3 facility is more prone or attractive to terrorist theft and release of a pathogen by an outsider than any other BSL-3 facility. To the contrary, the record reveals that LLNL is actually one of the most heavily guarded federal facilities, in contrast to hundreds of relatively unguarded BSL-3 facilities nationwide. Given that there are more than 1,300 other BSL-3 facilities nationwide, many of which lack the safeguards of LLNL\u2019s BSL-3 facility, and further, given that many of the BSL-3 pathogens also exist in the natural environment, DOE reasonably concluded that the construction of a BSL-3 facility at LLNL did not change the status quo, and therefore found no significant impact. See Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find that the DOE reasonably Holdings: 0: holding that the stay put provision establishes a strong preference but not a statutory duty for maintenance of the status quo 1: holding that a claim regarding postdischarge conduct that does not impact the bankruptcy estate in any way does not fall under title lls jurisdictional umbrella 2: holding that the explicit status quo provisions together with   2 first form an integrated harmonious scheme for preserving the status quo from the beginning of the major dispute through the final 30day coolingoff period 3: holding that where a proposed project does not alter the status quo then it does not have a significant impact 4: holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "influence of sympathy,\u201d because the claim was raised on federal habeas and a ruling for the petitioner would constitute a \u201cnew rule\u201d of constitutional law); Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990) (upholding death sentence where jurors reasonably may have believed that they could not consider the defendant\u2019s mitigating evidence regarding his character and background); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990) (affirming placement upon the defendant of the burden to establish mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency). The Court has also refused to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se for juveniles, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989), and the mentally retarded, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989). 7 See Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764 (1990) Holdings: 0: holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty 1: holding that an idaho statute as interpreted by the idaho supreme court which authorizes the death penalty for those murderers who have displayed utter disregard for human life genuinely narrows the class of deatheligible defendants 2: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 3: holding that aggravating circumstance of utter disregard for human life was not facially invalid when construed by state supreme court to refer to coldblooded pitiless slayer 4: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "injury, sickness, or disease. The Penn National policies contain no language requiring the cause of injury to be identifiable before coverage is triggered. Our interpretation of the Penn National policies is confirmed by comparable cases applying the first manifestation rule to determine trigger of coverage under third party liability insurance policies. These cases consistently identify the initial manifestation of injury as the trigger of coverage. See D\u2019Auria, 507 A.2d at 862 (\u201c[A]n \u2018occurrence\u2019 happens when injury is reasonably apparent, not at the time the cause of injury occurs.\u201d) (emphasis in orig inal); App the effects of an injury caused by the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings first manifested when the wrongful suit was filed); Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (<HOLDING>). In these cases, there was no potential for an Holdings: 0: holding that the effects of injury caused by discriminatory employment policies first manifested when the policies were implemented 1: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended 2: holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence 3: holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment 4: holding that employment practices which are neutral in form but which result in discriminatory effects are prohibited unless justified by business necessity", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in the trial court on the grounds now asserted, defendant is deemed to have waived the objection on appeal. CRE 103; People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983). Kruse, 819 P.2d at 551 (Van Cise, J., dissenting). We agree with Judge Van Cise. The protection provided by section 16-8-107(1) should not have been addressed by the court of appeals. The general rule is that failure to make a timely and sufficient objection during the trial constitutes a waiver of that ground on appeal. Larkin v. People, 177 Colo. 156, 160, 493 P.2d 1, 3 (1972); People v. Browning, 809 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Colo.App.1990). Kruse waived his objection to the admission of Ortiz\u2019s testimony under section 16-8-107(1) by failing to properly object at trial. People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965, 966-67 (Colo.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). An exception to the general rule exists, Holdings: 0: holding that defendant must have clearly objected at trial to the matter he is raising on appeal 1: holding that appellate court could not consider objection to testimony when defendant objected at trial on different grounds 2: holding that error was preserved when defendant objected to question regarding defendant was under arrest immediately following question about postarrest event sufficient to put trial court on notice of appellants state constitutional grounds for objection 3: holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review 4: holding that claims based on grounds not objected to at trial cannot be considered on appeal", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an underground pipe system, is a common usage. See also, Voelker v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 727 F.Supp. 991 (D.Md.1989). Moreover, we have uncovered no case, in Maryland or any other jurisdiction, in which a natural gas utility company was held strictly liable for injuries based on the theory that the distribution of natural gas is an abnormally dangerous activity incapable of being carried out without significant risk. Many cases specifically hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Auriemme v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 21 Conn.Supp. 66, 144 A.2d 701 (Conn.Super.1958) (distinguishing natural gas distribution from the category of other activities, including natural gas storage that have been held inherently dangerous). See also Zamora v. Mobil Oil Co., 104 Wash.2d 199, 704 P.2d 584, 587 (1985) (<HOLDING>); New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Holdings: 0: holding that gas line is not improvement 1: holding that injury caused by criminal fleeing after stealing gas from gas station was not foreseeable result of stations policy of not requiring customers to prepay for gas 2: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 3: holding plaintiffs were properly enjoined from using excessive amounts of gas not contemplated by the free gas clause in the lease 4: holding propane gas to be an inherently dangerous product", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(\"In order to estab lish a manufacturing defect, the plaintiffs must prove that \u2018the finished product deviates, in terms of its construction or quality, from the specifications or planned output in a manner that renders it unreasonably dangerous.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 434)). 18 . See, e.g., Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600. 19 . Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability \u00a7 2(a) (1998); see also id. \u00a7 1 cmt. a (\"A manufacturing defect is a physical departure from a product\u2019s intended design.\u201d). 20 . Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 807 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code \u00a7 82.005). 21 . See id. at 807. 22 . Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex.2004) (discussing Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 601). 23 . See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 583 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>); Nissan Motor Co., 145 S.W.3d at 137 (holding, Holdings: 0: holding that jurors do not need expert testimony on matters of common knowledge 1: holding that expert testimony was required to establish causation in products liability case because a lay jurors general experience and common knowledge do not extend to whether design defects such as those alleged in this case caused releases of diesel fuel during a rollover accident 2: holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance 3: holding that expert testimony is unnecessary where the case is not a case in which lay jurors would be unable to grasp the issues without expert assistance 4: holding plaintiff in a defective design case failed to establish a prima facie case because plaintiffs expert identified an alternative design that was not feasible at the time of manufacture and thus failed to prove that defendants design was not state of the art", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Securities Act of 1933. Dissent at 1433. The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip, however, takes precisely the opposite approach: it interprets the differing language of the two Acts as evidence of the Acts\u2019 differing ambits. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733-734, 95 S.Ct. at 1924-1925 (noting that Congress' use of the term \"in offer or sale\u201d in the 1933 Act showed that \"when Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble in doing so expressly\u201d). To ignore the linguistic differences between the definitions in the two Acts is to suggest implicitly that Congress did not know what it was doing when it chose the differing language. This we refuse to do. 6 . See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733 n. 5, 95 S.Ct. at 1924 n. 5 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). 7 . The dissenting Holdings: 0: holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument 1: holding that the wording of  10b making fraud in connection with purchase or sale of security a violation of the act is surely badly strained when construed to provide a cause of action not to purchasers or sellers of securities but to the world at large 2: holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities 3: holding that for a section 10b violation the sec must prove that the defendant in connection with the purchase or sale of securities made a materially false statement or omitted a material fact with scienter and that the plaintiffs reliance on the defendants action caused injury to the plaintiff 4: holding only purchasers and sellers of securities can recover under section 10b and rule 10b5", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in determining that Mrs. Barr was entitled to only 50% of the net sales proceeds. While I agree that foreclosure was correct, there is no legal justification for concluding, as the majority opinion does, that the propriety of foreclosure is somehow dependent upon a particular distribution of proceeds. I also strongly reject the majority opinion\u2019s surprising conclusion that Michigan law requires us to treat a forced sale for tax purposes as identical to a consensual sale. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. A. The District Court\u2019s Order of Foreclosure It is undisputed that the government had the right to request, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7403, that the district court order the sale of the Residence. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 680, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 283, Holdings: 0: holding that the confirmation statute does not inhibit subsequent sale under power of property other than the property which at a former sale under power had failed to bring the amount of the debt  1: holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final 2: holding that  7403 grants power to order the sale 3: holding that when a district court expressly grants leave to amend it is plain that the order is not final 4: holding that an order authorizing a sale is a final judgment", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and safety during the 2007 China summer program trip. Every public school shares this common-sense duty to protect the health and safety of students in its care, Connecticut General Statutes \u00a7 10-220, but this duty may be heightened for boarding schools, institutions that accept responsibility for students\u2019 well being. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); cf. Loomis Inst. v. Town of Windsor, 234 Conn. 169, 172, 661 A.2d 1001 (1995) (reasoning that on-campus \u201cfaculty members, unlike off campus faculty members, act in loco par-entis to boarding students and must be available on a twenty-four hour basis to take care of any problems that may occur at the school.\u201d); accord Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 282, 141 A.2d 639 (1958) (<HOLDING>). Further, a boarding school may create a legal Holdings: 0: holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child 1: recognizing that teachers are not merely instructors in sciences and letters they are authority figures role models behavioral examples surrogate parents after a fashion teachers stand in loco parentis children learn much more from their teachers than the quadratic equation and the proper spelling of dirndl  they learn important values and morals one of the most important values children learn from their teachers is respect for the law 2: holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody 3: holding that teachers stand in loco parentis toward a pupil in matters of discipline and security 4: holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "camps have staked out three general positions on the use of an alleged violation of the ECOA after the statute of limitations has run. 1. Position # 1: A debtor can only asseH an ECOA violation as a counterclaim. A number of state and federal courts have held the only remedy provided for an ECOA violation is an offensive action for damages brought within two years of the violation. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1691e(a), (b), (d), (f) (providing expressly for a civil cause of action for actual and punitive damages as well as attorney fees and costs against a creditor who violates the ECOA). Consequently, these courts have refused to recognize the validity of an ECOA violation asserted as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. 32 Edwardsville, Inc., 873 F.Supp. 1474, 1480 (D.Kan.1995) (<HOLDING>); Riggs Nat\u2019l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Holdings: 0: holding that an ecoa violation is not properly asserted as an affirmative defense to liability and should instead take the form of a compulsory counterclaim 1: holding a plaintiff cannot assert a violation of the ecoa as an affirmative defense 2: holding defendant was entitled to assert an ecoa violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be to enforce conduct that is forbidden by the ecoa 3: holding even though an affirmative action for damages is barred the debtor may assert an ecoa violation defensively in the nature of recoupment 4: holding the recoupment doctrine could allow a spouse to assert an ecoa affirmative defense against a creditor even after the statute of limitations had run", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or dilute the Hensley trademark\u201d, established by conduct over the course of 10 years (Id. at \u00b6 38). Defendant Hensley\u2019s primary argument \u2014 that the only contract at issue is the February 1994 license agreement \u2014 is rebutted by Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff alleges both a February 1994 agreement (or agreements) and an oral agreement (\u201cestablished by conduct\u201d) relating to the trademarks at issue in this suit. However, it is also clear that Plaintiff has not alleged a breach of any term of the February 1994 agreement (or agreements) that it references in \u00b6 18-19. Thus, Plaintiffs entire breach of contract claim rests on a violation of the alleged oral agreement requiring Defendant to absta any claim of dilution. Herman Miller, Inc. v. A. Studio S.R.L., 2006 WL 2456218 (W.D.Mich.2006) (<HOLDING>). Proving Plaintiffs breach of contract claim Holdings: 0: holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense 1: holding that the penalty is applicable 2: holding that the ordinary concept of use as applied in determining the existence of a nonconforming use must yield to the realities of the business in question and the nature of its operations 3: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 4: holding that the concept of fair use is applicable in cases of alleged dilution", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "controlling. Indeed, reading the two guilty verdicts together, the jury did find all of the elements of assault with a deadly weapon upon a government official. But it is plain error for a judge to amend a verdict to create a greater offense when the jury returned a verdict of guilty of a lessor offense. To hold otherwise would effectively allow the trial court to eviscerate the role of the jury by changing the jury\u2019s verdict to create an offense greater than the one found by the jury. Such an encroachment upon the function of the jury would unfairly violate a defendant\u2019s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. See State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 373, 226 S.E.2d 353, 371 (1976) (<HOLDING>). But we disagree with the defendant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that due process of law requires all courts to insure that elementary fairness toward one charged with an offense is not infringed 1: holding that due process requires appellate courts to scrutinize the sentencing process to insure that sentences are based on reliable information 2: holding that due process requires state courts to make an affirmative showing that a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary 3: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 4: holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment \u00a7 9.2(a) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing Terry as permitting a stop or seizure when an officer reasonably suspects a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime). As noted above, the officer who frisked Terry did so not because he believed Terry had committed a crime, but because he believed Terry was going to do so. Accordingly, if an officer reasonably suspects a person is about to commit a crime, a protective pat search is warranted in the interests of officer and community safety. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974) (concluding a pat search for weapons reasonable when officers knew the defendant had bragged about shooting a police officer); State v. Gobely, 366 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Minn. 1985) (<HOLDING>). We are persuaded that the seizure and limited Holdings: 0: holding noknock search unconstitutional where there was no testimony or evidence that either of the suspects were violent or were known to keep weapons in their home 1: holding that the  2d11b1 enhancement was proper where a firearm and drugrelated items were found in the defendants residence where he had also engaged in conspiratorial conversations 2: holding pat search for weapons justified where defendant was in home where stolen items were found and informant reported that in at least one robbery the participants had been armed 3: holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found 4: holding search of armed robbery defendants suitcases and between mattresses of hotel room proper where at time of arrest officers were aware that the defendants had used several different weapons during the robberies and that one weapon a loaded revolver was in plain view concluding officers reasonably feared that someone else was going to come to the room who knew where the other weapons were or that the defendants would position themselves to take advantage of any hidden weapons or instrumentalities", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the sentence entered by the trial court is illegal and must be set aside.\u201d 12 S.W.3d at 800 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We determined that, [o]n remand, the trial court may impose a sentence that is mutually agreeable to the State and appellant, so long as the sentence is available under the 1989 Act. If an agreement is not reached, though, appellant may withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial on the original charges. Id. Thus, McLaney and McConnell stand for the proposition that, when a defendant bargains for and receives an illegal sentence, the defendant will have the option of resentencing on the original plea or withdrawal of the plea and recommencement of the prosecution. See also Henderson v. State ex rel. Lance, 220 Tenn. 520, 419 S.W.2d 176, 178-79 (1967) (<HOLDING>). These cases recognize that where \u201cthe Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence 1: holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was not pending because nothing was left for the court to decide 2: holding circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea where defendant was not indicted for the charge to which he pled guilty but signed a sentencing sheet which established defendant was notified of the charge to which he pled guilty 3: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error 4: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "no evidence of fraud on the face of the arbitration award. As to Piceo\u2019s claim that GE breached the 1994 settlement agreement by relocating his position, the district court said that Picco was bound by the settlement agreement to arbitrate that claim. Because he had not arbitrated that particular claim, the district court refused to consider it in the first instance. On appeal Picco primarily challenges the district court\u2019s conclusion that he failed to point to fraud on the face of the arbitration award. Indiana law provides limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, and those grounds are listed in the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act. See Ind.Code \u00a7 34-57-2-13; Sch. City of E. Chi, Ind. v. E. Chi. Fed\u2019n of Teachers, Local No. 511, A.F.T., 622 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ind.1993) (<HOLDING>); Fort Wayne Educ. Assoc. v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Holdings: 0: holding that judicial is review available in the absence of an agreement for arbitration or some other form of final resolution of a dispute 1: holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope 2: holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required 3: recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit 4: holding that minnesotas arbitration statutes govern appraiser decisions and appraisal awards are to be treated as arbitration awards", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to regulate them, \u201c \u2018[a]ny effect they have on the lending activities of a federal savings association is incidental rather than material.\u2019 \u201d (Lopez, supra, at p. 742.) Here, plaintiffs are not attempting to employ the UCL to enforce a state law purporting to regulate the lending activities of a federal savings association, as was the case in Lopez v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, supra, 302 F.3d 900. (Lopez v. World Savings & Loan Assn., supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.) Rather, they are using it to enforce federal law governing the operation of federal savings associations. Cases addressing other federal preemption statutes suggest that use of the UCL is not preempted under these circumstances. As noted in Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at page 787 (<HOLDING>), \u201cprivate state causes of action are not Holdings: 0: holding that a ucl cause of action is not preempted by respa and regulation x 1: recognizing the cause of action 2: recognizing cause of action 3: holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action 4: holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "taxable. In reaching this conclusion, we place considerable emphasis on the nature of the funds that the Commissioner found taxable. Section 104(a)(2) excludes from taxation \u201cthe amount of any damages received ... on account of personal injury or sickness.\u201d (emphasis supplied). Language is not infinitely elastic, and here, the disputed prejudgment interest simply does not comprise \u201cdamages\u201d within the meaning of section 104(a)(2). We explain briefly. Under the applicable Rhode Island statute, prejudgment interest is awarded in all civil cases, not just in personal injury cases. See R.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7 9-21-10. This interest is separate and distinct from damages, and is awarded mainly to compensate for delay in payment. See Foster v. Quigley, 94 R.I. 217, 179 A.2d 494, 495 (1962) (<HOLDING>); accord Balian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 610 A.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right 2: recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 3: holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person 4: holding that prejudgment interest for damages to the person is not of the substance of the right of action but exclusively an incident attached thereto by legislative fiat after such right has been adjudicated", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "unfair, or improper means; and (iv) the defendants\u2019 acts injured the relationship.\u201d Scutti Enters., LLC. v. Park Place Entm\u2019t Corp., 322 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir.2003). Counterclaim 4 simply recites the elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations . without alleging facts to support this claim. Importantly, it fails to identify the business relationships and third parties to those relationships on which the claim is based. It fails to set forth any facts regarding the \u201cimproper, deceptive, illegal or fraudulent conduct\u201d in which Plaintiff and Counter-Defendants engaged. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Advanced Global Tech. LLC v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 15 Misc.3d 776, 836 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2007) (<HOLDING>). To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to make out prima facie case for mere department status of foreign corporation defendant 1: holding that plaintiffs allegations that defendant engaged in coercive business practices without justification entirely out of malice and without normal economic selfinterest were conclusory and thus insufficient to state a claim 2: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim 3: holding that conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based citations omitted 4: holding that conclusory allegations that defendant used coercive business practices to intentionally interfere with business relations was insufficient to state a claim", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "however, refiners that sold oil to plaintiff were required to pay a tax on that oil because plaintiff was not registered as a producer with the IRS. During that period plaintiff paid refiners approximately $178,-000 in costs attributable to this tax. Plaintiff did not pass these increased costs on to its customers, though some of them used the fuel for tax-exempt purposes. Walsh argues that the tax was erroneously or illegally collected because it met statutory requirements, and that plaintiff merits a refund on equitable considerations under an implied-in-fact contract with defendant. DECISION Plaintiff admitted during oral argument that the statutes impose a tax upon the original seller of the fuel. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 205, 95 S.Ct. 1605, 1609, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975) (<HOLDING>). While it is not disputed that plaintiff lost Holdings: 0: holding that a retailer lacked standing to challenge a federal excise tax assessed against a thirdparty fuel supplier even where the retailer was required by contract to pay the supplier an amount equal to the excise tax upfront at the time of purchase since the alleged injury  in the form of increased fuel costs was not occasionedby the government 1: holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on distributors not retailers 2: holding that the legal incidence of a federal excise tax on gasoline falls upon the statutory producer and not the purchaser of the gasoline 3: holding that a person who finds a purchaser for a property falls precisely within the statutory definition of a real estate broker 4: holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on the distributor", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "corporations, shall pay annually to the State an annual franchise tax of two dollars on each one thousand of the actual amount of capital employed in this state.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In a series of acts, the Legislature amended the rate of taxation to maintain equality of rate between domestic and foreign corporations. In 1955, the rate for the franchise tax on both domestic and foreign corporations was increased from $2 to $2.50 on each $1,000. Act No. 74, 1955 Ala. Acts 191-92. In 1971, the Legislature again increased the tax rate on both domestic and foreign corporations, raising it from $2.50 to $3 on each $1,000 of capital stock and of capital, respectively. Act No. 103, 1971 Ala. Acts 184-86. 9 . Accord State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 256 Ala. 61, 67-68, 53 So.2d 745, 749-50 (1951) (<HOLDING>); State v. P.R. Mallory (Huntsville), Inc., 273 Holdings: 0: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 1: holding that the actual amount of capital employed in the state by a foreign corporation was to be based on the property of the corporation that was within the state and that was used in business transacted within the state 2: holding that a public corporation in that case a commission created to provide information about the tva is an entity separate from the state and its acts are not acts of the state  within the meaning of the state constitutions prohibition against the state creating new debts 3: holding that specific jurisdiction may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum state since it is an inescapable fact of  modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines thus obviating the need for physical presence within a state in which business is conducted 4: holding that resident shareholder of s corporation is eligible for tax credit for taxes paid by corporation in another state and noting that this conclusion is consistent with the internal revenue code which provides that shareholders of an s corporation are entitled to a foreign tax credit for their share of foreign income tax paid by an s corporation", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court. See V.I. Code Ann., tit. 4, \u00a7 76(a). Callwood\u2019s petition, in contrast, was filed on November 6, 1997, after the effective date of \u00a7 76(a). A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in nature. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir.1996). Accordingly, by operation of \u00a7 76(a), as of October 1, 1991 the District Court of the Virgin Islands was divested of jurisdiction to consider petitions for writs of habeas corpus under territorial habeas corpus law. We have previously held that to the extent that Virgin Islands Code provisions vest jurisdiction in the District Court, they have been implicitly repealed. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. of St. Thomas, Holdings: 0: holding that vi code ann tit 5  76a implicitly repealed a writofreview provision that provided for jurisdiction in the district court 1: holding that habeas jurisdiction under  2241 was not repealed by  the illegal immigration reform and immigrant responsibility act of 1996 iirira 2: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 3: holding that application of the exclusive remedies provision in tax code section 4209 deprives courts of subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding that postconfirmation jurisdiction was proper in light of plan provision retaining such jurisdiction", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court with those facts relevant to the court\u2019s appellate review of agency action. Rule 80B(d) is not intended to allow the reviewing court to retry the facts that were presented to the governmental \u25a0 decision-maker, nor does it apply to any independent civil claims contained in the complaint. Rather, it is intended to allow the reviewing court to obtain facts not in the record that are necessary to the appeal before the court. See Palesky v. Secretary of State, 1998 ME 103, \u00b6\u00b6 5-9, 711 A.2d 129, 131-132. For example, the complainant may augment the record if there are claims of ex parte communication or bias alleged, with sufficient particularity, to have had an effect on the fairness of the governmental proceedings, see, e.g., White v. Town of Hollis, 589 A.2d 46, 48 (Me.1991) (<HOLDING>); Ryan v. Town of Camden, 582 A.2d 973, 975 Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial 1: holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed 2: holding rule 80bd motion was properly denied because petitioner was not entitled to relief as a matter of law 3: holding that property owner was not entitled to relief under cafra because he received notice and failed to properly file a claim 4: holding that the defendants motion for discharge was premature and thus properly denied by the trial court", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the March 24, 1997 Solicitation Offer and Award at line 11 is the following language: The Contractor shall begin performance within 5 calendar days and complete it within * calendar days after receiving notice to proceed. This performance period is mandatory. *See Sec. 00800, 52.023-4801 (FAR 52.211-10). Def.App. at 1. The performance period \u201cnegotiable\u201d block was not checked. Id. Therefore, the court interprets the specific reference to FAR 52.211-10, requiring the contractor to commence within five days of the Notice to Proceed, together with the fact that the negotiable block was not cheeked to supercede and take preference over the subsequent general reference to contract provision \u00a7 52.023-703. See Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1170, 1171-72 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. Holdings: 0: recognizing this as the general rule 1: recognizing fundamental error as an exception to the general rule of preservation 2: holding that as a general rule of contract interpretation an express reservation indeed dominates a general provision 3: recognizing general rule 4: holding that no reasonable interpretation of a general directive would create a property interest", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "explained: Where a particular amendment' \u201cprovides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection\u201d against a particular sort of governmental behavior \u201cthat Amendment, not the more generalized notion of \u2018substantive due process,\u2019 must be the guide for analyzing these claims.\u201d We think this principle is likewise applicable here. The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty, and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it. Id. at 273, 114 S.Ct. 807 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)); see e.g. Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1003 (11th Cir.1998) (characterizing a malicious prosecution claim as being based on the Fourth rather than Fourteenth Amendment); Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 380-381 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, Sims alleges the same facts in support Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs claim that city encouraged private individuals to trespass on the plaintiffs land was properly a fourth amendment rather than a substantive due process claim 1: holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment 2: recognizing that the integrity of the family unit has found protection in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding that the plaintiffs fourteenth amendment substantive due process claim was foreclosed because the fourth amendment provided protection for their claim that law enforcement officers participated in an unlawful seizure of their mobile home 4: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the reasonable probability of a valid claim to warrant a VA examination. The RO did not respond to Mr. Hayre\u2019s argument regarding the failure to obtain the requested psychiatric SMRs. In July 1993, Mr. Hayre\u2019s accredited representative filed an appeal to the Board and stated that the issue was \u201c[wjhether the rating of [November 6, 1972] was clearly erroneous in the decision to deny the claimed nervous condition.\u201d The representative claimed that the 1972 rating action was erroneous because the RO had failed properly to assist Mr. Hayre in developing his claim. The Board found that Mr. Hayre\u2019s claim of CUE was not well-grounded because a breach of the duty to assist under 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 5107(a) cannot, as a matter of law, be CUE. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 377, 382-383 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Hayre appealed the Board\u2019s decision to Holdings: 0: holding that a state agencys breach of its statutory duty to assist individuals in reestablishing their business was a tort within the meaning of the otca 1: holding that a breach of the duty to assist cannot constitute cue because claimants cannot show that fulfillment of the duty to assist would have manifestly changed the outcome of the prior decision 2: holding that cue motion is not claim for benefits and that vcaa definition of claimant cannot encompass person seeking revision of final decision based on cue 3: holding that where employee cannot establish unions breach of duty of fair representation in failing to process grievance he must abide the outcome of the contractual remedies 4: holding that missouri law applied to the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim because it is corporate law that defines the contours of that duty", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Frame v. Sutherland, 459 Pa. 177, 327 A.2d 623 (1974). This argument is without merit. The record is barren of any evidence concerning the circumstances of Mr. Packel\u2019s appointment. His appointment was not before the Frame Court, and we have not been informed of any other proceeding in quo warranto in which his right to have held the office was challenged. In any event, assuming arguendo that Mr. Packel\u2019s appointment suffered from the same defect as the defendants\u2019 appointments in Frame, he was at least a de facto officer at the time of the filing of the petition in this'case, and thus his public acts possess the same validity as if he had been validly appointed. Falone\u2019s argument is completely disposed of by Commonwealth ex rel. Palermo v. Pittsburgh, 339 Pa. 173, 13 A.2d 24 (1940) (<HOLDING>), a case identical in all material respects Holdings: 0: holding that mayor is a high public official 1: holding that bond and miller did not apply because the plaintiff was appointed to the city council by the mayor rather than elected by the public 2: holding the public acts of the pittsburgh director of public safety were valid even if his purported recess appointment by the mayor or was invalid because the city council was not in fact in recess 3: holding that an employment contract between an outgoing city council and the city manager was void on public policy grounds because it attempted to take away the governmental or legislative power of the incoming council to appoint and remove public officers 4: holding in the context of a case involving the availability for public inspection of criminal docket books that files in the possession of the clerk of the criminal court of the city of new york are public records which may be fully examined by any person unless the papers have been sealed from public scrutiny by the court or by the terms of a statute", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(quoting Harrington v. State, 200 Ala. 480, 482, 76 So. 422, 424 (1917)). \u201c[T]he law is a reasonable master, and it should be so construed in the light of common sense in ascertain ing the legislative intent.\u201d Stith Coal Co. v. Sanford, 192 Ala. 601, 606-07, 68 So. 990, 992 (1915). We conclude that \u00a7 26-18-5 does not establish a firm deadline beyond which a petition for termination of parental rights cannot be filed. Similarly, \u00a7 26-18-5(b), Ala.Code 1975, does not necessarily establish a \u201cstarting point\u201d for DHR to file a petition to terminate parental rights. The starting point is not simply those conditions set out in \u00a7 26-18-5(b), but, as always, is triggered by the best interests of the child. See J.C. v. State Dep\u2019t of Human Res., 986 So.2d 1172, 1191-94 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (<HOLDING>). If DHR has sufficient evidence indicating Holdings: 0: holding that the mortgage conveys such interests that the mortgagee is the holder of the paramount title 1: holding that best interests of the child analysis requires consideration of all section 5328a factors 2: holding that paramount consideration in terminationofparentalrights proceeding is best interests of the child 3: holding that the primary and overarching consideration in custody determination is the best interest of the child 4: holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "alleges a violation of the RFPA. Thus, without guidance from prior precedents, this court considered the plain meaning of the statute. Absent ambiguity, the plain meaning of the statute controls. See In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003, 577 Pa. 231, 843 A.2d 1223 (2004); Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 2005 Pa. LEXIS 1291 (Pa. 2005). 5 . There is some prior case law concerning the safety justification of facial hair regulations of firefighters. These cases involve so-called \u201cnegative-pressure\u201d facial masks, as opposed to the more modern \u201cpositive-pressure\u201d facepiece at issue in this case. It should be noted that none of the complaining parties in these cases asserted a violation of their free exercise of religion. See Kennedy v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847 (D.C. 1994) (<HOLDING>) see also, Quinn v. Mascare, 425 U.S. 560 (U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that the districts facial hair regulation was discriminatory as applied to the firefighter although the department was not precluded from promulgating a reasonable grooming regulation equally applied to all requiring beards to be neatly trimmed 1: holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation 2: holding that because a police department regulation prohibiting beards allowed for medical exemptions but not religious exemptions it was not generally applicable under smith 3: holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended 4: holding that the tdjcs prohibition on long hair and beards is rationally related to legitimate state objectives", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Roberts but before Crawford, the Supreme Court expressly relied on Roberts. The Court reasoned that \u201cthe co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule [Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ] is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court\u2019s holding in Roberts, a court need not inde1 pendently inquire into the reliability of such statements.\u201d Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Brist is therefore correct that the Court has rejected Bour-jaily\u2019s underlying reasoning by now requiring courts to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court \u201ctestimonial\u201d statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, \u2014, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2540, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 Holdings: 0: holding that confrontation clause issues are subject to harmless error analysis 1: holding confrontation clause violations subject to harmless error analysis 2: holding that certificates of analysis produced by forensic scientists who conducted a chemical analysis of drugs seized from the defendant are subject to confrontation clause challenge wjhether or not they qualify as business or official records 3: recognizing that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the confrontation clause  because confrontation clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis 4: holding that admission of business records does not violate the confrontation clause under roberts", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Circuit precedent recognizing the right, Adler v. Pataki, was decided in July 1999, and even in that case the court acknowledged that \u201c[t]he nature and extent [of the right to intimate association] is hardly clear....\u201d 185 F.3d at 41-42. Moreover, Adler recognized the right to intimate association between spouses, and it was not until May 2000 that the Eastern District of New York extended the right to encompass the parent-child relationship, see Sutton, 96 F.Supp.2d at 193, let alone the parent-child-in-law relationship recognized here. As such, the right to relief at issue was not clearly established at the time the individual defendants acted, and thus they are immune from suit with respect to the Mor-iarity plaintiffs. See Jenkins v. Tyler, 167 F.Supp.2d 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (<HOLDING>). c. Collateral Estoppel Defendants argue that Holdings: 0: holding that an individual defendant was immune from suit based on a right to intimate association between mother and son that was allegedly violated by acts occurring in the year 2000 1: holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens 2: holding that an individual is immune from antitrust liability for exercising first amendment right to petition the government 3: holding state immune from suit involving a federal question 4: holding state immune from suit brought in state court", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Judge. Devin Lavonne Bryant appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as against victim Leugim Freytes-Calderon. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Bryant\u2019s motion for judgment of acquittal, and we therefore affirm. Bryant argues that bec 5th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>); Parker v. State, 389 So.2d 336, 337 (Fla. 4th Holdings: 0: holding that evidence was sufficient where there was testimony that appellant was seen threatening the victim and that other people were afraid 1: holding that evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated assault where appellant was seen pointing and firing a gun at two women 2: holding that evidence was sufficient where appellant verbally threatened victim and pointed gun at him and then at a group of people causing everyone to scatter 3: holding that evidence that victims body was found naked that victim had been seen pushing the defendant away before she was shot and that there were possible finger marks on one of the victims thighs was insufficient evidence to support attemptedrape conviction 4: holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C.Cir. 1998), on reh\u2019g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C.Cir. 1999), is inconsistent with the Navegar line of cases. As the court explained, however, the plaintiff police officers in that case complained of an ongoing constitutional injury due to the conflict between local law enforcement duties and the federal law at issue. See Fraternal Order, 152 F.3d at 1001. Navegar and its progeny, as well as the present case, deal with the potential of prosecutions that could cause injury only in the future, if at all. 4 . Plaintiffs in each case asked for and were granted dismissal without prejudice rather than transfer so that they could appeal immediately. They did appeal, but neither appeal was successful. See Dearth v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 413 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Hodgkins v. Mukasey, 271 Fed.Appx. 412 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff generally may not appeal a voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment against him 1: holding that a voluntary dismissal moots a case 2: holding that this court has jurisdiction over an appeal from a stipulated voluntary dismissal with prejudice unless it was intended to settle the case 3: holding appeal improper since the dismissal was voluntary 4: holding the plain legal prejudice test applies to voluntary dismissal under the code", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of Rule 37(b)(2)(i) or (iv) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, or if the defendant seeks review of the sentence and there was no plea agreement concerning the sentence, or if the issues presented for review were not waived as a matter of law by the plea of guilty or nolo contendere and if such issues are apparent from the record of the proceedings already had. The defendant may also appeal as of right from an order denying or revoking probation, and from a final judgment in a criminal contempt, habeas corpus, extradition, or post-conviction proceeding. See Moody v. State, 160 S.W.Sd 512, 516 (Tenn.2005) (stating that Rule 3(b) \u201cdoes not authorize a direct appeal of a dismissal of a motion to correct an illegal sentence\u201d); State v. Adler, 92 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Tenn.2002) (<HOLDING>); State v. Leath, 977 S.W.2d 132, 135 Holdings: 0: holding the state does not have an appeal as of right under rule 3c from a trial courts order expunging public records 1: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order 2: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 3: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 4: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by tennessee rule of criminal procedure 16", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "denial of the early retirees' claims. MATTHEWS, Justice, not participating. 1 . AS 39.35.150(a) (1977). 2 . Id. 3 . Former AS 39.35.150 (1974). 4 . Former AS 39.35.150(a) (1974) (emphasis added). 5 . Former AS 39.35.150(b) (1974). 6 . Former AS 39.35.680(1) (1960). The definition now appears in AS 39.35.680(2) and is substantively the same, but has been retitled \"actuarial adjustment.\" 7 . The State of Alaska Public Employees Retirement System Board adopted this interpretation in its November 1980 decision, In the Matter of the Appeal of Walter L. Kubley. 8 . Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); see also Sheffield v. Alaska Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., 732 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Alaska 1987). 9 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1056, 1057; see also Sheffield, 732 P.2d at 1085 (<HOLDING>). 10 . The applicable statute provided that Holdings: 0: holding that the state cannot make changes to the retirement system that will diminish a members benefits without providing an offsetting advantage 1: holding in postamendment case that offsetting social security retirement benefits against permanent total disability payments rationally related to reducing wagereplacement benefits for retired workers 2: holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed 3: holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa 4: holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "however, that private contractual arrangements are not subject to constitutional requirements of objective standards. Id. 20. In the private sector, standards of reasonableness are commonly applied or implied which take into account the facts and the circumstances. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, \u00a7 55-1-102(3) (1961) (stating that under the Uniform Commercial Code, \u201cparties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable\u201d); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 111 N.M. 57, 60, 801 P.2d 639, 642 (1990) (every contract imposes upon parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 21. Although New Mexico has never dealt Holdings: 0: holding that the right to support is not subject to waiver by either parent 1: holding that the right of approval is subject to standards of reasonableness implied by law 2: holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law 3: holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration 4: holding that unilateral right to select independent counsel is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "A.M.C. 1578, 1580-81 (E.D.Va.1982); Wyche v. Oldendorff, 284 F.Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.Va.1967); Saridis v. S.S. Paramarina, 216 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this issue in any exhaustive opinion, it has rejected the theory that the time charter entitles an injured longshoreman to recovery as a third party beneficiary. See Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (4th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (noting that \u201ccharter party created no contractual duty to the longshoreman on the part of the United States as time charterer\u201d). Other jurisdictions have also agreed that .Ed.2d 278 (1982) and mandate amended on different grounds, 702 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1983); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). However, the Court finds that that authority Holdings: 0: holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer 1: holding that clause 8 of the nype charter party expressly makes the time charterer hable for the vessels neghgence 2: holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman 3: holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen 4: holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the BIA\u2019s substantive review of the IJ\u2019s decision .was flawed.\u201d Id. At oral argument, Awe\u2019s attorney acknowledged that he had missed the briefing deadline, but argued that \u201chis mistake was not fatal because the Notice of Appeal gave the BIA a \u2018fair appraisal\u2019 of the issues to be addressed in Awe\u2019s appeal.\u201d Id. at 513. We held that Awe\u2019s notice argument was waived because he failed to present it to the court prior to oral argument. However, we continued: Even assuming Awe had not waived his right,to challenge the BIA\u2019s procedural dismissal, we note that 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.1(d)(2)(i)(D) explicitly gives the BIA authority to dismiss procedurally defective appeals, and we have condoned the BIA\u2019s use of this power in cases similar to this one. See Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 499 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); accord Rioja v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 514, Holdings: 0: holding that reply brief is appropriate forum to rebut new material raised in appellees brief 1: holding that a party may pursue an issue not raised in its initial brief where a substantial change in law occurs after the brief was filed 2: holding that a party abandons claims that he does not argue in his brief 3: holding that appellate counsels admitted failure to timely file the brief constituted good cause to grant motion for belated brief 4: holding summary dismissal appropriate where party indicated he would file brief requested and received 30day filing extension and never filed brief nor explained why he had not", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "perceived to be false benefits that would contravene the rules of professional conduct for accountants; she was unable to identify any other benefits, and she was later terminated. Such evidence satisfies the Lorenz standard for purposes of our limited consideration on appeal of a directed verdict. IV. In conclusion, we hold that professional codes may be a source of public policy for purposes of a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Mariani properly relied on Rule 7.3 of the Colorado State Board of Accountancy Rules of Professional Conduct as a source of public policy. She further presented evidence sufficient to satisfy the prima facie requirements of Lorenz. On the evidence Mariani adduced at trial, reasonable jurors could 0 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Holdings: 0: holding that where statutory or regulatory provisions which evidence the public policy themselves provide a remedy for the wrongful discharge provision of a further remedy under the public policy exception is unnecessary 1: holding that public policy must be evidenced by constitutional or statutory provisions 2: holding that the courts may not declare public policy without a basis in either the constitution or statutory provisions 3: holding that public policy may be found in letter or purpose of constitutional statutory or regulatory provisions in judicial decisions of state and in certain instances in professional codes of ethics 4: holding that sources of public policy include legislation administrative rules regulations or decisions and judicial decisions and in certain instances a professional code of ethics", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "rule apply in this case, this court simply notes that Southmark failed to complain of this omission on appeal, and thus, waived any objections to the bankruptcy court's sua sponte consideration of res judicata. 13 . See also Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1196 (3d Cir.1993) (\"the denial of a Rule 11 motion does not foreclose the assertion of a subsequent malicious prosecution suit ....\"); cf. Port Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir.1988) (\"If Rule 11 did expand substantive rights, it would be invalid under the Enabling Act\u201d because it regulates procedure rather than create a new substantive right or an independent cause of action). 14 . Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, 897 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir.1990). 15 . See also In re Howe, 913 F.2d at 1143-47 (<HOLDING>). 16 . We have also held that a debtor does not Holdings: 0: holding based on  1127b that only the proponent  of a chapter 11 reorganization plan can seek to have it modified 1: holding that remedies provided in the bankruptcy code for enforcing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are not exclusive 2: holding that claims raised in later litigation were barred because they could have been fully litigated in chapter 11 reorganization process 3: holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion 4: holding that debtor whose plan of reorganization had been confirmed by bankruptcy court could not later bring lender liability claims against creditors where those claims could have been raised in bankruptcy proceeding", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "prohibition. Finally, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that it was \u201cobjectively reasonable\u201d for Jones to believe that he was acting lawfully. Jennings, 2005 WL 2043945, at *5. In reviewing the district court\u2019s grant of immunity on JMOL, I assume arguendo that the evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A. Effect of the Jury\u2019s Verdict Two thoughts should be removed from the picture at the outset. First, Jones did not break Jennings\u2019 ankle with reckless or callous indifference to Jennings\u2019 federal rights. Second, he did not knowingly violate the law. The jury verdict cannot, as a matter of law, be taken to establish these points because they were not elements of the claim that went to the jury. There was no basis for punitive damages here. S 92) (<HOLDING>). The majority reasons that the jury, by its Holdings: 0: holding that once probable cause is established officer is not required to investigate further 1: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself 2: holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest 3: holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had 4: holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a separate taxable entity to receive income, however, as the creation alone will not guarantee that the entity is deemed to have earned the income in question. [\u00b6 11] The general principle mandating that corporations be recognized as separate, taxable entities from their owners creates some tension with the requirement that income be taxed to the party who earns it. Recognizing that tension, in 1982 the United States Tax Court noted that, in the corporate context, simply identifying who earned the income may be inadequate to allow a determination of how the income should be taxed because corporations can act, and thus earn income, only through their agents. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 890-91; see also Haag v. Comm\u2019r, 88 T.C. 604, 611 (1987); cf. State v. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Me.1977) (<HOLDING>). That inadequacy is highlighted when Holdings: 0: holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity 1: recognizing as a matter of federal law that an action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation 2: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 3: holding that a corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agents corporate powers strictly construed but which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually authorized and in such eases there need be no written authority under seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the act 4: recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in their closing arguments and may advance all legitimate arguments and draw logical inferences from the evidence. See McArthur, 801 So.2d at 1039^40. Moreover, prosecutors in specific are not limited to a robotic presentation on behalf of the State. See Diaz v. State, 797 So.2d 1286, 1287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). However, \u201c[a] criminal trial is a neutral arena wherein both sides place evidence for the jury\u2019s consideration; the role of counsel in clos ing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing that evidence, not to obscure the jury\u2019s view with personal opinion, emotion, and nonrecord evidence.\u201d Ruiz, 743 So.2d at 4. Unfortunately, prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is neither a new nor fading phenomenon. See, e.g., Crew v. State, 146 So.3d 101, 111 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>); Freeman v. State, 717 So.2d 105, 106 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that the cumulative effect of the prosecutors comments which as seen above are welldocumented errors denied appellant a fair trial 1: holding that cumulative  effect of multiple errors worked to deprive defendant of fair trial although  some errors standing alone would be subject to plain error review and others might be harmless 2: holding that although neither of the trial courts errors when considered in isolation were necessarily sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial the cumulative effect of the errors created sufficient prejudice to deny defendant a fair trial 3: holding that plain error is the appropriate standard of review when a defendant objects to a prosecutors comments at trial does not move for a mistrial and then on appeal argues that the comments deprived him of a fair trial 4: holding that a number of errors may be deemed harmful in their cumulative effect", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "form, governs. See 10 Collier on Bankruptcy, \u00b6 6006.01[3][a] (15th ed.1998). For example, many asset sales include assignments of executory contracts and/or unexpired leases, and courts generally allow a motion to sell to be treated as a motion to assume or assign those contracts and leases being sold as long as all substantive and notice requirements for assumption and assignment are strictly followed. See, e.g., Chbat v. Tleel (In re Tleel), 876 F.2d 769, 770-771 (9th Cir.1989). Other courts have held that approval of an agreement in a stipulation regarding the assumption or rejection of unexpired leases may be sufficient to put the other parties to those leases on notice. See, e.g., Elliott v. Four Seasons Properties (In re Frontier Properties, Inc.), 979 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Lindsey v. ITPE-NMU Welfare Plan (In re Holdings: 0: holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement 1: holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable 2: holding that a stipulation as to the law is generally not binding upon the courts 3: holding that challenge to oneyear residency requirement for divorce action was not moot even though plaintiff had since satisfied requirement 4: holding that courtapproved stipulation satisfied notice requirement for assumption of contract", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "lender knew there were some consignment goods for sale, there is absolutely no record evidence as to whether the gallery was \u201cgenerally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others.\u201d \u00a7 679.1021(l)(t)lc. Consignor presented no evidence as to who or how many creditors the gallery had when he placed his painting there for sale in 2006. Similarly there is no evidence that lender knew this paint consignor must show that a majority of the consignee\u2019s creditors were aware that the consignee was substantially engaged in selling the goods of others by consignment sales, and the majority is determined by the number of creditors, not by the amount of their claims. See Valley Media, 279 B.R. at 126; In re Wicaco Mach. Corp., 49 B.R. 340, 344 (E.D.Pa.1984) (<HOLDING>). Again, here the consignor had no idea who or Holdings: 0: holding that  567203 did not exempt life insurance proceeds paid to the debtor spouse against the claims of her own creditors 1: holding that debtor did not prove that defendant creditors violated automatic stay under 11 usc  362a with respect to their actions in a state court lawsuit because the creditors actions involved a counterclaim that debtor asserted and were in response to that counterclaim 2: holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor 3: holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures 4: holding that 20 of creditors knowing of consignment relationship does not satisfy general knowledge requirement notwithstanding that such creditors represented 63 of claims against debtor", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "report falls into this category, then the 21-day deadline to object to the report was never triggered, and the trial court was required to dismiss Haskell\u2019s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 74.851(b) (requiring claim against defendant who has not been timely served with expert report must be dismissed); Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549 (defining minimum requirements for document to be considered expert report). If we hold that Haskell\u2019s report is not so deficient as to constitute no report at all, then any objections to the report have been waived and the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss Haskell\u2019s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 74.351(a) (providing 21-day deadline to object to deficient expert report); Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>). If there are multiple defendants in a suit, Holdings: 0: holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal 1: holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court 2: holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal 3: holding defendants failure to object timely waives its right to challenge expert report 4: holding failure to object within 21day deadline waives objections and trial court must deny motion to dismiss", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is a component of the right to petition for redress of grievances, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Given the close relationship between an inmate filing a grievance and filing a lawsuit \u2014 indeed, the former is generally a prerequisite for the latter \u2014 our jurisprudence provided a strong signal that offic have recognized an inmate\u2019s right to be free from retaliation for filing a grievance under the First Amendment (albeit without referencing a particular clause). Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (\u201c[Inmate\u2019s] allegation that he was falsely charged with misconduct in retaliation for filing complaints against Officer Wilson implicates conduct protected by the First Amendment.\u201d); Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Holdings: 0: recognizing class i to be the most severe category of disciplinary rule violations 1: recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance 2: recognizing refund claim could be barred if there was any valid local limitations law in force when the claim was filed 3: holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely letter with the irs that requested a refund and subsequently filed a formal refund claim 4: holding that state waived its eleventh amendment immunity by filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy proceedings", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "category of II, the probation officer set Peterson\u2019s sentencing range at 15 to 21 months\u2019 imprisonment. At the sentencing on January 23, 2009, Peterson challenged the USSG \u00a7 2S1.3(b)(2) enhancement, contending that the enhancement did not apply because her structuring offense did not involve \u201ca pattern of unlawful activity,\u201d which is defined as \u201cat least two separate occasions of unlawful activity ..., without regard to whether any such occasion occurred during the course of the offense or resulted in a conviction for the conduct that occurred on that occasion.\u201d USSG \u00a7 2S1.3, comment, (n.3). According to Peterson, if the structured money came from one source, here her safe deposit box, there could be only one offense, see United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), and thus no pattern of unlawful activity, Holdings: 0: holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause 1: holding the proper unit of prosecution for indecent liberties is the number of discrete acts 2: holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution 3: holding that the structuring itself and not each individual deposit is the unit of prosecution in a structuring offense 4: holding that test for whether two offenses are not the same is whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "rather than evidence presented in a representative fashion or via documentary evidence, is unclear.\u201d Medlock v. Host Int\u2019l, Inc., No. 12-cv-2024-JLT, 2013 WL 2278095, at *5 (E.D.Cal. May 22, 2013). Indeed, a number of courts, including the Medlock court, have recognized that PAGA plaintiffs can often satisfy their burdens of proof without undue reliance on individualized evidence. See id.) see also Plaisted v. Dress Barn, Inc., No. 12-cv-1679-ODW, 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (recognizing that individualized or fact-intensive evidence of damages is not required under PAGA, because PAGA only permits recovery of \u201cstatutory penalties in fixed amounts per violation\u201d); Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No. 11-cv-1600 PSG, 2013 WL 146323, at *3-4 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Uber does not explain why Gillette cannot Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: recognizing the statelaw privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant 2: recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing 3: holding that there was little risk litigation of representative paga claim would require a series of highly individualized fact intensive mini trials because the burden would be on defendants to prove that the labor code was not violated and such proof could be drawn easily from defendants own records 4: holding the states reference to the defendants lack of remorse was error because it was a comment on the defendants assertion of his constitutional rights to plead not guilty and require the state to carry its burden of proof", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "also held that the constitutional protections against double jeopardy prohibited retrial of the defendant on the habitual criminal charges. Id. at 754-55. In the present case the prosecution argues, and the court of appeals agreed, that Mason is distinguishable because Moore\u2019s attorney verbally acquiesced in the trial court\u2019s decision to preempt the jury\u2019s consideration of the habitual criminal counts. Although this distinction exists, we conclude that it lacks legal significance. We have recognized that the trial of habitual criminal charges, in contrast to an ordinary sentencing hearing, must be conducted \u201cin accordance with the same procedural and constitutional safeguards traditionally associated with a trial on guilt or innocence.\u201d People v. Quintana, 634 P.2d 413, 419 (Colo.1981) (<HOLDING>). See also People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy may be waived pursuant to a bargainedfor plea 1: holding that an amendment to a felony information on the day of trial charging the defendant as a habitual criminal was not error 2: holding that constitutional protections against double jeopardy apply to a defendant prosecuted as an habitual criminal 3: holding that suspension of a drivers license for conduct already sanctioned in a criminal case did not violate defendants constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it served a remedial purpose beyond the criminal penalties 4: holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "age at the time (Gibbs Dep. at 18), it is possible that he was merely relating his own experiences about his ability to heal post-injury. See MacDonald v. United Parcel Serv., 430 Fed.Appx. 453, 460 (6th Cir.2011) (\u201cMacDonald testified that Bowen told him to \u2018move your old ass\u2019 during the contentious events of January 25, 2007, but Bowen is only three years younger than MacDonald, so even viewed in the light most favorable to MacDonald, this statement does little for him.\u201d). And the comment was accompanied by Ilardi\u2019s advice that exercise would be good for Gibbs\u2019 healing. (Id. at 37.) In this context, the comment does not require the conclusion that Ilardi harbored discriminatory feelings towards workers over fifty. Cf. Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The same does not hold true for the comment Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants comment that the plaintiffs upcoming fiftyfifth birthday was a cause for concern was too ambiguous to give rise to an inference of age discrimination and therefore was not direct evidence 1: holding that a prima facie case for discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that 1 he belongs to the protected age group 2 his job performance was satisfactory 3 adverse employment action was taken against him  in 4  circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination  2: holding that the hiring and firing of an employee by the same actor within a period of a few years gives rise to an inference that age discrimination was not the motive behind the termination 3: holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference 4: holding in age discrimination case that plaintiffs dismissal did not give rise to an inference of discrimination when job was subsequently offered to an older individual", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "this Lawsuit? Our conclusion that the D\u2019Oench doctrine has not been preempted by statute is reinforced by an examination of Motorcity\u2019s argument that \u00a7\u00a7 1821(d)(9)(A) and 1823(e)(1) are inapplicable because Motorcity repaid its loan to Southeast before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Pointing to \u00a7 1823(e)(l)\u2019s reference to an \u201cagreement which tends to diminish or defeat the [FDIC\u2019s] interest ... in any asset acquired by it,\u201d Motorcity contends that \u00a7 1823(e)(1) does not bar any claims against the FDIC that do not affect the value of a specific asset of the bank, such as a note, acquired by the FDIC. Because it repaid its note, Motorcity argues that there is no longer any specific asset to which the alleged oral agreements relate. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78 Holdings: 0: holding that section 1823e is narrower than the doench doctrine and that section 1823e applies only to cases involving a specific asset 1: holding that  1823e applies only when the fdics interest in a specific asset would be impaired by the alleged secret agreement 2: holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records 3: holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest 4: holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "To issue a certificate, FERC must determine that the public will be well-served by the company\u2019s proposed development; the Commission may also impose terms and conditions it believes the public convenience and necessity require. The Act further provides that [w]hen any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid [for the owner\u2019s property interests] ... it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The company\u2019s exercise of this eminent domain Holdings: 0: holding that floating barge moored to shore remaining in same place for approximately seven years and used as work platform to clean and strip cargo and gas from barges was not a vessel 1: holding that the natural gas act authorizes acquisition of gas storage easements by eminent domain 2: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 3: holding that an individual is presumed to intend the natural consequences of the individuals actions 4: holding that under fedrcivp 71a federal procedure governs condemnation actions brought under the natural gas act", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ORDER Plaintiff-Appellant Felix I. Lessambo, pro se, appeals from the September 29, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, /.) dismissing the complaint on summary judgment. We assume the parties\u2019 familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the District Court\u2019s June 2009 decision granting the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings because that decision was not designated in Lessambo\u2019s notice of appeal, as required by Rule 3(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, insofar as Lessambo challenges the Holdings: 0: holding that mothers failure to appeal prior contempt order precluded her challenge to prior order in appeal from later order entered based upon prior contempt order 1: holding that the appeal was properly before the court where the appellant appealed from an order amending a prior order without appealing from the prior order 2: holding that when a notice of appeal specified one district court order while failing to reference another an appeal from the unmentioned order cannot be considered 3: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order 4: holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on the estate of tenancy by entirety: The effect of the Married Women\u2019s Property Acts was to abrogate the husband\u2019s common law dominance over the marital estate and to place the wife on a level of equality with him as regards the exercise of ownership over the whole estate. The tenancy was and still is predicated upon the legal unity of husband and wife, but the Acts converted it into a unity of equals and not of unequals as at common law. No longer could the husband convey, lease, mortgage or otherwise encumber the property without her consent. The Acts confirmed her right to the use and enjoyment of the whole estate, and all the privileges that ownership of property confers, including the right to convey the property in its entirety, jointly with her husband, dur . 618, 619 (1891) (<HOLDING>). RBS admits that when property is held in Holdings: 0: holding that husband and wifes failure to recite marital status in the deed did not defeat tenancy by the entirety 1: holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead 2: holding that marital property was not attachable for the sole debts of the husband because it was held in tenancy by entirety 3: holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety cannot be reached by husbands creditors absent fraud 4: holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety is exempt from attachment or execution for the sole debts of husband", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "speedy and adequate remedy otherwise provided by law.... [Rleview shall be limited to a determination of whether the body or officer has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its dis cretion, based on the evidence in the record before the defendant body or officer. (Emphasis added.) Under this Rule, our review of the issue before us is limited to determining whether the court of appeals properly upheld the district court's conclusion that the zoning authorities of Colorado Springs abused their discretion or exceeded their jurisdiction. Ultimately, the resolution of this issue turns on whether the Zoning Code grants the zoning authorities the power to deny the development plan of a permitted use. See Sherman v. City of Colorado Springs Planning Comm'n, 680 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Colo.App.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 763 P.2d 292, 294 (Colo.1988). As Holdings: 0: holding that a local governmental body exceeds its jurisdiction under crcp 106a4 when it exercises discretion it does not have 1: recognizing that member of local governmental body does not necessarily act in legislative capacity when participation takes form of vote 2: recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law  the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way 3: holding that if a contract surrenders or contracts away governmental functions then it exceeds the scope of a governmental entitys powers and is void 4: holding the circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it fails to apply or misapplies statutory factors", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to progress under the program may result in further disciplinary action and even separation from the United States Air Force.\u201d R. 388. 11 . Section X491(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, provides, in pertinent part: To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any such judgment, issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official of the United States. (Emphasis added). 12 . Although this court generally lacks jurisdiction to grant declaratory and injunctive relief, we note that 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491(a)(2), ma 1336, 1340, 6 L.Ed.2d 313 (1961) (<HOLDING>). 17 . There is some doubt about whether Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government 1: holding that statements by an american consular officer that petitioners mother could not return to the united states because of her pregnant condition did not constitute affirmative misconduct sufficient to estop the government from relying on petitioners foreign birth to deny citizenship 2: holding that erroneous oral advice did not constitute the type of affirmative misconduct that would be sufficient to estop the government from relying on a valid regulation requiring that certain social security benefit applications be in writing 3: holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners 4: holding that a ceremonial marriage performed under the laws of a foreign power by a foreign consular officer on united states territory was invalid because it did not comply with the laws of new york state", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Stated differently, identification procedures are not per se unduly suggestive, but must be shown to be so under the circumstances unique to each case. Cothran argues that the identification procedures used in this case were unduly suggestive because both Harper and Cooper identified him: (1) while he was handcuffed; (2) after they saw officers take him out of a paddy wagon; and (3) after the police had told them that someone was in custody and had asked them to determine if that person was the robber. However, it is not enough that Cothran was identified under these circumstances. Police \u201cshow-ups,\u201d like the ones used in this case, are not generally unduly suggestive. State v. Williams, 717 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo.App.E.D.1986); State v. Moore, 925 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Mo.App.E.D.1996) (<HOLDING>). We have upheld identifications made while the Holdings: 0: holding that the friend of an eyewitness to a robbery who called the witness to view the defendant as he was being arrested by police was not acting as an agent of the state but rather a private citizen and therefore the protections of the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule for improper identification procedures did not apply to the eyewitnesss identification at the showup 1: holding that police seizure of weapon in plain view even though appellant was handcuffed and under the control of the officers was lawful because there were other occupants in the house who were not handcuffed and who would have had access to the weapon 2: holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight 3: holding that a showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive where it took place immediately after the unlawful conduct and was necessary to avoid arresting the wrong person 4: holding that a showup identification was valid even though the suspect was handcuffed", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Brett C. Kimberlin appeals the district court\u2019s order denying his motion filed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), in which he sought reconsideration of the court\u2019s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court\u2019s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Kimberlin v. Dewalt, No. CA-99-979-2 (E.D.Va. Oct. 20, 2000). In addition, we decline to consider the claims Kimberlin raises for the first time on appeal. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). We dispense with oral argument because the Holdings: 0: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered 1: holding that issues raised for first time on appeal generally will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice 2: holding claims raised for first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances 3: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived absent exceptional circumstances 4: recognizing that issues raised for first time on appeal generally are not considered absent exceptional circumstances", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n. 6, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). Campbell hopes that the dissents in those cases will persuade us to find the statute unconstitutionally vague. However, we are bound by the existing precedent to the contrary. Thus, the district court did not err in overruling Campbell\u2019s objection to his sentence based on the alleged vagueness of the ACCA. Campbell also argues that his previous convictions for third-degree burglary and fourth-degree aggravated assault are not violent felonies under the ACCA, in order to preserve these issues for further appeal. However, he concedes that we have held to the contrary. See United States v. Coleman, 655 F.3d 480, 482-83 (6th Cir.2011), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1045, 181 L.Ed.2d 768 (2012) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rodriguez, 664 F.3d 1032, Holdings: 0: holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act 1: holding that thirddegree burglary is a violent felony 2: holding that attempted burglary as defined by florida law is a violent felony under acca 3: holding that coerced sex is violent felony 4: holding a burglary must be of a building or structure in order to qualify as a violent felony for acca purposes", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "false on \u201c[pjrimarily medical evidence but also what was related to [him] about her visit to California by family members\u201d as well as McCullough\u2019s testimony. Id. However, trial counsel did not introduce medical evidence even though such a report existed, or the testimony of family members, or any other evidence to prove the falsity of the California Claim. Id. at 125-126. McCullough\u2019s counsel also did not object when the prosecutor, clearly improperly, referred to uncharged misconduct during closing argument or during rebuttal when the prosecutor stated: \u201cCalifornia, I wish I could charge it, but that\u2019s not my jurisdiction. I wish I could charge in California what he did to her, what she testified that he did to her, what she told Diane Bowers that he did to he 978 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Trial counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Bowers Holdings: 0: holding that trial counsels failure to object to the prosecutors repeated pervasive and clearly improper references during closing arguments to similar transactions committed by the defendant constituted deficient performance and amounted to prejudice that required a new trial 1: holding that omissions of informants criminal history from warrant affidavit did not support suppression where the affiant did not know the exact nature of the criminal history 2: holding that trial counsels performance in failing to object move to strike or request an admonishment of the jury with respect to the defendants criminal history was deficient and that it could not be said that the references to the defendants criminal history did not impact the jurys decision where the evidence was not overwhelming and reversing for a new trial 3: holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel 4: holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "rights,\u201d not determinative.) [original emphasis]. Numerous decisions support this Court\u2019s conclusion that the defendant\u2019s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. See, e.g., Tennell v State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (only interrogating police officer and fourteen year old boy present when Miranda rights given and defendant signed written waiver, and officer \u201csatisfy[ied] himself that the appellant understood [his rights].\u201d); C.J. v State, 376 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (eleven year old boy held not to have understood rights he waived); Fields v State, 402 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (\u201cwhile a juvenile may waive his Miranda rights, the state bears a \u2018heavy burden\u2019 in establishing that the waiver is valid.\u201d); Hall v State, 421 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, 430 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1983); State Holdings: 0: recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial 1: recognizing that distinguishing trespassers from nontrespassers is a heavy burden 2: recognizing burden 3: holding defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on lesserincluded offenses because his request did not constitute a waiver of the statute of limitations on those offenses such a waiver must be knowingly intelligently and voluntarily made 4: recognizing states heavy burden of establishing that the waiver was intelligently made", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the record.\u201d PL Mot. at 18. Moreover, it is well established that military decisions are \u201csubject to judicial review and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious or not based on substantial evidence.\u201d PI. Mot. at 18 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983)). Since the Complaint alleges the BOI\u2019s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence, and that the Navy failed to follow \u201cmeasured tests and standards,\u201d this case is justiciable. PL Mot. at 18. Plaintiff adds that although \u201cdecisions which affect the conduct of military operations, strategy or tactics\u201d are not justiciable, \u201cpersonnel decisions\u201d are reviewable by the courts. Pl. Mot. at 20-21 (citing Adair v. England, 183 F.Supp.2d 31, 50 (D.D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>)). The Government replies that the suggestion Holdings: 0: holding that chilling effect claim must still be rooted in specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm to convey standing 1: holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review 2: holding that courts have inherent power to hire and require salaries be paid to secretaries clerks probation officers and assistants 3: holding that the militarys policies to hire retain and promote chaplains  relate to qualityoflife issues for military personnel and have no specific operational strategic or tactical objective and therefore require less deference 4: holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. See Sensback, 720 N.E.2d at 1164-1165. 2. Lack of Criminal History Page argues that the trial court gave no weight to his lack of criminal history. We disagree. The trial court recognized Page\u2019s lack of criminal history as a miti-gator but discounted the value of this miti-gator. Specifically, the trial court stated, \u201cThe court finds as mitigating circumstances that he has some criminal history, arguably it\u2019s not significant, but a weapons charge and another pending crime of violence along with these three crimes of violence, I don\u2019t think the mitigators are worth much.\u201d Transcript at 34. Page asks us to review the weight given to this mitigating factor for abuse of discretion, which we cannot do. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (<HOLDING>). B. Aggravators Page appears to argue that the Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave aggravating factors considerable weight 1: holding that the relative weight or value assignable to aggravating and mitigating factors properly found is not subject to review for abuse of discretion 2: holding that a trial courts weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion 3: holding that trial court retains wide discretion to apply or reject mitigating and aggravating factors as well as to interpret meaning of individual factors and its determination must be upheld absent abuse of discretion 4: holding imposition of the death penalty proportionate where the trial court found two aggravating circumstances ccp and contemporaneous murder two statutory mitigating factors and a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "did not present these arguments in any of his post-conviction motions to the trial court. Furthermore, Payne did not appeal his convictions and did not seek to withdraw his guilty pleas (nor can he do so now, in light of the time that has passed since his convictions). Under these circumstances, Payne may pursue these arguments only through habeas corpus proceedings. Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. Decided October 27, 2005 Reconsideration denied November 30, 2005 Andrew W. Payne, Jr., pro se. Dennis C. Sanders, District Attorney, William P. Doup\u00e9, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See Martin v. State, 277 Ga. 227, 228 (3) (587 SE2d 650) (2003). 2 (Emphasis supplied.) 3 See generally State v. Allen, 262 Ga. App. 724, 727 (2) (586 SE2d 378) (2003) (<HOLDING>); OCGA\u00a7 17-7-70.1 (a) (2) (\u201c[a]ll laws relating Holdings: 0: holding that ocga  911111 offers substantive protection beyond the procedural consideration related to the timing of the filing of the verification 1: holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 2: recognizing that ocga  911111 embodies both a procedural and substantive component 3: holding that a defendants statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his sixth amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses 4: recognizing that ocga 177701 relates primarily to felonies charged by accusation", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 72, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (\"The basic rationale behind our ripeness doctrine is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements, when those disagreements are premised on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Furthermore, as discussed above, because all states owe due process obligations to \u201cany person,\u201d without regard to state borders, if a neighboring state is later poised to close an abortion provider upon which a Mississippi woman relies, she could sue to enjoin that closure. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 129, 149, 155-56, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (<HOLDING>). For the same reason, there is no basis for Holdings: 0: holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law 1: holding that citizens of iowa and wisconsin could bring suit to enjoin minnesota officials from enforcing state law setting railroad rates that allegedly deprived them of property without due process of law 2: holding that where state law treats goodwill as property business goodwill is a property interest entitled to protection the owner cannot be deprived of it without due process 3: holding young applicable in an action to enjoin state officials from enforcing a law in violation of the commerce clause 4: holding that licenses issued under minnesota law do not create property interests in renewal that are protected by due process clause", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "protest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1515(b). Pl.\u2019s Opp\u2019n at 4. However, such a request cannot cure a timing defect in the underlying protest. For Plaintiff\u2019s claim to be within the Court\u2019s jurisdiction, the referenced protest must first be filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1514. As Plaintiff\u2019s protest was untimely, Plaintiff\u2019s subsequent request for accelerated disposition could not revive it. The Court therefore holds that the protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely and improperly filed. Moreover, Plaintiff\u2019s subsequent acts failed to cure or amend its original protest. Because Plaintiff failed to file a valid protest, Customs\u2019 decisions are final and this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1581(a). New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Hambro Auto. Corp. v. United States, 66 Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that refusal by customs officials to reliquidate entries became final and conclusive upon the importer when it failed to file a protest within the previously mandated sixtyday limitations period 1: holding that the ninetyday time period under the federal rule is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a partys death and that mere reference to a partys death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution 2: holding that although the jurisdiction limitation also works to make decisions final and conclusive upon the government unless it acts to revise them within the limitations period there was no such decision that triggered the ninetyday period and consequently a failure to invoke jurisdiction 3: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 4: holding that the courts jurisdiction is limited to the appeal of final board decisions that are adverse to the claimant", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "defendant, plaintiff has failed to establish that he filed a refund claim for the second quarter of 1988, as required before filing a suit for refund. Def.\u2019s MTD at 7; see I.R.C. \u00a7 7422(a). In his objection to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, plaintiff included a Form 843 refund claim dated April 7, 2000, and received May 2, 2000. Pl.\u2019s Obj. Exh. B. This claim is for the tax period from January 1987 through 1988. Id. As discussed above, the IRS denied plaintiffs refund claims for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1987 on February 14, 1997. Def.\u2019s MTD Exh. A. Filing a second claim for these tax periods, as plaintiff appears to do with his Form 843 claim in exhibit B, does not alter the statute of limitations for those claims. See Jones v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 424, 425 (1992) (<HOLDING>); I.R.C. \u00a7 6532(a)(4) (\u201cAny consideration, Holdings: 0: holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived 1: holding that although the filing of suit and service of citation interrupt the running of the statute its dismissal for want of prosecution will have the same effect as if the suit had never been filed 2: holding that taxpayers filing of a second set of claims after the first set had been disallowed had no effect on the running of the statute of limitations 3: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 4: holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the appellant is ... unable to provide now or in the future.\u201d The record demonstrates that S.O. is doing very well in her foster placement. Esser and Jones testified that S.O. has formed a strong bond with her siblings, and that maintaining a relationship with her siblings is in her best interest. But even if maintaining S.O.\u2019s out-of-home placement with her siblings is in her best interest, that is not a sufficient reason to terminate her father\u2019s parental rights. The best interest of the child is a \u201cparamount\u201d concern, but termination of parental rights is contingent upon a finding under MinmStat. \u00a7 260C.301, subd. 1(b), that at least one of the statutory conditions, such as palpable unfitness, is met. MinmStat. \u00a7 260C.301, subd. 7 (2012); see also R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 54-55 (<HOLDING>). II. Appellant also argues that he was never Holdings: 0: recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests 1: holding that it was error to base a tpr decision solely on the childs best interest 2: holding that a modification of custody should not be based on one parents default because it is the childs best interests that are at stake 3: holding that a childs preference regarding parental contact is not determinative of the best interest analysis and that a court must assess a childs best interest in light of all statutory factors 4: holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an illegal contract. B. Application of Claim Preclusion to Claim in This Case Under Article I, Section 24 of the Iowa Constitution. We first consider whether the doctrine of claim preclusion applies under the circumstances of this case. Here, the parties are identical, there is no doubt that the article I, section 24 claim could have been brought in the prior proceeding, and there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action. Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 319. Further, no additional evidence would have been required to litigate the constitutional question in the first proceeding, in contrast to our other cases allowing parties to litigate separate claims involving the same contract in two proceedings. See Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982) (<HOLDING>). Although not raised by the parties, there is Holdings: 0: holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit 1: holding that claim preclusion did not bar fire insurer from bringing a second action against its coplaintiff in first action 2: holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action  and thus did not count as third strike 3: holding claim preclusion did not foreclose plaintiffs second action even though it arose out of the same lease agreement as that of a prior action 4: holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1089, 1089 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam). 47 . United States v. Gornto, 792 F.2d 1028, 1033 (11th Cir.1986) (collecting cases); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 465 n. 38, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). 48 . United States v. Vasquez, 677 F.3d 685, 692 (5th Cir.2012) (per curiam). 49 . See United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 179 (5th Cir.1994) (\"Since a justification defense such as duress is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant. To succeed, the defendant must prove each ele ment of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d (internal citation omitted)); United States v. MMR Corp. (LA), 907 F.2d 489, 499 (5th Cir.1990) (withdrawal is an affirmative defense). 50 .See United States v. Barton, 992 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 51 . United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, Holdings: 0: holding that in reviewing a defendants motion for judgment of acquittal based on insanity which the defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the court must determine whether no reasonable jury could have failed to find that the defendants criminal insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence 1: holding presumption overcome based on competent substantial record evidence which the judge could reasonably find to be clear and convincing 2: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence 3: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 4: holding that the state must establish insanity and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence in order to confine an insane convict beyond his criminal sentence when the basis for his original confinement no longer exists", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with HUD. To receive funding under the contract, BHA was required to provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing to low income households, and it was required to comply with HUD\u2019s regulations. BHA could only use HUD funding for eligible work items, and an employee could not use the money for personal gain. After HUD\u2019s review of BHA\u2019s annual agency plan, it could conduct civil audits or a variety of other options in the event of the appearance of impropriety or noncompliance with the regulations. Based on this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the converted funds were federal and that HUD maintained sufficient supervision and control over BHA. See McRee, 7 F.3d at 980; see also United States v. Hope, 901 F.2d 1013, 1020-21 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Further, Trent\u2019s conviction under \u00a7 666(a)(1) Holdings: 0: holding that defendant violated section 4b when she misappropriated pool participant funds by soliciting funds for trading and then trading only a small percentage of those funds while disbursing the rest of the funds to investors herself and her family 1: holding that funding obtained through hud through its loan program retained its federal character where the funds could be applied only toward eligible program activities could not be diverted into interest bearing accounts or used for the benefit of another loan applicant and grantees were required to repay the federal government for misappropriated or misapplied funds 2: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college 3: holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee 4: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000). Instead, Burns appears to concede his federal habe-as petition is untimely but argues application of the one-year limitations period to a person in his position raises serious constitutional questions. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.1998). After reviewing the record and considering the claims Burns is attempting to raise in his \u00a7 2254 petition, we reject his argument that applying the limitations period in this case renders the habeas remedy inadequate or ineffective. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.1998). Burns asserts he is illiterate and was denied counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings, resulting in his inability to ap peal his conviction. Cf. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 376-380 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The record contradicts these assertions. Holdings: 0: holding habeas review was available to federal prisoner claiming actual innocence who was barred from bringing a successive  2255 motion because the denial of collateral review would raise sufficiently serious constitutional questions under the eighth amendment and the due process clause 1: holding in a  2255 case that the failure to raise a bailey claim on direct review can be overcome by a showing of actual innocence 2: recognizing that after iirira habeas review remains available  to raise substantial constitutional questions 3: holding that a prisoner cannot use the savings clause of 28 usc  2241 to escape the restrictions on successive  2255 motions and the failure to raise an available claim earlier 4: holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with respect to civil proceedings. The D.C. Circuit has neither recognized nor rejected that the First Amendment affords the public a right of access to civil proceedings. The government interprets the D.C. Circuit\u2019s silence as a denial of the right. Quoting Ctr. for Nat\u2019l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, the government argues that the D.C. Circuit has never \u201cindicated that it would apply the [First Amendment right-of-public-aceess] test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.\u201d 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C.Cir.2003). In Ctr. for Nat\u2019l Sec. Studies, however, the third party was not seeking access to judicial records in civil proceedings; rather, it sought Department of Justice investigation information on individuals detained for immigration violations. 331 F.3d at 934-35 (<HOLDING>). The Court is unaware of any D.C. Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that the first amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings 1: recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents 2: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 3: holding that the first amendment right of public access does not extend to nonjudicial documents compiled during an executive branch investigation 4: holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "mailing in order to obtain the search warrant needed for its inspection. We only hold that on the facts of this case ...a 29-hour delay between the mailing[] and the service of the warrant cannot be said to be \u201cunreasonable\u201d within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253, 90 S.Ct. at 1032-33 (emphasis added); see Place, 462 U.S. at 705 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at 2643 n. 6 (Van Leeuwen \u201c[ejxpressly limit[ed] its holding to the facts of the case\u201d); see also Anderson, 663 F.2d at 938 (interpreting Van Leeuwen as providing that \u201c[t]he legality of the continuing detention of [validity seized] luggage depends on whether such detention is reasonable, in light of all the surrounding circumstances \u201d (emphasis added); United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S.Ct. 3551, Holdings: 0: holding that the circuit judge did not have the authority to extend the thirtyday time limit for filing a notice of appeal 1: holding that van leeuwen did not place an outer time limit on the detention of impersonal objects 2: holding that the crossappeal time limit is jurisdictional 3: holding that claims consideration in bankruptcy has no express time limit 4: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6532(a)(1). Because Congress has explicitly provided for suits against the IRS for refunds only if the claimant files a complaint within two years of the agency\u2019s decision to deny a refund claim, courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain challenges brought later. The jurisdictional nature of the two-year time limit has been recognized by this and other courts. See, e.g., Compagnoni v. United States, 173 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 Holdings: 0: holding that full payment of the assessment is also required for tax refund suits brought in the united states court of federal claims 1: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 2: holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations 3: holding that sovereign immunity bars an attorneys lien against the united states 4: holding that sovereign immunity does not bar extinguishment of united states junior lien in proceeding in which united states was not a party", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at a specific customer\u2019s site. Other Customer Engineers, including Smith, were \"on 'Call\u201d or \"reactive\u201d \u2014 they responded to different customer service calls and traveled between customer sites. 5 . In its reply brief, HP cites Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 357 (5th Cir.2001), to contend that \"Smith must establish that he was clearly more qualified than the person retained to establish pretext in a WFR context.\u201d D. Reply Br. 8. The court has not considered this argument. First, the part of Celestine that HP cites addresses a claim for failure to promote and train. Second, this assertion is directly refuted \u2014 at least in the context of an age discrimination case \u2014 by EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1096 n. 5 (5th Cir.1994) (age discrimination case) (<HOLDING>). 6 . HP Customer Engineers were referred to Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not commit reversible error in charging jury that reasonable certainty was the proper standard for establishing the value of plaintiffs lost earnings and that some evidence was all that was required in this matter 1: holding that it was reversible error for district court to charge jury that plaintiffs were required in reduction of force case to show that they were clearly better qualified than the employees retained 2: holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 3: holding that district court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show that they were better qualified than employees who were promoted in order to make a prima facie case 4: holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the victim of a crime prevents a sentencing court from ordering restitution. The other circuits, however, have generally held that \u201ca release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.\u201d United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998) (concluding \u201cthat district courts possess the discretion to impose restitution orders in spite of civil settlements\u201d because of \u201cthe rehabilitative and retributive functions\u201d of restitution), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1808, 143 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1999); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hairston, 888 F.2d 1349, Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement 1: holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement 2: holding that the existence of a prior bankruptcy settlement does not preclude a subsequent criminal restitution order 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Inc., 334 Ill.App.3d 926, 268 Ill.Dec. 750, 779 N.E.2d 364 (2002); Lewis v. Collinsville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 158 Ill.App.3d 411, 110 Ill.Dec. 722, 511 N.E.2d 899 (1987); Williams v. Naylor, 147 Ill.App.3d 258, 100 Ill.Dec. 912, 497 N.E.2d 1274 (1986). However, where allegations of civil rights violations are framed only in terms of federal laws, such as the claims involved in this case, the Illinois courts have been much less clear. Compare Stykel v. City of Freeport, 318 Ill.App.3d 839, 252 Ill.Dec. 368, 742 N.E.2d 906, 914 (2001) (determining that a trial court may consider federal civil-rights claims joined with an administrative review of a distinct claim before the circuit court); Stratton v. Wenona Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 1, 133 Ill.2d 413, 141 Ill.Dec. 453, 551 N.E.2d 640 (1990) (<HOLDING>); with, Faulkner-King, 168 Ill.Dec. 874, 590 Holdings: 0: holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action 1: holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the administrative record conducted under the administrative procedure act 2: holding that courts may review nonconstitutional claims 3: holding that this court may independently review the administrative construction of a statute 4: holding that  1983 claims may be joined with an administrative review", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "implies that the trustees hold title to the Trust as joint tenants, a provision consistent with the rule that co-trustees must act in unison. Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that co-trustees must not act independently of one another. See, e.g., Colburn v. Grant, 181 U.S. 601, 606, 21 S.Ct. 737, 739, 45 L.Ed. 1021 (1901) (recognizing the principle that \u201ccotrustees may not act independently of one another, nor ignore each other in the management of the trust\u201d); Union Bank & Trust Co. of Helena v. Penwell, 99 Mont. 255, 42 P.2d 457, 462 (1935) (stating \u201cit is clear that both under our statutes and the general rule under the common law the act of one only of the trustees is not sufficient\u201d); Cooper v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 175 Okla. 610, 53 P.2d 678, 682 (1936) (<HOLDING>). The principle that two trustees must exercise Holdings: 0: holding that trustees fiduciary duty exists independent of any clause in trust agreement 1: holding that trustees did not breach their fiduciary duty by deciding to set independent contribution rates for each local union 2: holding that cotrustees cannot act independent of one another and the disagreement between the trustees in this case renders the act of each a nullity 3: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 4: holding that trustees act of conveying entire corpus terminated the trust", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a startling event.\u201d [\u00b6 40.] The remaining statements were admitted under SDCL 19-16-7, which provides: A statement of the declarant\u2019s then existing state of. mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health, is not excluded by \u00a7 19-16-4, even though the declarant is available as a witness, but a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed is excluded unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declar-ant\u2019s will. The court explained that the evidence, \u201cwhich describes the emotional, physical, and verbal abusive acts by the Defendant towards the victim and his controlling nature is relevant to show ... the state of mind of both the vict 728, 730 (2001) (<HOLDING>); State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573, 509 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding victims statements to coworkers admissible to rebut defendants claim that they had a good marriage 1: recognizing exception under state constitution 2: holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted 3: holding victims statements admissible under state of mind exception to rebut defendants claim of accident andor suicide 4: holding victims statements were admissible under state of niind exception to show gun was not accidentally fired", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to Grant to accommodate situation where appellant\u2019s sentence of seven days time served was too short to raise ineffectiveness claim in PCRA petition). But see Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d 991 (2003) (declining to apply Salisbury/Ingold exception, where appellant was sentenced to 90 days\u2019 imprisonment and a concurrent 3 years\u2019 probation and still had almost two years to litigate PCRA petition). \u00b6 29 The Salisbury/Ingold exception is premised on the PCRA statute at 42 Pa. C.S.A. \u00a7 9543(a)(1)(f) (referring to PCRA\u2019s eligibility requirement that petitioner is \u201cat the time relief is granted\u201d currently serving sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for crime on which petition is based) and the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 548 Pa. 544, 699 A.2d 718 (1997) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 30 Instantly, appellate counsel has raised Holdings: 0: holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed 1: holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision 2: holding that under section 9543a1 a pcra petitioner is not eligible for relief where the petitioner has completed serving the sentence before final adjudication on the petition 3: holding pcra statute requires that petitioner must be currently serving sentence of imprisonment parole or probation on underlying crime not only when petition is filed but also when decision on petition is rendered 4: holding that probation is not a sentence", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 1362. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in a decision five years before Garner that \u201cthe focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of \u2018disadvantage,\u2019 ... but on whether any such change ... increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.\u201d California Dep\u2019t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). This approach has been taken by a number of other courts in the wake of Garner as well. See, e.g., Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1217 (\u201c[Petitioner] could still prevail upon a showing that ... a ty for the proposition that parole guidelines cannot be considered \u201claws\u201d for purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming the guidelines at issue in Holdings: 0: holding that the federal parole guidelines at issue were not laws within meaning of ex post facto clause 1: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation 2: holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause 3: holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker 4: holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "when, under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court might well conclude that Rodrigues had failed to state a claim because he has not alleged that Pacheco had notice of the charge or an opportunity to conciliate. The Court need not resolve this difficult question, however, because it determines below that the plaintiff has stated a colorable state law claim against Pacheco for interference with contractual relations. 2. Interference with Contractual Relations Genlyte argues that the claim against Pacheco for tortious interference with contractual relations is preempted by c. 151B. The weight of authority holds otherwise. While c. 151B\u2019s remedial scheme preempts all other state statutory causes of action, see, e.g., Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 557-558, 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996) (<HOLDING>), an employee is not foreclosed, under Holdings: 0: holding a pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim under the civil rights act if the allegations are mere conclusions 1: holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc  1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims 2: holding that c 151b precludes claims under mass gen l c 214  1c civil rights act and equal rights act 3: holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under civil rights act of 1871 4: holding that  16 of the urban mass transit act  1656 of the federalaid highway act and other acts created no substantive rights sufficient to invoke  1983", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "its general experience as to how much time a case requires. In order to exercise its discretion fairly, a district court needs flexibility in deciding whether to reduce a fee request and, if so, by how much. B. In the instant case, the defendants\u2019 challenge to the amount of time spent by Gross tests the outer limits of the specificity requirement. Although the issue is a close one, we hold that the challenge meets this requirement. We also hold, with less difficulty, that the challenge to the fee award requested by McGahen was raised with sufficient clarity. However, we hold that the district court erred by reducing the fee request for Gross\u2019s law clerk, because it was never challenged by the defendants. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-70, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The district court reduced the time spent by Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys fees awards are available under  1988 for frivolous actions 1: holding that a law clerks time is recoverable as part of attorneys fees under  1988 2: holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees 3: holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered 4: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "protest jurisdiction into pre-procurement decisions. As plaintiffs characterize in responding to defendant\u2019s criticism of their failure to cite authority for their assertions of OCI violations: \u201c[o]f course there are no cases directly on point; there was no such jurisdiction in this Court or in any other forum prior to this case.\u201d (Pls.\u2019 Resp./Reply Def.\u2019s Mot. Dismiss/Opp\u2019n Pls.\u2019 Mot. J. and Cross-Mot. J. AR 12, ECF No. 88.) No viable lack of good faith and fair dealing has been established by plaintiffs in this matter. D. Waiver Defendant contends plaintiffs\u2019 claimed errors in the \u201cprocuring method\u201d were waived by failing to timely raise them. (Def.\u2019s Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 79.) See Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2007) (\u201cBlue & Gold Fleet\u201d) (<HOLDING>) Id. Because the protestor was aware that the Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review applies where the defendant fails to object to the lack of an opportunity to allocute 1: holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court 2: holding protestor waived its right to challenge a solicitation amendment by not objecting to its terms during the bidding process 3: holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal 4: holding that a party who has the opportunity to object to the terms of a government solicitation containing a patent error and fails to do so prior to the close of the bidding process waives its ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid protest action in the court of federal claims", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "tort,\" and their \"accrual dates are linked to the accrual date[s] of the underlying tort[s].\" Prince George's County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859, 877 & n. 22 (2011); see Filmservice Labs., Inc. v. Harvey Bernhard Enters., Inc., 208 Cal.App.3d 1297, 256 Cal.Rptr. 735, 742 (1989) (\"[Nlo cause of action exists for conspiracy, per se. Whether or not a cause of action for conspiracy is timely must be determined by reference to the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying cause of action. In this case the underlying cause of action is ... time-barred. That being the case we find the ... cause of action for conspiracy is also time-barred.\") (citations omitted); Meyer Land & Cattle Co. v. Lincoln County Conservation Dist., 29 Kan.App.2d 746, 31 P.3d 970, 977 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Schlotthauer v. Sanders, 153 A.D.2d 731, 545 Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication 1: holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort 2: holding that plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim was barred by section 343909c 3: recognizing that although civil conspiracy is a separate actionable tort a conspiracy claim is barred where the underlying tort is barred by the applicable statute of limitations 4: holding that where summary judgment is granted on the underlying tort claims a conspiracy claim must also fail", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "should also consider whether mandamus will allow the court to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments and whether mandamus will spare litigants and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding). Because a trial court\u2019s temporary orders are not appealable, mandamus is an appropriate means to challenge them. See, e.g., In re Derzapf 219 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex.2007) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief and directing trial court to vacate its temporary orders granting grandparents access to grandchild); Little v. Daggett, 858 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex.1993) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 Holdings: 0: holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal 1: holding that mandamus is appropriate to challenge temporary orders because they are not subject to interlocutory appeal 2: holding that mandamus is appropriate to challenge temporary orders 3: holding that mandamus is appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable 4: holding that a temporary order granting emergency relief and temporary child custody under the domestic violence act is not immediately appealable", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as a result of Defendant\u2019s disposal of C8. As to loss of use, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot show any loss of use of its property as a result of C8 contamination. Throughout litigation, Plaintiff has argued that the C8 contamination interfered with its Five-Year Plan, originally drafted in 1995, which includes the blueprint to expand its water supply to three areas: Decatur Township 250, Barlow Township 261, and Palmer Square. Further, Plaintiff has alleged that the C8 contamination hindered its plans to drill a new production well. First, regarding the Five-Year Plan, Defendant responds that the Plaintiff cannot sustain an injury under private nuisance to expand into land it does not yet own. Gevelaar v. Millennium Inorganic Chemicals, 2013-Ohio-435, \u00b6\u00b6 30-31, 2013 WL 501745 (<HOLDING>). Next, Defendant avers that these plans are Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could not recover medical bills that were discharged in bankruptcy 1: holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent 2: holding defendant that did not present its own claim under chapter 38 could not recover attorneys fees 3: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 4: holding that the plaintiff could not recover fees for time spent on unsuccessful motions", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "with prejudice.\u201d); LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C.1985) (\u201cIn the exercise of its discretion under Rule 41(b), the trial court 'should first resort to the wide range of lesser sanctions which it may impose.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Garces v. Bradley, 299 A.2d 142, 144 (D.C.1973)). 58 . Techniarts Video, 572 A.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). 59 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Granville v. Hunt, 566 A.2d 65, 66 (D.C.1989). 60 . Wolfe, 618 A.2d at 173. 61 . See id. (\"When the conduct calling for sanctions consists of delay, ... relevant factors include the length of the delay and the resulting prejudice, if any, to the defendant.\"). 62 . 680 A.2d at 438. 63 . Id. 64 . See Lofton v. Kator & Scott, 802 A.2d 955, 957-58 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>); Dobbs v. Providence Hosp., 736 A.2d 216, 220 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend 1: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a case after the parties allowed it to lay dormant for at least fourteenandahalfmonths 2: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention 3: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case 4: holding that the decision whether to apply the exhaustion requirement in an erisa case is committed to the district courts sound discretion but that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "decisions of trial counsel in deciding whether a decision not to file a motion constitutes neglect). The Board thus erred in finding neglect. Failure to Communicate Brice\u2019s second allegation is that Schoeneman failed to return her telephone calls for three weeks, which we regard as an allegation that Schoeneman failed to keep his client reasonably informed. Rule 1.4 (a) of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct requires a lawyer to \u201ckeep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.\u201d The guiding principle for evaluating conduct under this rule is whether the lawyer fulfilled the client\u2019s \u201creasonable ... expectations for information.\u201d D.C. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.4 cmt.; cf, e.g., In re Karr, 722 A.2d at 21 (<HOLDING>). Brice admits that she and Schoeneman spoke Holdings: 0: holding that an attorney violated rule 84d when he failed to perform any effective action on behalf of his client 1: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 2: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 3: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case 4: holding that a failure of an attorney to provide a copy of a brief to a client violated rule 14a", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "also provided that \u201cin order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not neces sary for [the] State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death.\u201d This instruction did not require the jury to find that Mr. Jasper intended to kill the victim. See Daniels v. State, 72 So.3d 227, 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (finding 2008 amended instruction not fundamentally erroneous), review granted, 79 So.3d 744 (Fla.2012) ; Moore v. State, 57 So.3d 240, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (\u201cBecause the instruction given differs from the instruction given in [State v.]Montgomery [, 39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010)], and the jury was also instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence, we find no fundamental error.\u201d); but cf. Haygood v. State, 54 So.3d 1035, 1036, 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA) (<HOLDING>), review granted, 61 So.3d 410 (Fla.2011). At Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act 1: holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court 2: holding erroneous jury instruction on manslaughter by intentional act not fundamental error where trial court also instructed jury on manslaughter by culpable negligence 3: holding jury instruction on lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter by act which required finding of intent to kill constituted fundamental error and required reversal of defendants conviction for seconddegree murder 4: holding that erroneous manslaughter instruction that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim did not constitute fundamental error certifying question  if a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of seconddegree murder in a case where the evidence does not support a theory of culpable negligence does a trial court commit fundamental error by giving a flawed manslaughter by act instruction when it also gives an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 56-66 (1993) (similar). In line with this mode of analysis, the court below, after concluding that the Medicare Act does not preclude general federal-question jurisdiction over a preenforcement challenge to the Secretary\u2019s regulations, held that respondent\u2019s APA notice-and-comment challenge was ripe but that its . constitutional vagueness claim was not. 143 F. 3d, at 1076-1077. express no view on the proper application of ripeness doctrine to respondent\u2019s claims, I am confident that this method of analysis enjoys substantially more support in our eases than does the majority\u2019s approach, which prescribes a case-by-case hardship inquiry at the threshold stage of determining whether preenforcement review has been precluded by statute. See ante, at 20 (<HOLDING>). While the majority\u2019s variation would be Holdings: 0: holding that  1395u does not incorporate  405h where the aggrieved party can obtain no review at all unless it can obtain judicial review in a  1331 action 1: holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record 2: holding that a party to an administrative proceeding failed to effectively obtain judicial review where the party filed a response to another partys petition rather than a separate petition 3: holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review 4: holding failure to argue elements or obtain ruling on judicial estoppel precluded review", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not testify as a nonexpert fact witness about what he did and directly observed during the reenactment. Relying on several out-of-state cases, the court concluded that the relevant legal inquiry for admissibility of reenactment evidence generally is whether the reenactment was conducted under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the event in question, otherwise the evidence would be excluded as irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury. See Loevsky v. Carter, 773 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Haw. 1989) (\u201c[W]hen a test or experiment is an attempt to reenact the original happening, the essential elements of the experiment must be substantially similar to those existing at the time of the accident.\u201d) (quotation omitted); State v. Leroux, 584 A.2d 778, 780-81 (N.H. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Even allowing for additional evidence offered Holdings: 0: holding that trial court could properly have found testimony explaining a videotaped reenactment was substantially more likely to mislead the jury than to be probative under rule 403 1: holding that although the instruction at issue could have been worded more specifically the jury instructions as a whole did not mislead the jury as to the law 2: holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury 3: holding that evidence necessary to the governments rebuttal of a defendants case could not be excluded under rule 403 but could have been if it was introduced only to bolster the prosecutions case 4: holding that admission of a summary chart was harmless because it was clear that the summary did not mislead the jury and the evidence introduced at trial was more than sufficient to prove the elements as to each defendant", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Court should afford deference to the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and hold that mandatory detention applies to Petitioner. (Id. at 3-7.) Second, Respondent objects that Magistrate Judge Theiler never addressed its argument that Petitioner\u2019s continued detention is lawful pursuant to INA \u00a7 236(a) and 8 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 241.8 and 241.4(c). (Dkt. No. 19 at 7-9.) Respondent asserts these provisions permit the district director or the director of detention and removal to exercise discretion, and asserts that Petitioner therefore has received all the benefits of due process that he is entitled to. (Id. at 9.) Discussion A. Mandatory Detention Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under INA \u00a7 236(c), because that section only requires mandatory dete 7 (W.D.Wash.1997) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner is deportable because of his 2001 Holdings: 0: holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina  212c 1: holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review 2: holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel 3: holding that under permanent rules of hrira the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over claims of aliens ordered deported for crimes listed in ina and holding that district courts retain habeas jurisdiction over deportation orders of criminal aliens 4: holding that the plain meaning of the statute indicates that ina  236c applies to aliens immediately after release from custody and not to aliens released many years earlier", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(Doc. # 1-6 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff brought this suit, accusing seven Defendants of eight causes of action\u2014 three claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and five under state law. Plaintiff has since abandoned three of her state law claims; she maintains her claims for violations of the Alabama Constitution (Count IV) and for the tort of misrepresentation (Count VI). IV. DISCUSSION A. The State and its agencies are immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits brought against unconsenting states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep\u2019t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against Holdings: 0: holding that a state university is not a person within the meaning of  1983 and therefore is not subject to suits brought under  1983 1: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 2: holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 3: holding state university is not a person under  1983 4: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "286 (2005). \u201c[T]he intent to sell or [deliver] may be inferred from (1) the packaging, labeling, and storage of the controlled substance, (2) the defendant\u2019s activities, (3) the quantity found, and (4) the presence of cash or drug paraphernalia.\u201d Id. at 106, 612 S.E.2d at 176. \u201cAlthough \u2018quantity of the controlled substance alone may suffice to support the inference of an intent to transfer, sell, or deliver,\u2019 it must be a substantial amount.\u201d Id. at 105, 612 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 659-60, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835-36 (1991)). In the present case, only 1.89 grams of marijuana was found on defendant\u2019s person, which alone is insufficient to prove that defendant had the intent to sell or deliver. See State v. Wiggins, 33 N.C. App. 291, 294-95, 235 S.E.2d 265, 268 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 293 N.C. 592, 241 S.E.2d 513 Holdings: 0: holding that the finding of less than a half pound of marijuana alone was not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss 1: holding that evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for acquittal where the threateninglanguage was not ambiguous 2: recognizing that a court may deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss quotations and citation omitted 3: holding that plaintiff who provides evidence of acts more severe than a lack of due care may withstand summary judgment motion on a failure to protect claim 4: holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "from the unlawful interrogation in this case.\u201d Following the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), we have held that \u201ca failure to administer Miranda warnings, without more, does not automatically require suppression of the \u2018fruits\u2019 of the uncounseled statement,\u201d but rather \u201c[wjhere the uncounseled statement is voluntary ... the \u2018fruits\u2019 may be admissible in the Government\u2019s case in chief.\u201d United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1517 (6th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Crowder, 62 F.3d 782, 786 (6th Cir.1995). Lewis contends that the Sixth Circuit\u2019s approach under Elstad, Sangineto-Miranda, and Crowder was undermined by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (<HOLDING>), and by the Tenth Circuit\u2019s application of Holdings: 0: holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound 1: holding that mirandas warningbased approach to custodial interrogation was constitutionally derived and could not be overruled by legislative action 2: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission 3: holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative 4: holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing  in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), or unless the IJ ignored probative evidence, an important possible inference or otherwise failed to make a reasoned analysis of the evidence before her as a whole, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 890 (7th Cir.2007); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2006); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir.2005). To show that he is entitled to asylum, withholding of removal or CAT relief, Adekpe must show at a minimum that he is unable or unwilling to return to Togo because of persecution or a'well-founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1101(a)(42)(A) & 1158(b)(1)(A) (discussing asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25,104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (<HOLDING>), or that he would more likely than not be Holdings: 0: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return 1: holding that an applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal 2: holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution 3: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum 4: holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "are given, a remand is presumed to be general. Moore, 131 F.3d at 598. Upon limited remand, the district court in Jeross was not required to \u201cbegin anew,\u201d and thus could rely upon the procedural rights provided to the defendants prior to remand. See United States v. Ramsdale, 179 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir.1999) (noting that upon limited remand, when the issues under consideration are restricted, the defendant does not have a right to allocute under Rule 32). Here, unlike in Jeross, the remand was general as it contained no express limitation, thereby requiring the district court to conduct resentencing de novo. Accordingly, the district court was required to provide Garcia-Robles the right to be present and allocute. See United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). V. Next, Garcia-Robles asserts that the Holdings: 0: holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report 1: holding the district court need not provide de novo review where the objections are frivolous conclusive or too general because the burden is on the parties to pinpoint those portions of the magistrates report that the district court must specifically consider 2: holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo 3: holding that sentencing upon general remand is to be de novo requiring the district court to consider new objections to the presentence report 4: holding in the criminal context that a district courts obligation to make a de novo determination with respect to the portions of a magistrate judges report and recommendation to which objections are made did not require a de novo hearing", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "at [the stop\u2019s] inception,\u201d and then whether the officer\u2019s subsequent conduct \u201cwas reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.\u201d Id. Pursuant to this standard, we must first determine whether Amundsen\u2019s driving justified the initial stop by providing reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. If so, we then must determine whether the field sobriety tests exceeded the scope of that stop. Our reasonable suspicion determination hinges on the district court\u2019s finding that Amundsen had been weaving between lanes prior to the stop. We have held on multiple occasions that weaving between lanes provides reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, Holdings: 0: holding alj correctly held that officer had reasonable suspicion to make stop based on observation that driver crossed over shoulder stripe and was weaving within his traveling lane 1: holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence 2: holding that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because a vehicles one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence 3: holding that an officers observations of a vehicle weaving between the center line and the shoulder line four to five times over a distance of approximately five miles created reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence 4: holding officers observations of a vehicle crossing the center double yellow line of a twolane highway four times by less than one half of her car  once causing a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic to shift right within his lane but without the need for drastic evasive action  and crossing the fog line four times over a distance of at least 16 miles established probable cause for a traffic stop", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a citizen-informant's tip about a drunk driver is sufficient to give the police reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal behavior, ie., driving under the influence, even if the basis for the informant's conclusion is not fully explained. See id. However, whether a person is \"smoking drugs\" does not seem to fall within the realm of knowledge common to members of the public, unlike the ability to re hat the officer identifies as cocaine is sufficient to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) requires careful analysis because cocaine in its pure form, as the expert in this case test 2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988); State v. Harrison, 287 Wis.2d 133, 703 N.W.2d 383U, 2005 WL 1577441, *2 (Wise.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). See also People v. Darby, 263 A.D.2d 112, Holdings: 0: holding that a smell associated with pcp was enough to establish probable cause 1: holding that because of officers experience detection of the smell of cocaine smoke reliably supported a probable cause determination 2: holding officer had probable cause after detecting an odor associated with cocaine because of officers experience from prior cocaine seizures 3: holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle 4: holding that the smell of burning opium was sufficient to establish probable cause", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the complaint nevertheless. In either case, we reverse the District Court. A. The District Court\u2019s Treatment of Mr. Richardson\u2019s Reply to the Motion to Dismiss On the record at hand, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to consider Mr. Richardson\u2019s complaint in light of his reply to the motion to dismiss. See Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1059 (D.C.Cir.1998). There are four factors that inform our holding that the District Court erred in refusing to consider Mr. Richardson\u2019s reply to constitute an amendment to his original complaint. First, Mr. Richardson proceeded pro se before the District Court. Courts must construe pro se filings liberally. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). This point was recently emphasized in Holdings: 0: holding allegations of a pro se complaint to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 1: holding that the allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 2: holding allegations contained in a prisoners pro se complaint to less stringent standards than pleadings written by counsel in reversing a dismissal for failure to state a claim 3: holding that allegations of pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers 4: holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "relationships with our sister states and \u201cdoing justice in order that justice may be done in return,\u201d accept jurisdiction of Defendants\u2019 appeal pursuant to the authority conferred by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 l-277(a) and 7A-27(d). Notably, Defendants also contend that their appeal to this Court is permitted by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(b), which provides that \u201c[a]ny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant.\u201d Thus, because the order being appealed from denied Defendants\u2019 12(b)(2) motion, Defendants contend that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under \u00a7 l-277(b). See Data Gen. Corp. v. Cnty. of Durham, 143 N.C. App. 97, 99-100, 545 S.E.2d 243, 245-46 (2001) (<HOLDING>). However, while \u201c[a] motion to dismiss based Holdings: 0: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 1: holding a decision denying a motion to dismiss an action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable 2: holding that denial of counsel in section 1983 action is not immediately appealable 3: holding that a denial of a 12b2 motion for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable 4: holding if immunity is raised as a basis in the motion for summary adjudication a substantial right is affected and the denial is immediately appealable", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "evidence of arson. Oscar merely helped Mr. Long focus his investigation to determine the point of origin. The point of origin was then independently confirmed by separate an 2 (2d Cir.1998) (noting that even if decision to allow expert testimony was erroneous, \u201cthere was substantial additional evidence ... that an accelerant was used by the defendant\u201d); Carr, 482 S.E.2d at 318 (finding harmful error because no other evidence of arson existed); People v. Dix, 242 A.D.2d 912, 662 N.Y.S.2d 879, 879 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (finding failure to lay proper foundation for accel-erant-sniffing dog evidence harmless since proof of guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that error contributed to defendant\u2019s conviction); State v. Simpson, 2002 Ohio 3717,\u00b6 78 (Ohio Ct.App. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a fiftynine minute detention to wait for a drug dog was reasonable where the officer requested the dog immediately after developing reasonable suspicion 1: holding that a dog sniff of a federal express package was a search 2: holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert 3: holding that even without testimony of handler of dog used for accelerant detection there was other evidence of accelerant 4: holding that motherowner of home in which attack occurred was not hable for attack by dog owned by sontenant where there was no evidence that she exercised dominion and control over the dog", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "apply to his invasion of privacy claim. DOC argues the two-year statute of limitations applies for two reasons: first, because \u201c[i]n-vasion of privacy by intrusion is an intentional act\u201d and \u201c[i]ntentional torts are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations\u201d under RCW 4.16.100; and second, \u201cinvasion of privacy claims are subject to a two[-]year statute of limitations\u201d under Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 106 Wn.2d 466, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986). Br. of Resp\u2019t at 38. We disagree with DOC and apply the three-year statute of limitations. \u00b644 As noted, Emeson asserts an invasion of privacy by publication claim, not an invasion of privacy by intrusion. The tort invasion of privacy by publication does not include intent as an essential element. See Fisher, 125 Wn. App. at 879-80 (<HOLDING>). Thus, invasion of privacy by publication is Holdings: 0: holding that invasion of an identifiable customers account is not a necessary element proof under the statute 1: holding under section 1902a1 specific intent required as an element of section 1501 is the intent to cause the death of an individual 2: holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication 3: holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property 4: holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Anthony R., 2010 ME 4, \u00b6\u00b6 8-9, 987 A.2d 532, 534. Error is obvious if it is \u201ca seriously prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.\u201d Tibbetts v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 2010 ME 61, \u00b6 10, 999 A.2d 930, 933 (quotation marks omitted). [\u00b6 12] \u201cWhen significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.\u201d GENUJO LOK Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 2008 ME 50, \u00b6 18, 943 A.2d 573, 579. Because due process guarantees the right to respond to evidence, an adjudicator must afford a party the opportunity to rebut or challenge evidence offered against him or her. See In re Dustin C., 2008 ME 89, \u00b6 7, 952 A.2d 993, 995 (<HOLDING>); Balian v. Bd. of Licensure in Med., 1999 ME Holdings: 0: holding that a mother in a child protection proceeding was afforded due process when she had notice of a hearing was represented by counsel and was given the opportunity to rebut evidence 1: holding defendant was afforded substantive and procedural due process at the administrative level when he was given seven days to respond to a prepenalty notice for negligence 2: holding mothers due process rights were not violated when her appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw and hearing was held without mother because the record showed mother did not inform counsel of her whereabouts after moving thereby frustrating counsels efforts to contact her and because mother was properly served with notice of the termination hearing 3: holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement 4: holding that where appellant was put on notice of disciplinary charges against him and was afforded opportunity to respond to boards recommendation demands of due process were satisfied", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "initially receives the charges. EEOC\u2019s receipt of charges on the FEPA\u2019s behalf will automatically initiate the proceedings of both EEOC and the FEPA for purposes of ... Title VII. Worksharing Agreement Between Virginia Council on Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for Fiscal Year 1998. This Court has already determined that a unitary filing with the EEOC in which the complainant checked the box at the bottom of the standard EEOC charge form requesting that the charge be filed with both the EEOC and the state agency satisfies the requirement that plaintiffs commence proceedings under state law. See Capps, 67 F.Supp.2d 589. Other federal courts in Virginia have reached the same or similar conclusions. See Harris v. TJX Companies, Inc., 60 F.Supp.2d 562 (W.D.Va.1999) (<HOLDING>); Grimes v. Canadian American Transportation, Holdings: 0: holding that failure of eeoc to transmit charge to phrc within limitations period was subject to equitable tolling where plaintiff requested crossfiling in the cover letter attached to the eeoc charge on the first page of the charge itself and on an official form used by the eeoc for requests for dualfiling 1: holding that in light of a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the eeoc a charge of discrimination filed with the state agency was properly filed with the eeoc on the same date 2: holding that plaintiff had exhausted state remedies where eeoc transmitted charge to vchr pursuant to the worksharing agreement and vchr declined to investigate 3: holding that because veteran had never before submitted due process issue to bva he had not exhausted his administrative remedies and court declined to address merits of that claim 4: holding that the making of a complaint with the eeoc or the vchr setting forth a factual basis for employment discrimina tion is sufficient to commence proceedings under state law", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "does not satisfy this requirement. See R. Doc. 28, Ex. A at 3. Mr. Mayberry\u2019s claim that his termination was not for job-related misconduct and not subject to mandatory demotion is supported by his uncontroverted affidavit asserting that none of the other inmates involved received a similar retroactive demotion and loss of credits. It is further uncontroverted that no disciplinary committee recommended retroactive loss of good-time credits due to the April 7, 1998 incident as required by 57 O.S.1991 \u00a7 138. The State\u2019s argument that it was impossible to provide Mr. Mayberry with a predeprivation hearing is without merit, and the cases on which it relies for that proposition are easily distinguishable. Compare Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (<HOLDING>), with Waldon, 861 P.2d at 313 (holding that, Holdings: 0: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional 1: holding that a civil cause of action for wrongful conversion of personal property is an adequate postdeprivation remedy for drugrelated property forfeitures 2: holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies 3: holding that postdeprivation tort remedy constitutes all the process that is due for unauthorized negligent and intentional torts by state officials 4: holding that meaningful postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to remedy unauthorized intentional deprivations of inmates property", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the same argument in the context of the Exemption 6 inquiry above. See Section III. B.l, supra (collecting cases and explaining that individuals do not lose their privacy interests simply because they are known to the public). Moreover, the names of third-parties in law enforcement records are almost always exempt from disclosure. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991) (\u201c[w]e now hold categorically that, unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure\u201d). See also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c  are exempt from disclosure 1: holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c 2: holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure   3: holding that in light of the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations exemption 7c affords broad privacy rights to suspects witnesses and investigators 4: holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports  have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a diversion process or go to juvenile court. Dated_ Dated_ Parent or Guardian (optional) Juvenile The above statement was read to the juvenile and signed by the juvenile on the date indicated. Representative of Diversion Unit\u201d 3 State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 188, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (stating a defendant generally has no right to contest a prior conviction at a subsequent sentencing), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986). 4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975) (requiring that before a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel and represents himself pro se, \u201che should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation\u201d); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41-42, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (<HOLDING>); City of Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wn.2d 203, Holdings: 0: holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel 1: holding that juvenile and his parents must be advised of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings and the mothers knowledge that she could employ counsel was not an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right 2: holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings 3: recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "2. Clerk Fees The SFWMD is further presumptively entitled to recover the Clerk Fees under Appellate Rule 39, which like Rule 54 is read in conjunction with Section 1920. See Fed. R.App. P. 39 advisory committee\u2019s note (observing that \u201c[statutory authorization for taxation of costs is found in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1920\u201d). Section 1920(1) provides that taxable costs include \u201cFees of the clerk and marshal.\u201d Appellate Rule 39(e)(4) specifically, allows the district court to tax \u201cthe fee for filing the notice of appeal.\u201d Although they are costs of appeal, costs enumerated in Appellate Rule 39(e) are \u201cmade taxable in the district court for general convenience.\u201d Fed. R.App. P. 39(e) advisory committee\u2019s note. See also King v. Gowdy, No. 02-CV-75136, 2008 WL 1820837, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 22, 2008) (<HOLDING>). 3. Mandate Fees Finally, none of the parties Holdings: 0: holding cafeteria management fee is not taxable even if it is bundled with the sales price of food 1: holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed 2: holding that appellate rule 66b does not authorize an interlocutory appeal that fails to comply with appellate rule 14 3: holding that 455 appeal fee is clearly a taxable cost citing section 19201 and appellate rule 39e4 4: holding that section 7263 authorizes this court to review fee agreements when appeal is properly before this court and when fee agreement has been filed with court at time appeal is filed", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "reach, where it was readily accessible to him but not to the other occupants of the vehicle. In Taylor, the contraband was in carrying bags that were personal to someone other than the defendant. The lynchpin of the Court\u2019s holding there was that it is not permissible to infer that someone merely occupying a room in which there are carrying bags belonging to another person knows the contents of those personal carrying bags. In this ease, by contrast, the white bag was not personal to someone other than the appellant, to a particular occupant of the car, or to anyone. The kind of evidence that in Taylor negated any reasonable inference of knowledge and possession is not present here. The white bag was an ordinary plastic bag. See Ford v. State, 37 Md.App. 373, 381, 377 A.2d 577 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Officer Webster testified that plastic bags Holdings: 0: holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the juvenile a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by four persons was in possession of marijuana recovered from a crumpled piece of newspaper behind the drivers seat 1: holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine 2: holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke 3: holding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant a rear seat passenger of a car for possession of marijuana based on the discovery of two marijuana seeds in the front of the vehicle 4: holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendant a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by three individuals was in constructive possession of marijuana found in white bag directly under the defendants seat", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the discovery deposition of the patient on January 22, 1999, because FAHC had erected an \u201cintervening screen\u201d which hid any wrongdoing. Dulude relies on Jones v. Pinkerton\u2019s, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). In Jones, the employer expressly prevented the plaintiff from learning about an investigation and report, and the court held that such factors that are outside of the plaintiff\u2019s control may prevent the plaintiff from knowing he or she had suffered a legal harm. Id. at 457, 460. In the instant case, FAHC took no steps to hide any report or patient complaint and specifically referenced this particular patient in its termination letter on February 9, 1995. In addition, Dulude interviewed the patient involved in January 1995 and had the opportuni 07, 311 (D. Mass. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed. 1 Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) Holdings: 0: holding that the mere fact that some toys r us employees may have heard a rumor that the plaintiff was terminated for dealing drugs does not prove reckless publication 1: holding that the mere fact that the fda does not require a warning on a product label does not necessarily create a conflict 2: holding that the fact that the defendant did not handle the drugs is not dispositive of his involvement in drug dealing 3: holding anonymous tip that someone at the residence was dealing drugs did not amount to anything the tip was never substantiated and none of the occupants were ever charged with drug dealing 4: holding that evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy where the evidence did not show that individuals who sold drugs to the defendant knew that the drugs were meant to be resold", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "he feared that he would be harmed if returned to C\u00f3te d\u2019Ivoire because of his former involvement with t that military forces continued to look for him or have any interest in harming him after 2005, or that former UDPCI members continued to face harm. Thus, given that Attobra did not provide any objective evidence that authorities in Cote d\u2019Ivoire continued to look for him or have any interest in him, the agency reasonably concluded that Attobra failed to establish the requisite objective likelihood of future harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks \u201csolid support\u201d in the record and is merely \u201cspeculative at best\u201d); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 1: holding that a showing of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution 2: holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 3: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 4: holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "862 Mass. 684, 687, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972). See also Jacques B. Gelin & David W. Miller, The Federal Law of Eminent Domain \u00a7 4.1 (1982) (elaborating on the applicable legal standard); 4A Nichols at \u00a7 14A.01[2] (\u201cBecause it is proper for the trier to consider all elements which are a natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land, facts of the impact upon the remainder during the course of construction, although temporal i 5th Cir.1966) (recognizing viability of claim for severance damages based on prospective buyers\u2019 likely fear of hazards arising from construction of power line carrying high voltage electricity); United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Easement and Right of Way, Holdings: 0: holding that local buyers fear of possible knapweed infestation legitimately affected calculation of severance damages 1: holding that increased fear of flooding was a matter that factfinder could properly consider in assessing severance damages 2: holding that stigma damages were properly included in calculation of severance damages where proximity of gas pipeline could trigger fears about possible mishaps 3: holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding 4: holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to start such a process could also subject the Company to liability, especially where WWL seems to have been seeking to determine whether its obligations to Marks included not only an approval of a technician\u2014as he had requested\u2014but also a covering of the cost of such repairs. Under such a rule, moreover, an employer would apparently be able to avoid liability only by immediately approving every disability-accommodation request that it received, even where there was no reason to believe harm might follow from a brief delay. Defendant, moreover, had no reason to believe that Marks would suffer any imminent harm from a brief negotiation period over the scope of his needed accommodations. Accord Ungerleider v. Fleet Mortg. Grp. of Fleet Bank, 329 F.Supp.2d 343, 355 (D. Conn. 2004) (<HOLDING>). This was similarly not a situation where a Holdings: 0: holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada 1: holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later  request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation 2: holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation 3: holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months 4: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "district court should not apply the less rigorous fairground-for-litigation standard and should only grant the injunction if the moving party establishes, along with irreparable injury, a likelihood of success on the merits.\u201d Id. at 43 n. 6. Here, since the Station already has been closed, an order granting the plaintiffs motion to direct its opening would alter the status quo. As such, Hassan faces a heightened burden. He must establish both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits. b. Irreparable harm A showing of irreparable harm is considered the \u201csingle most important requirement\u201d in satisfying the standard. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 F.3d at 696; Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int\u2019l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>). \u201cA moving party must show that the injury it Holdings: 0: holding that even though irreparable harm is not required it had been shown and weighed in favor of issuance of the preliminary injunction 1: holding that intangible injuries such as damage to advertising efforts and goodwill can be irreparable harm for purpose of a preliminary injunction 2: recognizing that irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction 3: holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction 4: holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "woman, who then conceived a child. Both the woman and her previous husband objected to the paternity action because the child was born during their marriage and had been found to be a child of their marriage during their dissolution action. McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 300-01. In remanding for a determination of paternity, the McDaniels court recognized that both the husband and the petitioner had established strong parenting relationships with the child, and that these relationships justified maintaining visitation between the child and both of the men even after paternity was established. McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 310, 313. An even more pointed recognition of the importance of the psychological bond between a child and a nonbiological parent was expressed in In re Marria 9 P.2d 1304 (1979) (<HOLDING>), cited with approval in In re Dependency of Holdings: 0: recognizing the due process rights of legal guardians who had raised child for over eight years and stood in loco parentis to the child to be given a full and meaningful opportunity to be heard at a dependency hearing under chapter 1304 rcw 1: holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child 2: holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner 3: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 4: holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1995, writ denied) (plaintiffs equitable remedy of reinstatement not precluded); and City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209 (Tex.2000) (although the Court declined to rule on whether reinstatement can be a remedy for violations of the Texas Constitution, it affirmed the court of appeals' decision, 949 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1997), to reverse and remand the reinstatement issue to the trial court). 145 .Docket no. 44, at 27. 146 . See Board of County Commissioners, Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); and Harris v. Victona ISD, 168 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022, 120 S.Ct. 533, 145 L.Ed.2d 413 (1999). 147 . See Board of County Commissioners, Bryan County, Oklahoma, 520 U.S. at 404-05, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (<HOLDING>). 148 . See Baltazor v. Holmes, 162 F.3d 368, Holdings: 0: holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 2: holding inter alia that a municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory 3: holding that only deliberate conduct by a municipality which actually causes an injury is compensable under section 1983 4: holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and filed with the assistance of his counsel during the course of the IJ proceedings. Furthermore, Liu explained in his second addendum that he was presenting the addendum because the \u201casylum application which was prepared and filed on my behalf by the travel agency did not fully state my reasons for seeking asylum,\u201d whereas this addendum \u201cfully and correctly state[d] why [he was] seeking political asylum.\u201d Given this claim of completeness and accuracy of the second addendum, and considering that the incidents Liu omitted from that document are material to his claim of persecution and his reason for leaving China, the IJ\u2019s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep\u2019t of Homeland Security, 446 F.3d 289, 296 n. 7 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the IJ considered and reasonably Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction was lacking to review an ijs determination that an asylum application was untimely when that determination was based on the fact that the petitioner offered no evidence other than his own testimony regarding his date of entry 1: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account 2: holding that where the petitioner purported to provide an exhaustive account of the grounds for his claim of asylum that included no reference to his detention and beating this account of persecution was inconsistent with his later testimony before the ij 3: holding that abuse at the hands of a father constituted persecution because it was on account of his daughters religious beliefs 4: holding that an applicants failure to include any reference to his alleged detention and beating in his 1589 form is a self evident inconsistency that the agency may rely on without first soliciting an explanation", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "committee notes (1972) (describing rationale underlying exception as \u201c[t]he element of unusual reliability ... said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation\u201d) (citation omit ted). Thus, the motivation of a record\u2019s author is relevant to admissibility. Id. Not every item of business correspondence constitutes a business record. See, e.g., Breeden v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 754 (10th Cir.1997) (sustaining exclusion of letter from chiropractor proffered as \u201cmedical business record\u201d); Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 342 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). \u201cIt is well-established that one who prepares Holdings: 0: holding that court erred in admitting letter as business record where testimony was not adequate to establish that the letter was compiled as a matter of regular practice as opposed to one prepared in anticipation of litigation 1: holding that letters addressing dispute that was subject of litigation and that were written in anticipation of litigation did not fall under business record exception under rule 8036 of the federal rules of evidence and noting that it is wellestablished that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of business 2: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation 3: holding that court erred in admitting letters written in anticipation of litigation as business records 4: holding that a rule 90211 certification of medical records was not testimonial noting that the court did not find as controlling the fact that a certification of authenticity under 90211 is made in anticipation of litigation what is compelling is that crawford expressly identified business records as nontestimonial evidence", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was based on the Commission\u2019s conclusion that it was \u201cpossible in this case to follow the ordinance\u2019s requirement to locate at an alternative site.\u201d (Schill Deck Ex. H at 3.) On September 12, 2001, Verizon appealed the decision of the Commission to the City\u2019s Board of Appeals, and on November 27, 2001, the Board denied Verizon\u2019s appeal. II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS A. Jurisdiction I have jurisdiction over this action based on 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 332(c)(7)(B)(v), which permits unsuccessful applicants for permits for wireless facilities to bring actions \u201cin any court of competent jurisdiction.\u201d For purposes of review under \u00a7 332(e)(7)(B)(v), federal district courts are courts of competent jurisdiction. See Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm\u2019n of Ky., 227 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Aegerter v. City of Delafield, Wis., Holdings: 0: holding that when neither the petitioners state court briefs nor the state courts decision made any reference to any federal constitutional claim or cited any federal constitutional cases the lack of fundamental error found by the state court was a lack of fundamental error under arizonas state constitution 1: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law 2: holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury 3: holding that the reference to any court encompasses both state and federal courts 4: holding that favorable evidence encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence and articulating the materiality standard", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "D.E. Shaw Investment Group, LLC, D.E. Shaw Valence International, Inc., KBC Alternative Investment Management Ltd., and KBC Financial Products UK Ltd., and QVT Fund, LP)\u201d via certified mail sent to the Bondholder entity or its corporate affiliate. (Aristocrat\u2019s Letter 8/21/09.) The Bondholders do not contest corrected corporation may be served through an officer or agent explicitly or implicitly authorized to accept service of process.\u201d); Boryk v. deHavilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666, 668-69 (2d Cir.1965) (finding service on the president of a subsidiary adequate and noting that the label attached to the agent and the agent\u2019s lack of explicit authority to accept service was not determinative); In re Elec. & Musical Indus., Ltd., Middlesex, Eng., 155 F.Supp. 892, 893 (S.D.N.Y.1957) (<HOLDING>); accord Wright & Miller, supra, \u00a7 2454 Holdings: 0: holding that arson committed by stockholder who was the principal managing agent precluded recovery by the corporation 1: holding that a corporation could be served by delivering a copy of the subpoena to an officer or managing or general agent of the corporation and that the agent could be an individual a partnership or another corporation 2: holding that travel by an agent of defrauded corporation is imputed to the victim 3: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 4: holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992)). In a similar vein, Debtors also maintain rights that were bargained for under the Mortgage. See [Claim No. 11-1, Ex. 1]. The Mortgage allows Debtors to prepay the Mortgage without a prepayment penalty. Id. at 6. Specifically, the Mortgage provides that the payments will be due on or before the first day of each month \u201ccontinuing consecutively until April 1, 2022 when the entire unpaid balance of principal and interest shall become due ankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re Moran, 121 B.R. 879, 883 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990) (finding that \u201c[i]f [a] mortgage allows pre-payment, the [d]ebtors may exercise this right,\u201d notwithstanding \u00a7 1322(b)(2)). As in Gaetje, the Mortgage in this case specifically allows the Debtors to prepay prior to the April 2022 maturity date. Id. at *6 (<HOLDING>). Thus, in the instant case, Debtors proposal Holdings: 0: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 1: holding that where a mortgagee is acting on behalf of the note holder there is no disconnection between note and mortgage and the mortgagee may foreclose 2: holding that application note 6 is not mandatory 3: holding that there is no impermissible modification of the note because the very terms of the note allow for prepayment without a penalty 4: holding that the situs of debt  for purposes of the act of state doctrine  was not in dubai when the terms of the relevant promissory note provided that the note was payable in united states dollars at the place of the holders designation", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the structure of drug trafficking organizations and the role of drug couriers. Cira testified that a drug distributor would not have allowed the quantity of drugs in this case out of his control, and that, in his experience, he had never encountered a courier who did not know what was in his vehicle. Martinez never objected to the admission of Cira\u2019s testimony in district court. Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 814 (8th Cir.2001). Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, Martinez contends admission of the testimony was error because he was not charged with conspiracy to import drugs and no evidence was presented to link him to an actual drug trafficking organization. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Martinez also contends admission of the Holdings: 0: holding that expert testimony concerning the structure of drug trafficking organizations is inadmissible where the defendant is not charged with a conspiracy to import drugs or where such evidence is not otherwise probative of a matter properly before the court 1: holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case 2: holding that the district court committed prejudicial error in admitting expert testimony about the structure of drug trafficking organizations because the testimony portrayed the defendant as a member of such an organization and implied the defendant knew the drugs were in his vehicle 3: holding that expert testimony regarding the structure of drug trafficking organizations was inadmissible in a nonconspiracy importation case 4: holding that the district court complied with the requirements of  lb13alb where it made specific references to testimony in the record relating to the scope of the defendants involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy noted that the relevant testimony was unrefuted and stated that the testimony was internally consistent", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a reasonable foundation upon which to make the offer, a finding which must be made by the trial court after conducting an evidentiary hearing thereon). Ormond Beach also claims that the trial court erred in denying its request for statutory offer of judgment attorney\u2019s fees because its offer of judgment and amended offer of judgment \u201cundeniably satisfied the requirements of section 768.79\u201d. Ormond Beach argues that since it satisfied the procedural requirements of section 768.79 of the Florida Statute, the court trial erred in denying its request for fees. We disagree. Our supreme court has ruled that, upon voluntary dismissal of an action without prejudice, statutory offer of judgment attorney\u2019s fees are not recoverable. See MX Investments, Inc., v. Crawford, 700 So.2d 640 (Fla.1997)(<HOLDING>). Thus, once the trial court recognized Holdings: 0: holding proper basis for award of fees 1: holding attorney fees not allowable as costs 2: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 3: holding that offer of judgment statute does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and costs unless dismissal is with prejudice 4: recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "from Bagelmann. As in the Restatement example, the implied right in the present case follows logically from certain express terms of the agreement \u2014 i.e., the landlord\u2019s right to sell or mortgage the property. And unlike in Bagelmann, the contract here contains an express term (the right to sell) to which the implied obligation (the right to show the property) can be attached. It would \u201cdestroy[ ] or injur[e] the right of [Alta Vista] to receive the fruits of the' contract\u201d if we were to decline to find an implied right to show the premises to prospective buyers. See Am. Tower, 809 N.W.2d at 550. Other courts have agreed that the right to sell property implicitly includes the right to show it to prospective purchasers. See, e.g., Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681, 685 (Colo.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Glenn v. Keyes, 107 Utah 415, 154 P.2d 642, Holdings: 0: holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant 1: holding the landlord did not trespass when his agent entered the premises for the purpose of showing them to a potential tenant 2: holding landlord jointly liable when he knew of or acquiesced in the tenants trespass 3: recognizing the general rule that the landlord is not liable for dangerous conditions existing once the tenant takes possession of the premises 4: holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a sum for abandoning his interest in the 2007 Mortgage so that Wells Fargo could go into state court to seek its reformation. Or, once the mortgage is avoided and preserved for the benefit of the estate, the Trustee might himself seek its reformation in state court. But what the Trustee cannot do in a Chapter 7 case is use the Bankruptcy Code to change the terms of an avoidable mortgage. Reformation of the 2007 Mortgage is reserved to the parties to that mortgage and/or the state court. For these reasons, approval of the Compromise in the form offered is not possible. Nor can the Court fashion its own remedy for liquidating the estate\u2019s interest in the 2007 Mortgage in lieu of the Trustee\u2019s judgment. See In re Central Illinois Energy, L.L.C., 406 B.R. 371 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. 2008) (<HOLDING>). C. Debtor\u2019s Motion to Abandon Section 554(b) Holdings: 0: holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable 1: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 2: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement 3: holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable 4: holding that a bankruptcy court cannot rewrite an agreement and by doing so approve terms that differ from those to which the parties agreed in evaluating a proposed settlement or compromise under rule 9019 the court must accept or reject the agreement as presented", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "AEDPA that he was prejudiced by the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, or that it \u201cso infected [his] trial with unfairness as to make [his] conviction a denial of due process\u201d. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868. Moreover, this claim is not \u201cadequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further\u201d. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595. B. Next, Gutierrez seeks a COA for whether he was denied an impartial jury, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, because: (1) Harrell made a material misstatement that she had never been arrested or convicted of a crime of theft; and (2) the prosecution successfully challenged Gerald Becker for cause, based solely on his religious beliefs, in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (<HOLDING>). 1. In both his state and federal habeas Holdings: 0: holding that potential jurors may not be excluded merely because they voice general moral or philosophical reservations about the death penalty 1: holding statute stating that judge could excuse jurors was violated when jury commissioners excused jurors 2: holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing 3: holding prospective jurors may not be excused from jury service in a capital case because based on religious beliefs they voice general objections to the death penalty 4: holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (same). Valdez next argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the district court\u2019s sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. \u00a7\u00a7 2D1.1(b)(1) (firearm possession) and 3B1.1 (leader/organizer). However, the record overwhelmingly supports a finding that Valdez was a leader and/or organizer of the conspiracy, thereby qualifying him for an enhancement under \u00a7 3B1.1. And according to the testimony of a co-conspirator, Valdez possessed a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy and it was not \u201cclearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.\u201d \u00a7 2D1.1 cmt. n. 3; see also United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Valdez\u2019s sentence enhancement Holdings: 0: holding that the court cannot examine the underlying merits of the claims in determining whether to certify a class 1: holding that a trial court has a duty to examine the entire record including all physical documentary evidence in order to reach an equitable result 2: holding that the trial court must examine the entire course of criminal conduct in determining possession 3: holding that for purposes of determining whether complete diversity exists a court must examine the plaintiffs pleading as of the time of the petition for removai 4: holding that court must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "language of the statute to suggest that such a limited interpretation was intended by the legislature. See generally State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, T11, 144 P.3d 1152 (\"[Legislative] intent is most readily ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute.\"). To the contrary, regularity of contact appears to be irrelevant to this analysis, as the statute lists several individuals as being in a position of special trust whose relationship to the child may be even more remote than a cohabitant of a noncustodial parent, such as aunts and uncles, who may have infrequent contact with their nieces and nephews, and babysitters, who may come into contact with their charges only a single time. See Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 76-5-404.1(4)(h); see also Rowley, 2008 UT App 233, 113, 189 P.3d 109 (<HOLDING>). 8 . Although Watkins now argues that he Holdings: 0: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 1: holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody 2: holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school 3: holding that the position of special trust is not dependent on the closeness of the defendants relationship with the child 4: holding that courier is not in position of trust", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Petitioner Thomas Alfred Brydon appeals the district court\u2019s denial of his 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255 petition for relief. We affirm. Brydon pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court applied the career-offender provisions of United States Sentencing Guidelines \u00a7\u00a7 4B1.1 & 4B1.2. The court determined that four prior Iowa convictions for operating a motor vehicle without the owner\u2019s consent and one prior Iowa conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated qualified as predicate crimes of violence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Later, in United States v. Steward, 598 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated dwi may be a crime of violence 1: holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b 2: holding that statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated applied to defendant driving on a private parking lot 3: holding that driving while intoxicated is not a violent felony pursuant to 18 usc  924e2b 4: holding that burglary is violent felony", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "explained in 4 Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 81.01, at p. 81-2: Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the injury. It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison are not quite the same. Actual earnings are a relatively concrete quantity.... Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical concept. It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury earnings factor. See also Shiek, 2002 ND 85, \u00b6 15, 643 N.W.2d 721 (noting the definition of disability is broader than lost wages, it means loss of earning capacity); Business Ins. Co. v. BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., 23 P.3d 1261, 1265 (Colo.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Ruff v. Labor and Industry Review Comm\u2019n, 159 Holdings: 0: recognizing this distinction 1: recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest 2: recognizing distinction between actual wage loss and loss of future earning capacity 3: recognizing distinction between two types of waiver 4: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "peril of fire. Plaintiffs contend that the term \u201cany fire insurance policy\u201d in the VPL refers to any homeowner\u2019s insurance policy in Louisiana that covers fire and other perils, such as wind. Plaintiffs assert that there is no such thing as a single-peril fire policy in Louisiana, that the term \u201cfire policy\u201d is broadly used in the insurance industry to refer to a homeowner\u2019s policy, and that Louisiana courts have applied the VPL to losses caused by perils other than fire. After extensive briefing and oral argument on the question of whether the VPL applies to hazards other than fire, the Court has concluded that it need not answer this question to resolve the dispute. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided as a ma La.1995), aff'd 106 F.3d 396, 1996 WL 773044 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); with Grice v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 359 Holdings: 0: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue 1: holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment 2: holding that an insurer need not comply with the vpl with respect to the nonfire perils covered by the policy 3: holding the same with respect to an apartment 4: holding that the vpl requires an insurer to pay the full value of the policy only when a covered peril causes a total loss", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the evidence, he helped prepare the terms that were the basis for the transaction, and he created the relationship between SBC and defendants which led to the December 1997 deal. On defendants\u2019 version, defendants only worked with plaintiff on the April 1997 proposal, which expired on its terms in May 1997. SBC\u2019s subsequent RFP created a new opportunity for defendants to bid on the SBC project, and defendants did not use plaintiffs assistance in successfully concluding that deal. On the present record, the available facts may support either conclusion and are too conflicted for us to determine whether Fieger procured the SBC sale and leaseback for Pitney Bowes. Accordingly, the district court must provide for a factfinder to resolve this dispute. See R.B. Ventures, 112 F.3d at 61 (<HOLDING>). The court has considered defendants\u2019 other Holdings: 0: holding that the sort of trespasses to which the ecpa applies are those in which the trespasser gains access to information to which he is not entitled to see not those in which the trespasser uses the information in an unauthorized way 1: holding that the analysis to determine whether a claimant has established a reasonable basis to plead a claim for punitive damages is similar to the analysis applied to determine whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action 2: holding that plaintiff in erisa action was entitled to restitution under similar circumstances 3: holding that a factfinder must determine whether plaintiffs involvement in initial realestate development proposal which was not built entitled plaintiff to a commission for completed second proposal which involved plans similar to those for the initial proposal 4: holding it was improper for ninth circuit to determine that an aliens family constituted a particular social group for asylum purposes because proper course was to remand issue to board for initial determination", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Food Stores, 960 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1045, 122 L.Ed.2d 354 (1993). For this reason, any state law claims brought by the Claimants related to the Agreements, including their claims of unjust enrichment, are preempted by ERISA. Claimants\u2019 state law claims may not simply be recharacterized as federal claims to circumvent the preemption requirement of ERISA. Lea v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 903 F.2d 624, 632-33 (9th Cir.1990). \u201cERISA\u2019s civil enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1132(a) (1982), creates an exclusive remedial scheme.\u201d Id. at 631. \u201cCongress\u2019s express inclusion of several specific remedies in the statute represents an implicit exclusion of remedies not listed.\u201d Bishop v. Osborn Transportation, Inc., 838 F.2d 1173, 1174 (11th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832, 109 S.Ct. 90, 102 Holdings: 0: holding a court may not award punitive damages 1: holding that punitive damages may be imposed against employer for tortious conduct of employee 2: holding that erisa did not permit employee to bring claim for punitive damages against employer 3: holding that punitive damages are not fines 4: holding unconscionable under california law employment contract compelling arbitration of claims employee most likely to bring against employer but not claims employer most likely to bring against employee and requiring first 125 of arbitration fees to be paid by employee", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to those under the comparator statutes \u2014 There are very important substantive differences between the Veterans\u2019 Benefits Act and the Social Security Act ... especially between the service-connected disability ' compensation ... and the available benefits under the comparator acts. These differences render the Veterans\u2019 Benefits Act, as a matter of statu tory construction, dissimilar to the Social Security Act.... Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 226, 233-34 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 285, 187 L.Ed.2d 152 (2013). \u201cCongress has created a paternalistic veterans\u2019 benefits system to care for those who served their country in uniform\u201d. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.Cir. 2009); Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1262 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>) ; Nolen v. Gober, 222 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Holdings: 0: holding that a plantshutdown benefit is not an optional form of benefit 1: recognizing that the veterans benefit system is uniquely proclaimant 2: holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court 3: recognizing nonadversarial and proclaimant character of veterans benefits adjudication 4: holding that the interpretation of a veterans filings is a factual inquiry", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Letter, litigation concerning the other two events should be stayed pending arbitration of the March 2002 event. Although not mentioned by the parties, Ind.Code \u00a7 34-57-2-3(d) and (f) are relevant to this issue and provide: (d) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application for an order for arbitration has been made under this section (or IC 34^1-2-3 before its repeal), or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect to the issue only. When the application is made in such an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration must include such a stay. \u215c \u215c \u215c \u215c \u215c (f) If the court determines that there are other issues between the parties that are not subject Md.App. 116, 801 A.2d 1104, 1126 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Appellants make no argument that the creation Holdings: 0: holding that unfair competition claims are arbitrable 1: holding that a settlement agreement is an arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable 2: holding that the nonarbitrable fraud claims had to be stayed pending resolution of the arbitrable issue because the fraud claims depended upon the arbitrable issues 3: holding that title vii and nyhrl claims are arbitrable 4: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that sanctions \u201cshould be limited to the consequential expenses and attorney\u2019s fees, i.e., those incurred \u2018because\u2019 of the paper filed in violation.\u201d (Weinstein Opening Brief at 27); (see also id. at 28). However, this argument is itself sanctionable as it ignores the plain language of Rule 9011, which expressly provides that when a party brings a motion for sanctions, \u201cthe court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney\u2019s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.\u201d Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9011(c)(1)(A); see In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp., 87 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir.1996) (affirming bankruptcy judge\u2019s sanctions order where attorney was sanctioned for misquoting statute); see also Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Second, appellants contend that there is no Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not err by including in the amount awarded the costs and fees borne by defendantsappellees in bringing the motion for sanctions 1: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing 2: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 3: holding that costs including attorneys fees imposed by a mexican court did not constitute a penalty 4: holding that trial court did not err", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "part of their potential audiences would therefore be placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to carried stations in their efforts to attract local advertisers. See 1998 House Hearing at 68 n. 38 (statement of James J. Popham). Congress heard testimony that a station-by-station license would essentially enable satellite carriers to pick winners and losers in local advertising markets, undermining the efforts of emerging television networks to compete with the established broadcast networks: \u201cNothing could more surely dull the cutting edge of competition from new networks, their local affiliates, and innovative independent stations in local markets.\u201d Id. at 59. In short, Con gress had substantial evidence for the judgment t, 466 U.S. 789, 807, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that Congress\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation 1: holding that a sublessee had no property interest taken by the city 2: holding that city had a substantial interest in preventing the visual assault on the citizens of los angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property 3: holding that a law prohibiting signs on public property in order to preserve aesthetics could be applied to politicalcampaign signs 4: holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 TR 16-205.1. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d 100 (2007) (\u201cThe purpose of [TR \u00a7 16-205.1 ] was to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.\u201d); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 178, 844 A.2d 388 (2004) (stating that \u201cthe Legislature intended \u2018to create procedures that would be an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739 A.2d 58 (1999) (stating that the suspension of a license serves a remedial purpose, including protection of the public); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 475, 597 A.2d 939 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we conclude that the court erred Holdings: 0: recognizing that in interpreting a statute our primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the legislature 1: holding that contracts where the primary purpose is to restrain trade are void 2: holding that the determination and assessment of damages are not the primary purpose of a declaratory action 3: recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public 4: recognizing that the primary purpose of tr  162051 is protection of the public", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in driving, but merely her interest in driving a vehicle that displays a preferred set of vanity plates. Whether, in this particular case, this interest is substantial enough to be regarded as a \u201cprotected interest\u201d under the Due Process Clause \u2014 a question which we need not answer \u2014 the interest does not appear to be as significant as, for example, the loss of income or public-assistance benefits. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). Accordingly, Perry\u2019s interest does not weigh heavily in the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, and certainly it weighs less heavily than the state\u2019s interest. As to the final relevant factor under Mathews v. Eldridge, there is little risk of an erroneous deprivation of an individual\u2019s asserted intere Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Sabree v. Parking Violations Bureau, City of Holdings: 0: holding that towing of illegally parked vehicles without opportunity for prior hearing did not violate due process 1: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 2: holding that a district court grievance committees reliance on a state courts findings without holding an independent hearing did not violate the attorneys due process rights 3: holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process 4: holding that due process was not violated in a twentyseven day delay in holding a hearing after an illegally parked vehicle was towed", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM: Jose Rodriguez Rueda petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 (BIA) decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge\u2019s (IJ) order denying his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229b(b)(l). Rueda contests the merits o 999) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to Holdings: 0: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal based on a lack of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship 1: recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims 2: holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases 3: holding under the predecessor to  1229bb that denials of suspension based on the  element of extreme hardship are discretionary decisions 4: holding that discretionary denials of motions to reopen are reviewed only for abuse of that discretion", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that she was afraid that it escalated and she would be raped. So, I want you to keep that in mind. It\u2019s a pretty serious act of what happened.\u201d The defendant claims that, in the course of the state\u2019s closing argument excerpted here, the prosecutor made improper comments on facts that were not in evidence. We agree with the defendant. We now turn to the first step in our analysis of whether the defendant was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial by first determining whether summation statements made by the prosecution were improper. If they were not improper, there would be no need to address the second stage of analysis concerning whether substantial prejudice resulted to the defendant. \u201cA prosecutor, in fulfilling his duties, must confine himself to the 124 A. 820 (1924) (<HOLDING>). By making the challenged remarks, the Holdings: 0: holding improper counsels argument that plaintiff was entitled to something for manner in which defense was conducted 1: holding that hearsay evidence is not acceptable in opposing a summary judgment motion 2: holding improper counsels argument that opposing counsel knew why plaintiff delayed in bringing action where opposing counsels knowledge was not in evidence 3: holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper 4: holding defense counsels rates to be an improper starting point in determining plaintiff counsels reasonable hourly rate", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "2020 and leaves his reversionary interest to a third party. Similarly, Neera would have an interest in a replacement home or annuity payment until 2030. We conclude, therefore, that partition does not give Appellees a \u201cgreater estate\u201d than they already have. Rakesh Did Not Waive Right to Partition \u00b6 20 Appellants also contend that partition is not permitted because the terms of the QPRTs do not expressly provide for partition and by entering into the QPRTs, the parties waived any right to partition. However, nothing in the QPRTs expressly precludes partition, and the voluntary or involuntary sale of the residence is permitted. \u00b6 21 Generally, a waiver of the right to partition occurs if a partition would violate the parties\u2019 agreement. See Cohen, 215 Ariz. at 65-66, 157 P.3d at 485-86 (<HOLDING>). The QPRTs, however, do not implicitly or Holdings: 0: holding right to testify was federal constitutional right 1: holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived 2: holding that the evidence supported the conclusion that husbands entry into estranged wifes home was unauthorized where husband had moved out wife had changed locks and husband entered house through window after removing screen 3: holding that the defendant waived the right to appeal his sentence including the terms and conditions of his supervised release when he agreed to a plea agreement that said he expressly waives his right to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed on any ground emphasis added 4: holding wifes right to partition waived because she previously agreed husband alone had right to live in or sell house as he chose", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Bahl from perusing a collection of Playboy magazines, but it may not. This condition may prohibit Bahl from attending a Karen Finley performance, but it may not. \u00b656 The lawfulness of these examples depends solely on the subjective belief of the particular person charged with monitoring Bahl\u2019s community custody. The danger is that prohibiting \u201csexually explicit\u201d or \u201cerotic\u201d material ultimately translates into prohibiting whatever the community custody officer finds personally titillating. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001). Erotica, like art, is found in the eye of the beholder; yet enforcement of the law cannot be predicated on the subjective belief of the enforcer. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971) (<HOLDING>). \u00b657 In sum, taking all the challenged terms Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutional a sexual harassment statute prohibiting conduct that alarmed or seriously annoyed the victim 1: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied 2: holding an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting conduct entirely dependent upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed 3: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague 4: holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "it takes a case to make its way to the Courts of Appeals, in the majority of the cases cited above the sale closings had already taken place, this distinction is not determinative. In those cases, the courts were not asked to draw a distinction between sales before closings and sales after closing. The critical step is approval by the bankruptcy court, not closing. See, e.g., In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d at 849; In re Vetter Corp., 724 F.2d at 55-56. Debtor has provided no case law which supports the proposition that appeal of an order authorizing a sale is not moot after approval of the sale but before closing. To the contrary, the courts that have examined this issue have held that the appeal is moot even before closing. See In re Southwest Products, Inc., 144 B.R. at 105 (<HOLDING>); see also In re Exennium, Inc., 715 F.2d 1401, Holdings: 0: holding appeal moot on this basis 1: holding that the fact that the sale may not be fully consummated does not prevent a determination that the appeal is moot because section 363m does not require the purchaser to take irreversible steps consummating the sale before the absence of a stay will render an appeal moot 2: holding that action challenging united states forest services approval of a timber sale became moot when challenged sale was halted as a result of an administrative appeal 3: holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser 4: holding that payment does not moot a confirmation request", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Midland Nat\u2019l Life Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 436, 444 (S.D.Iowa 2009) (denying class certification for a proposed subclass finding inter alia the relief sought required extensive individualized inquiry to ascertain the class). b. Whether the Proposed Representatives Satisfy the Definition \u201cThe second \u2018implicit requirement\u2019 of Rule 23 is that each proposed representative is in fact a member of the proposed class____\u201d In re Teflon, 254 F.R.D. at 363. While Christian necessarily meets the definitions Plaintiffs proffer, as she pre-paid for a documented six months of treatment under the care of Kerkhoff, who was at that time a member of The Masters Circle, for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that the proposed class does not appropriately accommodate Rhiner\u2019s circumstances. See id. (<HOLDING>). 3. Rule 23(b)(3) Even if Plaintiffs could Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial 1: holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services 2: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion 3: holding that the court could not in good conscience grant certification under the second implicit requirement when the court was unable to establish membership with objective certainty 4: holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 398 (Ind.2011). Similarly, a plaintiff must establish that a duty of care exists to prevail on a claim of constructive fraud. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind.1996). \u201cAbsent a duty, there can be no breach, and therefore, no recovery for the plaintiff in negligence.\u201d Pfenning, 947 N.E.2d at 398 (citation omitted). Old National asks that the Court adopt a \u201cno customer, no duty\u201d rule, which recognizes that a bank should not owe a duty of care to an \u201cundefined and unlimited category of strangers who might interact with [the bank\u2019s] customer.\u201d Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2002); see also Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Old Na tional contends that because Purcell Holdings: 0: holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties 1: holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm 2: holding that under illinois law a lender owes no duty to protect third parties from the credit risk of an insolvent borrower 3: holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal 4: holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Counsel\u2019s predicate affidavit for constructive service reveals he knew Bland\u2019s local counsel\u2014 with whom he was in contact throughout the settlement discussions \u2014 and where to reach him. In spite of that he sent the required notice of service by publication only to Bland\u2019s old address which he knew would never reach him. When asked by the trial Judge if he had also sent a copy of the notice to Bland\u2019s lawyer, he responded: \u201cI felt that sending him a letter ... was above and beyond the call.\u201d [sic! ] To the contrary, his failure to do so violated the essential notice required by due process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and Tulsa Prof. Collection Serv. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (<HOLDING>). We are left with notice to Bland only in the Holdings: 0: holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action 1: holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice 2: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 3: holding that notice by mail or other means as certain to insure actual notice is minimum constitutional precondition 4: holding that if persons identity is known under mullane due process requires notice by such means as is certain to ensure actual notice", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or while having his features artificially distorted shall, for the first of-fence be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five years.... Whoever commits any offense described herein while armed with a firearm ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years. Mass. Gen. L. ch 265 \u00a7 17. As the parties agree, this creates a divisible statute because \u201cdangerous weapon\u201d is not defined in the offense conduct; thus not all armed robberies would constitute firearm offenses. The analysis of a divisible statute in the immigration context is analogous to the application of sentencing enhancements in the sentencing context. In the sentencing context, the court applies Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>); in the immigration context, we apply a Holdings: 0: holding that a sentencing court in determining whether a burglary was a violent felony that resulted in an enhanced statutory minimum had to rely on charging documents elements of offenses plea colloquies and express findings by the trial judge and could not look to police reports or complaint applications 1: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense 2: holding that a court can look only to the statutory elements charging documents and jury instructions to determine whether an earlier conviction after trial qualified as a violent felony under the acca 3: holding that inquiry under the acca to determine statutory elements of prior conviction is limited to judicial records and may not include documents that simply state facts such as police reports 4: holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "398 So.2d at 982. There, the court found that based on a suicide note, \u201ca jury could conceivably find that the railroad\u2019s negligence in hiring and training of supervisory personnel caused the stress that resulted in the' decedent\u2019s uncontrollable impulse to kill himself. Under such circumstances, the defendant\u2019s negligent or wrongful act would be actionable.\u201d Id. Here, not only is \u201cthe broad scope of coverage afforded by [the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.\u00a7 51],\u201d id. inapplicable in this case, no suicide note exists, nor does anything alleged in the complaint plausibly suggest that Defendant Verduce drove Plaintiff beyond the point where he could rationally decide killing himself. See also Kelley v. Beverly Hills Club Apartments, 68 So.3d 954, 958 (Fla.3d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims of negligence Holdings: 0: holding unfair trade practices and consumer protection law applicable to residential leases 1: holding that a residential landlord has no duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 2: holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law 3: holding that attorney breached duty to client by ignoring clients instruction to conduct particular discovery 4: holding apartment complex that contracted with addiction and mental health treatment facility to house facilitys residential clients owed no legal duty to protect a residential client from attempted suicide", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is \u201cgenuine\u201d if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). If a movant properly supports a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in her complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Only admissible evidence Holdings: 0: holding that mere speculation does not satisfy the nonmoving partys burden of establishing a dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment 1: holding that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact 2: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 3: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 4: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "any additional damages under state law that were not recoverable under CERCLA), because we have found that Durham\u2019s state-law claims are barred by the statute of limitations, Durham may not recover attorneys\u2019 fees under state law. 97. Accordingly, Durham\u2019s request for attorneys\u2019 fees is denied. VII. Conclusion 98. On Plaintiffs claims under \u00a7 113(f)(1) of CERCLA, the Court awards Plaintiff, The Durham Manufacturing Company, $116,075.65 against Defendant Merriam Manufacturing Company, and $19,345.94 against Defendant Allan E. Adams, plus post-judgment interest. 99. The Court further awards Plaintiff pre-judgment interest, accruing from the latter of the date on which Plaintiff made demand for payment on the Defendants or the date of the expenditure. See Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 177 (<HOLDING>). The Plaintiff is directed to submit a Holdings: 0: holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest 1: holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion 2: holding that an award of prejudgment interest under  113f of cercla is mandatory 3: holding that the state circuit court did not have the authority to award prejudgment interest for matters occurring prior to arbitration award 4: holding summary rejection of request for interest was not an abuse of discretion under indcode  345147 which states the court may award prejudgment interest as part of a judgment", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the only major issue was the identity of the robbers.\u201d Id. 21 .Similarly, if the defense indicates that it will present evidence during its case to impeach the testimony of a State witness (as in Milligan and Cobh), there is no concern that the State will not have the \"predicate issue\u201d to justify offering further evidence to refute the defense evidence during the State\u2019s rebuttal case. 22 . The legislature has established entrapment as an affirmative defense with the concomitant burden of proof on the defendant rather than as an element of an offense to be negated in the State\u2019s prima facie case. See 11 Del. C. \u00a7 432(a). 23 . Arguments by counsel during opening statements and summation are not evidence and thus cannot be said to raise an affirmative defense. Cf. Milligan 761 A.2d at 8 (<HOLDING>). 24 . Cf. United States v. Bailey, D.C.Cir., Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony 1: holding that evidence of a later sexual encounter that triggered the delayed report was admissible only after milligan had in fact introduced evidence of late reporting  to impeach the victims testimony 2: holding that remedial measures evidence was not admissible to impeach testimony that at the time of the event the measure was not believed to be as practical as the one employed 3: recognizing that if the government introduced evidence tending to show that the victims  did not expect to engage in prostitution  it will have put those victims sexual histories at issue and under those circumstances it is possible that  evidence rebutting the governments allegations might be admissible under the constitutional exception 4: holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that these taxes were discharged in the Joyes\u2019 bankruptcy case. 1. Section 1305 is entitled \u201cFiling and allowance of post-petition claims.\u201d Subsection (a) provides that \u201c[a] proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim against a debtor ... (1) for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending.\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1305(a)(1). The parties do not dispute that the Joyes\u2019 bankruptcy case was pending from March 7, 2001 to March 4, 2004. Therefore, whether the Joyes\u2019 outstanding taxes give rise to a post-petition claim pursuant to section 1305(a)(1) depends on when these taxes became \u201cpayable\u201d for the purpose of that section. We have yet to construe the term \u201cpayable\u201d as used in section 1305(a)(1). See In re Savaria, 317 B.R. 395, 401 (9th Cir. BAP 2004) (<HOLDING>). However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Holdings: 0: recognizing a split of authority 1: recognizing a split of authority on this issue 2: recognizing split 3: recognizing split within the circuit on whether the rule is mandatory or discretionary but not resolving the conflict 4: recognizing without resolving the split in authority on the meaning of the word", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.\u2019 \u201d). A fact is \u201cmaterial\u201d for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). A patent enjoys a presumption of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282. \u201cConsequently, \u2018a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.\u2019 \u201d Chrimar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 318 F.Supp.2d 476, 491 (E.D.Mich.2004) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir. 2001) ); see also Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). However, \u201c[t]he burden of persuasion created Holdings: 0: holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence 1: recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome 2: holding presumption overcome based on competent substantial record evidence which the judge could reasonably find to be clear and convincing 3: holding that a party seeking to establish particular claims as invalid must overcome the presumption of validity in 35 usc  282 by clear and convincing evidence 4: holding that the presumption of validity  and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard  does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss  it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard  a burden of proof  to such motions citation omitted", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "properly resorted to construing the contract against the drafter, Ms. LeKander. Point II is also denied, and the trial court\u2019s order granting her claim only as to the mortgage interest she had paid on the home after Mr. LeKander\u2019s death is affirmed. BARNEY, P.J., and LYNCH, J\u201e Concurs. 1 . The probate commissioner heard this matter and entered a \"judgment\u201d denying Ms. LeKander's claim on July 8, 2010. Under section 472.160.1(1) and (13), an order denying a claim against an estate of more than one hundred dollars may be appealed. Under section 478.268, the judge of the probate division must reject or confirm the orders and judgments of the probate commissioner in the thirty-first judicial circuit. Cf. Clemans v. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A., 936 S.W.2d 889, 890 (Mo.App. E.D.1997) (<HOLDING>). Greene County is within the thirty-first Holdings: 0: holding that the notice of appeal filed after the district court entered judgment as to one defendant but before the court dismissed the claims against the other defendants would have become effective when those defendants were later dismissed 1: holding that the determination by the probate court in the summary proceeding provided for by section 211516 revised code that assets should be included in an estate makes the question of title res judicata as between all parties to the proceeding but the judgment of the probate court may be attacked in a subsequent action by other interested persons who were not parties to the proceeding in probate court 2: holding that the appeal should be dismissed as nothing in the record indicated that the probate court confirmed the commissioners order in construing a similar statute  section 478266  applicable in certain other circuits 3: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 4: holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "bad law, we conclude that the territorial restriction in Atlanta Speciality\u2019s uninsured motorist policy does not violate Mississippi public policy as embodied in the UM Act. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court\u2019s judgment and RENDER judgment for Atlanta Speciality. REVERSED AND RENDERED. 1 . The Mississippi Supreme Court has found various provisions of uninsured motorist policies ambiguous. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss.1984) (limitation of liability clause); Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So.2d 267, 270-71 (Miss.1979) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Miss. 1977) (same); compare Blansett v. American Employers Ins. Co., 652 F.2d 535, 536-37 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). There is no dispute in this case that the Holdings: 0: holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous 1: holding that an identical or nearly identical limitation of liability clause was valid and enforceable under georgia law 2: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 3: holding that if easement language is clear and unambiguous and does not limit its duration then the court cannot impose such a limitation 4: holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "In addition, to the extent Olmstead has argued that the court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b) motion because he was proceeding without counsel, a defendant\u2019s pro se status in civil litigation generally will not excuse mistakes he makes regarding procedural mies. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 1984, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (explaining that the Court \u201cnever [had] suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel,\u201d because \u201cexperience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law\u201d); see also Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, relief cannot be granted under Rule Holdings: 0: holding that a pro se litigants failure to comply with the filing deadlines for a notice of appeal set out in federal rule of bankruptcy procedure 8002 meant that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the litigants appeal 1: holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules 2: recognizing that although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigants reasonable expectations about what had occurred 3: holding that rule 56f applies to pro se litigants 4: holding that liberal construction of the pleading requirements for pro se litigants does not equate with liberal deadlines", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "filed a motion for a new trial on September 16, 2009, which the trial court denied on February 15,2013. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which properly transferred the appeal to this Court on October 8,2013. The case was docketed here for the January 2014 term and submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 In addition, OCGA \u00a7 16-3-21 (d) (2), which was enacted in 1993, authorizes relevant expert testimony regarding the defendant\u2019s condition of mind at the time of the offense, including relevant facts and circumstances relating to the family violence or child abuse that are the bases of the expert\u2019s opinion, to support a justification defense in a prosecution for murder or manslaughter. See also Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 SE2d 678) (1981) (<HOLDING>). 3 We recognize that the descriptions of Holdings: 0: holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible 1: holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion 2: holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard 3: holding that expert testimony in support of a justification defense based on battered spouse syndrome would not he an improper opinion on an ultimate fact 4: holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that Rutherford was not prejudiced by the District\u2019s lack of notice because he received all of the benefits he otherwise would have received had the leave been designated. Defi\u2019s Mem. Supp. 31; Dunn Dep. 37 (Dunn stated that while Rutherford was not given FMLA forms, he \u201cwas given all the rights and benefits as if [he] had been.\u201d) This argument misses the mark in addressing Rutherford\u2019s real concern: that he was not returned to work once he had proven himself fit to do so. Pl.\u2019s Mem. 32. Simply put, the District\u2019s failure to follow the FMLA notice rules, and thereby prolonging Rutherford\u2019s reinstatement process, prejudiced Rutherford because it kept him from returning to work despite the fact that he wanted to, was fit to do so, and was entitled to do so. Cf. Ridings, 537 F.3d at 762 (<HOLDING>). Even though Rutherford was not required to Holdings: 0: holding that an employer was justified in demoting plaintiff after she returned from maternity leave because plaintiff could not rebut the employers evidence that she was having performance problems before she went on leave and that additional performance problems were discovered while she was on leave 1: holding in the only seventh circuit case addressing prejudice in the context of failure to notice that an employee was not prejudiced because she benefitted from a reduced schedule of leave for more than a yeara schedule she wanted to keep 2: holding that defendants decision to change the office schedule without allowing plaintiff leave to alter his personal schedule did not constitute an adverse action although plaintiff alleged that because of the schedule revisions he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift a mere inconvenience is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case 3: holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action 4: holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer and officer testified that request was unambiguous", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by Tus-chner was reasonable in law. According to the district court, although our court ultimately disagreed with the conclusion that Tuschner controlled Zahareas, \u201cthe SEC\u2019s legal position was at least a colorable, reasonable attempt at defining an otherwise undefined phrase.\u201d (Id. at 12.) Third, relying on the undisputed communications and dealings between Tuschner and Za-hareas, the district court found that the SEC\u2019s factual basis was reasonable. The fact that the district court and our court found for the SEC at various stages in the litigation does not automatically grant the government immunity from EAJA liability. See Herman v. Schwent, 177 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir.1999) (reversing district court and granting attorney\u2019s fees); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 53 F.3d at 885 (<HOLDING>). Instead, we must fully analyze the facts and Holdings: 0: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 1: recognizing ajlthough presiding judge mccormicks opinion in davis  is labeled a concurring opinion it was joined by a majority of the court and may be regarded as an opinion for the court 2: holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion 3: holding a medical opinion to be not significantly probative where the opinion was contrary to other substantial record evidence 4: holding that the district court erred in denying fees by relying too heavily upon its original opinion and judge magills dissent from our decision reversing that opinion", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the Government\u2019s bargaining power and the fact that the defendant waives his constitutional rights. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. When considering an alleged breach of a plea agreement, we first identify the terms of the agreement. We then determine whether there has been a breach. If so, we fashion a remedy. Id. at 235. In Miller\u2019s case, the Government filed a written 5K1.1 motion, which requested a downward departure of \u201c \u20183 levels from the parties\u2019 stipulated offense level of 26,\u2019 to \u2018offense level 23.\u2019 \u201d Br. for Appellee 27 (quoting App. 360). Miller asserts that he reasonably understood this to be- a term of the plea agreement and, therefore, that the Government was bound to recommend offense level 23 at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). We will assume for the sake of argument that Holdings: 0: holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities 1: holding that the government is no longer bound by its obligations under a plea agreement when a defendant commits a material breach 2: holding that objecting to guidelines calculations as specifically reserved in the plea agreement is not a breach of the plea agreement even if the objection is overruled and thus government is not released from obligation under the agreement to move for acceptance of responsibility 3: holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms 4: holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "they completely terminated their physician and patient relationship. Generally, the negligent conduct of a physician causes at least some immediate damage to the patient, but the statute of limitations, nonetheless, commences running at termination of the course of treatment, sometime after the initial damage occurs. See Schmit, 183 Minn, at 359, 236 N.W. at 625 (adopting the termination of treatment rule despite the general rule that a statute of limitations action in tort begins to run at the time of the negligent act which coincides with the injury). Zagaros claims the termination of treatment rule is inapplicable in her case because no immediate damage coincided with Erickson\u2019s allegedly negligent misdiagnosis. See Peterson v. St. Cloud Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). She argues she was not injured by any lack of Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal 1: holding that the occurrence of damages determines when a medical malpractice action accrues 2: recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner 3: holding that absent a contrary mandate from congress the discovery rule determines when a cause of action accrues in a federal question case 4: holding cause of action accrues when some compensable damage occurs", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "It\u2019s a rather unusual circumstance, but I\u2019ve heard it before. Obviously, it\u2019s not unusual for participants in a trial to watch the jury, but we want to be sure that the jury is not made uncomfortable. So if I\u2019m correct that the regular attendees have been members of the family or friends of the defendants, I would appreciate counsel commenting to them when and as appropriate that we don\u2019t want to make the jurors uncomfortable, and what\u2019s actually a lot more interesting about a trial is what goes on in the well of the court and from the witness stand as opposed to the jury. So I share that with you just so you can convey the court\u2019s mild concern that the jurors not be made uncomfortable. It\u2019s nothing more than that. Okay? J.A. 915-16. There was no evidence that the judge had ir.1994) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, Holdings: 0: holding that multiple sentences for offenses under 18 usc  924c are appropriate when multiple separate acts of firearm use have occurred even if they are related to the same underlying offense 1: holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts 2: holding that in relation to is an element of 18 usc  924c 3: holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole 4: holding that multiple convictions under  924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the confidentiality protections afforded by the Mediation Order. A. The Defendants Have Not Established a Special Need for Mediation Communications Under the first prong of the Teli-gent test, a movant seeking to modify a protective order must establish \u201cimprovidence in the grant of the order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need.\u201d Teligent, 640 F.3d at 59 (quoting SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir.2001)); see Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 165 Fed.Appx. 878, 880 (2d Cir.2005) (affirming denial of motion to modify protective order on the\u201d basis that movant \u201chad not shown a compelling need or extraordinary circumstances necessary to modify the protective order\u201d); Martindell v. Int\u2019l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also Dandong, 2012 WL 4793870, at *5 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant has the right to an order permitting him to inspect his own written or recorded statements absent a basis for a protective order 1: holding that a protective order under rule 26c to stay discovery pending determination of a dispositive motion is an appropriate exercise of the courts discretion 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified 3: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure 4: holding that a protective order granted pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 26c should not be modified absent a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the \u201ccatchall has to be understood within the context of the limitations\u201d enumerated in the first eight factors). 9 . Although the Coalition's briefs appear to pose its specificity challenge as an attack on EPA's interpretation of RCRA, it might also have intended to argue that the asserted vagueness of \u00a7 270.10(Z) renders the regulation arbitrary and capricious. But such an argument would also fail because, as was true in Animal Legal Defense Fund, \"[t]he explanation that renders the [agency\u2019s] interpretation of the statute rea th respect to a jurisdictional provision analogous to RCRA, that agency action is reviewable if it \"binds private parties or the agency itself with the 'force of law\u2019 \u201d), with McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, our jurisdictional cases routinely Holdings: 0: holding that when the agency reopens a proceeding for any reason and after reconsideration issues a new and final order setting forth the rights and obligations of the parties that order  even if it merely reaffirms the rights and obligations set forth in the original order  is reviewable on its merits 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that an agency pronouncement is a policy statement exempt from apa notice and comment if it first does not have a presentday binding effect that is it does not impose any rights and obligations and second genuinely leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion  quoting community nutrition inst v young 818 f2d 943 946  n 4 dccir1987 3: holding that the court reviews noncompliance with an agency pronouncement only if it actually has the force and effect of law 4: holding that ftc issuance of a complaint meets the apa definition of order and therefore is agency action even if not final agency action", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "applicable here, and supports our conclusion that the language of the ballot title and summary do not constitute political or emotional rhetoric. Moreover, the common definition of the term \u201cprotect\u201d is \u201cto maintain the status or integrity of.\u201d Merriam Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 938 (10th ed.1998). This common definition, when read in context and conjunction with the rest of the language contained in the ballot title and summary accurately portrays the chief purpose of the amendment \u2014 preserving the current concept of marriage in Florida as the legal union of one man and one woman. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ballot summary and title in the instant proposal are not impermissibly misleading, nor are they \u201cclearly and conclusively defective.\u201d Askew, 421 So.2d at 154 (<HOLDING>). REVIEW OF FINANCIAL IMPACT STATEMENT Article Holdings: 0: holding that language in a citizen initiative must be clearly and conclusively defective to justify removal of the measure from the ballot 1: holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective 2: holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still 3: holding that notice of removal was defective on its face because it failed to contain a copy of the process as required by the removal statute 4: holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Rather, as noted above, it is clear that the IDEA provides for reimbursement only if (1) the school district fails to provide a FAPE and (2) the parental placement is \u201creasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.\u201d Carter, 950 F.2d at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996. These two findings lie at the heart of the statute. In this regard, we note that the hearing officer and district court made findings that Lindamood-Bell had fallen short in several significant respects, namely in the failure to provide the life skills and vocational training and the group interaction needed by M.S. for his instruction. We accord great deference to such findings under our precedent. See MM ex rel. DM, 303 F.3d at 531 (<HOLDING>). Whether the identified shortcomings of Holdings: 0: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 1: holding that findings of fact from a bench trial are reviewed for clear error 2: holding that findings of fact made in administrative proceedings are considered to be prima facie correct and that where a district court has heard and considered additional evidence  we review its findings of fact for clear error 3: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 4: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "due process claim was proper because it was subsumed by his Fourth Amendment claim. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). Summary judgment was proper on McKinney\u2019s First Amendment claim because McKinney failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers acted with intent to deny McKinney his first amendment rights. Cf. Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1469 (9th Cir.1994). Summary judgment on McKinney\u2019s claim alleging the seized property was never returned to him was proper because McKinney admitted at deposition that he did not follow California state law procedures for recovering property pursuant to Cal.Penal Code \u00a7 1536. See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241, 119 S.Ct. 678, 142 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Summary judgment on McKinney\u2019s pendent state Holdings: 0: holding california postdeprivation recovery procedures satisfy due process despite lack of notice to claimant of recovery procedures 1: holding that the irs has notice of plaintiffs alternate ground of recovery because it had considered and evaluated the applicability of the code provision under which the plaintiff sought recovery 2: holding that its flexible approach to due process taking account of private interests the potential for reducing erroneous deprivations and the costs of procedures needed to reduce errors applies to evaluations of notice as well as the procedures at a hearing 3: holding that notice and postdeprivation grievance procedures are sufficient process to freeze an inmates prison trust account until the prisoner pays for medical expenses he has incurred 4: holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir.1996)). Under the circumstances at hand, where the case was originally filed in state court and subsequently removed to federal court, precedent dictates that the district court should have remanded the remaining claims to state court. See, e.g., Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 402 F.3d 1092, 1123 (11th Cir.2005) (explaining \u201c[bjeeause this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C \u00a7 1441, if the district court declines to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, [plaintiffs] remaining claim should be remanded to state court\u201d); Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find that the district court Holdings: 0: holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction 1: holding that district courts dismissal of state law claims was proper where the district court had properly dismissed all of the federal questions that gave it original jurisdiction 2: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 3: holding that when all federal claims have been dismissed the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims 4: holding that after all federal claims had been dismissed if the district court does decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction these state claims shall be remanded to state court rather than dismissed because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in accordance with another provision of this code. See Act of May 10, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 290, \u00a7 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 548, 548-51 (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 541.051-.061). 9 . See, e.g., Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex.1996); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 491 n. 1 (Tex.1988); IN A of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1985); Conte v. Ditta, No. 14-02-00482-CV, 2003 WL 21191296, at *4 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (presuming that trial court did not consider a late-filed affidavit where the record showed only that the trial court considered the response). But see Durbin v. Culberson County, 132 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 339-40 Holdings: 0: holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government 1: holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant 2: holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing 3: holding that the sevenday limit before submission in which a nonmovant may submit summaryjudgment evidence does not apply to the movants reply 4: holding that title ii does not apply to the states", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to Deitz's complaint, Palaigos was acting as the husband's attorney throughout that litigation. 3 . The other defendants later joined in this motion. 4 . Although we reach the same result as the trial court, we do so taking a different route. \"Ordinarily, an appellate court will not affirm a summary judgment by ruling on a ground not ruled upon by the trial court.\u201d Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md.App. 440, 450, 688 A.2d 448 (1997); see also Gresser v. Anne Arundel County,-Md.-, -, -A.2d - (No. 20, Sept. Term, 1997, slip op. at 9, filed Jan. 28, 1998). \"If the alternative ground is one as to which the trial court had no discretion, however, summary judgment may be affirmed.\u201d Thomas, 113 Md.App. at 450, 688 A.2d 448; see also Maryland Cas. Co., 100 Md.App. at 357-58, 641 A.2d 924 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial judge would have had Holdings: 0: holding where an appellate court affirms trial courts grant of summary judgment on a particular ground the appellate court need not discuss the remaining grounds 1: holding that an appellate court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record even if the circuit court did not rely on it 2: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion 3: holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment 4: holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment on ground not presented by movant in writing", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the Army argues that the two jobs are not identical and Nealon failed to present \u201ccomparable worth\u201d evidence below. However, it is for the district court to determine on the merits whether the two jobs are sufficiently similar to find an EPA violation; Nealon. was never permitted to offer evidence on the merits because her suit was dismissed before trial, on the Army\u2019s motion. B. Finally, Nealon argues that the fact that her favorable EEOC I decision was issued during the limitations period, in October 1987, warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. We agree. As a general matter, statutory time limits in suits against the government are subject to equitable tolling principles. See Irwin v. Veterans Administration, \u2014 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409 (D.C.Cir.1985), Holdings: 0: holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 1: holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration 2: holding as subject to equitable tolling title vii statute authorizing suit brought within 90 days of receipt of right to sue notice 3: holding title vii subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(1st Cir.1985) (applying Mass. Law). Utah requires proof under its consumer fraud act of either intent to deceive or knowledge of the falsity of defendant\u2019s affirmative misrepresentations, while South Dakota requires proof of both knowledge and intent under its consumer fraud statute. Utah Code Ann \u00a7 13-11-4(2); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952); Iadanza v. Mather, 820 F.Supp. 1371, 1381 (D.Utah 1993); S.D.Code Ann. \u00a7 37-24-6; Stene v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 N.W.2d 399, 404 (S.D.1998). California and Pennsylvania require proof under their consumer fraud acts of justifiable reliance by plaintiff on defendant\u2019s deceptive acts. Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court of Orange County (Fahnestock), 18 Cal.3d 355, 134 Cal.Rptr. 388, 556 P.2d 750, 755 (1976); (<HOLDING>); Weinberg v. Sun Company, Inc., supra., 777 Holdings: 0: holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law 1: holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement 2: holding that each class member was not required to prove justifiable reliance when an inference of reliance arises if a materially false representation was made to persons whose acts thereafter were consistent with reliance upon the representations 3: holding in the context of a non  212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance 4: holding that where material misrepresentations are made to class members an inference of reliance arises to the entire class", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)). Accordingly, a trial court has the authority to impose sanctions on a party that perpetrates a fraud on the court, which includes striking that party\u2019s pleadings and entering a. default judgment against that party. See Faddis, 121 So.3d at 1135. However, and importantly for our purposes, the power of the court to impose sanctions under these circumstances \u201cshould be exercised with .great restraint\u201d and should be used \u2018\u201conly upon the most blatant showing of fraud, pretense, collusion, or other similar wrongdoing.\u2019 \u201d E.I. DuPont De Nemours &\u25a0 Co. v. Sidran, 140 So.3d 620, 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). See also Celebrity Cruises, Inc. v. Fernandes, 149 So.3d 744, 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (noting that \u201cstriking a party\u2019s pleadings and entry of a default ... is 7) (<HOLDING>). We reverse and remand to the trial court for Holdings: 0: holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence 1: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence 2: holding that district court acted prematurely by dismissing case on the pleadings 3: holding appeal from an order dismissing action without prejudice was properly before this court 4: holding court must have evidence to support dismissal before dismissing a case for fraud on the court", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "claim is the Agreement, Plaintiffs have not identified any other contract to which these allegations could refer. Plaintiffs argue that their claims relate to disclosures on HighBeam\u2019s website, not in the Agreement. However, as already mentioned, Plaintiffs admit that some disclosures were made in the Agreement. (Id. \u00b6 46(f).) Even if this were not the case, the First Circuit\u2019s decision in Huffington defeats Plaintiffs\u2019 argument. In Huffington, the plaintiff argued that his tort and statutory fraudulent misrepresentation claims did not relate to his contract with the defendant because the misrepresentations \u201cwould be actionable regardless of whether the parties executed a contract.\u201d 637 F.3d at 22. However, as the First Circu . A. 97-12283-RGS, 1998 WL 518187 (D.Mass. Aug. 5, 1998) (<HOLDING>). C. Unresolved Factual Disputes. There remain Holdings: 0: holding that the forum selection clause at issue encompassed both contract and tort claims 1: holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum 2: holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract 3: holding that claims were not related to a license agreement which contained a forum selection clause in part because the bulk of the claims were against a defendant who was not a party to the agreement for breaches of employment contracts which did not contain forum selection clauses and for disclosure of trade secrets 4: holding enforceable forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "below the 50 percent mark, but such mathematical uncertainty is not fatal to the guideline\u2019s validity, and we have previously concluded that criminal provisions featuring the \u201csubstantial\u201d language survive facial challenge. See Doctor John\u2019s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (ordinance requiring licensing of store selling \u201c \u2018significant or substantial\u2019 \u201d amount of sexually oriented merchandise was not void for vagueness); see also VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir.2010) (language of zoning ordinance defining sexually oriented business as establishment with \u201csubstantial or significant portion\u201d of goods in adult merchandise not unconstitutionally vague); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418-19 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we cannot say the sentencing court Holdings: 0: holding that safety standards regarding the safe design and use of trampolines including astm standards were admissible on the issue of the defendants negligence even though the defendants were unaware of the standards 1: holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law 2: holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent 3: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission 4: holding that substantial or significant  is not  devoid of meaningful legislative standards ", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "sex offenders, Bender, 566 F.3d at 752, whereas the district court here imposed the ban on pornography after a discussion of Demers\u2019s background and characteristics, including his prior child pornography arrests and domestic battery offenses, citing \u201cthe need to curb any tendency you might have to further engage in child pornography efforts or abuses.\u201d Moreover, even were we to find that the district court erred in not conducting a sufficiently individualized determination, that error likely would not \u201caffect[ ] substantial rights,\u201d Davis, 452 F.3d at 994, since Demers\u2019s offense and history, including his prior conviction for sexual abuse, make it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not have been imposed in any event. Cf. Curry, 627 F.3d at 315 (<HOLDING>). Demers also argues that special condition 7 Holdings: 0: holding that a condition banning pornography prejudiced the defendant because there was a reasonable probability that the condition would not have been imposed had the district court conducted a sufficiently individualized determination given that the defendants conviction was for a registration offense not a sexual exploitation offense 1: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 2: holding that that the trial court erred when it determined that firstdegree sexual offense was an aggravated offense 3: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 4: recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was appropriate. 23 . Accord Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1980); United States v. City of Miami, Fla., supra at note 19. 24 . See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192, 93 S.Ct. 375, 378, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972) (judgment entered by an equally divided court is not entitled to precedential weight); Berlin v. F.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.1964) (affirmance by an equally divided court is, between the parties, conclusive determination, but the principles of law involved, having not gained the assent of a majority of the court, prevents the case from being authority for other cases); But see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 25 . In Fullilove, the Court was faced with Holdings: 0: holding of fragmented court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds 1: recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice 2: holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious 3: holding that when a fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taking by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds 4: holding of the court is the position taken by member who concurs in the judgment on the narrowest grounds", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "had robbed six businesses that purchased supplies from other states, and/or had employees or customers from other states. 328 F.3d at 711-12. We underscored that \u201c \u2018the cumulative result of many Hobbs Act violations is a substantial effect upon interstate commerce,\u2019 and that substantial effect empowers Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause.\u201d Id. at 711 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir.1997)). On this record, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jeanette was running a business that had the requisite nexus to interstate commerce. Although the speakeasy was not a licensed bar, it was selling alcohol and the people playing cards at the time of the robbery were its c (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). There was also evidence here from which a Holdings: 0: holding that the single transaction rule protects a purchaser of stolen goods who by definition must know the goods to be stolen from being made party to the original theft via conspiracy 1: holding that a buyer who purchases goods subject to an express warranty that the goods are free from all liens takes free of any unperfected security interest 2: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods 3: holding that the hobbs act jurisdictional nexus was met by the robbery of a delicatessen that sold goods produced out of state without mentioning whether the goods were purchased from outofstate or instate suppliers 4: holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "trial, all of his pretrial motions had not yet been heard and the State had failed to provide him a complete list of witnesses. The motion for continuance was granted in part and denied in part. Wilson claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for continuance because his trial counsel\u2019s scheduling conflict prevented counsel from adequately preparing Wilson\u2019s case. Additionally, Wilson argues that the continuance should have been granted because the State designated new experts, shortly before trial, denying trial counsel the opportunity to investigate the experts. Furthermore, the State failed to provide a complete witness list and the trial court failed to rule on his motion filed in accordance with Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Wilson argues that the trial court should Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant not only has a right to be examined by an expert but also has the right to have an expert appointed to assist him in his defense 1: holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff 2: holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify 4: holding that the defendant validly waived right to conflictfree representation where the defendant knew a conflict existed its effect on his defense and his right to have other counsel appointed", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "protected under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities\u201d); Pollock v. Farmers\u2019 Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583-86, 15 S.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759 (1895), modified, 158 U.S. 601, 15 S.Ct. 912, 39 L.Ed. 1108 (1895), overruled in part by U.S. Const. amend. XVI, South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515-27, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). 9 . From 1938 until the modern Code\u2019s enactment, state authorization was required for plan confirmation. See Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub.L. No. 302, ch. 657, sec. 83(e)(6), 50 Stat. . 653, 658 (codified at 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 403(e)(6) (1937) (conditioning confirmation of a plan on, inter alia, petitioner being \"authorized by law to take all action necessary to be taken by it to carry out the plan\u201d)); Bekins, 304 U.S. at 49, 58 S.Ct. 811 (<HOLDING>); accord 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 404 (1976). Puerto Rico's Holdings: 0: holding that law in  403e6 refers to state law 1: holding state law irrelevant 2: holding that even though  24 only refers to actions in state court it applies to state claims brought in federal court 3: holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to reward appellant for his past commendable service, while at the same time, adding incentive for appellant to remain with the company in order to exercise such options. Yet, in the unfortunate circumstance of appellant\u2019s death, the option period would have remained open to appellant\u2019s estate for one year. Similarly, if appellant became disabled, such options would then vest. Notwithstanding the lack of value, such options that were gained prior to the filing of the dissolution petition do represent assets that were accumulated during the marriage and are, thhs, subject to equitable distribution. We also find support for our holding in the majority of other state courts that have addressed this issue. In Fisher v. Fisher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing both .Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect 1: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husbands unvested stock options as marital property 2: holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property 3: holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust 4: holding that unvested stock options subject to the contingency of debtors future employment are property of the bankruptcy estate", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of self-defense, and a person is just as capable of defending himself with a marked firearm as with an unmarked firearm. With or without a serial number, a pistol is still a pistol. Furthermore, it cannot be the case that possession of a firearm in the home for self-defense is a protected form of possession under all circumstances. By this rationale, any type of firearm possessed in the home would be protected merely because it could be used for self-defense. Possession of machine guns or short-barreled shotguns \u2014 or any other dangerous and unusual weapon' \u2014 so long as they were kept in the home, would then fall within the Second Amendment. But the Supreme Court has made clear the Second Amendment does not protect those types of weapons. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined 1: holding that shortbarreled shotguns are unprotected 2: holding that arguments which are not sufficiently developed are waived 3: holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived 4: holding that possession of a shortbarreled shotgun is a violent felony under the accas residual clause because sawedoff shotguns are inherently dangerous and lack usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes internal quotation marks omitted", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Road Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex.2006) (the duty to defend is created by the terms of the insurance policy); 2 Allan D. WlNDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: Representation of InsuRance Companies and InsuReds \u00a7 11:31 (5th ed.2007) (\u201cThe difference between a self-insured retention and a deductible is usually that, under polices containing a self-insured retention, the insured assumes the obligation of providing itself a defense until the retention is exhausted.\u201d). If LTC itself had funded the defenses or settlements of the underlying claims, it would have no claim against U.S. Fire under the policy for amounts within the SIRs. See generally H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Nat\u2019l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 150 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, U.S. Fire\u2019s refusal to defend or Holdings: 0: holding that when the district court disposed of the adea claims the pendent claims became subject to dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction 1: holding that a common question of causation was a predominate issue central to each of plaintiffs claims and subject to generalize proof notwithstanding need to review each plaintiffs individual account 2: holding that insureds settlements of two claims were each subject to the sir provisions of the policy 3: recognizing that a contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions 4: holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "these prior holdings, Corus argues that fundamental structural changes to the U.S. Antidumping statute, as implemented in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (\u201cURAA\u201d), render zeroing inherently unreasonable, citing recent WTO decisions for further support that zeroing is no longer reasonable. See supra note 1. The Federal Circuit, however, in addressing arguments similar to the ones Corus now presents before the court, (1) expressly affirmed the reasonableness of Commerce\u2019s use of zeroing in an antidumping administrative review, and (2) accorded no deference to Corus\u2019s cited WTO cases, again concluding that WTO decisions are not binding on the U.S. and cannot trump domestic legislation. See Corus Staal BV v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1346 \u2014 49 (Fed.Cir.2005) (\u201cCorus Staal II\u201d) (<HOLDING>). While it is highly debatable whether the Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts apa review of a sba size decision was not entitled to deference but that the agencys interpretation and application of its own regulations did merit deference 1: holding that 1 our decision in timken addressed commerces interpretation of section 167735 and 2 we give commerce substantial deference in its administration of the statute because of the foreign policy implications of a dumping determination 2: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 3: holding that 19 usc  167735 is ambiguous and that zeroing is a reasonable interpretation 4: holding that we review for clear error a district courts factual determination as to whether prior cases were consolidated for sentencing under ussg  4a12a2 and that we give the court due deference in its application of the guidelines to that determination", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2009) (\u201cComstock I\u201d). In 2007, a district court in this Circuit struck down the commitment scheme of \u00a7 4248 on two constitutional grounds: that (1) Congress lacked the authority to enact \u00a7 4248; and (2) \u00a7 4248\u2019s clear and convincing burden of proof contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522 (E.D.N.C.2007). On appeal, we agreed with the district court that enactment of \u00a7 4248 exceeded congressional authority, without reaching the due process issue. See Comstock I, 551 F.3d at 276. In May 2010, the Supreme Court reversed our Comstock I decision, holding that Article I of the Constitution conferred sufficient authority for Congress to enact \u00a7 4248. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1954 (<HOLDING>). The Court remanded for an assessment of the Holdings: 0: recognizing that constitution grants authority for congress to enact  4248 as necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution 2: recognizing that provisions of the colorado constitution should be construed in the context of the constitution as a whole 3: recognizing that conflict preemption precludes laws that under the circumstances of a particular case stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress omission alteration internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: recognizing that a tax enactment will not be invalidated unless it clearly palpably and plainly violates the constitution internal quotation marks and citation omitted", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "citations omitted). \u201cConsidering whether \u2018questions of law or fact common to class members predominate\u2019 begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying cause of action.\u201d Halliburton, 131 S.Ct. at 2184. In the 30-page M&R adopted by the district court, the magistrate judge correctly began the predominance and superiority analysis by laying out the elements of Appellants\u2019 claims and what must be shown to prove antitrust liability in a class action context. The magistrate judge continued his Rule 23(b)(3) analysis by finding that Appellants failed to present class-wide proof of the various elements of their private antitrust claims. Ultimately, the magistrate judge concluded that individualized issues affecting each of the roughly one million c., 381 F.3d 717, 737 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because Appellants brought this case as a Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant geographic market or appropriate section of the country is the area in which the acquired firm is an actual competitor 1: holding that a contract for an exclusive agency to market a product contains an implied promise to use all reasonable efforts to market the product 2: holding that economic analysis in antitrust context is virtually meaningless if it is entirely unmoored from at least a rough definition of a product and geographic market 3: holding that changes in the baseball card market between 1965 and 1980 foreclosed any argument that a definition of the relevant market by the federal trade commission could preclude relitigation of the market definition issue 4: holding district court erred by incorporating issue of anticompetitive market effect into its standing analysis confusing antitrust injury with an element of a claim under section 1 of the sherman act and stating district courts approach may have been result of the similar antitrust injury label applied to injury component of antitrust standing analysis and to marketplace harm element under section 1", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the arbitration clause, we further conclude that Ms. Chapman\u2019s decision to accept arbitration bound Ms. Barron to arbitrate future disputes with Betty Dare. Unlike the parties in McMillan, DeArmond, and Lisanti, the record indicates that Ms. Chapman voluntarily and knowingly chose arbitration of future disputes. The Resolution of Legal Disputes form clearly stated that agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes indicated a waiver of a right to sue or go to trial in a court of law. To the extent that Plaintiff argues on appeal that Ms. Chapman did not fully understand the implications of the arbitration clause, we find this argument unavailing. Parties to an agreement are presumed to know and understand the terms of the agreement. See Ballard v. Chavez, 117 N.M. 1, 3, 868 P.2d 646, 648 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Plaintiff did not develop any Holdings: 0: holding a party to a contract who is himself in default cannot maintain a suit for its breach 1: holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it 2: holding that a party may not contract away the protection that a statute is intended to afford him nor may the other party to the contract exempt itself from its duty to comply with such statute 3: recognizing that a contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions 4: recognizing that each party to a contract has a duty to read and familiarize himself with its contents  and generally is presumed to know the terms of the agreement", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "injures, interferes with, or intimidates the provider or recipient of reproductive health care or speech that amounts to a threat of force that obstructs, injures, intimidates, or interferes with the provider or recipient of reproductive health care. The regulation of neither the former conduct, nor the latter speech, is violative of the First Amendment. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 2199, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993) (\u201c[A] physical assault is not ... expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.\u201d); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (noting that \u201cthreats of violence are outside the First Amendment\u201d); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-73, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361-63, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616-17, 88 Holdings: 0: holding new yorks disclosure law unconstitutionally overbroad 1: holding portions of the online solicitation of a minor statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment 2: holding the improper photography or visual recording statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the first amendment 3: holding that washingtons harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered constitutionally protected speech 4: holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the crime scene while he was a juror, [W.H.] answered yes. [W.H.] said he saw where the baby was .burned and that the trailer was \u2018burned pretty bad.\u2019 In cross-examination, however, [W.H.] indicated that he thought say the least, this Court cannot find that Dunaway has met his burden of proving this allegation of juror misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence as required by Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P. \u201cMoreover, even assuming [W.H.] improperly visited the crime .2d 822, 826 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (finding that juror misconduct did not warrant a new trial because \u2018[t]he jurors in the present case all stated that they were basing their decision on the officers\u2019 testimony rather than any statements of allegations coming from the investigating juror\u2019); Ex parte Dawson, 710 So.2d at 476 (<HOLDING>). \u25a0 \u201cEven if this Court were to And Duna-way Holdings: 0: holding bjecause dawson failed to show that the jurors viewing of the crime scene resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully influenced the jurys verdict a new trial is not warranted 1: holding that the unobjected to statements made by the prosecutor did not indicate an intent on the part of the prosecuting attorney to inflame the minds of the jurors or to arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant nor were they so inflammatory that the jurors might be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence and thus there was no misconduct 2: holding that bjecause the defendant in this case has failed to show that the experiment conducted by a juror resulted in the introduction of facts that might have unlawfully influenced the verdict rendered we find that the jurors action does not warrant a new trial 3: holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial 4: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "so, the Court noted Congress\u2019s recognition of this principle in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The earlier cases cited in Todd Shipyards included Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 43 S.Ct. 125, 67 L.Ed. 297 (1922), and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S.Ct. 436, 82 L.Ed. 673 (1938). 5 . Indeed, the Commissioner apparently has conceded that no Florida court would have personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs\u2019 German affiliates in a case arising under the German insurance contracts now at issue. See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (document 38) at 56. 6 . See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (<HOLDING>), cited with approval in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 1: holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms 2: holding a georgia law requiring a plaintiff in a direct action against an insurance company to attach a copy of the insurance policy to his complaint inapplicable because it conflicts with rule 8 3: holding that insureds widow as beneficiary of life insurance policy had standing as an injured person under the insurance code 4: holding that application of georgia law to dispute arising under life insurance policy issued by massachusetts insurer to new york resident violated due process clause where only georgia contact was that beneficiary moved there", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "shall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same. A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund coiresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. (Emphasis added.) Congress deleted the italicized portion in 1957. 71 Stat. 457-58. 8 . Cf. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596, 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The Commissioner points out that the Holdings: 0: holding that article 10 section 8 of the arizona constitution did not create greater restrictions than the enabling act on exchanges of trust lands because section 8 provided that every disposition of or contract concerning trust lands would be null and void if not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of the enabling act 1: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust 2: holding that a state can require firebreaks around housing on trust property adjacent to forest lands 3: holding that the state has no special sovereign interest in managing lands held in trust 4: holding that billboard was not structure within meaning of the zoning enabling act g l c 40  25", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "well as \u201c[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities for the parents and child.\u201d Code \u00a7 20-108.1(B)(15). See also Code \u00a7 20-108.1(B) (\u201cThe court\u2019s decision in any such proceeding shall be rendered upon the evidence relevant to each individual case.\u201d). Further, although the trial court must consider each of the statutory factors for which evidence is presented, the weight, if any, to give any particular factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion. Robbins, 48 Va.App. at 481, 632 S.E.2d at 622. Thus, we do not hold that the trial court must deviate from the presumptive guidelines because of the income imputed to father. Rather, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to first consider recent past earnings .2d 148, 152-53 (1996) (<HOLDING>). It is only when considering all the facts of Holdings: 0: holding that where husband had strong familial ties to richmond he was not voluntarily underemployed based on his refusal of a job opportunity requiring him to relocate to a different state 1: holding that a qualified or conditional consent is tantamount to a refusal except where a driver qualifies a refusal on his having an opportunity to contact an attorney 2: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 3: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated by refusal to allow him to contact counsel after he was given misleading information on consequences of refusal to take bloodalcohol test 4: holding that witness whose life had been threatened forcing him to relocate was not required to disclose true name address or telephone number", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "for first degree murder and when the judgment has become final in the trial court, the defendant shall have the right of direct appeal from the trial court to the court of criminal appeals. The affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the Tennessee supreme court.\u201d). 7 . Application of this pre 1989 version of the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance is proper as the offense was committed in 1987. See State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.1994). 8 . The trial court correctly deleted \"torture\u201d from the instruction, as both parties concede that the evidence does not support a finding that the murder involved torture. See State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 478-79 (Tenn.1993) (citing State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 139-40 (Tenn.1981) (<HOLDING>)). 9 . In Houston v. Dutton, the whole Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence 1: recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence 2: holding that trial court may charge on involuntary manslaughter only where evidence exists to support such a verdict 3: holding that without transcript of trial proceedings appellate court cannot review underlying evidence so as to conclude that trial courts judgment is not supported by evidence 4: holding that a trial court should charge only those aspects of an aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence in a case", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the acquisition of a new claim of homestead defeats and discharges a previously-filed claim of homestead. The court agreed with Citizens, holding that the plain language of \u00a7 2 meant that Garran\u2019s \u00a7 1A declaration and corresponding homestead exemption was defeated and discharged by his wife\u2019s subsequent \u00a7 1 declaration. We agree that this is the proper reading of the statutory language. Garran\u2019s wife filed a declaration of homestead under \u00a7 1 on February 21, 2001. The declaration of homestead under \u00a7 1 is an acquisition of a homestead \u201cfor the benefit of [the] family.\u201d Id. \u00a7 1. Therefore, by his wife\u2019s filing of a \u00a7 1 declaration, Garran, as her spouse and member of her family, \u201cacquired\u201d a homestead on February 21, 2001. See In re Roberts, 280 B.R. 540, 547 (Bankr.D.Mass. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Section 2 states that \u201cthe acquisition of a Holdings: 0: recognizing that the eighth amendment protects individuals from a lingering death 1: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 2: holding that the fourth amendment protects people not places 3: recognizing that a declaration filed under subsection 1 protects even the nonfiling debtor 4: recognizing that no private right of action exists for subsection a violations", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The investigation request form prepared by Kathryn Siegel alerted Elmer to the fact that petitioner had stated that a man named Charles Mitchell had seen petitioner \u201ctotally loaded\u201d and \u201crunning down the street,\u201d and petitioner himself told Elmer both before and during trial that Charles Mitchell could corroborate his account of the events preceding his entry into the Gonzalez home. Once he was made aware that Charles Mitchell was a witness to these events, Elmer was obligated to follow up with him to determine what he would say and whether he could give credible testimony in support of the defense. See, e.g., Riley, 352 F.3d at 1319. Of course, the Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to interview every possible witness. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1274 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Judicial scrutiny \u201cmust be highly Holdings: 0: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 1: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective 2: holding counsel will be held ineffective if he made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment and such performance prejudiced the defense 3: holding performance  not ineffective where trial counsel reviewed transcripts of interviews conducted by others 4: holding that reversal required where trial court did not attach portions of the transcripts to refute claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to improper closing argument", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (\"PI. Mem.'') at 18. 64 . See Complaint \u00b6\u00b6 34-35. 65 . See Commercial Union Ins. Co., 347 F.3d at 462 (citations omitted) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency \u00a7\u00a7 15, 26) (finding that an agency relationship is established when there are facts sufficient to demonstrate both that the principal intended to grant authority to the agent and the agent assented). See also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 483, 912 N.Y.S.2d 508, 938 N.E.2d 941 (2010) (\"Whether apparent authority exists is a fact-based determination requiring inquiry into the conduct of the principal.\u201d). 66 . See Complaint \u00b6 36. 67 . See id. \u00b6 20. 68 . See id. \u00b6 33. 69 . See Contractual Obligation Prods., LLC, 2006 WL 6217754, at *19 (citing Weiss, 69 F.Supp.2d at 462) (<HOLDING>). 70 . See Complaint \u00b6\u00b6 22, 43; SPA at 30. 71 . Holdings: 0: holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party 1: holding that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 2: holding plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 3: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 4: holding that under the rule 8 standard a short plain statement is sufficient", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the insured consciously desires the result of his or her act and the term \u2018expect\u2019 requires that the insured knows with substantial certainty that l 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (\u201cAn injury is expected if the insured was consciously aware that the injury was practically certain to occur.\u201d); James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Ky. 1991) (\u201cThe \u2018expected or intended\u2019 exception is inapplicable unless the insured specifically and subjectively intends the injury giving rise to the claim.\u201d); Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (noting that \u201c[t]he subjective intent of the insured . . . will determine whether an act is intentional\u201d); Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gervais, 1998 ME 197, \u00b6 11, 715 A.2d 938 (<HOLDING>) (quotations omitted); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the policy language expected or intended by an insured person is unambiguous and requires a subjective intent on behalf of the insured 1: holding that the exclusion is triggered when the insured subjectively expects or intends that bodily injury will occur 2: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended 3: holding that the inclusion of the phrase by the insured indicates that its application is triggered when the insured subjectively expects or intends that bodily injury will occur and not merely when an ordinary reasonable person would be able to foresee injury occurring as a result of his acts 4: holding that the standard policy exclusion of injuries expected or intended by the insured refers only to bodily injury that the insured in fact subjectively wanted intended to be a result of his conduct or in fact subjectively foresaw as practically certain expected to be a result of his conduct", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding whether the PSD adequately investigated that incident, the alleged facts concerning the Harper incident along with the broader allegations concerning routine failure to investigate excessive force claims permit a reasonable inference that the PSD failed to adequately investigate the Harper incident. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the PSD \u201cin the period before and since this event, has unfounded other complaints of excessive force by law enforcement.\u201d Compl. \u00b6 72. Though that allegation is somewhat ambiguous, it further suggests, at least implicitly, that the PSD has failed to adequately investigate claims of the use of excessive force. Cf. Owens v. Baltimore City State\u2019s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 403 (4th Cir.2014) (published) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, through the factual allegations Holdings: 0: holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii 1: holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct 2: holding that allegations of reported and unreported cases from the period of time before and during the events complained of establishing that the defendant had a custom policy or practice of knowingly and repeatedly violating constitutional rights were nonconclusory 3: holding the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing inapplicable when a witness had been deported during the period of time the defendant had been a fugitive 4: holding that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing that he properly served an agent of the defendant", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "526 U.S. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1239. 2. Thus, whether venue was proper for the section 924(c) violation charged in Count Seven depends on whether an overt act occurred in Maryland. Babb and Moore argue that the conspiracy had been terminated by the arrests of Moore, Babb, and Bush at the time the weapons were seized. However, because there was no termination of the conspiracy and an overt act occurred in Maryland, venue was proper there. A conspiracy is not terminated merely because its participants are arrested. United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1240 (4th Cir.1989). Even if substantial time has passed between the formation of the conspiracy and the last overt act, the conspiracy has not necessarily ended. Joyner v. United States, 547 F.2d 1199, 1203 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Instead, the defendant bears the burden to Holdings: 0: holding that the end of a conspiracy must be affirmatively shown 1: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 2: holding that prejudice cannot merely be alleged it must be affirmatively proved 3: holding that wrongful or improper purpose must be shown for jurisdictional purposes 4: holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "entirely within a single lane\u201d (emphasis added). While I find that Crivello is credible that the rig op were justified, defendants argue that Crivello did not have a reasonable suspicion authorized borrower of the ear, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the RV itself, but only that he lacked such an expectation in the closet. I disagree because he was the driver of the car at the time of the stop, had possession of the keys to the car, had been living in the RV for the two days prior to the search, and planned to use the RV as a home for the duration of the cross-country trip. Courts have recognized standing by homeowners to challenge searches of containers found on their premises but owned by third parties. See United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 218 (1st Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Issacs, 708 F.2d 1365, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who had constructively possessed a shotgun that was owned by his brother and used solely for lawful sporting purposes was entitled to a reduction under ussg  2k21b2 1: holding that defendant had standing to challenge the seizure of a box regardless of who owned it because it was in a house owned and possessed by defendant 2: holding that owner of a chattel seized during an illegal search of a car owned by a third party has standing to object to the seizure but no standing to object to the search 3: holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance 4: holding defendant who was employee of and had key to his fathers business  premises searched  lacked standing to challenge search of building his father owned", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "district courts should handle motions by the government to reconsider suppression orders. When the government seeks reconsideration of a suppression order based on a new legal argument or evidence, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits require the government to justify its failure to present this legal argument or evidence in the earlier proceedings. See United States v. Villabona-Gamica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1055 (11th Cir. 1995) (\u201cBy failing to raise an issue at a suppression hearing without offering any justification therefor, the government waives its right to assert it in subsequent proceedings.\u201d (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting, in parenthetical, United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir.1983))); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, the Second, Fifth, Holdings: 0: holding that our court will not consider an issue of whether a defendant has standing to seek suppression of evidence if the issue was not raised in the lower court 1: holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal 2: holding that suppression issue not raised to the district court was waived under rule 12 3: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   4: holding that the government was obligated to advance stronger justification for relitigating a suppression issue where the issue raised was clear and a considered ruling had been made", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "by relying on the facts in the presentence report to satisfy the factual basis for his guilty plea. According to Oehler, the lack of a specific overt act during the conspiracy time frame rendered the factual basis insufficient. We affirm. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) requires that the district court satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea prior to entering judgment. However, because Oehler did not move in district court to withdraw his guilty plea, his challenge to the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.2002). A district court may find the factual basis for the plea \u201cfrom anything that appears on the record,\u201d and the court may defer its inquiry until sentencing. Id. at 531 (<HOLDING>). Here, Oehler stipulated that a factual basis Holdings: 0: holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient 1: holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report 2: holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report 3: holding that the district court committed plain error in relying solely on the factual description in the presentence report 4: holding defendant waived alleged factual inaccuracies in presentence report by failing to raise them in district court", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "one or more of the following: (i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 9543(a)(2)(i). 14 . Appellee presumably concedes that the remaining subsections of Section 9543(a)(2)-are not applicable to his Batson claim. 15 . Moreover, this Court has examined Batson claims within the PCRA framework, albeit without challenges being raised as to the applicability of the PCRA eligibility requirements relied upon here by Appellee. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268 (2006) (finding Batson claim waived); Commonwealth v. Sneed, supra, (<HOLDING>);. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 571 Pa. 85, 811 Holdings: 0: holding claim is not cognizable 1: holding claim is cognizable 2: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 3: holding that while batson claim was waived derivative claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the batson claim is cognizable under the pcra 4: holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the pcra", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as upon information within the affiant\u2019s own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily. But surely it is to be \u2018truthful\u2019 in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.\u2019 Id. at 164-65. Franks clearly establishes, therefore, that an officer of the law may not make affirmative or reckless misrepresentations to the court in a warrant affidavit. The Eleventh Circuit has noted, since the O\u2019Ferrells\u2019 ease began, that Franks clearly established, for qualified immunity purposes, that an officer may not make an \u201caffirmative misstatement\u201d in \u2018applying for a warrant. See Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d at 1555 (<HOLDING>). The Eleventh Circuit \u2019interpreted Franks to Holdings: 0: holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under  1346 1: holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established 2: holding that franks had clearly established that a public official could not intentionally perjure himself in seeking warrant 3: holding that if official has violated clearly established law he is entitled to qualified immunity only if reasonable official could have believed conduct was lawful 4: holding police officer is a public official", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at 1428-29. It has been held that a disclosure sufficient to waive the work product protection does not have to be intentional; therefore inadvertent or unintentional disclosures of protected materials also might result in the waiver of the privilege. See, e.g., Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed.Cir.1990). However, such a disclosure does not automatically forfeit the attorney work product privilege. In determining whether a party has waived the privilege- through an inadvertent or involuntary disclosure, courts consider, among other factors,- the steps taken by a party to remedy the disclosure and any delay in doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., 885 F.Supp. 672, 676 (M.D.Pa.1994); cf. United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). But see Carter, 909 F.2d at 1451 (holding Holdings: 0: recognizing privilege 1: holding that a defendant waived his attorneyclient privilege with regards to a seized letter because he waited six months after the seizure to assert his privilege 2: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 3: holding that governmental entities may assert attorneyclient privilege to prevent disclosure of information otherwise required by statute 4: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to Complete Discovery. 2 . PL\u2019s Compl. 120. 3 . Officer Synder is a police officer with the Philadelphia Police Department who was a deputized Federal Officer with the FBI at the time of the events giving rise to this suit. 4 . Def.\u2019s Mots. to Compel Ex. B at 3. 5 . Pl.\u2019s Dep. at 117. 6 . Pl.\u2019s Resp. to Def.\u2019s Mot. at 8. 7 . In her Response to the Motion, Robinson states: \"Upon information and belief, it appears as if the government is maintaining the position that [Robinson] is permitted to testify to any and all matters relating to her conversations with the FBI.\" Pl.'s Resp. to Def.\u2019s Mot. at 8. 8 . Def.\u2019s Mots, to Compel Ex. B at 3. 9 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(1)(C). 10 . Vt. Agency of Nat\u2019l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Holdings: 0: holding that the provisions of the false claims act allowing suit imposing liability on any person who presented false claims to the federal government did not allow suits against state governments 1: holding that a state or agency is not a person subject to qui tam liability under the false claims act 2: holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states 3: holding that a state agency is not a person subject to suit under federal false claims act 4: holding that the fca effectively assigns the governments claims to qui tam plaintiffs  who then may sue based upon an injury to the federal treasury", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "head. Further examination of the baby revealed eighteen unexplained rib, leg and arm fractures in various stages of healing, in addition to a skull fracture. The mother denied any knowledge of the injuries except for the skull fracture, which she explained was accidental. DCF was notified and initiated an investigation. DCF subsequently sought termination of both parents\u2019 rights pursuant to sections 89.806(l)(f), (g) Florida Statutes (2010). The record shows that the evidence presented to the trial court did not rea undamental liberty interest, DCF must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child or children from serious harm. Id. at 571; see also J.C. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 937 So.2d 184, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>); L.D. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., Holdings: 0: holding that although parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children they have no fundamental right to allocate support to their children as they see fit 1: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children 2: holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 3: recognizing in dictum parents right to care custody management and companionship of their children 4: holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for f ends on resolution of a substantial question of workmen\u2019s compensation law Harper\u2019s retaliation claim also does not arise under Michigan\u2019s Worker\u2019s Disability Compensation Act according to the second \u201carising under\u201d definition because the claim does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question under that statute. The retaliation claim does not implicate the administrative or remedial mechanisms of that statutory scheme, require courts to interpret the statute, or seek an award of compensation for personal injury that causes a diminished wage-earning capacity, which is the only type of compensation that the statute affords, MICH. COMP. LAWS \u00a7 418.301(1), (4). See Thornton v. Denny\u2019s Inc., No. 92-1368, 1993 WL 137078, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.29, 1993) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). As the Seventh Circuit explained regarding a Holdings: 0: holding that claim for retaliatory discharge premised on michigans workers compensation statute does not arise under that law because the statute provides neither the mechanisms nor the remedy for this type of suit 1: holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law 2: recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act 3: holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws 4: holding that a claim for retaliatory discharge premised on missouris workers compensation law arises under that law for purposes of  1445c because antiretaliation provision also authorized the filing of a civil action for damages the antiretaliation right established by the missouri workers compensation statute is an essential element of plaintiffs claim", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "torture.\u201d As is evident from the facts recited above, there is more than ample evidence to support such a conclusion. This distinction\u2014finding torture but not depravity of mind\u2014is significant. The vagueness problem of the \u201cheinous, atrocious, and cruel\u201d (\u201cHAC\u201d) instruction is curable with appropriately narrowing language. We have held, of course, that requiring \u201ctorture or depravity of mind\u201d does not solve the vagueness problem. Requiring only torture, however, does. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (implying that \u201ctorture\u201d limitation suffices to cure vagueness of HAC); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (confirming implication); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 793 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); cf. Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1319-20 Holdings: 0: holding evidence of serious physical injury insufficient where victim was shot in right cheek but did not have to have surgery and victim denied having any longterm effects from the shooting 1: holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another 2: holding that torture occurs when the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death that serious sexual abuse may constitute serious physical abuse that facts supporting a finding of torture will also support a finding of depravity of mind and that the age of the victim may be considered in determining whether the evidence shows depravity of mind 3: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction 4: holding that torture of the victim or serious physical abuse language in the instruction cures vagueness of hac", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of FDCPA claims, concluding that the obligation to pay for criminal or tortious actions does not constitute a \u201cdebt.\u201d See, e.g., Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]lthough a thief undoubtedly has an obligation to pay for the goods or services he steals, the FDCPA limits its reach to those obligations to pay arising from consensual transactions, where parties negotiate or contract for consumer-related goods or services.\u201d); Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1168 (3d Cir.1987) (\u201c[N]othing in the statute or the legislative history leads us to believe that Congress intended to equate asserted tort liability with asserted con sumer debt.\u201d); Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs argue that they were in consensual Holdings: 0: holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa 1: holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities 2: holding that debt under the fdcpa is limited to liability arising out of consensual consumer transactions and not tortious activity 3: holding the fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activity even when that activity consists of litigation 4: holding that unpaid traffic fine is not debt under fdcpa", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "jury to conclude that the vehicle registration and inspection lane checklist, which indicated that a vehicle owned by Mendoza and bearing the license plate number 0285 had been inspected on June 4, 2009, was false. Moreover, Wheatley\u2019s testimony that Mendoza physically deposited the 0285 license plates with the Commission when he sold the 0285 license plates and medallion in December 2008 would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Mendoza knew the vehicle registration and inspection lane checklist were false. A jury could also reasonably infer from Mendoza\u2019s possession of the false vehicle registration and inspection lane checklist that he had procured those documents and that he had the intent to file them at the BMV. See United States v. Hall, 632 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1980) (<HOLDING>); People v. Rodriguez, 71 A.D.3d 450, 897 Holdings: 0: holding evidence establishing the intent of the defendants to distribute drugs also permits the inference they intended to exercise dominion over them to demonstrate constructive possession 1: holding jurys finding that money in bank safe deposit box was contraband was not supported by factually sufficient evidence when safety deposit box was located a distance away from marijuana despite fact that canine alerted to safety deposit box 2: holding defendants possession of fake ids was sufficient to infer his intent to defraud or deceive 3: holding defendants possession of forged checks was sufficient to allow inference of his intent to deposit them 4: holding that an inference of intent to distribute was not warranted from the possession of one ounce of cocaine", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(1952). The general test to resolve this question employs the following factors: 1) the form and manner of the employment contract concerning provisions of full-time or part-time employment; 2) whether the employment contract provides for vacation time, sick leave, or a retirement program; 3) the extent an nature of control the individual has over the execution of his duties; 4) the form of payment; and 5) the ownership status of equipment which is utilized. Rivera v. Hospital Universitario, 762 F.Supp. at 17. No one factor, by itself, is sufficient to establish an individual as an independent contractor. Id. In fact, it is unusual to find cases where the distinction between an \u201cindependent contractor\u201d and an employee is crystal clear. Nazario v. Gonzalez, 101 D.P.R. 569, 572 (1973) (<HOLDING>). In Landr\u00f3n v. Labor Relations Board, 87 Holdings: 0: holding that depriving an employee of vacation days to which he was entitled would constitute adverse action 1: holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed 2: holding that vacation pay is shortterm compensation because an employee must work six months before getting any vacation vacation pay was computed on the basis of the employees weekly earnings and if an employee was laid off he received vacation pay on a pro rata basis 3: holding that under the mwa the question of whether an employee was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of statutory interpretation 4: holding that an electrical appliance representative and salesperson was not an independent contractor but an employee and as such was entitled to unpaid compensation for accumulated vacation time", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "abuse of discretion. VI. Finally, the failure to give eyewitness identification instructions was not harmless. To reiterate, the State lacked any evidence directly connecting Cabinatan to the charged offenses. The testimony of Kincaid was in some respects inconsistent with the police report she filled out before viewing Cabina-tan. Also, her identification was the result of the inherently suggestive environment of a police showup. Cabinatan presented alibi evidence that indicated that he was not present when the thefts occurred. Hence, there was a reasonable possibility that the absence of eyewitness instructions caused the jury to place undue weight on Kincaid\u2019s testimony; thus contributing to Cabinatan\u2019s conviction. See State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 356, 378, 60 P.3d 306, 328 (2002) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent Holdings: 0: holding that error is considered harmless if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction 1: holding that the harmless error test places a burden on the state to prove that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or alternatively stated that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction 2: holding that under the harmless error standard an appellate court must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to the conviction 3: holding that harmless error test is satisfied when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction 4: holding that an error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to \u201c[m]ake reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of qualified employees with handicaps unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the agency's program,\" 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1614.102(a)(8). In order to fall under the protections of the Rehabilitation Act, a claimant must have a disability. The term \"disability,\" as used in the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, means \"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such impairment.\" 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12102(2). In determining whether an impairment significantly restricts an individual's ability to perform a major , 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Petty v. Freightliner Corp., 123 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a twentyfive pounds lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities 1: holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity 2: holding as a matter of law that a twentyfive pound lifting limitation does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity 3: holding that a lifting restriction did not substantially limit a computer technicians ability to engage in the major life activity of working 4: holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(\"The parties are entitled to all instructions on their legal theories of the case, provided the instructions are timely requested, supported by evidence, and correctly state the law.\u201d) (citing United States v. Jerde, 841 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir.1988)). 25 . See United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873, 884 (6th Cir.2010) (\"Where there are conflicting authorities, the district court could not have committed plain error.\u201d) (citing United States v. Williams, 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir.1995)); Rice v. Office of Servicemembers\u2019 Grp. Life Ins., 260 F.3d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir.2001) (\u201cWhile there is conflicting authority, we cannot say that the jury instruction amounted to plain error.\u201d) (citation omitted). See also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 26 . See State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law 1: holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error 2: holding that an error cannot be plain unless it is clear under current law quotation omitted 3: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 4: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "now moves to dismiss the complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction. II. The defendant argues tha aid fall into the latter its by taxpayers for refunds of taxes and penalties paid. See 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7422(f). However, such suits must be filed within two years of the decision by the IRS refusing the claim for refund. The governing statute states: No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) for the recovery of any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from t .2d 320, 324 (6th Cir.1990) (observing that \u201cas with most periods of limitation involving suits against the sovereign, the prerequisites to suit described in section 6532\u2019s \u2018general rule\u2019 are jurisdictional\u201d); Stevens v. United States, 859 F.Supp. 1110 (W.D.Mich.1994) (<HOLDING>); United Iron & Metal Co. v. Carey, 137 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: recognizing that  1404a allows for the transfer of federal employers liability act suits 1: holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations 2: recognizing that  1404a allows for the transfer of clayton act suits 3: holding that since limitations section in internal revenue code allows for suits against a sovereign its requirements are jurisdictional 4: holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "appears to be no major gender difference in the overall frequency of Delusional Disorder. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (2000), 297.1, atp. 326. 92 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 145-50. 93 . Id., at p. 151. 94 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 153-54. 95 . Id.., atpp. 154-58. 96 . Id., atpp. 170-71. 97 . Id., atpp. 172-73. 98 . Id., atpp. 180-81. 99 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Michael A. Roman, atp. 183. 100 . Id.., at p. 188. 101 . Id., at pp. 200-03. 102 . Id., at p. 203. 103 . Id., at pp. 206-07. 104 . Id., at pp. 209-10. 105 . I'd., at pp. 211-12. 106 . See Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 300 n. 25 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)(<HOLDING>); Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 870 Holdings: 0: holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial after defendant was found incompetent to stand trial in the midst of trial 1: holding that the due process clause prohibits the trial of a person who is incompetent 2: holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial 3: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 4: holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.\u201d 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A habeas petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must succeed on both prongs of the Strickland test. Butcher v. United States, 368 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir.2004). The Supreme Court has provided the following explanation regarding Strickland\u2019s application in the guilty plea context: In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland [ ] test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence .... [t]he second, or \u2018prejudice,\u2019 requirement, on the other hand, focuses 1991) (<HOLDING>). Alvarez-Sanchez\u2019s assertion that Deering did Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea 1: holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea  emphasis added 2: holding that the defendant remains the master of his case particularly with respect to the entry of a guilty plea 3: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 4: holding entry of a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional issues", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "court harmless. The district court stated that although the jury\u2019s special verdict \u201cwould have no impact upon the [c]ourt\u2019s sentencing decision,\u201d it would impact the court\u2019s decision if \u201cthe Supreme Court later determine[d] that Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] extends to federal sentencing.\u201d As mentioned above, the special verdict indicated that Soreide was responsible for $7 million to $20 million in actual loss and more than $20 million in intended loss, and that he participated as an organizer or leader. Because these jury findings were identical to those made by the sentencing judge and because they would be applied upon resentencing, any constitutional error was harmless. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 892 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). As for Soreide\u2019s claim of statutory Booker Holdings: 0: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding a constitutional booker error harmless on the ground that because the district court stated its sentence would be the same even if the guidelines were only advisory  we know with certainty beyond a reasonable doubt what the district court would do upon remand 2: holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted 3: holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence 4: holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "without their permission. Bums Librarian O'Neill states in his affidavit that \"[h]ad the assurances of confidentiality not been made, it is doubtful that any paramilitary would have participated in this oral history project. Their stories would have died with them, and an opportunity to document and preserve a critical part of the historical record would have been lost forever.\u201d 27 . Appellants\u2019 intervention complaint raised the same claims as their separate civil complaint. We have affirmed that there is no cause of action under the treaty and under the Constitution, so there is no need for us to consider whether the district court acted within its discretion in denying appellants' motion to intervene. Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 28 . Appellants also claim that the Attorney Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed 1: holding that a denial of qualified immunity on the law is collateral to the merits of the underlying action and is therefore considered final for appellate purposes 2: holding that the district courts error was however harmless in light of other considerations 3: holding that the district courts error in calculating the amount of drugs at issue was harmless because the error had no impact on the defendants sentence 4: holding that the district courts denial of a petition to intervene was harmless error because the merits of the appellants claim were eventually considered on appeal", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "must advise the employee of this fact and provide the employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any deficiency in the certification. Darst, 512 F.3d at 910. 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 825.305(d). In the case of an unforeseeable, serious health condition, an employee has \"15 calendar days after the employer\u2019s request\u201d to submit certification from her physician. Kauffman, 426 F.3d at 885. 4 . To be considered an \"eligible employee\u201d under the FMLA, an employee must demonstrate that, on the date which FMLA leave is to commence, the employee: (1) has been employed for a total of at least 12 months by the employer, and (2) has been employed for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 2611(2); 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 825.110(a). Bailey, 2009 WL 2970395 at *3 (<HOLDING>); Lonergan v. Cargo Tech. Inc., 2009 WL 3152562 Holdings: 0: holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiffs leave exceeded twelve weeks within a twelve month period 1: holding a plaintiff to be ineligible for fmla leave wherein the plaintiff had not accumulated enough work hours 2: holding that employees who exceed the twelve weeks of fmla leave stand to lose their entitlement to job restoration even if their employers provide additional nonfmla leave 3: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave 4: holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). A motion to dismiss may only be granted where the allegations fail to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Dismissal is warranted \u201cif it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved.\u201d Klein v. General Nutrition Cos., Inc., 186 F.3d s Brennan and its progeny too broadly. Specifically, Hartford asserts that where a dispute centers on whether a particular policy provision is contrary to a constitutional, legislative or administrative mandate, the controversy may be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Warner v. Continental/CNA Ins. Cos., 455 Pa.Super. 295, 688 A.2d 177, 181 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In view of this exception, Hartford maintains Holdings: 0: holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator 1: recognizing general rule 2: recognizing exception to general rule that disputes arising under contract with valid arbitration clause are referred to arbitrator 3: holding that an arbitrator not a federal or state court will resolve questions concerning validity in the first instance when parties agree to arbitrate all disputes arising under their contract 4: holding defenses concerning the contract as a whole must be referred to ah arbitrator while defenses to the arbitration provision itself are considered by the court", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The prosecutor explained that he was requesting the amendment only because he was unsure whether the multiple diamonds embedded in the ring were properly characterized as \u201cclusters.\u201d It is unclear whether Nations\u2019s argument on appeal is intended to challenge this amendment, as her brief does not mention the ring. In any event, this amendment was also permissible.. The State is permitted to amend the indictment to correct \u201cthe description of any property or thing,\u201d provided the amendment is not material or prejudicial. Miss. Code Ann. \u00a7 99-17-13 (Rev. 2015); see Jackson v. State, 450 So.2d 1081, 1082 (Miss.1984) (explaining that \u201c[t]he indictment could have been amended\u201d to allege theft of \u201crib eye roasts\u201d rather than \u201crib eye steak\u201d); Bennett v. State, 211 So.2d 520, 522 (Miss.1968) (<HOLDING>); Andrews v. State, 220 Miss. 28, 31, 70 So.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 1: holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment 2: holding that the indictment was permissibly amended to change the brand name of the barbed wire stolen 3: holding that the amendment made to the indictment in this case was not authorized by code  192231 because the amended indictment materially changed the nature of the offense originally charged 4: holding that the indictment was permissibly amended to change the description of a stolen watch", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Israel, 19 Wn. App. at 779. In Israel, after the prosecutor made a motion for competency determination, the trial judge did not appoint any experts to examine the defendant. Id. at 775. Instead, the court proceeded to ask questions of the defendant and allowed the prosecutor to question her. Id. Defense counsel asked no questions hut asked that the court find her competent at the close of the perfunctory examination. Id. at 775-76. While the court acknowledged that \u201cthe Washington statute . . . speak[s] in mandatory language,\u201d id. at 777, it held that the \u201cstatutory requirement that two experts be appointed to examine a defendant is not a constitutional right but is statutory and may be waived by counsel.\u201d Id. at 779; see also State v. Brooks, 16 Wn. App. 535, 538, 557 P.2d 362 (1976) (<HOLDING>). \u00b619 Despite the propriety of waivers in Holdings: 0: holding that the defenses presentation of two psychiatrists testimony constituted an election of the procedure and a waiver of the specific statutory procedures 1: recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure 2: holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b 3: holding that brady does not place any burden upon the government to conduct a defendants investigation or assist in the presentation of the defenses case 4: holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Law and Order Code also explicitly recognizes causes of action for the types of claims asserted against Snooks. Thus, Bassetto\u2019s causes of action are recognized and anticipated by the Washoe Tribe and by the Washoe Tribal Court. It is clear that the existence of tribal legislation in an area will exclude the state even if the tribal legislation differs greatly from the state\u2019s, or offers no remedy. ... A tribe\u2019s legislative jurisdiction over its own people and within its own territory must include the right not to legislate at all in an area, if self-government is to be meaningful. Felix Cohen\u2019s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 351 (1982) (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966), Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974) (<HOLDING>) and Enriquez v. Superior Court, 565 P.2d 522, Holdings: 0: holding that oklahoma police officer was without jurisdiction to arrest indian inside indian reservation when the state has neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction over indian country 1: holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil action filed by a nonindian against an indian for events that occurred on indian land 2: holding that the state has no jurisdiction to pursue an indian onto an indian reservation for criminal offenses committed off the reservation 3: holding that federal court has neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction over civil action by nonindian against indian for events occurring on the reservation 4: holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the defendant has assisted authorities in a manner that avoids preparing for trial, an adjustment under subsection (b) may only be granted upon a formal motion by the Government at the time of sentencing.\u201d Id., comment. (n.6) (emphasis added). We have rejected a defendant\u2019s claim for an additional one-level reduction pursuant to \u00a7 3El.l(b) where there was no government motion filed in support of such a reduction. U.S. v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir.2006), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2096, 167 L.Ed.2d 816 (2007). It appears, however, that we are not precluded from reviewing for an abuse of discretion the government\u2019s refusal to file a motion for a reduction pursuant to \u00a7 3E1.1(b). See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 1844, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding there was no jurisdiction to review district courts discretionary refusal to depart downward on the grounds that defendants conduct constituted a single act of aberrant behavior 1: holding that an insurer is not liable for punitive damages by its refusal to pay a claim unless such refusal is accompanied by a malicious intent to injure or defraud 2: holding in the context of a motion for substantial assistance that federal district courts have authority to review a prosecutors refusal to file a discretionary motion  if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive such as the defendants race or religion 3: recognizing that federal district courts have the authority to grant a remedy if the refusal to file a substantial assistance motion was based on an unconstitutional motive 4: holding the trial court was without authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "notwithstanding the previous Rule 404(b) ruling. Obviously, the calculus of whether or not to place Harris on the stand might have differed if evidence of his prior drug conviction were already before the jury. 2 . Compare Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 714-15 (11th Cir.2002) (in \u00a7 2255 context, where petitioner \"alleges facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief, then the district court should order an evidentiary hearing and rule on the merits of his claim\u201d) (citation omitted) and United States v. Yizar, 956 F.2d 230, 234 (11th Cir.1992) (where \u00a7 2255 petitioner \"has made sufficient allegations so that it cannot be conclusively stated that he is entitled to no relief, ... an evidentiary hearing must be held\u201d) with Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>) and Long v. United States, 883 F.2d 966, 968 Holdings: 0: holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources 1: holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on  2255 petitioners mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit 2: recognizing that evidentiary hearing is not required when  2255 petitioner offers nothing more than conclusoiy allegations 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for PFG whether removing New Mexico PERA and Central States from PFG would be a possible solution. Counsel for PFG answered in the affirmative. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55. A group vying for lead plaintiff status does not necessarily rise and fall as a group. Segmentation is a viable remedy and finds support in the case law. In re Surebeam Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03CV 1721, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25022, at *23 (S.D.Cal. Jan. 5, 2004). There, the court found one member of the presumptive lead plaintiff, FMC Pension Group, inadequate because of its securities industry misconduct. The court explained that it had the authority to \u201cbreak apart a proposed group in search of the most adequate lead plaintiff.\u201d Id.; see also Newman v. Eagle Bldg. Tech., 209 F.R.D. 499, 505 (S.D.Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Lit, 143 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that because the spd at issue stated that it is made part of the group policy its terms were sufficient to find that the plan conferred discretion on the plan administrator 1: holding that one members inadequacy is not imputed to the rest of the group noting that the remainder of the group still claimed a financial interest of well over 1 million 2: holding one of the trustees duties is to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor 3: holding that it is wrong to assume a financial conflict of interest from the fact that the plan administrator is also the insurer 4: recognizing that the primary issue to be considered in whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class is a determination of whether any antagonism exists between the interests of the plaintiffs and those of the remainder of the class", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the meaning of the Restrictions, and the Restrictions specifically preclude the construction or retention of any structure other than a single-family home. It was an abuse of discretion to ignore the language contained in the Restrictions, or to interpret the term \u201cstructure\u201d to exclude the proposed roadway. Holding otherwise would render meaningless \u201c[t]he sanctity of written contracts, [which] defin[e] the rights and duties of the contracting parties,\u201d Apolito v. Johnson, 3 Ariz.App. 358, 360, 414 P.2d 442, 444 (1966), and would violate the clear intent of the Restrictions as a contract among the property owners. \u00b6 20 Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Highland Meadow Estates at Castle Peak Ranch, Inc. v. Buick, 994 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Colo.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part, rev\u2019d in part, 21 P.3d 860 Holdings: 0: holding that a covenant stating that all lots shall be used exclusively for singlefamily dwellings was both a structural and a use restriction that prohibited the building of roads not used in connection with a residence 1: holding that a pasture leased by the policyholder was not used in connection with the residence premises of the policyholder 2: holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction 3: holding that an unpaved public street a short distance from the policyholders home was not part of the insured premises because it was not used in connection with the residence premises 4: holding that homeowners short term rental of home violated deed restriction that home could be used only for singlefamily residence purposes", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to witnesses. Trial Tr. at 360-61, 365, 387-89, 404, 423, 441, 466, 481, 496-97, 562-63, 577, 645. Contrary to the majority\u2019s conclusion, then, a review of the record shows there could have been a disparity between the movements of the parties during the trial that violated Earhart\u2019s \u201cSixth Amendment right to act as his own attorney,\u201d rebutting any factual determination to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(e)(1). A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to conduct one\u2019s own defense is a structural trial error not subject to the harmless-error rule; thus, whether Earhart was prejudiced is irrelevant in determining whether his movement restrictions violated his right to self-representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173, 174, 177, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (<HOLDING>). If Earhart\u2019s rights were violated, the Ohio Holdings: 0: recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice 1: holding that in determining whether a state officer is entitled to qualified immunity for  1983 purposes courts may not consider whether the constitutional right was clearly established before determining first that a constitutional right was violated 2: holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment 3: holding an accused has a constitutional right under the sixth amendment to conduct his own defense and the primary focus in determining whether this right was violated must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way citing faretta v california 422 us 806 95 sct 2525 45 led2d 562 1975 4: holding that the sixth amendment right to present a meaningful defense does not entitle a defendant to present evidence on a question of law", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "another. U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.2(1) (1992). 4 . Although \u201cbank robbery\" is not an expressly listed offense, separate from \u201crobbery,\u201d the Guidelines assume that \"robbery\u201d encompasses \"bank robbery.\" Under section 2B3.1 of the Guidelines, which assigns offense levels to various forms of \u201crobbery,\" a sentencing court is instructed to increase the offense level by a certain number of points \u201c[i]f the property of a financial institution ... was taken____\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2B3.1(b)(1) (1992). 5 . These purposes include, inter alia, (1) \"to provide just punishment;\u201d (2) to deter criminal conduct; and (3) \"to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant____\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a)(2). 6 . Our observation in this regard might be read as implicitly questioning our decision in Baskin, 886 F.2d at 389 (<HOLDING>). We do not address the validity of Baskin in Holdings: 0: holding that robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of habitualoffender sentencing 1: holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc  16 2: holding that a sentencing judge retains discretion to examine the underlying facts of a case in deciding whether an offense is a crime of violence under section 4b12 3: holding that sexual abuse of a minor is a violent crime within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines and noting that definitions of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 and ussg  4b12 differ slightly finding reyescastro to be persuasive in its  4b12 analysis 4: holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in requiring in camera review of the minutes. Fisher, 123 Md.App. at 328, 329, 718 A.2d 627. In Johnson, which was not an action for judicial review, this Court barred the County Executive\u2019s deposition, because the only relevant information concerned his mental processes while performing discretionary acts. See Johnson, 199 Md.App. at 328-30, 21 A.3d 199. 14 . See, e.g., Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 214, 477 A.2d 759 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941)) (just as a party may not depose a judge about his or her decisional processes, \" 'so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected\u2019 \u201d). 15 . Compare Maryland-Nat\u2019l Capital Park & Planning Comm\u2019n v. Mardi-rossian, 184 Md.App. 207, 223, 964 A.2d 713 (2009) (<HOLDING>). 16 . In arguing that the collateral order Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question 1: holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the expertise of an automobile systems expert did not extend to the mental processes and human factors which may have caused an automobile accident 2: holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by tracking the statutory language in the instruction 3: holding that court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the deposition of administrative decisionmakers because the party disavowed any intent to question the commissioners mental processes 4: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "did not file a return to this motion. The trial court granted the motion to alter or amend, finding the district court decision was binding on all parties to this action. It vacated the consent judgment and restored the case to the trial docket. Payne filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed. LAW/ANALYSIS The Pocisks assert the order granting Rule 60(b) relief is not immediately appealable. We agree. The determination of whether a party may immediately appeal an order issued before or during trial is governed primarily by statute. S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 14-3-330 (1976 & Supp. 2007); Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 195, 607 S.E.2d 707, 70 part of a pleading in the action. Therefore, neither subsections (a) nor (c) apply to this order. P (1980) (<HOLDING>); Anglin Stone v. Curtis, 146 N.C.App. 608, 553 Holdings: 0: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 1: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 2: holding an order allowing a motion under rule 60b is not immediately appealable because it is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right 3: holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 4: holding that overruling of motion to quash does not affect substantial right and is therefore not final appealable order", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at 73. 5 Id. 6 RCW 51.52.115; Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wn.2d 795, 800 n.4, 953 P.2d 800 (1998); Dep\u2019t of Labor & Indus. v. Fankhauser, 121 Wn.2d 304, 308, 849 P.2d 1209 (1993). 7 ROW -51.52.115. 8 ROW 51.52.140; McClelland v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 65 Wn. App. 386, 390, 828 P.2d 1138 (1992). 9 Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). 10 CR 56(c). 11 Ranger Ins. Co., 164 Wn.2d at 552. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id.; see also Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, 154 Wn.2d 16, 26, 109 P.3d 805 (2005). 15 Sligar v. Odell, 156 Wn. App. 720, 725, 233 P.3d 914 (2010). 16 Id. (quoting Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989)). 17 Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Labor & Indus., 19 Wn. App. 800, 804, 578 P.2d 59 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 18 Young, 112 Wn.2d at 225-26. 19 RCW Holdings: 0: holding the appellant needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her husbands death fell within the terms of the insurance policy 1: holding that wife could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of her husband where the husbands claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of his death even though husbands death occurred after the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments as wifes status as a dependent was subject to determination as of the time of husbands injury 2: holding that it was appellants burden to prove that her husbands death occurred in the scope of employment and that she was eligible for widows benefits 3: holding widows claim that deceased husbands former employer and its life insurance carrier were negligent in their handling of husbands conversion of benefits was preempted by erisa finding the liability of the defendants is dependent upon the existence of the erisa plan and the interpretation of rights conferred by it 4: holding that the employee was acting within the course of her employment when she died while returning from the workrelated session because her death occurred on a public highway which was brought within the scope of her employment by her employers requirement that she attend training at the state police academy", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "he held a press conference announcing his candidacy, Nix Decl. \u00b6 7; see also Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 907 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that a plaintiff \u201ccan freely augment his pleadings with affidavits,\u201d such as the affidavit Nix filed discussing, among other things, his press conference, to establish the plaintiffs standing). The district court nonetheless app . FEC, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In our view, Nix\u2019s allegation that he intended to run in the November 2011 election and his public announcement at the press conference sufficiently establish the \u201csubstantial probability\u201d of imminent injury required for Article III standing. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C.Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Shays, 414 F.3d at 92 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, as Nix argues, a contrary holding Holdings: 0: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search 1: holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop 2: holding that senator mcconnell lacked standing to challenge a provision of the bipartisan campaign reform act of 2002 bcra that at earliest would have affected him in his 2008 reelection campaign 3: recognizing taxpayer standing to assert a constitutional challenge to the manner of a judicial election given the special circumstances involved 4: holding that incumbent congressmen subject to twoyear election cycles had standing to challenge the fecs implementation of certain provisions of bcra", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Delta Airlines and Gary Richter contend that because Plaintiffs breach of contract claim arises out of events which occurred during the course of embarkation of an international flight, her claim is preempted by the Montreal Convention. Plaintiff responds that her claim falls outside the scope of the Convention because she alleges nonperformance of a contract. Although the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed this issue, a number of other federal courts have concluded that where the complaint alleges complete nonperformance of a contract, rather than delay in transportation, the Montreal Convention does not preempt a plaintiffs breach of contract claim. See, e.g., Nankin v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. CV-09-07851, 2010 WL 342632, at *7 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Mullaney v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. Holdings: 0: holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the montreal convention 1: holding plaintiffs claims were not preempted by the montreal convention because they were grounded in a cause of action for nonperformance of a contract and not delay 2: holding plaintiffs breach of contract claim was not preempted by the montreal convention because plaintiff was seeking damages resulting from deltas refusal to provide him with any flight home after having taken his money for a ticket  in short for failure to perform its obligation to provide carriage in exchange for money it had received 3: holding that the montreal convention was not applicable to plaintiffs claims because based on plaintiffs allegations it clearly appears that through its employees continental refused to perform the contract 4: holding plaintiffs breach of contract claims fell outside the scope of the montreal convention because the plain language of article 19 of the montreal convention indicates that it governs claims for delay not nonperformance", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "review. (d) Martin argues that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument repeatedly misled the jury regarding the effect of a sentence of guilty but mentally ill. While it was not improper for the prosecutor to state that it would not be justice for the jury to impose a sentence of guilty but mentally ill if it was not supported by the evidence, we agree that it was improper to refer to such a verdict using the phrases, \u201ca break\u201d and \u201ca pass,\u201d and by making similar arguments. We note, however, that such language would have been permissible in the sentencing phase where, regardless of whether the jury had found Martin guilty or guilty but mentally ill, the jury would be choosing between imposing a death sentence or granting mercy. See Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 764 (12) (620 SE2d 778) (2005) (<HOLDING>). Because Martin did not object to this line of Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 1: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 2: holding that the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict 3: holding that a jury verdict of guilty constitutes a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms statute and therefore the defendant was convicted of a felony during the interval between the jurys return of its guilty verdict and his scheduled sentencing 4: holding that where the evidence offered by the state and admitted by the trial court  whether erroneously or not  would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "similar to those presented here, involving an infant delivered by emergency caesarean section at 23-weeks\u2019 gestation that received lifesaving resuscitation contrary to the parents\u2019 wishes. The infant survived but later suffered a brain hemorrhage, a common complication of premature birth, which resulted in severe and permanent disabilities. In rejecting the parents\u2019 informed consent claim, the court in Miller, id. at 769, concluded that even though the parents were present in the delivery room, \u201cthere was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment . . . without jeopardizing [the infant\u2019s] life\u201d because the infant might survive with treatment but would likely die if treatment were postponed. See also Montalvo v. Borkovec, 2002 WI App 147, 256 Wis. 2d 472, 647 N.W.2d 413, 420 (<HOLDING>). In this case, as well, there was no time for Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole 1: holding that the informed consent doctrine does not apply in the context of emergency treatment provided to a neonate following a caesarean procedure because the failure to treat would be tantamount to a death sentence 2: holding that the doctrine does not apply in such circumstancesi 3: holding in case where plaintiff sought damages resulting from the defendants failure to pay the accidental death benefit claims she filed following death of her husband transfer to south carolina was warranted because with the exception of plaintiffs relocation to the state of west virginia following the death of the decedent the cause of action bears virtually no relation to the forum chosen by the plaintiff 4: holding that even if the court were to apply the apex doctrine the doctrine would not preclude the deposition of two corporate executives in that case", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "crime. In accordance with our reasoning in Mordica, therefore, section 784.045(l)(b) defines a specific intent crime because the statute requires the knowing commission of a battery on a pregnant woman. Appellant is thus correct to argue that the doctrine of transferred intent does not operate in the instant case to elevate V.M.\u2019s general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to violate section 784.045(l)(b). See (Mordica, 618 So.2d at 304-05)(\u201cIn this case, the state could not apply the doctrine of transferred intent to enhance the severity of the crime from simple battery to battery of a law enforcement officer by only proving that simple battery against the inmate was intended.\u201d). See also D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we affirm appellant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding where school principal was struck while trying to stop student fight transferred intent operates to transfer students intent to commit simple battery on classmate thus negating conviction for attempted battery on school official which requires heightened level of intent 1: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery 2: holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two 3: holding that prior battery was admissible to prove defendants intent to injure 4: holding sentence enhancement statute did not create offense of attempted battery on school employee and thus minors adjudication of delinquency should have been based on finding that minor committed attempted battery", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.1999). This Court reached a similar conclusion in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 919 F.Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Sotomayor, J.), holding that arbitration clauses only affect \u201cprocedural right[s]\u201d and \u201cthe parties\u2019 substantive rights remain amply protected.\u201d Id. at 139. The right to have a dispute heard in an arbitral forum is a procedural right that affects the forum that will decide the substantive rights of the parties. Therefore, applying the present law to this dispute would not have a disfavored retroactive consequence. Rather, because the parties\u2019 substantive rights remain unaffected by this statute, it is proper to apply the present law to this dispute. See Pezza, 767 F.Supp.2d at 234 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, section 922 of Dodd-Frank applies Holdings: 0: holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights 1: recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment 2: holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment 3: holding that because agreements to arbitrate do not affect underlying substantive rights doddfranks ban on arbitration should be applied to conduct that arose prior to its enactment 4: holding that a change of an element of an offense could not be applied retroactively to a crime committed prior to the statutes enactment", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is not impaired\u201d); In re Harris, 482 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (same); and In re Stroud, 219 B.R. at 390 (same and concluding that \u201c[l]ien avoidance must be conditioned upon Debtor\u2019s completion of the Chapter 13 Plan and granting of the discharge in order to ensure that creditors\u2019 interests are protected\u201d (citation omitted)). 18 . See In re Mulder, No. 810-74217-reg., 2010 WL 4286174, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (\"This Court finds no support in the Code to use Section 349 as a basis on which to condition Section 522(f) lien avoidance upon entry of a discharge. This position inappropriately assumes that failure to' receive a discharge goes hand in hand with dismissal of a case.\u201d); see also In re Ferrante, No. 09-13098, 2009 WL 2971306 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>). 19 . Law v. Siegel, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, Holdings: 0: holding that a state statutory framework and the punitive nature of segregation created a liberty interest 1: holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of  522f 2: holding that in light of the statutory framework created by the code  522f lien avoidance cannot be made subject to any subsequent event 3: holding that consumer lien avoidance powers of section 522f cannot be applied retroactively 4: holding that a debtors ability to utilize  522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge  ", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by \u201cproducing evidence that the adverse employment actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.\u201d Id. Finally, if the rebuttal is successful, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer\u2019s nondiscriminatory reason was pretext. Id. However, where the defendant asserts a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the alleged adverse actions, \u201cthe district court should ... proceed[ ] to the ultimate issue of retaliation vel non instead of evaluating whether [plaintiff] made out a prima facie case.\u201d Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C.Cir.2009) (citing United States Postal Service Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (<HOLDING>)). In this case, the parties do not dispute Holdings: 0: holding that once the employee makes its prima facie showing the burden then shifts to the employer to prove that legitimate reasons supported the termination 1: holding that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case the defendant employer must then articulate some legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action and the employee must then have a fair opportunity to show pretext that is that a discriminatory intent motivated the employers action 2: holding that once an employer asserts a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action it has done everything that would be required  if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case so whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant 3: holding in a race discrimination case that close timing is an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case but insufficient on its own to rebut a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason that explains the action and its timing 4: holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the finality of a decision resolving an adversary action does not turn on whether the entire bankruptcy proceeding has been terminated. See In re UAL Corp., 411 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir.2005). In this case, the bankruptcy court issued a final decision in Booker\u2019s adversary action against Fields on September 15, 2005, when the court entered a default judgment and declared that the amount owing to Booker was nondischargeable. This decision is therefore final because it resolved a discrete dispute that is equivalent to a stand-alone lawsuit. See Bank of Am. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 944 (7th Cir.2003); In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897, 899 (7th Cir.1991). The \u201cfinal disposition of any adversary proceeding falls within our jurisdiction.\u201d Zedan v. Habash, 529 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Teknek, 512 F.3d 342, 345 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court 1: holding that bankruptcy courts have inherent power to sanction and affirming sanctions imposed by bankruptcy court against a nonparty 2: holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction 3: holding that this court had jurisdiction to review a district courts order affirming a bankruptcy courts dismissal of an adversary complaint with prejudice 4: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of acquittal were entered on these counts by the Court because the jury\u2019s findings did not identify specified unlawful activities from which the funds were acquired by the defendant that were distinct from the alleged money laundering activities. See United States v. Howard, No. 02-079, slip. op. at 8 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2003); see also United States v. Seward, 272 F.3d 831, 836 (7th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe transaction or transactions that created the criminally-derived proceeds must be distinct from the money-laundering transaction because the money laundering statutes criminalize \u2018transaction^] in proceeds, not the transaction^] that create [ ] the proceeds.' \u201d) (quoting United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d 694, 705 (7th Cir.1998)); United States v. Butler, 211 F.3d 826, 830 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 9 . It is not entirely clear whether the Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence of  1957 money laundering was sufficient where the government proved aggregate withdrawals of far more than 10000 above the amount of clean funds available the vast majority of funds transferred to the defendants business account from the food stamp reimbursements were not supported by evidence of legitimate food sales 1: holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds 2: holding that a money laundering enhancement was applicable because defendant knew the funds were represented to be proceeds of a drug transaction 3: holding that defendant violated section 4b when she misappropriated pool participant funds by soliciting funds for trading and then trading only a small percentage of those funds while disbursing the rest of the funds to investors herself and her family 4: holding that to establish a money laundering offense the laundering of funds cannot occur in the same transaction through which those funds first become tainted by crime", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 1373, 84 L.Ed.2d 392 (1985). The Court agrees and finds that, as a class, gay men and lesbians are a minority and have relatively limited political power to attract the favorable attention of lawmakers. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Although this factor is not an absolute prerequisite for heightened scrutiny, the Court finds the evidence and the law support the conclusion that gay men and lesbians remain a politically vulnerable minority. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321, 96 S.Ct. 2562. Here, having analyzed the factors, the Court holds that the appropriate level of scrutiny to use when reviewing statutory classifications based on sexual orientation is heightened scrutiny. See also In re Levenson, 587 F.3d at 931 (<HOLDING>); Witt, 527 F.3d at 824-25 (Canby, J., Holdings: 0: holding that disability is not a suspect or quasisuspect classification that requires heightened scrutiny 1: recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to facial discrimination against a suspect class 2: holding that strict scrutiny applies 3: holding that some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies 4: recognizing scrutiny on statutory grounds stated in  10a and scrutiny for whether the award evinces a manifest disregard of applicable law", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by the phrase \u201ca public entity\u2019s property,\u201d and thus the same public entity on whose property the dangerous condition exists. Id. As such, the threshold question which must first be addressed when a public entity is sued for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition on property is whether the property is the public entity\u2019s property. Summitt v. Roberts, 903 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Mo.App.W.D.1995) (claim \u201cfails on a threshold question\u201d because property where plaintiff was injured \u201cbelongs to neither\u201d public entity); see also Spielvogel v. City of Kansas City, 302 S.W.3d 108, 112 (Mo.App.W.D.2009); Thomas v. Clay Cnty. Elec. Bd., 261 S.W.3d 574, 578-80 (Mo.App.W.D.2008). The phrase \u201ca public entity\u2019s property\u201d plainly includes property owned by a public entity. Claspill, 809 S.W.2d at 89 (<HOLDING>); Dorlon v. City of Springfield, 843 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program 1: holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver 2: holding that ijnjuries caused by the condition of a public entitys property  clearly refers to ownership of a property interest which allows a public entity to control the property 3: holding that a public entitys property refers to the public entity that owns the property where a dangerous condition exists 4: holding that property of a public entity includes having exclusive control and possession of  property", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "applied retroactively if it constitutes a \"clear break with the past.\" Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1128. A new rule is a clear break with the past if it caused \" 'an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule which in effect replaced an older one.'\" Baker, 935 P.2d at 509 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 LEd.2d 202 (1982)). A break with the past occurs when a decision \"disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases.\" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). T 74 As we concluded above, before subsection (1) was added to rule 11, the controlling case law only required a defendant to show good cause to withdraw his plea. And when a court failed to inform a defendant of a constitutional right li 2) (<HOLDING>). The failure to properly inform a defendant of Holdings: 0: holding that any error in excluding impeachment evidence about witnesss drug use in general was harmless when witness was heavily impeached in other ways 1: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible 2: holding that error if any in excluding portion of defendants statement to police was harmless because similar evidence was admitted through the testimony of another witness 3: holding that error in excluding a police officers report was harmless where the same evidence was presented by another witness 4: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the twentieth century, displaced \u201cthe traditional rule ... that an \u2018at will\u2019 employee could be discharged at any time and for any reason.\u201d 2 Dobbs \u00a7 6.10(1), at 190. Contrary to the majority\u2019s conclusion, it is not sufficient to state that because back pay involves monetary relief, it is necessarily legal in nature. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990). \u201c[N]ot all monetary relief is damages,\u201d and \u201c[ejquity sometimes awards monetary relief, or the equivalent.\u201d Clair v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir.1999) (concluding that \u201crestitution is both a legal and an equitable remedy that is monetary yet is distinct from damages\u201d); Allison v. Bank One-Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 1243 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Even Great-West, which stated that suits Holdings: 0: holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest 1: holding that a court may in its discretion award prejudgment interest in erisa cases where appropriate but it is not axiomatic that such interest should be awarded simply because  the prevailing party has demonstrated entitlement to the funds 2: holding that the owner of an equitable interest in property in the form of a land contract can grant a mortgage on that interest under ohio law 3: holding that prejudgment interest is in the nature of compensatory damages and therefore should be included in judgment finally obtained 4: holding in an erisa case decided after greatwest that monetary relief in the form of prejudgment interest may be equitable in nature", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "To be actionable as fraud in Illinois, a \u201cmisrepresentation\u201d must contain the following elements: (1) it must be a statement of material fact, as opposed to opinion; (2) it must be untrue; (3) the party making the statement must know or believe it to be untrue; (4) the person to whom the statement is made must believe and rely on it, and have a right to do so; (5) it must have been made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; and (6) the reliance by the person or entity to whom the statement is made must lead to the claimed injury. See Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd, 72 Ill.App.3d 37, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 390 N.E.2d 393, 403 (1979) (citing Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill.App.2d 134, 213 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (1965)) ; see also W.W. Vincent, 286 Ill.Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d at 969 (<HOLDING>). Orion\u2019s live pleadings allege that UOP\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that purchasing corporation stated valid claim of fraudulent misrepresentation by inducement based on knowingly false statements by transferring corporation that assets transferred to purchasing corporation included general agents contract 1: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 2: holding that in a merger shareholders are effectively purchasing shares in a new corporation while losing their status as shareholders in the previous corporation 3: recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation 4: holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Q. Is there another statement? A. On her? Q. Yes, sir. A. Not by me. Q. Okay. Well, when I asked you if there was anyone else around, you said not on this statement. A. There are other statements, but I was not present. Q. You weren\u2019t present for those? A. No, sir. Ms. Wansley argues that \u201c[b]y combining only the first and last [statements] and omitting others, the prosecutor left the possibility for the jury to misunderstanding the meaning of the statements.\u201d The State counters Ms. Wansley\u2019s concern that \u201c[c]ombining the two statements may have misled the jury,\u201d by asserting the \u201cpresumption that the judgment of the trial court is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate some reversible error to the appellant Court.\u201d See Edlin v. State, 533 So.2d 403, 410 (Miss.1988) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). The State further contends Holdings: 0: holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness 1: holding that in appellate proceedings the decision of the trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error 2: holding that it is the duty of the appellant to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the trial courts judgment by demonstrating some reversible error 3: holding that in appellate proceedings where no transcript is provided a trial courts decision has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error 4: holding that it is the appellants burden to present a record to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial courts findings", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of \u2018substantive due process,\u2019 must be the guide for analyzing these claims.\u201d Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Following the Supreme Court\u2019s holing in Graham, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected alleged deprivations of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based either on excessive force or on malicious prosecution. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.2008) (dismissing a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a life interest because the claim was based on excessive force more appropriately brought under the Fourth Amendment); Torres-Rivera v. O\u2019Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 51-53 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins., 81 Holdings: 0: holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment 1: holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively 2: holding that an excessive force claim is governed by the fourth amendments objectively reasonable standard rather than the fourteenth amendments shock the conscience standard 3: holding that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in making an arrest are properly analyzed under the fourth amendments objective reasonableness standard 4: holding that new york law reasonable cause standard is equivalent to fourth amendments probable cause standard", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "federal statute. See S Cal.App.3d 1365, 245 Cal.Rptr. 585, 588 (1988) (noting that State did not introduce any evidence regarding the purpose behind monitoring defendant's statements spoken in an interview in answer to defendant's contention that his statements were protected unless monitored for institutional security purposes). See generally U.S. v. Hearst, 9th Cir., 563 F.2d 1331, 1345-46 (1977), reh\u2019g denied, 9th Cir., 573 F.2d 579 (1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000, 98 S.Ct. 1656, 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978) (finding that surreptitiously recording conversations between prisoner and visitor does not violate prisoner\u2019s right to privacy when confronted with state's \"justifiable purpose of imprisonment or prison security\"); State v. Hauss, App., 142 Ariz. 159, 688 P.2d 1051, 1054-55 (1984) (<HOLDING>); People v. Gallego, Cal. Supr ., 52 Cal.3d Holdings: 0: holding that taking an individual who was not suspected of any crime to a police station and into an interview room and detaining her for approximately four hours where it was made clear she was not free to leave violated the fourth amendment 1: holding that in this case where police were concerned that while couple was in an interview room they would pass a weapon discuss escape plans or destroy evidence once the government established that its intrusion was for a justifiable purpose of imprisonment or prison security the fourth amendment question was essentially resolved in its favor 2: holding that even if an agreement that title would pass once financing was obtained the most a creditor could claim was a security interest once the good was delivered 3: holding that where an individual voluntarily goes to the police station to discuss the commission of a crime that person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 4: holding that public safety exception applies if and only if two conditions are satisfied 1 that the defendant might have or recently have had a weapon and 2 that someone other than police might gain access to that weapon and inflict harm with it and that while second prong would not apply for instance if the police entered a defendants room handcuffed him and placed him on a chair in the hallway outside his room it might apply if defendant was unrestrained and had turned back into his room to retrieve his identification when questioned by the police", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a set of facts would give rise to reasonable suspicion, this court must look at the totality of the circumstances and not just each independent fact standing alone. Furthermore, the court may consider any added meaning that certain conduct might suggest to experienced officers in the field, trained in the observation of criminal activity.\u201d United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 926-927 (8th Cir.2001). Based on the totality of facts discovered by Deputy Sheriff Brown during this consensual encounter, I conclude the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to continue detaining the defendants for a reasonable period of time to investigate the circumstances and determine if the defendants were engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir.2000)(<HOLDING>). See also, Jones, 269 F.3d at 928 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle 1: holding that questioning of passengers on bus including asking for drivers licenses and tickets constituted consensual encounter and passengers were free to decline to answer questions 2: holding presence of a masking odor in vehicle passengers nervous behavior passengers inability to recall the name of his purport ed daughterinlaw and vast divergence between passengers and drivers statements regarding travel accommodations to california justified further detention of the vehicle for investigation of whether a crime was being committed 3: holding that if random suspicionless questioning of bus passengers for inspection of identification and tickets was consensual encounter it was not a violation of passengers fourth amendment rights 4: holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and parties to a criminal prosecution may be privy to the information derived from the blood sample, O.R.S. \u00a7 181.085(2), and the State may not analyze'the samples to discover genetic predispositions to physical or mental conditions. The absence of any individualized suspicion that persons subject to blood sampling have committed criminal offenses other than their original offenses of conviction does not render Chapter 669 unconstitutional. Rather, the evenhandedness of Oregon\u2019s statute contributes to its reasonableness. \u201cAn essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.\u201d Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22, 109 S.Ct. at 1415-16 (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed and Holdings: 0: holding that a warrant was not required in part because in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate 1: holding that a contract for the installation and implementation of a complex computer system did not constitute a consumer purchase covered by the njcfa and noting that the contract did not provide for simply the installation of a standardized computer software program but rather the design of a custommade program to satisfy the plaintiffs unique needs and the defendants active participation in implementation of this program 2: holding that an alien had no wellfounded fear of persecution for resisting chinas coercive population control program in part because he was not charged with a crime and there was no warrant issued for his arrest 3: holding that nature and occasion of offenses are facts inherent in convictions and those facts need not be alleged in indictment or submitted to jury 4: holding that the nature and occasion of prior offenses are facts inherent in the convictions which government is not required to allege in the indictment or prove beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "days of receiving the notice of right to sue). Ms. Scott never served the defendant in that case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on January 21, 2000. Ms. Scott filed a second lawsuit on July 21, 2000. However, Ms. Scott also did not serve the defendant in the second case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on February 6, 2001. This circuit has held \u201cthat the filing of a complaint that is dismissed without prejudice does not toll the statutory filing period of Title VII.\u201d Brown, 926 F.2d at 961. We reasoned that \u201cas a general rule, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought.\u201d Id. Other courts have applied this rule to ADA claims, see Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As the district court observed, application Holdings: 0: holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter 1: holding that the dismissal without prejudice of the plaintiffs first action doomed his ada claim because the ninetyday filing period had run 2: holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice 3: holding borough could not appeal dismissal of complaint without prejudice because  dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit under the former practice of lavf  4: holding district court had no authority to require plaintiffs to obtain courts permission to dismiss defendant who had not served answer or motion for summary judgment as plaintiffs had absolute right to dismissal without prejudice and thus court could not sanction plaintiffs for filing notice of voluntary dismissal rather than motion", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "are the prices charged by suppliers like the BPA and the WAPA to the consumers like PG&E, through the CalPX and ISO. The Memphis clause binds the price charged to FERC determinations; the tariff binds the parties to use the CalPX and ISO for sale/purchase of energy; the parties, conducting sales through the CalPX and ISO to purchase/supply energy amongst themselves, are bound to each other through, their market transactions, the- rules of the tariff, and the FERC regulations. \u201cWhen a contract provides that its terms are subject to a regulatory body, all parties to that contract are bound by the actions of the regulatory body.\u201d Alliant Energy v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 347 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). See Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The sellers and buyers of power achieved Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court may refuse to exercise continuing jurisdiction even though the parties have agreed to it parties cannot confer jurisdiction by stipulation or consent 1: holding that parties to a contract which provided that its rates may be approved ordered or set by any valid law order rule or regulation of any  regulatory authority  having jurisdiction were bound by a ferc rate determination even though they were not directly subject to fercs jurisdiction 2: recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim 3: holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived 4: holding issues related to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "if the jury posed a question about insurance during deliberations. Evidence of insurance is generally not admissible at trial unless it is offered for a purpose permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 411. See also Piontkowski v. Scott, 65 Ohio App.3d 4, 582 N.E.2d 1002, 1003-04 (1989). Gratzianna\u2019s brief reference to \u201cCincinnati Insurance\u201d was inadvertent and unresponsive to the question Chapman\u2019s counsel asked. \u25a0 Counsel hurriedly diverted the jury\u2019s attention from the comment and, unlike the cases on which defendants rely, defense counsel did not ask the court contemporaneously to strike the witness\u2019s remark and instruct the jury to disregard it, nor did counsel ask for an immediate curative instruction. Cf. e.g., Kaltrider v. YMCA of Cleveland, Ohio, 457 F.2d 768, 770 (6th Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding the lack of a contemporaneous objection could not be salvaged by a motion for a mistrial 1: holding no prejudice occurred where party made contemporaneous objection to brief remark about insurance during closing argument and court gave cautionary instruction 2: holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review 3: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 4: holding mistrial unwarranted where contemporaneous objection was made to single mention of insurance and court gave cautionary instruction", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "so that no party is harmed by what we have called a 'preliminary' adjudication.\" (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40-41, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950))); Peter A. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 146 P.3d 991, 994-96 (Alaska 2006) (finding equity requires vacatur of challenged order when prevailing party's unilateral actions below resulted in issue becoming moot); City of Valdez v. Gavora, Inc., 692 P.2d 959, 960-61 (Alaska 1984) (vacating judgment because it was moot and to prevent it having later legal effect). 10 . See, e.g., State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 756 (Alaska 2011) (\"We will overturn one of our prior decisions only when we are 'clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no 0) (<HOLDING>). 18 . See, e.g., Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Holdings: 0: recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests 1: holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses 2: holding that a plenary hearing was necessary based upon mothers certification and school social workers report of childs behavioral problems 3: holding childs claim he was improperly adjudicated as delinquent not moot even though adjudication was later declared void ab initio because childs records were easily obtainable by others such as school authorities social workers judges at sentencing military and prospective employers 4: holding that trial court improperly awarded custody of child to the childs stepmother and grandparents where no pleading in the case was directed at such relief and the childs mother had no notice that the issue would be considered", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976). We tend to agree. \u00b6 35. It is important to distinguish between the apartment building and Dumstrey's actual home. While the parking garage is located directly beneath the entire apartment building, it does not follow that it is therefore closely proximate to Dumstrey's home. His home cannot reasonably be said to constitute the entire apartment building. Rather, Dumstrey occupies only one of the 30 units located within the building. This is a far cry from a single family home's attached garage, which courts have consistently held constitutes curtilage. See State v. Davis, 2011 WI App 74, \u00b6 12, 333 Wis. 2d 490, 798 N.W.2d 902 (collecting cases and citing State v. Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127, \u00b6 21 n.5, 275 Wis. 2d 512, 685 N.W.2d 536 (<HOLDING>)). \u00b6 36. In such cases, the garage is quite Holdings: 0: recognizing that cases consistently hold that an attached garage is part of the curtilage 1: recognizing that the supreme court in hayes consistently limited its holding that the mva title provisions applied instead of the ucc to cases involving tort law and liability insurance coverage  2: recognizing that the supreme court has consistently applied an analysis keyed to economic realities  3: recognizing that  the virginia supreme court has consistently applied the one year statute of limitation  to defamation actions  4: recognizing that an indictment may be dismissed in part", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not to place the tapes in the investigation file, depends upon the function he was performing at the time the conduct occurred. He is absolutely immune from liability for damages if he was gathering evidence to present to the trier of fact. See Ybarra, 723 F.2d at 679. Bogan and Ingram would be protected only by qualified immunity, however, if they were conducting an investigation to determine whether probable cause existed to arrest Broam and Manning. See, e.g., Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.1984) (determining that, \u201cwhen a prosecutor engages in or authorizes and directs illegal wiretaps\u201d and \u201cthe wiretapping is ... investigative in nature,\u201d the prosecutors are only \u201centitled to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity\u201d); Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 524 (9th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1255-56 Holdings: 0: holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity 1: holding that a judge was not entitled to absolute immunity for firing an employee 2: holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony 3: holding that when prosecutors joined in implementing the wiretap they engaged in an act that was ordinarily related to police activity and were not entitled to absolute immunity 4: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to the suit in which he is appointed, and the receiver is not appointed for the benefit of any party_\u201d) 16 . RCW \u00a7 7.60.040 provides: \"[t]he receiver shall have power, under control of the court, to bring and defend actions, to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, and generally to do such acts respecting the property, as the court may authorize.\u201d 17 . RCW \u00a7 7.60.030 provides: Before entering upon his duties, the receiver must be sworn to perform them faithfully, and with one or more sureties, approved by the court, execute a bond to such person as the court may direct, conditioned that he will faithfully discharge the duties of receiver in the action, and obey the orders of the court therein. 18 . See also, Bennett v. Williams, 892 F.2d at 824 (<HOLDING>). 19 . The general definition is in CERCLA \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii 1: holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 2: holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable 3: holding that bankruptcy trustees shall not be held liable for mistakes within reasonable business judgment 4: holding that employer may be held liable under  1981 for discrimination by supervisory employee", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and, in addition, show that a writing is \u201csufficient against the sender.\u201d We proceed to examine the context of the statute. ORS 71.1020 provides in part: \u201c(1) The Uniform Commercial Code shall be liberally-construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. \u201c(2) Underlying purposes and policies of the Uniform Commercial Code are: \u201c(a) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; \u201c(b) To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; \u201c(c) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.\u201d In examining the context of the statute, we also look to the decisions of other jurisdictions that have considered the merchant\u2019s exception. See Security Bank, 304 Or at 445 n 6 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited by the parties, however, do Holdings: 0: recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts 1: recognizing that decisions of other courts that have examined these questions are relevant 2: holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction 3: holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts 4: holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1996) (stating that the \u201cpurpose of the thirty-day rule is to ensure that the defendant is not held under an arrest warrant for an excessive period without receiving formal notice of the charge against which he must prepare to defend himself\u2019); United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 1447 (9th Cir.1983) (noting that purpose of the STA time limit is to \u201capprise defendant of the charges against which he must be prepared to defend himself\u201d). 6 . See also United States v. Hsin-Yung, 97 F.Supp.2d 24, 30 (D.D.C.2000) (citing Bailey with approval and concluding the charged offenses were not the same because \u201cthey have different elements, proscribe different forms of conduct, and carry different penalties\u201d). 7 .Cf. United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). It is of no moment that the two indictments Holdings: 0: holding that a found in indictment need not allege all of the elements of entry 1: recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry 2: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 3: holding that the defendants entry into the foyer of a fraternity house was an entry into a dwelling 4: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "have held that, under these circumstances, the additional language of Jenkins\u2019 proposed instruction \u201cprevents] the jury from considering the forbidden defense of assumption of the risk while allowing it to make factual findings on the issue of comparative negligence.\u201d Gish, 890 F.2d at 993; see also Koshorek v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 318 F.2d 364, 369 (3rd Cir.1963). Because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Jenkins was given a direct order, the district court\u2019s failure to give the proposed instruction was tantamount to reinstating the defense of assumption of risk. The district court\u2019s instruction allowed the jury to treat the employee\u2019s \u201cvoluntary, knowledgeable acceptance of a dangerous condition\u201d as contributory negligence. Gish, 890 F.2d at 991 (<HOLDING>). C Union Pacific argues that the district Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err 1: holding that the trial court erred by giving a misleading instruction 2: recognizing district court does not err by giving instruction that tracks pattern instruction and correctly states the law 3: holding that district court did not err in giving an instruction identical to that proposed by jenkins 4: holding that district court did not clearly err in giving twolevel enhancement for similar conduct", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "being discharged. See NRDC v. EPA 822 F.2d 104,108. (D.C.Cir.1987); see also Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 498 (discharge allowed \u201cwhere ... permits ensure that every discharge of pollutants will comply with all applicable effluent limitations and standards\u201d). This permit, known as a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (\u201cNPDES\u201d> permit, establishes enforceable effluent limitations, as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. NPDES permits, which are issued either by EPA or a state in a federally approved permitting system, see 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 1342, may be individual (issued to a specific entity to discharge y-forcing, meaning it should force agencies and permit applicants to adopt technologies that achieve the great est reductions in pollution. See NRDC, 822 F.2d at 124 (<HOLDING>). In determining the standard for TBELs, EPA Holdings: 0: holding that cwa seeks not only to stimulate but to press development of new more efficient and effective technologies which is essential purpose of this series of progressively more demanding technologybased standards 1: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum 2: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 3: holding that the more transformative the new work the more likely the use of the old work is a fair one 4: holding the aedpa standard is demanding but not insatiable", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.\u201d Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (quotations omitted). Because the district court did not rule on whether to grant Valencia a COA, we assume it was denied. 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C). Accordingly, she may not appeal the district court's decision absent a grant of COA by this court. 2 . Because the district court did not enter a separate judgment disposing of Valencia\u2019s \u00a7 2255 petition, judgment is deemed entered 150 days from the entry of the relevant order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(b)(2)(B). Thus, the judgment dismissing the first \u00a7 2255 petition is deemed entered on September 18, 2006, and Valencia\u2019s June 26, 2006 Notice of Appeal is timely. See Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir.2002) Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of appeal is timely when filed before final judgment is entered by the district court 1: holding that a judgment is final only when the parties have exhausted their respective rights to appeal or if no party to the action filed a timely appeal 2: holding that court had jurisdiction where no separate judgment had been entered even though notice of appeal was not timely filed as measured from the final decision 3: holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed 4: holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "assesses the prejudicial impact of most constitutional errors by determining whether they \u201chad substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007) (Brecht standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a \u201csubstantial and injurious effect\u201d on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-47, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 Holdings: 0: holding that an error must have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict to entitle a petitioner to habeas relief 1: holding that a substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict 2: holding that mental health evidence could be mitigating at the penalty phase even though it is insufficient to establish a legal defense to conviction in the guilty phase 3: holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jurys verdict in the penalty phase 4: holding that states improper use of defendants postmiranda silence was error but did not warrant habeas relief unless error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jurys verdict", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge LEE joined. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion. OPINION NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents the question of first impression in this circuit whether and to what extent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\u201cEEOC\u201d), in prosecuting a suit in its own name, is bound by a private arbitration agreement between the charging party and his employer. Other circuits are split on the proper response to this question. Compare EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), with EEOC v. Frank\u2019s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that neither the faa nor principles of preclusion or waiver could operate to bar the eeoc from seeking monetary relief on behalf of aggrieved individuals 1: holding that even if indirect purchasers are barred from seeking damages relief they may still obtain injunctive relief 2: holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought 3: holding that an arbitration agreement between a charging party and an employer precludes the eeoc from seeking purely monetary relief in federal court on behalf of the charging party but not from seeking broad injunctive relief 4: holding that a private party may bring an action in a federal district court seeking injunctive relief on the basis of garmon preemption for only arguably protected or prohibited activity", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "2013 WL 98059, at *1 (W.D.Ky. Jan. 7, 2013) (\u201cBased on the overwhelming precedent where federal courts sitting in diversity have applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) rather than state law to decide bifurcation issues\u2014many of which appear in the precise context presented in this case\u2014the Court cannot agree with the parties\u2019 assertions that Kentucky law governs and instead finds Rule 42(b) is the standard applicable here.\u201d). Federal law on bifurcation for bad faith claims against insurers does not support Arrowood\u2019s argument for separate trials. Federal courts sometimes bifurcate trials of underlying liability claims and bad faith claims, but only when the liability claims are still unresolved. See, e.g., Warren v. Federal Ins. Co., 358 Fed.Appx. 670, 676 (6th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). There is no pending contract claim here. The Holdings: 0: holding it was reasonable for the district court to bifurcate bad faith claim and stay discovery while breach of contract coverage claim was pending 1: holding that claim file discovery was premature in a firstparty breach of contract claim 2: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 3: holding that an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant is an element of a bad faith refusal claim 4: holding that a party cannot claim damages for breach of contract unless he has shown his full compliance with the contract and is not acting in bad faith", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the legal requirements of exclusive dealing. We acknowledge that \u201cpartial\u201d exclusive dealing is rarely a valid antitrust theory. See Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 110 n. 24 (\u201cAn agreement affecting less than all purchases does not amount to true exclusive dealing.\u201d) (citation omitted); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1044, 1062-63 (noting that the defendant\u2019s discount program, which conditioned incremental discounts on customers purchasing 60-80% of their needs from the defendant, did not constitute exclusive dealing because customers were not required to purchase all of their requirements from the defendant, and in fact, could purchase up to 40% of their requirements from other sellers without foregoing the discounts); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, 200-01 (7th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Partial exclusive dealing Holdings: 0: holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to  672606 1: holding that contract requiring buyer to purchase a fixed quantity of goods that amounted to roughly 6080 of its needs was not unlawful because the agreements contained no exclusive dealing clause and did not require the buyer to purchase any amounts of the defendants product that even approached its requirements 2: holding an arbitration clause contained in confirmations sent to buyer by seller was part of parties course of dealing and therefore part of the contract after buyer had repeated opportunities to object to the clause and had failed to do so 3: holding buyer liable for balance of contract price of accepted goods 4: holding that although the language of the contract was permissive when it said the buyer could purchase such quantities of the items listed herein as it might order or schedule and that the buyer shall have the right at any time and from time to time to cancel in whole or in part the deliveries specified and the authorizations contained in any shipping schedule given to the seller we must conclude that the contract taken as a whole is ambiguous and that further investigation as to whether the parties intended a requirements contract is required", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(1993). In \u00a7 2254 proceedings, the federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding under Brecht\u2019s more forgiving \u201csubstantial and injurious effect\u201d standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the \u201charmless beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a \u201csubstantial and injurious effect\u201d on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-47, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 Holdings: 0: holding that states improper use of defendants postmiranda silence was error but did not warrant habeas relief unless error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jurys verdict 1: holding that a substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict 2: holding that an error must have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict to entitle a petitioner to habeas relief 3: holding that mental health evidence could be mitigating at the penalty phase even though it is insufficient to establish a legal defense to conviction in the guilty phase 4: holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jurys verdict in the penalty phase", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1223, 1228 (7th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Badalamenti, No. S.S. 84 Cr. 236CPNL), 1985 WL 2572, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1985) (referring to a second indictment that would be returned after dismissal of a first indictment because of section 2517(5) violations, the same situation as in this case, as a \u201csuperseding\u201d indictment). Therefore, the court holds that the second indictment in this case can properly be referred to as a \u201csuperseding\u201d indictment. The superseding-versus-new-indictment issue might have been an interesting and relevant debate if the Speedy Trial Act or the statute of limitations were the focus of defendants\u2019 appeals from the Detention Order, because those are the only situations in which it matters whether an indictment is a superseding indictme (D.C.1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654, Holdings: 0: holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result 1: holding that the law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case 2: holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate 3: holding that for all intents and purposes the instant case is the same action that was brought previously we therefore find the application of the doctrine of the law of the case to be appropriate 4: holding that the degree of the loss of use of a body part is a question of fact whether the loss is for all practical intents and purposes is a question of law", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "be obtained\u2019 and the \u2018obligations imposed\u2019 reveal a purpose to preclude state authority.... Even when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, pre-emption may occur to the extent that state and federal law actually conflict. Such a conflict arises when \u2018compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility/Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when a state law \u2018stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress/Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). \u2014 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2481-82 (citations omitted). Accord Hatfield v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 958 F.2d 320, 321 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We believe that release of the government\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that where evidence shows that federal funds were expended for installation for warning devices or signs at railroad crossing state law claims based on adequacy of those warning devices are preempted by the federal railroad safety act 1: holding that manual on uniform traffic control devices mutcd standards were admissible 2: holding adoption by secretary of transportation of manual on uniform traffic control devices issued under federal railroad safety act preempted state common law standards of care for grade crossings 3: holding that the government is immune from liability for its choice of traffic protection devices 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "stop\u201d and \u201cnot an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence.\u201d Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189, 124 S.Ct. 2451. But the request for Mocek\u2019s identification was a \u201ccommonsense inquiry\u201d meant to gather basic information about a suspect, which has \u201can immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.\u201d Id. Mocek\u2019s refusal to cooperate interfered with these efforts to investigate possible disorderly conduct. Second, Mocek argues the arrest was a mere pretext for seizing his camera and destroying his recordings of the security checkpoint. He cites our holding that police cannot use an administrative search as an excuse to enter a building to seize suspected contraband. See Winters v. B ly motivated by hi 4) (<HOLDING>); Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Holdings: 0: recognizing that general rule applies only to statutes that implicate  no constitutionally protected conduct emphasis added 1: holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication 2: holding for purposes of a retaliation claim because michigan has not passed an applicable time place or manner restriction dean had a constitutionally protected right to engage in peaceful targeted picketing in front of byerleys residence emphasis added 3: holding floridas stalking statute which contained the language constitutionally protected activity is not included in the course of conduct definition and constitutional protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests was not impermissibly vague 4: holding for purposes of a retaliation claim restricting  disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time place and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in issue here is the air bladder, and only the air bladder. (Big-man Deck, Ex. 8 at 105.) Plaintiff has, however, admitted that its \u201cair bladder concept and design\u201d (the trade secret) were disclosed in the \u2019099 Patent, which issued on September 9, 1986. (First Am.Compl. \u00b6 10.) Additionally, this Court has previously determined that \u201cthe information disclosed to Reebok in May of 1986 was contained in the [\u2019099 Patent].\u201d (Order of Dec. 6, 1993.) Thus, as plaintiffs trade secret was extinguished in September 1986 with the issuance of the \u2019099 Patent, Reebok'cou\u00edd only be liable on plaintiffs trade secret claims for products incorporating the trade secret that were sold by defendant prior to the issuance date of the patent. See Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 304 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); Trenton Indus. v. A.E. Peterson Mfg. Co., 165 Holdings: 0: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 1: holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested 2: holding that if the breach of an entire contract is only partial the plaintiff can recover only such damages as he or she has sustained leaving prospective damages to a later suit in the event of further breaches 3: holding that plaintiff could recover royalties only for products manufactured by defendant after disclosure of secret but before issuance of patent 4: holding that plaintiff could recover only damages sustained as a result of the sale of the accused product by defendant prior to the issuance date", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "no matter how meager or unlikely. Manuel v. State, 667 So.2d 590, 593 (Miss.1995). A lesser-included-offense instruction should be granted where there is an evidentiary basis in the record for it. Lee v. State, 469 So.2d 1225, 1230 (Miss.1985). \u201c[T]he evidence in a particular case generally warrants granting a lesser offense instruction if a \u2018rational\u2019 or a \u2018reasonable\u2019 jury could find the defendant not guilty of the principal offense charged in the indictment yet guilty of the lesser included offense.\u201d Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss.1987). Common sense dictates that if someone resists too strongly it becomes an assault, and therefore, resisting arrest is clearly a lesser-included-offense of simple assault on an officer. Murrell v. State, 655 So.2d 881, 886 (Miss.1995) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 5. Officer Gray testified that there was a Holdings: 0: holding that force exerted against an officer after an arrest is complete cannot be used as the basis for prosecuting one for resisting arrest 1: holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer 2: holding that merger did not apply because sexual assault was not a lesser included offense of seconddegree kidnapping involving sexual assault 3: holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest 4: holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to one holding a superior position or office.\u201d That relationship typically involves \u201csubjection, guidance, or control.\u201d In addition, precedent and statutory purpose make clear that the private person\u2019s \u201cacting under\u201d must involve an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior. Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 151-52, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (2007) (internal citations omit ted). \u201cThe words \u2018acting under\u2019 are broad,\u201d and the Supreme Court \u201chas made clear that the statute must be \u2018liberally construed.\u2019\u201d Id. at 147, 127 S.Ct. 2301. In Jacks v. Meridian Resource Co., LLC, 701 F.3d 1224 (8th Cir.2012), an insurance carrier administering a service benefit plan under FEHBA brought a sub , 629 F.Supp.2d 905 (E.D.Ark.2007) (<HOLDING>). The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of Holdings: 0: holding that a health plan insurer contracting with a government agency under a federal benefits program is considered a person acting under a federal officer 1: holding that the federal officer removal statute is not narrow or limited  2: holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute 3: holding that an alcoholic beverage control officer was a public officer within the meaning of the statute 4: holding that a federal drug informant acting under the partial direction of the fbi and for pay was not a federal employee under the ftca", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "custody of his mother when she was naturalized, the legal custody condition would be met if he could show that his parents were legally separated at that time. The critical question, therefore, is whether, at the time of his mother\u2019s naturalization, \u201cthere ha[d] been a legal separation of the parents.\u201d INA \u00a7 321(a)(3). The meaning of the term \u201clegal separation\u201d as contained in former INA \u00a7 321(a)(3) is a question of federal statutory interpretation. See Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2004); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir.2000). Yet, the INA does not define the term and the only case from our circuit to discuss it merely holds that a legal separation must be preceded by a legal marriage. See Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Wedderburn, 215 F.3d at 797, 799-800 Holdings: 0: holding that a petitioner did not enjoy derivative citizenship under the first clause of  321a3 because his natural parents never married and thus could not legally separate emphasis in original 1: holding that a childs interest supercedes that of its natural parents 2: holding the foster parents responsible for support where the childs natural parents are unknown and noting that an earlier new york case held that an agreement to adopt did not terminate the natural parents duty of support but that in that earlier case the natural parent was alive and capable of providing for the child 3: holding evidence legally sufficient 4: holding that once a state posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married his mother", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an interpreter when, other than having some syntactical errors, his testimony was \u201cvery responsive\u201d and \u201cindicative of [his] ability to speak and understand English.\u201d). Additionally, and as noted by the trial court in its denial of Nur\u2019s motion for a new trial, neither Nur nor his attorney ever requested an interpreter; Nur communicated with the court in English, both orally and in writing; and the evidence at trial showed that Nur communicated with native English speakers in English when orchestrating the crime. Thus, based on the record, we cannot say that the court had notice that Nur had a significant language difficulty. As such, the court\u2019s failure to appoint an interpreter on its own motion was not fundamental error. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 451 N.E.2d 39, 41 (Ind.1983) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the trial court\u2019s denial Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court was under no obligation to appoint an interpreter where defendant did not request one and spoke english reasonably well 1: holding that it was not error for a trial court to have failed to provide sua sponte a competent interpreter where counsel did not request one prior to trial and defendant spoke and understood english well enough to conversantly discuss the crime with a police officer and had no trouble answering questions at the sentencing hearing 2: holding that trial court need not appoint an interpreter where counsel indicated that he could communicate with defendant and that defendant could understand questions and answers 3: holding that once counsel was appointed defendant spoke to the court through counsel and thus the court was not required to respond to defendants request for a speedy trial 4: holding that where alien was in custody spoke only spanish had limited education and was unfamiliar with this country and its legal procedures in light of his failure to obtain counsel despite his efforts the immigration judge sua sponte if necessary should have continued the hearing so as to provide the petitioner a reasonable time to locate counsel and permit counsel to prepare for the hearing", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for the confidential informant to exit his vehicle and say \u201cHi,\u201d Peery drove his vehicle to the corner of the parking lot where he parked and took no further action until, coincidentally, the confidential informant had completed his drug deal with Dustin and the police moved in for the drug bust, at which point Peery attempted to exit the parking lot. Courts have considered similar conduct to be suggestive of counter-surveillance by a participant in a drug transaction. See United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir.1993) (officer\u2019s belief that person was engaged in counter-surveillance was reasonable when record showed that the defendant showed up with the suspect and drove back and forth in front of store while the suspect purchased drugs); Ocampo, 937 F.2d at 490 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Green, 52 F.3d 194, 198-99 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of appeals erred in declining to consider whether the arrest was illegal and whether the consent was tainted by the potentially illegal police activity 1: holding that firing authority is indicative of employer status 2: holding that countersurveillance driving is a fact indicative of illegal activity 3: holding that money seized from a bank account must be traceable to illegal activity in order to be subject to forfeiture even if account previously contained proceeds of illegal activity 4: holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "See id. at 281, 117 S:Ct, 2028 (\"We do not think Treasure Salvors ... is helpful to the Tribe because the state officials there were acting beyond the authority conferred upon them by the State, a theory the Tribe does not even attempt to pursue in the case before us.\u201d (internal citation omitted)). 11 . Because the Court in Inyo County determined the tribe sought to assert sovereign rights, the Court did not definitively resolve whether a sovereign could sue under \u00a7 1983 to vindicate personal, non-sovereign rights. Inyo County, 538 U.S. at 710-12, 123 S.Ct. 1887. Subsequently, certain of our sister circuits appear to have provided different answers to that question, albeit in differing contexts. Compare Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Reinhard, 405 F.3d 185, 190 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), with Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Rising, 569 Holdings: 0: holding that the state police is a state agency 1: holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver 2: holding that the university of colorado is an arm of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 3: holding state university is not a person under  1983 4: holding a state agency as an arm of the state cannot constitute a person under  1983 because it is a sovereign entity", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that: Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed. Id. \u00a7 924(c)(l)(D)(ii). These consecutive terms are imposed separately from, and in addition to, the enhanced penalty for use of a weapon already provided by the bank robbery statute itself. See 18 \u00a7 U.S.C. 2118(d) (raising maximum penalty from 20 to 25 years if the offender \u201cputs in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device\u201d); United States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). A defendant may be convicted of multiple \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding that  924es consecutive sentences apply even when the underlying crimes carry their own mandatory minimums 1: holding apprendi does not apply to consecutive sentencing 2: holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts 3: holding that mandatory minimums do not implicate apprendi 4: holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is binding upon the United States. C. Authority To Bind The United States Even if the court were to assume arguen-do that Kozak has demonstrated the existence of a cooperation agreement between her and Iowa authorities, Kozak must also demonstrate that the state cooperation agreement is binding on the United States. Federal circuit courts of appeal have held that agreements made by state agents cannot be enforced against the United States because state agents are without authority to bind federal proceedings. Hendrix v. Norris, 81 F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201c \u2018[S]tate prosecutors cannot bind federal prosecutors without the latter\u2019s knowledge and consent.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting United States v. Fuzer, 18 F.3d 517, 520 (7th Cir.1994)); United States v. Sparks, 87 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cordova-Perez, 65 F.3d 1552, Holdings: 0: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity 1: holding that prosecutors statements were not evidence and could not support restitution order 2: holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors 3: holding that prosecutors reference to cooperation agreements with government witnesses was not plain error 4: holding that the prosecutors question to the defendant about a prior unrelated offense was improper", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "require a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for willful violations.\u201d Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir.2014). The court reasoned that when, as with the FCRA, \u201cthe statutory cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual damages.\u201d Id. at 413; see also 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681n(a)(1)(A) (\u201cAny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed [under the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of \u2014 any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.\u201d (emphasis added); Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Montgomery v. Wells Fargo Bank, C12-3895 TEH, Holdings: 0: holding that irrespective of whether bateman and all the potential class members can demonstrate actual harm resulting from a willful violation of the fail and accurate credit transactions act they are entitled to statutory damages 1: holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages 2: holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages 3: holding that fdcpa statutory damages did not predominate over the requested equitable relief because given the defendants net worth and the number of class members each class member would be entitled to receive only 025 in statutory damages 4: holding that class certification is not appropriate because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the calculation of individualized actual economic damages if any suffered by the class members can be performed in accordance with the predominance requirement of rule 23b3", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend \u201ctraditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102. The phrase \u201ctransacting any business\u201d (R.C. 2307.382[A][2]) has been interpreted very broadly by Ohio courts. Schneider v. Gunnerman (Aug. 24, 1998), Fayette App. Nos. CA97-07-017, CA97-12-034, unreported, 1998 WL 526541. Defendants argue that there was no significant business transacted in Ohio. They note that the closing occurred in Kenton County, Kentucky, for assets located in Kenton County, Kentucky, of a business incorporated in Kentucky. However, plaintiffs argue that they were contacted by defendants at their residence in Clermont County, hio App.3d 696, 591 N.E.2d 1336 (<HOLDING>). In our case, the contacts between defendants Holdings: 0: holding that a texas court had personal jurisdiction over a kansas resident who after objecting to the texas courts jurisdiction filed a motion for attorneys fees 1: holding negotiating over the telephone with an ohio resident and mailing a contract to ohio to be accepted were sufficient to grant ohio courts jurisdiction 2: holding that outofstate defendants who furnished intangibles and services in west virginia and ohio and entered into agreement in which a florida corporation served as financier and supervisor of enterprises business aspects did not submit themselves to florida jurisdiction 3: holding the defendant employee subject to personal jurisdiction in ohio based on his businessrelated travels to ohio in an action for breach of a noncompetition agreement 4: holding nonresident defendant did not submit to general jurisdiction of texas courts merely by executing contract with resident", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s reversal of Carter\u2019s attempted murder conviction. While I agree that the instruction at issue here was erroneous and that Carter\u2019s appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal, I conclude that Carter has failed to demonstrate prejudice. As a result, I would affirm the post-conviction courts denial of Carter\u2019s petition for post-conviction relief. If deficient performance by appellate counsel is found, we turn to the prejudice prong to determine whether the issues appellate counsel failed to raise would have been clearly more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 724 (Ind.2007), reh\u2019g denied; Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 165 (Ind.2007) (<HOLDING>), reh\u2019g denied, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 129 Holdings: 0: holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 1: holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 2: holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 3: holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 4: holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the parties supplement their briefs following the Court's decision in that case. 3 Scull argues that the State forfeited its right to argue that the good-faith exception applies because it did not raise the issue before the circuit court. We disagree. First, we may affirm a circuit court's decision on any grounds. See State v. Milashoski, 159 Wis. 2d 99, 108-09, 464 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1990). Second, the good-faith exception never came up before the circuit court because the circuit court ruled on the issue prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jardines and concluded that the dog sniff was not a search. Therefore, the circuit court did not need to explore the contours of the exclusionary rule in this case. 4 See United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 Holdings: 0: holding that a drug sniff outside defendants locked bedroom door was not a fourth amendment search because it detected only the presence of contraband and did not provide any information about lawful activity over which the defen dant had a legitimate expectation of privacy 1: holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest 2: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest 3: holding a dog sniff outside the defendants front door was not a fourth amendment search 4: holding that a drug sniff outside the front door of the defendants residence was not a fourth amendment search because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy at the entrance to property that is open to the public including the front porch", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "end of the spectrum, in that Scott Brooks was an indirect cause of these injuries, but we cannot conclude that Scott Brooks is outside the scope of USSG \u00a7 5K2.1 or USSG \u00a7 5K2.2. Unintended consequences are often the result of reckless behavior, and while perhaps Scott Brooks could not have anticipated the particular sequence of events, Scott Brooks should have foreseen the possibility of serious physical harm to another as a result of his actions. We see no basis for foreclosing a departure under USSG \u00a7 5K2.1 or USSG \u00a7 5K2.2 when a defendant helps put into motion a chain of events that risks serious injury or death, even when an intent to harm is entirely absent and the defendant was not directly responsible for the death. Cf. United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 100-01 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Fortier, 242 F.3d 1224, Holdings: 0: holding it error to give selfdefense instruction requiring that defendant believe his actions were necessary to avert death or great bodily harm when defendant claimed that the victims death was accidental 1: holding a reasonable recipient would have perceived the letter as a serious expression of an intent to harm 2: holding that in a 18 usc  922g1 prosecution ussg  5k21 upward departure was warranted because the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of serious harm as a result of his actions even though the defendant harbored no intent to harm and was not directly responsible for the death 3: holding that a death sentence for a conviction for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in death of the victim was barred by the eighth amendment 4: holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "requirements. Further, upon review of the record, we find no objection by appellant to the trial court\u2019s response to the jury question. Appellant stated that he was satisfied with the judge\u2019s instruction. See N.T., 9/22/99, at 131-32. Under Pa. R.A.P. 302(a), \u201c[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.\u201d See also Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 553 Pa. 160, 718 A.2d 751, 753 (1998); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 548 Pa. 116, 695 A.2d 409, 411 (1997) (\u201c[I]f appellate courts were to consider issues not raised in the trial court, then the trial would become a dress rehearsal ....\u201d) (citing Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116 (1974)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 248 Pa.Super. 214, 375 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Because appellant did not preserve the issue Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver 1: holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue 2: holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error 3: holding that failure to object to trial courts refusal of further instruction to jury during deliberation results in waiver of issue on appeal 4: holding failure to object in timely fashion at trial results in waiver of issue for appeal", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Co., 32 Va. Cir. 497, 502-03 (Henrico 1981). In any event, Dryvit was sued at the same time as RML and had the same notice of the original homeowner suit. Defendants state that the only notice received regarding the warranty claims was from the service of the Third-Party Motion for Judgment and RML\u2019s cross-claim against Dryvit and argue that this does not constitute adequate notice within the parameters of Virginia Code \u00a7 8.2-607(3)(a). It is true that some courts have found that service of process is insufficient notice of a breach of warranty claim. See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 513 (Ala. 1980) (filing of a third-party complaint by defendant one year into the litigation); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 327 A.2d 502, 514 (Md. 1974) (<HOLDING>); Voboril v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24 UCC Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled 2: holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer 3: holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy 4: holding that no right of action is given to the estate of the victim of a tort but is granted only to his heirs  if there are no heirs no right of action vests in anybody", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "susceptible to the interpretation that they do\u201d). However, it was appropriate for the court to look to the 1994 Will as an aid to determining whether the 2007 Will was affected by undue influence. See Griffith, 50 Md. at 482 (explaining that a testator\u2019s \"declarations in regard to her testamentary intentions ... before the execution of the will and codicil, and before any improper influences are supposed to have operated upon her, are admissible ... either to rebut the charges of fraud and undue influence, by showing that the will is consistent with the long cherished wishes of a testator, or [to show] that it is contrary to well settled convictions of what he thought was a just and proper disposition of his property\u201d); Estate of Gill, 111 Cal.App.2d 486, 244 P.2d 724, 726 (1952) (<HOLDING>). 13 . The 1994 Will did name Amani as trustee Holdings: 0: holding that presumption that respondent exercised undue influence by preparing will that left all of the decedents property to him was amply rebutted by evidence that decedent had made an earlier will ineffective because not witnessed leaving all her property to him and had written him a letter stating that she was leaving all her property to him 1: holding that the plaintiffs evidence that his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50 of the jobs previously available to him was enough to classify him as disabled under the ada 2: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty  and threatened him if he did not take the plea 3: holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him 4: holding that the trial judge must comply with rule 3172c8 and advise all defendants in all cases that the plea may subject him or her to deportation ", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "by the plaintiffs in their complaints \u2014 harmful effects on the quality and quantity of East Texas\u2019 water supply\u2014 \u201care among the sorts of interests\u201d that NEPA was specifically designed to protect. Lujan, 110 S.Ct. at 3187. These alleged injuries fall squarely within the class of injuries that NEPA safeguards: the circuit courts, to be sure, are flooded with cases which elucidate that water quality and water supply are prototypically matters of great environmental concern. E.g., Olmsted Citizens for a Better Community, 793 F.2d 201, 205 (8th Cir.1986) (a federal action which \u201cposes a threat to the physical resources of the area because of anticipated ... water supply problems\u201d must be preceded by an EIS); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 851-53 (9th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, Holdings: 0: holding after consideration of a single significance factor that an eis was required 1: holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea 2: holding that an eis was required to evaluate the environmental consequences of the decision to divert water to industrial use 3: holding that an agencys decision not to prepare an eis was unreasonable because record demonstrated that four of the regulatory factors were implicated 4: holding that an ea prepared by an agency in that case was not the functional equivalent of an eis", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or in a state of flux, \u201cthis Court has not hesitated to render its independent judgment as a matter of distinct and enforceable Pennsylvania constitutional law.\u201d Pap\u2019s AM. v. City of Erie, 571 Pa. 375, 812 A.2d 591, 607 (2002) (addressing freedom of expression) (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (1992) (extending double jeopardy protection under Pennsylvania Constitution) and Ins. Adjustment Bureau v. Ins. Comm\u2019r, 518 Pa. 210, 542 A.2d 1317, 1324 (1988) (addressing commercial speech)). Similarly, we have recognized that decisions based on Pennsylvania\u2019s Declaration of Rights \u201censure[s] future consistency in state constitutional interpretation, since federal law is always subject to change.\u201d Commonwealth v. Lewis, 528 Pa. 440, 598 A.2d 975, 979 n. 8 (1991) (<HOLDING>). When considering the rights provided by the Holdings: 0: holding that state prosecutor violated fifth amendment by telling jury that a defendants failure to testify supports an unfavorable inference against him 1: holding that a single ballot question encompassing amendments to both article i section 9 and article v section 10c violated the separatevote requirement 2: holding that defendants rights under article i section 9 were violated by the failure to provide a noadverse inference instruction 3: recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations 4: holding that a defendants fifth amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the use must be necessary to the use of the dominant estate); Koonce v. J.E. Brite Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.1984) (stating one of the required elements to establish an easement by necessity is that \u201caccess must be a necessity and not a mere convenience\u201d). Because necessity is the common, and dispositive element for the purpose of this appeal, we further narrow our review to whether the Saenzes carried their burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact on the element of necessity, and we do not consider whether they met their burden on the remaining elements of their theories of recovery. There is no dispute the Saenzes must cross property owned by another in order to access their acreage. \u201c[A]n easement by necessity is not defeated n Antonio 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). In their motion for summary judgment, the Holdings: 0: holding same as to an implied easement appurtenant 1: holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone 2: holding same as to an easement by implication 3: recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance 4: holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "as applicable, to the present case. 1. Purchaser Of Assets As an initial matter, there is no explicit requirement in the substantial continuity test for successor liability that an entity must be a \u201cpurchaser of assets\u201d to be a successor. However, the Court recognizes that whether a transfer of assets occurred may be relevant to the find ing of substantial continuity when balancing the equities in a particular case or legal context. See Whitmore v. O\u2019Connor Mgmt., Inc., 156 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir.1998) (\u201c[T]here are many difficulties with [plaintiffs] legal argument, not the least of which is the fact that there was no sale of a business creating a predecessor-successor relation between the two corporations\u201d). ERISA appears to be such a legal context. See Einhorn, 632 F.3d at 99 (<HOLDING>); see also Cobb, 452 F.3d at 556 (\u201cTitle VII Holdings: 0: holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession 1: holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without sellers knowledge and consent 2: holding that a purchaser of assets may be liable for a sellers delinquent erisa fund contributions to vindicate important federal statutory policy where the buyer had notice of the liability prior to the sale and there exists sufficient evidence of continuity of operations between the buyer and seller emphasis added 3: holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision 4: holding that auctioneer who handled sale of car between seller and buyer could not be held liable for allegedly defective condition of car", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Bank of Am. Nat\u2019l Trust & Sav. Ass\u2019n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir.1986). Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public\u2019s interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government\u2019s actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (<HOLDING>); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. Holdings: 0: holding that the county had no standing to sue the state to recover taxes illegally obtained from citizens unless the money belongs to the county 1: holding that plaintiffs claim for conversion of funds was barred by statute of limitations because the conversion occurred when robert white exercised unlawful dominion over the funds  in other words when robert white withdrew the funds from the annuities without plaintiffs permission 2: holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information 3: holding citizens lacked standing to challenge statute when all citizens affected in the same way 4: holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials possible conversion of funds", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "agent for service of process is one of agency law with particular emphasis on the nature of the relationship and the degree of control exercised. In Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 45 S.Ct. 250, 69 L.Ed. 634 (1925), the United States Supreme Court held that a parent-subsidiary relationship, by itself, is not sufficient to justify severance of the subsidiary as an agent for the parent corporation. Although in Cannon service of process was made on the subsidiary as agent for the parent, rather than on the parent as in the present case, this factual distinction does not affect the Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning concerning when one corporation becomes the other corporation\u2019s agent for severance. See Akari Imeji Co. v. Qume Corp., 748 F.Supp. 588, 591 (N.D.Ill.1990) (<HOLDING>); Geick v. American Honda Motor Co., 117 F.R.D. Holdings: 0: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 1: holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities 2: holding there is no precise test for defining how much control a foreign parent corporation must wield over its domestic subsidiary before the subsidiary will be deemed its agent for the purposes of service 3: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary 4: holding that control person liability adequately alleged because as the sole shareholder of the subsidiary the parent corporation had the potential power to influence and direct the activities of its subsidiary", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "evade review. DEQ begins by observing that some federal courts have adopted a \u201crule of thumb\u201d that two years is an adequate time to obtain a final judicial decision on a challenge to a federal administrative agency order. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc., v. Hogan, 428 F3d 1059, 1064 (DC Cir 2005). The time it takes to fully litigate a challenge to a federal administrative agency order or rule, however, may be different from the time it would take to challenge an Oregon agency\u2019s order or rule under the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, the \u201crule of thumb\u201d that DEQ identifies does not appear to have been uniformly followed by federal courts, particularly in cases involving challenges to NPDES permits. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F2d 549, 555 (9th Cir 1984) (<HOLDING>); Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Costle, Holdings: 0: recognizing a mootness exception for abortion litigation because pregnancy  truly could be capable of repetition yet evading review  1: holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review 2: holding ease not moot when challenged administrative order expired because icc proceedings are continuing and their consideration ought not be defeated by short term orders capable of repetition yet evading review 3: holding that we have no difficulty concluding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permit was capable of repetition yet evading review 4: holding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permits originally issued eight years earlier was capable of repetition yet evading review", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is three years1.\u201d); Ortiz v. Morgenthau, 772 F.Supp. 1430, 1432 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cThe three-year limitations period is appropriate for actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1985....\u201d), aff'd, 962 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.1992.). Plaintiffs alleged civil rights claims arise solely out of the 1994 civil suit, and thus are time-barred because they accrued more than three years prior to the commencement of this action. Plaintiff filed this suit on October 5, 1999. Therefore, any civil rights claims which accrued prior to October 5, 1996 are time-barred. All of Plaintiffs civil rights claims arose prior to October 5,1996. In New York, federal civil rights actions are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See Owens v.Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250-51, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (<HOLDING>). \u201cFederal civil rights claims accrue at the Holdings: 0: holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years 1: holding new mexico statute of limitations for filing a  1983 action is three years 2: holding that the new jersey statute of limitations applicable to  1983 actions is njsa 2a142 3: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorneys fees action under  1415e4b is three years 4: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the City from intervening as a matter of right. B. The District Court Improperly Engaged In Issue Reduction. The district court acknowledged that the complaint contained allegations regarding both abuse of process and federal preemption, but inappropriately claimed that the case \u201cis not about the applicability of environmental laws.\u201d The district court is mistaken; the question of federal preemption necessarily concerns the applicability of environmental laws. CEMEX\u2019s prayer for relief clearly states that it wishes to conduct its gravel mining operation without impediment from state environmental laws. The district court\u2019s focus on abuse of process and away from the application of environmental laws is not only mistaken, but also impermissible. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 399 (<HOLDING>) Regardless of the impermissible issue Holdings: 0: holding that while it is not appropriate to consider the merits in determining certification the admissibility of all evidence which has relevance to the merits is not barred if it is relevant to the purpose of refuting or supporting the existence of a class 1: holding that the district court is not free to consider the potential for issue reduction when determining whether a putative intervener has a protectable interest in the merits of the action 2: holding that when the district court dismissed rather than transferred a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action 3: holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred 4: holding that the district court is free to consider the full record in the case when selecting the appropriate sanction", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Act. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub.L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The amendments left intact the prohibition against discrimination based on union-membership status, but having found the closed shop susceptible to abuse, Congress outlawed it. See General Motors, 373 U.S. at 740-41, 83 S.Ct. 1453. Congress accordingly rewrote Section 8(3) \u2014 which it renumbered as Section 8(a)(3) \u2014 to permit only union-shop and agency-shop arrangements requiring union membership (or its equivalent) no earlier than 30 days after the start of employment. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 158(a)(3). Gone was the language authorizing closed-shop agreements that made union-membership a condition of obtaining employment. See N.L.R.B. v. Local Union No. 55, 218 F.2d 226, 232 (10th Cir.1954) (<HOLDING>). But lest the Taft-Hartley Act\u2019s detailed Holdings: 0: holding that immunity agreements are analogous to plea agreements and are enforced under principles of contract law within the constitutional safeguards of due process 1: holding that identical all agreements language  this policy contains all of the agreements between the parties  is an integration clause 2: recognizing closed shop agreements were made illegal 3: holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301 4: holding such agreements to be per se illegal", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the use and benefit of the life tenant ...\"); see also Tex. Prop.Code Ann. \u00a7 5.009 (West 2003) (specifying rules with respect to the fiduciary duties of a life tenant of a life estate who is given the power to sell and reinvest life tenancy property). 82 .See Gonzales v. Gonzales, 115 Tex. 16, 273 S.W. 798, 798 (1925) (indicating that the continued homestead rights of a spouse following the death of the owner of the homestead property are contingent upon the spouse's use and possession of the property for homestead purposes); Laster, 826 S.W.2d at 129 (\"This homestead protection, however, can arise only in the person or family who has a present possessory interest in the subject property.\u201d); see also Moorhouse v. Crew, 273 S.W.2d 654, 655-56 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 83 . See Lucas v. Lucas, 104 Tex. 636, 143 Holdings: 0: holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title 1: holding that spouses homestead interest was not abandoned because right to possession continued 2: holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other 3: holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead 4: holding that even if divorced wife only owned a beneficial interest and not title interest in the residence constituting her homestead she was nonetheless entitled to claim a homestead exemption from the forced sale of the property", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may bring an action on the contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the non-party, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely an incidental benefit of the contract. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo.1985). While the intent to benefit the non-party need not be expressly recited in the contract, the intent must be apparent from the terms of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances, or both. Id. In this case, Parrish was only one of many health care providers from which Progressive\u2019s insureds could have chosen for treatment of injuries resulting from automobile accidents covered by that policy. See Kelly Health Care, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 226 Va. 376, 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Parrish argues that it is nevertheless an Holdings: 0: holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract 1: holding that health care providers could pursuant to  1983 enforce the boren amendment to the medicaid act 2: holding that boren amendment created substantive federal right enforceable by health care providers to reasonable and adequate rates 3: holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder 4: holding that member of a large class of health care providers available to the insured was only a potential and incidental beneficiary of the contract and thus not entitled to recover thereunder", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "however, the Appellant in this case conceded that United States v. Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2006), prevents this Court from dismissing this appeal and remanding with instructions that the district court enter a new judgment as in Fuller. See Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d at 51-52 (<HOLDING>). The Appellant requested, in the alternative, Holdings: 0: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 1: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it 2: holding that because it was not clear on the present record unlike in fuller that morenoriveras trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective the court should dismiss the appeal as untimely and the defendant would have the opportunity to develop the recordand seek a remedy for his trial counsels alleged ineffectiveness should he prove that trial counsel failed to timely file a requested appealin a  2255 motion before the district court 3: holding that a defendant whose new trial motion is based on the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel may bypass rule 33s sevenday time limit only if his claim that his counsel  was ineffective was based on information unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial 4: holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "So.2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993). When a police officer turns on his or her emergency and takedown lights under these circumstances, a reasonable person would expect to be stopped, at a minimum, for a traffic infraction and perhaps for the crime of fleeing and eluding if he or she drove away. See \u00a7 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. McCune, 772 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, the use of such lights cer who has initiated a consensual encounter may turn on his emergency lights for reasons of traffic safety during the consensual encounter. In this case, there is no dispute that the deputy lacked a well-founded suspicion that Mr. Hrezo had committed or was about to commit a crime when he turned on his emergency lights. See Danielewicz v. State, 730 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). The cocaine and drug paraphernalia that the Holdings: 0: holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion 1: holding the location of an investigative stop is a factor that contributes to an officers reasonable suspicion 2: holding investigative stop based on officers observation of defendant apparently asleep in legally parked car was improper 3: holding that even if an officers stop of a defendant who was on foot was unlawful the search of a parked car was justified by a different officer observing a gun magazine in plain view in the car 4: holding that the fact that a group of men surrounding a car parked in a marked bus stop dispersed upon the approach of investigating officers was relevant to a reasonable suspicion determination", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "ruling precluded Bolt from testifying about the work papers. The court did not explicitly make a ruling on Bolt\u2019s testimony concerning the work papers. The court stated it was not prepared to rule on Bolt\u2019s analysis of the work papers at the beginning of the trial. The court also stated it had no problem with QCBT mentioning inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the work papers in its opening statement; The record clearly establishes the court\u2019s ruling on the motion in limine declared that Bolt\u2019s testimony concerning generally accepted CPA auditing standards, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, was inadmissible. The court did not equivocate or state it would reconsider its ruling at trial. Cf. Holst v. Countryside Enters., Inc., 14 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Thus, as to this testimony, we conclude the Holdings: 0: holding defendant failed to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence that was the subject of the motion in limine where defendant failed to object to evidence when offered at trial 1: holding that a trial courts evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the issue    for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during trial 2: holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial 3: holding that a party had failed to preserve an argument for appellate review when that party had failed to argue the issue to the trial court either at trial or in his postjudgment motion 4: holding that trial courts have discretion to decide whether litigation conduct violates a ruling on a motion in limine", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Section 1692f(6), referenced in this definition, prohibits a debt collector from taking or threatening to take \u201cnonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property\u201d if there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest, if there is no present intention to take possession of the property, or if the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement. Under the cited definition, a person whose principal purpose is the enforcement of security interests is a \u201cdebt collector\u201d for the purpose of \u00a7 1692f(6), but is not subject to the rest of the FDCPA unless he also fits \u00a7 1692a(6)\u2019s general definition of a debt collector. See Kaltenbach v. Richards, 464 F.3d 524, 527, 527 n. 3 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (citing Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 Holdings: 0: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 1: holding that a person may regularly render debt collection services even if these services are not a principal purpose of his business 2: holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt 3: recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of  1692a6   a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to  1692f6 4: holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "were made after 11 October 2002. See Warren v. Warren, 175 N.C. App. 509, 517, 623 S.E.2d 800, 805 (2006); 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 159, sec. 33.5. Here, the parties separated a January 2002. Therefore, any post-separation, debt-reduction payments made prior to 11 October 2002 should technically not be characterized as divisible property. However, Plaintiff does not argue that the trial court erred by mischaracterizing, in this particular way, the post-separation payments made by the parties as divisible property. Nonetheless, we hold that any error regarding the trial court\u2019s characterization of any such payments as divisible property to be harmless. See Cooke v. Cooke, 185 N.C. App. 101, 107-08, 647 S.E.2d 662, 667 (2007), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 175, 657 S.E.2d 888 (2008) Holdings: 0: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to award a spouse all of the divisible property attributable to his postseparation payments which reduced marital debt 1: holding that the lower court failed to account for payments made in connection with the marital home including mortgage payments 2: holding that funds advanced by husbands parents as down payment for purchase of marital residence was a gift and not a loan where there was no promissory note or other documentation no payments were made to parents for several years and no payments were requested 3: holding that the collateralsource statute requires a reduction of the judgment only for payments made prior to the verdict 4: holding that it was error but not error necessitating remand for a trial court to mischaracterize postseparation payments made prior to 11 october 2002 towards marital debt as divisible property and to distribute all such payments to the party who made them", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "139 Va. 394, 124 S.E. 477, 481 (1924)). All of these versions of fraud share the common element of a false statement of fact. In the present case, Plaintiff has not alleged any statement attributable to Womack that was false. Plaintiff does allege that, \u201cDefendants engaged in an aggressive advertising campaign throughout Virginia touting its self-proclaimed honesty and fair dealing to prospective consumers, including the Plaintiffs.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 4.) While this amounts to an assertion by Defendants, it is not an assertion of fact. It is well established that such an expression of opinion \u201cis no fraud.\u201d McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 262 Va. 463, 471-72, 552 S.E.2d 364 (2001); see ECA Local m IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 205 (2nd Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Alpine Bank v. Hubbell, 555 F.3d 1097, 1108 Holdings: 0: holding that five alleged incidents in four years were too few too separate in time and too mild  to create an abusive working environment 1: holding that false statements in a labor dispute that were injurious to employers reputation were not preempted 2: holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud 3: holding that defendants selfprofessed standardsetting reputation for integrity were too general to sustain charge of fraud 4: holding sanctions order was too general to support award", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "each other prior to trial is of no consequence. Under those circumstances, we are persuaded that there was manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, considering the \u201cends of justice for the defendant and the State.\u201d Farmer, supra, 48 N.J. at 171, 224 A.2d 481. In our view, the trial court exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial and that decision is entitled to deference. Ibid, (noting that \u201cappellate courts must realize that under our system the conduct of a trial is committed to the trial judge, and that in appraising the exercise of his discretionary action a wise and tolerant restraint must be practiced if the separate levels of the judicial process are to be maintained.\u201d). See also Arizona v. Washington, supra, 434 U.S. at 515-16, 98 S.Ct. at 835-36, 54 L.Ed.2d at 734 (<HOLDING>); State v. Modell, 260 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 615 Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff responsible for attorney error 1: holding that the record supported the district courts award of damages 2: holding the federal government responsible for the immediately foreseeable consequences of its actions 3: holding defendant implicitly consented to trial courts declaration of a mistrial 4: holding that trial courts responsible and deliberate actions supported mistrial declaration", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the best position to discern the impression conveyed by the witness, and because the IJ\u2019s finding of non-responsiveness was supported by the record, the IJ reasonably found that Li\u2019s demeanor undermined her credibility. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. Similarly, the record supports the IJ\u2019s finding that Li was \u201chesitant and vague\u201d when asked to describe her mother\u2019s practice of Falun Gong. The record reflects that Li\u2019s testimony on this topic was \u201cspare\u201d and that the IJ attempted to \u201cprobe for incidental details.\u201d Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003). Because the IJ\u2019s finding also included her perception of Li\u2019s demeanor, it serves as an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding. See Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the IJ reasonably found that it Holdings: 0: holding that history of dishonesty can support an adverse credibility finding 1: holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true 2: holding that the record did not support the agencys adverse credibility finding in the absence of additional probing 3: holding that speculation and conjecture cannot support an adverse credibility finding 4: holding that inconsistencies  adequately support the administrative law judges alj  adverse credibility finding", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "these two provisions do not do, however, is clearly define how states can invoke standing to bring Title VII suits. Nonetheless, a review of the standing capacities traditionally available to plaintiff states confirms that Congress intended to permit parens patriae actions when it authorized state governments to bring suit under Title VII. In Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir.2000), the Second Circuit held that \u201cPlaintiff-States generally bring suit in the federal courts in one of three standing capacities: (1) proprietary suits in which the State sues much like a private party suffering a direct, tangible injury; (2) sovereignty suits requesting adjudication of boundary disputes or water rights, or (3) parens patriae suits in which States h Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, Holdings: 0: holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix 1: holding that white woman who sued under title vii to enjoin racially discriminatory employment practices was aggrieved person within meaning of the statute 2: holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii 3: holding that white woman who was not object of discrimination but who alleged injury because of race discrimination against another was a person aggrieved within the meaning of title vii 4: holding that a plaintiff alleging discriminatory employment practices with regard to race has an independent remedy under  1981 without respect to exhaustion under title vii", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a grace period of 30 days to permit the claimant to comply with that subsection.\u201d See Act of May 5, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 140, \u00a7 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 985, 985-87, repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, \u00a7 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 887. Under section 13.01(g), the granting of a 30-day grace period is mandatory upon a finding that the failure to comply was the result of accident or mistake. Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 62-63 (Tex. 2003). Although a trial court has the discretion to find good cause and grant an extension under section 13.01(f) based on facts that also would constitute accident or mistake under section 13.01(g), this does not mean that the analysis under these two statutory provisions is the same. See James, 2005 WL 713671, at *2-4 (<HOLDING>). Even if the Scotts had proven accident or Holdings: 0: holding that claims under the adea and the nyshrl are subject to the same analysis 1: holding that analysis under section 1301g is not the same as the analysis under section 1301f and that the existence of accident or mistake is irrelevant because appellants moved for relief only under section 1301f 2: holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the fdcpa 3: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 4: holding that section 4a12 is a broadly applicable section of the guidelines", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "will undoubtedly assist us in our present analysis. Indeed, Massachusetts courts have indicated that when a Massachusetts statute is similar to a statute in another jurisdiction, even though it may not be identical, a consideration of the foreign jurisdiction\u2019s law, including judicial decisions, is appropriate, though by no means binding. See Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 723, 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (1979). An examination of case law from other jurisdictions reveals that there are two types of actions that arise during the period of corporate existence but survive past the windup period of the survival statute. The first are those actions that are brought in an individual capacity for a personal wrong. See Hunter v. Old Ben Coal Co., 844 F.2d 428, 432 (7th Cir.1988)(<HOLDING>). Indeed, when a claim is held individually by Holdings: 0: holding shareholder thirdparty benficiaries to corporate contract have individual breachofcontract claim 1: holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract 2: holding that even where no attorneyclient relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney this does not necessarily mean that the law firm had no fiduciary duty to the shareholder and observing that instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small in such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity 3: holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status 4: holding that sole shareholder could recover on behalf of company but not in individual capacity for former shareholder and officers misappropriation of corporate assets", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "717 (1910). In all of those situations, the conduct at issue occurred before a specific risk had been identified; the risk at issue was the inherent danger of gas or electricity. Here, in contrast, the risk at issue was not the inherent danger of mulch, but the unique and specific danger of the mulch surrounding these buildings and its known propensity to catch fire from careless disposal of smoking materials. See Shantigar Found. v. Bear Mt. Builders, 441 Mass. 131, 144, 804 N.E.2d 324 (2004) (\u201cMassachusetts law recognizes that in the absence of a statutory duty to [take certain fire prevention measures], a jury could find such a duty when the owner knows of a \u2018particular danger of fire.\u2019 \u201d); accord Little v. Lynn & Marblehead Real Estate Co., 301 Mass. 156, 161, 16 N.E.2d 688 (1938) (<HOLDING>). In Stewart, the SJC also held that expert Holdings: 0: holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire 1: holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable 2: holding that not having been shown to have knowledge of any particular danger of fire the defendant was not obliged to take precautions to guard against it 3: holding that even without  expert testimony the grand jurors common knowledge of the nature of fire would have allowed them to conclude that a fire spreads and becomes more dangerous the longer it is left unattended 4: holding that the fact that the fire was communicated to other property may reasonably be inferred from common knowledge of the operation of the established laws of nature in the familiar forms of combustion  and the effects of wind on fire ", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and Key were unreliable because they were not asked to identify him in a photographic lineup before trial and their testimony about the appearance of the surviving assailant differed to some extent. However, Appellant did not object to the admission of this eyewitness identification evidence at trial. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 196-201 (93 SCt 375, 34 LE2d 401) (1972) (discussing the due process protection against the admission of evidence deriving from suggestive identification procedures). And it is firmly established that the determination of a witness\u2019s credibility, including eyewitness identification, is within the exclusive province of the jury. See Reeves v. State, 288 Ga. 545, 546 (705 SE2d 159) (2011). See also Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 690 (763 SE2d 704) (2014) (<HOLDING>); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) Holdings: 0: holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been 1: holding that expert testimony should not be admitted as to a matter that is obviously within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony almost by definition can be of no assistance 2: holding that because the special master saw the witnesses and heard the testimony he has broad discretion in determining credibility 3: holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to exclude testimony of a witness for an alleged sequestration violation where no impermissible harmonization of testimony could be inferred from the witnesss reading of the newspaper in the absence of any evidence that this testimony was based on what he read 4: holding that whether and to what extent a witnesss testimony should be believed is a matter to be decided by the jury that saw and heard the testimony not by an appellate court reviewing a transcript", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "different place in the superseding indictment than it does in the statute makes no difference here. First, the \u201cattempt\u201d language appears after \u201cknowingly\u201d and before the other elements of the crime. \u201cAttempt\u201d can fairly be read to modify all of the elements that follow the word, not just the \u201cmeans or facility of interstate commerce\u201d element. Second, even if the \u201cattempt\u201d language in the superseding indictment is somewhat imprecise, this does not render the superseding indictment insufficient. \u201c[D]ue process does not require a recitation of the statute; it requires only that the [indictment] as a whole set forth the critical details of the offense charged.\u201d United States v. Lentsch, 369 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Third, given the circumstances in which this Holdings: 0: holding that the government need not prove that the defendant actually knew the exact nature of the substance to establish mens rea knowledge of drugs illegality is sufficient 1: holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea 2: holding convictions under fla stat  893131 qualify as serious drug offenses pursuant to the acca despite the florida statutes lack of a mens rea element 3: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 4: holding that an indictment that omitted the mens rea element was sufficient because it cited the applicable statutes which informed the defendant of the elements of the charged offenses", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "stated: In many cases it would work the grossest injustice to a carrier if it could not rely on the contract of shipment it has made, know whether it was bound to obey the state or Federal law, or, obeying the former, find itself mulcted in penalties for not obeying the law of the other jurisdiction, simply because the shipper intended a transportation beyond that specified in the contract. It must be remembered that there is no presumption that a transportation when commenced is to be continued beyond the state limits, and the carrier ought to be able to depend upon the contract which it has made, and must conform to the liability imposed by that contract. Id. at 414, 27 S.Ct. at 363. 21 . Compare Klitzke v. Steiner Corp., 110 F.3d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir.1997); Shew, 370 F.2d at 378, 380 (<HOLDING>); Beggs v. Kroger Co., 167 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Holdings: 0: holding shipments from a distribution point supplied by outofstate shipments made pursuant to preexisting orders were interstate in character 1: holding prima facie showing of unreasonableness made by presenting evidence that tariff rates in effect at time of shipments were well above rates paid to other carriers for same service 2: holding that warehouse distributions to companyowned stores constituted interstate commerce since inter alia the company knew at the time oufiofstate shipments to the warehouse commenced that the shipments were bound for its retail stores 3: holding that interstate shipments to a warehousedistribution point through to samestate retail outlets retained their interstate character where the warehouse was merely a convenient instrumentality for the division of the shipments coming to it and the continuation of the movement of each part to the retail stores 4: holding that the halt of shipments of unprocessed milk without processing or commingling did not remove the interstate character of the shipments", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "developed over a period of years is evenhandedly applied.\u201d Id. at 401, 101 S.Ct. 2424. Reliance on \u201cpublic policy\u201d was similarly misplaced: \u201c \u2018[pjublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Traveling Men\u2019s Ass\u2019n, 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931)). See also Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1325 (7th Cir.1992) (\u201cMoitie scotches equitable arguments\u201d against application of principles of preclusion in any particular situation). Just as fairness and equity are no reason not to apply claim preclusion, a party seeking its application need not show that the particular circumstances are abusive or vexatious. See First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Parsons Steel, Inc., 825 F.2d 1475, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). It is the mere fact of relitigation that is Holdings: 0: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 1: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 2: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 3: holding that showing of bad faith prosecution or harassment not required for issuance of injunction to prohibit relitigation 4: holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that they made a fraudulent statement in the October letter when they said that \u201cthe congregation of [the Church] has been working on the \u2018Ball Field\u2019 at [the Park], without pay, since April 2013\u201d because \u201cwork performed by members of the Church congregation had ceased in May 2013.\u201d (Compl. \u00b6 92.) The next paragraph of the Complaint, however, belies this assertion of falsity because it acknowledges that the October letter also informed the Town that the Church\u2019s work at the Park \u201chad stopped.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 93,). In other words, the October letter stated that the Church had worked on the soccer field, but this work had ended. Thus, the Complaint does not adequately explain why the October letter was fraudulent. Compare Houraney v. Burton & Assocs., P.C., 701 F.Supp.2d 258, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Nanjing Standard Int'l, Ltd. v. DMD Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false 1: holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence 2: holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal 3: holding that fundamental error occurred and reversal was required when trial court failed to explain allegations or to explain adequately future use of adjudication record 4: holding that plaintiff failed to explain why statement was fraudulent where it was not necessarily inconsistent with plain tiffs factual allegations", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "decision to waive his right to counsel. 3 . Our concurring colleague, Judge Katzmann, disagrees with our characterization of the quoted language as dictum. In his view, the Supreme Court would not have vacated the state judgment of conviction if it had not been satisfied that Faretta knowingly exercised his right to self-representation; thus, the Court\u2019s discussion of what constitutes a \"knowing and intelligent\u201d waiver of the right to counsel \u201cwas essential to its conclusion that Faretta\u2019s constitutional rights had been violated.\u201d Infra at 566. We are not convinced. Given Faretta's recognition of a constitutional right to represent oneself, the Court might well have vacated the state conviction and remanded the case even without a finding of a valid waiver of the right t 1984) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that for a trial judge to accept a defendants guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary violates the defendants constitutional rights 1: holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea 2: holding that factual basis inquiry is one way of satisfying the constitutional requirement that a guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent but it is not mandated by due process 3: holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge 4: holding that due process requires state courts to make an affirmative showing that a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, if Johnson\u2019s claim rests upon the ineffectiveness of his attorney on appeal, then his cause of action could not have accrued prior to the disposition of his appeal. For these reasons, we find that Johnson\u2019s cause of action for habeas corpus did not accrue until his direct appeal was decided by this court on May 19, 1989. See Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141. Because this decision occurred after the legislature\u2019s deletion of imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations under section 78-12-36, the trial court correctly held that Johnson\u2019s claim was time-barred. We recognize that the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to habeas corpus actions has been declared unconstitutional. See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (<HOLDING>); see also Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, Holdings: 0: recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations 1: holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution 2: holding that refusal to proceed to trial by arbitrarily abating case violates article i section 13 of the texas constitution 3: holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government 4: holding that ninetyday statute of limitations on habeas actions is unreasonable limitation that violates article i section 11 of utah constitution", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "me with real questions about the fairness of this trial. See United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 197 (2d Cir.2013) (vacating judgment of conviction and remanding because multiple errors, considered together, \u201ccall into serious doubt whether the defendant received the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness to which she and all criminal defendants are entitled\u201d). See infra Point IV. Because the Confrontation Clause violation and the instructional error rendered defendants\u2019 trial fundamentally unfair, a new trial as to all counts is warranted. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (\u201c[T]he Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.\u201d); cf. United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). See infra Point V. I The Constitution Holdings: 0: recognizing spillover effect that warranted vacatur of counts other than those primarily infected with error 1: holding that severance was not required when a defendant was charged with five counts of forcible rape two counts of felonious restraint three counts of kidnapping two counts of armed criminal action two counts of forcible sodomy one count of second degree assault one count of first degree robbery and one count of stealing 2: holding error was structural because of the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error 3: recognizing with approval the practice following vacatur of some counts of conviction on appeal of increasing the defendants sentence on remaining counts to yield an aggregate sentence equal to the original aggregate imposed 4: holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. New Jersey were tried and convicted based on confessions elicited without Miranda warnings, and the convictions became final before Miranda was decided. Id. at 725-26, 86 S.Ct. 1772. In unambiguous terms, the Court held that \u201cMiranda applies only to cases in which the trial began after the date of our decision one week ago.\u201d Id. at 721, 86 S.Ct. 1772. The rule did not apply \u201cretroactively,\u201d that is, to convictions which were already final, nor did it apply to cases tried before Miranda\u2019s effective date. Id. at 731-32, 86 S.Ct. 1772. However, even for statements elicited pre-Miranda, the rule would henceforth apply \u201cto persons whose trials had not begun as of June 13, 1966.\u201d Id. at 734, 86 S.Ct. 1772; see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 738, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Since Johnson v. New Jersey and Frazier, no Holdings: 0: holding that a confession obtained in violation of miranda was admissible for impeachment 1: holding miranda decision does not apply retroactively 2: holding that miranda was constitutionally based but declining to go further than miranda  to establish a constitutional right 3: holding on collateral review that miranda rule did not apply to confession because petitioner was tried before miranda decision 4: holding miranda inapplicable because defendant not in custody", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court finds that a material issue of fact exists concerning whether or not the La Vega site may currently present an imminent and substantial endangerment. Defendant Esso has presented evidence that the chemicals released at the site do not constitute such a threat, but this evidence has been controverted by plaintiffs. Accordingly, this issue must be reserved for trial. F. Plaintiffs\u2019 CWA Claim Adequately Identifies the Effluent Standard That Esso is Allegedly Violating Defendant argues that plaintiffs claim does not identify the effluent al cases in support of assertion that \u201cthe CWA has been consistently applied by the courts to land and waters located in Puerto Rico\u201d); Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Alexander, 438 F.Supp. 90, 94-96 (D.D.C.1977) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs\u2019 claim alleges that an indivisible Holdings: 0: holding that the federal water pollution control act amendments of 1972 and certain regulations promulgated thereunder are applicable to nonnavigable waters of puerto rico despite contention that such waters are areas of purely local concern and that federal regulation of such areas is inapplicable under the puerto rican federal relations act 1: holding that no implied private right of action exists under the nha and noting that the district of columbia first sixth and ninth circuits have held that the housing act and regulations promulgated thereunder do not satisfy the fourpart cort test and thus have refused to create a right of action for private parties who wish to sue to enforce the statute or regulations promulgated thereunder 2: holding ripe for review an epa informal adjudication that regulations promulgated under the federal water pollution control act applied to certain brass cleaning facilities 3: holding that a private company operating under a federal contract was not a federal department agency or instrumentality for the purposes of section 313 of the federal water pollution control act amendments of 1972 4: holding that a landlord has a duty of reasonable care over common areas or other areas over which the landlord has retained control", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "ineffective assistance under Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ], then the prejudice standard under the \u2018cause and prejudice\u2019 showing to excuse a procedural default is also met.\u201d Lynch v. Ficco, 438 F.3d 35, 49 (1st Cir.2006). In this case, it is clear that the error complained of \u2014 Goldman\u2019s sentencing as a Career Offender despite the invalidity of one of his essential prior convictions \u2014 had \u201csubstantial and injurious effect.\u201d The government does not dispute that Goldman\u2019s Career Offender status increased his sentence by at least seventeen years. This constitutes a \u201csubstantial and injurious effect or influence\u201d and meets the Strickland standard. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203, 121 S.Ct. 696, 148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001) (<HOLDING>). With regard to cause, Goldman argues that the Holdings: 0: holding that it is error to engraft onto the prejudice branch of the strickland test a requirement that any increase in a sentence must meet a standard of significance 1: holding regarding sixth amendment prejudice if there is no reasonable possibility that the appellate court would have ruled in his favor there can be no strickland prejudice 2: holding that there is no baseline or quantifiable increase in a defendants sentence that must be shown to establish prejudice under strickland 3: holding that any reduction in sentence constitutes substantial prejudice for purposes of strickland analysis 4: holding that prejudice is shown where a sentencing error may affect the determination of sentence", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "omitted). Accord, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1014 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1982) (\u2018Voluntary\u201d means not caused by police misconduct); United States v. Barber, 557 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir.1977) (evidence left in police car after illegal arrest held inadmissible because discovery of the evidence was a direct result of the unconstitutional seizure of defendant\u2019s person); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993, 995 (10th Cir.1974) (drugs left behind as a result of illegal search of rear compartment of camper held inadmissible). Of course, if the abandonment is truly voluntary \u2014 i.e., not caused by police misconduct \u2014 evidence found is admissible even if there was a prior or subsequent illegal search or seizure. E.g., United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 763 Holdings: 0: recognizing that trial court properly left the door open for defendant to prove its defenses to the fed complaint 1: holding that when a police officer observes something from an area where the officer is lawfully entitled to be anything that is in open view may be observed without having to obtain a search warrant because making such open view observations does not constitute a search in the constitutional sense 2: holding tacit consent to search of person was insufficient to prove consent to search bags where bags were not in defendants actual possession defendant merely pointed out bags at officers request and officer never specifically asked for consent to search bags 3: holding that abandonment was not caused by police misconduct where defendant left bags in open view before officers had knocked on door to gain admission because officers had not yet done anything illegal 4: holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "applied Hardy and suggested the limits of the term: whether the information \u201ctell[s] the [agency] how to catch lawbreakers; [or tells] lawbreakers how to avoid the [agency\u2019s] enforcement efforts.\u201d Id. Our existing cases lead our district courts to strain the logical limits of \u201claw enforcement\u201d to cover otherwise valid invocations of Exemption 2. They regularly deny requests for disclosure of all kinds of internal documents, including those related to the military and national security, even if unrelated to investigations or prosecutions. See, e.g., Kelly v. FAA, No. 07-00634, 2008 WL 958037 (E.D.Cal. Apr.8, 2008) (magistrate judge recommending exemption of \u201cgrading sheet\u201d for hiring of Designated Pilot Examiners); L.A. Times v. Dep\u2019t of Army, 442 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D.Cal.2006) (<HOLDING>); Gordon, 388 F.Supp.2d at 1036 (holding \u201cno Holdings: 0: holding attempted aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer is not a crime in florida 1: holding data on insurgent and other attacks in iraq are law enforcement materials 2: holding that law enforcement commission was a benefit of employment 3: holding that while law enforcement officers properly separated and assumed possession of a cell phone from arrestees person during the search incident to arrest a warrant was required before the information data and content of the cell phone could be accessed and searched by law enforcement 4: holding that a question about present employment in field of law enforcement did not trigger disclosure of past employment in field of law enforcement", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period.\u201d Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 416, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 838, 80 S. Ct. at 826. The Court also stated that \u201cwhere conduct occurring within the limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice,\u201d \u201cit serves to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful. And where a complaint based upon that earlier event is time-barred, to permit the event itself to be so used in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair labor practice.\u201d Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. at 416-17, 4 L. Ed. 2d at 838, 80 S. Ct. at 827. See also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106, 122, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2072 (2002) (<HOLDING>). This court subsequently addressed the issue Holdings: 0: holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotive theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination 1: holding that in title vii cases the mixedmotives theory of discrimination is available in cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination 2: holding that the mixedmotive framework does not apply to retaliation cases under title vii 3: holding that in title vii cases the statute of limitations does not bar an employee from using prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim 4: holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to make bond, and to keep an office or place of business; but none or all of these requirements do not absolutely determine whether or not a given employment is a public office, within the meaning of a given statute or constitutional provision.... \u201cOn account of this variety of meanings attaching to the words \u2018office\u2019 and \u2018officer,\u201d as used in various written laws, the adjudicated cases do not always, nor even often, furnish safe guides by which to determine with absolute certainty whether or not a given employment is an office [within] the meaning of a given statute or other written law. Every case must of necessity be determined by consideration of the particular facts and circumstances involved.... \u201d Harrington v. State ex rel. Van Hayes, 200 Ala. 480, 481-82, 76 So. 422, 424 (1917) (<HOLDING>). In Ward v. State ex rel. Goldsmith, 203 Ala. Holdings: 0: holding that county defendant was a person within meaning of fca for purposes of suit by private plaintiff 1: holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 2: holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute 3: holding that an alcoholic beverage control officer was a public officer within the meaning of the statute 4: holding that the position of  alltime health officer for a county was not an office within the meaning of section 1467 of the code of 1907", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "after conviction,\u201d and (3) \u201cmultiple punishments for the same offense.\u201d Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir.2001) (\u201c[T]he double jeopardy bar prohibits not only multiple punishments for the same offense, but also a second prosecution following conviction[.]\u201d). The prohibition of multiple successive prosecutions, the double jeopardy claim at issue in this case as urged by defendant, serves two interests. First, it preserves the criminal defendant\u2019s interest in the finality of judgment. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (\u201cWhere successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee ser 680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (<HOLDING>). \u201cAs a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a Holdings: 0: holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant 1: holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted 2: holding double jeopardy bar on subsequent prosecution did not apply even after defendant had been sentenced when he breached conditions of his guilty plea and refused to testify for a second time at codefendants retrial for murder 3: holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder 4: holding that fact that conviction has been overturned at defendants behest removes double jeopardy bar to increased sentence after retrial", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the risk or to see that sufficient precautions are taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses.\u201d Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 735 (Fla.1989). Thus, \u201c[a]s to duty, the proper inquiry for the reviewing appellate court is whether the defendant\u2019s conduct created a foreseeable zone of risk, not whether the defendant could foresee the specific injury that actually occurred.\u201d McCain, 593 So.2d at 504 (bold emphasis added). By placing the large cement pipes on the corner of an intersection, Freedom created a \u201cforeseeable zone of risk\u201d where motorists had an obstructed view of eastbound traffic on Griffin Road. Therefore, Freedom had a duty to take necessary precautions and minimize the risk inherent in that obstructed view. Cf. Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So.2d 210 (Fla.2001) (<HOLDING>). The primary issue upon which the trial court Holdings: 0: holding a private landowner can be held hable for negligently keeping property in a manner that obstructs a drivers view of traffic 1: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties 2: holding that public entities may be held vicariously hable for the negligent acts of their individual employees 3: holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance 4: holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "provided, however, that: (t \u215d \u215c \u215d \u201c(2) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of medical * * * malpractice which could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of the malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered.\u201d (Emphases added.) Under the plain language of \u00a7 9-1-14.1, in order to toll the malpractice statute of limitations, there must be a finding that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence at the time the injury occurred, yet failed to discover a wrongful act on the part of the defendant. See Grossi v. Miriam Hospital, 689 A.2d 403, 404 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the tolling provision contained Holdings: 0: holding prescription defense available to wife who asserted that she was holding her husbands pills on his behalf 1: holding erisa did not apply when doctor was not employee of the medical association of the state of alabama 2: holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy 3: holding that the tolling provision of  91141 did not apply when the plaintiff knew that medical negligence may have contributed to her husbands death but asserted that she did not know the identity of the doctor who treated him 4: holding that where petitioner testified she did not know who fired shots at her ear or why the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the shooting was based on her political opinion", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the assets at stake were artwork or cash, the Defendants, through a series of complex transactions, have succeeded in moving such assets from trusts and accounts in which the Plaintiff had the right of access, to trusts and accounts in which she did not. Thus, all of the alleged predicates of mail fraud, wire fraud and money laundering are related insofar as they served either to execute the fraud, or mask it. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Cooper, 882 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir.1989) (although plaintiff alleged separate acts involving separate properties, relatedness present where all acts had purported effect of depriving plaintiff of his interest in real estate entity). At this stage, nothing more is required. See, e.g., Koal Indus. v. Asland, S.A., 808 F.Supp. 1143, 1161-62 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>). The Plaintiff has also met the continuity Holdings: 0: holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity 1: holding that plaintiff stated pattern of racketeering activity where defendants allegedly committed various predicates with common design of defrauding plaintiffs of money and obtaining control of coal mine 2: holding that a pattern of racketeering activity required multiple illegal schemes 3: holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant engaged in multiple instances of mail and wire fraud did not allege pattern of racketeering activity with sufficient particularity 4: holding that racketeering predicates must be related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that separateness. In Grace\u2019s view, for the Maxima to become Nathaniel\u2019s separate property, he owed her half of the value of the automobile because the couple had purchased it with \u201cjoint\u201d funds. Likewise, Nathaniel had to pay \u201chis\u201d separate part of the marital debt for health and automobile insurance. {\u00b6 58} However, spouses cannot by agreement convert marital assets and debt into separate assets and debt, unless the agreement is pursuant to an immediate separation. R.C. 3103.06 (\u201cA husband and wife cannot, by any contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except that they may agree to an immediate separation and make provisions for the support of either of them and their children during the separation\u201d); Blair v. Blair (Mar. 5, 2002), 3d Dist. No. 9-01-36, 2002 WL 359470 (<HOLDING>). \u201c \u2018R.C. 3103.06 prohibits post-nuptial Holdings: 0: holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property 1: holding that separate property valued at 45000 was transmuted to marital property when improved by 3800 of marital property 2: holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property 3: holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property 4: holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "have changed the jury\u2019s decision to impose a death sentence. See Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 713-714 (10) (b) (reviewing alleged impropriety that was not objected to at trial solely for the purpose of determining if a death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor in violation of OCGA \u00a7 17-10-35 (c) (D). 9. In addition to his claim above regarding unsworn and allegedly false testimony, Martin argues that the trial court erred by permitting victim impact testimony that was improper in other ways. Because Martin failed to both raise objections and obtain rulings on them regarding any of the allegedly objectionable statements, he has forfeited his right to appeal under ordinary appellate review standards. See Smith, 287 Ga. at 30 (3) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, we conclude under the \u201cplain Holdings: 0: holding that appellants failure to obtain a ruling at the trial level even on a constitutional issue precluded review on appeal 1: holding that the supreme court will not address an argument on appeal if a party has failed to obtain a ruling below 2: holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court 3: holding that a party must obtain a distinct ruling on an issue in order to raise it on appeal 4: holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "twice for the same offense arising from the same act. See State v. Craft, 685 So.2d 1292 (Fla.1996). Accordingly, because Appellant was twice convicted for the same offense arising from a single episode, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court vacate Appellant\u2019s conviction on Count I. We also remand for recalculation of the score sheet and re-sentencing since the vacated conviction will result in a reduced sentencing range. See Johnson v. State, 744 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(re-manding for re-sentencing where one of defendant\u2019s convictions was vacated and the appellate court was unable to conclude that the defendant\u2019s sentence would have been the same had the trial court used a properly prepared score sheet); Roy v. State, 711 So.2d 1848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and Holdings: 0: holding habitual offender sentence rendered any errors in guidelines score sheet harmless 1: holding that resentencing is required 2: holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed 3: holding that on a motion for postconviction relief defendant was entitled to reduction of points based upon a vacated conviction which resulted in a reduced sentencing range which required resentencing with a corrected score sheet 4: holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "interpreted asa holding that a gold tooth equates with a stereotypical belief as a matter of law. See George v. State, 263 Ga. App. 541, 545 (2) (b) n. 13 (588 SE2d 312) (2003) (summarizing our holding in Rector as \u201cimproper stereotyping where state failed to explain how prospective juror\u2019s gold tooth related to case\u201d), disapproved on other grounds, Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 202 (1) (c) n. 3 (739 SE2d 682) (2013) (noting that George is overruled to the extent it was based upon standard disapproved in Toomer, supra). Clearly, our decision in Rector rested upon the State\u2019s failure to provide a case-related explanation for its peremptory strike. But the Supreme Court of Georgia has now expressly disapproved of that portion of the decision. Toomer, supra, 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted; emphasis supplied). After Holdings: 0: holding that a written statement could not be regarded as an affidavit sufficient in law for any purpose because it was not sworn to by any one or before any officer 1: holding explanation need not even be caserelated  and stating any statements to the contrary in four identified cases and any other georgia case are hereby disapproved 2: holding an auditors review and approval of quarterly financial statements nonactionable under  10b and stating that because defendant did not actually engage in the reporting of the financial statements  but merely reviewed and approved them the statements are not attributable to defendant and thus defendant cannot be found liable for making a material misstatement 3: holding that courts are not bound to decide any particular jurisdictional question before any other 4: recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(1) legal fees incurred to repossess the equipment; (2) investigator\u2019s fees expended to track down the equipment hidden by Paul; (3) devaluation of the market price of the recovered equipment; and (4) loss of some of the equipment hidden by Paul. Mullins has challenged the inclusion of consequential damages in the restitution award and the failure of the court to make findings as to his ability to pay. The amount of restitution that may be awarded under the VWPA is specifically described: The order may require that such defendant\u2014 \u201c(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction o n effect, even if costs that are not included would appear to be justified as a way of making the victim whole. United States v. Mitchell, 876 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In cases involving the damage, loss, or Holdings: 0: holding that restitution under the vwpa was more akin to compensation for actual loss than a criminal penalty that may not bear interest 1: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not 2: holding that restitution for lost income in property cases was improper under the plain language of the statute because restitution for lost income is authorized only for victims of bodily injury 3: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 4: holding that restitution for lost income is not authorized for offenses resulting in damage to loss of or destruction of property the fact that the goals of the vwpa may be thwarted by denying lost income restitution does not authorize us to ignore the plain language of the statute", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a judicially created doctrine in this state. The action existed at common law, and was adopted into the jurisprudence of this state. See, e.g., Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266, 55 P. 46 (1898). The legislature of this state has not specifically provided for an action for alienation of affections. No doubt has ever been expressed regarding the courts' power to abolish this judicially created action for alienation of a spouse's affections. Our original decision in this case recognized that \"a rule of law which has its origins in the common law and which has not been specifically enacted by the legislature may be modified or abolished by the courts when such revision is mandated by changed conditions.\" Wyman v. Wallace, 91 Wn.2d at 318-19. See also Freehe v. Freehe, 81 W 9, 134 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the question of Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 2: holding that the question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction and therefore may be assumed without being decided 3: recognizing that the question of abolition of the action for alienation of affections is a matter that can be decided by the state courts and then holding that the action will continue to exist 4: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of these claims. IGRA requires the Secretary to review a tribe\u2019s distribution plan and approve it, if it meets the requirements of 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 2710(b)(3). The Secretary complied with this requirement, determining that the Community\u2019s plan \u2014 including its provision that \u201c[t]he decision as to those persons entitled to share in Community gaming profits is strictly an internal Tribal matter and an inherent right and power of the Tribe,\u201d (Amend.Compl. Ex. I, \u00a7 14.5, pt. A) \u2014 was \u201cadequate.\u201d The \u201cadequacy\u201d of a tribal gaming ordinance falls within the expertise of the BIA and the NIGC, and as such, is entitled to significant deference. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)(A); Lile v. University of Iowa Hosp., 886 F.2d 157, 160 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the Federal Holdings: 0: holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency 1: recognizing that courts accord significant deference to an agency decision where agency expertise is involved 2: holding deference to agency methodology appropriate unless agency failed to address an essential factor 3: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review 4: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to any portion of the twenty percent contingent fee arrangement? In its panel opinion, the Veterans Court ruled that under New York law the termination extinguished Mason\u2019s right to a contingent fee. The en banc court, however, vacated the panel decision when it granted rehearing en banc. Ordinarily state law controls the attorney-client relationship. See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.1960). Here, however, a federal statute provides for and governs the twenty percent contingent fee arrangement and the Secretary\u2019s payment of the fee to the attorney out of the proceeds of the past benefits awarded. In that situation, should not federal rather than state law govern those aspects of the relationship? Cf. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597, 79 S.Ct. 1331, 3 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Of course, such federal standards may reflect Holdings: 0: holding that the rights and duties of the united states on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal law and that in the absence of an applicable act of congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards 1: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity 2: holding that the validity of government officials claim of absolute immunity for statement allegedly defamatory under state law must be judged by federal standards to be formulated by the courts in the absence of legislative action by congress 3: holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent 4: holding that ejxcept in matters governed by the federal constitution or by acts of congress the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "... to trigger the [IAD], and that he did request, as he was required to do, a trial within the time period.\u201d Subsequently, the judge denied the State\u2019s motion for reconsideration. The State appeals, contending that the motion judge erred in dismissing the indictment and that the IAD was not applicable. Under the IAD, a person who is imprisoned in one state, who has, pending in another state which is a party to the agreement, an \u201cuntried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against\u201d him, must \u201cbe brought to trial within 180 days after he [has] caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer\u2019s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a fin ) (<HOLDING>). Here, the State never filed a detainer. \u201cA Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant is not entitled to dismissal of an indictment under the iad as no detainer had been lodged against him 1: holding that indictment sufficiently informed defendant of the charge against him so as to enable him to prepare a defense and thus there is no claim that he was surprised at trial 2: holding that if the time limits of the iad have been violated the charges underlying the detainer must be dismissed 3: holding that the 180day time period in article 111a of the iad does not commence until the prisoners request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him 4: recognizing that under fex prisoners request for final disposition requires actual delivery to court and prosecuting officer of jurisdiction that lodged detainer against him", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the Leases is fatal to their appeal. See Loven v. Greene County, 94 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Mo.App. S.D.2003) (\u201cAn appellant\u2019s failure to challenge a finding and ruling that would support the conclusion complained about is fatal to an appeal.\u201d). It is the Appellants\u2019 \u201cburden on appeal to demonstrate that the trial court\u2019s judgment was incorrect on any basis supported by the record and the applicable law.... As such, the [Appellants\u2019] failure to properly challenge a finding and ruling of the trial court that would support its judgment ... would be fatal to [their] appeal.\u201d Landry v. Miller, 998 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo.App. W.D.1999) (abrogated on other grounds) (internal citation omitted); see also City of Peculiar v. Hunt Martin Materials, LLC, 274 S.W.3d 588, 590-91 (Mo.App. W.D.2009) (<HOLDING>); Houston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 133 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal 1: holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified 2: holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal 3: holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal 4: holding that to establish grounds for reversal an appellant must challenge all grounds on which the trial court ruled against it", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "any court.\u201d This court con- eludes that section 440(a) expressly repeals all federal court jurisdiction over the deportation orders of the defined class of criminal aliens, including jurisdiction under \u00a7 2241. Nevertheless, because the Fifth Circuit said in Williams that the Constitution prevents Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus for the class of criminal deportees to which Olvera belongs, 114 F.3d at 84, the court must assume that habeas jurisdiction is constitutionally required in this case despite the language of section 440(a). III. Scope of Review Among the district courts that have found jurisdiction to review deportation orders under \u00a7 2241, there has been considerable debate over the proper scope of review. See, e.g., Mbiya v. INS, 930 F.Supp. 609 (N.D.Ga.1996) (<HOLDING>); Mojica v. Reno, 970 F.Supp. 130 Holdings: 0: holding that federal court cannot review claim procedurally defaulted in state court absent showing of either cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice 1: holding that in the case of state procedural default a federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate among other things that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice 2: holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice 3: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered absent exceptional circumstances of plain error or fundamental miscarriage of justice 4: holding that fundamental miscarriage of justice standard requires petitioner to make threshold showing of actual innocence", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a preponderance of the evidence either that he or she had no knowledge of the illegal activity, or, in the alternative, that he or she did not consent to such activity occurring. United States v. 141st Street Corporation, by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir.1990). This \u201cinnocent owner\u201d defense is an affirmative defense that must be proven by the claimant. United States v. One Parcel of Property, Located at 755 Forest Road, Northford, Conn., 985 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1993). Whether the claimant must prove absence of actual knowledge of the illegal activity or the more demanding burden of absence of constructive knowledge of the illegal activity is a split issue amongst the circuits. Compare United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred. Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) with One Parcel of Property, Located at 755 Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff can prove foreseeability by showing the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the assailants violent nature 1: recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge 2: holding that constructive knowledge satisfies the reason to know standard 3: holding that the innocent owner defense hinges upon the claimants actual not constructive knowledge 4: holding stock dividend payable to actual owner not owner of record", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Alan Pardofigueroa appeals from the district court\u2019s judgment and 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction to Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 371, Fraud and Misuse of Documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1546(a), and False Statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291, and we affirm. Pardofigueroa contends that the district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, when determining whether the factual predicate for a sentencing enhancement had been met. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Pardofigueroa also contends that the district Holdings: 0: holding guidelines to be only advisory 1: holding that the preponderance standard is generally appropriate in guidelines sentencing 2: recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard 3: holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard 4: holding that under the advisory guidelines a district court should resolve factual disputes at sentencing by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "289, 292 (5th Cir.1981)] or (3) when the government no longer has a mortgage or a lien upon the property in dispute when the suit was filed, [citing Koehler, 153 F.3d at 266-67].\u201d Hussain, 311 F.3d at 629-30. Furthermore, if the complaint or pleading does not set forth with particularity the nature of the government\u2019s interest showing that it has or claims to have a lien or mortgage against the property that is the subject of the suit, the complaint fails to satisfy the conditions necessary to waive the sovereign immunity of the United States and invoke federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2410(b) (\u201cThe complaint or pleading shall set forth with particularity the nature of the interest or lien of the United States.\u201d); see also Dahn v. United States, 127 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Macklin v. United States, 300 F.3d 814, 821 Holdings: 0: holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity 1: holding that a complaint that fails to meet the pleading requirements does not invoke the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity 2: holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal 3: holding that the ada does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity and thus does not apply to the federal government 4: holding where party fails to challenge specificity of pleading it waives right to claim that pleading fails to meet legal requirements", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to DOJ before the IC\u2019s appointment that she will not recover under the Act. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Mullins would not have incurred the attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses for which she seeks reimbursement \u201cbut for\u201d the requirements of the Act. D. Fees are \u201cReasonable\" under the Act 1. Attorneys\u2019fees As we have often observed, the fee petitioner bear rneys\u2019 fees and expenses and we will review each bill separately to ensure that all items sought are reimbursable under the Act and are reasonable. The January 1993 bill totals $22,322.50 and Mullins subtracts $6,800 for representation prior to IC diGenova\u2019s appointment on December 14, 1992, and $632.50 for research in connection with recovering attorneys\u2019 fees, which is not reimbursable under the Act. See Gadd, 12 F.3d at 257 (<HOLDING>). We find reasonable the remaining fees of Holdings: 0: holding that fees for fees are not reimbursable under 28 usc  593f1 1: holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees 2: holding a bankruptcy court is not a court of the united states entitled to waive filing fees pursuant to 28 usc section 1915a 3: holding that a case awarding fees under 42 usc  1988 has no application in a private claim for attorneys fees sounding in mississippi contract law 4: holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the debtor, who could with impunity demand the return of property repossessed pre-petition informally, realizes that it cannot prevail and thus declines to file an adversary proceeding to recover the property. ORDER Pursuant to the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Defendant, which repossessed Debtor\u2019s vehicle pre-petition, did not violate the automatic stay by refusing to voluntarily return the vehicle to Debtor after the Chapter 13 case was filed. Therefore, the Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendant. 1 . Of course sometimes creditors are told by debtors or individuals acting on a debtor\u2019s behalf that a case is pending when in fact it has not been filed. See In re Karis, 208 B.R. 913 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.1997) (<HOLDING>). Sometimes this representation is innocent as Holdings: 0: holding a tape of a telephone call was admissible because one party to the call consented to the recording 1: holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk 2: holding that telephone call from debtors attorney did not constitute notice of bankruptcy filing because petition had not in fact been filed 3: holding that a debtors entitlement to an exemption under  522d1 is determined as of the filing date of  a bankruptcy petition 4: holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "parents, they obtained the PTSD diagnosis and the prescription for homebound placement, and they largely refused to cooperate with the ARD committee. Marc\u2019s parents should have cooperated with the ARD committee in addressing the homebound placement issue, the PTSD diagnosis, and the related mistreatment allegations. E. Plaintiffs ADA, Section 1983, and Section 504 claims based on alleged violations of the IDEA occurring between August 13, 2003 and August 13, 2004 fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs\u2019 IDEA claim has failed. Since Defendants complied with the IDEA during the relevant time period, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their derivative Section 1983, Section 504, and ADA claims as a matter of law. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 297 (5th Cir.2005) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the individual Defendants are Holdings: 0: recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea 1: holding in the alternative that plaintiffs establishment clause claims were barred by laches 2: holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea 3: recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea 4: holding that plaintiffs redundant nonidea claims were barred by issue and claim preclusion where there were administrative findings that the school district complied with the idea", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that district court\u2019s claim-by-claim description of the frivolous nature of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint demonstrated clearly that their \u201cwidespread charges of racial discrimination [were leveled] without any regard for the truth ... in order to harass and embarrass the personnel at Fort Bragg\u201d). The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court\u2019s belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that \u201csimply was not credible.\u201d We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the \u201cinherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Carri\u00f3n v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722 Holdings: 0: holding that even if defendants knew that the company had inventory problems  that fact standing alone does not show that defendants knew that the statements in their prospectus or other representations were materially false or misleading at the time the material statements were made 1: holding that the defendants materially false statements made under oath are having been critical to the success of his case alone enough to support a finding of bad faith 2: holding that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by statements made under oath during his plea colloquy 3: recognizing that the sixth circuit has folded the absence of bad faith in under the inadvertence prong made the determination of whether there was evidence of a motive or intention to conceal the potential claim critical to a finding of bad faith and has held that in a particular case numerous attempts by the plaintiffs to cure an initial omission provided evidence that the omission was inadvertent not intentional 4: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "she could not perform the quintessential function of regularly attending work. Cf. Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F.Supp. 481, 485 (W.D.Tenn.1986) (stating an employee \u201cwho does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise\u201d), aff'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.1987). Other jurisdictions agree that irregular attendance renders a person unqualified for most types of employment and thus susceptible to legitimate termination. Cf. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529-30 (D.C.Cir.1994) (affirming district court\u2019s holding that plaintiffs prolonged, frequent, and unpredictable absences rendered her unqualified for any government job because \u201ccoming to work regularly\u201d is an \u201cessential function\u201d); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs. Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Tuttle v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 921 F.2d 183, Holdings: 0: holding that even though instructor possessed the necessary teaching skills and performed well when she was at work her frequent absences rendered her unable to function effectively as a teacher 1: holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus 2: holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim 3: holding that because the plaintiffs skills had deteriorated during the period she claims she was paid less than a male employee who performed equal work the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed further under the epa 4: holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Veterans Court, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the NPWE under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Id. In January 2014, the Atlanta VA regional office issued a Statement of the Case regarding Payne\u2019s termination and attached instructions for completing an appeal. Payne immediately filed an \u201cemergency motion for the [Veterans] Court to issue an order declaring the \u2018signed\u2019 Statement of the Case ... a legal nullity and does not moot the petition for a writ of mandamus full relief stated and requested.\u201d Id. at *2. On January 28, 2014, the Veterans Court denied the petition. Id. Relying on the standard outlined in Cheney v. United States District Court for District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (<HOLDING>), the Veterans Court noted that the Holdings: 0: holding that a court may grant a writ of mandamus if 1 the petitioner demonstrates that he lacks an adequate alternative 2 the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ and 3 the court is convinced that issuing the writ is warranted 1: holding that a trial court had no discretion to enter a writ of replevin after finding that the statutory requirements for issuing the writ had been met even though the statute provided that a circuit court may issue a writ of replevin reasoning that based on the context may implied an imperative obligation 2: holding that common pleas erred in setting aside the writ of execution on the basis that the union erroneously filed a writ of execution instead of filing a writ of mandamus 3: holding that notice of condemnation and availability of a state court injunction writ of mandamus and writ of certiorari in an eminent domain case satisfied due process 4: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Hewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 113-14, 218 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1966) (specifically holding that a double jeopardy issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal pursuant to then Rule 885); Iozzi v. State, 224 Md. 42, 46, 166 A.2d 257, 260 (1960) (not reaching a claim that the defendant was not allowed his right to counsel when his attorney was not present at a portion of the trial, citing Rule 885 and stating, \u201c[i]n the absence of anything to show a request to the trial court or a ruling thereon, there is nothing before us to consider\u201d) (alteration added); Kirby v. State, 222 Md. 421, 425, 160 A.2d 786, 788 (1960) (stating that \u201ccases almost uniformly hold that the right to a speedy trial ... like other statutory or constitutional rights, may be waived and that it 363, 365-66 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Johnson v. State, 138 Md.App. 539, Holdings: 0: recognizing that even constitutional issues may be waived if not properly raised at the trial court level pursuant to rules 885 and 1085 both predecessors to current md rule 8131a 1: holding issues not raised at trial level cannot be argued for the first time on appeal 2: holding that we consider issues not raised at administrative level waived 3: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 4: holding that exhaustion of issues is waived if not raised by the government", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "decision that Detective Clark was not entitled to rely in good faith on the warrant issued by the commissioner. Whether a law enforcement officer reasonably relied upon a subsequently invalidated search warrant is a legal question which we review de novo. See United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir.2002). A. The Foundations and Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule Simply stated, \u201c[t]he exclusionary rule operates to prevent the Government from using evidence seized as the result of an illegal search in a subsequent criminal prosecution.\u201d United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2005). It has existed, in some form, as part of our constitutional jurisprudence for over one hundred years. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (<HOLDING>). Although commentators have articulated Holdings: 0: holding statute requiring parties in tax suit to take notice of subsequent pleadings was not unconstitutional when city failed to take such notice 1: holding that where it was erroneous for the district court to take judicial notice it certainly cannot be said that such notice was mandatory and therefore ire 201d is inapplicable 2: holding that a notice to produce personal papers was unconstitutional and void and that the inspection by the district attorney of said invoice when produced in obedience to said notice and its admission in evidence by the court were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings 3: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner 4: holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "profanity or vulgarity may constitute sufficient grounds for a denial of unemployment compensation to an individual discharged for using such language, most of the cases in which a claimant\u2019s vulgar or profane language has been held to be a basis for the denial of benefits have involved a combination of factors, of which the claimant\u2019s use of offensive language was only one. Id. at 110 (footnote omitted). A finding of willful misconduct necessarily depends upon the particular circumstances of the case. Here, we must consider the circumstances attending the alleged misconduct to determine whether the words spoken were of such a nature to evince a willful disregard of the employer\u2019s interests and the employee\u2019s duties and obligations. See Israel, 7 Va. App. at 175, 372 S.E.2d at 210-11 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, our inquiry will focus on \u201cthe Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate retaliation for activities that occurred two years prior to the termination 1: holding two instances of violating  148 were two offenses because thirty minutes elapsed between the two incidents and in the intervening space of time the defendant had completely calmed down and ceased his criminal activity 2: holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms 3: holding that where truck driver had two accidents within two weeks the circumstances failed to demonstrate a willful disregard of employers interests or employees duties and obligations 4: holding that two robberies of different people at the same time are two separate offenses calling for two judgments and two sentences when the defendants were convicted of taking a grandfathers wallet pistol and car and taking a grandsons fishing equipment", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "interest at the Maturity/Default Rate for all times after the maturity of the notes. II. Balancing the Equities Debtor suggests that this Court balance the equities involved in allowing CBE to calculate its claim using the Maturity/ Default Rate. I rejected the \u201cbalancing of the equities\u201d method in Gillikin. See also In re Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir.1990) (rejecting the \u201cbalancing the equities\u201d approach to the extent it contravenes clear language in the Bankruptcy Code). Even if this Court had not rejected that approach, the equities in this case would not justify a different outcome in this case. Debtor is solvent, and any decrease in its interest rate would only benefit the Debtor once it emerges from bankruptcy. Summary of Schedules, Dckt. No. 21. Sublett, 895 F.2d at 1385-86 (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Holmes, 330 B.R. 317, 321 Holdings: 0: holding that nonconsensual oversecured tax claim is entitled to the statutory rate of interest unless the statutory rate constitutes a penalty 1: holding that an oversecured creditor is entitled to postpetition interest if the creditor is oversecured or if the estate proves to be solvent 2: holding that when an oversecured creditor seeks interest on its claim courts apply the interest rate provided for in the contract 3: holding that when a creditor is oversecured solvency is not required for the creditor to be entitled to postpetition interest and fees and granting contractual default interest to the oversecured creditor of approximately 24 4: holding that nonconsensual oversecured creditor shall receive the statutory rate of interest unless it can be characterized as a penalty", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "essentially assumes a trustee\u2019s role of deciding what information is relevant or material, and thus undercuts the central principles of chapter 7\u201d); Klutchko, 338 B.R. at 568 (\"Generally ... it is not for the debtor to determine which assets should be disclosed to creditors.... The debtor\u2019s duty is merely to answer truthfully. It is left to the creditors or parties-in-interest to judge whether that information will aid them or prejudice them.\u201d); Fokkena v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 356 B.R. 468, 478 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2006) (stating that debtors have an absolute duty to report whatever interests they hold in property, even if they believe their assets are worthless) (citing Kas-den v. Kasden (In re Kasden), 209 B.R. 239, 243-44 (8th Cir. BAP 1997)). 39 .See Bressler, 387 B.R. at 461-62 (<HOLDING>) (citing Bank of India v. Sapru (In re Sapru), Holdings: 0: holding that a debtors right to strip off a wholly unsecured lien is conditioned on the debtors obtaining confirmation of and performing under a chapter 13 plan that meets all of the statutory requirements rather than on a debtors discharge 1: holding that a retainer agreements general payorwewill quit language was not specific enough to comply with a local rule that required bankruptcy attorneys to represent debtors in adversary proceedings unless the debtors expressly agreed otherwise 2: holding that otherwise immaterial falsehoods or omissions can aggregate into a critical mass substantial enough to bar a debtors discharge 3: holding that a cause of action exists under  523a15 by which a debtors own former divorce attorneys might except from discharge the debtors contractual obligation to them 4: holding that a debt that was the result of debtors fraud could be exempted from discharge under  523a4 when the parties had later entered into a settlement agreement", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 51, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990). But despite the constitutional requirement that there be a remedy, the Supreme Court expressly noted in Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 115 S.Ct. 547, 130 L.Ed.2d 454 (1994), that \u201cthe sovereign immunity [that] States enjoy in federal court, under the Eleventh Amendment, does generally bar tax refund claims from being brought in that forum.\u201d Id. at 110, 115 S.Ct. 547 (second emphasis added). To ensure that taxpayers possess an avenue for relief, the Court held that state courts must hear suits to recover taxes unlawfully exacted, the \u201csovereign immunity [that] States traditionally enjoy in their own courts notwithstanding.\u201d Id.; cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Reasoning analogously, we conclude that the Holdings: 0: holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations 1: holding that congress has power to subject the states to wage and hour regulation 2: holding that congress did not properly abrogate states eleventh amendment immunity from suits under the patent act 3: holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts 4: holding that congress cannot subject states to suits in state courts but taking care not to overrule reich", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for sum mary judgment that the plaintiff does not have a vested right or property interest in the position of municipal judge. Although in his Original Petition the plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that he was a public employee working pursuant to a contract of employment, the plaintiff fails to allege any facts to indicate that a contract of employment existed and further fails to provide any competent summary judgment evidence to support this allegation. The City of Was-kom\u2019s ordinance provides that the term of office of the municipal judge shall be by appointment of the City Council by a majority vote of the governing body. The City\u2019s ordinance does not appear to create a contract of employment. See Youngblood v. City of Galveston, 920 F.Supp. 10B (S.D.Tex. 1996) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff does not even allege that the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff did not have dueprocessprotected property interest because he failed to sufficiently plead a rule or other mutually explicit understanding from the manual or otherwise bridling the reason for which he could be terminated and thereby creating a sufficient expectation of continued employment  the critical component herewithout alleging such a bridle plaintiff was an atwill employee consequently he lacked a property interest in his continued employment 1: holding that former municipal judge did not have property interest in continued employment 2: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 3: holding that property interest in continued expectation of public employment does not include right to actually occupy position 4: holding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment under montanas statutory scheme for at will employment", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(finding objections on hearsay and foundational ground sufficient to preserve a Sixth Amendment claim for appeal because of the close relationship between hearsay and confrontation), aff'd 933 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind.2010). The best practice is for attorneys to make both objections when applicable. The failure to do so in this case is not particularly egregious; because the trial court concluded that the testimony was not hearsay, it seems unlikely that the trial court would have sustained an objection based on the Confrontation Clause. Regardless, we agree with the State that Officer Thompson\u2019s testimony was not \u201ctestimonial hearsay,\u201d the type of hearsay barred pursuant to the Confrontation Clause. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Davis described the distinction between Holdings: 0: holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination 1: holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination 2: holding that the admission of prior testimony that had been subjected to crossexamination violated the confrontation clause because the state did not prove that the witness was unavailable 3: holding that outofcourt statements by witnesses that are testimonial in nature are barred under the confrontation clause unless witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine them 4: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Care Servs. v. Dobos, 380 So.2d 516, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (referring to rule as the \u201cofficious intermeddler doctrine\u201d). In certain circumstances, however, restitution for services performed will be required even though the recipient did not request or voluntarily consent to receive such services. For example, section 116 of the Restatement of Restitution provides: A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other\u2019s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if (a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and (b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and (c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that 668, 675 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 2. Application of law to facts. The district Holdings: 0: recognizing that a caregiver and patient relationship may be confidential 1: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment 2: holding that hospital had claim against patient based on implied contract for reasonable value of services rendered even though patient was not fully compensated by settlement with atfault party medical providers claim rests upon debtorcreditor relationship and cannot be extinguished by doctrine of subrogation 3: holding evidence of apparent authority insufficient where patient sought services of particular doctor rather than services of hospital generally 4: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "under the ADA. The District Court denied his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. In September 2011, the District Court granted summary judgment for Cryovac on Spring\u2019s FMLA claims. Spring filed a timely notice of appeal. II. A. State-Law Claims Spring argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his state-law claim for retaliatory discharge. We review the District Court\u2019s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo. Marcavage v. Nat'l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 858 (3d Cir.2012). Spring contends that under Pennsylvania law, which recognizes an exception to the at-will employment doctrine for a termination based on filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim, he also has a claim for retaliatory discharge. See Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 716 A.2d 1231, 1232 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The Pennsylvania courts have yet to enumerate Holdings: 0: holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act 1: holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim 2: recognizing a tort action when employee was dismissed for filing a workers compensation claim 3: holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law 4: recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "motion to dismiss. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity As a threshold matter, we must determine if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immu nity. If so, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. See Lovely, 570 F.3d at 782 n. 2 (6th Cir.2009) (\u201c[Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine----\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (\u201c[T]he Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court\u2019s judicial power.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immunity, we need not address the issues of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). MBF argues that CNI waived its Holdings: 0: holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant 1: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 2: holding that an official capacity suit should be treated as a suit against the entity 3: holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver 4: holding that if an entity enjoys tribalsovereign immunity federal jurisdiction is otherwise irrelevant and dismissal of the suit is proper", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Mexico. On February 6, 2012, Saldana filed a timely petition for review and petition for habeas corpus with this court. II. Discussion A. Jurisdiction Though the parties agree that we have jurisdiction, we must first satisfy ourselves of our own jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ojedar-Terrazas v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 292, 294 (5th Cir.2002). This case arises from DHS\u2019s January 17, 2012 reinstatement of the 1999 removal order against Saldana. We treat this appeal as a petition for review of that order of reinstatement. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(5) (providing that a petition for review with the court of appeal is the \u201csole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal\u201d). We clearly have jurisdiction over a petition for review of a reinstatement order. Ojeda-Terrazas, 290 F.3d at 295 (<HOLDING>). Under the applicable regulations, Holdings: 0: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 1: holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders 2: holding that remand orders are also appealable orders under 28 usc  1291 3: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal 4: holding that appellate jurisdiction over final orders of removal are limited to claims that have been exhausted before the bia", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that because Mr. Firth did not directly appeal the revocation of his probation, the relevant judgment became final on May 20, 2004. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2244(d)(1)(A) (mandating that a judgment becomes final for purposes of the limitations period upon \u201cthe conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review\u201d); see also Col. R.App. P. 4(b) (requiring criminal defendants to file a notice of appeal within forty-five days of the entry of the judgment from which they are appealing). We also agree that the limitations period was tolled 75 days later, on August 3, 2004, when Mr. Firth filed his motion for reconsideration, and did not begin to run again until September 28, 2004, when that motion was denied. See Robinson v. Golder, 443 F.3d 718, 721 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Mr. Firth had 290 days from September Holdings: 0: holding that properly filed application for statecourt discretionary review tolls aedpa limitations period 1: holding that suit filed within six years of assessment tolls the limitation period indefinitely 2: holding that a motion to reconsider filed after the entry of final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error 3: holding that a properly filed motion to reconsider under colo rcrim p 35b tolls the oneyear limitations period 4: holding that a timely motion for reconsideration tolls the statute of limitations even if the motion is procedurally invalid", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "third factor is satisfied because Argentina will be unable to obtain effective review in a United States court of the Discovery Order through a later appeal of a final judgment. Because the Discovery Order grants NML discovery respecting foreign assets, any future attachment or collection proceeding would be conducted in a foreign court. Argentina would have no further opportunity to challenge the Discovery Order in this or any other United States court. Moreover, depending on the laws of the jurisdictions where any attachable property is located, NML may be able to levy Argentina\u2019s foreign assets directly, without instituting a separate proceeding, rendering the Discovery Order unreviewable by any court. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Finally, because the Discovery Order does not Holdings: 0: holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment 1: holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court 2: holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order  is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable 3: recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment 4: recognizing that an order granting discovery may be a final appealable order where the sole object of a postjudgment proceeding is discovery of the judgment debtors assets and the assets discovered may then be levied without a court order", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Given this, the trial court on remand had no discretion to deny United\u2019s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on the unreasonableness of Telus-nor\u2019s failure to attend the IMEs. The appellate division was similarly bound by this Court\u2019s opinion in Comprehensive I, as well as by its own prior determination on the issue of \u201creasonableness.\u201d Accordingly, we find that the appellate division\u2019s decision before us failed to apply the correct law when it failed to follow the law of the case as established in Comprehen sive I. See Juliano, 801 So.2d at 105 (\u201cThe doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court ... through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.\u201d); see also Dougherty, 23 So.3d at 158 (<HOLDING>). Comprehensive, however, asserts that this Holdings: 0: holding that district courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review by common law certiorari decision of circuit court upholding county court conviction obtained in violation of constitution 1: holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available 2: holding that circuit court failed to apply the correct law when it failed to enforce its prior decision after this court issued a denial of certiorari review in morningside civic assn v dougherty 944 so2d 370 fla 3d dca 2006 table 3: holding that review by common law certiorari in district courts of appeal is limited to circuit court decisions constituting denial of procedural due process application of incorrect law or miscarriage of justice 4: holding that this court laeks the authority to review a sentencing courts denial of a downward departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras, especially in the Industrial Age, as explained by Judge Dyk\u2019s thoughtful historical review. See 545 F.3d, at 966-976 (concurring opinion). But times change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways. For example, it was once forcefully argued that until recent times, \u201cwell-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program.\u201d Diehr, 450 U.S., at 195, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But this fact does not mean that unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable. See id., at 192-193, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (majority opinion) (<HOLDING>). Section 101 is a \u201cdynamic provision designed Holdings: 0: holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply 1: holding that patents that would  disproportionately tie up the use of the underlying natural laws are invalid for lacking patentable subject matter 2: holding that trial court properly granted motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust remedies available through exclusive grievance procedure 3: holding that copying occurs when a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to a computers random access memory 4: holding a procedure for molding rubber that included a computer program is within patentable subject matter", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in benefits, ineligibility for promotional opportunities, or more formal discipline\u201d). Defendant\u2019s placement of Plaintiff on the County\u2019s Performance Improvement Plan more closely constitutes an adverse employment action. Plaintiff alleges that the \u201cP.I.P. is a tool, which is a step toward dismissal, demotion, suspension, etc.\u201d (Dkt.36-2, p. 22) Defendant placed Plaintiff on the PIP based on its conclusion that Plaintiff was not receptive to counseling regarding her performance. (Dkt. 25, Papin Aff. \u00b6 4; Dkt. 27, Balzer Aff. \u00b6 3). As a result of her placement on PIP, Plaintiff alleges she was given additional assignments and reporting requirements and increased supervision, although she does not develop the record in this regard. (Dkt.36-2, pp. 22, 43) See Smith, 509 F.Supp.2d at 1203 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs \u201creassignment to Building 41,\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that deprivation of increased compensation as the result of a failure to train constitutes an adverse employment action 1: holding that an employers requirement that an employee comply with a performance improvement plan or face disciplinary action did not constitute adverse employment action 2: holding that reduction in workload is an adverse employment action 3: holding that change in employment assignment that inter alia increased onthejob commuting time was not an adverse employment action 4: holding that plaintiffs placement on a performance improvement plan was an adverse employment action because it resulted in increased workload increased reporting requirements increased supervision and tempo rarity prevented plaintiff from receiving pay raises or bonuses", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "agree with the State and Water Defense Association that aboriginal water rights must be established by evidence of historical use, and that, under the facts herein, the trial court correctly rejected the argument that the Tribe was entitled to an aboriginal priority date for water for agricultural purposes quantified by a PIA standard, I believe the trial court erred in refusing to recognize that the Tribe had established an aboriginal water right with a priority date of time immemorial to waters appurtenant to the lands included in the area of the reservation for reasonable domestic use. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1413 (confirming aboriginal title of tribe to water rights for domestic purposes and \u201cto support its hunting, fishing, and gathering lifestyle\u201d); Aamodt, 618 F.Supp. at 1009-10 (<HOLDING>). There is evidence in the record of an actual Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to use water to generate power 1: holding in custody dispute that fathers alleged domestic violence in an earlier marriage must be considered for purposes of as 2524150gi 2: recognizing aboriginal right to use of waters by pueblos for domestic purposes 3: holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count 4: recognizing private right of action", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "seized literature of Khalistan and pamphlets relating to a protest rally, but he testified at the hearing that police found only a small sheet of paper and no pamphlets. We also think the IJ was within the bounds of reasonable adjudication in discounting Kaur\u2019s testimony that she was raped at the police station. The police conduct was heinous if the testimony is believed, and it is understandable that the female petitioner may have been reluctant to discuss such a degrading experience if it occurred. In light of the overall credibility problems with the testimony of Singh and Kaur, however, we cannot say that the IJ was compelled to accept Kaur\u2019s statements about the incident at the police station without some corroboration. See Esaka v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1105, 1110 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). In sum, because the record does not compel a Holdings: 0: holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it 1: holding that an adverse credibility determination may be dispositive where the applicant does not produce any corroborating evidence 2: holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony 3: holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony 4: holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "obtain other forms of discovery from Bonilla including: a response to a request for admissions, answers to interrogatories, and a response to a request for production. Finally, in September of 1992, Bonilla\u2019s attorney filed a notice of availability with the court stating that Bonilla had just arrived in Miami and was available for deposition, but Apollo never responded to this notice. Taking the totality of these unique circumstances into consideration, it appears that Bonilla did not wilfully disregard the trial court\u2019s orders; instead he made a conscious effort, and displayed a willingness, to comply with the court\u2019s orders, to the extent that he was capable of doing so. The facts clearly indicate that, at the time the trial court ordered Bonilla to appear for 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); Turner v. Anderson, 376 So.2d 899, 901 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding if a deposition is taken for discovery only  not for use at trial the deposition is not a stage of trial for which the defendant must be present 1: holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates 2: holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal 3: holding that dismissal for discovery violations was an extreme remedy but warranted under the facts of the case 4: holding that dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint was too drastic a remedy where plaintiff had difficulty getting to the united states from jamaica the deposition was set after the cutoff date for completing discovery and it was only eleven days prior to trial", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "but only as evidence of the property\u2019s willing-seller/willing-buyer value on the date of the foreclosure sale; By permitting the court to consider evidence that is not typically relevant to a fair-market-value analysis, the statute simply reflects the nature of foreclosure sales, not a new meaning of \u201cfair market value,\u201d The statute expressly requires that the court determine \u201cthe fair market value of the real property as of the date of the foreclosure sale,\u201d and the evidence regarding the discounted future sales price is permissible only to \u201carrive at a current fair market value\u201d on that date. Tex. Prop. Code \u00a7 51.003(b)(5). C. \u201cDiscounting\u201d the Future Sales Price Although the statute refers to a \u201cfuture sales price,\u201d it does so using terms that necessarily tie that p mm\u2019n App.1931) (<HOLDING>). As we explained in Jaeger, discounting future Holdings: 0: holding that in computing the present worth of such future payments same should have been discounted to their present worth at the date of judgment at 6 per cent interest per annum 1: holding that courts may not find a per se sixth amendment violation where the defendant was unable to present relevant evidence 2: holding that an award of future salary payments should have been discounted to its present value at the legal rate of interest 3: holding that plaintiff must present such evidence 4: holding that bonds that bore interest at one percent per annum plus on supplemental coupons up to 212 additional interest per annum to the extent net revenues are available were not negotiable instruments because the supplemental coupons indefinite interest rate failed to state a sum certain under section 3106", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "On August 31, 2000 she reported to the Human Resources Manager, Donald Vincent, that she had been told that John Warren had rhymed her last name with \u201cslut.\u201d In response Vincent immediately had Henry Morrissey (the Area Manufacturing Manager) interview Warren about the remark. He also interviewed two other employees who were present at that meeting; they denied that he made the remark. Also, Cynthia Holm (the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) interviewed Warren and three other supervisors. All those interviewed denied that Warren had called Cooper-Schut a slut; because of this, no discipline was implemented. Visteon\u2019s response of immediately conducting multiple interviews with the employees involved was a reasonable response, and was not negligent. See Perry, 126 F.3d at 1014-15 (<HOLDING>). Regarding her confrontations with subordinate Holdings: 0: holding that eeoc charge filed by plaintiff more than 180 days after alleged incident of sexual harassment was timely where alleged sexual harassment violation continued as hostile work environment through time of plaintiffs termination 1: holding that managements failure to investigate and report incidents of sexual harassment made the employers response unreasonable 2: holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment 3: holding an employers response to a complaint of sexual harassment was reasonable when the employer investigated the incident but the alleged harasser and supervising employee denied that the incident occurred 4: holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the asphalt foreman positions. Clark alleges that he was qualified because he worked on an asphalt crew at APAC for well over a decade and because he acted as temporary foreman for two or three weeks out of the year for the years 1999-2004. APAC disputes that Clark\u2019s experience establishes that he was qualified to be an asphalt foreman. Instead, APAC declares that Clark was not qualified because he was unable to run the electronics on the APAC [paver] \u2014 a factor that Sam Head, the individual making the decision to fill the jobs, considered the single most important skill for the jobs. ([Head, Doc 20-2 at] 7-8, 17). Therefore, [Clark] cannot demonstrate that he was qualified for the job. See e.g., Greer [v. Birmingham Beverage Co., Inc.], 291 Fed.Appx. [948] at 945 [ (11th Cir.2008) ] (<HOLDING>). (Doc. 19 at 15-16). Head testified that Clark Holdings: 0: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position 1: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 2: holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job 3: holding that the employers discharge of the plaintiff four months after the plaintiff filed a discrimination claim is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge 4: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and prohibit that spouse from realizing any investment income generated by his separate property interest. Steven R. Brown, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the Division of Pension Benefits in Divorce and Post-Judgment Partition Actions: Cu 534, 535 (1996) (noting that QDRO unambiguously gave the non-employee wife a right to receive her portion of the marital share of any early retirement subsidy available to the husband when the husband actually retires); Layne v. Layne, 83 Ohio App.3d 559, 615 N.E.2d 332, 336 (1992) (stating that a non-employed former spouse is entitled to the benefit of any increase in the value of his or her unma-tured proportionate share after divorce attributable to the continued participation of the other spouse in the retirement plan, including earl .App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 746 A.2d 358, 361-62 Holdings: 0: holding husbands early retirement subsidy was not marital property as a vested right but an option contingent upon his continued employment and eventual qualification for the subsidy in nine years based upon value of the pension frozen at the time of dissolution 1: holding that a nonemployee spouse holds a community marital property interest in pension plan early retirement enhancements because practically by definition the right to retirement benefits that accrues at least in part during marriage before separation underlies any right to an enhancement 2: holding that qdros providing the former wife with future enhancements that were not part of the marital portion of husbands pension plan including future improvements cost of living adjustments and early retirement subsidies conflicted with the final judgment that valued the pension at the time of dissolution 3: holding that nonemployee spouse waived distribution of her husbands early retirement benefits because although both parties were aware of the enhancements the additional benefits were not included in calculation of the pension funds at the time of dissolution 4: recognizing the continued interest of a criminal defendant in frozen property prior to forfeiture", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "contract balances on any of the above contracts.\u201d D\u2019s App. at 92-93. The Postal Service\u2019s response, dated March 22, 1989, indicated that the Lake Worth contract should not be covered by the agreement and then stated that there should be further discussions on March 24, 1989 if this were unacceptable. D\u2019s App. at 95. By letter dated April 4, 1989, Rodeo\u2019s attorney notified USPS that \u201d[t]he [draft] mods are acceptable except that one element of the agreement that is important to Rodeo has been left out.\" D\u2019s App. at 96. That element was that Rodeo would continue to be eligible for contracts with USPS. The modifications were executed on April 5, 1989 after they were amended to reflect this change. See supra note 5. 8 . See ARB, Inc. v. E-Sys., Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 198-99 (D.C.Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 614 n. 4 Holdings: 0: holding that integration clauses are to be given effect under ucc law and maryland common law 1: holding that article 2 of the ucc preempts common law claims 2: holding that article 4a of the ucc preempts common law claims where they are inconsistent or duplicative 3: holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms 4: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "arrest is amenable to \u201cgrave abuse\u201d by police officers and prosecutors: \u201cMinor acts of evasion and resistance are sufficiently ambiguous to give rise to honest error, sufficiently elusive to encourage false allegations, and sufficiently commonplace to afford general opportunity for discriminatory enforcement.\u201d Id. Most\u2014though not all\u2014jurisdictions that have adopted statutes based upon the Model Penal Code provision, consistent with the Code\u2019s commentary, construe these statutes to exclude punishment for mere flight. See, e.g., Womack, 847 P.2d at 611-13 (stating that leading police on a chase in Arizona was not resisting arrest under \u201ca common sense application of the ordinary meaning of the statutory language\u201d); see also Howard v. State, 101 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Alaska Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); State v. Crane, 46 Or.App. 547, 612 P.2d 735, Holdings: 0: holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer 1: holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest 2: holding that fleeing from officers and hiding in the woods did not constitute resisting arrest 3: holding that it is equally wellestablished that a suspects mere flight to escape arrest does not violate the resisting arrest statute 4: holding fleeing police officers in a vehicle was a violent felony under the acca", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a substantial preliminary showing that Officer McGrew recklessly made false statements and has further shown that the false statements were necessary or material to the magistrate judge\u2019s finding of probable cause, we remand the case for a Franks hearing on Flake\u2019s allegations. B. Downward Departure in Sentencing Flake contends that the federal district court erroneously concluded during the sentencing proceedings that it did not have the legal authority to depart downward on the basis of the six months that Flake had already been held in custody on related state charges. We find no support for Flake\u2019s contention in the record and hold that the district court was aware of and properly exercised its discretion. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). C. Right of Allocution Flake contends that he Holdings: 0: holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure 1: holding that the district courts refusal to grant a downward departure was discretionary and not because it believed it lacked the authority to depart where the court assessed the facts of the case and concluded that the departure requested does not seem  to have a basis 2: holding that a district courts statement that there was no basis for a downward departure did not indicate that it believed it lacked authority 3: holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward 4: holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "other equipment. 45 U.S.C. \u00a7 51. \u201cFELA is liberally construed, and its language regarding causation is as broad as could be framed.\u201d Pitter v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 826 F.Supp.2d 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 2636,180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, \u201cthe United States Supreme Court has interpreted FELA as prescribing a relaxed standard of causation that departs from the ordinary proximate cause requirement of common law negligence.\u201d Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Corsale v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 1:08-CV-572 GLS/RFT, 2010 WL 3907827, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Marchica v. Long Island R.R. Co., 31 Holdings: 0: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 1: recognizing that in an fela case the traditional concept of proximate cause is supplanted by the less stringent standard that there be some causal relation no matter how slight between the injury and the railroads breach of duty 2: holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury 3: holding proximate cause required for claim of breach of special duty 4: holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "so accommodating. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 327(a) (\u201c... the trustee, with the court\u2019s approval, may employ ...\u201d); 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 363(b) (\u201cThe trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease ... \u201d); and 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 365(a) (\u201c... the trustee, subject to the court\u2019s approval, may assume or reject ... \u201d). As a consequence, courts have been left in these many instances to figure out for themselves what they are to consider. Their response, though, has frequently been limited to only the adoption of some vague standard that in turn is exemplified by some equally vague phrase. Take, for example, the different measures that courts have offered in connection with Section 363(b) sales. Section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the present dispute and provides (Bankr.D.Del.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re Charlesbank Laundry Co., 37 B.R. 20, 22 Holdings: 0: holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty 1: holding that duty of good faith and fair dealing did not extend to thirdparty claimant 2: holding that benefiting fiduciary must show he acted in good faith and that transactions were fair and equitable 3: holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith 4: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "bank account. Asked about that during his deposition, Fisher testified that he did so in part because he was concerned about possible garnishment for child support that he later learned had already been collected out of a tax refund. Despite Fisher\u2019s abandonment of his bank account during this period, the bankruptcy court specifically found that the transfers to Brennan both before and after November 2002 were in fact used to pay the debtor\u2019s share of the ongoing expenses of maintaining them combined household. It was not clear error for the bankruptcy court to conclude that these monetary transfers were not made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any of Fisher\u2019s creditors. See Bennett & Kahnveiler Assocs. v. Rainer (In re Rainer), 132 B.R. 728, 733 (N.D.Ill.1991) (<HOLDING>); Glaser v. Glaser (In re Glaser), 49 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that actual intent to defraud is not necessary to finding of constructive fraud 1: holding that  506a does not require or permit a reduction in the creditors secured claim to account for purely hypothetical costs of sale of chapter 13 debtors residence 2: holding that the statute requires actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors or the trustee constructive intent to defraud does not suffice 3: holding that although there was evidence the defendant transferred or caused to be transferred more money to the debtor than the debtor transferred to the defendant there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jurys finding of actual fraud under section 24005a1 and b because the badges of fraud showed the debtors intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors 4: holding that debtors depositing of funds into spouses separate account did not establish actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors for purposes of denial of discharge under chapter 7", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "while exclusion of present claimants appears to have limited the opposition, it did not completely eliminate it. 14 . See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 4, at 1058; Crampton, supra note 4, at 829-30. 15 .In addition, the settlement\u2019s silence regarding the actual compensation that claimants can expect \u2014 other than various caps and limitations on recovery \u2014 makes it difficult for class members and courts to evaluate the settlement. That lack of information might be one of the reasons that the intervenors chose not to attack the settlement\u2019s substantive fairness on appeal. 16 . The Ninth Circuit has held that a class action certified under rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) cannot bind absent plaintiffs unless they are allowed to opt out. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 511 Holdings: 0: holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa 1: holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action 2: holding that a class action judgment awarding money damages will not bind an absent plaintiff without adequate notice 3: holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim 4: holding that absent plaintiffs were not bound by a rule 23blb2 class action for money damages because the original class action court did not have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs and did not provide them with an optout right", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for a trial on the merits. \u00b6 32. The circuit court found that the Appellants\u2019 negligence claim against Barlow Eddy Jenkins, P.A. (Barlow Eddy) failed because the Appellants did not pres ent any competent evidence to demonstrate that Barlow Eddy\u2019s actions were the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of Robert Gary Rogers\u2019s (Rogers) injuries. Although the circuit court correctly pointed out that evidence of OSHA\u2019s regulations are not admissible in Mississippi to show negligence, OSHA\u2019s standards and regulations may be \u201cadmissible as a measure to show reasonable care consistent with industry standards.\u201d Wilkins v. Bloodsaw, 850 So.2d 185, 188(\u00b6 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2003); see also Accu-Fab & Constr., Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So.2d 766, 771(\u00b6 21) (Miss.2001) (overruled on other grounds) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 33. The Appellants presented two expert Holdings: 0: holding that safety standards regarding the safe design and use of trampolines including astm standards were admissible on the issue of the defendants negligence even though the defendants were unaware of the standards 1: holding that oshas regulations were admissible as a measure of reasonable care consistent with industry standards 2: holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure 3: holding that although compliance with administrative safety regulations did not establish due care it was evidence of due care 4: holding that an experts testimony that a victims symptoms were consistent with administration of a date rape drug were admissible", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Alaska consumer fraud act); Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 6-l-113(2)(a) (the court may award three times the actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater, if it is proven that the defendant engaged in bad faith conduct); Quist v. Specialties Supply Co., Inc., 12 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (where the court held plaintiff was precluded under principles of collateral estoppel from challenging the amount of actual damages fixed by the judgment, but holding that collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing enhanced punitive damages); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1345.09(B)(the injured party may seek and the trial court in its discretion may rescind the contract or award treble the actual damages or $200, whichever is greater); Crye v. Smolak, 110 Ohio App.3d 504, 674 N.E. 2d 779 (1996)(<HOLDING>). Connecticut, Delaware and Kentucky make no Holdings: 0: holding that treble damages are appropriate under ohio law when the seller engages in an unconscionable practice or deceptive act 1: holding treble damages under the civil theft statute are punitive 2: holding that a plaintiff may receive both treble damages under rico and state law punitive damages for the same course of conduct 3: recognizing that an award of treble damages for an antitrust violation and punitive damages for common law tortious interference with business relations based on same conduct would be duplicative holding that punitive and treble damages cannot both be awarded and indicating that a special jury verdict in this situation would be appropriate 4: holding that treble damages under the housing and rent act are remedial in nature", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "for the proposition that \u201can insured cannot recover from an insurer for attorney\u2019s fees and expenses incurred by it in defense of suit against it in an absence of showing that those items have actually been paid.\u201d We decline, however, to follow that opinion\u2019s isolated preference for physical payment. Rather, \u201cit [i]s not necessary that [an attorney\u2019s] fee be paid to enable [an insured] to recover, but when he established that he [i]s obligated to pay, and that the fee is reasonable ... his cause of action accrued.\u201d Royal Indem. Co. v. Schwartz, 172 S.W. 581, 584 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1914, writ dism\u2019d w.o.j.); see also Oliver B. Cannon and Son, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 519 F.Supp. 668, 675-76 (D.C.Del.1981) (recognizing that an insured x.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, we decline Hartford\u2019s invitation Holdings: 0: holding attorney fees may be allowed for expenses incurred for default 1: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 2: holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid 3: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment 4: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "3 . Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). 4 . D.C.Code \u00a7 48-904.01(a)(l) (2001). 5 . D.C.Code \u00a7 48-1103(a) (2001). 6 . Gant, supra note 2, 129 S.Ct. at 1714-15. 7 . Id. at 1715. 8 . Id. 9 . Arizona v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640, 646 (2007). The Arizona Supreme Court added: \"The State has advanced no alternative theories justifying the warrantless search of Gant's car, and we note that no other exception to the warrant requirement appears to apply.\u201d Id. The court therefore did not inquire into the good-faith exception to suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 10 . See Griffith, supra note 3, 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S.Ct. 708. 11 . See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>). 12 . Id. at 909, 104 S.Ct. 3405. 13 . Holdings: 0: holding that evidence should not be suppressed if police officers acted in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 1: holding that evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not barred by the exclusionary rule 2: holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant 3: holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by police officers acting in reasonable reliance on search warrant later held invalid 4: holding suppression of evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not required", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "It is, in any event, incorrect. If Rooney receives a declaratory judgment that the discharge was valid and the revocation invalid, \u201crelease ... would follow automatically since, in a second action for a writ of habeas corpus, the prior judgment would have res judicata effect.\u201d Monk, 793 F.2d at 366. It thus does \u201cnot matter that he ha[s] not asked for release.\u201d LoBue, 82 F.3d at 1083. Nor may Rooney \u201cavoid the requirement that he proceed by habeas corpus by adding a request for relief that may not be made in a petition for habeas corpus.\u201d Monk, 793 F.2d at 366. Accordingly, habeas corpus is Rooney\u2019s exclusive remedy. See id. (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)); cf. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The problem for Rooney is that, because his Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that 42 usc  1396aa13a is enforceable in a suit under  1983 4: holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "106-11 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of the variable annuities were \u201cin connection with\u201d the security); Korsinsky, 2002 WL 27775, at *5 (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the value of a stock were \u201cin connection with\u201d the stock); Hardy, 189 F.Supp.2d at 18 (same). In contrast, courts have found that the \u201cin connection with\u201d element was not met when the plaintiff did not allege that the fraud concerned the value of the security or the consideration received in return. See Anatian v. Coutts Bank (Switzerland) Ltd., 193 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1999) (finding that the alleged misrepresentations as to the authority to extend credit did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received); Spielman, 2001 WL 1182927, at *5 (<HOLDING>); Laub v. Faessel, 981 F.Supp. 870, 871 Holdings: 0: holding that the same must pertain to the value of the security and where the facts indicated they did not 1: holding that a plaintiff satisfied rule 9b by pleading which machines were the subject of alleged fraudulent transactions and the nature and subject of the alleged misrepresentations 2: holding that the alleged misrepresentations concerning the transaction fees charged by a broker did not concern the value of a security or the consideration received 3: holding that if the alleged misrepresentations are material a plaintiff is entitled to recovery whether or not the misrepresentations caused the alleged damage 4: holding that plaintiff was entitled to sue under rule 10b5 for the difference between the price and the value received from the sale of the security where as here the evil is not the price at which plaintiff bought but the fact of being induced to buy", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not err in her evaluation of the medical evidence or in discounting Casey\u2019s subjective complaints. Casey challenges the ALJ\u2019s reliance on Dr. May\u2019s RFC opinion, directing us to Nevland v. Apfel where we reversed an ALJ\u2019s decision because he relied on the opinions of nontreating, nonex-amining physicians in determining the claimant\u2019s RFC. 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir.2000). But as we recognized in Eichelberger v. Barnhart, Nevland addressed the evidence necessary to satisfy an ALJ\u2019s burden of proof at step five in the disability analysis; Nevland does not preclude the ALJ\u2019s reliance on a reviewing physician\u2019s report at step four when the burden is on the claimant to establish an inability to do past relevant work. 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir.2004); see also Masterson, 363 F.3d at 737-39 (<HOLDING>). \u201cIt is well settled that an ALJ may consider Holdings: 0: holding that the alj properly relied on the assessments of a nonexamining physician and not claimants treating physicians in determining the rfc at step four 1: holding that the alj properly discounted a treating physicians report where the physician was unsure of the accuracy of his findings and statements 2: holding that the commissioner must determine a claimants rfc based on all of the relevant evidence including medical records observations of treating physicians and others and an individuals own description of the limitations 3: holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs 4: holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "184-192; Pl. Opp. at 8 n. 15. 186 . See FAC \u00b6\u00b6 351-358; Pl. Opp. at 8 n. 15. 187 . See FAC \u00b6\u00b6 279-287; Pl. Opp. at 8 n. 16. 188 . See FAC \u00b6\u00b6 206, 372. 189 . See id. \u00b6 300. 190 . See id. \u00b6\u00b6 222-228, 318-324, 387-393. 191 . See id. \u00b6\u00b6 229-234. - 192 . See Berman v. Sugo LLC, 580 F.Supp.2d 191, 202 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (dismissing a breach of contract claim where counterclaim plaintiff failed to \"set forth a single fact relating to the formation of the contract, the date it took place, the contract\u2019s major terms, the parties to the contract, or [counter-defendant's] assent to its terms\u201d) (quotation marks omitted). 193 . See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 194 . See Levy v. Bessemer Trust Co., N.A., No. 97 Civ. 1785, 1997 WL 431079, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1997); Sedona Corp., 2005 WL 1902780, at *20 (<HOLDING>). 195 . See FAC \u00b6\u00b6 3, 61-64, 189, 281, 291, Holdings: 0: holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim 1: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 2: holding breach of contract claim not preempted as a straightforward breach of contract action as it alleged violation of specific covenant 3: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 4: holding that a laundry list of alleged breaches of myriad alleged oral and written agreements was insufficient to provide defendants with notice of the breach of contract claim", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "persons affected.\u201d State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 (Ct.App.1986). In any equal protection analysis, the court must: first, identify the classification that is being challenged; second, articulate the standard under which the classification will be tested; and third, determine whether the standard has been satisfied. Id. at 500, 725 P.2d at 205. Accordingly, in order for Rome to prevail, he is required to show that he, by virtue of some classification, was treated differently than a person who does not share that classification, However, I.C. \u00a7 18-1401 does not create a classification. The statute applies to \u201cevery person\u201d who enters a building with the intent to commit any theft or felony. See State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 316, 324 P.3d 1006, 1015 (Ct.App.2014) (<HOLDING>). It is true, as Rome points out, that Idaho Holdings: 0: holding that statute which defined sexual contact as any touching of the anus breast or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person was not vague 1: holding that a statute applied to any person who sexually abused and exploited a vulnerable adult and did not treat the defendant differently on account of any classification 2: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account 3: holding that the plaintiff who alleged he was subjected to discipline and a disciplinary proceeding not applicable to any other police officer under the collective bargaining agreement but not alleging any classbased discrimination failed to state a claim as the plaintiff did not show how he was treated differently from others similarly situated emphasis added 4: holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident   4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "whereas before ... they were exempt from the requirements of \u00a7 327. The difference is significant because \u00a7 327 authorizes the trustee to employ an attorney \u2018with the court\u2019s approval.\u2019 \u201d Id. In Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538-39, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), the Court succinctly stated: [W]e hold that \u00a7 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors\u2019 attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by \u00a7 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under \u00a7 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court. This reading of the statute shows \u201cthat the revised \u00a7 330 means what it says.\u201d Weinschneider, 395 F.3d at 403; see also In re Oliver, 511 B.R. 556, 561-62 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.2014) (<HOLDING>). Without citing any authority, Jones argues Holdings: 0: holding that where an attorney serves as trustee and attorney for the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding the attorney must distinguish time spent in each role 1: holding that where the insurer retains an attorney to represent the insured pursuant to an insurance policy the attorney acts in the capacity of an independent contractor for the insured 2: holding the district courts conclusion that the attorney should receive no compensation was an abuse of discretion because we are confident that some legitimate time was expended by the attorney 3: holding that an attorney could not receive compensation from the estate pursuant to  330 because the chapter 7 trustee never sought to hire the attorney pursuant to  327 whose employment would have also required court approval 4: holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "waived arguments that might have supported such jurisdiction.\u201d). 6 . The Department of Labor asserts that Taylor has standing to pursue her claims, even in the absence of injury, simply because defendants breached duties owed to her pursuant to ERISA. This argument, however, was not raised by the parties in their appellate briefs. Accordingly, we will not consider this issue. Cellnet Commons, Inc. v. FCC, 149 F.3d 429, 443 (6th Cir.1998) (\"While an amicus may offer assistance in resolving issues properly before a court, it may not raise additional issues or arguments not raised by the parties.\"). 7 . Entry of final judgment, alone, is not a basis upon which to deny a motion to intervene. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394-96, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Following the filing of a notice to Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to reconsider filed after the entry of final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error 1: holding that a motion to intervene filed ten weeks after the commencement of the action was timely 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 4: holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "does not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.\u201d 435 U.S. at 340-41. The Court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that giving the instruction was \u201clike waving a red flag in front of the jury,\u201d finding this assertion premised on an \u201cindulgence in two very doubtful assumptions\u201d that (1) jurors would not notice the defendant did not testify absent the instruction, and (2) jurors would disregard the instruction not to give weight to the defendant\u2019s failure to testify. Id. at 340. 7 The right to testify was extended to criminal defendants in Vermont by Public Act No. 40, \u00a7 1, 1866 (predecessor to 13 V.S.A. \u00a7 6601). 8 Baker's ruling is no longer controlling in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (<HOLDING>), and the 1955 statutory amendment. 1955, No. Holdings: 0: holding that admitting evidence of a defendants prior statement to an investigator proffered by the commonwealth did not violate the defendants fifth amendment rights by forcing him to testify to dispute it 1: holding that a defendants fifth amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court 2: holding that state prosecutor violated fifth amendment by telling jury that a defendants failure to testify supports an unfavorable inference against him 3: recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify 4: holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that Tull required courts to determine statutory damage awards. The Court noted that in Tull, it was \u201cpresented with no evidence that juries historically had determined the amount of civil penalties to be paid to the [government,\u201d while in Feltner there was \u201cclear and direct historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff.\u201d Id. at 354-55, 118 S.Ct. 1279. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the historical nature of the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury in federal cases involving punitive damages. Its decisions, taken together, indicate that this right includes the right to a jury determination regarding the amount of punitive damages. See Capital Solutions, 695 F.Supp.2d at 1152 (<HOLDING>). Rule 38, by preserving \u201cthe right to a trial Holdings: 0: holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded 1: holding that curtis suggests that the amount of punitive damages is a question for the jury under the seventh amendment 2: holding that punitive damages are not allowed under the flsa 3: holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment 4: holding that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious violations of the lmrda", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "provides that the \u201capplicable commitment period\u201d of a plan \u201cshall be\u201d either (A) subject to subparagraph (B), ... (i) 3 years; or (ii) not less than 5 years, if the [debt- or\u2019s] current monthly income ..., when multiplied by 12, is not less than [the median annual family income in the applicable state]; and (B) may be less than 3 or 5 years, whichever is applicable under subpara-graph (A), but only if the plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period. Id. \u00a7 1325(b)(4). The debtor\u2019s \u201ccurrent monthly income\u201d and \u201cdisposable income\u201d are calculated according to statutorily defined formulae. See id. \u00a7 101(10A) (defining \u201ccurrent monthly income\u201d); id. \u00a7 1325(b)(2) (defining \u201cdisposable income\u201d); see also Lanning, 130 S.Ct. at 2469, 2471-74, 2478 (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that Debtors\u2019 current Holdings: 0: holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added 1: holding that courts must cjonsider  the practical effect of a putative  judgment on the state treasury emphasis added 2: holding that courts must calculate projected disposable income which is not statutorily defined using a forwardlooking approach emphasis added 3: holding that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that defendant committed a crime emphasis added 4: holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of Green to section 693 of the Probate Code, the trial court could dispense with further proceedings and sua sponte appoint a guardian. In other words, if section 692 grants to a trial judge the power to conduct a preliminary trial and dismiss the proceeding if the applicant fails to prove incapacity, then section 693 must surely permit the same court to appoint a guardian if incapacity is established in that same pretrial hearing. Given this result and its supposed validity, we again wonder why the legislature enacted section 643 if the trial court has the power to sua sponte grant final relief prior to a jury trial. But, because the legislature enacted section 643, the latter must be given meaning. See Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.App.\u2014Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). We cannot ignore it. Rather, our duty is to Holdings: 0: holding that each provision of a statute must be afforded meaning when possible 1: holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute 2: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts 3: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous 4: holding that each element required under the act must be included in the written notice and each element must be sufficiently clear and accurate ", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada.\u201d In response, Wade averred in his answer, \u201cDefendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph one (1) of Plaintiffs petition.\u201d Further, Wade\u2019s first affirmative defense averred, \u201cThe court lacks jurisdiction to hear and enter orders regarding this matter because the Plaintiff is not in good standing with the State of Nevada and is therefore restricted from bringing suit or participating in litigation.\u201d As a threshold matter, Wade\u2019s cursory denial of AllStar\u2019s paragraph one is inadequate under Rule 55.13. It is well established that a general denial of allegations of corporate capacity or existence fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 55.13. See id. (<HOLDING>); Student Loan Mkt. Ass\u2019n v. Holloway, 25 Holdings: 0: holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself 1: holding bare allegation of social friendship insufficient 2: holding that making a nonfrivolous allegation is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 3: holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra 4: holding that a denial of each and every allegation is insufficient under rule 5513", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the state\u2019s insurance market. In addition to this competitive disadvantage, the Legislature considered the practical \u201cbusiness difficulties\u201d confronting all insurers as a result of such possible catastrophic claims, such as the difficulty in determining the amount of reserves to keep on hand. It was thought that the creation of such an association of insurers would alleviate the competitive inequity of these catastrophic claims by spreading their cost throughout the industry, and also increase the statistical basis for prediction of the overall cost of such claims, making the management of these liabilities easier. See House Legislative Analysis, SB 306, March 13,1978. [In re Certified Question, supra at 714 n 2.] 19 T laims Ass\u2019n, 177 Mich App 538 (1989), aff'd 434 Mich 901 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 27 In re Certified Question, supra at 723. Holdings: 0: holding that insured cannot demand reimbursement for defense insurer had no opportunity to control if insured does not promptly notify insurer of facts triggering coverage 1: holding that indemnitees could recover their attorneys fees and costs from an indemnitor despite the fact that the fees and costs had been paid directly by an insurer and noting that the indemnitor is not relieved from liability either on the theory that the insurer is entitled to reimbursement out of the indemnitees recovery  or that the defendant should not benefit from a contract providently made and paid for by the plaintiff  2: holding that the plaintiff insurer was not entitled to reimbursement from the mcca 3: holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith 4: holding that the insurer was entitled to credit against the owners claim in the amount paid to the mortgagee", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was, under the totality of the circumstances, insufficient to taint McLeod\u2019s confession as involuntary. There fore, we hold that the State carried its burden of proving that McLeod\u2019s confession was voluntary. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur. ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur in the result. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2 . There was evidence to indicate that McKissick and his girlfriend had visited McLeod's wife at McLeod\u2019s residence; that McLeod returned home and became angry when he saw McKissick sitting at the kitchen table; that McLeod ir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, Holdings: 0: holding that an officers promise to bring defendants cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor did not make confession involuntary 1: holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary 2: holding that confession was voluntary although agents had promised to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation 3: holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary 4: holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "See Brzonkala v. Morrison, 272 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir.2001) (rejecting the applicability of the common benefit doctrine, given that the plaintiffs did not identify a strategy for \u201cshiftpng] costs with some exactitude to those bene-fitting\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, the plaintiffs urge us to find attorneys\u2019 fees appropriate because the defendants \u201cacted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.\u201d Hall, 412 U.S. at 5, 93 S.Ct. 1943 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the \u201cbad faith\u201d requirement has been interpreted strictly by this court. See Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Comm\u2019n, 517 F.2d 696, 698 (7th Cir.1975) (\u201cThe standards for bad faith are necessarily stringent.\u201d); see also Singer Co. v. Skil Corp., 803 F.2d 336, 341 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). We find no need to liberalize the rule in Holdings: 0: holding that if the town acted in bad faith in negotiations and litigation which prevented construction then the plaintiffs on remand cannot be deemed to have lost any rights to vest that they would have been able to exercise in the absence of bad faith 1: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims 2: holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint 3: holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith 4: holding that use of plaintiffs mark is in good faith even though other aspects of defendants behavior may have evidenced bad faith", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the patrol car. Within seconds after Brett Jarman\u2019s exit, Six Feathers ran head-on into Tarrell\u2019s vehicle. Brett Jar-man fired four shots at Six Feathers, but, as the District Court noted, it is unclear whether the shots were fired \u201cbefore, during, or after the collision.\u201d Mem. Op. and Order at 5 (July 31, 2002). Six Feathers died at the scene. The District Court denied the summary judgment motions of Brett Jarman and Tarrell. Subsequently, based on the motions of Tarrell and Brett Jarman, the District Court issued an order of clarification because it believed its prior ord used excessive force during their seizure of Six Feathers \u201cunder the Fourth Amendment and its \u2018objective reasonableness\u2019 standard.\u201d Seiner, 304 F.3d at 812; Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether this use of force in Holdings: 0: holding that an initially reasonable seizure can become an unreasonable seizure that violates the fourth amendment when officers refuse to return seized property 1: holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon 2: holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment 3: holding that a fourth amendment seizure of a fleeing suspect occurs only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied  4: holding a fourth amendment seizure oceurs when an officer fatally shoots a fleeing suspect", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Keziah v. W.M. Brown & Son, 888 F.2d 322 (4th Cir.1989), the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for defendant was affirmed on plaintiffs IIED claim when plaintiff alleged, among other things, that her telephone messages were withheld and used by male sales representatives to usurp her sales leads, information was secretly removed from her files and mail, and she was harassed, humiliated, and otherwise subject to an adverse employment environment. Id. at 326-27 (citing Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 79 N.C.App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986)). Furthermore, claims of IIED based upon sexual harassment generally include a combination of explicitly obscene language, sexual advances, and/or sexual touching. Compare Poole v. Copland, Inc., 348 N.C. 260, 261-62, 498 S.E.2d 602, 603 (1998) (<HOLDING>), with Guthrie v. Conroy, 152 N.C.App. 15, 24, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment 1: holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters 2: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 3: holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her 4: recognizing an iied claim sufficient to go to a jury where defendant repeatedly used explicitly obscene language to describe what he would do to plaintiff touched his genitals in her presence while propositioning plaintiff or gesturing toward her obscenely and stood behind her with his pants unzipped suggesting he would show plaintiff what a real man felt like", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit discussed at length the purpose and intent behind the Act as follows: \u201cCongress enacted EMTALA in response to its concern that hospitals were \u2018dumping\u2019 patients (who were) unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment or transferring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized. Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993). Through EMTALA, Congress sought \u2018to provide an adequate first response to a medical crisis for all patients,\u2019 Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (daily ed. October 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Dole)); see also, Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 Holdings: 0: holding that hospital did not violate emtala by failing to follow a thrombolysis protocol because by its very terms the protocol was not expressly applicable to patients in the er 1: holding that emtala applies to any and all patients 2: holding that a company providing administrative purchasing and financial services to a hospital was not a hospital and thus could not be held directly liable under emtala 3: holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients 4: holding that doctors do not have to accept patients", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "explicitly and on the record as to whether Mother validly intended to waive her right to contest the termination.\u201d). If the parties were not prepared to address the issue, the trial court should have ordered a brief continuance. Here, such a continuance would have given the parties an opportunity to propose arrangements for Mother to participate even though she cbuld not be physically present, see Ruth Anne E., 1999\u2014 NMCA-035, \u00b6\u00b6 28-29, 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164 to develop evidence as to whether Mother had voluntarily waived her due process rights, see Stella P., 1999-NMCA-100, \u00b6\u00b6 30-31, 127 N.M. 699, 986 P.2d 495 or to gather evidence that reasonable efforts had been made to contact Mother without success, cf. In re Dependency of A.G., 93 Wash. App. 268, 968 P.2d 424, 428-30 (1999) (<HOLDING>). {13} We recognize that Mother\u2019s right to Holdings: 0: holding that mother did not waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to raise it in her first responsive pleading ie her answer to dhrs  petition to terminate her parental rights because the mother sought leave to amend her answer to include the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction  dhr did not object to that motion and  the juvenile court allowed the mother to amend her answer 1: holding that a mother in a child protection proceeding was afforded due process when she had notice of a hearing was represented by counsel and was given the opportunity to rebut evidence 2: holding mothers due process rights were not violated when her appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw and hearing was held without mother because the record showed mother did not inform counsel of her whereabouts after moving thereby frustrating counsels efforts to contact her and because mother was properly served with notice of the termination hearing 3: holding indigent mothers due process rights were not violated by trial courts failure to appoint attorney ad litem for her until six months after parental termination suit was filed against her where counsel was appointed giving mother a year to prepare for trial when department of protective and regulatory services made clear its intent to pursue dualtrack of both termination and reunification 4: holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "are distributed without affording an opportunity for creditors to present and enforce claims. Id. at 965. The trust fund doctrine was developed to protect creditors who are otherwise without a remedy. Bowers-Siemon Chemicals Co. v. Bowers (In re Bowers-Siemon Chemicals Co.), 139 B.R. 436, 450 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992). Andeo fails to provide any legal authority to support its proposition that this doctrine applies where a debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition. Furthermore, in this ease, the disputed funds were not distributed without affording Andeo an opportunity to enforce its claims through the bankruptcy process. Therefore, as in Bowers, I conclude that the purpose of the trust fund doctrine is satisfied and the doctrine does not apply here. See, e.g., Bowers, 139 B.R. at 450 (<HOLDING>). Andco\u2019s third theory for imposing a Holdings: 0: holding the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing inapplicable when a witness had been deported during the period of time the defendant had been a fugitive 1: holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed 2: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust 3: holding that an anticipated tax refund was property of the bankruptcy estate as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed 4: holding that the trust fund doctrine was inapplicable where the corporation had filed bankruptcy", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the expiration date of the batch.\u201d 21 C.F.R. \u00a7 211.180(a). These records \u201cshall be readily available for authorized inspection\u201d by the FDA at any time. 21 C.F.R. \u00a7 211.180(c). We think that the requirement to maintain records for FDA inspection satisfies the requirement that the uses be reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the FDA. It is not disputed by the parties that these records are produced in order to develop and submit to the FDA proof that the Amphastar products comply with a Federal law. The fact that the FDA does not in most cases actually inspect the records does not change the fact that they are for the \u201cdevelopment and submission of information under a Federal law.\u201d 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1); cf. Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 207, 125 S.Ct. 2372 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we consider this information Holdings: 0: holding that class ii medical devices which are not subject to a rigorous premarket approval process and thus cannot receive patent term extensions are nonetheless covered by the safe harbor 1: holding that uses which are not ultimately included in a submission to the fda are nonetheless exempted by the safe harbor 2: holding that arguments which are not sufficiently developed are waived 3: holding that sanctions under rule 11 are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is served on the opposing party for the full twentyone day safe harbor period before it is filed with or presented to the court 4: holding that rules which are genuinely responsive to safety concerns are exempted from preemption", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of State Laws Applicable to Credit Card Transactions, OTS Op. Letter, No. P-96-14, 1996 WL 767462, at *5. 17 . Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 611, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937); Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). 18 . Tex. Fam. Code \u00a7 3.003; Richardson v. Richardson, 424 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2014, no pet.). 19 . Tex. Estates Code \u00a7 201.003; Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 317, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935) (\u201cIt is, however, the rule in this state 'that the community estate passes charged with the debts against it.\u2019 \u201d). 20 . Tex. Estates Code \u00a7 453.002; Shepherd v. Ledford, 926 S.W.2d 405, 412-15 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1996), aff'd, 962 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1998). 21 . Cf. Wilson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 48 F.Supp.3d 787, 796-97 (E.D.Pa.2014) Holdings: 0: holding that the surviving spouse of the borrower could not maintain a respa claim in her individual capacity because she never assumed the deceaseds loan 1: holding under a similar statute ownership of property was transferred to surviving joint tenants upon the death of the joint tenant by operation of law thus defeating the homestead claim of deceaseds spouse 2: holding where among other things the borrower signed confirming the transaction had not been rescinded on the date the loan closed she stated a claim for violation of tila 3: holding that nonsignatory wife asserting in her individual capacity claims for damages such as her own mental anguish and loss of consortium earnings companionship society and inheritance lacked the type of privity contemplated for the contracting parties to bind her to a contract that she did not sign in her individual capacity 4: holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "before us, it would not salvage the day. There is nothing talismanic about the phrase \u201cprocedural harm.\u201d A party claiming under that r\u00fabric is not relieved from compliance with the actual injury requirement for standing. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza, 711 F.2d at 425-26 (requiring, as a precondition to standing, that plaintiffs who allege procedural harm also show \u201cinjury in fact\u201d). Thus, one who asserts procedural harm as the basis for standing must set forth particulars that serve to indicate a distinct and palpable injury. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Put bluntly, a party must set forth a sufficient panoply of facts to show that his injury is real as opposed to being theoretical or abstract. See Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In the case of an association, this Holdings: 0: holding that hypothetical injury was insufficient for standing 1: holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 2: holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation 3: holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain 4: holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the application of law to undisputed fact are reviewed de novo. See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). As an initial matter, because Huang fails to challenge the agency\u2019s denial of his claim for CAT relief before this Court, any such challenge is deemed waived. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005). Regarding Huang\u2019s asylum and withholding claims, we find that the agency reasonably concluded that Huang was not eligible for relief as a result of his mother\u2019s sterilization. See Shao Yan Chen v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 417 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that \u201cthe children of those victimized by coercive family planning policies\u201d are not per se eligible for asylum); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Huang does not challenge the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors  would presumably only be persecution where  the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident 1: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 2: holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic 3: recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares  the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 4: holding that an alien cannot claim asylum based on persecution that is personally motivated", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the unmarketability of one person\u2019s title should not delay the payment of other entitled parties\u2019 royalties, but it is not clear whether the unmarketa-bility of part of one person\u2019s title justifies a delay in paying the rest of that same person\u2019s proceeds. While the issue is not free from doubt, we believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not interpret this provision as excusing a delay in the payment of royalties on the interest in which Howell\u2019s title was marketable. See Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 10 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 5, 25 (1987-88) (\u201cthe Arkansas Supreme Court is likely to interpret section 53-525 in favor of the ... party entitled to receive lease proceeds\u201d (citing, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. First Nat\u2019l Bank, 288 Ark. 338, 705 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1986) (<HOLDING>)). This is a case of \u201ca company ... withholding Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury 1: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 2: holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations 3: holding that the time limits in section 53525 begin to run as soon as the oil or gas is delivered not when payment is actually made 4: holding that because an indemnitor is not liable until the indemnitee actually makes payment interest does not accrue until the payment is made", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Servs., L.P. v. Perez, 792 F.3d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 2015). To the extent that the award is based merely on repeated filings, it is unclear that a court\u2019s inherent powers can do the same work as Rule 41(d), which is necessarily backward-looking. Rule 41(d) concerns the award of costs from a previous action. In contrast, a court's inherent power gives it the \"authority to impose sanctions in order to control the litigation before it.\" Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Cotp., 619 F.3d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and 'citation omitted) (emphasis added). This court has repeatedly vacated sanctions that punish conduct that did not occur in front of the district court: See, e.g., Matter of Case, 937 F.2d 1014, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1991); Positive, 619 F.3d at 463 (<HOLDING>); FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 593-94 Holdings: 0: holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements 1: recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process 2: holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss 3: holding that the court had no power to sanction conduct that occurred in an arbitration 4: holding that trial courts have the power to sanction parties for bad faith abuse of the judicial process not covered by rule or statute", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The trial itself only lasted two days, and was followed by two telephone conferences and two in-person hearings. On the other hand, the City heavily litigated this case, particularly after it lost at trial, requiring the Church to respond in kind. The Court will bear these factors in mind, as well. C. Results Obtained A major dispute between the parties is whether and to what extent any fee award should be reduced or enhanced. After calculating the appropriate rate and number of hours worked, \u201cthe court has the opportunity to adjust the lodestar to account for other considerations that have not yet figured into the computation, the most important being the relation of the results obtained to the work done.\u201d Dillard, 213 F.3d at 1353; see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (<HOLDING>). In rare or exceptional cases, like those Holdings: 0: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 1: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 2: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived 3: holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims 4: holding that a fee application based on claims that were interrelated nonfrivolous and raised in good faith may still be excessive where the applicant achieved only partial or limited success", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Court rejects the debtor\u2019s argument that the reimbursement debt is invalid. B. Constitutional Defenses 1. Ex Post Facto First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (\u201c[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.\u201d); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the debtor contends that Holdings: 0: holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause 1: holding that because of its civil nature section 881 is not subject to the ex post facto clause 2: holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive 3: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation 4: holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, and the me or benefit need not necessarily be commercial.\u201d Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, \u00b6 1, 351 N.E.2d 454 of syllabus (Ohio 1976), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus, Ohio law prohibits the publication of another\u2019s name or likeness in a commercial use that draws from that persons \u201creputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity.\u201d Id. at 231, 351 N.E.2d 454. Nevertheless, several exceptions exist to this common law right. First, incidental use of one\u2019s name or likeness is permissible. See e.g., Vinci v. American Can Company, 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1990) (<HOLDING>) Second, one\u2019s name and appearance, in and of Holdings: 0: holding that member of a large class of health care providers available to the insured was only a potential and incidental beneficiary of the contract and thus not entitled to recover thereunder 1: holding that informational blurbs about charles vinci the 1956 and 1960 weightlifting olympic gold medalist on dixie cups was merely incidental to the promotion of the dixie cups and thus permissible 2: holding that service and notice in a technical sense are incidental where the main purpose of obtaining the appearance of parties and their participation is accomplished 3: holding that the mention of olympic athletes names was incidental to the promotion of dixie cups and thus not a violation of ohios common law right of appropriation because the use was purely informational and there was no implication that the athletes used supported or promoted the product 4: holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "v. Dobrayel (In re Dobrayel), 287 B.R. 3, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)). As to the second criteria under Section 523(a)(2)(A), false representation requires that the defendant \u201c(1) made a false or misleading statement; (2) with the intent to deceive; and (3) in order for the plaintiff to turn over money or property to the defendant.\u201d In re Chase, 372 B.R. at 129 (citing In re Dobrayel, 287 B.R. at 12). \u201c\u2018[I]ntent to deceive may be established through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the totality of the evidence presented.\u201d Id. (citing H.K. Deposit & Guar. Ltd. v. Shaheen (In re Shaheen), 111 B.R. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). The plaintiff must also establish that his reliance was justifiable. Id.; see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61, 70-72, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Whether justifiable reliance is established Holdings: 0: holding that a creditors reliance under  523a2a need only be subjectively justified and not objectively reasonable 1: holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law 2: holding standard under section 523a2a is justifiable reliance 3: holding that  523a2a requires justifiable but not reasonable reliance 4: holding that in fraud and nondisclosure claims a plaintiff must show actual and justifiable reliance", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "behavior by failing to investigate or to take any remedial measures following Mr. Loy\u2019s arrest. Although the failure to investigate may give rise to \u00a7 1983 supervisory liability, Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1457 (6th Cir.1990) Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir.1985), no sua sponte investigation by Sexton was warranted here. The reports describing the arrest, including statements by Deputy Elliott and the two Children\u2019s Services workers, do not indicate that Elliott used excessive force or unlawfully entered the Loy residence. In the absence of a \u201cstrong\u201d indication of unconstitutional conduct, Sexton\u2019s failure to conduct an investigation was reasonable and he cannot be hable as a supervisor under \u00a7 1983. See Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, unlike M\u00e1rchese, 758 F.2d at 188, Holdings: 0: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor 1: holding that supervisors were not hable because they possessed no information indicating a strong likelihood of unconstitutional conduct by their subordinate 2: holding that supervisors are not personally hable as employers under the adea either 3: holding that deliberate indifference is not the mere possibility a harm will occur rather a strong likelihood 4: holding that plaintiffs necessarily demonstrated irreparable harm because they showed a substantial likelihood that their first amendment rights had been infringed", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Judge Byrd\u2019s July 13, 2007 order, imposing sanctions under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 for his filing of the 2007 Complaint for Custody. The sanctions against both Upson and Merkle were imposed in the form of an attorney\u2019s fee award to Wallace, who proceeded pro se in both matters. We address the two appeals together because both require the resolution of a common issue: whether a trial court can impose a sanction of attorney\u2019s fees, pursuant to the court\u2019s inherent power or pursuant to Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11, to be awarded to an attorney appearing pro se as a litigant. We hold that it cannot. Sanctions Under Superior Court Domestic Relations Rule 11 Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 sanctions are available when a \u201cpleading, motion, or other paper\u201d that is sig 3d 1365, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We are persuaded by the foregoing authorities Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 1: holding that the language of fed rcivp 37 a rule that allows for sanctions regarding discovery violations does not allow a pro se lawyer to receive fees for his own time 2: holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions is dispositive 3: holding that new jersey rule patterned on fed r civ p 11 precludes a pro se attorney litigant from receiving attorneys fees because such fees are not actually incurred 4: holding that california rule modeled almost word for word on rule 11 of the federal rules of civil procedure does not allow a pro se attorney litigant to recover sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys fees", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "up and documenting the fish kill, and any future costs associated with stream restoration. Having found PFBC meets the Findley factors, we now address the specific question of whether PFBC, as an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, has statutory authority and/or implicit power to bring a cause of action in West Virginia under West Virginia common law. PFBC\u2019s authority to bring this action must be either expressly conferred by the legislature or given by necessary implication. See Commonwealth v. Am. Ice Co., 406 Pa. 322, 178 A.2d 768, 773 (1962) (\u201cOnly those powers within the legislative grant, either express or necessarily implied, can be exercised by the administrative body.\u201d); see also Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm\u2019n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>) powers expressly conferred by the legislature; Holdings: 0: recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 1: holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law 2: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 3: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state 4: recognizing separation of powers doctrine", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the jury.\u201d). This is particularly true where the arrest occurred on January 31, 2007, over four years prior to the incident which gave rise to this action. Accordingly, evidence of Goodman\u2019s prior arrest to establish that she in fact engaged in acts of prostitution is excluded. In addition to using this evidence to establish truthfulness of any alleged defamatory statements, Defendants also seek its admission on the question of defamation damages. Although Goodman\u2019s, San Diego arrest may be minimally relevant to her reputation at the time she was detained at the Cosmopolitan, reputational damage is presumed in a slander per se action like this one, as explained below in the Court\u2019s discussion of Goodman\u2019s defamation claim. See Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 637 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1981) (<HOLDING>). This is because \u201c[a]t the heart of the libel- Holdings: 0: recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest 1: holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery 2: holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law 3: recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages 4: recognizing continued vitality of kassowitz on what is slander per se", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "S. Kreindler et al., 15 N.Y. Practice Series, N.Y. Law of Torts \u00a7 12:38 (2013) (\u201cA restaurant owner, as a landowner, has a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for persons on the property. Accordingly, a restaurant owner must take appropriate measures to protect persons on the premises from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons.\u201d). Evidence of prior criminal acts sufficiently similar to the instant act can demonstrate foreseeability. See, e.g., Maysonet v. KFC, Nat\u2019l Mgmt. Co., 906 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir.1990); Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 598 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163, 614 N.E.2d 723 (1993). Here, Gray adduced evidence that she was physically assaulted by a group of loud and profane customers whom she asked to be quiet 584 N.Y.S.2d 64, 64 (1st Dep\u2019t 1992) (<HOLDING>). Nor is it a case in which the prior assaults Holdings: 0: holding that no seizure occurred where officers boarded bus and began questioning passengers gave passengers no reason to believe that they required an answer and tjhere was no application of force no intimidating movement no overwhelming show of force no brandishing of weapons no blocking of exits no threat no command not even an authoritative tone of voice 1: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 2: holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant 3: holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved 4: holding that defendant had no duty where tjhere was no evidence of a pattern of criminal activity or of even one similar incident involving different patrons", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and the substantive basis\u201d for the claims it asserts under Counts I (unconstitutional vagueness), Count III (violation of the Administrative Procedures Act), and Count IV (procedural due process violation). In Salfi, the Court held the plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional challenge to an eligibility statute was a claim arising under the Act within the meaning of \u00a7 405(h) even though the claim also arose under the Constitution. Likewise, in Ringer, the Court held the plaintiffs\u2019 claim that the Secretary failed to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act arose under the Medicare Act within the meaning of \u00a7 405(h). 466 U.S. at 614, 104 S.Ct. at 2021. See also Good Samaritan Medical Ctr. v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 776 F.2d 594, 597-98 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Livingston Care Ctr., 934 F.2d at 722 Holdings: 0: holding hospitals equal protection claim arises under the medicare act 1: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 2: holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim 3: holding that the state law violated equal protection principles 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "this opinion. CAYCE, C.J.; HOLMAN and McCOY, JJ., dissent without opinion. 1 . Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). 2 . Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.Ap officers' information that described vehicle, including license number, contained parole violator constituted reasonable suspicion to check for warrants). 61 . See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005). 62 . Neese v. State, 930 S.W.2d 792, 801 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, pet. ref'd) (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417). 63 . See Quick v. State, 999 S.W.2d 79, 80-81 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 64 . See Domingo v. State, 82 S.W.3d 617, 622 Holdings: 0: holding that claims for false arrest and imprisonment under  1983 accrue at the time of the arrest 1: holding evidence legally insufficient 2: holding that evidence was legally insufficient to support statutory fraud finding because appellant was not actually aware of real estate agents misrepresentations 3: holding that because appellant was not under arrest or detained at time he gave officer a false name the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction for failure to identify 4: holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The burden of showing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact is initially on the moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 996) (allowing a malicious prosecution claim to proceed under \u00a7 1983). While the Third Circuit has held that a plaintiff must have been \"seized\u201d in order to proceed with a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983, it has set a very low threshold for a finding of seizure. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Gatter\u2019s post-indictment restrictions, which Holdings: 0: holding that postindictment restrictions on the plaintiff such as requiring him to post a bond attend all court hearings contact pretrial services on a weekly basis and prohibiting him from traveling outside of new jersey constituted seizure for the purpose of a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim 1: holding the same for malicious prosecution 2: holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  3: holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists 4: holding that a plaintiffs allegations that the defendant seized him pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a  1983 malicious prosecution claim alleging a seizure that was violative of the fourth amendment", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "alleges that an unauthorized surgical procedure was performed, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the operation that was performed was not authorized by him). In Appellants\u2019 view, by proving that the \u201ccontact\u201d or \u201ctouching\u201d was not consented to, the patient establishes that it was \u201coffensive,\u201d which is sufficient to make the unauthorized surgery a de facto battery. Thus, they conclude, there is no need to instruct the jury on the elements of an \u201cactual\u201d battery. Appellants further argue that the trial court\u2019s jury charge requiring proof of the surgeon\u2019s intent to harm is inconsistent with well-settled case law establishing that a patient may pursue a claim for lack of consent even where no physical injury resulted from the unauthorized surgery. See Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Appellants point out that the Holdings: 0: holding that courts lack jurisdiction to address merits of a claim where party raising the claim is found to lack standing to maintain suit 1: holding that a lack of consent claim is actionable even if the subject surgery was properly performed and the overall result is beneficial 2: holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act 3: holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent 4: holding that claim for sons suicide was not actionable", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of Columbia. See Travelers Indem. Co., 321 A.2d at 150-51 (noting that, under Maryland law, loss of consortium is deemed an injury to the marital relationship and not an independent tort); Carey v. Foster, 345 F.2d 772, 776 (4th Cir.1965) (noting that Virginia does not recognize cause of action for loss of consortium). However, no choice of law problem is presented because the law of consortium in Maryland and Virginia is less favorable to Fetisoff\u2019s \"arising out of\u2019 argument than District of Columbia law. Thus, the law of the relevant jurisdictions is not \"different,\u201d see Eli Lilly & Co., 764 F.2d at 882, because the result reached is the same no matter which jurisdiction\u2019s view of consortium is applied. 8 . See Rollins v. District of Columbia, 265 F.2d 347, 349 (D.C.Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). 9 . 211 Cal.App.3d 431, 259 Cal.Rptr. 382 Holdings: 0: recognizing that loss of consortium is a right of action separate from that of the spouse 1: holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse 2: holding that recovery for loss of consortium is a right  separate and apart from right of injured spouse to receive compensation for personal injuries 3: holding that plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium can proceed even where the injured spouse was contributorily negligent 4: holding that a loss of consortium is separate and independent from the primary action", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Doggett, 663 A.2d at 517 n. 8, and we \u201cwill not question\u201d the value fixed by the appraiser that the parties have chosen \u201cin the absence of fraud or mistake.\u201d Id. at 515. However, when an appraiser must interpret the meaning of a legal document \u2014 a contract between parties \u2014 before he may perform his appraisal, that interpretation is subject to judicial review. A court \u201cwill defer to the appraiser\u2019s interpretation of the lease as long as it is reasonable and does not exceed the appraiser\u2019s authority,\u201d Doggett, 663 A.2d at 516, but the court noted in Marceron that unlike the actual appraisal of value, which is accorded deference, an appraiser\u2019s interpretation of his instructions as set forth in a contract is \u201cclothed with no presumption of correctness.\u201d Marceron, 258 F.2d at 158 (<HOLDING>). The interest that the parties intended the Holdings: 0: holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term 1: holding that the appraisers interpretation of the lease was unreasonable on its face because they had appraised the value of a single lot instead of the entire tract contrary to the language of the lease 2: holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease 3: holding that the lessors interest in the leased property was subject to liens because it was perfectly obvious that the parties knew that the improvements at issue were the pith of the lease and that except for them the lease would not have been executed and because the improvements were essential to the purpose of the lease 4: recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "under the doctrine of respondeat superior.\u201d)). \u00b6 25 The liberal construction afforded workers\u2019 compensation legislation exists because Arizona\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is remedial legislation enacted to protect employees injured in the course of their employment. Hopkins, 176 Ariz. at 177, 859 P.2d at 800 (citing Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 62 Ariz. 398, 402-03, 158 P.2d 511, 513 (1945)). In fact, where doubt exists as to the proper construction, courts in workers\u2019 compensation eases should adopt the construction that will best effectuate the purpose of compensating the claimant for his disability. Id. (citing Bonnin v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 6 Ariz.App. 317, 320, 432 P.2d 283, 286 (1967)); see also Aitken v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 183 Ariz. 387, 392, 904 P.2d 456, 461 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in workers\u2019 compensation cases, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the waiver rule is procedural not jurisdictional and we may suspend it in our discretion citations omitted 1: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee 2: holding that where the existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict  it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury internal quotation marks and citations omitted 3: recognizing that we have consistently applied workers compensation laws liberally remedially and in a manner insuring that injured employees receive maximum available benefits and the overriding theme of the system as evidenced by our constitution statutes and case law has been to preserve a claimants opportunity to be made whole to the fullest possible extentnothing more or less citations omitted 4: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "does not dispute that the medical reports and corresponding TWCC-69 Forms are privileged under the Medical Practice Act and the right to privacy, we hold that the documents are not discoverable and thus, we need not decide whether the litigation exception applies. Here, Locke seeks medical reports relating to thousands of non-party claimants without their consent. He argues that the physician-patient privilege and right to privacy do not preclude him from obtaining redacted TWCC-69 Forms like the ones he offered below. However, \u201cmerely because a person ... has filed a claim with an insurance company does not necessarily mean the person ... has consented to making his medical records public.\u201d See In re Dolezal, 970 S.W.2d 650, 652-53 (Tex.App. \u2014 Corpus Christi, 1998, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, to the extent that other documents, Holdings: 0: holding that court was required to award an attorneys billing rate where defendant had submitted no evidence on fees 1: holding attorneys testimony on all work performed sufficient to support attorneys fees award even though no time records presented 2: holding that failure to produce supporting documentation regarding billing statements of counsel after an order to was a factor in denying requested attorneys fees 3: holding that emtala applies to any and all patients 4: holding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering chiropractor to disclose the identity of all patients that had any type of connection to the plaintiffs attorneys and to produce all billing records for services rendered to attorneys or patients", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is shown by motive of partiality, prejudice or oppres sion, or is induced by corruption. State v. Loewe, 756 S.W.2d 177, 184 (Mo.App.1988). Similarly, a sentencing court has great discretion in applying Section 558.046. Section 558.046 states \u201cthe sentencing court may reduce any term of sentence or probation pronounced by the court or a term of conditional release or parole pronounced by the state board of probation and parole ...\u201d The use of the word \u201cmay\u201d is indicative of the amount of discretion a sentencing court has in regards to sentence reduction. Under the current statute, the sentencing court is not even required to consider sentence reduction, but has a right to do so. See State v. Simmons, 660 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Mo.App.1983); Benson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.1974) (<HOLDING>). In addition to a reduction of any term of Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court is required to enter sentencing order for probation violation that reflects the trial courts oral pronouncement that gives the defendant prison credit for time served on a split sentence prior to sentencing 1: holding that probation is not a sentence 2: holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation 3: holding that revocation of probation is merely an extension of a sentencing proceeding 4: holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a particular degree, license, or education. Id.; Leaf, 590 N.W.2d at 535 (\u201c[N]o particular education is required; experience is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.\u201d); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1994) (\u201cAlthough licensing carries a presumption of qualification to testify in the given field, \u2018learning and experience may provide the essential elements of qualifica tion.\u2019\u201d (quoting Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Iowa 1973))). Rule 5.702 does not impose a requirement for how an expert is to become qualified and does not distinguish between whether an expert is qualified or unqualified based on whether he or she belongs to a particular profession or has a particular degree. Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 689; see also Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 888 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the witness does not need to be a Holdings: 0: holding that refugees who have already acquired lpr status are ineligible for a  209c waiver in light of the language in that adjustment of status can be granted to an alien who has not acquired permanent resident status 1: holding that no tax liens may attach to property after the fdic acquired title 2: recognizing expertise acquired through experience is every bit as good as expertise acquired academically 3: holding statute requiring dealers to keep records of all motor vehicles acquired as junk is lawful 4: holding that equity acquired due to improving property is subject to cap", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Agreement constituted a contract, through which Appellants ratified a prior transaction. Therefore, even if the CFA note and mortgage were in fact invalid, Appellants\u2019 argument would still fail because a ratification of a former transaction is clearly not a transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. By the time ratification occurs, the unauthorized or voidable transfer transaction has already been completed and, at that point, may only be voided or ratified. See In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (\u201cA fraudulent transfer is not void, but voidable; thus, it can be ratified by a creditor who is then estopped from seeking its avoidance.\u201d); see also Cohen v. Treuhold Capital Group, LLC (In re Cohen), 422 B.R. 350, 371 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (<HOLDING>). When Appellants executed the Agreement, any Holdings: 0: holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal 1: holding that questioning of a juvenile by a principal in presence of a police officer did not constitute an interrogation because principal was sole questioner and was not acting as an agent for police 2: holding that defendant was not an agent because alleged principal did not control means by which the defendants accomplished their duties 3: holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser 4: holding that an unauthorized property transfer effectuated by an agent and not evidenced by a signed writing could be subsequently ratified by the principal", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.2d at 400. Quarles also claims that the law firm seeks recovery on a sworn account under section 38.001(7) and that such recovery is not available because the law firm did not present the proper affidavit necessary for recovery under a sworn account. We need not inquire as to whether the affidavit in the record is somehow deficient so as not to satisfy Tex.R.Civ.P. 185, since we hold that the law firm need not seek recovery of attorneys' fees only under section 38.-001(7), as section 38.001(1) allows recovery of attorneys' fees on a claim for \"rendered services,\" section 38.001(2) on a claim for \"performed labor,\" and section 38.001(8) on a claim for \"oral or written contract.\" See Youngblood v. Wilson & Cureton, 321 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). B. As stated earlier, the law firm's Holdings: 0: holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 1: holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed 2: holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of  38001 3: holding defendant could not recover attorneys fees under predecessor to statute 38001 when defendant did not present contract claim 4: holding that predecessor to section 38001 codified with no changes as section 38001 et seq contained no requirement that the contract sued upon have a provision providing for attorneys fees", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "given the defendant, a foreign state to be served under section 1608(a), was insufficient to meet the requirements of the FSIA. See also Shen v. Japan Airlines, 918 F.Supp. 686, 692 (S.D.N.Y.1994). The Seventh Circuit similarly required strict compliance under section 1608(a) in Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.1983). In that case, noting that section 1608(a) \u201cdelineates the \u2018exclusive procedures\u2019 for effecting service of process upon a foreign state,\u201d the court refused to excuse the plaintiffs service on the Nicaraguan Ambassador in lieu of the head of the foreign affairs ministry. See also Magnus Elec., Inc., v. Royal Bank of Canada, 620 F.Supp. 387, 389 (N.D.Ill.1985), aff'd in part, rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 830 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The District of Columbia Circuit, holding Holdings: 0: holding that noncompliance with the fsiajs literal requirements though it certainly did provide notice deprives this court of personal jurisdiction 1: holding that where it was erroneous for the district court to take judicial notice it certainly cannot be said that such notice was mandatory and therefore ire 201d is inapplicable 2: holding that an effective notice of appeal must be filed for this court to have jurisdiction to hear the case 3: holding that at a bare minimum the district court was required to provide a pro se prisoner with fair notice of the summary judgment rule requirements 4: holding that late notice of the bond did not excuse supplier from its obligation to comply with statutory notice requirements", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "697, 698, 759 P.2d 335, 336 (1988) (per curiam) (\u201cThere is no authority, statutory or otherwise, that allows avoidance of the will contest limitation by designating an action as one on a claim or for a declaratory judgment based on purported invalidity of a will.\u201d); Lipsey v. Lipsey, 660 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Tex.App.1983) (\u201c[W]e hold the validity of the entire will cannot be ques tioned through a declaratory judgment proceeding.\u201d); Howard Hughes Med. Inst. v. Lummis, 596 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex.Civ.App.1980) (\u201cTo allow the declaratory judgment mechanism to determine the validity of HHMI\u2019s claim that a valid will exists would impermissibly subvert the statutory scheme and time limitations established by the probate code.\u201d); Henry v. Cottingham, 253 S.C. 286, 293, 170 S.E.2d 387, 391 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Farthing v. Farthing, 235 N.C. 634, 635, 70 Holdings: 0: holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding that a claim for a declaratory judgment which sought nullification of a probate courts orders is precisely the type of claim encompassed by the rookerfeldman doctrine 3: holding that south carolinas declaratory judgment act is not a vehicle for the nullification of such instruments nor is it a substitute or alternate method of contesting the validity of wills 4: holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of McCoy\u2019s false statements in connection with the loan application, but there is no evidence that they were affected by McCoy\u2019s perjury in the 1995 bankruptcy proceeding \u2014 much less that they were \u201cdirectly and most seriously affected.\u201d McCoy does not contend that either institution relied upon that false testimony. Indeed, the SBA does not appear to have participated in the bankruptcy proceeding at all, while Adams National won every significant issue contested therein. See McCoy\u2019s Waste Indus. & Mfg., Inc. v. Adams Nat\u2019l Bank, Adv. No. 94-0096, slip op. at 1, 50-52, 1995 WL 908054 (Bankr. D.C. Oct. 4, 1995). It is therefore difficult to discern how either entity could have been adversely affected by McCoy\u2019s perjury. Cf. United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 272 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Guidelines further provide that \u201c[f]or Holdings: 0: holding there was no assumption where neither the bankruptcy court nor the debtor exhibited any intention of assuming the contract 1: holding that civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause 2: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support 3: holding that for purposes of 18 usc  3663 creditors in bankruptcy proceeding were not victims of perjury when they neither relied on the false testimony nor incurred any losses as a consequence thereof 4: holding reasonable fee in contract action included fees incurred in related bankruptcy proceeding", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in the case which supports it.\u201d Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 519, 750 A.2d 10 (2000); Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80, 506 A.2d 646 (1986); Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 285 Md. 186, 194, 401 A.2d 651 (1979); Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 13, 320 A.2d 258 (1974). 6 . Our holding is consistent with other cases that have considered this issue. See Vieregger v. Robertson, 9 Neb.App. 193, 609 N.W.2d 409, 414 (2000)(where instruction to jury imposed burden of proof that doctor had to be the cause and not a cause of the injury to be considered a proximate cause, court ruled that \u201can instruction that the burden of proof is to show that a doctor's negligence was a cause is what is required.\u2019'[(emphasis added); Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885, 891 (1999)(<HOLDING>)(emphasis added); Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Holdings: 0: holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury 1: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible 2: holding that whether the negligent acts of parties combined to become the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury 3: holding proximate cause required for claim of breach of special duty 4: holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "are you aware of whether or not Eligi\u00f3 [Saenz] has any other method of getting to a public roadway, other than through Mrs. Thrash\u2019s property and through your property? A. He\u2019s even going through my, my easement that I bought outright several times, and also through the ranch, through other places. [Emphasis added] Q. Through what other places sir? A. Through mine and Bazans and Manuel Reyes too. He\u2019s been using it, not right now because he locked the gates. [Emphasis added] Xavier Reyes\u2019 testimony raises a genuine issue of material fact on whether the Saenzes have other possible legal means of access to their property and on whether access across the Reyeses\u2019 property is a necessity, as opposed to a mere convenience. See Mitchell v. Castellaw, 151 Tex. 56, 246 S.W.2d 163, 168 (1952) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION We conclude the Saenzes failed to Holdings: 0: holding it is a question of fact 1: holding that whether the defendants confession was voluntary was a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review 2: holding that an error pertaining to a mixed question of law and fact under state law is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding 3: holding that probable cause determination presents a mixed question of law and fact 4: holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "meant by an \u201cunfair or discriminatory practice\u201d based on sex. Vivian, 601 N.W.2d at 874. The legislative history of the sex discrimination provision of Title VII is not substantial. Nevertheless, the federal courts which have examined Title VII\u2019s legislative history have found personal grooming codes that reflect customary modes of grooming having only an insignificant impact on employment opportunities do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of the Act. See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401-02 (6th Cir.1977); Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Dodge, 488 F.2d at 1337. Several federal appellate courts have considered Title VII in the context of personal grooming codes regulating hair length. Every federal appellate court w . 593, 795 P.2d 602, 604 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Because there was no discrimination on the Holdings: 0: holding that the court may only make a facial inquiry into the validity of the certification 1: recognizing that source code is speech but not reaching the object code issue 2: holding that the apparent conflict between two subsections of the tax code renders the facial meaning of the statute ambiguous 3: holding personal grooming code which allows females to wear jewelry but prohibits men from wearing facial jewelry was not sexually discriminatory under state statute 4: holding that since limitations section in internal revenue code allows for suits against a sovereign its requirements are jurisdictional", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 294, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging inherent sovereign immunity of territories); cf. Davis v. Knud-Hansen Memorial Hospital, 635 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing Virgin Islands' sovereign immunity generally). 2 That a state may voluntarily contribute to a judgment is insufficient to confer immunity on a state agency and thus is irrelevant to the alter ego question. Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661 (citing, inter alia, Kovats v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 822 F.2d 1303, 1309 (3d Cir. 1987). Furthermore, that a state agency faced with a large judgment against it \"might be compelled to rely on increased state subsidies\" has expressly been rejected by the Third Circuit as insufficient to accord the agency with alter ego status. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819; see Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the thrust of this first Holdings: 0: holding that  1983 does not override a states eleventh amendment immunity 1: holding that a complaint that fails to meet the pleading requirements does not invoke the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity 2: holding that  1983 does not override states eleventh amendment immunity 3: holding that states appropriation to agency of funds to meet any shortfall does not trigger immunity 4: holding negligence in supervision and evaluation of student in governmental units custody does not trigger waiver of immunity", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "factors, the Burnet court relied on Snedigar, which had in turn relied on Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. 223. The Snedigar court\u2019s holding (with the Burnet court\u2019s deletions italicized) is as follows: We . . . hold that when a trial judge chooses one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b), the reasons for that choice should he clearly stated on the record. We further hold that when the most severe sanction of default or dismissal is ordered, it must be apparent from the record that the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed, and whether it found the Associated Mortgage due process factors [of willfulness and substantial prejudice] to be present. 53 Wn. App. at 487 (emphasis added); Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. at 228-29 (<HOLDING>). The Burnet court also cited a line of cases Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court had the authority to impose a default judgment as a sanction for violating a rule 16 scheduling order pursuant to rule 37b2 stating we agree with the basic premise that a default sanction can under certain circumstances be an appropriate response to a violation of a rule 16 order after all the express terms of rule 37 permit a trial court to impose sanctions when a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery 1: holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous  because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained  2: holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291 3: recognizing that courts have discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction for violation of a discovery order 4: holding that the sanction of a default judgment authorized by cr 37b2c is a harsh remedy which should only be granted where there has been a willful or deliberate refusal to obey a discovery order which refusal substantially prejudices the opponents ability to prepare for trial", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "plan. Tex. Fam.Code \u00a7\u00a7 7.001, 7.003; (6) seek spousal maintenance if they separate or divorce. Tex. Fam.Code \u00a7 8.051; (7) enjoy the benefit of the \u201czone of privacy\u201d that heterosexual married couples enjoy in the form of evidentiary privileges between spouses. Tex.R. Evid. 504; (8) enjoy succession rights under state laws of intestacy. Tex. Prob.Code \u00a7 45; or (9) have the right to make burial or other decisions regarding the handling and disposition of one another\u2019s remains. On October 3, 2013, Plaintiffs Holmes and Phariss applied for a marriage license from the Bexar County Clerk Riekhoffs office. Defendant Rickhoff refused to issue a license because Holmes and Phariss are both men. This denial establishes an Article III injury. See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74, Holdings: 0: holding article iii courts may not exercise executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature 1: holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists 2: holding that courts have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an article iii injury 3: holding that the exception applies where a state administrative agency operates pursuant to a federal legislative scheme 4: holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "denied, 488 U.S. 840, 109 S.Ct. 108, 102 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988); Jaranee v. State, 770 So.2d 644, 647-48 (Ala.Crim.App.1999)(argument as to variance between indictment and proof \"goes to sufficiency of the evidence\u201d); Bennett v. Tennessee, (Tenn.Crim.App.1998)(argument that there was a fatal variance between indictment and proof at trial viewed as sufficiency claim under Jackson); Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 796 n. 21 (stating variance between indictment allegation and proof was insufficiency of evidence problem), overruled, in part, on other grounds, Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Deltenre v. State, 808 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(variance between indictment allegations and proof resulted in legally insufficient evidence); Franklin v. State, 659 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Crim.App.1983)(<HOLDING>), such approach is not necessarily mainstream. Holdings: 0: recognizing double jeopardy bar is inapplicable where a variance between indictment and proof necessitated prosecution under a new indictment 1: holding that variation between an indictment and proof to a jury is not material where the allegations and proof substantially correspond 2: recognizing that evidence may be legally insufficient where there is variance between indictment allegations and proof 3: holding evidence legally insufficient 4: holding variance between enhancement allegation and proof renders evidence legally insufficient only if variance is material", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1983). The court in Pennington, citing to Hill, 122 B.R. 539, further explained that when a debtor counterclaims against the plaintiff in initial proceedings, the counterclaim is not stayed by section 362, because the proceeding is not \u201cagainst\u201d the debtor. Noting that all of the authority of which it was aware held that the initial proceedings, and not the appeal, constitute the reference point for determining whether the action is one \u201coriginally brought\u201d against the debtor, the court held that Harvest Foods was not entitled to a stay of its appeal because it, as the debtor, was the party who originally brought the action. See also Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>). This court\u2019s decision in Pennington is in Holdings: 0: holding that whether a case is subject to the automatic stay must be determined at its inception and such a determination does not change depending on the particular stage of litigation at which the filing of the bankruptcy petition occurs 1: holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action 2: holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage 3: holding that at this stage of the proceedings review is limited to a determination of whether the circuit court afforded due process and whether the court observed the essential requirements of law 4: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "for an alleged work-related injury through a Board-approved settlement. See OCGA \u00a7 34-9-15. The interplay of OCGA \u00a7\u00a7 34-9-11 (a) and 34-9-15 (b), which this Court has not previously addressed, is informed by how we and the Court of Appeals have interpreted the interplay between the exclusive remedy provision and subsection (a) of OCGA\u00a7 34-9-15. (b) It is well established that a settlement under OCGA \u00a7 34-9-15 (a) which requires an employer to compensate its employee for an alleged injury bars a subsequent tort suit by the employee against anyone protected by the exclusive remedy provision, regardless of the actual circumstances of the employee\u2019s injury and the amount of compensation to which the parties agreed. See Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 244 Ga. 165, 166-167 (259 SE2d 429) (1979) (<HOLDING>); Thorn v. Phillips, 164 Ga. App. 47, 48 (296 Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative agency or a state courts finding that an employer had just cause to terminate a plaintiff is not preclusive with regard to the plaintiffs discrimination claim against the employer 1: holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation 2: recognizing that an appellants tort claim was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies where the appellant had previously pursued and recovered workers compensation benefits for the same injury 3: holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy 4: holdingthat the exclusive remedy provision barred a tort lawsuit against the plaintiffs employer because the plaintiff had previously entered a boardapproved settlement with the employer for the same injury", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and intent of the Zoning Procedure Ordinance. Finally, the Court acknowledges that the Appeals Board heard neighbor testimony that the proposed use would be incompatible with the neighborhood. However, to the extent the Board relied on this testimony to support its finding of lack of compatibility, the Board failed to identify how the testimony factually substantiated its conclusion that the proposed unusual use \u201cwould not be compatible with the area and its development.\u201d Moreover, the neighbor testimony, while sincere, was largely opinion based and, therefore, lacked sufficient factual content to support the Appeals Board\u2019s decision. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.1999); City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (<HOLDING>). In sum, Nextel presented substantial Holdings: 0: holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board 1: holding that public hearings should not be held for the purpose of polling the neighborhood but to present facts to assist a board with its decision 2: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 3: holding where secretary breached the duty to assist veteran in ensuring examination report was as complete and thorough as possible remand was required to enable the board to assist claimant in developing the facts of his case 4: holding due process requires that 1 the board be presented with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes  and 2 the parties may be heard either in person by counsel or by other representatives  and the  board shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee ", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may well result in a different social recognition of social groups opposed to gang violence, even if the gang in question is the same. 8 . The Third and Seventh Circuits invalidated the pre W-G-R-/M-EV-G- \"particularity\u201d and \"social visibility\u201d requirements on the ground that they were inconsistent with prior BIA precedent and therefore were not entitled to Chevron deference. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.2011) (\"Since the \u2018social visibility' requirement is inconsistent with past BIA decisions, we conclude that it is an unreasonable addition to the requirements for establishing refugee status where that status turns upon persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.\u201d); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The IJ failed to grant Pirir-Boc relief Holdings: 0: holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 1: holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation 2: holding that the interpretation of social visibility is inconsistent with previous decisions and makes no sense 3: holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation 4: holding that the defendants ability to give directions and make decisions on a course of action for himself was inconsistent with the intoxication defense", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "work a manifest injustice.\u2019 \u201d Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382). There is no reason to deviate from \u2014 and good reason to follow \u2014 Judge Berman\u2019s prior decision deeming the respondent\u2019s attorney\u2019s rate of $345 per hour reasonable. Counsel\u2019s billing rates are strong evidence of prevailing market rates. See Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 209-10; Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 4290, 2010 WL 334975, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010); Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 576 F.Supp.2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y.2008). Furthermore, courts in this district and in neighboring districts have found similar rates to be reasonable for attorneys with similar experience. See Coe, 714 F.Supp.2d at 450 (<HOLDING>); Wise v. Kelly, 620 F.Supp.2d 435, 446 \u2014 47 Holdings: 0: holding 325 per hour reasonable for partner litigating paca case 1: recognizing that 90 per hour is a reasonable rate for a paralegal 2: holding 350 per hour reasonable for civil rights federal court litigation 3: holding that evidence was insufficient to support conviction for vehicular homicide where the defendant was driving 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone before the collision and a minimum of 50 miles per hour at the time of impact 4: holding that speed alone will not support a conviction but that other factors supported the vehicular homicide conviction where defendant was speeding at 50 to 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour residential area with slowchildren playing sign", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "objection was based on his claim that the changes were substantive and that he was prejudiced thereby. 9 . We recognize that a member of this panel concurred in Fields v. State. After reading and considering the analysis in Ramon, which was handed down the same day as Fields, that member finds Ramon more persuasive. 10 . We also note that this amendment added thirty-nine additional charges. Brown, however, was not tried on these additional charges and does not challenge the amendment in this regard on appeal. 11 . The State also amended the references to the file names relating specific images to each charge, pp.2004) (\"the sale of four videotapes to a detective ... surely constituted but one act of distribution of obscene matter.\"); Am. Film Distribs., Inc. v. State, 471 N.E.2d 3 (<HOLDING>); Porter v. State, 440 N.E.2d 690 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants acquiescence to a mistrial constituted implicit consent precluding a later claim of double jeopardy 1: holding that the showing of four pornographic films on one occasion constituted but one exhibition and thus defendants multiple convictions violated double jeopardy 2: holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds 3: holding that convictions for the crimes of conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise violate double jeopardy 4: holding that convictions for two counts of possession of one quantity of cocaine constituted double jeopardy and fundamental error reversing one possession conviction and remanding for resentencing", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "investor. {32} \u201cThe number of victims has been a particularly significant indicator in determining whether acts are distinct\u201d and \u201ca strong indicator of legislative intent to punish distinct conduct that can only be overcome by other factors.\u201d Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, \u00b6 18, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289. In the present case, each unlicensed transaction and each sale of an unregistered security were distinct and separate in time, resulting in distinct and separate harm to different victims. See DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, \u00b6 33, 139 N.M. 211, 131 P.3d 61 (reading the holding in Morro to be based on each act occurring at a distinct time and place each time a gravestone was smashed or defaced and on the fact that there were different victims for each act of vandalism at a diff M. 78, 183 P.3d 963 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 2008-NMCERT-003, 143 N.M. 682, Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence 1: holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms 2: holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop 3: holding that the evidence supported eight separate convictions and punishments for contributing to the delinquency of different minors during a party at the defendants residence 4: holding that the evidence supported separate convictions and punishments for sales of securities namely renewal notes to different victiminvestors", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "See, e.g., Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19, 20 S.Ct. 251, 44 L.Ed. 347 (1900). Here, the Navajo Nation has no standing to assert the rights of the grandparents, nor do the grandparents have any rights under state or federal law. a. Navajo Nation Lacks Standing When acting solely in a representative capacity, a tribe\u2019s standing is based exclusively upon the standing of its individual members: the tribe simply raises claims that its members could raise individually, and essentially stands in the same position as they would had they brought the action collectively. The governmental entity must raise claims which affect all its members, not just a select few. See Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Indep. School Dist., 817 F.Supp. 1319, 1328 (E.D.Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>). Nothing in the pleadings and little in the Holdings: 0: holding that the term indian tribe under the ada is broad enough to encompass a school board a nonprofit state corporation where the tribe used the board to manage a tribal school 1: holding that a tribes bare interest in the safety of its members cannot satisfy the second exception 2: holding tribes were not suing in its parens patriae capacity when they challenged the school district because tribe was not representing interests of all its members in challenging restriction 3: holding that the district court may exercise jurisdiction over an indian tribe when the tribe is engaged in activity off of the reservation as an unincorporated association registered and authorized to do business in this state and is sued in that capacity for breach of a written contract 4: holding that waiver in a sue and be sued clause is limited to actions involving the corporate activities of the tribe and does not extend to actions of the tribe in its capacity as a political governing body", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "they present no argument that we have not already addressed. 41 . The class-certification order\u2019s certification of the rule 42(b)(1)(A) class also mandates notice and sets forth opt-out provisions, 42 . To the extent LSRC\u2019s fifth issue contains other one-sentence complaints that we have not addressed elsewhere, these- complaints are waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant\u2019s brief to \"contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record\u201d); Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284-85 (Tex. 1994) (recognizing long-standing rule that error may be waived through inadequate briefing); Magana v. Citibank, N.A., 454 S.W.3d 667, 680-81 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Kinsel v. Holdings: 0: holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal 1: holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief 2: holding that where a party does not adequately brief an argument we need not address it on appeal 3: holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief 4: holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "class members nationwide would predominate over common ones, given the lack of a national market or a nationwide conspiracy. Appellants contend that they should not have been required to prove national market or nationwide conspiracy at the class certification stage because these are not required elements of their antitrust claims. Recovery under \u00a7 4 of the Clayton Act, however, requires proof of antitrust impact, which in turn requires proof of the relevant market. Ala. v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir.1978) (\u201cwe do not understand how the plaintiffs can make this proof [of anti-trust impact] without examining the relevant school bus market where each individual plaintiff is located\u201d); see Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Comms., 435 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., Holdings: 0: holding that market participant socal edison is in privity with the california power exchange corporation not with other market participants 1: holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2 2: recognizing implied duty to market 3: holding that a plaintiff claiming monopolization is obligated to establish the relevant market because the power to control prices or exclude competition only makes sense with reference to a particular market 4: holding that to pose a threat to monopolization one firm alone must have the power to control market output and exclude competition", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the debtor and for the description of the collateral, which identifies EAI of NC as the debtor and put[s] third parties on inquiry notice to read the attached Security Agreement.\u201d Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in the bankruptcy court, 4-5. {\u00b6 16} Plaintiff further contended that \u201c[i]n this case, any third party inquiring as to liens against the EAI entity intended would be \u2018fairly put on notice that there might be an outstanding lien\u2019 against EAI of NC as a result of the Financing Statements listing EAI as the debtor and referring to the attached Security Agreement for the signature of the debtor and the description of the collateral, clearly setting forth EAI of NC as the debtor.\u201d (Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in bankruptcy 96), 194 B.R. 23, 29 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 617 (<HOLDING>); and In re Platt (E.D.Pa.1966), 257 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding a financing statement which incorrectly listed mines company inc as opposed to mines tire company inc to be sufficient 1: holding statement of points in notice of appeal sufficient 2: holding a company which is responsible for tendering into the market a drug which it knows or should know is so dangerous that it should not be taken by anyone can be said to have violated its duty of care either in design or marketing 3: holding that where the appellants listed challenges in the statement of issues but failed to brief them the challenges were waived 4: holding an issue listed in statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in brief is abandoned", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}