question
stringlengths 1
6.54k
| subject
stringclasses 1
value | choices
sequence | answer
class label 4
classes |
---|---|---|---|
Passenger is suing Defendant for injuries suffered in the crash of a small airplane, alleging that Defendant had owned the plane and negligently failed to have it properly maintained. Defendant has asserted in defense that he never owned the plane or had any responsibility to maintain it. At trial, Passenger calls Witness to testify that Witness had sold to Defendant a liability insurance policy on the plane. The testimony of Witness is | [
"inadmissible, because the policy itself is required under the original document rule. ",
"inadmissible, because of the rule against proof of insurance where insurance is not itself at issue. ",
"admissible to show that Defendant had little motivation to invest money in maintenance of the airplane.",
"admissible as some evidence of Defendant's ownership of or responsibility for the airplane."
] | 3D
|
|
Opal owned several vacant lots in ABC Subdivision. She obtained a $50,000 loan from a lender, Bank, and executed and delivered to Bank a promissory note and mortgage describing Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The mortgage was promptly and properly recorded. Upon payment of $10,000, Opal obtained a release of Lot 2 duly executed by Bank. She altered the instrument of release to include Lot 5 as well as Lot 2 and recorded it. Opal thereafter sold Lot 5 to Eva, an innocent purchaser, for value. Bank discovered that the instrument of release had been altered and brought an appropriate action against Opal and Eva to set aside the release as it applied to Lot 5. Opal did not defend against the action, but Eva did. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record." The court should rule for | [
"Eva, because Bank was negligent in failing to check the recordation of the release. ",
"Eva, because she was entitled to rely on the recorded release. ",
"Bank, because Eva could have discovered the alteration by reasonable inquiry. ",
"Bank, because the alteration of the release was ineffective. "
] | 3D
|
|
Jones, a marijuana farmer, had been missing for several months. The sheriff's department received an anonymous tip that Miller, a rival marijuana farmer, had buried Jones in a hillside about 200 yards from Miller's farmhouse. Sheriff's deputies went to Miller's farm. They cut the barbed wire that surrounded the hillside and entered, looking for the grave. They also searched the adjacent fields on Miller's farm that were within the area enclosed by the barbed wire and discovered clothing that belonged to Jones hanging on a scarecrow. Miller observed their discovery and began shooting. The deputies returned the fire. Miller dashed to his pickup truck to escape. Unable to start the truck, he fled across a field toward the barn. A deputy tackled him just as he entered the barn. As Miller attempted to get up, the deputy pinned his arms behind his back. Another deputy threatened, "Tell us what you did with Jones or we will shut you down and see your family on relief." Miller responded that he had killed Jones in a fight but did not report the incident because he did not want authorities to enter his land and discover his marijuana crop. Instead, he buried him behind the barn. Miller was thereafter charged with murder. If Miller moves to suppress his admission about killing his neighbor, the court should | [
"grant the motion, because Miller did not voluntarily waive his right to silence. ",
"grant the motion, because the statement was the product of the warrantless entry and search of Miller's farm. ",
"deny the motion, because the deputy was in hot pursuit when he questioned Miller. ",
"deny the motion, because Miller was questioned during a police emergency search. "
] | 0A
|
|
Jones, a marijuana farmer, had been missing for several months. The sheriff's department received an anonymous tip that Miller, a rival marijuana farmer, had buried Jones in a hillside about 200 yards from Miller's farmhouse. Sheriff's deputies went to Miller's farm. They cut the barbed wire that surrounded the hillside and entered, looking for the grave. They also searched the adjacent fields on Miller's farm that were within the area enclosed by the barbed wire and discovered clothing that belonged to Jones hanging on a scarecrow. Miller observed their discovery and began shooting. The deputies returned the fire. Miller dashed to his pickup truck to escape. Unable to start the truck, he fled across a field toward the barn. A deputy tackled him just as he entered the barn. As Miller attempted to get up, the deputy pinned his arms behind his back. Another deputy threatened, "Tell us what you did with Jones or we will shut you down and see your family on relief." Miller responded that he had killed Jones in a fight but did not report the incident because he did not want authorities to enter his land and discover his marijuana crop. Instead, he buried him behind the barn. Miller was thereafter charged with murder. If Miller moves to exclude the introduction of Jones's clothing into evidence, the court should | [
"grant the motion, because the deputies had not obtained a warrant. ",
"grant the motion, because the deputies' conduct in its entirety violated Miller's right to due process of law. ",
"deny the motion, because Miller had no expectation of privacy in the fields around his farmhouse. ",
"deny the motion, because the clothing was not Miller's property."
] | 2C
|
|
Passenger departed on an ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage due to predicted storms. The ocean liner was not equipped with the type of lifeboats required by the applicable statute. Passenger was swept overboard and drowned in a storm so heavy that even a lifeboat that conformed to the statute could not have been launched. In an action against the operator of the ocean liner brought by Passenger's representative, will Passenger's representative prevail? | [
"Yes, because the ocean liner was not equipped with the statutorily required lifeboats. ",
"Yes, because in these circumstances common carriers are strictly liable. ",
"No, because the storm was so severe that it would have been impossible to launch a statutorily required lifeboat. ",
"No, because Passenger assumed the risk by boarding the ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage. "
] | 2C
|
|
The King City zoning ordinance contains provisions restricting places of "adult entertainment" to two specified city blocks within the commercial center of the city. These provisions of the ordinance define "adult entertainment" as "live or filmed nudity or sexual activity, real or simulated, of an indecent nature." Sam proposes to operate an adult entertainment establishment outside the twoblock area zoned for such establishments but within the commercial center of King City. When his application for permission to do so is rejected solely because it is inconsistent with provisions of the zoning ordinance, he sues the appropriate officials of King City, seeking to enjoin them from enforcing the adult entertainment provisions of the ordinance against him. He asserts that these provisions of the ordinance violate the First Amendment as made applicable to King City by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the court hearing Sam's request for an injunction would probably hold that the adult entertainment provisions of the King City zoning ordinance are | [
"constitutional, because they do not prohibit adult entertainment everywhere in King City, and the city has a substantial interest in keeping the major part of its commercial center free of uses it considers harmful to that area. ",
"constitutional, because adult entertainment of the kind described in these provisions of the King City ordinance is not protected by the free speech guarantee of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ",
"unconstitutional, because they prohibit in the commercial area of the city adult entertainment that is not \"obscene\" within the meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ",
"unconstitutional, because zoning ordinances that restrict freedom of speech may be justified only by a substantial interest in preserving the quality of a community's residential neighborhoods."
] | 0A
|
|
On June 1, Seller and Buyer contracted in writing for the sale and purchase of Seller's cattle ranch (a large single tract), and to close the transaction on December 1. Assume the following facts. On October 1, Buyer told Seller, "I'm increasingly unhappy about our June 1 contract because of the current cattle market, and do not intend to buy your ranch unless I'm legally obligated to do so." If Seller sues Buyer on October 15 for breach of contract, Seller will probably | [
"win, because Buyer committed a total breach by anticipatory repudiation on October 1. ",
"win, because Buyer's October 1 statement created reasonable grounds for Seller's insecurity with respect to Buyer's performance. ",
"lose, because the parties contracted for the sale and conveyance of a single tract, and Seller cannot bring suit for breach of such a contract prior to the agreed closing date. ",
"lose, because Buyer's October 1 statement to Seller was neither a repudiation nor a present breach of the June 1 contract. "
] | 3D
|
|
On June 1, Seller and Buyer contracted in writing for the sale and purchase of Seller's cattle ranch (a large single tract), and to close the transaction on December 1. Assume the following facts. Buyer unequivocally repudiated the contract on August 1. On August 15, Seller urged Buyer to change her mind and proceed with the scheduled closing on December 1. On October 1, having heard nothing further from Buyer, Seller sold and conveyed his ranch to Rancher without notice to Buyer. On December 1, Buyer attempted to close under the June 1 contract by tendering the full purchase price to Seller. Seller rejected the tender. If Buyer sues Seller for breach of contract, Buyer will probably | [
"win, because Seller failed seasonably to notify Buyer of any pending sale to Rancher. ",
"win, because Seller waived Buyer's August 1 repudiation by urging her to retract it on August 15. ",
"lose, because Buyer did not retract her repudiation before Seller materially changed his position in reliance thereon by selling the ranch to Rancher. ",
"lose, because acceptance of the purchase price by Seller was a concurrent condition to Seller's obligation to convey the ranch to Buyer on December 1."
] | 2C
|
|
Owner owned a hotel, subject to a mortgage securing a debt Owner owed to Lender One. Owner later acquired a nearby parking garage, financing a part of the purchase price by a loan from Lender Two, secured by a mortgage on the parking garage. Two years thereafter, Owner defaulted on the loan owed to Lender One, which caused the full amount of that loan to become immediately due and payable. Lender One decided not to foreclose the mortgage on Owner's hotel at that time, but instead brought an action, appropriate under the laws of the jurisdiction and authorized by the mortgage loan documents, for the full amount of the defaulted loan. Lender One obtained and properly filed a judgment for that amount. A statute of the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered." There is no other applicable statute, except the statute providing for judicial foreclosure of mortgages, which places no restriction on deficiency judgments. Lender One later brought an appropriate action for judicial foreclosure of its first mortgage on the hotel and of its judgment lien on the parking garage. Lender Two was joined as a party defendant, and appropriately counterclaimed for foreclosure of its mortgage on the parking garage, which was also in default. All procedures were properly followed and the confirmed foreclosure sales resulted as follows: Lender One purchased the hotel for $100,000 less than its mortgage balance. Lender One purchased the parking garage for an amount that is $200,000 in excess of Lender Two's mortgage balance. The $200,000 surplus arising from the bid paid by Lender One for the parking garage should be paid | [
"$100,000 to Lender One and $100,000 to Owner. ",
"$100,000 to Lender Two and $100,000 to Owner. ",
"$100,000 to Lender One and $100,000 to Lender Two. ",
"$200,000 to Owner."
] | 0A
|
|
Kontractor agreed to build a power plant for a public utility. Subbo agreed with Kontractor to lay the foundation for $200,000. Subbo supplied goods and services worth $150,000, for which Kontractor made progress payments aggregating $100,000 as required by the subcontract. Subbo then breached by refusing unjustifiably to perform further. Kontractor reasonably spent $120,000 to have the work completed by another subcontractor. Subbo sues Kontractor for the reasonable value of benefits conferred, and Kontractor counterclaims for breach of contract. Which of the following should be the court's decision? | [
"Subbo recovers $50,000, the benefit conferred on Kontractor for which Subbo has not been paid. ",
"Subbo recovers $30,000, the benefit Subbo conferred on Kontractor minus the $20,000 in damages incurred by Kontractor. ",
"Kontractor recovers $20,000, the excess over the contract price that was paid by Kontractor for the performance it had bargained to receive from Subbo. ",
"Neither party recovers anything, because Subbo committed a material, unexcused breach and Kontractor received a $50,000 benefit from Subbo for which Subbo has not been paid. "
] | 2C
|
|
The Rapido is a sports car manufactured by the Rapido Motor Co. The Rapido has an excellent reputation for mechanical reliability with one exception, that the motor may stall if the engine has not had an extended warm-up. Driver had just begun to drive her Rapido in city traffic without a warm-up when the engine suddenly stalled. A car driven by Troody rearended Driver's car. Driver suffered no external physical injuries as a result of the collision. However, the shock of the crash caused her to suffer a severe heart attack. Driver brought an action against the Rapido Motor Co. based on strict liability in tort. During the trial, the plaintiff presented evidence of an alternative engine design of equal cost that would eliminate the stalling problem without impairing the functions of the engine in any way. The defendant moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence. This motion should be | [
"denied, because the jury could find that an unreasonably dangerous defect in the engine was a proximate cause of the collision. ",
"denied, if the jury could find that the Rapido was not crashworthy. ",
"granted, because Troody's failure to stop within an assured clear distance was a superseding cause of the collision. ",
"granted, if a person of normal sensitivity would not have suffered a heart attack under these circumstances."
] | 0A
|
|
Pedestrian died from injuries caused when Driver's car struck him. Executor, Pedestrian's executor, sued Driver for wrongful death. At trial, Executor calls Nurse to testify that two days after the accident, Pedestrian said to Nurse, "The car that hit me ran the red light." Fifteen minutes thereafter, Pedestrian died. As a foundation for introducing evidence of Pedestrian's statement, Executor offers to the court Doctor's affidavit that Doctor was the intern on duty the day of Pedestrian's death and that several times that day Pedestrian had said that he knew he was about to die. Is the affidavit properly considered by the court in ruling on the admissibility of Pedestrian's statement? | [
"No, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"No, because it is irrelevant since dying declarations cannot be used except in prosecutions for homicide. ",
"Yes, because, though hearsay, it is a statement of then-existing mental condition. ",
"Yes, because the judge may consider hearsay in ruling on preliminary questions. "
] | 3D
|
|
John is a licensed barber in State A. The State A barber licensing statute provides that the Barber Licensing Board may revoke a barber license if it finds that a licensee has used his or her business premises for an illegal purpose. John was arrested by federal narcotics enforcement agents on a charge of selling cocaine in his barbershop in violation of federal laws. However, the local United States Attorney declined to prosecute and the charges were dropped. Nevertheless, the Barber Licensing Board commenced a proceeding against John to revoke his license on the ground that John used his business premises for illegal sales of cocaine. At a subsequent hearing before the board, the only evidence against John was affidavits by unnamed informants, who were not present or available for cross-examination. Their affidavits stated that they purchased cocaine from John in his barbershop. Based solely on this evidence, the board found that John used his business premises for an illegal purpose and ordered his license revoked. In a suit by John to have this revocation set aside, his best constitutional argument is that | [
"John's inability to cross-examine his accusers denied him a fair hearing and caused him to be deprived of his barber license without due process of law.",
"the administrative license revocation proceeding was invalid, because it denied full faith and credit to the dismissal of the criminal charges by the United States Attorney. ",
"Article III requires a penalty of the kind imposed on John to be imposed by a court rather than an administrative agency.",
"the existence of federal laws penalizing the illegal sale of cocaine preempts state action relating to drug trafficking of the kind involved in John's case."
] | 0A
|
|
Driver was driving his car near Owner's house when Owner's child darted into the street in front of Driver's car. As Driver swerved and braked his car to avoid hitting the child, the car skidded up into Owner's driveway and stopped just short of Owner, who was standing in the driveway and had witnessed the entire incident. Owner suffered serious emotional distress from witnessing the danger to his child and to himself. Neither Owner nor his property was physically harmed. If Owner asserts a claim for damages against Driver, will Owner prevail? | [
"Yes, because Driver's entry onto Owner's land was unauthorized. ",
"Yes, because Owner suffered serious emotional distress by witnessing the danger to his child and to himself. ",
"No, unless Driver was negligent. ",
"No, unless Owner's child was exercising reasonable care. "
] | 2C
|
|
Vendor owned Greenacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. Vendor entered into a valid written agreement with Purchaser under which Vendor agreed to sell and Purchaser agreed to buy Greenacre by installment purchase. The contract stipulated that Vendor would deliver to Purchaser, upon the payment of the last installment due, "a warranty deed sufficient to convey the fee simple." The contract contained no other provision that could be construed as referring to title. Purchaser entered into possession of Greenacre. After making 10 of the 300 installment payments obligated under the contract, Purchaser discovered that there was outstanding a valid and enforceable mortgage on Greenacre, securing the payment of a debt in the amount of 25% of the purchase price Purchaser had agreed to pay. There was no evidence that Vendor had ever been late in payments due under the mortgage and there was no evidence of any danger of insolvency of Vendor. The value of Greenacre now is four times the amount due on the debt secured by the mortgage. Purchaser quit possession of Greenacre and demanded that Vendor repay the amounts Purchaser had paid under the contract. After Vendor refused the demand, Purchaser brought an appropriate action against Vendor to recover damages for Vendor's alleged breach of the contract. In such action, should damages be awarded to Purchaser? | [
"No, because the time for Vendor to deliver marketable title has not arrived. ",
"No, because Purchaser assumed the risk by taking possession. ",
"Yes, because in the absence of a contrary express agreement, an obligation to convey marketable title is implied. ",
"Yes, because the risk of loss assumed by Purchaser in taking possession relates only to physical loss."
] | 0A
|
|
The state of Red sent three of its employees to a city located in the state of Blue to consult with a chemical laboratory there about matters of state business. While in the course of their employment, the three employees of Red negligently released into local Blue waterways some of the chemical samples they had received from the laboratory in Blue. Persons in Blue injured by the release of the chemicals sued the three Red state employees and the state of Red in Blue state courts for the damages they suffered. After a trial in which all of the defendants admitted jurisdiction of the Blue state court and fully participated, plaintiffs received a judgment against all of the defendants for $5 million, which became final. Subsequently, plaintiffs sought to enforce their Blue state court judgment by commencing a proper proceeding in an appropriate court of Red. In that enforcement proceeding, the state of Red argued, as it had done unsuccessfully in the earlier action in Blue state court, that its liability is limited by a law of Red to $100,000 in any tort case. Because the three individual employees of Red are able to pay only $50,000 of the judgment, the only way the injured persons can fully satisfy their Blue state court judgment is from the funds of the state of Red. Can the injured persons recover the full balance of their Blue state court judgment from the state of Red in the enforcement proceeding they filed in a court of Red? | [
"Yes, because the final judgment of the Blue court is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of Red. ",
"Yes, because a limitation on damage awards against Red for tortious actions of its agents would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ",
"No, because the Tenth Amendment preserves the right of a state to have its courts enforce the state's public policy limiting its tort liability. ",
"No, because the employees of Red were negligent and, therefore, their actions were not authorized by the state of Red. "
] | 0A
|
|
Martha's high school teacher told her that she was going to receive a failing grade in history, which would prevent her from graduating. Furious, she reported to the principal that the teacher had fondled her, and the teacher was fired. A year later, still unable to get work because of the scandal, the teacher committed suicide. Martha, remorseful, confessed that her accusation had been false. If Martha is charged with manslaughter, her best defense would be that she | [
"committed no act that proximately caused the teacher's death.",
"did not intend to cause the teacher's death.",
"did not act with malice.",
"acted under extreme emotional distress."
] | 0A
|
|
Plaintiff sued Defendant for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. Which of the following would be ERROR? | [
"The judge allows Defendant's attorney to ask Defendant questions on crossexamination that go well beyond the scope of direct examination by Plaintiff, who has been called as an adverse witness. ",
"The judge refuses to allow Defendant's attorney to cross-examine Defendant by leading questions.",
"The judge allows cross-examination about the credibility of a witness even though no question relating to credibility has been asked on direct examination.",
"The judge, despite Defendant's request for exclusion of witnesses, allows Plaintiff's eyewitness to remain in the courtroom after testifying, even though the eyewitness is expected to be recalled for further cross-examination."
] | 3D
|
|
Phil is suing Dennis for injuries suffered in an automobile collision. At trial Phil's first witness, Wanda, testified that, although she did not see the accident, she heard her friend Frank say just before the crash, "Look at the crazy way old Dennis is driving!" Dennis offers evidence to impeach Frank by asking Wanda, "Isn't it true that Frank beat up Dennis just the day before the collision?" The question is | [
"proper, because it tends to show the possible bias of Frank against Dennis. ",
"proper, because it tends to show Frank's character. ",
"improper, because Frank has no opportunity to explain or deny. ",
"improper, because impeachment cannot properly be by specific instances. "
] | 0A
|
|
Thirty years ago Able, the then-record owner of Greenacre, a lot contiguous to Blueacre, in fee simple, executed and delivered to Baker an instrument in writing which was denominated "Deed of Conveyance." In pertinent part it read, "Able does grant to Baker and her heirs and assigns a right-of-way for egress and ingress to Blueacre." If the quoted provision was sufficient to create an interest in land, the instrument met all other requirements for a valid grant. Baker held record title in fee simple to Blueacre, which adjoined Greenacre. Twelve years ago Charlie succeeded to Able's title in fee simple in Greenacre and seven years ago Dorcas succeeded to Baker's title in fee simple in Blueacre by a deed which made no mention of a right-of-way or driveway. At the time Dorcas took title, there existed a driveway across Greenacre which showed evidence that it had been used regularly to travel between Main Road, a public road, and Blueacre. Blueacre did have frontage on Side Road, another public road, but this means of access was seldom used because it was not as convenient to the dwelling situated on Blueacre as was Main Road. The driveway originally was established by Baker. Dorcas has regularly used the driveway since acquiring title. The period of time required to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is ten years. Six months ago Charlie notified Dorcas that Charlie planned to develop a portion of Greenacre as a residential subdivision and that Dorcas should cease any use of the driveway. After some negotiations, Charlie offered to permit Dorcas to construct another driveway to connect with the streets of the proposed subdivision. Dorcas declined this offer on the ground that travel from Blueacre to Main Road would be more circuitous. Dorcas brought an appropriate action against Charlie to obtain a definitive adjudication of the respective rights of Dorcas and Charlie. In such lawsuit Charlie relied upon the defense that the location of the easement created by the grant from Able to Baker was governed by reasonableness and that Charlie's proposed solution was reasonable. Charlie's defense should | [
"fail, because the location had been established by the acts of Baker and Able. ",
"fail, because the location of the easement had been fixed by prescription. ",
"prevail, because the reasonableness of Charlie's proposal was established by Dorcas's refusal to suggest any alternative location. ",
"prevail, because the servient owner is entitled to select the location of a right- of-way if the grant fails to identify its location."
] | 0A
|
|
Computers, Inc., contracted in writing with Bank to sell and deliver to Bank a mainframe computer using a new type of magnetic memory, then under development but not perfected by Computers, at a price substantially lower than that of a similar computer using current technology. The contract's delivery term was "F.O.B. Bank, on or before July 31." Assume that Computers tendered the computer to Bank on August 15, and that Bank rejected it because of the delay. If Computers sues Bank for breach of contract, which of the following facts, if proved, will best support a recovery by Computers? | [
"The delay did not materially harm Bank.",
"Computers believed, on the assumption that Bank was getting a \"super deal\" for its money, that Bank would not reject because of the late tender of delivery. ",
"Computers' delay in tender was caused by a truckers' strike.",
"A usage in the relevant trade allows computer sellers a 30-day leeway in a specified time of delivery, unless the usage is expressly negated by the contract. "
] | 3D
|
|
Computers, Inc., contracted in writing with Bank to sell and deliver to Bank a mainframe computer using a new type of magnetic memory, then under development but not perfected by Computers, at a price substantially lower than that of a similar computer using current technology. The contract's delivery term was "F.O.B. Bank, on or before July 31." Assume the following facts. After making the contract with Bank, Computers discovered that the new technology it intended to use was unreliable and that no computer manufacturer could yet build a reliable computer using that technology. Computers thereupon notified Bank that it was impossible for Computers or anyone else to build the contracted-for computer "in the present state of the art." If Bank sues Computers for failure to perform its computer contract, the court will probably decide the case in favor of | [
"Computers, because its performance of the contract was objectively impossible. ",
"Computers, because a contract to build a machine using technology under development imposes only a duty on the builder to use its best efforts to achieve the result contracted for. ",
"Bank, because the law of impossibility does not apply to merchants under the applicable law. ",
"Bank, because Computers assumed the risk, in the given circumstances, that the projected new technology would not work reliably. "
] | 3D
|
|
Defendant was charged with attempted murder of Victor in a sniping incident in which Defendant allegedly shot at Victor from ambush as Victor drove his car along an expressway. The prosecutor offers evidence that seven years earlier Defendant had fired a shotgun into a woman's home and that Defendant had once pointed a handgun at another driver while driving on the street. This evidence should be | [
"excluded, because such evidence can be elicited only during cross-examination. ",
"excluded, because it is improper character evidence. ",
"admitted as evidence of Defendant's propensity toward violence.",
"admitted as relevant evidence of Defendant's identity, plan, or motive."
] | 1B
|
|
Art, who owned Blackacre in fee simple, conveyed Blackacre to Bea by warranty deed. Celia, an adjoining owner, asserted title to Blackacre and brought an appropriate action against Bea to quiet title to Blackacre. Bea demanded that Art defend Bea's title under the deed's covenant of warranty, but Art refused. Bea then successfully defended at her own expense. Bea brought an appropriate action against Art to recover Bea's expenses incurred in defending against Celia's action to quiet title to Blackacre. In this action, the court should decide for | [
"Bea, because in effect it was Art's title that was challenged. ",
"Bea, because Art's deed to her included the covenant of warranty. ",
"Art, because the title Art conveyed was not defective. ",
"Art, because Celia may elect which of Art or Bea to sue. "
] | 2C
|
|
Alex contracted for expensive cable television service for a period of six months solely to view the televised trial of Clark, who was on trial for murder in a court of the state of Green. In the midst of the trial, the judge prohibited any further televising of Clark's trial because he concluded that the presence of television cameras was disruptive. Alex brought an action in a federal district court against the judge in Clark's case asking only for an injunction that would require the judge to resume the televising of Clark's trial. Alex alleged that the judge's order to stop the televising of Clark's trial deprived him of property his investment in cable television service without due process of law. Before Alex's case came to trial, Clark's criminal trial concluded in a conviction and sentencing. There do not appear to be any obvious errors in the proceeding that led to the result in Clark's case. After Clark's conviction and sentencing, the defendant in Alex's case moved to dismiss that suit. The most proper disposition of this motion by the federal court would be to | [
"defer action on the motion until after any appellate proceedings in Clark's case have concluded, because Clark might appeal, his conviction might be set aside, he might be tried again, and television cameras might be barred from the new trial. ",
"defer action on the motion until after the Green Supreme Court expresses a view on its proper disposition, because the state law of mootness governs suits in federal court when the federal case is inexorably intertwined with a state proceeding. ",
"grant the motion, because the subject matter of the controversy between Alex and the defendant has ceased to exist and there is no strong likelihood that it will be revived. ",
"deny the motion, because Alex has raised an important constitutional question whether his investment in cable service solely to view Clark's trial is property protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
] | 2C
|
|
Traveler was a passenger on a commercial aircraft owned and operated by Airline. The aircraft crashed into a mountain, killing everyone on board. The flying weather was good. Traveler's legal representative brought a wrongful death action against Airline. At trial, the legal representative offered no expert or other testimony as to the cause of the crash. On Airline's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the legal representative's case, the court should | [
"grant the motion, because the legal representative has offered no evidence as to the cause of the crash. ",
"grant the motion, because the legal representative has failed to offer evidence negating the possibility that the crash may have been caused by mechanical failure that Airline could not have prevented. ",
"deny the motion, because the jury may infer that the aircraft crashed due to Airline's negligence. ",
"deny the motion, because in the circumstances common carriers are strictly liable. "
] | 2C
|
|
Company wanted to expand the size of the building it owned that housed Company's supermarket by adding space for a coffeehouse. Company's building was located in the center of five acres of land owned by Company and devoted wholly to parking for its supermarket customers. City officials refused to grant a required building permit for the coffeehouse addition unless Company established in its store a child care center that would take up space at least equal to the size of the proposed coffeehouse addition, which was to be 20% of the existing building. This action of City officials was authorized by provisions of the applicable zoning ordinance. In a suit filed in state court against appropriate officials of City, Company challenged this child care center requirement solely on constitutional grounds. The lower court upheld the requirement even though City officials presented no evidence and made no findings to justify it other than a general assertion that there was a shortage of child care facilities in City. Company appealed. The court hearing the appeal should hold that the requirement imposed by City on the issuance of this building permit is | [
"constitutional, because the burden was on Company to demonstrate that there was no rational relationship between this requirement and a legitimate governmental interest, and Company could not do so because the requirement is reasonably related to improving the lives of families and children residing in City. ",
"constitutional, because the burden was on Company to demonstrate that this requirement was not necessary to vindicate a compelling governmental interest, and Company could not do so on these facts. ",
"unconstitutional, because the burden was on City to demonstrate that this requirement was necessary to vindicate a compelling governmental interest, and City failed to meet its burden under that standard. ",
"unconstitutional, because the burden was on City to demonstrate a rough proportionality between this requirement and the impact of Company's proposed action on the community, and City failed to do so."
] | 3D
|
|
Ollie owned a large tract of land known as Peterhill. During Ollie's lifetime, Ollie conveyed the easterly half (East Peterhill), situated in the municipality of Hawthorn, to Abel, and the westerly half (West Peterhill), situated in the municipality of Sycamore, to Betty. Each of the conveyances, which were promptly and properly recorded, contained the following language: The parties agree for themselves and their heirs and assigns that the premises herein conveyed shall be used only for residential purposes; that each lot created within the premises herein conveyed shall contain not less than five acres; and that each lot shall have not more than one single-family dwelling. This agreement shall bind all successor owners of all or any portion of Peterhill and any owner of any part of Peterhill may enforce this covenant. After Ollie's death, Abel desired to build houses on one-half acre lots in the East Peterhill tract as authorized by current applicable zoning and building codes in Hawthorn. The area surrounding East Peterhill in Hawthorn was developed as a residential community with homes built on one-half acre lots. West Peterhill was in a residential area covered by the Sycamore zoning code, which allowed residential development only on five-acre tracts of land. In an appropriate action brought by Betty to enjoin Abel's proposed construction on onehalf acre lots, the court will find the quoted restriction to be | [
"invalid, because of the change of circumstance in the neighborhood. ",
"invalid, because it conflicts with the applicable zoning code. ",
"valid, but only so long as the original grantees from Ollie own their respective tracts of Peterhill. ",
"valid, because the provision imposed an equitable servitude. "
] | 3D
|
|
At Defendant's murder trial, Defendant calls Witness as his first witness to testify that Defendant has a reputation in their community as a peaceable and truthful person. The prosecutor objects on the ground that Witness's testimony would constitute improper character evidence. The court should | [
"admit the testimony as to peaceableness, but exclude the testimony as to truthfulness. ",
"admit the testimony as to truthfulness, but exclude the testimony as to peaceableness. ",
"admit the testimony as to both character traits.",
"exclude the testimony as to both character traits."
] | 0A
|
|
The governor of the state of Green proposes to place a Christmas nativity scene, the components of which would be permanently donated to the state by private citizens, in the Green Capitol Building rotunda where the Green Legislature meets annually. The governor further proposes to display this stateowned nativity scene annually from December 1 to December 31, next to permanent displays that depict the various products manufactured in Green. The governor's proposal is supported by all members of both houses of the legislature. If challenged in a lawsuit on establishment clause grounds, the proposed nativity scene display would be held | [
"unconstitutional, because the components of the nativity scene would be owned by the state rather than by private persons. ",
"unconstitutional, because the nativity scene would not be displayed in a context that appeared to depict and commemorate the Christmas season as a primarily secular holiday. ",
"constitutional, because the components of the nativity scene would be donated to the state by private citizens rather than purchased with state funds. ",
"constitutional, because the nativity scene would be displayed alongside an exhibit of various products manufactured in Green. "
] | 1B
|
|
Two police officers in uniform were on foot patrol in a neighborhood frequented by drug sellers. They saw Sandra, who, when she saw them, turned around and started to walk quickly away. The police ran after her and shouted, "Stop and don't take another step, lady!" Sandra turned, looked at the police, and stopped. She put her arms up in the air. As the police approached, she threw a small object into nearby bushes. The police retrieved the object, which turned out to be a small bag of cocaine, and then arrested Sandra. Sandra is charged with possession of the cocaine. She moves pretrial to suppress its use as evidence on the ground that it was obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure. Her motion should be | [
"granted, because the police did not know the item was cocaine until after they had seized it. ",
"granted, because the police acquired the cocaine as the result of an unlawful seizure. ",
"denied, because the police had probable cause to seize the package. ",
"denied, because Sandra voluntarily discarded the contraband."
] | 1B
|
|
In a federal civil trial, Plaintiff wishes to establish that, in a state court, Defendant had been convicted of fraud, a fact that Defendant denies. Which mode of proof of the conviction is LEAST likely to be permitted? | [
"A certified copy of the judgment of conviction, offered as a selfauthenticating document. ",
"Testimony of Plaintiff, who was present at the time of the sentence. ",
"Testimony by a witness to whom Defendant made an oral admission that he had been convicted.",
"Judicial notice of the conviction, based on the court's telephone call to the clerk of the state court, whom the judge knows personally. "
] | 3D
|
|
Three years ago Adam conveyed Blackacre to Betty for $50,000 by a deed that provided: "By accepting this deed, Betty covenants for herself, her heirs and assigns, that the premises herein conveyed shall be used solely for residential purposes and, if the premises are used for nonresidential purposes, Adam, his heirs and assigns, shall have the right to repurchase the premises for the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000)." In order to pay the $50,000 purchase price for Blackacre, Betty obtained a $35,000 mortgage loan from the bank. Adam had full knowledge of the mortgage transaction. The deed and mortgage were promptly and properly recorded in proper sequence. The mortgage, however, made no reference to the quoted language in the deed. Two years ago Betty converted her use of Blackacre from residential to commercial without the knowledge or consent of Adam or of the bank. Betty's commercial venture failed, and Betty defaulted on her mortgage payments to the bank. Blackacre now has a fair market value of $25,000. The bank began appropriate foreclosure proceedings against Betty. Adam properly intervened, tendered $1,000, and sought judgment that Betty and the bank be ordered to convey Blackacre to Adam, free and clear of the mortgage. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified by statute. If the court rules against Adam, it will be because | [
"the provision quoted from the deed violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.",
"the Bank had no actual knowledge of, and did not consent to, the violation of the covenant. ",
"the rights reserved by Adam were subordinated, by necessary implication, to the rights of the bank as the lender of the purchase money. ",
"the consideration of $1,000 was inadequate."
] | 0A
|
|
Loyal, aged 60, who had no plans for early retirement, had worked for Mutate, Inc., for 20 years as a managerial employee-at-will when he had a conversation with the company's president, George Mutant, about Loyal's post- retirement goal of extensive travel around the United States. A month later, Mutant handed Loyal a written, signed resolution of the company's Board of Directors stating that when and if Loyal should decide to retire, at his option, the company, in recognition of his past service, would pay him a $2,000per-month lifetime pension. (The company had no regularized retirement plan for atwill employees.) Shortly thereafter, Loyal retired and immediately bought a $30,000 recreational vehicle for his planned travels. After receiving the promised $2,000 monthly pension from Mutate, Inc., for six months, Loyal, now unemployable elsewhere, received a letter from Mutate, Inc., advising him that the pension would cease immediately because of recessionary budget constraints affecting in varying degrees all managerial salaries and retirement pensions. In a suit against Mutate, Inc., for breach of contract, Loyal will probably | [
"win, because he retired from the company as bargained-for consideration for the Board's promise to him of a lifetime pension. ",
"win, because he timed his decision to retire and to buy the recreational vehicle in reasonable reliance on the Board's promise to him of a lifetime pension. ",
"lose, because the Board's promise to him of a lifetime pension was an unenforceable gift promise. ",
"lose, because he had been an employee- at-will throughout his active service with the company. "
] | 1B
|
|
Congress wishes to enact legislation prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of the affectional preference or sexual orientation of the potential purchaser or renter. Congress wishes this statute to apply to all public and private vendors and lessors of residential property in this country, with a few narrowly drawn exceptions. The most credible argument for congressional authority to enact such a statute would be based upon the | [
"general welfare clause of Article I, Section 8, because the conduct the statute prohibits could reasonably be deemed to be harmful to the national interest. ",
"commerce clause of Article I, Section 8, because, in inseverable aggregates, the sale or rental of almost all housing in this country could reasonably be deemed to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. ",
"enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, because that amendment clearly prohibits discrimination against the class of persons protected by this statute. ",
"enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because that amendment prohibits all public and private actors from engaging in irrational discrimination."
] | 1B
|
|
Because of Farmer's default on his loan, the bank foreclosed on the farm and equipment that secured the loan. Among the items sold at the resulting auction was a new tractor recently delivered to Farmer by the retailer. Shortly after purchasing the tractor at the auction, Pratt was negligently operating the tractor on a hill when it rolled over due to a defect in the tractor's design. He was injured as a result. Pratt sued the auctioneer, alleging strict liability in tort. The jurisdiction has not adopted a comparative fault rule in strict liability cases. In this suit, the result should be for the | [
"plaintiff, because the defendant sold a defective product that injured the plaintiff. ",
"plaintiff, if the defendant failed to inspect the tractor for defects prior to sale. ",
"defendant, because he should not be considered a \"seller\" for purposes of strict liability in tort. ",
"defendant, because the accident was caused in part by Pratt's negligence. "
] | 2C
|
|
In exchange for a valid and sufficient consideration, Goodbar orally promised Walker, who had no car and wanted a minivan, "to pay to anyone from whom you buy a minivan within the next six months the full purchase-price thereof." Two months later, Walker bought a used minivan on credit from Minivanity Fair, Inc., for $8,000. At the time, Minivanity Fair was unaware of Goodbar's earlier promise to Walker, but learned of it shortly after the sale. Can Minivanity Fair enforce Goodbar's promise to Walker? | [
"Yes, under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. ",
"Yes, because Minivanity Fair is an intended beneficiary of the GoodbarWalker contract. ",
"No, because Goodbar's promise to Walker is unenforceable under the suretyship clause of the statute of frauds. ",
"No, because Minivanity Fair was neither identified when Goodbar's promise was made nor aware of it when the minivansale was made."
] | 1B
|
|
Plaintiff sued Defendant for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. During Plaintiff's hospital stay, Doctor, a staff physician, examined Plaintiff's X rays and said to Plaintiff, "You have a fracture of two vertebrae, C4 and C5." Intern, who was accompanying Doctor on her rounds, immediately wrote the diagnosis on Plaintiff's hospital record. At trial, the hospital records custodian testifies that Plaintiff's hospital record was made and kept in the ordinary course of the hospital's business. The entry reporting Doctor's diagnosis is | [
"inadmissible, because no foundation has been laid for Doctor's competence as an expert. ",
"inadmissible, because Doctor's opinion is based upon data that are not in evidence. ",
"admissible as a statement of then existing physical condition.",
"admissible as a record of regularly conducted business activity."
] | 3D
|
|
A city owns and operates a large public auditorium. It leases the auditorium to any group that wishes to use it for a meeting, lecture, concert, or contest. Each user must post a damage deposit and pay rent, which is calculated only for the actual time the building is used by the lessee. Reservations are made on a first-come, first-served basis. A private organization that permits only males to serve in its highest offices rented the auditorium for its national convention. The organization planned to install its new officers at that convention. It broadly publicized the event, inviting members of the general public to attend the installation ceremony at the city auditorium. No statute or administrative rule prohibits the organization from restricting its highest offices to men. An appropriate plaintiff sues the private organization seeking to enjoin it from using the city auditorium for the installation of its new officers. The sole claim of the plaintiff is that the use of this auditorium by the organization for the installation ceremony is unconstitutional because the organization disqualifies women from serving in its highest offices. Will the plaintiff prevail? | [
"Yes, because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits such an organization from discriminating against women in any of its activities to which it has invited members of the general public. ",
"Yes, because the organization's use of the city auditorium for this purpose subjects its conduct to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. ",
"No, because the freedom of association protected by the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the city from interfering in any way with the organization's use of city facilities. ",
"No, because this organization is not a state actor and, therefore, its activities are not subject to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."
] | 3D
|
|
Adam owns Townacres in fee simple, and Bess owns the adjoining Greenacres in fee simple. Adam has kept the lawns and trees on Townacres trimmed and neat. Bess "lets nature take its course" at Greenacres. The result on Greenacres is a tangle of underbrush, fallen trees, and standing trees that are in danger of losing limbs. Many of the trees on Greenacres are near Townacres. In the past, debris and large limbs have been blown from Greenacres onto Townacres. By local standards Greenacres is an eyesore that depresses market values of real property in the vicinity, but the condition of Greenacres violates no applicable laws or ordinances. Adam demanded that Bess keep the trees near Townacres trimmed. Bess refused. Adam brought an appropriate action against Bess to require Bess to abate what Adam alleges to be a nuisance. In the lawsuit, the only issue is whether the condition of Greenacres constitutes a nuisance. The strongest argument that Adam can present is that the condition of Greenacres | [
"has an adverse impact on real estate values.",
"poses a danger to the occupants of Townacres.",
"violates community aesthetic standards.",
"cannot otherwise be challenged under any law or ordinance."
] | 1B
|
|
Breeder bought a two-month-old registered boar at auction from Pigstyle for $800. No express warranty was made. Fifteen months later, tests by experts proved conclusively that the boar had been born incurably sterile. If this had been known at the time of the sale, the boar would have been worth no more than $100. In an action by Breeder against Pigstyle to avoid the contract and recover the price paid, the parties stipulate that, as both were and had been aware, the minimum age at which the fertility of a boar can be determined is about 12 months. Which of the following will the court probably decide? | [
"Breeder wins, because the parties were mutually mistaken as to the boar's fertility when they made the agreement. ",
"Breeder wins, because Pigstyle impliedly warranted that the boar was fit for breeding. ",
"Pigstyle wins, because Breeder assumed the risk of the boar's sterility. ",
"Pigstyle wins, because any mistake involved was unilateral, not mutual."
] | 2C
|
|
Homeowner owns a house on a lake. Neighbor owns a house across a driveway from Homeowner's property. Neighbor's house sits on a hill and Neighbor can see the lake from his living room window. Homeowner and Neighbor got into an argument and Homeowner erected a large spotlight on his property that automatically comes on at dusk and goes off at sunrise. The only reason Homeowner installed the light was to annoy Neighbor. The glare from the light severely detracts from Neighbor's view of the lake. In a suit by Neighbor against Homeowner, will Neighbor prevail? | [
"Yes, because Homeowner installed the light solely to annoy Neighbor. ",
"Yes, if, and only if, Neighbor's property value is adversely affected. ",
"No, because Neighbor's view of the lake is not always obstructed. ",
"No, if the spotlight provides added security to Homeowner's property. "
] | 0A
|
|
On May 1, 1987, a car driven by Debra struck Peggy, a pedestrian. On July 1, 1987, with regard to this incident, Debra pleaded guilty to reckless driving (a misdemeanor) and was sentenced to 30 days in jail and a fine of $1,000. She served the sentence and paid the fine. On April 1, 1988, Peggy died as a result of the injuries she suffered in the accident. On March 1, 1991, a grand jury indicted Debra on a charge of manslaughter of Peggy. On May 15, 1991, trial had not begun and Debra filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of double jeopardy in that her conviction of reckless driving arose out of the same incident, and on the ground that the three-year statute of limitations for manslaughter had run. Debra's motion should be | [
"granted only on double jeopardy grounds.",
"granted only on statute of limitations grounds.",
"granted on either double jeopardy grounds or statute of limitations grounds.",
"denied on both grounds."
] | 3D
|
|
Defendant is on trial for participating in a drug sale. The prosecution calls Witness, an undercover officer, to testify that, when Seller sold the drugs to Witness, Seller introduced Defendant to Witness as "my partner in this" and Defendant shook hands with Witness but said nothing. Witness's testimony is | [
"inadmissible, because there is no evidence that Seller was authorized to speak for Defendant. ",
"inadmissible, because the statement of Seller is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"admissible as a statement against Defendant's penal interest.",
"admissible as Defendant's adoption of Seller's statement."
] | 3D
|
|
State Y has a state employee grievance system that requires any state employee who wishes to file a grievance against the state to submit that grievance for final resolution to a panel of three arbitrators chosen by the parties from a statewide board of 13 arbitrators. In any given case, the grievant and the state alternate in exercising the right of each party to eliminate five members of the board, leaving a panel of three members to decide their case. At the present time, the full board is composed of seven male arbitrators and six female arbitrators. Ellen, a female state employee, filed a sexual harassment grievance against her male supervisor and the state. Anne, the state's attorney, exercised all of her five strikes to eliminate five of the female arbitrators. At the time she did so, Anne stated that she struck the five female arbitrators solely because she believed women, as a group, would necessarily be biased in favor of another woman who was claiming sexual harassment. Counsel for Ellen eliminated four males and one female arbitrator, all solely on grounds of specific bias or conflicts of interest. As a result, the panel was all male. When the panel ruled against Ellen on the merits of her case, she filed an action in an appropriate state court, challenging the panel selection process as a gender-based denial of equal protection of the laws. In this case, the court should hold that the panel selection process is | [
"unconstitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorney in this case does not satisfy the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. ",
"unconstitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorney in this case denies the grievant the right to a jury made up of her peers. ",
"constitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorney in this case satisfies the requirements of the strict scrutiny test. ",
"constitutional, because the gender classification used by the state's attorney in this case satisfies the requirements of the rational basis test."
] | 0A
|
|
Theresa owned Blueacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. Theresa wrote and executed, with the required formalities, a will that devised Blueacre to "my daughter, Della, for life with remainder to my descendants per stirpes." At the time of writing the will, Theresa had a husband and no descendants living other than her two children, Della and Seth. Theresa died and the will was duly admitted to probate. Theresa's husband predeceased her. Theresa was survived by Della, Seth, four grandchildren, and one great-grandchild. Della and Seth were Theresa's sole heirs at law. Della and Seth brought an appropriate action for declaratory judgment as to title of Blueacre. Guardians ad litem were appointed and all other steps were taken so that the judgment would bind all persons interested whether born or unborn. In that action, if the court rules that Della has a life estate in the whole of Blueacre and that the remainder is contingent, it will be because the court chose one of several possible constructions and that the chosen construction | [
"related all vesting to the time of writing of the will.",
"related all vesting to the death of Theresa.",
"implied a condition that remaindermen survive Della.",
"implied a gift of a life estate to Seth."
] | 2C
|
|
Driver negligently drove his car into Pedestrian, breaking her leg. Pedestrian's leg was put in a cast, and she used crutches to get about. While shopping at Market, her local supermarket, Pedestrian nonnegligently placed one of her crutches on a banana peel that had been negligently left on the floor by the manager of Market's produce department. Pedestrian's crutch slipped on the peel, and she fell to the floor, breaking her arm. Had Pedestrian stepped on the banana peel at a time when she did not have to use crutches, she would have regained her balance. Pedestrian sued Driver and Market for her injuries. Pedestrian will be able to recover from | [
"Driver, for her broken leg only. ",
"Driver, for both of her injuries. ",
"Market, for both of her injuries. ",
"Driver, for her broken leg only, and Market, for her broken arm only. "
] | 1B
|
|
FBI agents, without a warrant and without permission of Mexican law enforcement or judicial officers, entered Mexico, kidnapped Steven, an American citizen wanted in the United States for drug smuggling violations, and forcibly drove him back to Texas. Thereafter, the agents, again without a warrant, broke into the Texas home of Joan, wanted as a confederate of Steven, and arrested her. Steven and Joan were both indicted for narcotics violations. Both moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that their arrests violated the Fourth Amendment. The court should | [
"grant the motions of both Steven and Joan.",
"grant the motion of Steven and deny the motion of Joan.",
"grant the motion of Joan and deny the motion of Steven.",
"deny the motions of both Steven and Joan."
] | 3D
|
|
Gourmet purchased the front portion of the land needed for a restaurant he desired to build and operate, but the back portion was the subject of a will dispute between Hope and Faith (two sisters). Hope's attorney advised her that her claim was doubtful. Gourmet, knowing only that the unresolved dispute existed, agreed in a signed writing to pay Hope $6,000, payable $1,000 annually, in exchange for a quitclaim deed (a deed containing no warranties) from Hope, who promptly executed such a deed to Gourmet and received Gourmet's first annual payment. Shortly thereafter, the probate court handed down a decision in Faith's favor, ruling that Hope had no interest in the land. This decision has become final. Gourmet subsequently defaulted when his second annual installment came due. In an action against Gourmet for breach of contract, Hope will probably | [
"lose, because she was aware at the time of the agreement with Gourmet that her claim to the property quitclaimed was doubtful. ",
"lose, because Hope suffered no legal detriment in executing the quitclaim deed. ",
"win, because Gourmet bargained for and received in exchange a quitclaim deed from Hope. ",
"win, because Gourmet, by paying the first $1,000 installment, is estopped to deny that his agreement with Hope is an enforceable contract."
] | 2C
|
|
Athlete, a professional football player, signed a written consent for his team's physician, Doctor, to perform a knee operation. After Athlete was under a general anesthetic, Doctor asked Surgeon, a world famous orthopedic surgeon, to perform the operation. Surgeon's skills were superior to Doctor's, and the operation was successful. In an action for battery by Athlete against Surgeon, Athlete will | [
"prevail, because Athlete did not agree to allow Surgeon to perform the operation. ",
"prevail, because the consent form was in writing. ",
"not prevail, because Surgeon's skills were superior to Doctor's. ",
"not prevail, because the operation was successful. "
] | 0A
|
|
Senator makes a speech on the floor of the United States Senate in which she asserts that William, a federal civil servant with minor responsibilities, was twice convicted of fraud by the courts of State X. In making this assertion, Senator relied wholly on research done by Frank, her chief legislative assistant. In fact, it was a different man named William and not William the civil servant, who was convicted of these crimes in the state court proceedings. This mistake was the result of carelessness on Frank's part. No legislation affecting the appointment or discipline of civil servants or the program of the federal agency for which William works was under consideration at the time Senator made her speech about William on the floor of the Senate. William sues Senator and Frank for defamation. Both defendants move to dismiss the complaint. As a matter of constitutional law, the court hearing this motion should | [
"grant it as to Frank, because he is protected by the freedom of speech guarantee against defamation actions by government officials based on his mere carelessness; but deny it as to Senator, because, as an officer of the United States, she is a constituent part of the government and, therefore, has no freedom of speech rights in that capacity. ",
"grant it as to both defendants, because Senator is immune to suit for any speech she makes in the Senate under the speech or debate clause of Article I, Section 6, and Frank may assert Senator's immunity for his assistance to her in preparing the speech. ",
"deny it as to both defendants, because any immunity of Senator under the speech or debate clause does not attach to a speech that is not germane to pending legislative business, and Frank is entitled to no greater immunity than the legislator he was assisting. ",
"deny it as to Frank, because he is not a legislator protected by the speech or debate clause; but grant it as to Senator, because she is immune from suit for her speech by virtue of that clause."
] | 1B
|
|
Six years ago, Oscar, owner of Blackacre in fee simple, executed and delivered to Albert an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed, purporting to convey Blackacre to "Albert and his heirs." At that time, Albert was a widower who had one child, Donna. Three years ago, Albert executed and delivered to Bea an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed, purporting to convey Blackacre to "Bea." Donna did not join in the deed. Bea was and still is unmarried and childless. The only possibly applicable statute in the jurisdiction states that any deed will be construed to convey the grantor's entire estate, unless expressly limited. Last month, Albert died, never having remarried. Donna is his only heir. Blackacre is now owned by | [
"Donna, because Albert's death ended Bea's life estate pur autre vie. ",
"Bea in fee simple pursuant to Albert's deed.",
"Donna and Bea as tenants in common of equal shares.",
"Donna and Bea as joint tenants, because both survived Albert. "
] | 1B
|
|
Smart approached Johnson and inquired about hiring someone to kill his girlfriend's parents. Unknown to Smart, Johnson was an undercover police officer who pretended to agree to handle the job and secretly taped subsequent conversations with Smart concerning plans and payment. A few days before the payment was due, Smart changed his mind and called the plan off. Nevertheless, Smart was charged with solicitation to commit murder. Smart should be | [
"acquitted, because he withdrew before payment and commission of the act. ",
"acquitted, because no substantial acts were performed. ",
"convicted, because the offense was completed before his attempt to withdraw. ",
"convicted, because Johnson agreed to commit the offense."
] | 2C
|
|
Retailer, a dry goods retailer, telephoned Manufacturer, a towel manufacturer, and offered to buy for $5 each a minimum of 500 and a maximum of 1,000 large bath towels, to be delivered in 30 days. Manufacturer orally accepted this offer and promptly sent the following letter to Retailer, which Retailer received two days later: "This confirms our agreement today by telephone to sell you 500 large bath towels for 30-day delivery. /s/ Manufacturer." Twenty-eight days later, Manufacturer tendered to Retailer 1,000 (not 500) conforming bath towels, all of which Retailer rejected because it had found a better price term from another supplier. Because of a glut in the towel market, Manufacturer cannot resell the towels except at a loss. In a suit by Manufacturer against Retailer, which of the following will be the probable decision? | [
"Manufacturer can enforce a contract for 1,000 towels, because Retailer ordered and Manufacturer tendered that quantity. ",
"Manufacturer can enforce a contract for 500 towels, because Manufacturer's letter of confirmation stated that quantity term. ",
"There is no enforceable agreement, because Retailer never signed a writing. ",
"There is no enforceable agreement, because Manufacturer's letter of confirmation did not state a price term. "
] | 1B
|
|
Doctor, a resident of the city of Greenville in the state of Green, is a physician licensed to practice in both Green and the neighboring state of Red. Doctor finds that the most convenient place to treat her patients who need hospital care is in the publicly owned and operated Redville Municipal Hospital of the city of Redville in the state of Red, which is located just across the state line from Greenville. For many years Doctor had successfully treated her patients in that hospital. Early this year she was notified that she could no longer treat patients in the Redville hospital because she was not a resident of Red, and a newly adopted rule of Redville Municipal Hospital, which was adopted in conformance with all required procedures, stated that every physician who practices in that hospital must be a resident of Red. Which of the following constitutional provisions would be most helpful to Doctor in an action to challenge her exclusion from the Redville hospital solely on the basis of this hospital rule? | [
"The bill of attainder clause.",
"The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV.",
"The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"The ex post facto clause."
] | 1B
|
|
Martin, the owner in fee simple of Orchardacres, mortgaged Orchardacres to Marie to secure the payment of the loan she made to him. The loan was due at the end of the growing season of the year in which it was made. Martin maintained and operated an orchard on the land, which was his sole source of income. Halfway through the growing season, Martin experienced severe health and personal problems and, as a result, left the state; his whereabouts were unknown. Marie learned that no one was responsible for the cultivation and care of the orchard on Orchardacres. She undertook to provide, through employees, the care of the orchard and the harvest for the remainder of the growing season. The net profits were applied to the debt secured by the mortgage on Orchardacres. During the course of the harvest, Paul, a business invitee, was injured by reason of a fault in the equipment used. Under applicable tort case law, the owner of the premises would be liable for Paul's injuries. Paul brought an appropriate action against Marie to recover damages for the injuries suffered, relying on this aspect of tort law. In such lawsuit, judgment should be for | [
"Paul, if, but only if, the state is a title theory state, because in other jurisdictions a mortgagee has no title interest but only a lien. ",
"Paul, because Marie was a mortgagee in possession. ",
"Marie, because she acted as agent of the owner only to preserve her security interest. ",
"Marie, if, but only if, the mortgage expressly provided for her taking possession in the event of danger to her security interest. "
] | 1B
|
|
Actor, a well-known movie star, was drinking Vineyard wine at a nightclub. A bottle of the Vineyard wine, with its label plainly showing, was on the table in front of Actor. An amateur photographer asked Actor if he could take his picture and Actor said, "Yes." Subsequently, the photographer sold the photo to Vineyard. Vineyard, without Actor's consent, used the photo in a wine advertisement in a nationally circulated magazine. The caption below the photo stated, "Actor enjoys his Vineyard wine." If Actor sues Vineyard to recover damages as a result of Vineyard's use of the photograph, will Actor prevail? | [
"No, because Actor consented to being photographed. ",
"No, because Actor is a public figure. ",
"Yes, because Vineyard made commercial use of the photograph. ",
"Yes, unless Actor did, in fact, enjoy his Vineyard wine."
] | 2C
|
|
At Defendant's trial for sale of drugs, the government called Witness to testify, but Witness refused to answer any questions about Defendant and was held in contempt of court. The government then calls Officer to testify that, when Witness was arrested for possession of drugs and offered leniency if he would identify his source, Witness had named Defendant as his source. The testimony offered concerning Witness's identification of Defendant is | [
"admissible as a prior inconsistent statement by Witness.",
"admissible as an identification of Defendant by Witness after having perceived him.",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"inadmissible, because Witness was not confronted with the statement while on the stand. "
] | 2C
|
|
Buyer mailed a signed order to Seller that read: "Please ship us 10,000 widgets at your current price." Seller received the order on January 7 and that same day mailed to Buyer a properly stamped, addressed, and signed letter stating that the order was accepted at Seller's current price of $10 per widget. On January 8, before receipt of Seller's letter, Buyer telephoned Seller and said, "I hereby revoke my order." Seller protested to no avail. Buyer received Seller's letter on January 9. Because of Buyer's January 8 telephone message, Seller never shipped the goods. Under the relevant and prevailing rules, is there a contract between Buyer and Seller as of January 10? | [
"No, because the order was an offer that could be accepted only by shipping the goods; and the offer was effectively revoked before shipment. ",
"No, because Buyer never effectively agreed to the $10 price term. ",
"Yes, because the order was, for a reasonable time, an irrevocable offer. ",
"Yes, because the order was an offer that seller effectively accepted before Buyer attempted to revoke it."
] | 3D
|
|
As Seller, an encyclopedia salesman, approached the grounds on which Hermit's house was situated, he saw a sign that said, "No salesmen. Trespassers will be prosecuted. Proceed at your own risk." Although Seller had not been invited to enter, he ignored the sign and drove up the driveway toward the house. As he rounded a curve, a powerful explosive charge buried in the driveway exploded, and Seller was injured. Can Seller recover damages from Hermit for his injuries? | [
"Yes, if Hermit was responsible for the explosive charge under the driveway. ",
"Yes, unless Hermit, when he planted the charge, intended only to deter, not to harm, a possible intruder. ",
"No, because Seller ignored the sign, which warned him against proceeding further. ",
"No, if Hermit reasonably feared that intruders would come and harm him or his family. "
] | 0A
|
|
Adam owned Blackacre. Adam entered into a written three-year lease of Blackacre with Bertha. Among other provisions, the lease prohibited Bertha from "assigning this lease, in whole or in part, and from subletting Blackacre, in whole or in part." In addition to a house, a barn, and a one-car garage, Blackacre's 30 acres included several fields where first Adam, and now Bertha, grazed sheep. During the following months, Bertha: I. By a written agreement allowed her neighbor Charles exclusive use of the garage for storage, under lock and key, of his antique Packard automobile for two years, charging him $240. II. Told her neighbor Doris that Doris could use the fields to practice her golf as long as she did not disturb Bertha's sheep. Which, if any, of Bertha's actions constituted a violation of the lease? | [
"I only.",
"II only.",
"Both I and II.",
"Neither I nor II."
] | 0A
|
|
Defendant is charged with murder. The evidence shows that she pointed a gun at Victim and pulled the trigger. The gun discharged, killing Victim. The gun belonged to Victim. Defendant testifies that Victim told her, and she believed, that the "gun" was a stage prop that could fire only blanks, and that she fired the gun as part of rehearsing a play with Victim at his house. If the jury believes Defendant's testimony and finds that her mistaken belief that the gun was a prop was reasonable, they should find her | [
"guilty of murder.",
"guilty of manslaughter.",
"guilty of either murder or manslaughter.",
"not guilty of murder or manslaughter."
] | 3D
|
|
Del's sporting goods shop was burglarized by an escaped inmate from a nearby prison. The inmate stole a rifle and bullets from a locked cabinet. The burglar alarm at Del's shop did not go off because Del had negligently forgotten to activate the alarm's motion detector. Shortly thereafter, the inmate used the rifle and ammunition stolen from Del in a shooting spree that caused injury to several people, including Paula. If Paula sues Del for the injury she suffered, will Paula prevail? | [
"Yes, if Paula's injury would have been prevented had the motion detector been activated. ",
"Yes, because Del was negligent in failing to activate the motion detector. ",
"No, because the storage and sale of firearms and ammunition is not an abnormally dangerous activity. ",
"No, unless there is evidence of circumstances suggesting a high risk of theft and criminal use of firearms stocked by Del."
] | 3D
|
|
A statute of the state of Texona prohibits any retailer of books, magazines, pictures, or posters from "publicly displaying or selling to any person any material that may be harmful to minors because of the violent or sexually explicit nature of its pictorial content." Violation of this statute is a misdemeanor. Corner Store displays publicly and sells magazines containing violent and sexually explicit pictures. The owner of this store is prosecuted under the above statute for these actions. In defending against this prosecution in a Texona trial court, the argument that would be the best defense for Corner Store is that the statute violates the | [
"First Amendment as it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, because the statute is excessively vague and overbroad. ",
"First Amendment as it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, because a state may not prohibit the sale of violent or sexually explicit material in the absence of proof that the material is utterly without any redeeming value in the marketplace of ideas. ",
"equal protection of the laws clause, because the statute irrationally treats violent and sexually explicit material that is pictorial differently from such material that is composed wholly of printed words. ",
"equal protection of the laws clause, because the statute irrationally distinguishes between violent and sexually explicit pictorial material that may harm minors and such material that may harm only adults."
] | 0A
|
|
In an arson prosecution the government seeks to rebut Defendant's alibi that he was in a jail in another state at the time of the fire. The government calls Witness to testify that he diligently searched through all the records of the jail and found no record of Defendant's having been incarcerated there during the time Defendant specified. The testimony of Witness is | [
"admissible as evidence of absence of an entry from a public record.",
"admissible as a summary of voluminous documents.",
"inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"inadmissible, because the records themselves must be produced."
] | 0A
|
|
By warranty deed, Marta conveyed Blackacre to Beth and Christine "as joint tenants with right of survivorship." Beth and Christine are not related. Beth conveyed all her interest to Eugenio by warranty deed and subsequently died intestate. Thereafter, Christine conveyed to Darin by warranty deed. There is no applicable statute, and the jurisdiction recognizes the common-law joint tenancy. Title to Blackacre is in | [
"Darin.",
"Marta.",
"Darin and Eugenio. (C) Darin and Eugenio.",
"Darin and the heirs of Beth."
] | 2C
|
|
Peavey was walking peacefully along a public street when he encountered Dorwin, whom he had never seen before. Without provocation or warning, Dorwin picked up a rock and struck Peavey with it. It was later established that Dorwin was mentally ill and suffered recurrent hallucinations. If Peavey asserts a claim against Dorwin based on battery, which of the following, if supported by evidence, will be Dorwin's best defense? | [
"Dorwin did not understand that his act was wrongful.",
"Dorwin did not desire to cause harm to Peavey.",
"Dorwin did not know that he was striking a person.",
"Dorwin thought Peavey was about to attack him."
] | 2C
|
|
Penstock owned a large tract of land on the shore of a lake. Drury lived on a stream that ran along one boundary of Penstock's land and into the lake. At some time in the past, a channel had been cut across Penstock's land from the stream to the lake at a point some distance from the mouth of the stream. From where Drury lived, the channel served as a convenient shortcut to the lake. Erroneously believing that the channel was a public waterway, Drury made frequent trips through the channel in his motorboat. His use of the channel caused no harm to the land through which it passed. If Penstock asserts a claim for damages against Drury based on trespass, which of the following would be a correct disposition of the case? | [
"Judgment for Penstock for nominal damages, because Drury intentionally used the channel. ",
"Judgment for Drury, if he did not use the channel after learning of Penstock's ownership claim. ",
"Judgment for Drury, because he caused no harm to Penstock's land. ",
"Judgment for Drury, because when he used the channel he believed it was a public waterway. "
] | 0A
|
|
Structo contracted with Bailey to construct for $500,000 a warehouse and an access driveway at highway level. Shortly after commencing work on the driveway, which required for the specified level some excavation and removal of surface material, Structo unexpectedly encountered a large mass of solid rock. For this question only, assume the following facts. Structo informed Bailey (accurately) that because of the rock the driveway as specified would cost at least $20,000 more than figured, and demanded for that reason a total contract price of $520,000. Since Bailey was expecting price of $520,000. Since Bailey was expecting warehousing customers immediately after the agreed completion date, he signed a writing promising to pay the additional $20,000. Following timely completion of the warehouse and driveway, which conformed to the contract in all respects, Bailey refused to pay Structo more than $500,000. What is the maximum amount to which Structo is entitled? | [
"$500,000, because there was no consideration for Bailey's promise to pay the additional $20,000. ",
"$500,000, because Bailey's promise to pay the additional $20,000 was exacted under duress. ",
"$520,000, because the modification was fair and was made in the light of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the original contract was made. ",
"$520,000, provided that the reasonable value of Structo's total performance was that much or more. "
] | 2C
|
|
Structo contracted with Bailey to construct for $500,000 a warehouse and an access driveway at highway level. Shortly after commencing work on the driveway, which required for the specified level some excavation and removal of surface material, Structo unexpectedly encountered a large mass of solid rock. For this question only, assume the following facts. Upon encountering the rock formation, Structo, instead of incurring additional costs to remove it, built the access driveway over the rock with a steep grade down to the highway. Bailey, who was out of town for several days, was unaware of this nonconformity until the driveway had been finished. As built, it is too steep to be used safely by trucks or cars, particularly in the wet or icy weather frequently occurring in the area. It would cost $30,000 to tear out and rebuild the driveway at highway level. As built, the warehouse, including the driveway, has a fair market value of $550,000. Bailey has paid $470,000 to Structo, but refuses to pay more because of the nonconforming driveway, which Structo has refused to tear out and rebuild. If Structo sues Bailey for monetary relief, what is the maximum amount Structo is entitled to recover? | [
"$30,000, because the fair market value of the warehouse and driveway \"as is\" exceeds the contract price by $50,000 (more than the cost of correcting the driveway). ",
"$30,000, because Structo substantially performed and the cost of correcting the driveway would involve economic waste. ",
"$30,000, minus whatever amount Structo saved by not building the driveway at the specified level. ",
"Nothing, because Bailey is entitled to damages for the cost of correcting the driveway. "
] | 3D
|
|
Larson was charged with the murder of a man who had been strangled and whose body was found in some woods near his home. Larson suffers from a neurological problem that makes it impossible for him to remember an occurrence for longer than 48 hours. occurrence for longer than 48 hours. After Larson was charged, the police visited him and asked if they might search his home. Larson consented. The police found a diary written by Larson. An entry dated the same day as the victim's disappearance read, "Indescribable excitement. Why did no one ever tell me that killing gave such pleasure to the master?" Larson was charged with murder. His attorney has moved to exclude the diary from evidence on the ground that its admission would violate Larson's privilege against self-incrimination. Counsel has also argued that Larson could not give informed consent to the search because more than 48 hours had passed since the making of the entry and hence he could not remember the existence of the incriminating entry at the time he gave his consent. There is no evidence that the police officers who secured Larson's consent to the search were aware of his memory impairment. With regard to the diary, the court should | [
"admit it, because Larson's consent was not obtained by intentional police misconduct and Larson was not compelled to make the diary entry. ",
"admit it, pursuant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. ",
"exclude it, because Larson was not competent to consent to a search. ",
"exclude it, because use of the diary as evidence would violate Larson's privilege against self-incrimination. "
] | 0A
|
|
In contract litigation between Pixley and Dill, a fact of consequence to the determination of the action is whether Pixley provided Dill with a required notice at Dill's branch office "in the state capital." Pixley introduced evidence that he gave notice at Dill's office in the city of Capitan. Although Capitan is the state's capital, Pixley failed to offer proof of that fact. Which of the following statements is most clearly correct with respect to possible judicial clearly correct with respect to possible judicial notice of the fact that Capitan is the state's capital? | [
"The court may take judicial notice even though Pixley does not request it.",
"The court may take judicial notice only if Pixley provides the court with an authenticated copy of the statute that designates Capitan as the capital.",
"If the court takes judicial notice, the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether Capitan is the capital shifts to Dill. ",
"If the court takes judicial notice, it should instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive the fact that Capitan is the capital. "
] | 0A
|
|
A statute of the state of East Dakota requires each insurance company that offers burglary insurance policies in the state to charge a uniform rate for such insurance to all of its customers residing within the same county in that state. So long as it complies with this that state. So long as it complies with this requirement, a company is free to charge whatever rate the market will bear for its burglary insurance policies. An insurance company located in the state of East Dakota files suit in federal district court against appropriate East Dakota state officials to challenge this statute on constitutional grounds. The insurance company wishes to charge customers residing within the same county in East Dakota rates for burglary insurance policies that will vary because they would be based on the specific nature of the customer's business, on its precise location, and on its past claims record. In this suit, the court should | [
"hold the statute unconstitutional, because the statute deprives the insurance company of its liberty or property without due process of law. ",
"hold the statute unconstitutional, because the statute imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. ",
"hold the statute constitutional, because the statute is a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. ",
"abstain from ruling on the merits of this case until the state courts have had an opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of this state statute."
] | 2C
|
|
Dawson was charged with felony murder because of his involvement in a bank robbery. The evidence at trial disclosed that Smith invited Dawson to go for a ride in his new car, and after a while asked Dawson to drive. As Smith and Dawson drove around town, Smith explained to Dawson that he planned to rob the bank and that he needed Dawson to drive the getaway car. Dawson agreed to drive to the bank and to wait outside while Smith went in to rob it. As they approached the bank, Dawson began to regret his agreement to help with the robbery. Once there, Smith got out of with the robbery. Once there, Smith got out of the car. As Smith went out of sight inside the bank, Dawson drove away and went home. Inside the bank, Smith killed a bank guard who tried to prevent him from leaving with the money. Smith ran outside and, finding that his car and Dawson were gone, ran down an alley. He was apprehended a few blocks away. Dawson later turned himself in after hearing on the radio that Smith had killed the guard. The jurisdiction has a death penalty that applies to felony murder. Consistent with the law and the Constitution, the jury may convict Dawson of | [
"felony murder and impose the death penalty.",
"felony murder but not impose the death penalty.",
"bank robbery only.",
"no crime."
] | 1B
|
|
In an automobile negligence action by Popkin against Dwyer, Juilliard testified for Popkin. Dwyer later called Watts, who testified that Juilliard's reputation for truthfulness was bad. On cross-examination of Watts, Popkin's counsel asks, "Isn't it a fact that when you bought your new car last year, you made a false affidavit to escape paying the sales tax?" This question is | [
"proper, because it will indicate Watts's standard of judgment as to reputation for truthfulness. ",
"proper, because it bears on Watts's credibility. ",
"improper, because character cannot be proved by specific instances of conduct. ",
"improper, because one cannot impeach an impeaching witness. "
] | 1B
|
|
David built in his backyard a garage that encroached two feet across the property line onto property owned by his neighbor, Prudence. Thereafter, David sold his property to Drake. Prudence was unaware, prior to David's sale to Drake, of the encroachment of the garage onto her property. When she thereafter learned of the encroachment, she sued David for damages for trespass. In this action, will Prudence prevail? | [
"No, unless David was aware of the encroachment when the garage was built. ",
"No, because David no longer owns or possesses the garage. ",
"Yes, because David knew where the garage was located, whether or not he knew where the property line was. ",
"Yes, unless Drake was aware of the encroachment when he purchased the property. "
] | 2C
|
|
Poole sued Darrel for unlawfully using Poole'sidea for an animal robot as a character in Darrel's science fiction movie. Darrel admitted that he had received a model of an animal robot from Poole, but he denied that it had any substantial similarity to the movie character. After the model had been returned to Poole, Poole destroyed it. In order for Poole to testify to the appearance of the model, Poole | [
"must show that he did not destroy the model in bad faith.",
"must give advance notice of his intent to introduce the oral testimony.",
"must introduce a photograph of the model if one exists.",
"need do none of the above, because the \"best evidence rule\" applies only to writings, recordings, and photographs. "
] | 3D
|
|
Lanny, the owner of Whiteacre in fee simple, leased Whiteacre to Teri for a term of ten years by properly executed written instrument. The lease was promptly and properly recorded. It contained an option for Teri to purchase Whiteacre by tendering $250,000 as purchase price any time "during the term of this lease." One year later, Teri, by a properly executed written instrument, purported to assign the option to Oscar, expressly retaining all of the remaining term of the lease. The instrument of remaining term of the lease. The instrument of assignment was promptly and properly recorded. Two years later, Lanny contracted to sell Whiteacre to Jones and to convey a marketable title "subject to the rights of Teri under her lease." Jones refused to close because of the outstanding option assigned to Oscar. Lanny brought an appropriate action against Jones for specific performance. If judgment is rendered in favor of Lanny, it will be because the relevant jurisdiction has adopted a rule on a key issue as to which various state courts have split. Which of the following identifies the determinative rule or doctrine upon which the split occurs, and states the position favorable to Lanny? | [
"In a contract to buy, any form of \"subject to a lease\" clause that fails to mention expressly an existing option means that the seller is agreeing to sell free and clear of any option originally included in the lease. ",
"Marketable title can be conveyed so long as any outstanding option not mentioned in the purchase contract has not yet been exercised.",
"Options to purchase by lessees are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.",
"Options to purchase contained in a lease cannot be assigned separately from the lease."
] | 3D
|
|
Daniel and a group of his friends are fanatical basketball fans who regularly meet at each others' homes to watch basketball games on television. Some of the group are fans of team A, and others are fans of team B. When the group has watched televised games between these two teams, fights sometimes have these two teams, fights sometimes have broken out among the group. Despite this fact, Daniel invited the group to his home to watch a championship game between teams A and B. During the game, Daniel's guests became rowdy and antagonistic. Fearing that they would begin to fight, and that a fight would damage his possessions, Daniel asked his guests to leave. They refused to go and soon began to fight. Daniel called the police, and Officer was sent to Daniel's home. Officer sustained a broken nose in his efforts to stop the fighting. Officer brought an action against Daniel alleging that Daniel was negligent in inviting the group to his house to watch this championship game. Daniel has moved to dismiss the complaint. The best argument in support of this motion would be that | [
"a rescuer injured while attempting to avert a danger cannot recover damages from the endangered person.",
"a police officer is not entitled to a recovery based upon the negligent conduct that created the need for the officer's professional intervention.",
"as a matter of law, Daniel's conduct was not the proximate cause of Officer's injury. ",
"Daniel did not owe Officer a duty to use reasonable care, because Officer was a mere licensee on Daniel's property. "
] | 1B
|
|
In a prosecution of Drew for forgery, the defense objects to the testimony of West, a government expert, on the ground of inadequate qualifications. The government seeks to introduce a letter from the expert's former criminology professor, stating that West is generally acknowledged in his field as well qualified. On the issue of the expert's qualifications, the letter may be considered by | [
"the jury, without regard to the hearsay rule. ",
"the judge, without regard to the hearsay rule. ",
"neither the judge nor the jury, because it (C) neither the judge nor the jury, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
"both the judge and the jury, because the letter is not offered for a hearsay purpose. "
] | 1B
|
|
Responding to County's written advertisement for bids, Tyres was the successful bidder for the sale of tires to County for County's vehicles. Tyres and County entered into a signed, written agreement that specified, "It is agreed that Tyres will deliver all tires required by this agreement to County, in accordance with the attached bid form and specifications, for a one-year period beginning September 1, 1990." Attached to the agreement was a copy of the bid form and specifications. In the written advertisement to which Tyres had responded, but not in the bid form, County had stated, "Multiple awards may be issued if they are in the best interests of County." No definite quantity of tires to be bought by County from Tyres was specified in any of these documents. In January 1991, Tyres learned that County was buying some of its tires from one of Tyres's competitors. Contending that the Tyres-County agreement was a requirements contract, Tyres sued County for the damages caused by County's buying some of its tires from the competitor. If County defends by offering proof of the advertisement concerning the possibility of multiple awards, should the court admit the evidence? | [
"Yes, because the provision in the written agreement, \"all tires required by this agreement,\" is ambiguous. ",
"Yes, because the advertisement was in writing. ",
"No, because of the parol evidence rule. ",
"No, because it would make the contract illusory. "
] | 0A
|
|
Responding to County's written advertisement for bids, Tyres was the successful bidder for the sale of tires to County for County's vehicles. Tyres and County entered into a signed, written agreement that specified, "It is agreed that Tyres will deliver all tires required by this agreement to County, in accordance with the attached bid form and specifications, for a one-year period beginning September 1, 1990." Attached to the agreement was a copy of the bid form and specifications. In the written advertisement to which Tyres had responded, but not in the bid form, County had stated, "Multiple awards may be issued if they are in the best interests of County." No definite quantity of tires to be bought by County from Tyres was specified in any of these documents. In January 1991, Tyres learned that County was buying some of its tires from one of Tyres's competitors. Contending that the Tyres-County agreement was a requirements contract, Tyres sued County for the damages caused by County's buying some of its tires from the competitor. If the court concludes that the Tyres-County contract is an agreement by County to buy its tire requirements from Tyres, Tyres probably will | [
"recover under the contracts clause of the United States Constitution.",
"recover under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.",
"not recover, because the agreement lacks mutuality of obligation. ",
"not recover, because the agreement is indefinite as to quantity. "
] | 1B
|
|
Supermarket is in a section of town where there are sometimes street fights and where pedestrians are occasionally the victims of pickpockets and muggers. In recognition of the unusual number of robberies in the area, the unusual number of robberies in the area, the supermarket posted signs in the store and in its parking lot that read: Warning: There are pickpockets and muggers at work in this part of the city. Supermarket is not responsible for the acts of criminals. One evening, Lorner drove to Supermarket to see about a special on turkeys that Supermarket was advertising. She decided that the turkeys were too large and left the store without purchasing anything. In the parking lot, she was attacked by an unknown man who raped her and then ran away. If Lorner sues Supermarket, the result should be for the | [
"plaintiff, if Supermarket failed to take reasonable steps to protect customers against criminal attack in its parking lot. ",
"plaintiff, because Supermarket is liable for harm to business invitees on its premises. ",
"defendant, if the warning signs were plainly visible to Lorner. ",
"defendant, because the rapist was the proximate cause of Lorner's injuries. "
] | 0A
|
|
Jones wanted to kill Adams because he believed Adams was having an affair with Jones's wife. Early one morning, armed with a pistol, he crouched behind some bushes on a park hillside overlooking a path upon which Adams frequently jogged. On this morning, however, Jones saw Adams jogging on another path about a half mile away. Nonetheless, Jones fired five shots at Adams. None of the five shots came anywhere close to Adams as he was well out of the range of the pistol Jones was using. Jones is | [
"guilty of attempted murder, if he was not aware of the limited range of his pistol. ",
"guilty of attempted murder, if a reasonable person would not have been aware of the limited range of his pistol. ",
"not guilty of attempted murder, or any lesser included offense, because, under the circumstances, it was impossible for him to have killed Adams. ",
"not guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of assault. "
] | 0A
|
|
Widgets are manufactured wholly from raw materials mined and processed in the state of Green. The only two manufacturers of widgets in the United States are also located in that state. However, their widgets are purchased by retailers located in every state. The legislature of the state of Green is considering the adoption of a statute that would impose a tax solely on the manufacture of widgets. The tax is to be calculated at 3% of their wholesale value. Which of the following arguments would be LEAST helpful to the state in defending the constitutionality of this proposed state tax on widgets? | [
"At the time widgets are manufactured and taxed they have not yet entered the channels of interstate commerce.",
"The economic impact of this tax will be passed on to both in-state and out-ofstate purchasers of widgets and, therefore, it is wholly nondiscriminatory in its effect. ",
"Because of the powers reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, states have plenary authority to construct their tax system in any manner they choose. ",
"A tax on the manufacture of widgets may be imposed only by the state in which the manufacturing occurs and, therefore, it is not likely to create the danger of a multiple tax burden on interstate commerce. "
] | 2C
|
|
Blackacre is a large tract of land owned by a religious order known as The Seekers. On Blackacre, The Seekers erected a large residential building where its members reside. Blackacre is surrounded by rural residential properties and its only access to a public way is afforded by an easement over a strip of land 30 feet wide. The easement was granted to The Seekers by deed from Sally, the owner of The Seekers by deed from Sally, the owner of one of the adjacent residential properties. The Seekers built a driveway on the strip, and the easement was used for 20 years without incident or objection. Last year, as permitted by the applicable zoning ordinance, The Seekers constructed a 200-bed nursing home and a parking lot on Blackacre, using all of Blackacre that was available for such development. The nursing home was very successful, and on Sundays visitors to the nursing home overflowed the parking facilities on Blackacre and parked all along the driveway from early in the morning through the evening hours. After two Sundays of the resulting congestion and inconvenience, Sally erected a barrier across the driveway on Sundays preventing any use of the driveway by anyone seeking access to Blackacre. The Seekers objected. Sally brought an appropriate action to terminate the easement. The most likely result in this action is that the court will hold for | [
"Sally, because The Seekers excessively expanded the use of the dominant tenement. ",
"Sally, because the parking on the driveway exceeded the scope of the easement. ",
"The Seekers, because expanded use of the easement does not terminate the easement. ",
"The Seekers, because Sally's use of selfhelp denies her the right to equitable relief. "
] | 2C
|
|
Three months ago, Bert agreed in writing to buy Sam's single-family residence, Liveacre, for $110,000. Bert paid Sam a $5,000 deposit to be applied to the purchase price. The contract stated that Sam had the right at his option to retain the deposit as liquidated damages in the event of Bert's default. The closing was to have taken place last week. Six weeks ago, Bert was notified by his employer that he was to be transferred to another job 1,000 miles away. Bert immediately notified Sam that he could not close, and therefore he demanded the return of his $5,000. Sam refused, waited until after the contract closing date, listed with a broker, and then conveyed Liveacre for $108,000 to Conner, a purchaser found by the real estate broker. Conner paid the full purchase price and immediately recorded his deed. Conner knew of the prior contract with Bert. In an appropriate action, Bert seeks to recover the $5,000 deposit from Sam. The most probable result will be that Sam | [
"must return the $5,000 to Bert, because Sam can no longer carry out his contract with Bert. ",
"must return the $5,000 to Bert, because Bert was legally justified in not completing the contract. ",
"must return $3,000 to Bert, because Sam's damages were only $2,000. ",
"may keep the $5,000 deposit, because Bert breached the contract. "
] | 3D
|
|
Rollem, an automobile retailer, had an adult daughter, Betsy, who needed a car in her employment but had only $3,000 with which to buy one. Rollem wrote to her, "Give me your $3,000 and I'll give you the car on our lot that we have been using as a demonstrator." Betsy thanked her father and paid him the $3,000. As both Rollem and Betsy knew, the demonstrator was reasonably worth $10,000. After Betsy had paid the $3,000, but before the car had been delivered to her, one of Rollem's sales staff sold and delivered the same car to a customer for $10,000. Neither the salesperson nor the customer was aware of the transaction between Rollem and Betsy. Does Betsy, after rejecting a tendered return of the $3,000 by Rollem, have an action against him for breach of contract? | [
"Yes, because Rollem's promise was supported by bargained-for consideration. ",
"Yes, because Rollem's promise was supported by the moral obligation a father owes his child as to the necessities of modern life. ",
"No, because the payment of $3,000 was inadequate consideration to support Rollem's promise. ",
"No, because the salesperson's delivery of the car to the customer made it impossible for Rollem to perform. "
] | 0A
|
|
Peter, who was 20 years old, purchased a new, high-powered sports car that was marketed with an intended and recognized appeal to youthful drivers. The car was designed with the capability to attain speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. It was equipped with tires designed and tested only for a maximum safe speed of 85 miles per hour. The owner's manual that came with the car stated that "continuous driving over 90 miles per hour requires high-speed-capability tires," but the manual did not describe the speed capability of the tires sold with the car. Peter took his new car out for a spin on a straight, smooth country road where the posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. Intending to test the car's power, he drove for a considerable distance at over 100 miles per hour. While he was doing so, the tread separated from the left rear tire, causing the car to leave the road and hit a tree. Peter sustained severe injuries. Peter has brought a strict product liability action in tort against the manufacturer of the car. You should assume that pure comparative fault principles apply to this case. Will Peter prevail? | [
"No, because Peter's driving at an excessive speed constituted a misuse of the car. ",
"No, because the car was not defective. ",
"Yes, if the statement in the manual concerning the tires did not adequately warn of the danger of high-speed driving on the tires mounted on the car. ",
"Yes, unless Peter's driving at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit was negligence per se that, by the law of the jurisdiction, was not excusable. "
] | 2C
|
|
In a federal court diversity action by Plant against Decord on an insurance claim, a question arose whether the court should apply a presumption that, where both husband and wife were killed in a common accident, the husband died last. Whether this presumption should be applied is to be determined according to | [
"traditional common law.",
"federal statutory law.",
"the law of the state whose substantive law is applied.",
"the federal common law."
] | 2C
|
|
Plagued by neighborhood youths who had been stealing lawn furniture from his back yard, Armando remained awake nightly watching for them. One evening Armando heard noises in his backyard. He yelled out, warning intruders to leave. Receiving no answer, he fired a shotgun filled with nonlethal buckshot into bushes along his back fence where he believed the intruders might be hiding. A six-year-old child was hiding in the bushes and was struck in the eye by some of the pellets, causing loss of sight. If Armando is charged with second-degree assault, which is defined in the jurisdiction as "maliciously causing serious physical injury to another," he is | [
"not guilty, because the child was trespassing and he was using what he believed was nondeadly force. ",
"not guilty, because he did not intend to kill or to cause serious physical injury. ",
"guilty, because he recklessly caused serious physical injury. ",
"guilty, because there is no privilege to use force against a person who is too young to be criminally responsible. "
] | 2C
|
|
Twenty percent of the residents of Green City are members of minority racial groups. These residents are evenly distributed among the many different residential areas of the city. The five city council members of Green City are elected from five single-member electoral districts that are nearly equally populated. No candidate has ever been elected to the city council who was a member of a minority racial group. A group of citizens who are members ofminority racial groups file suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the single-member districts in Green City are unconstitutional. They claim that the single-member districting system in that city diminishes the ability of voters who are members of minority racial groups to affect the outcome of city elections. They seek an order from the court forcing the city to adopt an at-large election system in which the five candidates with the greatest vote totals would be elected to the city council. No state or federal statutes are applicable to the resolution of this suit. Which of the following constitutional provisions provides the most obvious basis for plaintiffs' claim in this suit? | [
"The Thirteenth Amendment.",
"The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
"The Fifteenth Amendment."
] | 3D
|
|
Loomis, the owner and operator of a small business, encourages "wellness" on the part of his employees and supports various physicalfitness programs to that end. Learning that one of his employees, Graceful, was a dedicated jogger, Loomis promised to pay her a special award of $100 if she could and would run one mile in less than six minutes on the following Saturday. Graceful thanked him, and did in fact run a mile in less than six minutes on the day specified. Shortly thereafter, however, Loomis discovered that for more than a year Graceful had been running at least one mile in less than six minutes every day as a part of her personal fitness program. He refused to pay the $100. In an action by Graceful against Loomis for breach of contract, which of the following best summarizes the probable decision of the court? | [
"Loomis wins, because it is a compelling inference that Loomis's promise did not induce Graceful to run the specified mile. ",
"Loomis wins, because Graceful's running of the specified mile was beneficial, not detrimental, to her in any event. ",
"Graceful wins, because running a mile in less than six minutes is a significantly demanding enterprise. ",
"Graceful wins, because she ran the specified mile as requested, and her motives for doing so are irrelevant. "
] | 3D
|
|
Able was the owner of Blackacre, an undeveloped city lot. Able and Baker executed a written document in which Able agreed to sell Blackacre to Baker and Baker agreed to buy Blackacre from Able for $100,000; the document did not provide for an earnest money down payment. Able recorded the document, as authorized by statute. Able orally gave Baker permission to park his car on Blackacre without charge prior to the closing. Thereafter, Baker frequently parked his car on Blackacre. Another property came on the market that Baker wanted more than Blackacre. Baker decided to try to escape any obligation to Able. Baker had been told that contracts for the purchase and sale of real property require consideration and concluded that because he had made no earnest money down payment, he could refuse to close and not be liable. Baker notified Able of his intention not to close and, in fact, did refuse to close on the date set for the closing. Able brought an appropriate action to compel specific performance by Baker. If Able wins, it will be because | [
"Baker's use of Blackacre for parking constitutes part performance.",
"general contract rules regarding consideration apply to real estate contracts.",
"the doctrine of equitable conversion applies.",
"the document was recorded."
] | 1B
|
|
Under the terms of a written contract, Karp agreed to construct for Manor a garage for $10,000. Nothing was said in the parties' negotiations or in the contract about progress payments during the course of the work. For this question only, assume the following facts. After completing 25% of the garage strictly according to Manor's specifications, Karp demanded payment of $2,000 as a "reasonable progress payment." Manor refused, and Karp abandoned the job. If each party sues the other for breach of contract, which of the following will the court decide? | [
"Both parties are in breach, and each is entitled to damages, if any, from the other. ",
"Only Karp is in breach and liable for Manor's damages, if any. ",
"Only Manor is in breach and liable for Karp's damages, if any. ",
"Both parties took reasonable positions, and neither is in breach. "
] | 1B
|
|
Under the terms of a written contract, Karp agreed to construct for Manor a garage for $10,000. Nothing was said in the parties' negotiations or in the contract about progress payments during the course of the work. For this question only, assume the following facts. After completing 25% of the garage strictly according to Manor's specifications, Karp assigned his rights under the contract to Banquo as security for an $8,000 loan. Banquo immediately notified Manor of the assignment. Karp thereafter, without legal excuse, abandoned the job before it was half-complete. Karp subsequently defaulted on the loan from Banquo. Karp has no assets. It will cost Manor at least $8,000 to get the garage finished by another builder. If Banquo sues Manor for $8,000, which of the following will the court decide? | [
"Banquo wins, because the Karp-Manor contract was in existence and Karp was contract was in existence and Karp was not in breach when Banquo gave Manor notice of the assignment. ",
"Banquo wins, because Banquo as a secured creditor over Karp is entitled to priority over Manor's unsecured claim against Karp. ",
"Manor wins, because his right to recoupment on account of Karp's breach is available against Banquo as Karp's assignee. ",
"Manor wins, because his claim against Karp arose prior to Karp's default on his loan from Banquo. "
] | 2C
|
|
The Sports Championship Revenue Enhancement Act is a federal statute that was enacted as part of a comprehensive program to eliminate the federal budget deficit. That act imposed, for a period of five years, a 50% excise tax on the price of tickets to championship sporting events. Such events included the World Series, the Super Bowl, major college bowl games, and similar major college bowl games, and similar championship sports events. This federal tax is probably | [
"constitutional, because the compelling national interest in reducing the federal budget deficit justifies this tax as a temporary emergency measure. ",
"constitutional, because an act of Congress that appears to be a revenue raising measure on its face is not rendered invalid because it may have adverse economic consequences for the activity taxed. ",
"unconstitutional, because a 50% tax is likely to reduce attendance at championship sporting events and, therefore, is not rationally related to the legitimate interest of Congress in eliminating the budget deficit. ",
"unconstitutional, because Congress violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by singling out championship sporting events for this tax while failing to tax other major sporting, artistic, or entertainment events to which tickets are sold. "
] | 1B
|
|
On June 1, Topline Wholesale, Inc., received a purchase-order form from Wonder-Good, Inc., a retailer and new customer, in which the latter ordered 1,000 anti-recoil widgets for delivery no later than August 30 at a delivered total price of $10,000, as quoted in Topline's current catalog. Both parties are merchants with respect to widgets of all types. On June 2, Topline mailed to Wonder-Good its own form, across the top of which Topline's president had written, "We are pleased to accept your order." This form contained the same terms as Wonder-Good's form except for an additional printed clause in Topline's form that provided for a maximum liability of $100 for any breach of contract by Topline. As of June 5, when Wonder-Good received Topline's acceptance form, which of the following is an accurate statement concerning the legal relationship between Topline and Wonder-Good? | [
"There is no contract, because the liability-limitation clause in Topline's form is a material alteration of WonderGood's offer. ",
"There is no contract, because WonderGood did not consent to the liabilitylimitation clause in Topline's form. ",
"There is an enforceable contract whose terms include the liability-limitation clause in Topline's form, because liquidation of damages is expressly authorized by the Uniform Commercial Code. ",
"There is an enforceable contract whose terms do not include the liabilitylimitation clause in Topline's form."
] | 3D
|
|
Electco operates a factory that requires the use of very high voltage electricity. Paul owns property adjacent to the Electco plant where property adjacent to the Electco plant where he has attempted to carry on a business that requires the use of sensitive electronic equipment. The effectiveness of Paul's electronic equipment is impaired by electrical interference arising from the high voltage currents used in Electco's plant. Paul has complained to Electco several times, with no result. There is no way that Electco, by taking reasonable precautions, can avoid the interference with Paul's operation that arises from the high voltage currents necessary to Electco's operation. In Paul's action against Electco to recover damages for the economic loss caused to him by the electrical interference, will Paul prevail? | [
"Yes, because Electco's activity is abnormally dangerous. ",
"Yes, for loss suffered by Paul after Electco was made aware of the harm its activity was causing to Paul. ",
"No, unless Electco caused a substantial and unreasonable interference with Paul's business. ",
"No, because Paul's harm was purely (D) No, because Paul's harm was purely economic and did not arise from physical harm to his person or property. "
] | 2C
|
|
Les leased a barn to his neighbor, Tom, for a term of three years. Tom took possession of the barn and used it for his farming purposes. The lease made Les responsible for structural repairs to the barn, unless they were made necessary by actions of Tom. One year later, Les conveyed the barn and its associated land to Lottie "subject to the lease to Tom." Tom paid the next month's rent to Lottie. The next day a portion of an exterior wall of the barn collapsed because of rot in the interior structure of the wall. The wall had appeared to be sound, but a competent engineer, on inspection, would have discovered its condition. Neither Lottie nor Tom had the barn inspected by an engineer. Tom was injured as a result of the collapse of the wall. Les had known that the wall was dangerously weakened by rot and needed immediate repairs, but had not told Tom or Lottie. There is no applicable statute. Tom brought an appropriate action against Les to recover damages for the injuries he sustained. Lottie was not a party. Which of the following is the most appropriate comment concerning the outcome of this action? | [
"Tom should lose, because Lottie assumed all of Les's obligations by reason of Tom's attornment to her. ",
"Tom should recover, because there is privity between lessor and lessee and it cannot be broken unilaterally. ",
"Tom should recover, because Les knew of the danger but did not warn Tom. ",
"Tom should lose, because he failed to inspect the barn. "
] | 2C
|