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Dahle is charged with possession of heroin. Prosecution witness Walker, an experienced dog trainer, testified that he was in the airport with a dog trained to detect heroin. As Dahle with a dog trained to detect heroin. As Dahle approached, the dog immediately became alert and pawed and barked frantically at Dahle's briefcase. Dahle managed to run outside and throw his briefcase into the river, from which it could not be recovered. After Walker's experience is established, he is asked to testify as an expert that the dog's reaction told him that Dahle's briefcase contained heroin. Walker's testimony is
[ "admissible, as evidence of Dahle's guilt. ", "admissible, because an expert may rely on hearsay. ", "inadmissible, because it is based on hearsay not within any exception. ", "inadmissible, because of the unreliability of the reactions of an animal. " ]
0A
Doe negligently caused a fire in his house, and the house burned to the ground. As a result, the sun streamed into Peter's yard next door, which previously had been shaded by Doe's house. The sunshine destroyed some delicate and valuable trees in Peter's yard that could grow only in the shade. Peter has brought a grow only in the shade. Peter has brought a negligence action against Doe for the loss of Peter's trees. Doe has moved to dismiss the complaint. The best argument in support of this motion would be that
[ "Doe's negligence was not the active cause of the loss of Peter's trees.", "Doe's duty to avoid the risks created by a fire did not encompass the risk that sunshine would damage Peter's trees.", "the loss of the trees was not a natural and probable consequence of Doe's negligence.", "Peter suffered a purely economic loss, which is not compensable in a negligence action. " ]
1B
Phillips bought a new rifle and wanted to try it out by doing some target shooting. He went out into the country to an area where he had previously hunted. Much to his surprise, he noticed that the area beyond a clearing noticed that the area beyond a clearing contained several newly constructed houses that had not been there before. Between the houses there was a small playground where several children were playing. Nevertheless, Phillips nailed a paper target to a tree and went to a point where the tree was between himself and the playground. He then fired several shots at the target. One of the shots missed the target and the tree and hit and killed one of the children in the playground. Phillips was convicted of murder. He appealed, contending that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction of murder. The appellate court should
[ "affirm the conviction, as the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of murder. ", "reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial, because the evidence is not sufficient for murder but will support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. ", "reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial, because the evidence is not sufficient for murder but will support a sufficient for murder but will support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. ", "reverse the conviction and order the case dismissed, because the evidence is sufficient only for a finding of negligence and negligence alone cannot support a criminal conviction. " ]
0A
Dominique obtained a bid of $10,000 to tear down her old building and another bid of $90,000 to replace it with a new structure in which she planned to operate a sporting goods store. Having only limited cash available, Dominique asked Hardcash for a $100,000 loan. After reviewing the plans for the project, Hardcash in a signed writing promised to lend Dominique $100,000 secured by a mortgage on the property and repayable over ten years in equal monthly installments at 10% annual interest. Dominique promptly accepted the demolition bid and the old building was removed, but Hardcash thereafter refused to make the loan. Despite diligent efforts, Dominique was unable to obtain a loan from any other source. Does Dominique have a cause of action against Hardcash?
[ "Yes, because by having the building demolished, she accepted Hardcash's offer to make the loan. ", "Yes, because her reliance on Hardcash's promise was substantial, reasonable, and foreseeable. ", "No, because there was no bargained-for exchange of consideration for Hardcash's promise to make the loan. ", "No, because Dominique's inability to obtain a loan from any other source demonstrated that the project lacked the financial soundness that was a constructive condition to Hardcash's performance. " ]
1B
Dominique obtained a bid of $10,000 to tear down her old building and another bid of $90,000 to replace it with a new structure in which she planned to operate a sporting goods store. Having only limited cash available, Dominique asked Hardcash for a $100,000 loan. After reviewing the plans for the project, Hardcash in a signed writing promised to lend Dominique $100,000 secured by a mortgage on the property and repayable over ten years in equal monthly installments at 10% annual interest. Dominique promptly accepted the demolition bid and the old building was removed, but Hardcash thereafter refused to make the loan. Despite diligent efforts, Dominique was unable to obtain a loan from any other source. For this question only, assume that Dominique has a cause of action against Hardcash. If she sues him for monetary relief, what is the probable measure of her recovery?
[ "Expectancy damages, measured by the difference between the value of the new building and the old building, less the amount of the proposed loan ($100,000). ", "Expectancy damages, measured by the estimated profits from operating the proposed sporting goods store for ten years, less the cost of repaying a $100,000 loan at 10% interest over ten years. ", "Reliance damages, measured by the $10,000 expense of removing the old building, adjusted by the decrease or increase in the market value of Dominique's land immediately thereafter. ", "Nominal damages only, because both expectancy and reliance damages are speculative, and there is no legal or equitable basis for awarding restitution. " ]
2C
Dan, an eight-year-old, rode his bicycle downhis driveway into a busy highway and Driver had to stop her car suddenly to avoid colliding with the bike. Because of the sudden stop, Driver's two-year-old son, Peter, who was sitting on the seat without any restraint, was thrown into the dashboard and injured. Had Peter been properly restrained in a baby car seat, as required by a state safety statute of which his mother was aware, he would not have been injured. In an action brought on Peter's behalf against Dan's parents to recover for Peter's injuries, Peter will
[ "not prevail, because parents are not vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their children. ", "not prevail, because Peter's injury was attributable to his mother's knowing violation of a safety statute. ", "prevail, if Dan's parents knew that he sometimes drove into the highway, and they took no steps to prevent it. they took no steps to prevent it. ", "prevail, if Dan's riding into the highway was negligent and the proximate cause of Peter's injuries. " ]
2C
While Hill was in her kitchen, she heard the screech of automobile tires. She ran to the window and saw a tricycle flying through the air. The tricycle had been hit by a car driven by Weber, who had been speeding. She also saw a child's body in the grass adjacent to the street. As a result of her shock from this experience, Hill suffered a heart attack. In a claim by Hill against Weber, the issue on which Hill's right to recover will depend is whether
[ "a person can recover damages based on the defendant's breach of a duty owed to another.", "it is foreseeable that a person may sufferphysical harm caused solely by an injury inflicted on another.", "a person can recover damages caused by (C) a person can recover damages caused by shock unaccompanied by bodily impact.", "a person can recover damages for harm resulting from shock caused solely by another's peril or injury." ]
3D
Suffering from painful and terminal cancer, Willa persuaded Harold, her husband, to kill her to end her misery. As they reminisced about their life together and reaffirmed their love for each other, Harold tried to discourage Willa from giving up. Willa insisted, however, and finally Harold held a gun to her head and killed her. The most serious degree of criminal homicide of which Harold can be legally convicted is
[ "no degree of criminal homicide.", "involuntary manslaughter.", "voluntary manslaughter.", "murder." ]
3D
Peterson sued Dylan for libel. After Peterson testified that Dylan wrote to Peterson's employer that Peterson was a thief, Dylan offers evidence that Peterson once stole money from a former employer. The evidence of Peterson's prior theft is
[ "admissible, as substantive evidence to prove that Peterson is a thief. ", "admissible, but only to impeach Peterson's credibility. ", "inadmissible, because character may not be shown by specific instances of conduct. ", "inadmissible, because such evidence is more unfairly prejudicial than probative. " ]
0A
The Federal Computer Abuse Act establishes the Federal Computer Abuse Commission, authorizes the Commission to issue licenses for the possession of computers on terms that are consistent with the purposes of the act, and makes the unlicensed possession of a computer a crime. The provisions of the Federal Computer Abuse Act are inseverable. User applied to the Federal Computer Abuse Commission for a license to possess a computer. The Commission held, and User participated in, a trial-type proceeding on User's license application. In that proceeding it was demonstrated that User repeatedly and intentionally used computers to introduce secret destructive computer programs (computer viruses) into electronic data banks without the consent of their owners. As a result, the Commission denied User's application for a license. The license denial was based on a Commission rule authorized by the Computer Abuse Act that prohibited the issuance of computer licenses to persons who had engaged in such conduct. Nevertheless, User retained and continued to use his computer. He was subsequently convicted of the crime of unlicensed possession of a computer. On appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the licensing provision of constitutionality of the licensing provision of the Federal Computer Abuse Act. In this case, the reviewing court would probably hold that act to be
[ "constitutional, because the Constitution generally authorizes Congress to enact all laws that are necessary and proper to advance the general welfare, and Congress could reasonably believe that possession of computers by people like User constitutes a threat to the general welfare. ", "constitutional, because Congress may use the authority vested in it by the commerce clause to regulate the possession of computers and the provisions of this act do not violate any prohibitory provision of the Constitution. ", "unconstitutional, because Congress may not impose a criminal penalty on action that is improper only because it is inconsistent with an agency rule. ", "unconstitutional, because the mere possession of a computer is a wholly possession of a computer is a wholly local matter that is beyond the regulatory authority of Congress. " ]
1B
Defendant left her car parked on the side of a hill. Two minutes later, the car rolled down the hill and struck and injured Plaintiff. In Plaintiff's negligence action against Defendant, Plaintiff introduced into evidence the facts stated above, which are undisputed. Defendant testified that, when she parked her car, she turned the front wheels into the curb and put on her emergency brakes, which were in good working order. She also introduced evidence that, in the weeks before this incident, juveniles had been seen tampering with cars in the neighborhood. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant, and Plaintiff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Plaintiff's motion should be
[ "granted, because it is more likely than not that Defendant's negligent conduct was the legal cause of Plaintiff's injuries. ", "granted, because the evidence does not support the verdict. ", "denied, because, given Defendant's evidence, the jury was not required to draw an inference of negligence from the circumstances of the accident. ", "denied, if Defendant was in no better position than Plaintiff to explain the accident. " ]
2C
Able conveyed Blackacre to Baker by a warranty deed. Baker recorded the deed four days later. After the conveyance but prior to Baker's recording of the deed, Smollett properly filed a judgment against Able. The two pertinent statutes in the jurisdiction provide the following: 1) any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered, and 2) no conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law. The recording act has no provision for a grace period. Smollett joined both Able and Baker in an appropriate action to foreclose the judgment lien against Blackacre. If Smollett is unsuccessful, it will be because
[ "Able's warranty of title to Baker defeats Smollett's claim.", "Smollett is not a purchaser for value.", "any deed is superior to a judgment lien.", "four days is not an unreasonable delay in recording a deed." ]
1B
The United States Department of Energy regularly transports nuclear materials through Centerville on the way to a nuclear weapons processing plant it operates in a nearby state. The city of Centerville recently adopted an ordinance prohibiting the transportation of any nuclear materials in or through the city. The ordinance declares that its purpose is to protect the health and safety of the residents of that city. May the Department of Energy continue to transport these nuclear materials through the city of Centerville?
[ "No, because the ordinance is rationally related to the public health and safety of Centerville residents. ", "No, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states certain unenumerated sovereign powers. ", "Yes, because the Department of Energy is a federal agency engaged in a lawful federal function and, therefore, its activities may not be regulated by a local government without the consent of Congress. ", "Yes, because the ordinance enacted by Centerville is invalid because it denies persons transporting such materials the equal protection of the laws. " ]
2C
Dart is charged with the statutory offense of "knowingly violating a regulation of the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board" and specifically that he knowingly violated regulation number 345-90 issued by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board. That regulation prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 18 and also prohibits the sale of any alcoholic beverage to a person over the age of 17 and under the age of 22 without the presentation of such person's driver's license or other identification showing the age of the purchaser to be 18 or older. The evidence showed that Dart was a bartender in a tavern and sold a bottle of beer to a person who was 17 years old and that Dart person who was 17 years old and that Dart did not ask for or see the purchaser's driver's license or any other identification. Which of the following, if found by the jury, would be of the most help to Dart?
[ "The purchaser had a driver's license that falsely showed his age to be 21.", "Dart had never been told he was supposed to check identification of persons over 17 and under 22 before selling them alcohol.", "Dart did not know that the regulations classified beer as an alcoholic beverage.", "Dart mistakenly believed the purchaser to be 24 years old." ]
3D
In a writing signed by both parties on December 1, Kranc agreed to buy from Schaff a gasoline engine for $1,000, delivery to be made on the following for $1,000, delivery to be made on the following February 1. Through a secretarial error, the writing called for delivery on March 1, but neither party noticed the error until February 1. Before signing the agreement, Kranc and Schaff orally agreed that the contract of sale would be effective only if Kranc should notify Schaff in writing not later than January 2 that Kranc had arranged to resell the engine to a third person. Otherwise, they agreed orally, "There is no deal." On December 15, Kranc entered into a contract with Trimota to resell the engine to Trimota at a profit. For this question only, assume the following facts. Kranc did not give Schaff notice of the resale until January 25, and Schaff received it by mail on January 26. Meantime, the value of the engine had unexpectedly increased about 75% since December 1, and Schaff renounced the agreement. If Kranc sues Schaff on February 2 for breach of contract, which of the following is Schaff's best defense?
[ "The secretarial error in the written delivery-term was a mutual mistake concerning a basic fact, and the concerning a basic fact, and the agreement is voidable by either party. ", "Kranc's not giving written notice by January 2 of his resale was a failure of a condition precedent to the existence of a contract.", "In view of the unexpected 75% increase in value of the engine after December 1, Schaff's performance is excused by the doctrine of commercial frustration. ", "The agreement, if any, is unenforceable because a material term was not included in the writing. " ]
1B
In a writing signed by both parties on December 1, Kranc agreed to buy from Schaff a gasoline engine for $1,000, delivery to be made on the following for $1,000, delivery to be made on the following February 1. Through a secretarial error, the writing called for delivery on March 1, but neither party noticed the error until February 1. Before signing the agreement, Kranc and Schaff orally agreed that the contract of sale would be effective only if Kranc should notify Schaff in writing not later than January 2 that Kranc had arranged to resell the engine to a third person. Otherwise, they agreed orally, "There is no deal." On December 15, Kranc entered into a contract with Trimota to resell the engine to Trimota at a profit. For this question only, assume the following facts. On December 16, Kranc notified Schaff by telephone of Kranc's resale agreement with Trimota, and explained that a written notice was unfeasible because Kranc's secretary was ill. Schaff replied, "That's okay. I'll get the engine to you on February 1, as we agreed." Having learned, however, that the engine had increased in value about 75% since December 1, Schaff renounced the agreement on February 1. February 1. If Kranc sues Schaff on February 2 for breach of contract, which of the following concepts best supports Kranc's claim?
[ "Substantial performance.", "Nonoccurrence of a condition subsequent.", "Waiver of condition.", "Novation of buyers." ]
2C
David owned a shotgun that he used for hunting. David knew that his old friend, Mark, had become involved with a violent gang that recently had a shoot-out with a rival gang. David, who was going to a farm to hunt quail, placed his loaded shotgun on the back seat of his car. On his way to the farm, David picked up Mark to give him a ride to a friend's house. up Mark to give him a ride to a friend's house. After dropping off Mark at the friend's house, David proceeded to the farm, where he discovered that his shotgun was missing from his car. Mark had taken the shotgun and, later in the day, Mark used it to shoot Paul, a member of the rival gang. Paul was severely injured. Paul recovered a judgment for his damages against David, as well as Mark, on the ground that David was negligent in allowing Mark to obtain possession of the gun, and was therefore liable jointly and severally with Mark for Paul's damages. The jurisdiction has a statute that allows contribution based upon proportionate fault and adheres to the traditional common-law rules on indemnity. If David fully satisfies the judgment, David then will have a right to recover from Mark
[ "indemnity for the full amount of the judgment, because Mark was an intentional tortfeasor. ", "contribution only, based on comparative fault, because David himself was negligent. ", "one-half of the amount of the judgment.", "nothing, because David's negligence was a substantial proximate cause of the shooting. " ]
0A
The legislature of the state of Chetopah enacted a statute requiring that all law enforcement officers in that state be citizens of the United States. Alien, lawfully admitted to permanent residency five years before the enactment of this statute, sought employment as a forensic pathologist in the Chetopah coroner's office. He was denied such a job solely because he was not a citizen. Alien thereupon brought suit in federal district court against appropriate Chetopah officials seeking to invalidate this citizenship requirement on federal constitutional grounds. The strongest ground upon which to attack this citizenship requirement is that it
[ "constitutes an ex post facto law as to previously admitted aliens.", "deprives an alien of a fundamental right to employment without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.", "denies an alien a right to employment in violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "denies an alien the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." ]
3D
Olwen owned 80 acres of land, fronting on a town road. Two years ago, Olwen sold to Buck the back 40 acres. The 40 acres sold to Buck did not adjoin any public road. Olwen's deed to Buck expressly granted a right-of-way over a specified strip of Olwen's retained 40 acres, so Buck could reach the town road. The deed was promptly and properly recorded. Last year, Buck conveyed the back 40 acres to Sam. They had discussed the right-of-way over Olwen's land to the road, but Buck's deed to Sam made no mention of it. Sam began to use the right-of-way as Buck had, but Olwen use the right-of-way as Buck had, but Olwen sued to enjoin such use by Sam. The court should decide for
[ "Sam, because he has an easement by implication. ", "Sam, because the easement appurtenant passed to him as a result of Buck's deed to him. ", "Olwen, because Buck's easement in gross was not transferable. ", "Olwen, because Buck's deed failed expressly to transfer the right-of-way to Sam. " ]
1B
Dickinson was charged with possession of cocaine. At Dickinson's trial, the prosecution established that, when approached by police on a suburban residential street corner, Dickinson dropped a plastic bag and ran, and that when the police returned to the corner a few minutes later after catching Dickinson, they found a plastic bag containing white powder. Dickinson objects to introduction of this bag (the contents of which would later be established to be cocaine), citing lack of adequate identification. The objection should be
[ "overruled, because there is sufficient evidence to find that the bag was the one Dickinson dropped. ", "overruled, because the objection should have been made on the basis of incomplete chain of custody. ", "sustained, because Dickinson did not have possession of the bag at the time he was arrested. ", "sustained, unless the judge makes a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the bag was the one dropped by Dickinson. " ]
0A
Chemco manufactured a liquid chemical product known as XRX. Some XRX leaked from a storage tank on Chemco's property, seeped into the groundwater, flowed to Farmer's adjacent property, and polluted Farmer's well. Several of Farmer's cows drank the polluted well water and died. If Farmer brings an action against Chemco to recover the value of the cows that died, Farmer will
[ "prevail, because a manufacturer is strictly liable for harm caused by its products. ", "prevail, because the XRX escaped from Chemco's premises. ", "not prevail, unless Farmer can establish that the storage tank was defective. ", "not prevail, unless Chemco failed to exercise reasonable care in storing the XRX. " ]
1B
A threatening telephone call that purports to be from Defendant to Witness is most likely to be admitted against Defendant if
[ "the caller identified himself as Defendant.", "Witness had previously given damaging testimony against Defendant in another lawsuit.", "Witness had given his unlisted number only to Defendant and a few other persons.", "Witness believes that Defendant is capable of making such threats." ]
2C
The open-air amphitheater in the city park of Rightville has been utilized for concerts and other entertainment programs. Until this year, each of the groups performing in that city facility was allowed to make its own arrangements for sound equipment and sound technicians. After recurring complaints from occupants of residential buildings adjacent to the city park about intrusive noise from some performances held in the amphitheater, the Rightville City held in the amphitheater, the Rightville City Council passed an ordinance establishing city control over all sound amplification at all programs held there. The ordinance provided that Rightville's Department of Parks would be the sole provider in the amphitheater of sound amplification equipment and of the technicians to operate the equipment "to ensure a proper balance between the quality of the sound at such performances and respect for the privacy of nearby residential neighbors." Which of the following standards should a court use to determine the constitutionality on its face of this content neutral ordinance?
[ "The ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest, and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression. ", "The ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression. ", "The ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and restricts the expressive rights involved no more than is reasonable under the no more than is reasonable under the circumstances.", "The ordinance is substantially related to a legitimate governmental interest and restricts the expressive rights involved no more than is reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances." ]
0A
Smith and Penn were charged with murder. Each gave a confession to the police that implicated both of them. Smith later retracted her confession, claiming that it was coerced. Smith and Penn were tried together. The prosecutor offered both confessions into evidence. Smith and Penn objected. After a hearing, the trial judge found that both confessions were voluntary and admitted both into evidence. Smith testified at trial. She denied any involvement in the crime and claimed that her confession was false and the result of coercion. Both defendants were convicted. On appeal, Smith contends her conviction should be reversed because of the admission into evidence of Penn's confession. Smith's contention is
[ "correct, unless Penn testified at trial. ", "correct, whether or not Penn testified at trial. ", "incorrect, because Smith testified in her own behalf. ", "incorrect, because Smith's own confession was properly admitted into evidence. " ]
0A
The state of Orrington wanted to prevent its only major league baseball team, the privately owned and operated Orrington Opossums, from moving to the rival state of Atrium. After a heated political debate in the legislature, a heated political debate in the legislature, Orrington enacted legislation providing for a one-time grant of $10 million in state funds to the Opossums to cover part of the projected income losses the team would suffer during the next five years if it remained in that state. The legislation required that the team remain in the state for at least ten years if it accepted the grant. After accepting the grant, the owners of the Opossums decided to build a new $150 million stadium in Orrington. As plans for the construction of the new stadium proceeded, it became evident that all of the contractors and subcontractors would be white males, and that they had been chosen by the owners of the Opossums without any public bids because these contractors and subcontractors had successfully built the only other new baseball stadium in the region. Several contractors who were females or members of minority racial groups filed suit against the owners of the Opossums in federal district court to compel public solicitation of bids for the construction of its new stadium on an equal opportunity basis, and to enjoin construction of the stadium until compliance was ensured. Their only claim was that the contracting practices of the owners of the Opossums denied them the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this suit, the court will probably rule that
[ "the nexus between the actions of the owners of the Opossums and the onetime grant of monies to them by the state is sufficiently substantial to subject their actions to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment.", "the intense public preoccupation with the activities of major league baseball teams coupled with the fact that baseball is considered to be our national pastime is sufficient to justify application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the activities of major league teams.", "in the absence of additional evidence of state involvement in the operations or decisions of the owners of the Opossums, a onetime grant of state Opossums, a onetime grant of state monies to them is insufficient to warrant treating their actions as subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. ", "the issues presented by this case are nonjusticiable political questions because there is a lack of judicially manageable standards to resolve them and they are likely to be deeply involved in partisan politics." ]
2C
Walker, who knew nothing about horses, inherited Aberlone, a thoroughbred colt whose disagreeable behavior made him a pest around the barn. Walker sold the colt for $1,500 to Sherwood, an experienced racehorse-trainer who knew of Walker's ignorance about horses. At the time of sale, Walker said to Sherwood, "I hate to say it, but this horse is said to Sherwood, "I hate to say it, but this horse is bad-tempered and nothing special." For this question only, assume that soon after the sale, Aberlone won three races and earned $400,000 for Sherwood. Which of the following additional facts, if established by Walker, would best support his chance of obtaining rescission of the sale to Sherwood?
[ "Walker did not know until after the sale that Sherwood was an experienced racehorse-trainer.", "At a pre-sale exercise session of which Sherwood knew that Walker was not aware, Sherwood clocked Aberlone in record-setting time, far surpassing any previous performance. ", "Aberlone was the only thoroughbred that Walker owned, and Walker did not know how to evaluate young and untested racehorses. ", "At the time of the sale, Walker was angry and upset over an incident in which Aberlone had reared and thrown a rider. " ]
1B
Walker, who knew nothing about horses, inherited Aberlone, a thoroughbred colt whose disagreeable behavior made him a pest around the barn. Walker sold the colt for $1,500 to Sherwood, an experienced racehorse-trainer who knew of Walker's ignorance about horses. At the time of sale, Walker said to Sherwood, "I hate to say it, but this horse is said to Sherwood, "I hate to say it, but this horse is bad-tempered and nothing special." Which one of the following scenarios would best support an action by Sherwood, rather than Walker, to rescind the sale?
[ "In his first race after the sale, Aberlone galloped to a huge lead but dropped dead 100 yards from the finish line because of a rare congenital heart defect that was undiscoverable except by autopsy. ", "Aberlone won $5 million for Sherwood over a three-year racing career but upon being retired was found to be incurably sterile and useless as a breeder.", "After Aberlone had won three races for Sherwood, it was discovered that by clerical error, unknown to either party, Aberlone's official birth registration listed an undistinguished racehorse as the sire rather than the famous racehorse that in fact was the sire. ", "A week after the sale, Aberlone went berserk and inflicted injuries upon Sherwood that required his hospitalization for six months and a full hospitalization for six months and a full year for his recovery. " ]
0A
Sixty years ago by a properly executed and recorded deed, Albert conveyed Greenacre, a tract of land: "To Louis for life, then to Louis's widow for her life, then to Louis's child or children in equal shares." At that time, Louis, who was Albert's grandson, was six years old. Shortly thereafter, Albert died testate. Louis was his only heir at law. Albert's will left his entire estate to First Church. Twenty-five years ago, when he was 41, Louis married Maria who was then 20 years old; they had one child, Norman. Maria and Norman were killed in an automobile accident three years ago when Norman was 21. Norman died testate, leaving his entire estate to the American Red Cross. His father, Louis, was Norman's sole heir at law. Two years ago, Louis married Zelda. They had no children. This year, Louis died testate, survived by his widow, Zelda, to whom he left his entire estate. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is unchanged by statute in the jurisdiction. In an appropriate action to determine the ownership of Greenacre, the court should find that title is vested in
[ "First Church, because the widow of Louis was unborn at the time of conveyance and, hence, the remainder violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. ", "Zelda, because her life estate and her inheritance from Louis (who was Albert's sole heir at law and who was Norman's sole heir at law) merged the entire title in her. ", "the American Red Cross, because Norman had a vested remainder interest (as the only child of Louis) that it (as the only child of Louis) that it inherited, the life estate to Louis's widow being of no force and effect. ", "Zelda for life under the terms of Albert's deed, with the remainder to the American Red Cross as the successor in interest to Norman, Louis's only child. " ]
3D
In an automobile collision case brought by Poe against Davies, Poe introduced evidence that Ellis made an excited utterance that Davies ran the red light. Davies called Witt to testify that later Ellis, a bystander, now deceased, told Witt that Davies went through a yellow light. Witt's testimony should be
[ "excluded, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ", "excluded, because Ellis is not available to explain or deny the inconsistency. ", "admitted only for the purpose of impeaching Ellis.", "admitted as impeachment and as substantive evidence of the color of the light." ]
2C
Plaintiff, a jockey, was seriously injured in a race when another jockey, Daring, cut too sharply in front of her without adequate clearance. The two horses collided, causing Plaintiff to fall to the ground, sustaining injury. The State Racetrack Commission ruled that, by cutting in too sharply, Daring committed a foul in violation of racetrack rules requiring adequate clearance for crossing lanes. Plaintiff has brought an action against Daring for damages in which one count is based on battery. Will Plaintiff prevail on the battery claim?
[ "Yes, if Daring was reckless in cutting across in front of Plaintiff's horse. ", "Yes, because the State Racetrack Commission determined that Daring committed a foul in violation of rules applicable to racing. ", "No, unless Daring intended to cause impermissible contact between the two impermissible contact between the two horses or apprehension of such contact by Plaintiff. ", "No, because Plaintiff assumed the risk of accidental injury inherent in riding as a jockey in a horse race. " ]
2C
Able entered into a written contract with Baker to sell Greenacre. The contract was dated June 19 and called for a closing date on the following August 19. There was no other provision in the contract concerning the closing date. The contract contained the following clause: "subject to the purchaser, Baker, obtaining a satisfactory mortgage at the current rate." On the date provided for closing, Baker advised Able that he was unable to close because his mortgage application was still being processed by a bank. Able desired to declare the contract at an end and consulted his attorney in regard to his legal position. Which of the following are relevant in advising Able of his legal position? I. Is time of the essence? II. Parol evidence rule. III. Statute of Frauds. IV. Specific performance.
[ "I and III only.", "II and IV only.", "II, III, and IV only. ", "I, II, III, and IV. " ]
3D
Lester was engaged to marry Sylvia. One evening, Lester became enraged at the comments of Sylvia's eight-year-old daughter, Cynthia, who was complaining, in her usual fashion, that she did not want her mother to marry Lester. Lester, who had had too much to drink, began beating her. Cynthia suffered some bruises and a broken arm. Sylvia took Cynthia to the hospital. The police were notified by the hospital staff. Lester was notified by the hospital staff. Lester was indicted for felony child abuse. Lester pleaded with Sylvia to forgive him and to run away with him. She agreed. They moved out of state and took Cynthia with them. Without the testimony of the child, the prosecution was forced to dismiss the case. Some time later, Sylvia returned for a visit with her family and was arrested and indicted as an accessory-after-the-fact to child abuse. At her trial, the court should
[ "dismiss the charge, because Lester had not been convicted. ", "dismiss the charge, because the evidence shows that any aid she rendered occurred after the crime was completed. ", "submit the case to the jury, on an instruction to convict only if Sylvia knew Lester had been indicted. ", "submit the case to the jury, on an instruction to convict only if her purpose in moving was to prevent Lester's conviction. " ]
3D
In response to massive layoffs of employees of automobile assembly plants located in the state of Ames, the legislature of that state enacted a statute which prohibits the parking of automobiles manufactured outside of the United States in any parking lot or parking structure that is owned or operated by the state or any of its instrumentalities. This statute does not apply to parking on public streets. Which of the following is the strongest argument with which to challenge the constitutionality of this statute?
[ "The statute imposes an undue burden on foreign commerce.", "The statute denies the owners of foreignmade automobiles the equal protection of the laws.", "The statute deprives the owners of foreign-made automobiles of liberty or property without due process of law.", "The statute is inconsistent with the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ]
0A
Pate sued Dr. Doke for psychiatric malpractice and called Dr. Will as an expert witness. During Will's direct testimony, Will identified a text as a reliable authority in the field. He seeks to read to the jury passages from this book on which he had relied in forming his opinion on the proper standard of care. The passage is
[ "admissible, as a basis for his opinion and as substantive evidence of the proper standard of care. ", "admissible, as a basis for his opinion but not as substantive evidence of the proper standard of care. ", "inadmissible, because a witness's credibility cannot be supported unless attacked. ", "inadmissible, because the passage should be received as an exhibit and not read to the jury by the witness." ]
0A
The Daily Sun, a newspaper, printed an article that stated: Kitchen, the popular restaurant on the town square, has closed its doors. Kitchen employees have told the Daily Sun that the closing resulted from the owner's belief that Kitchen's general manager has embezzled thousands of dollars from the restaurant over the last several years. A decision on reopening the restaurant will be made after the completion of an audit of Kitchen's books. Plaintiff, who is Kitchen's general manager, brought a libel action against the Daily Sun based on the publication of this article. The parties stipulated that Plaintiff never embezzled any funds from Kitchen. They also stipulated that Plaintiff is well known among many people in the community because of his job with Kitchen. The case went to trial before a jury. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict in its favor, made at the close of the evidence, should be granted if the
[ "record contains no evidence that Plaintiff suffered special harm as a result of the publication.", "record contains no evidence that the defendant was negligent as to the truth or falsity of the charge of embezzlement.", "evidence is not clear and convincing that the defendant published the article with \"actual malice.\" ", "record contains uncontradicted evidence that the article accurately reported what the employees told the Daily Sun." ]
1B
Surgeon performed a sterilization operation on Patient. After the surgery, Surgeon performed a test that showed that Patient's fallopian tubes a test that showed that Patient's fallopian tubes were not severed, as was necessary for sterilization. Surgeon did not reveal the failure of the operation to Patient, who three years later became pregnant and delivered a baby afflicted with a severe birth defect that will require substantial medical care throughout its life. The birth defect resulted from a genetic defect unknown to, and undiscoverable by, Surgeon. Patient brought an action on her own behalf against Surgeon, seeking to recover the cost of her medical care for the delivery of the baby, and the baby's extraordinary future medical expenses for which Patient will be responsible. Which of the following questions is relevant to the lawsuit and currently most difficult to answer?
[ "Did Surgeon owe a duty of care to the baby in respect to medical services rendered to Patient three years before the baby was conceived?", "Can a person recover damages for a life burdened by a severe birth defect based on a physician's wrongful failure to prevent that person's birth from occurring?", "Did Surgeon owe a duty to Patient to inform her that the sterilization operation had failed?", "Is Patient entitled to recover damages for the baby's extraordinary future medical expenses?" ]
3D
Robert walked into a store that had a checkcashing service and tried to cash a $550 check which was payable to him. The attendant on duty refused to cash the check because Robert did not have two forms of identification, which the store's policies required. Robert, who had no money except for the check and who needed cash to pay for food and a place to sleep, became agitated. He put his hand into his pocket and growled, "Give me the money or I'll start shooting." The attendant, who knew Robert as a neighborhood character, did not believe that he was violent or had a gun. However, because the attendant felt sorry for Robert, he handed over the cash. Robert left the check on the counter and departed. The attendant picked up the check and found that Robert had failed to endorse it. If Robert is guilty of any crime, he is most likely guilty of
[ "robbery.", "attempted robbery.", "theft by false pretenses.", "larceny by trick." ]
1B
Kabb, the owner of a fleet of taxis, contracted with Petrol, a dealer in petroleum products, for the purchase and sale of Kabb's total requirements of gasoline and oil for one year. As part of that agreement, Petrol also agreed with Kabb that for one year Petrol would place all his advertising with Ada Artiste, Kabb's wife, who owned her own small advertising agency. When Artiste was informed of the Kabb-Petrol contract, she declined to accept an advertising account from the Deturgid Soap Company because she could not handle both the Petrol and Deturgid accounts during the same year. For this question only, assume the following facts. During the first month of the contract, Kabb purchased substantial amounts of his gasoline from a supplier other than Petrol, and Petrol thereupon notified Artiste that he would no longer place his advertising with her agency. In an action against Petrol for breach of contract, Artiste probably will
[ "succeed, because she is a third-party beneficiary of the Kabb-Petrol contract. ", "succeed, because Kabb was acting as Artiste's agent when he contracted with Petrol. ", "not succeed, because the failure of a constructive condition precedent excused Petrol's duty to place his advertising with Artiste. ", "not succeed, because Artiste did not provide any consideration to support Petrol's promise to place his advertising with her. " ]
2C
Kabb, the owner of a fleet of taxis, contracted with Petrol, a dealer in petroleum products, for the purchase and sale of Kabb's total requirements of gasoline and oil for one year. As part of that agreement, Petrol also agreed with Kabb that for one year Petrol would place all his advertising with Ada Artiste, Kabb's wife, who owned her own small advertising agency. When Artiste was informed of the Kabb-Petrol contract, she declined to accept an advertising account from the Deturgid Soap Company because she could not handle both the Petrol and Deturgid accounts during the same year. For this question only, make the following assumptions. Artiste was an intended beneficiary under the Kabb-Petrol contract. Kabb performed his contract with Petrol for six months, and during that time Petrol placed his advertising with Artiste. At the end of the six months, Kabb and Artiste were divorced, and Kabb then told Petrol that he had no further obligation to place his advertising with Artiste. Petrol thereupon notified Artiste that he would no longer place his advertising with her. In an action against Petrol for breach of contract, Artiste probably will
[ "succeed, because, on the facts of this case, Petrol and Kabb could not, without Artiste's consent, modify their contract so as to discharge Petrol's duties to Artiste. ", "succeed, because Kabb acted in bad faith in releasing Petrol from his duty with respect to Artiste. ", "not succeed, because, absent a provision in the contract to the contrary, the promisor and promisee of a third-party beneficiary contract retain by law the right to modify or terminate the contract. ", "not succeed, because the agency relationship, if any, between Kabb and Artiste terminated upon their divorce. " ]
0A
76. Drew, the owner of a truck leasing company, asked Pat, one of Drew's employees, to deliver $1,000 to the dealership's main office. The following week, as a result of a dispute over whether the money had been delivered, Drew instructed Pat to come to the office to submit to a lie detector test. When Pat reported to Drew's office for the test, it was not administered. Instead, without hearing Pat's story, Drew shouted at him, hearing Pat's story, Drew shouted at him, "You're a thief!" and fired him. Drew's shout was overheard by several other employees who were in another office, which was separated from Drew's office by a thin partition. The next day, Pat accepted another job at a higher salary. Several weeks later, upon discovering that the money had not been stolen, Drew offered to rehire Pat. In a suit for slander by Pat against Drew, Pat will
[ "prevail, because Pat was fraudulently induced to go to the office for a lie detector test, which was not, in fact, given. ", "prevail, if Drew should have foreseen that the statement would be overheard by other employees. ", "not prevail, if Drew made the charge in good faith, believing it to be true. ", "not prevail, because the statement was made to Pat alone and intended for his ears only. " ]
1B
Adam owns his home, Blackacre, which was mortgaged to Bank by a duly recorded purchase money mortgage. Last year, Adam purchase money mortgage. Last year, Adam replaced all of Blackacre's old windows with new windows. Each new window consists of a window frame with three inserts: regular windows, storm windows, and screens. The windows are designed so that each insert can be easily inserted or removed from the window frame without tools to adjust to seasonal change and to facilitate the cleaning of the inserts. The new windows were expensive. Adam purchased them on credit, signed a financing statement, and granted a security interest in the windows to Vend, the supplier of the windows. Vend promptly and properly filed and recorded the financing statement before the windows were installed. Adam stored the old windows in the basement of Blackacre. This year, Adam has suffered severe financial reverses and has defaulted on his mortgage obligation to Bank and on his obligation to Vend. Bank brought an appropriate action to enjoin Vend from its proposed repossession of the Vend from its proposed repossession of the window inserts. In the action, the court should rule for
[ "Bank, because its mortgage was recorded first. ", "Bank, because windows and screens, no matter their characteristics, are an integral part of a house. ", "Vend, because the inserts are removable. ", "Vend, because the availability of the old windows enables Bank to return Blackacre to its original condition. " ]
2C
In a suit by Palmer against Denby, Palmer sought to subpoena an audiotape on which Denby had narrated his version of the dispute for his attorney. Counsel for Denby moves to quash the subpoena on the ground of privilege. The audiotape is most likely to be subject to subpoena if
[ "Denby played the audiotape for his father to get his reactions.", "the lawsuit involved alleged criminal behavior by Denby.", "Denby has been deposed and there is good reason to believe that the audiotape may contain inconsistent statements.", "Denby is deceased and thus unavailable to give testimony in person." ]
0A
The National Ecological Balance Act prohibits the destruction or removal of any wild animals located on lands owned by the United States without express permission from the Federal Bureau of Land Management. Violators are subject to fines of up to $1,000 per offense. After substantial property damage was inflicted on residents of the state of Arkota by hungry coyotes, the state legislature passed the Coyote Bounty Bill, which offers $25 for each coyote killed or captured within the state. The Kota National Forest, owned by the federal government, is located entirely within the state of Arkota. Many coyotes live in the Kota National Forest. National Forest. Without seeking permission from the Bureau of Land Management, Hunter shot several coyotes in the Kota National Forest and collected the bounty from the state of Arkota. As a result, he was subsequently tried in federal district court, convicted, and fined $1,000 for violating the National Ecological Balance Act. Hunter appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals should hold the National Ecological Balance Act, as applied to Hunter, to be
[ "constitutional, because the property clause of Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution authorizes such federal statutory controls and sanctions. ", "constitutional, because Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact all laws necessary and proper to advance the general welfare. ", "unconstitutional, because Congress may not use its delegated powers to override the Tenth Amendment right of the state of Arkota to legislate in areas of traditional state governmental functions, such as the protection of the property of its residents. ", "unconstitutional, because Congress violates the full faith and credit clause of Article IV when it punishes conduct that has been authorized by state action. " ]
0A
A kidnapping statute in State A makes it a crime for a person, including a parent, to "take a child from the custody of his custodial parent, knowing he has no privilege to do so." After a bitter court battle Ann and Dave were divorced and Ann was given custody of their daughter, Maria. Dave later moved to State B where he brought an action to obtain custody of Maria. A local judge awarded him custody. His attorney incorrectly advised him that, under this award, he was entitled to take Maria away from Ann. Dave drove to State A, picked Maria up at her preschool, and took her back to State B with him. He was indicted for kidnapping in State A, extradited from State B, and tried. At trial, he testified that he had relied on his attorney's advice in taking Maria, and that at the time he believed his conduct was not illegal. If the jury believes his testimony, Dave should be
[ "acquitted, because he acted on the advice of an attorney. ", "acquitted, because he lacked a necessary mental element of the crime. ", "convicted, because reliance on an attorney's advice is not a defense. ", "convicted, provided a reasonable person (D) convicted, provided a reasonable person would have known that the attorney's advice was erroneous. " ]
1B
Owen, the owner of Greenacre, a tract of land, mortgaged Greenacre to ABC Bank to secure his preexisting obligation to ABC Bank. The mortgage was promptly and properly recorded. Owen and Newton then entered into a valid written contract for the purchase and sale of Greenacre, which provided for the transfer of "a marketable title, free of encumbrances." The contract did not expressly refer to the mortgage. Shortly after entering into the contract, Newton found another property that much better suited her needs and decided to try to avoid her contract with Owen. When Newton discovered the existence of the mortgage, she asserted that the title was encumbered and that she would not close. Owen responded by offering to provide for payment and discharge of the mortgage at the closing from the proceeds of the closing. Newton refused to go forward, and Owen brought an appropriate action against her for specific performance. If the court holds for Owen in this action, it will most likely be because
[ "the mortgage is not entitled to priority because it was granted for preexisting obligations.", "the doctrine of equitable conversion supports the result.", "Owen's arrangements for the payment of the mortgage fully satisfied Owen's obligation to deliver marketable title.", "the existence of the mortgage was not Newton's real reason for refusing to close." ]
2C
Pawn sued Dalton for injuries received when she fell down a stairway in Dalton's apartment building. Pawn, a guest in the building, alleged that she caught the heel of her shoe in a tear in the stair carpet. Pawn calls Witt, a tenant, to testify that Young, another tenant, had said to him a week before Pawn's fall: "When I paid my rent this morning, I told the manager he my rent this morning, I told the manager he had better fix that torn carpet." Young's statement, reported by Witt, is
[ "admissible, to prove that the carpet was defective. ", "admissible, to prove that Dalton had notice of the defect. ", "admissible, to prove both that the carpet was defective and that Dalton had notice of the defect. ", "inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. " ]
3D
A law of the state of Wonatol imposed a generally applicable sales tax payable by the vendor. That law exempted from its provisions the sale of "all magazines, periodicals, newspapers, and books." In order to raise additional revenue, the state legislature eliminated that broad exemption and substituted a narrower exemption. The new, narrower exemption excluded from the state sales tax only the sale of those "magazines, periodicals, newspapers, and books that are published or distributed by a recognized published or distributed by a recognized religious faith and that consist wholly of writings sacred to such a religious faith." Magazine is a monthly publication devoted to history and politics. Magazine paid under protest the sales tax due on its sales according to the amended sales tax law. Magazine then filed suit against the state in an appropriate state court for a refund of the sales taxes paid. It contended that the state's elimination of the earlier, broader exemption and adoption of the new, narrower exemption restricted to sacred writings of recognized religious faiths violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. In this case, the court will probably rule that
[ "Magazine lacks standing to sue for a refund of sales taxes imposed by a generally applicable state law because Article III of the Constitution precludes taxpayers from bringing such suits. taxpayers from bringing such suits.", "the Eleventh Amendment bars the state court from exercising jurisdiction over this suit in the absence of a law of Wonatol expressly waiving the state's immunity.", "the new, narrower exemption from the state sales tax law violates the establishment clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments by granting preferential state support to recognized religious faiths for the communication of their religious beliefs. ", "the new, narrower exemption from the state sales tax law violates the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it imposes a prior restraint on nonreligious publications that are required to pay the tax. " ]
2C
Defendant was prosecuted for bankruptcy fraud. Defendant's wife, now deceased, had testified adversely to Defendant during earlier bankruptcy proceedings that involved similar issues. Although the wife had been crossexamined, no serious effort was made to challenge her credibility despite the availability of significant impeachment information. At the fraud trial, the prosecutor offers into evidence the testimony given by Defendant's wife at the bankruptcy proceeding. This evidence should be
[ "admitted, under the hearsay exception for former testimony. ", "admitted, because it is a statement by a person identified with a party. ", "excluded, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ", "excluded, because Defendant has the right to prevent use of his spouse's testimony against him in a criminal case." ]
0A
Mermaid owns an exceptionally seaworthy boat that she charters for sport fishing at a $500 daily rate. The fee includes the use of the boat with Mermaid as the captain, and one other crew member, as well as fishing tackle and bait. On May 1, Phinney agreed with Mermaid that Phinney would have the full-day use of the boat on May 15 for himself and his family for $500. Phinney paid an advance deposit of $200 and signed an agreement that the deposit could be retained by Mermaid as liquidated damages in the event Phinney canceled or failed to appear. For this question only, assume the following facts. At the time of contracting, Mermaid told Phinney to be at the dock at 5 a.m. on May 15. Phinney and his family, however, did not show up on May 15 until noon. Meantime, Mermaid agreed at 10 a.m. to take Tess and her family out fishing for the rest of the day. Tess had happened to come by and inquire about the possibility of such an outing. In view of the late hour, Mermaid charged Tess $400 and stayed out two hours beyond the customary return time. Phinney's failure to appear until noon was due to the fact that he had been trying to charter another boat across the bay at a lower rate and had gotten lost after he was unsuccessful in getting such a charter. Which of the following is an accurate statement concerning the rights of the parties?
[ "Mermaid can retain the $200 paid by Phinney, because it would be difficult for Mermaid to establish her actual damages and the sum appears to have been a reasonable forecast in light of anticipated loss of profit from the charter. ", "Mermaid is entitled to retain only $50 (10% of the contract price) and must return $150 to Phinney.", "Mermaid must return $100 to Phinney in order to avoid her own unjust enrichment at Phinney's expense.", "Mermaid must return $100 to Phinney, because the liquidated-damage clause under the circumstances would operate as a penalty. " ]
0A
Mermaid owns an exceptionally seaworthy boat that she charters for sport fishing at a $500 daily rate. The fee includes the use of the boat with Mermaid as the captain, and one other crew member, as well as fishing tackle and bait. On May 1, Phinney agreed with Mermaid that Phinney would have the full-day use of the boat on May 15 for himself and his family for $500. Phinney paid an advance deposit of $200 and signed an agreement that the deposit could be retained by Mermaid as liquidated damages in the event Phinney canceled or failed to appear. For this question only, assume the following facts. On May 15 at 1 a.m., the Coast Guard had issued offshore "heavy weather" warnings and prohibited all small vessels the size of Mermaid's from leaving the harbor. This prohibition remained in effect throughout the day. Phinney did not appear at all on May 15, because he had heard the weather warnings on his radio. Which of the following is an accurate statement?
[ "The contract is discharged because of impossibility, and Phinney is entitled to return of his deposit. ", "The contract is discharged because of mutual mistake concerning an essential fact, and Phinney is entitled to return of his deposit. ", "The contract is not discharged, because its performance was possible in view of the exceptional seaworthiness of Mermaid's boat, and Phinney is not entitled to return of his deposit. ", "The contract is not discharged, and Phinney is not entitled to return of his deposit, because the liquidated-damage clause in effect allocated the risk of bad weather to Phinney. " ]
0A
Eight years ago, Orben, prior to moving to a distant city, conveyed Blackacre, an isolated farm, to his son, Sam, by a quitclaim deed. Sam paid no consideration. Sam, who was 19 years old, without formal education, and without experience in business, took possession of Blackacre and operated the farm but neglected to record his deed. Subsequently, Orben conveyed Blackacre to Fred by warranty deed. Fred, a substantial land and timber promoter, paid valuable consideration for the deed to him. He was unaware of Sam's possession, his quitclaim deed, or his relationship to Orben. Fred promptly and properly recorded his deed and began removing timber from the land. Immediately removing timber from the land. Immediately upon learning of Fred's actions, Sam recorded his deed and brought an appropriate action to enjoin Fred from removing the timber and to quiet title in Sam. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law." In this action, Fred should
[ "prevail, because a warranty deed for valuable consideration takes priority over a quitclaim deed without consideration. ", "prevail, because Orben's subsequent conveyance to Fred revoked the gift to Sam. ", "lose, because Sam's possession charged Fred with notice. ", "lose, because the equities favor Sam. " ]
2C
Brown owned Blackacre, a tract of undeveloped land. Blackacre abuts Whiteacre, a tract of land owned by Agency, the state's governmental energy agency. At Whiteacre, Agency has operated a waste-to-electricity recycling facility for 12 years. Blackacre and Whiteacre are in a remote area and Whiteacre is the only developed parcel of real estate within a ten-mile radius. The boundary line between Blackacre and Whiteacre had never been surveyed or marked on the face of the earth. During the past 12 years, some of the trucks bringing waste to the Agency facility have dumped their loads so that the piles of waste extend from Whiteacre onto a portion of Blackacre. However, prior to the four-week period during each calendar year when the Agency facility is closed for inspection and repairs, the waste piles are reduced to minimal levels so that during each of the four-week closures no waste was, in fact, piled on Blackacre. Neither Brown nor any representative of Agency knew the facts about the relation of the boundary line to the waste piles. The time for acquiring title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is ten years. Last year, Brown died, and his son, Silas, succeeded him as the owner of Blackacre. Silas became aware of the facts, demanded that Agency stop using Blackacre for the piling of waste, and, when Agency refused his demand, brought an appropriate action to enjoin any such use of Blackacre in the future. If Agency prevails in that action, it will be because
[ "the facts constitute adverse possession and title to the portion of Blackacre concerned has vested in Agency.", "Brown's failure to keep himself informed as to Agency's use of Blackacre and his failure to object constituted implied consent to the continuation of that use. consent to the continuation of that use.", "the interest of the public in the conversion of waste to energy overrides any entitlement of Silas to equitable remedies.", "the power of eminent domain of the state makes the claim of Silas moot." ]
0A
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He had been stopped while driving a car and several pounds of cocaine were found in the trunk. In his opening statement, defendant's counsel asserted that his client had no key to the trunk and no knowledge of its contents. The prosecutor offers the state motor vehicle registration, shown to have been found in the glove compartment of the car, listing Defendant as the owner. The registration should be
[ "admitted, as a statement against interest. ", "admitted, as evidence of Defendant's close connection with the car and, therefore, knowledge of its contents. ", "excluded, unless authenticated by (C) excluded, unless authenticated by testimony of or certification by a state official charged with custody of vehicle registration records. ", "excluded, as hearsay not within any exception. " ]
1B
Donald was arrested in Marilyn's apartment after her neighbors had reported sounds of a struggle and the police had arrived to find Donald bent over Marilyn's prostrate body. Marilyn was rushed to the hospital where she lapsed into a coma. Despite the explanation that he was trying to revive Marilyn after she suddenly collapsed, Donald was charged with attempted rape and assault after a neighbor informed the police that she had heard Marilyn sobbing, "No, please no, let me alone." At trial, the forensic evidence was inconclusive. The jury acquitted Donald of attempted rape but convicted him of assault. While he was serving his sentence for assault, Marilyn, who had never recovered from the coma, died. Donald was then indicted and tried on a charge of felony murder. In this common-law jurisdiction, there is no statute that prevents a prosecutor from proceeding in this manner, but Donald argued that a second trial for felony murder after his original trial for attempted rape and assault would violate the double jeopardy clause. His claim is
[ "correct, because he was acquitted of the attempted rape charge. ", "correct, because he was convicted of the assault charge. ", "incorrect, because Marilyn had not died at the time of the first trial and he was not placed in jeopardy for murder. ", "incorrect, because he was convicted of the assault charge. " ]
0A
Ogle owned Greenacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. Five years ago, he executed and delivered to Lilly an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed that conveyed Greenacre to Lilly "for and during the term of her natural life." No other estate or interest or person taking an interest was mentioned. Lilly took possession of Greenacre and has remained in possession. Fifteen months ago, Ogle died, leaving a will that has been duly admitted to probate. The will, inter alia, had the following provision: "I devise Greenacre to Mina for her natural life and from and after Mina's death to Rex, his heirs and assigns, forever." Administration of Ogle's estate has been completed. Mina claims the immediate right to possession of Greenacre. Rex also asserts a right to immediate possession. In an appropriate lawsuit to which Lilly, Mina, and Rex are parties, who should be adjudged to have the right to immediate possession?
[ "Lilly, because no subsequent act of Ogle would affect her life estate. ", "Mina, because Ogle's will was the final and definitive expression of his intent. ", "Mina, because Lilly's estate terminated with the death of Ogle. ", "Rex, because Lilly's estate terminated with Ogle's death and all that Ogle had was the right to transfer his reversion in fee simple. " ]
0A
Devlin was charged with murder. Several witnesses testified that the crime was committed by a person of Devlin's general description who walked with a severe limp. Devlin in fact walks with a severe limp. He objected to a prosecution request that the court order him to walk across the courtroom in order to display his limp to the jury to assist it in determining whether Devlin was the person that the witnesses had seen. Devlin's objection will most likely be
[ "sustained, because the order sought by the prosecution would violate Devlin's privilege against self-incrimination. ", "sustained, because the order sought by the prosecution would constitute an illegal search and seizure. ", "denied, because the order sought by the prosecution is a legitimate part of a proper courtroom identification process. ", "denied, because a criminal defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy. " ]
2C
A statute of the state of Kiowa provided state monetary grants to private dance, theater, and opera groups located in that state. The statute required recipients of such grants to use the granted monies for the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of appropriate facilities for the public performance of their performing arts. The last section of the statute conditioned the award of each such grant on the recipient's agreement to refrain from all kinds of political lobbying calculated to secure additional tax support for the performing arts. The strongest constitutional basis for an attack upon the validity of the last section of the statute would be based upon the
[ "commerce clause.", "obligation of contracts clause.", "Fifth Amendment.", "First and Fourteenth Amendments." ]
3D
Penkov suffered a severe loss when his manufacturing plant, located in a shallow ravine, was flooded during a sustained rainfall. The flooding occurred because City had failed to maintain its storm drain, which was located on City land above Penkov's premises, and because Railroad had failed to maintain its storm drain, which was located on Railroad land below Penkov's premises. The flooding would not have occurred if either one of the two storm drains had been maintained properly. Penkov sued Railroad to recover compensation for his loss. The evidence in the case established that the failures of the two drains were caused by the respective negligence of City and Railroad. There is no special rule City and Railroad. There is no special rule insulating City from liability. In his action against Railroad, Penkov should recover
[ "nothing, because he should have joined City, without whose negligence he would have suffered no loss. ", "nothing, unless he introduces evidence that enables the court reasonably to apportion responsibility between City and Railroad. ", "one-half his loss, in the absence of evidence that enables the court to allocate responsibility fairly between City and Railroad. ", "all of his loss, because but for Railroad's negligence none of the flooding would have occurred. " ]
3D
Smith asked Jones if he would loan him $500, promising to repay the amount within two weeks. Jones loaned him the $500. The next day Smith took the money to the race track and lost all of it betting on horse races. He then left town for six months. He has not repaid Jones. Smith has committed
[ "both larceny by trick and obtaining money by false pretenses (although he can only be convicted of one offense).", "larceny by trick only.", "obtaining money by false pretenses only.", "neither larceny by trick nor obtaining money by false pretenses." ]
3D
Assume that Congress passed and the President signed the following statute: "The appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court shall not extend to any case involving the constitutionality of any state statute limiting the circumstances in which a statute limiting the circumstances in which a woman may obtain an abortion, or involving the constitutionality of this statute." The strongest argument against the constitutionality of this statute is that
[ "Congress may not exercise its authority over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a way that seriously interferes with the establishment of a supreme and uniform body of federal constitutional law.", "Congress may only regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases initially arising in federal courts.", "the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may only be altered by constitutional amendment.", "the statute violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ]
0A
The federal statute admitting the state of Blue to the Union granted Blue certain public lands, and established some very ambiguous conditions on the subsequent disposition of these lands by Blue. This federal statute also required the new state to write those exact same conditions into its state constitution. One same conditions into its state constitution. One hundred years later, a statute of Blue dealing with the sale of these public lands was challenged in a state court lawsuit on the ground that it was inconsistent with the conditions contained in the federal statute, and with the provisions of the Blue Constitution that exactly copy the conditions contained in the federal statute. The trial court decision in this case was appealed to the Blue Supreme Court. In its opinion, the Blue Supreme Court dealt at length with the ambiguous language of the federal statute and with cases interpreting identical language in federal statutes admitting other states to the union. The Blue Supreme Court opinion did not discuss the similar provisions of the Blue Constitution, but it did hold that the challenged Blue statute is invalid because it is "inconsistent with the language of the federal statute and therefore is inconsistent with the identical provisions of our state constitution." If the losing party in the Blue Supreme Court seeks review of the decision of that court in the United States Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court should
[ "accept the case for review and determine the validity and interpretation of the federal statute if it is an important and substantial question.", "ask the Blue Supreme Court to indicate more clearly whether it relied on the state constitutional provision in rendering its decision.", "decline to review the case on the ground that the decision of the Blue Supreme Court rests on an adequate and independent state ground.", "decline to review the case because a decision by a state supreme court concerning the proper disposition of state public lands is not reviewable by the United States Supreme Court." ]
0A
Trawf, the manager of a state fair, contracted 100. with Schweinebauch, a renowned hog breeder, to exhibit Schweinebauch's world champion animal, Megahawg, for the three weeks of the annual fair, at the conclusion of which Schweinebauch would receive an honorarium of $300. Two days before the opening of the fair, Megahawg took sick with boarsitis, a communicable disease among swine, and, under the applicable state quarantine law, very probably could not be exhibited for at least a month. Upon learning this, Trawf can legally pursue which of the following courses of action with respect to his contract with Schweinebauch?
[ "Suspend his own performance, demand assurances from Schweinebauch, and treat a failure by Schweinebauch to give them as an actionable repudiation. ", "Suspend his own performance and recover damages from Schweinebauch for breach of contract unless Schweinebauch at once supplies an undiseased hog of exhibition quality as a substitute for Megahawg.", "Terminate his own performance and treat Megahawg's illness as discharging all remaining duties under the contract.", "Terminate the contract, but only if he (Trawf) seeks promptly to obtain for the exhibit a suitable substitute for Megahawg from another hog owner. " ]
2C
The manager of a department store noticed that Paula was carrying a scarf with her as she examined various items in the blouse department. The manager recognized the scarf as an expensive one carried by the store. Paula was trying to find a blouse that matched a color in the scarf, and, after a while, found one. The manager then saw Paula put the scarf into her purse, pay for the blouse, and head for the door. The manager, who was eight inches taller than Paula, blocked Paula's way to the door and asked to see the scarf in Paula's purse. Paula produced the scarf, as well as a receipt for it, showing that it had been purchased from the store on the previous day. The manager then told Paula there was no problem, and stepped out of her way. If Paula brings a claim against the store based on false imprisonment, the store's best defense would be that
[ "by carrying the scarf in public view and then putting it into her purse, Paula assumed the risk of being detained. ", "the manager had a reasonable belief that Paula was shoplifting and detained her only briefly for a reasonable investigation of the facts.", "Paula should have realized that her conduct would create a reasonable belief conduct would create a reasonable belief that facts existed warranting a privilege to detain.", "Paula was not detained, but was merely questioned about the scarf. " ]
1B
A proposed federal statute would prohibit all types of discrimination against black persons on the basis of their race in every business transaction executed anywhere in the United States by any person or entity, governmental or private. Is this proposed federal statute likely to be constitutional?
[ "Yes, because it could reasonably be viewed as an exercise of Congress's authority to enact laws for the general welfare. ", "Yes, because it could reasonably be viewed as a means of enforcing the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment. ", "No, because it would regulate purely local transactions that are not in interstate commerce. ", "No, because it would invade the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. " ]
1B
Sam told Horace, his neighbor, that he was going away for two weeks and asked Horace to keep an eye on his house. Horace agreed. Sam gave Horace a key to use to check on the house. Horace decided to have a party in Sam's house. He invited a number of friends. One friend, Lewis, went into Sam's bedroom, took some of Sam's rings, and put them in his pocket. Which of the following is true?
[ "Horace and Lewis are guilty of burglary.", "Horace is guilty of burglary and Lewis is guilty of larceny.", "Horace is guilty of trespass and Lewis is guilty of larceny.", "Lewis is guilty of larceny and Horace is not guilty of any crime." ]
3D
John's father, Jeremiah, died in Hospital. Hospital maintains a morgue with refrigerated drawers a bit larger than a human body. Jeremiah's body was placed in such a drawer awaiting pickup by a mortician. Before the mortician called for the body, a Hospital orderly placed two opaque plastic bags in the drawer with Jeremiah's body. One bag contained Jeremiah's personal effects, and the other contained an amputated leg from some other Hospital patient. It is stipulated that Hospital was negligent to allow the amputated leg to get into Jeremiah's drawer. The mortician delivered the two opaque plastic bags to John, assuming both contained personal effects. John was shocked when he opened the bag containing the amputated leg. John sued Hospital to recover for his emotional distress. At the trial, John testified that the experience had been extremely upsetting, that he had had recurring nightmares about it, and that his family and business relationships had been adversely affected for a period of several months. He did not seek medical or psychiatric treatment for his emotional distress. Who should prevail?
[ "John, because of the sensitivity people have regarding the care of the bodies of deceased relatives. ", "John, because hospitals are strictly liable for mishandling dead bodies. ", "Hospital, because John did not require medical or psychiatric treatment. ", "Hospital, because John suffered no bodily harm. " ]
0A
Able was the owner of Greenacre, a large tract of land. Able entered into a binding written contract with Baker for the sale and purchase of Greenacre for $125,000. The contract required Able to convey marketable record title. Baker decided to protect his interest and promptly and properly recorded the contract. Thereafter, but before the date scheduled for the closing, Charlie obtained and properly filed a final judgment against Able in the amount of $1 million in a personal injury suit. A statute in the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered." The recording act of the jurisdiction authorizes recording of contracts and also provides: "No conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law." There are no other relevant statutory provisions. At the closing, Baker declined to accept the title of Able on the ground that Charlie's judgment lien encumbered the title he would receive and rendered it unmarketable. Able receive and rendered it unmarketable. Able brought an appropriate action against Baker for specific performance of the contract and joined Charlie as a party. In this action, the judgment should be for
[ "Able, because in equity a purchaser takes free of judgment liens. ", "Able, because the contract had been recorded. ", "Baker, because Able cannot benefit from Baker's action in recording the contract. ", "Baker, because the statute creating judgment liens takes precedence over the recording act. " ]
1B
Post sued Dint for dissolution of their yearlong partnership. One issue concerned the amount of money Post had received in cash. amount of money Post had received in cash. It was customary for Dint to give Post money from the cash register as Post needed it for personal expenses. Post testified that, as he received money, he jotted down the amounts in the partnership ledger. Although Dint had access to the ledger, he made no changes in it. The ledger was admitted into evidence. Dint seeks to testify to his memory of much larger amounts he had given Post. Dint's testimony is
[ "admissible, because it is based on Dint's firsthand knowledge. ", "admissible, because the ledger entries offered by a party opponent opened the door. ", "inadmissible, because the ledger is the best evidence of the amounts Post received. ", "inadmissible, because Dint's failure to challenge the accuracy of the ledger constituted an adoptive admission. " ]
0A
In a signed writing, Nimrod contracted to purchase a 25-foot travel trailer from Trailco for $15,000, cash on delivery no later than for $15,000, cash on delivery no later than June 1. Nimrod arrived at the Trailco sales lot on Sunday, May 31, to pay for and take delivery of the trailer, but refused to do so when he discovered that the spare tire was missing. Trailco offered to install a spare tire on Monday when its service department would open, but Nimrod replied that he did not want the trailer and would purchase another one elsewhere. Which of the following is accurate?
[ "Nimrod had a right to reject the trailer, but Trailco was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect. ", "Nimrod had a right to reject the trailer and terminate the contract under the perfect tender rule.", "Nimrod was required to accept the trailer, because the defect could be readily cured. ", "Nimrod was required to accept the trailer, because the defect did not substantially impair its value. substantially impair its value. " ]
0A
Oker owned in fee simple two adjoining lots, Lots 1 and 2. He conveyed in fee simple Lot 1 to Frank. The deed was in usual form of a warranty deed with the following provision inserted in the appropriate place: "Grantor, for himself, his heirs and assigns, does covenant and agree that any reasonable expense incurred by grantee, his heirs and assigns, as the result of having to repair the retaining wall presently situated on Lot 1 at the common boundary with Lot 2, shall be reimbursed one-half the costs of repairs; and by this provision the parties intend a covenant running with the land." Frank conveyed Lot 1 in fee simple to Sara by warranty deed in usual and regular form. The deed omitted any reference to the retaining wall or any covenant. Fifty years after Oker's conveyance to Frank, Sara conveyed Lot 1 in fee simple to Tim by warranty deed in usual form; this deed omitted any reference to the retaining wall or the covenant. There is no statute that applies to any aspect of the problems presented except a recording act and a statute providing for acquisition of title after ten years of adverse possession. All conveyances by deeds were for a consideration equal to fair market value. The deed from Oker to Frank was never recorded. All other deeds were promptly and properly recorded. Lot 2 is now owned by Henry, who took by intestate succession from Oker, now dead. Tim expended $3,500 on the retaining wall. Then he obtained all of the original deeds in the chain from Oker to him. Shortly thereafter, Tim discovered the covenant in Oker's deed to Frank. He demanded that Henry pay $1,750, and when Henry refused, Tim instituted an appropriate action to recover that sum from Henry. In such action, Henry asserted all defenses available to him. defenses available to him. If judgment is for Henry, it will be because
[ "Tim is barred by adverse possession.", "Frank's deed from Oker was never recorded.", "Tim did not know about the covenant until after he had incurred the expenses and, hence, could not have relied on it. ", "Tim's expenditures were not proved to be reasonable and customary." ]
3D
While Prudence was leaving an elevator, it suddenly dropped several inches, causing her to fall. An investigation of the accident revealed that the elevator dropped because it had been negligently maintained by the Acme Elevator Company. Acme had a contract with the owner of the building to inspect and maintain the elevator. Prudence's fall severely aggravated a preexisting physical disability. If Prudence sues Acme Elevator Company for damages for her injuries, she should recover
[ "nothing, if Acme could not reasonably have been expected to foresee the extent of the harm that Prudence suffered as a result of the accident. ", "nothing, if the accident would not have caused significant harm to an ordinarily prudent elevator passenger. ", "damages for the full amount of her disability, because a tortfeasor must take its victim as it finds her. ", "damages for the injury caused by the falling elevator, including the aggravation of her preexisting disability. " ]
3D
Dix is on trial for killing Vetter. The prosecutor calls Winn to testify that after being shot, Vetter said, "Dix did it." Before the testimony is given, Dix's lawyer asks for a hearing on whether Vetter believed his death was imminent when he made the statement. Before permitting evidence of the dying declaration, the judge should hear evidence on the issue from
[ "both sides, with the jury not present, and decide whether Winn may testify to Vetter's statement. ", "both sides, with the jury present, and decide whether Winn may testify to Vetter's statement. ", "both sides, with the jury present, and allow the jury to determine whether Winn may testify to Vetter's statement. ", "the prosecutor only, with the jury not present, and if the judge believes a jury could reasonably find that Vetter knew he was dying, permit Winn to testify to the statement, with Dix allowed to offer evidence on the issue as a part of the defendant's case. " ]
0A
Police received an anonymous tip that Tusitala was growing marijuana in her backyard, which was surrounded by a 15-foot high, solid wooden fence. Officer Boa was unable to view the yard from the street, so he used a police helicopter to fly over Tusitala's house. Boa identified a large patch of marijuana plants growing right next to the house and used this observation to obtain a search warrant. Tusitala is prosecuted for possession of marijuana and moves to suppress use of the marijuana in evidence. The court should
[ "grant the motion, because the only purpose of Boa's flight was to observe the yard. ", "grant the motion, because Tusitala had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage around her house and the police did not have a warrant. ", "deny the motion, because a warrant is not required for a search of a residential yard. ", "deny the motion, because Tusitala had no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation. " ]
3D
Buyem faxed the following signed message to Zeller, his long-time widget supplier: "Urgently need blue widgets. Ship immediately three gross at your current list price of $600." Upon receipt of the fax, Zeller shipped three gross of red widgets to Buyem, and faxed to Buyem the following message: "Temporarily out of blue. In case red will help, am shipping three gross at the same price. Hope you can use them." Upon Buyem's timely receipt of both the shipment and Zeller's fax, which of the following best describes the rights and duties of Buyem and Zeller?
[ "Buyem may accept the shipment, in which case he must pay Zeller the list price, or he must reject the shipment and recover from Zeller for total breach of contract. ", "Buyem may accept the shipment, in (B) Buyem may accept the shipment, in which case he must pay Zeller the list price, or he may reject the shipment, in which case he has no further rights against Zeller. ", "Buyem may accept the shipment, in which case he must pay Zeller the list price, less any damages sustained because of the nonconforming shipment, or he may reject the shipment and recover from Zeller for total breach of contract, subject to Zeller's right to cure. ", "Buyem may accept the shipment, in which case he must pay Zeller the list price, less any damages sustained because of the nonconforming shipment, or he may reject the shipment provided that he promptly covers by obtaining conforming widgets from another supplier. " ]
1B
Members of a religious group calling itself the Friends of Lucifer believe in Lucifer as their Supreme Being. The members of this group meet once a year on top of Mt. Snow, located meet once a year on top of Mt. Snow, located in a U.S. National Park, to hold an overnight encampment and a midnight dance around a large campfire. They believe this overnight encampment and all of its rituals are required by Lucifer to be held on the top of Mt. Snow. U.S. National Park Service rules that have been consistently enforced prohibit all overnight camping and all campfires on Mt. Snow because of the very great dangers overnight camping and campfires would pose in that particular location. As a result, the park Superintendent denied a request by the Friends of Lucifer for a permit to conduct these activities on top of Mt. Snow. The park Superintendent, who was known to be violently opposed to cults and other unconventional groups had, in the past, issued permits to conventional religious groups to conduct sunrise services in other areas of that U.S. National Park. The Friends of Lucifer brought suit in Federal Court against the U.S. National Park Service and the Superintendent of the park to compel issuance of the requested permit. As a matter of constitutional law, the most appropriate result in this suit would be a decision that denial of the permit was
[ "invalid, because the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibits the Park Service from knowingly interfering with religious conduct. ", "invalid, because these facts demonstrate that the action of the Park Service purposefully and invidiously discriminated against the Friends of Lucifer. ", "valid, because the establishment clause of the First Amendment prohibits the holding of religious ceremonies on federal land. ", "valid, because religiously motivated conduct may be subjected to nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions that advance important public interests. " ]
3D
Park sued Davis Co. for injuries suffered in the crash of Park's dune buggy, allegedly caused by a defective auto part manufactured by Davis Co. Davis Co. claims that the part was a fraudulent imitation, not produced by Davis Co. Which of the following is NOT admissible on the issue of whether the part was manufactured by Davis Co.?
[ "The fact that the defective part bears Davis Co.'s insignia or trademark.", "Testimony that the part was purchased from a parts house to which Davis Co. regularly sold parts.", "The part itself and a concededly genuine part manufactured by Davis Co. (for the jury's comparison).", "A judgment for another plaintiff against Davis Co. in another case involving substantially similar facts." ]
3D
Anna entered into a valid written contract to purchase Blackacre, a large tract of land, from Jones for its fair market value of $50,000. The contract was assignable by Anna. Anna duly notified Jones to convey title to Anna and Charles, Charles being Anna's friend whom Anna had not seen for many years. When Anna learned that Charles would have to sign certain documents in connection with the closing, she prevailed upon her brother, Donald, to attend the closing and pretend to be Charles. Anna and Donald attended the closing, and Jones executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Blackacre to Anna and Charles, as tenants in common. Donald pretended that he was Charles, and he signed Charles's name to all the required documents. Anna provided the entire $50,000 consideration for the transaction. The deed was promptly and properly recorded. Unknown to Anna or Donald, Charles had died several months before the closing. Charles's will, which was duly probated, devised "All my real estate to my nephew, Nelson" and the residue of his estate to Anna. Anna and Nelson have been unable to agree as to the status or disposition of Blackacre. Nelson brought an appropriate action against Jones and Anna to quiet legal title to an undivided one-half interest in Blackacre. The court should hold that legal title to Blackacre is vested
[ "all in Jones.", "all in Anna.", "one-half in Anna and one-half in Jones.", "one-half in Anna and one-half in Nelson." ]
2C
Staff, Inc., a flour wholesaler, contracted to deliver to Eclaire, a producer of fine baked goods, her flour requirements for a one-year period. Before delivery of the first scheduled installment, Staff sold its business and "assigned" all of its sale contracts to Miller, Inc., another reputable and long-time flour Miller, Inc., another reputable and long-time flour wholesaler. Staff informed Eclaire of this transaction. For this question only, assume that when Miller tendered the first installment to Eclaire in compliance with the Staff-Eclaire contract, Eclaire refused to accept the goods. Which of the following arguments, if any, legally support(s) Eclaire's rejection of the goods? I. Executory requirements contracts are nonassignable. II. Duties under an executory bilateral contract are assumable only by an express promise to perform on the part of the delegatee. III. Language of "assignment" in the transfer for value of a bilateral sale-of-goods contract affects only a transfer of rights, not a delegation of duties.
[ "I only.", "II and III only.", "I and II and III.", "Neither I nor II nor III." ]
3D
Staff, Inc., a flour wholesaler, contracted to deliver to Eclaire, a producer of fine baked goods, her flour requirements for a one-year period. Before delivery of the first scheduled installment, Staff sold its business and "assigned" all of its sale contracts to Miller, Inc., another reputable and long-time flour Miller, Inc., another reputable and long-time flour wholesaler. Staff informed Eclaire of this transaction. For this question only, assume that Eclaire accepted Miller's delivery of the first installment under the Staff-Eclaire contract, but that Eclaire paid the contract price for that installment to Staff and refused to pay anything to Miller. In an action by Miller against Eclaire for the contractual amount of the first installment, which of the following, if any, will be an effective defense for Eclaire? I. Eclaire had not expressly agreed to accept Miller as her flour supplier. II. Eclaire's payment of the contractual installment to Staff discharged her obligation. III. Staff remained obligated to Eclaire even though Staff had assigned the contract to Miller.
[ "I only.", "II only.", "I and III only. (C) I and III only.", "Neither I nor II nor III." ]
3D
On October 22, Officer Jones submitted an application for a warrant to search 217 Elm Street for cocaine. In the application, Officer Jones stated under oath that he believed there was cocaine at that location because of information supplied to him on the morning of October 22 by Susie Schultz. He described Schultz as a cocaine user who had previously supplied accurate information concerning the use of cocaine in the community and summarized what Schultz had told him as follows: the previous night, October 21, Schultz was in Robert Redd's house at 217 Elm Street. Redd gave her cocaine. She also saw three cellophane bags containing cocaine in his bedroom. The warrant was issued and a search of 217 Elm Street was conducted on October 22. The search turned up a quantity of marijuana but no cocaine. Robert Redd was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana. Redd moved to suppress the use of the marijuana as evidence contending that Susie Schultz was not in 217 Elm Street on October 21 or at any other time. If, after hearing evidence, the judge concludes that the statement in the application attributed to Susie Schultz is incorrect, the judge should grant the motion to suppress
[ "because the application contains a material statement that is false.", "because of the false statement and because no cocaine was found in the house.", "only if he also finds that Susie Schultz's statement was a deliberate lie.", "only if he also finds that Officer Jones knew the statement was false." ]
3D
The Personnel Handbook of Green City contains all of that city's personnel policies. One section of the handbook states that One section of the handbook states that "where feasible and practicable supervisors are encouraged to follow the procedures specified in this Handbook before discharging a city employee." Those specified procedures include a communication to the employee of the reasons for the contemplated discharge and an opportunity for a pretermination trial-type hearing at which the employee may challenge those reasons. After a year of service, Baker, the secretary to the Green City Council, was discharged without receiving any communication of reasons for her contemplated discharge and without receiving an opportunity for a pretermination trial-type hearing. Baker files suit in federal district court to challenge her discharge solely on constitutional grounds. Which of the following best describes the initial burden of persuasion in that suit?
[ "The Green City Council must demonstrate that its personnel handbook created no constitutionally protected interest in city employment or in the procedures by which such employment is terminated.", "The Green City Council must demonstrate that Baker's termination was for good cause.", "Baker must demonstrate that state law creates a constitutionally protected interest in her employment or in the procedures by which her employment is terminated.", "Baker must demonstrate that she reasonably believed that she could work for Green City for as long as she wished." ]
2C
Dean was prosecuted in federal court for making threats against the President of the United States. Dean was a voluntary patient in a private psychiatric hospital and told a nurse, shortly before the President came to town, that Dean planned to shoot the President. The nurse reported the threat to FBI agents. Dean's motion to prevent the nurse from testifying is likely to be
[ "successful, because the statement was made in a medical setting. ", "successful, because the nurse violated a confidence in reporting the statement. ", "unsuccessful, because the statement was not within any privilege. ", "unsuccessful, because Dean had not been committed involuntarily by court order. " ]
2C
Able, who owned Blackacre, a residential lot improved with a dwelling, conveyed it for a valuable consideration to Baker. The dwelling had been constructed by a prior owner. Baker had inspected Blackacre prior to the purchase and discovered no defects. After moving in, Baker became aware that sewage seeped into the basement when the toilets were flushed. Able said that this defect had been present for years and that he had taken no steps to hide the facts from Baker. Baker paid for the necessary repairs and brought an appropriate action against Able to recover his cost of repair. If Baker wins, it will be because
[ "Able failed to disclose a latent defect.", "Baker made a proper inspection.", "the situation constitutes a health hazard.", "Able breached the implied warranty of habitability and fitness for purpose." ]
0A
Gardner's backyard, which is landscaped with expensive flowers and shrubs, is adjacent to a golf course. While Driver was playing golf on the course, a thunderstorm suddenly came up. As Driver was returning to the clubhouse in his golf cart, lightning struck a tree on the course, and the tree began to fall in Driver's direction. In order to avoid being hit by the tree, Driver deliberately steered his cart onto Gardner's property, causing substantial damage to Gardner's expensive plantings. damage to Gardner's expensive plantings. In an action by Gardner against Driver to recover damages for the harm to his plantings, Gardner will
[ "prevail, because, although occasioned by necessity, Driver's entry onto Gardner's property was for Driver's benefit. ", "prevail, for nominal damages only, because Driver was privileged to enter Gardner's property. ", "not prevail, because the lightning was an act of God. ", "not prevail, because Driver's entry onto Gardner's property was occasioned by necessity and therefore privileged. " ]
0A
Steve, in desperate need of money, decided to hold up a local convenience store. Determined not to harm anyone, he carried a toy gun that resembled a real gun. In the store, he pointed the toy gun at the clerk and demanded money. A customer who entered the store and saw the robbery in progress pulled his own gun and fired at Steve. The bullet missed Steve but struck and killed the clerk. Steve was charged with felony murder. His best argument for being found NOT guilty is that he
[ "did not intend to kill.", "did not commit the robbery because he never acquired any money from the clerk.", "did not intend to create any risk of harm.", "is not responsible for the acts of the customer." ]
3D
Client consulted Lawyer about handling the sale of Client's building, and asked Lawyer what her legal fee would be. Lawyer replied that her usual charge was $100 per hour, and estimated that the legal work on behalf of Client would cost about $5,000 at that rate. Client said, "Okay; let's proceed with it," and Lawyer timely and successfully completed the work. Because of unexpected title problems, Lawyer reasonably spent 75 hours on the Lawyer reasonably spent 75 hours on the matter and shortly thereafter mailed Client a bill for $7,500, with a letter itemizing the work performed and time spent. Client responded by a letter expressing his good-faith belief that Lawyer had agreed to a total fee of no more than $5,000. Client enclosed a check in the amount of $5,000 payable to Lawyer and conspicuously marked, "Payment in full for legal services in connection with the sale of Client's building." Despite reading the "Payment in full..." language, Lawyer, without any notation of protest or reservation of rights, endorsed and deposited the check to her bank account. The check was duly paid by Client's bank. A few days later, Lawyer unsuccessfully demanded payment from Client of the $2,500 difference between the amount of her bill and the check, and now sues Client for that difference. What, if anything, can Lawyer recover from Client?
[ "Nothing, because the risk of unexpected title problems in a real-property transaction is properly allocable to the seller's attorney and thus to Lawyer in seller's attorney and thus to Lawyer in this case. ", "Nothing, because the amount of Lawyer's fee was disputed in good faith by Client, and Lawyer impliedly agreed to an accord and satisfaction. ", "$2,500, because Client agreed to an hourly rate for as many hours as the work reasonably required, and the sum of $5,000 was merely an estimate. ", "The reasonable value of Lawyer's services in excess of $5,000, if any, because there was no specific agreement on the total amount of Lawyer's fee. " ]
1B
Pauline and Doris own adjacent parcels of land. On each of their parcels was a low-rise office building. The two office buildings were of the same height. Last year Doris decided to demolish the lowrise office building on her parcel and to erect a new high-rise office building of substantially greater height on the parcel as permitted by the zoning and building ordinances. She secured all the governmental approvals necessary to pursue her project. As Doris's new building was in the course of construction, Pauline realized that the shadows it would create would place her (Pauline's) building in such deep shade that the rent she could charge for space in her building would be substantially reduced. Pauline brought an appropriate action against Doris to enjoin the construction in order to eliminate the shadow problem and for damages. Pauline presented uncontroverted evidence that her evaluation as to the impact of the shadow on the fair rental value of her building was correct. There is no statute or ordinance (other than the building and zoning ordinances) that is applicable to the issues before the court. The court should
[ "grant to Pauline the requested injunction.", "award Pauline damages measured by the loss of rental value, but not an injunction. ", "grant judgment for Doris, because she had secured all the necessary governmental approvals for the new building. ", "grant judgment for Doris, because Pauline has no legal right to have sunshine continue to reach the windows of her building. " ]
3D
Dumont, a real estate developer, was trying to purchase land on which he intended to build a large commercial development. Perkins, an elderly widow, had rejected all of Dumont's offers to buy her ancestral home, where she had lived all her life and which was located in the middle of Dumont's planned development. Finally, Dumont offered her $250,000. He told her that it was his last offer and that if she rejected it, state law authorized him to that if she rejected it, state law authorized him to have her property condemned. Perkins then consulted her nephew, a law student, who researched the question and advised her that Dumont had no power of condemnation under state law. Perkins had been badly frightened by Dumont's threat, and was outraged when she learned that Dumont had lied to her. If Perkins sues Dumont for damages for emotional distress, will she prevail?
[ "Yes, if Dumont's action was extreme and outrageous. ", "Yes, because Perkins was frightened and outraged. ", "No, if Perkins did not suffer emotional distress that was severe. ", "No, if it was not Dumont's purpose to cause emotional distress. " ]
2C
Dumont, a real estate developer, was trying to purchase land on which he intended to build a large commercial development. Perkins, an elderly widow, had rejected all of Dumont's offers to buy her ancestral home, where she had lived all her life and which was located in the middle of Dumont's planned development. Finally, Dumont offered her $250,000. He told her that it was his last offer and that if she rejected it, state law authorized him to that if she rejected it, state law authorized him to have her property condemned. Perkins then consulted her nephew, a law student, who researched the question and advised her that Dumont had no power of condemnation under state law. Perkins had been badly frightened by Dumont's threat, and was outraged when she learned that Dumont had lied to her. If Perkins asserts a claim based on misrepresentation against Dumont, will she prevail?
[ "Yes, if Dumont knew he had no legal power of condemnation. ", "Yes, if Dumont tried to take unfair advantage of a gross difference between himself and Perkins in commercial knowledge and experience. ", "No, if Dumont's offer of $250,000 equaled or exceeded the market value of Perkins's property. ", "No, because Perkins suffered no pecuniary loss. " ]
3D
State Y employs the Model Penal Code or American Law Institute test for insanity, and requires the state to prove sanity, when it is in issue, beyond a reasonable doubt. At Askew's trial for murder, he pleaded insanity. The state put on an expert psychiatrist who had examined Askew. He testified that, in his opinion, Askew was sane at the time of the murder. Askew's attorney did not introduce expert testimony on the question of sanity. Rather, he presented lay witnesses who testified that, in their opinion, Askew was insane at the time of the murder. At the end of the trial, each side moves for a directed verdict on the question of sanity. on the question of sanity. Which of the following correctly describes the judge's situation?
[ "She may grant a directed verdict for the defense if she believes that the jury could not find the prosecution to have proved sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.", "She may grant a directed verdict for the prosecution if she believes that Askew's witnesses on the insanity question are not believable.", "She may not grant a directed verdict for the defense, because the state had expert testimony and the defense only lay witnesses. ", "She may grant a directed verdict for the prosecution if she is convinced by their experts that Askew was sane beyond a reasonable doubt." ]
0A
Trelawney worked at a day-care center run by the Happy Faces Day Care Corporation. At the the Happy Faces Day Care Corporation. At the center, one of the young charges, Smith, often arrived with bruises and welts on his back and legs. A statute in the jurisdiction requires all day-care workers to report to the police cases where there is probable cause to suspect child abuse and provides for immediate removal from the home of any suspected child abuse victims. Trelawney was not aware of this statute. Nevertheless, he did report Smith's condition to his supervisor, who advised him to keep quiet about it so the day-care center would not get into trouble for defaming a parent. About two weeks after Trelawney first noticed Smith's condition, Smith was beaten to death by his father. Trelawney has been charged with murder in the death of Smith. The evidence at trial disclosed, in addition to the above, that the child had been the victim of beatings by the father for some time, and that these earlier beatings had been responsible for the marks that Trelawney had seen. Smith's mother had been aware of the beatings but had not stopped them because she was herself afraid of Smith's father. Trelawney's best argument that he is NOT guilty of murder is guilty of murder is
[ "he was not aware of the duty-to-report statute.", "he lacked the mental state necessary to the commission of the crime.", "his omission was not the proximate cause of death.", "the day-care corporation, rather than Trelawney, was guilty of the omission, which was sanctioned by its supervisorylevel agent. " ]
1B
Perkins and Morton were passengers sitting in adjoining seats on a flight on Delval Airline. There were many empty seats on the aircraft. During the flight, a flight attendant served Morton nine drinks. As Morton became more and more obviously intoxicated and attempted to engage Perkins in a conversation, Perkins chose to ignore Morton. This angered Morton, who suddenly struck Morton. This angered Morton, who suddenly struck Perkins in the face, giving her a black eye. If Perkins asserts a claim for damages against Delval Airline based on negligence, Perkins will
[ "not recover, because a person is not required by law to come to the assistance of another who is imperiled by a third party. ", "not recover, if Perkins could easily have moved to another seat. ", "recover, because a common carrier is strictly liable for injuries suffered by a passenger while aboard the carrier. ", "recover, if the flight attendants should have perceived Morton's condition and acted to protect Perkins before the blow was struck. " ]
3D
Perkins and Morton were passengers sitting in adjoining seats on a flight on Delval Airline. There were many empty seats on the aircraft. During the flight, a flight attendant served Morton nine drinks. As Morton became more and more obviously intoxicated and attempted to engage Perkins in a conversation, Perkins chose to ignore Morton. This angered Morton, who suddenly struck Morton. This angered Morton, who suddenly struck Perkins in the face, giving her a black eye. If Perkins asserts a claim for damages against Delval Airline based on battery, she will
[ "prevail, because she suffered an intentionally inflicted harmful or offensive contact. ", "prevail, if the flight attendant acted recklessly in continuing to serve liquor to Morton. ", "not prevail, because Morton was not acting as an agent or employee of Delval Airline. ", "not prevail, unless she can establish some permanent injury from the contact. " ]
2C
Terrorists in the foreign country of Ruritania kidnapped the United States ambassador to that country. They threatened to kill her unless the President of the United States secured the release of an identified person who was a citizen of Ruritania and was held in a prison of the state of Aurora in the United States pursuant to a valid conviction by that state. The President responded by entering into an agreement with Ruritania which provided that Ruritania would secure the release of the United States ambassador on a specified date in return for action by the President that would secure the release of the identified person held in the Aurora prison. The President then ordered the governor of Aurora to release the prisoner in question. The governor refused. No federal statutes are applicable. Which of the following is the strongest constitutional argument for the authority of the President to take action in these circumstances requiring the governor of Aurora to release the Aurora prisoner?
[ "The power of the President to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States includes a plenary authority to take whatever action the President deems wise to protect the safety of our diplomatic agents.", "The power of the President to appoint ambassadors authorizes him to take any action that he may think desirable to protect them from injury because, upon appointment, those officials become agents of the President. agents of the President. ", "The power of the President to negotiate with foreign nations impliedly authorizes the President to make executive agreements with them which prevail over state law.", "The duty of the President to execute faithfully the laws authorizes him to resolve finally any conflicts between state and federal interests, making the determination of such matters wholly nonjusticiable. " ]
2C
Damson was charged with murder, and Wagner testified for the prosecution. On crossexamination of Wagner, Damson seeks to elicit an admission that Wagner was also charged with the same murder and that the prosecutor told her, "If you testify against Damson, we will drop the charges against you after the conclusion of Damson's trial." The evidence about the prosecutor's promise is
[ "admissible, as proper impeachment of Wagner. ", "admissible, as an admission by an agent of a party-opponent. ", "inadmissible, because the law encourages plea-bargaining. ", "inadmissible, because the evidence is hearsay not within any exception. " ]
0A
On November 1, Debbit, an accountant, and Barrister, a lawyer, contracted for the sale by Debbit to Barrister of the law books Debbit had inherited from his father. Barrister agreed to pay the purchase price of $10,000 when Debbit delivered the books on December 1. On November 10, Barrister received a signed letter from Debbit that stated: "I have decided to dispose of the book stacks containing the law books you have already purchased. If you want the stacks, I will deliver them to you along with the books on December 1 at no additional cost to you. Let me know before November 15 whether you want them. I will not sell them to anyone else before then." On November 14, Barrister faxed and Debbit received November 14, Barrister faxed and Debbit received the following message: "I accept your offer of the stacks." Debbit was not a merchant with respect to either law books or book stacks. Debbit is contractually obligated to deliver the stacks because
[ "Barrister provided a new bargained-for exchange by agreeing to take the stacks.", "Debbit's letter (received by Barrister on November 10) and Barrister's faxmessage of November 14 constituted an effective modification of the original sale-of-books contract.", "Barrister's fax-message of November 14 operated to rescind unilaterally the original sale-of-books contract.", "Debbit's letter (received by Barrister on November 10) waived the bargained-for consideration that would otherwise be required." ]
1B
On November 1, Debbit, an accountant, and Barrister, a lawyer, contracted for the sale by Debbit to Barrister of the law books Debbit had inherited from his father. Barrister agreed to pay the purchase price of $10,000 when Debbit delivered the books on December 1. On November 10, Barrister received a signed letter from Debbit that stated: "I have decided to dispose of the book stacks containing the law books you have already purchased. If you want the stacks, I will deliver them to you along with the books on December 1 at no additional cost to you. Let me know before November 15 whether you want them. I will not sell them to anyone else before then." On November 14, Barrister faxed and Debbit received November 14, Barrister faxed and Debbit received the following message: "I accept your offer of the stacks." Debbit was not a merchant with respect to either law books or book stacks. For this question only, assume that on November 12 Debbit told Barrister that he had November 12 Debbit told Barrister that he had decided not to part with the stacks. Will this communication operate as a legally effective revocation of his offer to deliver the stacks?
[ "Yes, because Barrister had a pre-existing obligation to pay $10,000 for the law books. ", "Yes, because Debbit was not a merchant with respect to book stacks. ", "No, because Debbit had given a signed assurance that the offer would be held open until November 15. ", "No, because by delaying his acceptance until November 14, Barrister detrimentally relied on Debbit's promise not to sell the stacks to anyone else in the meantime. " ]
1B
Seller owned Blackacre, improved with an aging four-story warehouse. The warehouse was built to the lot lines on all four sides. On the street side, recessed loading docks permitted semi-trailers to be backed in. After the tractors were unhooked, the trailers extended into the street and occupied most of one lane of the street. Over the years, as trailers became larger, the blocking of the street became more severe. The municipality advised Seller that the loading docks could not continue to be used because the trailers blocked the street; it gave Seller 90 days to cease and desist. During the 90 days, Seller sold and conveyed Blackacre by warranty deed for a substantial consideration to Buyer. The problem of the loading docks was not discussed in the negotiations. Upon expiration of the 90 days, the municipality required Buyer to stop using the loading docks. This action substantially reduced the value of Blackacre. Buyer brought an appropriate action against Seller seeking cancellation of the deed and return of all monies paid. Such action should be based upon a claim of
[ "misrepresentation.", "breach of the covenant of warranty.", "failure of consideration.", "mutual mistake." ]
0A
Prescott sued Doxie for fraud. After verdict for Prescott, Doxie talked with juror Wall about the trial. Doxie's motion for a new trial would be most likely granted if Wall is willing to testify that he voted for Prescott because he
[ "misunderstood the judge's instructions concerning the standard of proof in a fraud case.", "was feeling ill and needed to get home quickly.", "relied on testimony that the judge had stricken and ordered the jury to disregard.", "learned from a court clerk that Doxie had (D) learned from a court clerk that Doxie had been accused of fraud in several recent lawsuits." ]
3D
Despondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be
[ "acquitted, because he honestly believed he faced an imminent threat of death or severe bodily injury. ", "acquitted, because his intoxication prevented him from appreciating the risk he created. ", "convicted, because he acted recklessly and in fact was in no danger. ", "convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable. " ]
3D